SECOND DIVISION

 
 
JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, G.R. No. 172716
Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO, J. Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES, *
- versus - PERALTA, ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
 
HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-
SAN PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan
Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and Promulgated:
EVANGELINE PONCE,
Respondents. November 17, 2010
x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
 
DECISION
 
CARPIO, J.: 
 
The Case
 
The petition seeks the review[1] of the Orders[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City
affirming sub-silencio a lower courts ruling finding inapplicable the Double Jeopardy Clause to
bar a second prosecution for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to
Property. This, despite the accuseds previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Slight Physical Injuries arising from the same incident grounding the second prosecution.

The Facts
 
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate
offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No.
82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2)
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No.
82366) for the death of respondent Ponces husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses
Ponces vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases.
On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367
and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to
quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second
punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.
 
The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.[3]
 
After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC), in a petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No.
2803). Meanwhile, petitioner sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in Criminal
Case No. 82366, including the arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a
1
prejudicial question. Without acting on petitioners motion, the MeTC proceeded with the
arraignment and, because of petitioners absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.
[4]
 Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioners motion to suspend
proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his arrest. [5]Petitioner sought
reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained unresolved.
 
Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the
dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803 for petitioners loss of standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner
contested the motion.
 
The Ruling of the Trial Court
 
In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803, narrowly
grounding its ruling on petitioners forfeiture of standing to maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising
from the MeTCs order to arrest petitioner for his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal
Case No. 82366. Thus, without reaching the merits of S.C.A. No. 2803, the RTC effectively
affirmed the MeTC. Petitioner sought reconsideration but this proved unavailing.[6]
 
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner denies absconding. He explains that his petition in S.C.A. No. 2803 constrained him to
forego participation in the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner distinguishes his
case from the line of jurisprudence sanctioning dismissal of appeals for absconding appellants
because his appeal before the RTC was a special civil action seeking a pre-trial relief, not a post-
trial appeal of a judgment of conviction.[7]
  
Petitioner laments the RTCs failure to reach the merits of his petition in S.C.A. 2803. Invoking
jurisprudence, petitioner argues that his constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense bars his prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366, having been
previously convicted in Criminal Case No. 82367 for the same offense of reckless imprudence
charged in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner submits that the multiple consequences of such
crime are material only to determine his penalty.
 
Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTCs decision forfeiting
petitioners standing to maintain his petition in S.C.A. 2803. On the merits, respondent Ponce
calls the Courts attention to jurisprudence holding that light offenses (e.g. slight physical
injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code with grave or less
grave felonies (e.g. homicide). Hence, the prosecution was obliged to separate the charge in
Criminal Case No. 82366 for the slight physical injuries from Criminal Case No. 82367 for the
homicide and damage to property.
 
In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, we granted the Office of the Solicitor Generals motion not to
file a comment to the petition as the public respondent judge is merely a nominal party and
private respondent is represented by counsel. 
The Issues
2
  
Two questions are presented for resolution: (1) whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek
relief in S.C.A. 2803 when the MeTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366; and (2) if in the negative, whether petitioners
constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in Criminal Case
No. 82366.
 
The Ruling of the Court
 
We hold that (1) petitioners non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 did
not divest him of personality to maintain the petition in S.C.A. 2803; and (2) the protection
afforded by the Constitution shielding petitioner from prosecutions placing him in jeopardy of
second punishment for the same offense bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
 
 
Petitioners Non-appearance at the Arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366 did not Divest him of Standing
to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803
 
 
Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellants escape from custody or violation of the terms
of his bail bond are governed by the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124, [8]in relation to
Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure authorizing this Court or the
Court of Appeals to also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the
appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the
pendency of the appeal. The appeal contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to
review judgments of convictions.
 
The RTCs dismissal of petitioners special civil action for certiorari to review a pre-arraignment
ancillary question on the applicability of the Due Process Clause to bar proceedings in Criminal
Case No. 82366 finds no basis under procedural rules and jurisprudence. The RTCs reliance
on People v. Esparas[9] undercuts the cogency of its ruling because Esparas stands for a
proposition contrary to the RTCs ruling. There, the Court granted review to an appeal by an
accused who was sentenced to death for importing prohibited drugs even though she jumped bail
pending trial and was thus tried and convicted in absentia. The Court in Esparas treated the
mandatory review of death sentences under Republic Act No. 7659 as an exception to Section 8
of Rule 124.[10]
 
The mischief in the RTCs treatment of petitioners non-appearance at his arraignment in Criminal
Case No. 82366 as proof of his loss of standing becomes more evident when one considers the
Rules of Courts treatment of a defendant who absents himself from post-arraignment hearings.
Under Section 21, Rule 114[11] of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendants
absence merely renders his bondsman potentially liable on its bond (subject to cancellation
should the bondsman fail to produce the accused within 30 days); the defendant retains his
standing and, should he fail to surrender, will be tried in absentia and could be convicted or

3
acquitted. Indeed, the 30-day period granted to the bondsman to produce the accused underscores
the fact that mere non-appearance does not ipso facto convert the accuseds status to that of a
fugitive without standing.
  
Further, the RTCs observation that petitioner provided no explanation why he failed to
attend the scheduled proceeding[12] at the MeTC is belied by the records. Days before the
arraignment, petitioner sought the suspension of the MeTCs proceedings in Criminal Case No.
82366 in light of his petition with the RTC in S.C.A. No. 2803. Following the MeTCs refusal to
defer arraignment (the order for which was released days after the MeTC ordered petitioners
arrest), petitioner sought reconsideration. His motion remained unresolved as of the filing of this
petition.
 
Petitioners Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367
Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366
 
The accuseds negative constitutional right not to be twice put in jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense[13] protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the
same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid
information.[14] It is not disputed that petitioners conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 was
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns on the
question whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No. 82367 involve the same
offense. Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same
offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property as the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact
which the other does not.[15]
 
We find for petitioner.
Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,
its Consequences on Persons and
Property are Material Only to Determine
the Penalty
 
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under
the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and
penalizing quasi-offenses. The text of the provision reads:
 
Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by reckless imprudence,
shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave
felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony,
the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be
imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor
in its maximum period shall be imposed.
 
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act
which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of
arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a

4
 less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be
imposed.
 
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only
resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a
fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damages to three times
such value, but which shall in no case be less than twenty-five pesos.
 
A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed
upon any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some
wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.
 
In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound
discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article sixty-four.
 
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:
 
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than
those provided in the first two paragraphs of this article, in which case the court
shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that which should be imposed
in the period which they may deem proper to apply.
 
2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the
Automobile Law, to death of a person shall be caused, in which case the
defendant shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods.
 
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or
failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable
lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such
act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of
intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time
and place.
 
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those
cases in which the damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the
danger clearly manifest.
 
The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall
be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties
such help as may be in this hand to give.
 
Structurally, these nine paragraphs are collapsible into four sub-groupings relating to (1)
the penalties attached to the quasi-offenses of imprudence and negligence (paragraphs 1-2); (2) a
modified penalty scheme for either or both quasi-offenses (paragraphs 3-4, 6 and 9); (3) a
generic rule for trial courts in imposing penalties (paragraph 5); and (4) the definition of reckless
imprudence and simple imprudence (paragraphs 7-8). Conceptually, quasi-offenses penalize the
mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight,
the imprudencia punible,[16] unlike willful offenses which punish the intentional
criminal act. These structural and conceptual features of quasi-offenses set them apart from the
mass of intentional crimes under the first 13 Titles of Book II of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended.

5
  Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species
of crime, separately defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing
new. As early as the middle of the last century, we already sought to bring clarity to this field
by rejecting in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga the proposition that reckless
imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it x x x [17] on three points of
analysis: (1) the object of punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed to intentional crimes); (2) the
legislative intent to treat quasi-crimes as distinct offenses (as opposed to subsuming them under
the mitigating circumstance of minimal intent) and; (3) the different penalty structures for quasi-
crimes and intentional crimes:
 
The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that
reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it and
merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability is too broad to deserve
unqualified assent. There are crimes that by their structure cannot be committed
through imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In truth,
criminal negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi offense,
and dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is not a mere question of
classification or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in
negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or
condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the
imprudencia punible. x x x x
 
Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies,
operating only to reduce the penalty therefor, then it would be absorbed in the
mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the lack of intent to commit so
grave a wrong as the one actually committed. Furthermore, the theory would
require that the corresponding penalty should be fixed in proportion to the penalty
prescribed for each crime when committed willfully. For each penalty for the
willful offense, there would then be a corresponding penalty for the negligent
variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty for
reckless imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to prision
correccional [medium], if the willful act would constitute a grave felony,
notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could range all the way from prision
mayor to death, according to the case. It can be seen that the actual penalty for
criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual willful crime, but is set in
relation to a whole class, or series, of crimes.[18] (Emphasis supplied)
  
This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes is to state that their
commission results in damage, either to person or property.[19]
Accordingly, we found the Justice of the Peace in Quizon without jurisdiction to hear a
case for Damage to Property through Reckless Imprudence, its jurisdiction being limited to
trying charges for Malicious Mischief, an intentional crime conceptually incompatible with the
element of imprudence obtaining in quasi-crimes.
 
Quizon, rooted in Spanish law[20] (the normative ancestry of our present day penal code)
and since repeatedly reiterated,[21] stands on solid conceptual foundation. The contrary doctrinal
pronouncement in People v. Faller[22] that [r]eckless impudence is not a crime in itself x x x [but]
simply a way of committing it x x x,[23] has long been abandoned when the Court en banc
promulgated Quizon in 1955 nearly two decades after the Court
decided Faller in 1939. Quizon rejected Fallers conceptualization of quasi-crimes by holding

6
that quasi-crimes under Article 365 are distinct species of crimes and not merely methods of
committing crimes. Faller found expression in post-Quizonjurisprudence[24] only by dint of
lingering doctrinal confusion arising from an indiscriminate fusion of criminal law rules defining
Article 365 crimes and the complexing of intentional crimes under Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code which, as will be shown shortly, rests on erroneous conception of quasi-crimes.
Indeed, the Quizonian conception of quasi-crimes undergirded a related branch of jurisprudence
applying the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses, barring second prosecutions for a quasi-
offense alleging one resulting act after a prior conviction or acquittal of a quasi-offense alleging
another resulting act but arising from the same reckless act or omission upon which the second
prosecution was based.
 
 Prior Conviction or Acquittal of
Reckless Imprudence Bars
Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
Quasi-Offense
 
  The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense
by itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal
of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless
of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Courts unbroken chain of jurisprudence on
double jeopardy as applied to Article 365 starting with People v. Diaz,[25] decided in
1954. There, a full Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Montemayor, ordered the
dismissal of a case for damage to property thru reckless imprudence because a prior case
against the same accused for reckless driving, arising from the same act upon which the
first prosecution was based, had been dismissed earlier. Since then, whenever the same
legal question was brought before the Court, that is, whether prior conviction or acquittal
of reckless imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense,
regardless of the consequences alleged for both charges, the Court unfailingly and
consistently answered in the affirmative in People v. Belga[26] (promulgated in 1957 by
the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.), Yap v. Lutero[27] (promulgated in 1959, unreported, per
Concepcion, J.), People v. Narvas[28] (promulgated in 1960 by the Court en banc, per
Bengzon J.), People v. Silva[29] (promulgated in 1962 by the Court en banc, per
Paredes,J.), People v. Macabuhay[30] (promulgated in 1966 by the Court en banc, per
Makalintal, J.), People v. Buan[31] (promulgated in 1968 by the Court en banc, per Reyes,
J.B.L., acting C. J.), Buerano v. Court of Appeals[32] (promulgated in 1982 by the
Court en banc, per Relova, J.), and People v. City Court of Manila[33] (promulgated in
1983 by the First Division, per Relova, J.). These cases uniformly barred the second
prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
 
The reason for this consistent stance of extending the constitutional protection under the
Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses was best articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes
in Buan, where, in barring a subsequent prosecution for serious physical injuries and damage to
property thru reckless imprudence because of the accuseds prior acquittal of slight physical
injuries thru reckless imprudence, with both charges grounded on the same act, the Court
explained:[34]
 
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of
a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for
that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under
article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or
negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law
penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of

7
 the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not
qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the
injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal
negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes
and prosecutions.[35] x x x (Emphasis supplied)
 
Evidently, the Diaz line of jurisprudence on double jeopardy merely extended to its logical
conclusion the reasoning of Quizon.
 
There is in our jurisprudence only one ruling going against this unbroken line of
authority. Preceding Diaz by more than a decade, El Pueblo de Filipinas v. Estipona,[36] decided
by the pre-war colonial Court in November 1940, allowed the subsequent prosecution of an
accused for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property despite his previous conviction
for multiple physical injuries arising from the same reckless operation of a motor vehicle upon
which the second prosecution was based. Estiponas inconsistency with the post-war Diaz chain
of jurisprudence suffices to impliedly overrule it. At any rate, all doubts on this matter were laid
to rest in 1982 in Buerano.[37] There, we reviewed the Court of Appeals conviction of an accused
for damage to property for reckless imprudence despite his prior conviction for slight and less
serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence, arising from the same act upon which the
second charge was based. The Court of Appeals had relied on Estipona. We reversed on the
strength of Buan:[38]
 
Th[e] view of the Court of Appeals was inspired by the ruling of this
Court in the pre-war case of People vs. Estipona decided on November 14,
1940. However, in the case of People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383 (March 29,
1968), this Court, speaking thru Justice J. B. L. Reyes, held that
 
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted
or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused
may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of
the quasi offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or
negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a
felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the
result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into
account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance
of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the
injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the
offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can
not be split into different crimes and prosecutions.
 
xxxx
 
. . . the exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan, by the
Justice of the Peace (now Municipal) Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan,
of the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical
injuries through reckless imprudence in the Court of First
Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from
the consequences of one and the same vehicular
accident, because the second accusation places the appellant in
second jeopardy for the same offense.[39] (Emphasis supplied)

8
 Thus, for all intents and purposes, Buerano had effectively overruled Estipona.
 
It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General in Buerano, in a reversal of his earlier stance
in Silva, joined causes with the accused, a fact which did not escape the Courts attention:
 
Then Solicitor General, now Justice Felix V. Makasiar, in his
MANIFESTATION dated December 12, 1969 (page 82 of the Rollo) admits that
the Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining petitioners plea of double jeopardy
and submits that its affirmatory decision dated January 28, 1969, in Criminal
Case No. 05123-CR finding petitioner guilty of damage to property through
reckless imprudence should be set aside, without costs. He stressed that if double
jeopardy exists where the reckless act resulted into homicide and physical
injuries. then the same consequence must perforce follow where the same reckless
act caused merely damage to property-not death-and physical injuries. Verily, the
value of a human life lost as a result of a vehicular collision cannot be equated
with any amount of damages caused to a motors vehicle arising from the same
mishap.[40] (Emphasis supplied)
 
Hence, we find merit in petitioners submission that the lower courts erred in refusing to extend in
his favor the mantle of protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. A more fitting
jurisprudence could not be tailored to petitioners case than People v. Silva, [41] a Diaz progeny.
There, the accused, who was also involved in a vehicular collision, was charged in two separate
Informations with Slight Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence and Homicide with Serious
Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence. Following his acquittal of the former, the accused
sought the quashal of the latter, invoking the Double Jeopardy Clause. The trial court initially
denied relief, but, on reconsideration, found merit in the accuseds claim and dismissed the
second case. In affirming the trial court, we quoted with approval its analysis of the issue
following Diaz and its progeny People v. Belga:[42]
 
On June 26, 1959, the lower court reconsidered its Order of May 2, 1959
and dismissed the case, holding:
 
[T]he Court believes that the case falls squarely within the doctrine
of double jeopardy enunciated in People v. Belga, x x x In the case
cited, Ciriaco Belga and Jose Belga were charged in the Justice of
the Peace Court of Malilipot, Albay, with the crime of physical
injuries through reckless imprudence arising from a collision
between the two automobiles driven by them (Crim. Case No. 88).
Without the aforesaid complaint having been dismissed or
otherwise disposed of, two other criminal complaints were filed in
the same justice of the peace court, in connection with the same
collision one for damage to property through reckless imprudence
(Crim. Case No. 95) signed by the owner of one of the vehicles
involved in the collision, and another for multiple physical injuries
through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 96) signed by the
passengers injured in the accident. Both of these two complaints
were filed against Jose Belga only. After trial, both defendants
were acquitted of the charge against them in Crim. Case No. 88.
Following his acquittal, Jose Belga moved to quash the complaint
for multiple physical injuries through reckless imprudence filed
against him by the injured passengers, contending that the case was
just a duplication of the one filed by the Chief of Police wherein he

9
 had just been acquitted. The motion to quash was denied and after
trial Jose Belga was convicted, whereupon he appealed to the
Court of First Instance of Albay. In the meantime, the case for
damage to property through reckless imprudence filed by one of
the owners of the vehicles involved in the collision had been
remanded to the Court of First Instance of Albay after Jose Belga
had waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation. After
such remand, the Provincial Fiscal filed in the Court of First
Instance two informations against Jose Belga, one for physical
injuries through reckless imprudence, and another for damage to
property through reckless imprudence. Both cases were dismissed
by the Court of First Instance, upon motion of the defendant Jose
Belga who alleged double jeopardy in a motion to quash. On
appeal by the Prov. Fiscal, the order of dismissal was affirmed by
the Supreme Court in the following language: .
 
The question for determination is whether the
acquittal of Jose Belga in the case filed by the chief
of police constitutes a bar to his subsequent
prosecution for multiple physical injuries and
damage to property through reckless imprudence.
 
In the case of Peo[ple] v. F. Diaz, G. R. No. L-6518, prom.
March 30, 1954, the accused was charged in the municipal court of
Pasay City with reckless driving under sec. 52 of the Revised
Motor Vehicle Law, for having driven an automobile in a ῾fast and
reckless manner ... thereby causing an accident. After the accused
had pleaded not guilty the case was dismissed in that court ῾for
failure of the Government to prosecute. But some time thereafter
the city attorney filed an information in the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, charging the same accused with damage to property thru
reckless imprudence. The amount of the damage was alleged to
be P249.50. Pleading double jeopardy, the accused filed a motion,
and on appeal by the Government we affirmed the ruling. Among
other things we there said through Mr. Justice Montemayor
 
The next question to determine is the
relation between the first offense of violation of the
Motor Vehicle Law prosecuted before the Pasay
City Municipal Court and the offense of damage to
property thru reckless imprudence charged in the
Rizal Court of First Instance. One of the tests of
double jeopardy is whether or not the second
offense charged necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the
former complaint or information (Rule 113, Sec. 9).
Another test is whether the evidence which proves
one would prove the other that is to say whether the
facts alleged in the first charge if proven, would
have been sufficient to support the second charge
and vice versa; or whether one crime is an
ingredient of the other. x x x
xxxx
 
The foregoing language of the Supreme Court also disposes
of the contention of the prosecuting attorney that the charge for
slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not have

10
 been joined with the charge for homicide with serious physical
injuries through reckless imprudence in this case, in view of the
provisions of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The
prosecutions contention might be true. But neither was the
prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused for slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the
more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the
defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the
prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in this case
the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged
reckless imprudence of which the defendant have been previously
cleared by the inferior court.[43]
 
  Significantly, the Solicitor General had urged us in Silva to reexamine Belga (and
hence, Diaz) for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its application.[44] We declined the
invitation, thus:
 
The State in its appeal claims that the lower court erred in dismissing the
case, on the ground of double jeopardy, upon the basis of the acquittal of the
accused in the JP court for Slight Physical Injuries, thru Reckless Imprudence. In
the same breath said State, thru the Solicitor General, admits that the facts of the
case at bar, fall squarely on the ruling of the Belga case x x x, upon which the
order of dismissal of the lower court was anchored. The Solicitor General,
however, urges a re-examination of said ruling, upon certain considerations for
the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its application. We find, nevertheless, that
further elucidation or disquisition on the ruling in the Belga case, the facts of
which are analogous or similar to those in the present case, will yield no
practical advantage to the government. On one hand, there is nothing which
would warrant a delimitation or clarification of the applicability of the Belga
case. It was clear. On the other, this Court has reiterated the views expressed in
the Belga case, in the identical case of Yap v. Hon. Lutero, etc., L-12669, April
30, 1959.[45] (Emphasis supplied)
  
Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
  
The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which the MeTC succumbed,
stems from persistent but awkward attempts to harmonize conceptually incompatible substantive
and procedural rules in criminal law, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses
and Article 48 on complexing of crimes, both under the Revised Penal Code. Article 48 is a
procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either of two
categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (thus
excluding from its operation light felonies[46]); and (2) when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other. The legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in
lieu of serving multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum of the penalty for the most
serious crime.
 
In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but
the mental attitude x x x behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight x x

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x,[47] a single mental attitude regardless of the resulting consequences. Thus, Article 365 was
crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or more consequences.
 
Ordinarily, these two provisions will operate smoothly. Article 48 works to combine in a
single prosecution multiple intentional crimes falling under Titles 1-13, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code, when proper; Article 365 governs the prosecution of imprudent acts and their
consequences. However, the complexities of human interaction can produce a hybrid quasi-
offense not falling under either models that of a single criminal negligence resulting in
multiple non-crime damages to persons and property with varying penalties corresponding to
light, less grave or grave offenses. The ensuing prosecutorial dilemma is obvious: how
should such a quasi-crime be prosecuted? Should Article 48s framework apply to complex
the single quasi-offense with its multiple (non-criminal) consequences (excluding those
amounting to light offenses which will be tried separately)? Or should the prosecution proceed
under a single charge, collectively alleging all the consequences of the single quasi-crime, to be
penalized separately following the scheme of penalties under Article 365?
Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one line of rulings (none of which involved
the issue of double jeopardy) applied Article 48 by complexing one quasi-crime with its multiple
consequences[48] unless one consequence amounts to a light felony, in which case charges were
split by grouping, on the one hand, resulting acts amounting to grave or less grave felonies and
filing the charge with the second level courts and, on the other hand, resulting acts amounting to
light felonies and filing the charge with the first level courts. [49] Expectedly, this is the approach
the MeTC impliedly sanctioned (and respondent Ponce invokes), even though under Republic
Act No. 7691,[50] the MeTC has now exclusive original jurisdiction to impose the most serious
penalty under Article 365 which is prision correccional in its medium period.
 
Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the complexing of acts
penalized under Article 365 involves only resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave felonies
because there will be a single prosecution of all the resulting acts. The issue of double jeopardy
arises if one of the resulting acts is penalized as a light offense and the other acts are penalized as
grave or less grave offenses, in which case Article 48 is not deemed to apply and the act
penalized as a light offense is tried separately from the resulting acts penalized as grave or less
grave offenses.
 
The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a single prosecution of all
the effects of the quasi-crime collectively alleged in one charge, regardless of their number or
severity,[51] penalizing each consequence separately. Thus, in Angeles v. Jose,[52] we interpreted
paragraph three of Article 365, in relation to a charge alleging reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property and less serious physical injuries, as follows:

[T]he third paragraph of said article, x x x reads as follows:

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall

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 to the value of said damage to three times such value, but which
shall in no case be less than 25 pesos.

The above-quoted provision simply means that if there is only damage to

 
By additional penalty, the Court meant, logically, the penalty scheme under Article 365.
 
Evidently, these approaches, while parallel, are irreconcilable. Coherence in this field
demands choosing one framework over the other. Either (1) we allow the complexing of a single
quasi-crime by breaking its resulting acts into separate offenses (except for light felonies), thus
re-conceptualize a quasi-crime, abandon its present framing under Article 365, discard its
conception under the Quizon and Diaz lines of cases, and treat the multiple consequences of a
quasi-crime as separate intentional felonies defined under Titles 1-13, Book II under the penal
code; or (2) we forbid the application of Article 48 in the prosecution and sentencing of quasi-
crimes, require single prosecution of all the resulting acts regardless of their number and
severity, separately penalize each as provided in Article 365, and thus maintain the distinct
concept of quasi-crimes as crafted under Article 365, articulated in Quizon and applied to double
jeopardy adjudication in the Diaz line of cases.
 
A becoming regard of this Courts place in our scheme of government denying it the
power to make laws constrains us to keep inviolate the conceptual distinction between quasi-
crimes and intentional felonies under our penal code. Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of
quasi-crimes under Article 365. It is conceptually impossible for a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a
single act constituting two or more grave or less grave felonies; or (2) an offense which is a
necessary means for committing another. This is why, way back in 1968 in Buan, we rejected
the Solicitor Generals argument that double jeopardy does not bar a second prosecution for slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence allegedly because the charge for that offense could
not be joined with the other charge for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence
following Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code:
 
The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not be joined with the
accusation for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence, because
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code allows only the complexing of grave or less
grave felonies. This same argument was considered and rejected by this
Court in the case of People vs. [Silva] x x x:
 
[T]he prosecutions contention might be true. But neither
was the prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused for slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the
more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the
defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the
prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in this case
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 the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged
reckless imprudence of which the defendant has been previously
cleared by the inferior court.
 
 
[W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of this appellant x x x by the Justice
of the Peace x x x of the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province,
where both charges are derived from the consequences of one and the same
vehicular accident, because the second accusation places the appellant in second
jeopardy for the same offense.[54] (Emphasis supplied)
 
Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. By prohibiting the splitting of charges under
Article 365, irrespective of the number and severity of the resulting acts, rampant occasions of
constitutionally impermissible second prosecutions are avoided, not to mention that scarce state
resources are conserved and diverted to proper use.
Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge
regardless of the number or severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will
do no more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged and proven.
In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one information shall
be filed in the same first level court.[55]
 
Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and
simpler protection of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are
thereby denied the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but
any disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for
quasi-crime effects qualifying as light offenses (or, as here, for the more serious consequence
prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-
crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be imposed
under a single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave or light
offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient
schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability,
should cushion the effect of this ruling.
 
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February 2006
and 2 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157. We DISMISS the
Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 against petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar pending with
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground of double jeopardy.

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