Report

Following the study

performed at the request of

The Minister in Charge of the Department for Public

Enterprise

on

the AER LINGUS VISCOUNT EI-AOM accident

occurred on March 24th, 1968

near TUSKAR ROCK

Ireland

VOLUME II: APPENDICES AND ANNEXES

TOME 1: APPENDICES

November 27, 2001

Yves LEMERCIER Manuel PECH Colin TORKINGTON

CONTENTS OF VOLUME II

APPENDICES to the STUDY REPORT

Tome 1
Appendices 1: Complementary information to the “Introduction”

Appendices 3: Complementary information to the “Similarities

Study”

Appendices 4: Complementary information to the “Technical

Analysis”

Appendices 5: Complementary information to the “Operational

Analysis”

Appendices 7: Complementary information to the

“Recommendations”
 Appendices 1: Complementary information to the “Introduction”

Appendices 1

1a: Team Members Experience

1b: Data available to the International Team

1c: Glossaries
 Appendix 1a Team Members’ Experience

1. Yves Lemercier

2. Manuel Pech

3. Colin Torkington
Yves LEMERCIER

4 Bd. Des Dunes

56260 LARMOR-PLAGE

Phone/fax (professional): 33 (02) 97 84 61 66

Phone (home): 33 (0) 2 97 84 20 04

e-mail: expair@noos.fr

Born July 7th, 1933, in Brest

Married, 3 children

Education French Naval Academy 1956-1959

French Air Force Academy 1960

Background Fleet Air Army Pilot 1960-1990

Experience During a career of more than 30 years, he held various appointments

including Aircraft Captain, Squadron leader, training operations
training-operations-safety manager.
Logged 7000 flight hours as P.I.C. on 15 aircraft types operated in the
Navy.

Level in the Profession

After having achieved the top positions in the Fleet Air Army:

 1985-1987 - N.A.S. LANN-BIHOUE CO

 1987-1989 - Head of Air Operations in the FR Western approach

(Eastlant)

 1989-1991 - Maritime Patrol Aviation C.O.

Retired with the rank of Rear-Admiral

Distinctions

Officier du Mérite Aéronautique

Officier du Mérite Maritime

Officier de la Légion d‟Honneur

Commandeur de l‟Ordre National du Mérite

▪ Air Events Investigator:

- Joined the BEA (Bureau Enquêtes-Accidents) French equivalent to NTSB

Getting the knowledge on the new generation aircraft (Boeing, Airbus, ATR),
and having executed tens of investigations in France and in foreign countries:

 CV640 Senegal – D0228 Tahiti – A320 Warzsawa and Orly

 ATR 42 Morocco – ATR72 Chicago
 A310 Orly and Romania
 A310 Nepal – A300 N
 A310 Nepal A300 Nagoya – DHC8 Roissy
 A330 Toulouse – Gulf Stream Lyon
 Super Puma Mexico – B707 Istres
 DA20 Le Bourget – B747 Tahiti FAAA
 A320 Air Inter, Mont St. Odile
 Beech King Air, Bay of Quiberon
 DO328, Chambery
 Embraer 120, Clermont Ferrand

Was appointed as the Principal Officer in charge of managing accidents and serious incidents
investigations

▪ Accredited Representative:

Accredited representative to the NTSB in the ATR72 accident in Roselawn

(Indiana), in October 1994. Expressed the disagreement of the French side, and
elaborated the BEA‟s response to the NTSB conclusions in the US report.

▪ Today:

Aeronautical associate expert, within the EXP‟AIR Cabinet

Manuel PECH

36 Rue A. Pallu
78110 LE VESINET
France

Phone: 33 (0) 1 30 15 09 79

Mobile: 33 (0) 6 13 57 84 07

e-mail: expair@noos.fr

Born October 7th, 1935 in NICE (06) France

Married, 3 children

Education

1952-1953 Baccalauréat

1954-1957 French Navy Officer – Ecole Navale

1960 Pilot Licence – French Naval Air Force

1966-1968 Engineer – Ecole Nationale Supérieure d‟Aéronautique

1969 Technical Brevet in Upper Naval War College

1969-1971 Master‟s Degree in Economics (Montpellier University)

Experience

1954-1981 French Navy:

 Flight testing at the French Navy Test Center (5 years)

 Maritime Patrol Crew Captain (6 years)

 Project Officer for development of Atlantic 2 Program (5 years)

 3500 flight hours as Crew Captain on 10 types of a/c operated in the

French Navy

Retired as Captain in 1981

1981-1995 AEROSPATIALE – HELICOPTER DIVISION then EUROCOPTER

1981-1987 Naval Programs Director

1987-1995 International Deputy Director of the NH 90 program

1998 – today Aeronautical associate expert, within the EXP‟AIR Cabinet

Colin Torkington

Colin Torkington is the Australian Nominee on the ICAO Air Navigation Commission and the
Alternate Member for Australia on the ICAO Council based in Montreal. He is in the final year of
a five-year posting.

He was born in Yorkshire and started his career in 1952 with Vickers-Armstrongs in the UK,
where his final position was a Senior Stressman in the design office.

He obtained a Master of Science degree in Aeronautical Engineering from Cranfield and held a
private pilot‟s licence and glider qualification.

Moving to Australia in 1961, he joined the Department of Civil Aviation as an Airworthiness

Engineer, specialising in aircraft structures. He worked on several major accident investigations
including Structures Group Leader in the investigation of two fatal Viscount accidents both
involving structural failure in flight. During his career, he undertook 70 overseas assessments and
certification visits covering Authorities, the Manufacturers and Operators in 30 countries. He
became Head of Airworthiness and Operations in the Australian Civil Aviation Authority in
Canberra; also Chairman of the ICAO Continuing Airworthiness Panel. He is the author and
presenter of 25 papers, 17 of which have been published.

In 1997, he was appointed to a United States National Academy of Sciences, National Research
Council Committee on Aircraft Certification Safety Management.

He is a Fellow of the Royal Aeronautical Society.

The work of the ICAO Air Navigation Commission encompasses standard setting on a wide range
of issues from licensing, accident investigation, airworthiness and operations to air traffic
management
 APPENDIX 1 b

Data available to the International Team

1b.1 General documentation made available by the Irish

1b.2 List of data made available for the “Similarities Study”

 Viscount occurrences (1976-1997)

 Aircraft accident reports

1b.3 List of data made available for the technical analysis:

 From UK, CAA

 From ICAO, Montreal

 From BAe Systems

 From Brocklands Museum

 From Dowty Aerospace

 From others

1b.4 List of data made available for the operational analysis

 By Aer Lingus

 With respect to UK involvement

 Appendix 1b
▪ LIST OF DATA MADE AVAILABLE TO THE INTERNATIONAL
TEAM

The documentary evidence related to this accident is voluminous reaching as it includes the
design, operation, maintenance and service history of the Viscount.

1b.1 General documentation made available by the Irish.

The two primary documents referred to are:

a) Department of Transport and Power AAP N° 6.

“Accident Viscount 803 Aircraft EI-AOM near Tuskar Rock, Co. Wexford on
24th March 1968”
Published 30 June 1970
There are 7 Appendices to the Report.

b) “Review of Irish & UK Files on the Loss of the Aer Lingus Viscount
St. Phelim.
Registration EI-AOM on 24th March 1968”
Report undated but published in June 2000.
Compiles by officials of the Irish Department of Public Enterprise in
association with UK officials:

A document of major interest is:

c) Aer Lingus Viscount Flight Crew Operating Manual (dated 21.3.68).

d) The AAIU made available to the International Team the 54 files of documents

which were reviewed by them and their British colleagues between 1998 and

2000 (refer list of documents in the Review Report : P 20 – 21).

e) The list of Viscount crashes was abstracted from the “World Directory of

Airliner crashes” by T. Dernham.

1b.2 List of data made available for the “Similarities Study”

▪ “Viscount Occurrences”, of UK registered Viscount, from January 1976 to September

1997 (CAA Data).

▪ Aircraft Accident Reports

- Viscount N 7462

Capital Airlines
Near Charles City, Virginia,
January 18, 1960

- Viscount N 7430

United Airlines
Near Ellicott City, Maryland,
November 23, 1962

 Viscount 708, F-BGNV

Air Inter,
Tramoyes, France,
August 12, 1963

 Viscount VT-DIO

Indian Airlines,
Near Agra, India,
September 11, 1963

 Viscount 701, PP-SRR

VASP Airlines,
Nova Friburgo, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil,
September 4, 1964

 Viscount 804, SP GVA

LOT (Polish Airlines)

Jenk, Limbourg, Belgium,
August 20, 1965

 Viscount 803, EI-AOF

Aer Lingus
Near Ashbourne, Co. Meath,
 June 22, 1967

 Viscount G-ATFN
British Eagle International Airlines
Langenbruck, Bavaria, Germany
August 9, 1968

 Vanguard G-APEC
British European Airways
Aarsele, Belgium,
October 2, 1971
 Viscount 724, F-BMCH
Air Inter
Viscontat, France,
October 27, 1972

 Viscount 802 G-AOHI

British European Airways

Ben More, Scotland,
January 19, 1973

 Viscount 785, HK-1058

Taxi Aereo Opita

San Cayetano, Norte de Santander, Columbia,
June 8, 1974

 Viscount 838, SE-FOZ

Skyline Sweden AB
Stockholm Airport, Sweden,
January 15, 1977

 Viscount 812, PK-IVS

Bouraq Indonesia Airlines

Near Djakarta, Indonesia,
August 26, 1980

 Viscount 813, G-OHOT

British World Airlines

Near Uttoxeter, Staffordshire,
February 25, 1994
1b.3 List of date made available for the technical analysis

1b.3.1 Data from UK, CAA

 British Civil Airworthiness Requirements (aeroplanes) Issue 4-16th March
1959
 Aircraft Specification No. A814 (REV 22) dated February 12, 1981
 Lists of CAA ADs for:
 Vickers Viscount 700 series (issue 54 - September 1980)
 Vickers Viscount 800/810 series (issue 53 – September 1980)
 Rolls-Royce DART engines (issue 38 – August 1999)
 Dowty Aerospace Propellers (issue 38 – May 2000)
 PTL 264 (issue 3 – 1.9.92) Tailplane – Inspection for cracking
 PTL 127 (issue 3 – 1.6.92) Tailplane – Inspection for cracking
 PTL 167 (issue 1 – 16.8.74) Tailplane – Inspection/modification
of rear spar top forward booms
 BAe/MAN/VISC/EDD/15 and 16 (1966-92):
Eddy current technique for examination of tailplane spar joint fittings-top
 Some copies made of individual pages from:
 Complete set of Viscount Service Bulletin
 8 volumes of 800 Series Aircraft Manuals
 Inspection and Repair Manuals

1b.3.2 Data from ICAO, Montreal

1 Airclaims Viscount Accident Summary of 160 Viscount accidents,

139 of which were a total loss
Statistics (Sept. 2000)
2 ICAO Annex 13, Second Edition Aircraft Accident Inquiry
March 1966
3 South African Accident Report Accident to Viscount 818 ZS-CVA in
Indian Ocean, 13 March 1967
4 ICAO ADREP System Briefs on all Viscounts accidents
5 ICAO ADREP Information 21 accident summaries involving door
failure
6 Accident Summary Capital Airlines Viscount 744 N7404
Midway airport, 20 February 1956
7 Accident Summary Accident to Boeing 747SR rear
pressure bulkhead failure, Japan, 12
August 1985

1b.3.3. Data from BAe Systems

1b.3.3.1 Reports

1 Rotol Performance Office Control and Performance

Report 1011 (February 1957) Characteristics of Rotol propellers for
Dart 510 engines in Viscount aircraft
2 BAe AL/Defects/1420/Viscount Examination of a Tailplane Spar Joint
(19 April 1963) Fitting removed from Viscount

G-AMON
3 Aero/Loading Note 627 Viscount 804 Data relating to crash of
SP-LVA
(Dec 1965)
4 BAe Aero/Loading Note 629 Pitching manoeuvres used in the design
of the Viscount
(7 Jan 1966)
5 BAe SS/VIS /EJC/PJ/287 Letter and campaign wires relating to
Viscount 700 accident in Columbia
(July 1974)
(8 June 1974)
6 BAe SS/VIS/704-03/EJC/CER Policy letter on Precautionary
(14 October 1980) Inspections and Tailplane root end
fittings following PK-IVS accident
including magnetic particle inspection
technique
7 DYN/BWP/SBW/2042 Bouraq PK-IVS Analysis

(November 1980)
8 US FAA Aircraft Specification TCDS Viscount
No. A-814 (Rev 22)

(February 1981)
9 LER/V15/800/51 Viscount 800 Series Life Extension
Review
(April 1988)
10 BK/AF 00001 Letter to AAIU Response to questions related to
Dublin dated 17 June 1998
EI-AOM and PK-IVS
11 BAe letter 26 October 1992 Viscount Certification Standard
12 BB/SAH/001 (Oct 2000) 33 pages response to questions raised
by Mr. Pech
13 BAe Operator Experience Date Occurrence data (22 pages)
File Viscount (Dec 2000)
 SS/VIS/705-03/EJC/CER Campaign Wire details

8886/647-ATA27
AL/MAT/3713A Airworthiness requirements arising
from Bouraq Accident
SS/VIS/GEN/EJC/CER/647 Control Spigot Policy
Dowty Control Maintenance Manual Leading Particulars
No. 945, Sections
Viscount 800/810 Aircraft Manual Chapter 2 Inspection Schedule

1b.3.3.2 Abstract from the Engineering Manual

Rigging, symmetry and control surface check (23.12.53)

1b.3.3.3 Drawings

70120 Sheet 367 Elevator lever Mounting (Iss. E)

80233 Sheet 105 Control Assy. Torque Tube Elevator (Iss. S)
81033 Sheet 9 G.A. of controls Rods in Rear Fuselage

(Iss. G)
81020 Sheet 103 Assy. Of Port Elevator Covered Structure

(Iss. W)
81033 Sheet 39 Controls Assy Torque Tube Elevator (Iss. W)
70118 Sheet 231/232 Tailplane Spar joint fitting top
70118 Sheet 231 F/232 F Idem
70120 Sheet 367 Elevator lever mounting

Abstracts from Viscount 800 series Aircraft Manual:

 Air conditioning system

 Electrical system: power distribution

electrical equipment in fuselage

 Rudder and tab operating mechanism: overhaul

maintenance

1b.3.4. Documents sighted and part copied at Brocklands Museum, Weybridge, UK

1. Taking the Viscount into the 21st Century (The Viscount Life Extension
Review) Paper by A. Kitcheside Nov. 30, 1998

2. Viscount 700 D Life Extension Review, British Aerospace – Aug 1998

3. Viscount 800 Series Life Extension Review, British Aerospace – March 1999
 4. Viscount Engineering Development Progress Bulletin No. 1 – Aug 1956

5. Viscount Engineering Development Progress Bulletin No. 8 – Sep 1958

6. Viscount Engineering Development Progress Bulletin No. 9 – Oct 1958

7. Viscount Engineering Development Progress Bulletin No. 10 – Feb 1959

The above have details of the tailplane static and fatigue tests.

1b.3.5 Data from Dowty Aerospace

 Performance Office Report No. 1011 dated Feb 57

 Abstract of Performance Manual Nr 945 (2.12.65)

 Drawings:

 Theoretical circuit diagram of propeller operating system

 Propeller operating system: hydraulic

1b.3.6 Data from others

Australian Department of Civil Review of Fatigue Cracking in

Aviation Aeronautical Engineering Viscount Spar booms
Report SM-51 (May 1969)
Air Safety Investigation Branch DCA Accident to Viscount 720C VH-
Australia RMQ, Port Headlang, 31 Dec 1968,
Factual Report
Aer Lingus – IRIS Memo Possibility of Frozen Elevator
Controls – Viscount
British European Airways Letter to Viscount aircraft – flying controls
BAe EP/T/WEC/1906 (18 March 1964)
French Navy Functioning of the fuel supply circuit
of RR DART engine MK 21
1. MC Ewan DART engine: Multiple on wing
and/on potentially hazard
1. MC Ewan Airplane Impact Angle vs DART
engine damage caused by impact
Rolls-Royce DART engine: left hand view

right hand view

1. MC Ewan Analysis of FCU capsule failures
1b.4 List of data made available for the operational analysis

1.b.4.1 Data made available by AER LINGUS

Ref Description
No.
01 Press Cuttings
02 Tragedy at “Tuskar Rock” by Dermot Walsh published in 1983 by
Mercier Press
03 Transcript of “5-7 Live” 3.3.98
04 Medical Reports
05 Operations Control Daily Report 24.3.68
06 Incident Signal
07 Description of Portion of Aircraft Wing with RAF Roundel recovered in
South Trench – document not dated
08 Air Safety Officer’s Log of Events at Rosslare from 2200hrs on 24.3.68
09 Folder containing ATC Reports, R/T transcripts, flight plan etc
10 A summary of accidents due to structural failure from various causes
15.7.66
11 Accident watch records
12 Letter from G.C. Wilkinson, Principal Inspector of Accidents AAIB to
B. Murray, Air Safety Officer re Identification of Wing Structure
17.7.74
13 Letter from BAC regarding Viscount 700 Series Accident in Colombia
8.6.74
14 Memo from Customer Relations to Air Safety Office consisting of
questions about Tuskar Rock Accident from Mr. Alan McCormack
15 Map of Search Area and Aircraft Flight Path
16 Map showing Location of Main Wreckage also showing Location of
“Wing piece”
17 Aeronautical chart Ireland
18 Aeronautical Chart showing aircraft flight path with bearings from
Tuskar Rock
19 Photographs of wreckage landed from “Uplifter” 23.7.68
20 Official accident investigation report Dept of Transport and Power
30.6.70
1b.4.2 With Respect to UK Involvement

1b.4.2.1 Irish questions related to mid-air collision theory

Peter Lawson‟s mail

Celtic League mail

Victims relative‟s mail:

Alan and Jerome McCormick

Sven Gablin

“Tragedy at Tuskar Rock”

1b.4.2.2 Documentation in support of the UK MOD’s responses to the Irish questions

raised during the 1998-2000 review

1b.4.2.2.1 Official RN reports of proceedings. Supporting papers to Doyle,

O’Driscol & associates’ Question 7

a) CinC Plymouth letter forwarding Op Tuskar Report dated 10 February

1969

b) HMS PENELOPE Report and picture dated 27 March 1968

c) HMS HARDY Report dated 29 March 1968

d) Senior Officer Search Force‟s Report dated 1 May 1968 (incomplete)

e) Senior Officer Search Force‟s Report dated 24 May 1968

f) Operation Order Tuskar 1/68 dated 11 June 1968

g) HMS NURTON Report dated 21 June 1968

1b.4.2.2.2 “The Report of the SAR and Salvage of Aer Lingus Viscount 712,

24 March-27 August, 1968: OPERATION TUSKAR” dated 10 February 1969

1.b.4.2.2.3 RNAS Brawdy Air Officer of the Day’s Log for 24 March 1968.

Supporting paper to Relatives’ questions List A question 4

1b.4.2.2.4 Supporting papers to Relatives’ questions list B question 5

1b.4.2.2.5 Supporting papers to Relatives’ question list B question 7 and Celtic

League question 7

a) DERDA Annex B: Weckage examined on the Fishguard/Rosslare Ferry at

Fishguard

b) DERDA Annex E: Salvage of wreckage from Aer Lingus lost over Irish Sea

1b.4.2.2.6 DERA : RAE Aberporth/Llanbedr – Evidence of Closure on Sunday 24th

March 1968. Supporting papers to Celtic League question 5 and Irish

Government supplementary question 3

1b.4.2.2.7 DERA Annex F: Aberporth Danger Area

Supporting papers to Celtic League question 9

1b.4.2.2.8 MOD comments on extracts from PRO supporting papers to question

arising from 24 May meeting and referred to supplementary questions 1 and
2

1b.4.2.2.9 DERA: STILETTO including identification findings on target wing held by

the Irish AAIU June 1999. Supporting papers on Stiletto

1b.4.2.2.10 Shorts Brothers of Belfast: STILETTO documents and MOD Summary

sheets
1b.4.2.2.11 Operational Signals: SAR and Salvage Ops

1b.4.2.2.12 Comments From:

a) Capt of HMS HARDY

b) Capt of HMS PENELOPE

c) British Air Accident Investigation Branch Officer who

advised and assisted Irish Dept of Transport and Power during the
investigation

1b.4.2.2.13 DERA: Review of UK anti-aircraft weapons 1968 Vintage – Performance

Status and Aberporth/Llanbedr “Connection”

1b.4.2.2.14 Comments on Thunderbirds and the Royal Artillery/TA

1b.4.2.3 Responses to French Questions

1b.4.2.3.1 From DERA (5.6.01)

1b.4.2.3.2 From Army Historical Branch (31.5.01)

1b.4.2.3.3 From RAF Historical Branch (4.6.01)

1b.4.2.3.4 From RN Historical Branch

1b.4.2.3.5 From U.K Public Record Officer (PRO)

 APPENDIX 1C: GLOSSARIES

1c.1 Glossary of Terms

1c.2 Glossary of Abbreviations

Glossary of Terms

Angle of Attack The angle between the wing chord or other reference axis and local undisturbed
airflow direction.
Attitude The relationship between the axes of the aircraft (longitudinal, lateral and vertical)
and that of a fixed reference such as the earth’s horizon.
Centre of The point within an aircraft about which all the moments trying to rotate the
Gravity aircraft are balanced.
Certificate of A document issued by the State of Registry of the aircraft and applicable to an
Airworthiness industrial aircraft. This specifies compliance with the necessary airworthiness
regulatory requirements for safe flight.
Corrosion An electrochemical process in which sound metal is decayed into its chemical
compounds. Examples are exfoliation (flaking), pitting and intercrystalline
cracking.
Damage The ability of a structure to continue to carry normal flight loads for a specified
Tolerance period in the presence of flaws, cracks and other damage.
Decompression The reduction in cabin air pressure to a level existing outside the aircraft. This may
be caused by a catastrophic structural failure or a system malfunction or contained
failure resulting in a safe descent.
Drag Aerodynamic force in a direction opposite to that of flight due and the resistance of
the atmosphere through which the aircraft passes.
Empennage The tail unit of an aircraft consisting of a horizontal surface (tailplane or horizontal
stabilizer) and a vertical surface (fan or vertical stabilizer) together with their
associated control surfaces of elevators and rudder.
Fail-safe Design concept in which the crack or failure of any single structural element will not
result in catastrophic failure of the whole aircraft structure – refer to annex b 3 a.
Fatigue Weakness on material because of changes in the crystalline structure caused by the
repeated application of stress – refer to annex B 3.
Flight controls Those governing the trajectory of the aircraft in flight i.e. elevators on the tailplane
to control pitch; ailerons on the wing to control roll; and rudder on the vertical fan
to control yaw.
Flutter An aeroelastic self-excited vibration of which the external source of energy is the
airstream.
Fuel control unit Governs engine fuel supply in accordance with pilot demand, ambient conditions
and engine limitations.
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation. A United Nations agency based in
Montreal, Canada.
Lift An aerodynamic force acting perpendicular to the line of flight, caused by air flow
over the aerofoil shape of the wing or tailplane – Refer to annex B 3(b)
Load The force exerted upon the structure due to aerodynamic or other pressures.
Maintenance Work required, scheduled or otherwise, for keeping the aircraft in a serviceable and
airworthy condition.
Manufacturer The Viscount was designed and constructed by Vickers Armstrongs (Aircraft) Ltd.,
Weybridge, England (Subsequently BAC, BAe and BAE systems). The engines were
produced by Rolls-Royce Ltd., and the propellers by Dowty Rotol Ltd.
Pressurisation A form of climate control where an engine driven air-compressor increases the
pressure of air inside the cabin of a high flying aircraft to a value which allows the
occupants to breathe normally without supplementary oxygen.
Pressure cabin The portion of the fuselage of an aircraft which is sealed and pressurised in flight.
Pressure A structural item designed to serve as a boundary to the pressurised section of the
Bulkhead fuselage.
Propeller Pitch The angle between the chord of a propeller blade and a plane perpendicular to the
axis of rotation.
Propeller Where the propeller blades are rotated so that the leading and trailing edges are as
Feathering near as possible parallel to the aircraft flight path. This minimises drag and engine
rotation.
Safe Life A design philosophy whereby primary structural elements subjected to fatigue
damage are replaced at a specific time – refer to annex B 3( a).
Spin A sustained spiral descent with an angle-of-attack beyond the stalling angle.
Stall A loss of lift caused by disruption and breakdown of airflow over the wing.
Stress The loading on structural material per unit area.
Tab A small, moveable control, hinged to the trailing edge of a primary flight control
surface.
Tail load The aerodynamic force produced by the tailplane moving through the air. Tail
loads normally act downwards (negative lift) in order to give the aircraft
longitudinal stability – refer to annex B 3 b.
Thrust The aerodynamic force produced by a propeller or a turbojet engine as it forces a
mass of air to the rear, behind the aircraft.

Appendix 1c.2

Glossary of Abbreviations

A AAIB Air Accident Investigation Branch

AAIU Air Accident Investigation Unit
AAN Airworthiness Approval Note
AAP Air Accident Publication
AAR Aircraft Accident Report
Ac, A/C Aircraft
AC Alternative Current
AD Airworthiness Directive
ADREP Advisory REPort
AIP Aeronautical Information Publication
ANO Air Navigation Order
AOC Air Operator Certificate
APP Approach Control
ARB Air Registration Board
ATC Air Traffic Control
ATC (O) Air Traffic Control Officer
ATS Air Traffic Service
ATSU Air Traffic Service Unit
AWY Airways

B BAC British Aircraft Corporation

BAe British Aerospace
BAe Systems British Aerospace – Systems Division
BCAR(s) British Civil Airworthiness Requirement(s)

C CAA Civil Aviation Authority

CAP Civil Aviation Publication
CB Cumulonimbus (Cloud)
CO Commanding Officer
CTA Control Terminal Approach
CVR Cockpit Voice Recorder

D DA Dangerous Area
DC Direct Current
DERA Defence Evaluation and Research Agency
DRA Defence Research Agency

E E.ST East Summer Time (in U.S.A.)

 E. TA Estimated Time of Arrival

F FAA Federal Aviation Administration (U.S.A.)

FDAS Flight Data Acquisition System
FCOM Flight Crew Operations Manual
FCU Flight Control Unit
FIR Flight Information Region
FL Flight Level
FOI Flight Operations Inspector
Ft Feet

G GA General Arrangement
GMT Greenwich Mean Time
GS Ground Speed

H HFEC High Frequency Eddy Current

I IAC Irish Air Corps

IAS Indicated Air Speed
IFF Identification Friend or Foc
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation
ILS Instrument Landing System
IMC Instrument Meteo Conditions

J JAA Joint Aviation Authority (Europe)

JAR(s) Joint Airworthiness Requirement(s)

K Kts. Knots

L LATTC London Air Traffic Control Centre

LAAWC Local Anti-Aircraft Warfare Co-ordinator
LOC Loss of Control

M Mn Minutes
Mhz Megahertz
Mi Statute Mile
MOD Ministry of Defense
MSN Manufacturer Serial Number
(M) RCC (Maritime) Rescue Coordination Center

N NAS Naval Air Station

NDB Non Directional Beacon
Nm Nautical Mile
NOTAM Notice to Air Men
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board

O OTC Officer Tactical in Command

OM (FCOM) Operations Manual

P PCU Propeller Control Unit

PIC Pilot in Command
PRO Public Record Office (UK)
PTL Preliminary Technical Leaflet
R RAE Royal Aeronautical Establishment
RAF Royal Air Force
RCC Rescue Co-ordination Center
REG Regulation
REV Revision
RN Royal Navy
RNAS Royal Navy Air Station
RR Rolls-Royce
R/T Radio Transmissions

S SAR Search and Rescue

SB Service Bulletin
SMP Standard Maintenance Procedure
S/N Serial Number

T TAS True Air Speed

TCDS Technical C……..D…….Specification
TGT Turbine Gas Temperature
TWR Tower Control
TSN Time Since New
TU, (=Z,GMT) Temps Universel

U UHF Ultra High Frequencies

V VFR Visual Flight Rules

VHF Very High Frequency
VMC Visual Meteo Conditions

Z Zulu Time Time in usage in the Greenwich Time Zone

(=GMT, TU)
 Appendices 3
3a: Bird Migrations

3b: Sample of Ads Tail Related

3c: Detailed Comparison AOM-AOF

Appendix 3a

« Birds Migrations to/from South Ireland »

Study by Captain M. Reynolds

3a.1 Monthly summary of weather (February-March 1968) – Extract from “Irish

Meteorological Office”

3a.2 Data gathered from “Wildfowl and Wetlands Trust”

3a.3 Tracks of Swan Migrations (March 1968)

- Bewick Swans
- Whooper Swans
3a.1 Monthly Summary of Weather (February-March 1968)
supplied by Irish Meteorological Office (I.M.O.)

(Extract re-typed)

February, 1968

COOL, DRY AND SUNNY

From 1st to 4th a mainly westerly airflow covered Ireland and in this airflow troughs of low
pressure crossed the country during 4th. There was dull rainy weather during the late evening of
3rd and at first on 4th. Otherwise there were showers and bright periods – some of the showers
being thundery and of hail. During 5th a depression moved southeastwards to lie just to the west
of Ireland by evening, with a trough to the east, resulting in a complex low pressure system which
covered Ireland and England until it was superseded by a southeasterly airflow during 9th. There
were fair periods and showers – occasionally of hail – on 5th, 6th and early on 7th, while for the rest
of the time it was mainly cloudy or dull with periods of rain or snow. From 10 th to 14th on
extensive low pressure area to the southwest of Ireland maintained a south-easterly to easterly
airflow over the country giving mainly cloudy or dull conditions with periods of rain and drizzle –
mostly light – in many places. Between 15th and 28th, high pressure over or just to the north or
Ireland gave mainly dry conditions – mostly cloudy until 19th and thereafter mainly fine or fair.
During 29th a trough of low pressure approaching from the west gave generally dull weather with
outbreaks of rain and drizzle especially in the west.

PRESSURE

Mean pressure for the month was below normal except in the extreme north. At 18h it was 1.8
millibars below normal at Birr, 3.6 millibars at Roche‟s Point and 4.2 millibars at Valentia
Observatory. At Malin Head it was 0.1 millibars above normal.

Extreme mean sea level pressures recorded were, 1033.1 millibars at Clones on 27th and 984.0
millibars at Valentia Observatory on 6th.

PRECIPITATION

The rainfall for the country as a whole was 44% of normal. Rainfall was below normal
everywhere. Parts of the east and midlands had less than 25% of the normal fall. The greatest
daily fall 41.1mm, was recorded at Bantry, Co. Cork on 10th. Extreme monthly totals recorded
were, 10.8mm, at Clonbulloge, Co. Offaly and 177.8mm, in the Kerry mountains.

WIND

Wind reached gale force in mean speed or in gusts on some days mainly in the first half of the
month. Directions were mainly between northerly and southeasterly.

The highest gust, 76 miles per hour and the highest mean speed over 10 minutes, 55 miles per
hour, were both recorded at Malin Head on 4th.

TEMPERATURE

Mean temperature varied between 4.5°C at Dublin (Upper O‟Connell Street), Roche‟s Point,
Rosslare and Valentia Observatory and 2.0°C at Ballinamore and Clones. It was below normal in
all areas, varying from 1.5°C below normal at Rosslare to 2.7°C below normal at Markree Castle.
At many stations mean temperature was the lowest recorded for any month since February, 1963.
Extreme temperatures recorded were 13.3°C at Tralee (Clash) on 12th and –9.5°C at Glenties on
6th. Extreme “grass-minimum” temperature recorded was –17.3°C at Glenties on 6th.

SUNSHINE

Mean daily duration of bright sunshine was over 125% or normal everywhere and varied between
4.2 hours at Carna, Co. Galway and 2.8 hours at Boora, Co. Offaly. At Belmullet, Claremorris
and Malin Head mean duration was over 150% of normal. At Dublin Airport, Claremorris and
Shannon Airport it was the sunniest February since records are available at these stations (Dublin
Airport 1941; Claremorris 1944, Shannon Airport 1946). At Belmullet (159% of normal) the
total duration for the month 116.3 hours, was the highest there for February since records are
available (1957). The greatest daily duration of bright sunshine, 9.7 hours, was recorded at
Kilkenny on 25th.

Extremes of total monthly duration of bright sunshine recorded were 122.3 hours at Carna and
80.5 hours at Boora.

FOG

Fog occurred at dawn in many places on about ten days between 6th and 21st and there were
isolated occurrences on 24th, 26th, 27th and 29th. It was generally slow to clear, persisting in some
places until afternoon.

SNOW

Falls of snow occurred in the period 1st - 9th and were widespread on 4th, 5th and 6th. Snow was
reported in the southeast on 11th. Snow fell in the period 21st-25th and was general on 24th.

HAIL

Hail showers occurred in the periods 1st - 9th and 21st - 24th and also on 12th.

THUNDER

Thunderstorms were reported at Belmullet on 4th, Rosslare on 10th and Tralee (Clash) on 1st.

March, 1968

GENERALLY COLDER AND WETTER THAN NORMAL

From the 1st to 11th an anticyclone just to the west of Ireland dominated Irish weather – giving
mostly dry conditions, apart from some scattered showers mainly in the west and northwest.
Between 1st and 7th there were good sunny periods in most localities but from 8th to 11th it was
mainly cloudy or dull. During 12th the anticyclone moved away southeastwards and from 13th to
21st there was established over the country a westerly to northwesterly airflow – the circulation
round an intense low pressure area extending from south of Iceland to north of Scotland to west
Norway. In this airflow several troughs of low pressure crossed Ireland. Weather throughout was
mostly cloudy or dull, with periods or rain or showers in most districts.

The showers were of snow or hail at times and were heavy on occasion especially between 17 th
and 21st when thunderstorms were reported in some localities. Between 22nd and 25th a deepening
depression to the west of Ireland moved northeastwards reaching the Hebrides by 25th and its
associated troughs of low pressure crossed Ireland.
Mainly cloudy or dull weather with rain on 22nd and 23rd was replaced by showers and bright
periods on 24th and 25th. Some of the showers were heavy, and of hail at times – thunderstorms
occurring in several districts on 25th. From 26th to 28th a strong south-westerly airflow covered
Ireland giving mostly dull weather with outbreaks of rain and drizzle prolonged in places. During
29th a trough of low pressure moved slowly southeastwards across Ireland and was succeeded by a
northwesterly airflow. Mostly fair or fine conditions prevailed over the second half of 29 th and
also on 30th. Otherwise weather was generally dull with rain – the rain being prolonged and heavy
in places in the northwest on 31st.

PRESSURE

Mean pressure for the month was above normal except in the extreme north. At 18h it exceeded
normal by 2.3 millibars at Birr, 2.9 millibars at Roche‟s Points and 4.3 millibars at Valentia
Observatory. At Malin Head it was 1.2 millibars below normal.
Extreme mean sea level pressures recorded were, 1037.7 millibars at Valentia Observatory on 4th
and 982.1 millibars at Belmullet on 22nd.

PRECIPITATION

The rainfall for the country as a whole was 113% of normal. Rainfall was above normal except
for parts of Leinster and south Munster. At Malin Head rainfall was 186% of normal but at
Rosslare it was 64%. In most areas there was little rainfall in the period 1 st-12th. At Dublin
(Upper O‟Connell Street), Kilkenny, Mullingar and Rosslare the period 25th February to 12th
March constituted an absolute drought, i.e. a period of a least 15 consecutive days on each of
which less than 0.2 mm of precipitation occurred. The greatest daily fall, 71.7 mm was recorded
at the Gap of Dunloe, Co. Kerry. Extreme monthly totals recorded were, 25.4 mm at Dalkey, Co.
Dublin and 315.0 mm in the Donegal mountains.

WIND

Wind reached gale force in mean speed or in gusts on over half the days of the month, mostly
during 2nd and 3rd weeks. Directions lay predominantly between southeast through west and
northwest to north.

The highest gust, 96 miles per hour, and the highest mean speed over 10 minutes, 55 miles per
hour, were both recorded at Malin Head on 17th.

TEMPERATURE

Mean temperature varied between 7.8°C at Dublin (Trinity College) and 5.7°C at Lullymore (Agr.
Inst.). It was below normal nearly everywhere ranging from 0.3°C above normal at Dublin
(Glasnevin) to 1.0°C below normal at Valentia Observatory. The period 23rd-29th was mild,
temperatures in excess of 12°C being recorded at most places. The highest temperature, 20.4°C,
was recorded at Dublin (Rathfarnham Castle) on 28th. Lowest temperatures were recorded mainly
in the period 1st-4th, 7th-8th and 21st when daily minimum values were near or below 0°C (freezing
point). The lowest temperature, -4.9°C, was recorded at Clonsast on 7th.

Extreme “grass minimum” temperature recorded was –12.0° at Phoenix Park on 8th.

SUNSHINE

Mean daily duration of bright sunshine ranged from 5.0 hours at Rosslare to 2.6 hours at
Glencolumbkille. It was above normal in Leinster and Munster and below normal in Connaught
and Ulster. In parts of the south and southeast, mean duration was between 121% and 132% of
normal but at Malin Head it was only 78%.

Extremes of total monthly duration of bright sunshine recorded were, 155.6 hours at Rosslare and
81.7 hours at Glencolumbkille. The greatest daily duration of bright sunshine recorded was 10.8
hours at Phoenix Park on 28th.

FOG

Fog occurred on only a few occasions during the month notably in the period 1st-3rd and on 8th,
15th, 16th and 29th.

SNOW

Snow or sleet was general in the period 15th-22nd and there were isolated falls on 14th, 23rd and
25th.

HAIL

Hail showers were reported from most places in the period 15th -25th and there were well scattered
showers on 2nd and 3rd.

THUNDER

Thunderstorms were reported on 18th at Belmullet, Shannon Airport and Tralee (Caherweesheen),
on 19th at Malin Head, on 21st at Ballybritta, Ballygagin, Roche‟s Point and Rosslare, on 22nd at
Ballygagin and on 25th were reported in most areas except the west and north.

(Extract ended)
3a.2 DATA ON BIRDS MIGRATIONS

gathered by Captain M. Reynolds from “Wildfowl and Wetlands Trust”

(Extract re-typed)

3a.2.1

DATA GATHERED
FROM
“WILDFOWL AND WETLANDS TRUST”

W.W.T. was founded by the late Sir Peter Scott and is still managed by Lady Phillipa Scott and
her daughter Daphela. Their Trust has been very co-operative and their employees are
enthusiastic and helpful.

They searched their computer records to ascertain the 1968 departure dates of swans. They also
patiently explained to me the movements of birds leaving Ireland on transists to England and
Wales across the Irish Sea.

Swans are unlike geese in their selection of departure dates inasmuch as the local weather has an
influence. Colder winter = later departure. Therefore I secure the Irish Met Temperature
Summary for 1967-68 to establish similar departure dates for Irish birds. (Summary enclosed).

Whooper Swans head for Iceland, Bewick‟s Swans head for Siberia, etc. Irish birds of both breeds
make en route stops in various parts of England, Wales and North Ireland to top up their fuel (fat)
at feeding wetlands.

ALTITUDE RECORD

W.W.T. have numerous reports from aircrew of swans at 20,000 feet. In an eerie coincidence,
the actual all-time record was made on the incoming late – 1967 flight by the Irish Whoopers who
were the same birds who left Ireland in March 1968. They were tracked above the Outer
Hebrides in December 1967 at an altitude of 8,200 metres. All of this is confirmed on bottom of
p.2 at: www.bbc.co.uk/education/archive/heading_south/whooperfaq.htm

3a2.2

U.K. DEPARTURE DATES – 1968

W.W.T transferred Sir Peter Scott‟s old hand-written notebooks to their computer database. They
searched on my behalf. Because of the cold winter, flocks of swans were still taking-off on 22nd
March 1968, and this continued until the last birds left on 27th March. (Confirmation:
1453890333-Extension 183-Swan Office – Ms. Jenny Earle).

IRISH DEPARTURE DATES – 1968

W.W.T. advise me that unless the 1967-68 Irish winter was warmer than usual the Irish swans
would depart at about the same time as the U.K. birds. I examined the Irish Met Records for the
final two months of the feeding regime in Ireland (enclosed) and the following are salient
extracts:-
February 1968: “Temperatures below normal in all areas, varying from 1.5 degrees C below
normal at Rosslare to 2.7 degrees C below normal at Markree Castle. At many
stations mean temperature was the lowest recorded for any month since February
1963”.

March 1968: “Temperature was below normal nearly everywhere. Lowest temperatures were
recorded mainly in the period 1st-4th, 7th-8th, and on the 21st, when daily minimum
values were near, or below, 0 degrees C”.

This indicates departure dates similar to the U.K. cold winter.

ROUTES BY IRISH SWANS – 1968

Some Irish swans leaving Kerry, Cork, Galway, River Shannon, etc. stop at Slimbridge
(Gloucestershire) en route to Siberia and Russia.

Birds from the southeast extremities of Ireland can head a short distance to sea to orientate their
navigation systems with the coastline profile. Those, which stop at Slimbridge are unlikely to
climb above 2,000 feet, and many even, stay close to sea level, because of the relatively short
distance. However, W.W.T. advise me that many flocks of Irish Bewick‟s overshoot Slimbridge
altogether and head for Welney, in Norfolk. This is near the east coast of England, in the
Fenlands close to the River Ouse washes.

These birds have a higher rate of climb for the longer haul, which puts them on collision
course, and possibly at collision altitude, above St. George‟s Channel and the south Irish Sea.
Whooper Swans en route to Iceland keep alternate “airfields” close to their track in case the
weather deteriorates, or energy is sapped. They do not head in a straight line for Iceland. (This is
like ETOPS operations by twin-engined aircraft on the Atlantic route. e.g. Azores, Reykjavik, etc
alternates). Again, W.W.T. advise that departing Irish Whoopers follow the reciprocal of the
track, which they used, on their Iceland-Ireland Journey in December. They leave Iceland from
breeding grounds between 15 degrees W and 20 degrees W and head southeast for the nearest
landfall.

Routes (Continued)

They cross the Outer Hebrides before turning south at 5 degrees W. (In fact, it was above the
Outer Hebrides that a crew reported an “air-miss” with Ireland-bound swans at an altitude of 8,200
metres in 1967).

Irish Whoopers from the far southern extremities of our island can also swing seaward for an
orientation period, entering coastline waypoints in their little-understood navigation systems.

Ms. Earle of W.W.T. has advised me that some of these flocks head for a place called Martin
Mere, near Ormskirk in the Southport region of Lancashire. Their landing place is on the southern
side of the estuary of the River Ribble. From there they head northwards to the Outer Hebrides
again, and thence northwest to Iceland.

There seems little doubt that swan migrations from Kerry, Shannon, Galway, etc., were on
collision courses with the track of EI-AOM.
3a.3 Tracks of Swan Migrations

- Bewick Swans
- Whooper Swans
It may be noted that both types of Swan concentrate in and migrate over Cork and Dungarvan
areas.
 APPENDIX 3B

Sample of ADs Viscount Tail related

3b.1 Introduction

3b.2 ADs

3b.3 Conclusion

Sample created by Captain M. Reynolds

3b.1 Introduction

Section 3.11 “Regulatory Action” explains the issue of mandatory Continuing Airworthiness
requirements for Viscount aircraft. There are many hundreds of such documents.

The United States Federal Aviation Administration (FSS) issued many Airworthiness Directives
(ADs) on the 700 and 810 Series Viscount aircraft. These were the only Series certificated in the
U.S. All these ADs were based upon prior UK mandatory action.

Because of their concise presentation a small sample of FAA ADs is presented in this Appendix.
These are not meant to be definitive but merely to give a feel for the kind of service problems
encountered in the tailplane region over the range of Viscounts Models.

3b.2 : ADs

 AD 55 – 22 – 04
 AD 57 – 08 – 06
 AD 60 – 11 – 10
 AD 66 – 20 – 04
 AD 68 – 15 – 02
 AD 68 – 15 – 03
 AD 75 – 13 – 06
 AD 75 – 13 – 06
 AD 76 – 19 – 01
 AD 80 – 21 – 51
 AD 91 – 26 – 01
 AD 92 – 14 – 06
 AD 95 – 15 – 08
 AD 95 – 19 – 11, together with the presentation notice
 Airworthiness Directives

▼ Header Information

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

AD 55 – 22 – 04

Airworthiness Directives: Vickers-Armstrong Model 745D Aircraft

► Preamble Information

▼ Regulatory Information

55-22-04 VICKERS-ARMSTRONG: Applies to all Viscount Model 745D Aircraft

Compliance required as indicated.

Cracks have been found in the tailplane centre section main spar extending along the lines of
rivets attaching the web plate.

Accordingly, Vickers-Armstrong (Aircraft) Ltd. issued Preliminary Technical Leaflet No. 52

dated August 19, 1955, covering this subject. The British Air Registration Board considers
Modification D.1384, the initial and repetitive inspections recommended therein mandatory in
which the FAA concurs.

Aircraft complying with the limitations specified in PTL No. 52 will be considered serviceable.

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►Federal Register Information

►Comments

Airworthiness Directives

▼ Header Information

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
AD 57 – 08 – 06
Airworthiness Directives: Vickers-Armstrong Model 744 and 745 Aircraft

►Preamble Information
▼Regulatory Information

57 – 08 – 06 Vickers: Applies to Viscount 744 and 745 Type Aircraft

Compliance required as indicated.

In view of a recent horizontal stabilizer buckling incident compliance with the following is
required:

1. Effective immediately the following placard must be installed in full view of the pilot:

“TURBULENT AIR PENETRATION-165-KNOTS-FLAPS UP-LANDING GEAR UP”

(This placard required regardless of compliance with item 2).

2. Compliance required by August 31, 1957, with Vickers Modification D 1906. This
modification introduces new horizontal stabilizer skin panels of 18 gage, Specification L.73
material between Station 34.36 and 99.13 in lieu of the 20-gage panels of Specification L.72

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Airworthiness Directives

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

AD 60 – 11 – 10

Airworthiness Directives: Vickers-Armstrong Model 745D and 810 Series Aircraft

► Preamble Information

▼ Regulatory Information

60 – 11 – 10 VICKERS: Amdt. 148 Part 507 Federal Register May 10, 1960. Applies to All
Viscount Model 745 D Aircraft (Pre-modification D.2013 Parts (C) (I) (D) and (K) (Standard) and
all Viscount 810 Series Aircraft (Pre-modification FG.237 Parts (D) and (K) (Standard).
Compliance required at next removal of rudder trim tab and/or elevator spring tab, but not later
than June 1, 1961.

To preclude the possibility of inadvertent interchange of Pre-mod. D.2013 and FG.237 rudder trim
tab and elevator spring tab torque tube assemblies, Vickers Modification D.2918 (700 Series) and
FG.1671 (800/810 Series) must be incorporated. This modification insures that the upper rudder
trim tab torque tube assembly cannot be connected to the elevator spring tab and the elevator
spring tab torque assembly cannot be connected to the rudder trim tab in the upper position.
Incorporation of this modification on 700 Series aircraft is accomplished by installation of a
nuissance bracket, P/N 70123-359 or equivalent, fitted to the tabs at the point of attachment of the
relevant short (Pre-mod. D.2013) skewbars.

On Model 810 Series aircraft, the long skewbar introduced by Mod. FG.237 is incorporated in the
basic design of the right elevator trim tab. The left elevator anti-balance tab and the spring tab are
operated by an external rod system to which Mod. FG.237 is not applicable. Since the rudder tab
has a short skewbar, of Pre-mod. FG.237 standard, fitted at the upper position, it is required that
installation of the nuisance bracket of Mod. FG.1671 or equivalent be made as a positive
safeguard against incorrect assembly. (Vickers-Armstrongs Modification Bulletins D.2918 (700
Series) and FG.1671 (800/810 Series) cover this subject).

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Airworthiness Directives

▼Header Information

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

Amendment 39-304; AD 66 – 29 – 04

Airworthiness Directives: VICKERS- Models 744, 745D and 810 Series Airplanes.

►Preamble Information

Regulatory Information

66 – 29 – 04 VICKERS: Amdt. 39-304 Part 39 Federal Register November 9, 1966. Applies to

Viscount Models 744, 745D and 810 Series Airplanes.

Compliance required within the next 100 hours‟ time in service after the effective date of this AD,
unless already accomplished.
To prevent fouling between the trailing edge of the elevator hinge beam shroud and the elevator
skin lap joint, accomplish the following:

(a) Visually inspect top and bottom shrouds on elevator hinge beam assemblies to ensure that
clearance between trailing edge of shroud and forward edge of elevator skin lap joints or rivet
heads is not less than 0.20 inch throughout full range of elevator movement.

(b) If clearance is less than 0.20 inch, cut back trailing edge of hinge beam shroud to provide
clearance of at least 0.20 inch but less than 0.25 inch throughout full range of elevator movement.

(British Aircraft Corporation (B.A.C.) Ltd. Preliminary Technical Leaflet (PTL) No. 263, Issue 1,
(700 Series) and No. 126, Issue 1) (800/810 Series) pertain to this subject).

This directive effective November 19, 1966.

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 Airworthiness Directives

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

Amendment 39-623; AD 68 – 15 – 02

Airworthiness Directives; BRITISH AIRCRAFT CORPORATION Models 744, 745D and 810
Series Airplanes.

►Preamble Information

▼Regulatory Information

68 – 15 – 02 BRITISH AIRCRAFT CORPORATION: Amendment 39-623. Applies to

Viscount Models 744, 745D and 810 Series Airplanes.

Compliance required as indicated.

To detect and repair cracks in the elevator root and ribs P/Ns 60920-65, 60920-63, 72420-11 for
Models 744 and 745D and 81020 Shts. 81 and 83 Model 810, accomplish the following:

(a) For airplanes that have accumulated 7850 or more landings, inspect in accordance with
paragraph (c) within the next 150 landings after the effective date of this AD and thereafter
at intervals not to exceed 475 landings from the last inspection.

(b) For airplanes that have accumulated less than 7850 landings, inspect in accordance with
paragraph (c) prior to the accumulation of 8000 landings and thereafter at intervals not to
exceed 475 landings from the last inspection.

(c) Visually inspect the root end ribs for cracks in accordance with British Aircraft Corporation
Preliminary Technical Leaflet No. 274 Issue 1 (700 Series) or No. 138 Issue 1 (800/810
Series) or later ARB-approved issues or an FAA-approved equivalent.

(d) If cracks are detected during the inspection specified in paragraph (c), within the next 10
landings incorporate the Repair/Reinforcement scheme in accordance with British Aircraft
Corporation Preliminary Technical Leaflet No. 274 issue 1 (700 Series) or No. 138 Issue 1
(800/810 Series) or later ARB-approved issues or an equivalent approved by the Chief,
Aircraft Certification Staff, FAA, European Region.

(e) If not already accomplished under paragraph (d), within the next 3,000 landings after the
effective date of this AD, incorporate the Repair/Reinforcement Scheme in accordance with
British Aircraft Corporation Preliminary Technical Leaflet No.274 Issue 1 (700 Series) or
No. 138 Issue 1 (800/810 Series) or later ARB-approved issues or equivalent approved by
the Chief, Aircraft Certification Staff, FAA, European Region.

(f) After incorporation of the Repair/Reinforcement Scheme in accordance with either

paragraph (d) or (e), repeat the visual inspection specified in paragraph (c) prior to the next
 takeoff after each occurrence of severe nosewheel shimmy, or at intervals not to exceed
3,000 landings from the last inspection , whichever occurs earlier.

(g) For the purpose of complying with the AD, subject to acceptance by the assigned FAA
maintenance inspector, the number of landings may be determined by dividing each
airplane‟s hours‟ time in service by the operator‟s fleet average time from takeoff to landing
for the airplane type.

This amendment becomes effective July 23, 1968.

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 Airworthiness Directives

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

Amendment 39-621; AD 68 – 15 – 03

Airworthiness Directives, BRITISH AIRCRAFT CORPORATION Models 744 and 745D

Airplanes.

►Preamble Information

▼Regulatory Information

68-15-03 BRITISH AIRCRAFT CORPORATION: Amendment 39-621. Applies to Viscount

744 and 745D airplanes.

Compliance required as indicated, unless already accomplished.

To prevent fatigue damage to the horizontal stabilizer top spar root joint fittings, P/N 70118-
231/232 (Pre Mod. D. 3190), and P/N 70118-671/672 (Post Mod.D.3190), accomplish the
following:

(a) Inspect the horizontal stabilizer top spar root joint fittings for cracks in accordance with British
Aircraft Corporation PTL No. 264, Issue 2, Dated February 12, 1968 (700 Series) or later ARB-
approved issue, or an FAA-approved equivalent, as follows:

(1) For fittings which have been involved in 11,500 or more landings on the effective date of this
AD, within the next 500 landings, unless already accomplished within the last 2,500 landings, and
thereafter at intervals not to exceed 3,000 landings for the last inspection.

(2) For fittings which have been involved in less than 11,500 landings on the effective date of this
AD, prior to the accumulation of 12,000 landings and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 3,000
landings from the last inspection.

(b) After each inspection under paragraph (a), replace all cracked fittings with new fittings of the
same part number before further flight.

(c) For the purpose of complying with this AD, subject to acceptance by the assigned FAA
maintenance inspector, the number of landings may be determined by dividing each airplane‟s
hours‟ time in service by the operators fleet average time from takeoff to landing for the airplane
type.

This superseded Amendment 39-371 (32 F.R. 4306), AD 67-9-5.

This amendment becomes effective August 15, 1968.

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►Comments
 Airworthiness Directives

▼Header Information

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

Amendment 39-2236; AD 75 – 13 – 06

Airworthiness Directives: BRITISH AIRCRAFT CORPORATION Model 700 Series

Airplanes.

►Preamble Information

▼Regulatory Information

75-13-06 BRITISH AIRCRAFT CORPORATION: Amendment 39-2236. Applies to Viscount

Model 700 Series airplanes, certificated in all categories.

Compliance required as indicated.

To prevent the possible in-flight fatigue failure of the horizontal stabilizer, accomplish the
following:

(a) For horizontal stabilizer rear spars with more than 25,000 landings on the effective date of
this AD, comply with paragraphs (c) and (d) of this AD within the next 10 landings or 50
hours time in service, whichever occurs first, unless already accomplished.

(b) For all horizontal stabilizer rear spars not covered in paragraph (a) of this AD, comply with
paragraphs (c) and (d) of this AD before the accumulation of 20,000 total landings or the
lesser of 100 landings or 300 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD,
whichever occurs later, unless already accomplished.

(c) Inspect the rear spar of the left and right horizontal stabilizer for cracks and corrosion, and
repair or replace as necessary, in accordance with CAA-approved British Aircraft
Corporation (BAC) Alert Preliminary Technical Leaflet (PTL) No. 298 Issue 1, dated
August 16, 1974, or an FAA-approved equivalent.

(d) Accomplish BAC Modification Leaflet D.3268 or D.3269, or an FAA-approved equivalent

of either, as provided in BAC PTL No. 298, Issue 1.

(e) Spar booms on which the corrosion damage exceeds the limits set forth in BAC PTL No.
298, Issue 1, may not be returned to service unless the repair of such damage is approved by
the Chief, Aircraft Certification Staff, Europe, Africa, and Middle East Region of the FAA.
(f) The service life limitation of the rear spar assembly of a spar boom modified in accordance
with BAC Modification Leaflet D.3268, or an FAA-approved equivalent, is 2000 landings
after modification or 30,000 total pre-modification and post modification landings,
whichever occurs first.

(g) The service life limitation of the rear spar assembly of a spar boom modified in accordance
with BAC Modification Leaflet D.3269, or an FAA-approved equivalent, is 30,000 total pre-
modification and post-modification landings.

(h) For the purpose of this AD, the number of landings may be determined by actual count, or,
subject to the acceptance of the assigned FAA maintenance inspector, by dividing the
horizontal stabilizer spar total time in service by an average flight time determined from the
airplane log book to be representative for that airplane. Operators who have not kept records
of landings or time in service for individual horizontal stabilizers must substitute total
number of airplane landings or time in service in place thereof.

This amendment becomes effective June 6, 1975.

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

Amendment 39-2723; AD 76 – 19 – 01

Airworthiness Directives: BRITISH AIRCRAFT CORPORATION Model 744, 745D and

810 Series Airplanes.

►Preamble Information

▼Regulatory Information

76–19-01 BRITISH AIRCRAFT CORPORATION: Amendment 39-2723. Applies to

Viscount Model 744, 745D and 810 Series airplanes, certificated in all categories.

Compliance required as indicated.

To prevent possible failure of the elevator spring servo tab control mechanism, accomplish the
following:

(a) Replace the spigot bracket, P/N 70120-367, that attaches the elevator spring tab system
bellcrank to the left elevator torque tube with a new bracket of the same part number as follows:

(1) If neither paragraph (b) or (c) of AD 71-4-2 has been complied with prior to the effective date
of this AD, replace the bracket within the next 100 hours time in service after the effective date of
this AD or prior to the accumulation of 12,000 hours total time in service on the bracket,
whichever occurs later.

(2) If Paragraph (b) or (c) of AD 71-4-2 has been complied with prior to the effective date of this
AD, replace the bracket at the latest of the following:

(i) Within the next 50 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD.

(ii) Within 1000 hours time in service after complying with AD 71-4-2 if the bracket was not
replaced in complying with that AD.

(iii) Prior to the accumulation of 12,000 hours total time in service on the bracket.

(3) After complying with paragraph (a)(1) or (a)(2) of this AD, as appropriate, continue to replace
the brackets prior to the accumulation of 12,000 hours total time in service after installation.

(b) Operators who have not kept records of total hours time in service on individual spigot
brackets, P/N 70120-367, must substitute in lieu thereof the total hours time in service of the
airplane.
This supersedes Amendment 39-1154 (36 FR 2562), AD 71-4-2.

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

Amendment 39-4205; AD 80 – 21 – 51

Airworthiness Directives: BRITISH AEROSPACE Viscount Model 744, 745D and 810
Airplanes.

►Preamble Information

▼Regulatory Information

80 – 21 - 51 BRITISH AEROSPACE (FORMERLY VICKERS ARMSTRONG AIRCRAFT

LMITED): Amendment 39-4205. Applies to all Viscount Model 744, 745D and 810 airplanes
certificated in all categories.

Compliance required as indicated, unless already accomplished.

To prevent failure of the elevator control system, accomplish the following:

(a) Before further flight, determine the time in service on spigot fitting P/N 70120-367. Replace
each spigot fitting with a serviceable part in accordance with the following schedule, and
thereafter continue to replace the spigot fittings at intervals not to exceed 3,000 hours time in
service:

(1) If spigot fitting has 12,000 hours or more time in service since new, or the total
time in service is unknown, replace before further flight.

(2) If spigot fitting has less than 12,000 but more than 3,000 hours time in service on
the effective date of this AD:

(i) Before further flight, unless already accomplished, inspect for cracks using
the magnetic flaw detection saturation method and 5X magnification in
accordance with item 4 of the British Aerospace Weybridge Bristol Division
Campaign Wire REF SS/749/V, dated September 5, 1980, or an FAA-
approved equivalent. If any crack or cracks are found, replace spigot fitting
before further flight.
 (ii) If no cracks are found, replace spigot fitting within 300 hours time in service
after the effective date of this AD, or prior to the accumulation of 12,000
hours time in service, whichever occurs first, except as provided in paragraph
(a)(4) of this AD.

(3) If spigot fitting has 3,000 hours time in service or less on the effective date of this
AD, replace prior to the accumulation of 3,000 hours time in service or within 300
hours time in service, whichever occurs later.

(4) Spigot fittings with more than 3,000 hours time in service on the effective date of
this AD must be replace prior to September 15, 1981.

(b) Before further flight, unless already accomplished, inspect the spring servo tab operating
mechanism for security by examining the inboard tab on the LH elevator and its attachment
to the elevator together with connecting linkage through to “bellcrank” lever, P/N 70133-
567, and its associated spigot fitting, P/N 70120-367, on the inner end of the LH elevator
torque tube. In addition, the control circuit must be checked from this point through to the
adjustment spring located on the inner end of the subject torque tube. If defects are found,
repair as necessary and return to service.

(c) When replacing spigot fitting, P/N 70120-367, insure that the twin center bearing assembly
in the control lever, P/N 70133-567, is free to move. If defects are found, repair as necessary
and return to service.

(d) For Viscount Type 810, prior to the accumulation of 10,000 flights or within 50 hours time
in service after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, inspect the right and left
hand tailplane top root end fittings, P/N‟s 81018-227 and 81018-228, in accordance with
British Aerospace Technique AL/MAT/3713, dated September 26, 1980, or an FAA-
approved equivalent. Cracked fittings must be replaced prior to further flight.

(e) If an FAA-approved equivalent is used in complying with this AD, that equivalent must be
approved by the Chief, Aircraft Certification Staff, FAA, Europe, Africa and Middle East
Office. Report defects found to the Chief, Aircraft Certification Staff, FAA, Europe, Africa
and Middle East Office, c/o American Embassy, Brussels, Belgium. Reporting approved by
the Office of Management and Budget OMB No. 04/R0174.

The manufacturer‟s specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive are
incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). All persons affected
by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may
obtain copies upon request to British Aerospace, Aircraft Group, Weybridge-Briston Division,
Brooklands Road, Weybridge, Surrey, England KT13 OSF. These documents may be examined
at FAA Headquarters, Room 916, 800 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, D.C. 20591.

This amendment becomes effective August 27, 1981, as to all persons except those persons to
whom it was made immediately effective by telegraphic AD T80-21-51, issued October 2, 1980,
which contained this amendment.

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

Docket No. 91-NM-117-AD; Amendment 39-8112; AD 91 – 26 – 01

Airworthiness Directives: BRITISH AEROSPACE Viscount Model 744, 745D and 810
Airplanes.

►Preamble Information

▼Regulatory Information

91 – 26 - 01 BRITISH AEROSPACE: Amendment 39-8112. Docket No. 91-NM-117-AD.

Applicability: All Viscount Model 744, 745D and 810 Series airplanes, certificated in any
category.

Compliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished.

To prevent reduced controllability of the airplane, accomplish the following:

(a) Within 180 days after the effective date of this AD, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed
4 years, perform a visual inspection of the elevators to detect corrosion of the mild steel
balance weights and of the forward face of the leading edge members in accordance with
British Aerospace Preliminary Technical Leaflet (PTL) No. 324 (for Viscount Model 744
and 745D Series airplanes), Issue 1, or PTL No. 193 (for Viscount Model 810 series
airplanes), Issue 1, both dated February 10, 1990, as applicable.

(1) If corrosion is found in the mild steel balance weights, prior to further flight, repair
in accordance with the applicable PTL.

(2) If corrosion is found in the forward face of the leading edge members, prior to
further flight, repair in accordance with the applicable PTL. If corrosion exceeds
the limits specified in the PTL, prior to further flight, replace the members in
accordance with the PTL.
(b) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides
an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Standardization
Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate.

NOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance

Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the

Manager,Standardization Branch, ANM-113.

(c) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate
airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD.

(d) The inspection and repair requirements shall be done in accordance with British Aerospace
Preliminary Technical Leaflet (PTL) No. 324 (for Viscount Model 744 and 745D series
airplanes) Issue 1, dated February 10, 1990; or PTL No. 193 (for Viscount Model 810 series
airplanes), Issue 1, dated February 10, 1990; as applicable. This incorporation by reference
was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and
1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from British Aerospace, PLC, Librarian for Service
Bulletins, P.O. Box 17414, Dulles International Airport, Washington, D.C. 20041-0414.
Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, Renton, Washington;
or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street N.W., Room 8401, Washington, D.C.

http://ww…/297a532718d07cee86256a1d0068add1?Open Document&Highlight=2,Viscoun 09/06/01

(e) This amendment (39-8112, AD 91-26-01) becomes effective on March 23, 1992.

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

Docket No. 92-NM-24-AD; Amendment 39-8288; AD 92 – 14 – 06

Airworthiness Directives: BRITISH AEROSPACE Model Viscount 810 Series Airplanes.

►Preamble Information

▼Regulatory Information

92 –14- 06 BRITISH AEROSPACE: Amendment 39-8288. Docket No. 92-NM-24-AD.

Applicability: Model Viscount 810 series airplanes, certificated in any category.

Compliance required as indicated, unless previously accomplished.

To prevent loss of elevator structural integrity and reduced controllability of the airplane,
accomplish the following:

(a) Within 60 days after the effective date of this AD, visually inspect the external surface of
the left and right elevator lower skins for skin quilting, corrosion, and delamination, in
accordance with British Aerospace Viscount Alert Preliminary Technical Leaflet (PTL) 196,
dated March 1991.

(b) As a result of the inspection required by paragraph (a) of this AD, accomplish the
procedures specified in either paragraph (b)(1) or (b)(2) of this AD, as applicable, in
accordance with British Aerospace Viscount Alert PTL 196, dated March 1991:

(1) If no discrepancies are detected, apply water displacing fluid and anti-corrosion
protective treatment to the inner surfaces of the elevator lower skins, and rebalance
the elevators.
 (2) If any discrepancies are detected, prior to further flight, replace quilted, corroded,
or delaminated skins with a single thickness skin, apply water displacing fluid and
anti-corrosion protective treatment to the inner surfaces of the elevator lower skins,
and rebalance the elevators.

(c) Repeat the visual inspection of the elevator skins required by paragraph (a) of this AD, and
inspect the condition of the corrosion protective treatment inside the elevators, at intervals
not to exceed 850 hours time-in-service or 12 months, whichever occurs first. Replace any
quilted, corroded, or delaminated skins, and renew any deteriorated corrosion protective
treatment, prior to further flight, in accordance with British Aerospace Viscount Alert
Preliminary Technical Leaflet (PTL) 196, dated March 1991.

(d) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides
an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Standardization
Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. The request shall be forwarded
through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then
send it to the Manger, Standardization Branch.

NOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of

compliance with this airworthiness directive, if any, may be obtained form the

Standardization Branch.

(e) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate
the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.

(f) The inspection and replacement shall be done in accordance with British Aerospace
Viscount Alert Preliminary Technical Leaflet (PTL) 196, dated March 1991. This
incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in
accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552 (a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from British
Aerospace PLC, Librarian for Service Bulletins, P.O. Box 17414, Dulles International
Airport, Washington, D.C. 20041-0414. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport
Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the
Federal Register, 1110 L Street NW., Room 8401, Washington D.C.

(g) This amendment becomes effective on August 20, 1992.

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39 [60 FR 37818 No. 141 7/24/95]

Docket No. 94-NM-166-AD; Amendment 39-9311; AD 95- 15- 08

Airworthiness Directives: British Aerospace Model Viscount 744, 745D and 810 Airplanes.

►Preamble Information

▼Regulatory Information

95–15-08 BRITISH AEROSPACE REGIONAL AIRCRAFT LIMITED (Formerly British

Aerospace Commercial Aircraft Limited, Vickers-Armstrongs Aircraft Limited):
Amendment 39-9311. Docket No. 94-NM-166-AD.

Applicability: All Model Viscount 744, 745D and 810 airplanes, certificated in any category.

NOTE 1: This AD applies to each airplane identified in the preceding applicability provision,
regardless of whether it has been modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the
requirements of this AD. For airplanes that have been modified, altered, or repaired so that the
performance of the requirements of this AD is affected, the owner/operator must use the authority
provided in paragraph (b) of this AD to request approval from the FAA. This approval may
address either no action, if the current configuration eliminates the unsafe condition; or different
actions necessary to address the unsafe condition described in this AD. Such a request should
include an assessment of the effect of the changed configuration on the unsafe condition addressed
by this AD. In no case does the presence of any modification, alteration, or repair remove any
airplane from the applicability of this AD.

Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously.

To prevent cracking or corrosion of the main spar forward booms or the upper root joint
attachment fitting, which consequently could lead to the failure of the tailplane assemblies and
reduce the controllability of the airplane, accomplish the following:
(a) Prior to the accumulation of 8 years since date of manufacture of this airplane, or within 18
months after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, perform an inspection to detect
corrosion of the tailplane assemblies, in accordance with British Aerospace Regional Aircraft
Limited Viscount Alert Preliminary Technical Leaflet (PTL) 182, Issue 2, dated August 7, 1992
(for Model Viscount 810 airplanes), or Viscount PTL 313, Issue 2, dated February 1, 1993 (for
Model Viscount 744, 754D, airplanes), as applicable. If corrosion is detected during the
inspection, prior to further flight, correct the discrepancies in accordance with the service bulletin.
Thereafter, repeat the inspection at intervals not to exceed 8 years.

NOTE 2: The inspection procedures described in Viscount Alert PTL‟s 182 and 313

include correction of any cracking found [ref. Paragraph D.(6) of the PTL‟s] and

application of corrosion protective treatment [ref. Paragraph E.(3) of the PTL‟s]

(b) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an
acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch ANM-
113, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an
appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the
Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113.

NOTE 3: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance

with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Standardization Branch, ANM-113.

(c) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199 of the
Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location
where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.

(d) The inspection shall be done in accordance with British Aerospace Regional Aircraft Limited
Viscount Alert Preliminary Technical Leaflet (PTL) 182, Issue 2, dated August 7, 1992; or
Viscount PTL 313, Issue 2, dated February 1, 1993; as applicable. This incorporation by
reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552
(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Copies may be obtained from British Aerospace Regional Aircraft Ltd.,
Engineering Support Manager, Military Business Unit, Chadderton Works, Greengate, Middleton,
Manchester M24 1SA, England. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane
Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal
Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., Suite 700, Washington, D.C.

(e) The amendment becomes effective on August 23, 1995.

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39 (60 FR 48634 No. 182 9/20/95)

Docket No. 94-NM-111-AD; Amendment 39-9373; AD 95 -19 -11

Airworthiness Directives: British Aerospace Model Viscount 744, 745D and 810 Airplanes.

►Preamble Information

▼Regulatory Information

95-19-11 BRITISH AEROSPACE REGIONAL AIRCRAFT LIMITED (Formerly British

Aerospace Commercial Aircraft Limited, Vickers-Armstrongs Aircraft Limited):
Amendment 39-9373. Docket No. 94-NM-111-AD.

Applicability: All Model Viscount 744, 745D, and 810 airplanes, certificated in any category.

NOTE 1: This AD applies to each airplane identified in the preceding applicability provision
regardless of whether it has been modified, altered or repaired in the area subject to the
requirements of this AD. For airplanes that have been modified, altered or repaired so that the
performance of the requirements of this AD is affected, the owner/operator must use the authority
provided in paragraph (d) of this AD to request approval from the FAA. This approval may
address either no action, if the current configuration eliminates the unsafe condition; or different
actions necessary to address the unsafe condition described in this AD. Such a request should
include an assessment of the effect of the changed configuration on the unsafe condition addressed
by this AD. In no case does the presence of any modification, alteration, or repair remove any
airplane from the applicability of this AD.

Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously.

To prevent structural degradation of the attachment of the horizontal stabilizer to the fuselage,
accomplish the following:
(a) For Model Viscount 744 and 745D airplanes: Within 3,000 landings or 3 years after the
effective date of this AD, whichever occurs first, perform a high frequency eddy current (HFEC)
inspection to detect cracking of the bolt holes on the top fittings of the root joint of the tailplane
spar, in accordance with British Aerospace Alert Preliminary Technical Leaflet (PTL) 264, Issue
3, dated September 1, 1992. Repeat the inspection thereafter at intervals not to exceed 3,000
landings or 3 years, whichever occurs first.

(b) For Model Viscount 810 airplanes: Within 1,000 landings or 1 year after the effective date of
this AD, whichever occurs first, perform an HFEC inspection to detect cracking of the bolt holes
on the top fittings of the root joint of the tailplane spar, in accordance with British Aerospace Alert
PTL 127, Issue 3, dated June 1, 1992. Repeat the inspection thereafter at intervals not to exceed
3,000 landings or 3 years, whichever occurs first.

(c) If any cracking is found during the inspections required by paragraph (a) or (b) of this AD,
prior to further flight, replace the cracked fitting with a serviceable part, in accordance with British
Aerospace Alert PTL 264, Issue 3, dated September 1, 1992 (for Model 744 and 745D airplanes),
or Alert PTL 127, Issue 3, dated June 1, 1992 (for Model 810 airplanes), as applicable.

(d) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an
acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch,
ANM-113, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an
appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the
Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113.

NOTE 2: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance

with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Standardization Branch, ANM-113.

(e) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with section 21.197 and 21.199 of the
Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location
where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.

(f) The inspection and replacement shall be done in accordance with British Aerospace Alert
Preliminary Technical Leaflet (PTL) 264, Issue 3, dated September 1, 1992; or British Aerospace
Alert PTL 127, Issue 3, Dated June 1, 1992, as applicable.

This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in
accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Copies may be obtained from British
Aerospace Regional Aircraft Ltd., Engineering Support Manager, Military Business Unit,
Chadderton Works, Greengate, Middleton, Manchester M24 1SA,England. Copies may be
inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton,
Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., Suite 700,
Washington, D.C.

(g) This amendment becomes effective on October 20, 1995.

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3b.3 Conclusion

Such examples, related to this part of the Viscount which was not recovered from
the wreckage, tend to question the statement of the Investigation Committee
Accident Report that:

“Failure of the basic airframe Structure contra-indicated”.

This sample has been created to give an idea on how complex was the follow-on
of the Viscount technical situation.

The presentation note of the 95-19-11 AD is an example, stating that the 800
series Viscount tailplane spar fittings were “loaded to higher stress levels, which
make them more susceptible to fatigue cracking that the fittings of the Model
Viscount 744 and 745 D airplanes”.
Airworthiness Directives; British Aerospace Model Viscount Model 744, 745D and 81…Page 1 of 5

[Federal Register: May 1, 1995]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 94-MN-111-AD] (AD95-19-11)

Airworthiness Directives; British Aerospace Model Viscount Model 744, 745D and 810
Airplanes.

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM)

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This document proposes the adoption of a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is
applicable to all British Aerospace Model Viscount Model 744, 745D and 810 airplanes. This
proposal would require inspections to detect cracking of certain fittings of the tailplane spar, and
replacement of the fittings with serviceable parts, if necessary. This proposal is promoted by
reports of fatigue cracking of certain fittings in the tailplane spar. The actions specified by the
proposed AD are intended to prevent such cracking, which could result in structural degradation of
the attachment of the horizontal stabilizer to the fuselage.

DATES: Comments must be received by June 12, 1995

ADDRESSES: Submit comments in triplicate to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),

Transport Airplane Directorate, AM-103, Attention: Rules Docket No. 94-NM-111-AD, 1601
Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056. Comments may be inspected at this
location between 9:00am and 3:00pm, Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

The service information referenced in the proposed rule may be obtained from British Aerospace
Regional Aircraft Ltd., Engineering Support Manager, Military Business Unit, Chadderton Works,
Greengate, Middleton, Manchester M24 1SA, England. This information may be examined at the
FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton Washington.
For Further Information Contact:

William Schroeder, Aerospace Engineer, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Transport

Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056; telephone:-
(206) 227-2148; fax:- (206) 227-1320.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

Interested persons are invited to participate in the making of the proposed rule by submitting such
written data, views, or arguments, as they may desire. Communications shall identify the Rules
Docket number and be submitted in triplicate to the address specified above.

All communications received on or before the closing date for comments, specified above, will be
considered before taking action on the proposed rule. The proposals contained in this notice may
be changed in light of the comments received.

Comments are specifically invited on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy
aspects of the proposed rule. All comments submitted will be available, both before and after the
closing date for comments, in the Rules Docket for examination by interested persons. A report
summarising each FAA-public contact concerned with the substance of this proposal will be filed
in the Rules Docket.

Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments submitted in response to
this notice must submit a self-addressed, stamped postcard on which the following statement is
made: “Comments to Docket Number 94-NM-111-AD”. The postcard will be date stamped and
returned to the commenter.

AVAILABILITY OF NPRMs:

Any person may obtain a copy of this NPRM by submitting a request to the FAA, Transport
Airplane Directorate, ANM-103, Attention: Rules Docket No. 94-NM-111-AD, 1601 Lind
Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056. [Page 21057].

DISCUSSION:

The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), which is the airworthiness authority for the United
Kingdom, recently notified the FAA that an unsafe condition may exist on all British Aerospace
Model Viscount Model 744, 745D and 810 airplanes. The CAA advises that it has received
reports of fatigue cracking of certain attach fittings of the tailplane spar on these airplanes. The
cracking was found in the top fitting of the tailplane spar at the junction of the chamfer and the
innermost hole of the bolt group through the top flange. Such fatigue cracking, if not detected and
corrected in a timely manner, could result in structural degradation of the attachment of the
horizontal stabilizer to the fuselage.

British Aerospace has issued Alert Preliminary Technical Leaflet (PTL) 264, Issue 3, dated
September 1, 1992 (for Model Viscount 744, and 745D airplanes), and Alert PTL 127, Issue 3,
dated June 1, 1992 (for Model Viscount 810 airplanes).

These Alert PTL‟s describe procedures for performing repetitive high frequency eddy current
(HFEC) inspections to detect cracking of the bolt holes on the top fittings of the tailplane spar, and
replacement of cracked fittings with serviceable parts.
The CAA classified these Alert PTL‟s as mandatory in order to assure the continued airworthiness
of these airplanes in the United Kingdom.

These airplane models are manufactured in the United Kingdom and are type certificated for
operation in the United States under the provisions of Sec. 21.29 of the Federal Aviation
Regulations (14 CFR 21.29) and the applicable bilateral airworthiness agreement. Pursuant to this
bilateral airworthiness agreement, the CAA has kept the FAA informed of the situation described
above.

The FAA has examined the findings of the CAA, reviewed all available information, and
determined that AD action is necessary for products of this type design that are certificated for
operation in the United States.

Since an unsafe condition has been identified that is likely to exist or develop on other airplanes of
the same type design registered in the United States, the proposed AD would require repetitive
HFEC inspections to detect cracking of certain fittings of the tailplane spar, and replacement of
the fittings with serviceable parts, if necessary. The actions would be required to be accomplished
in accordance with the Alert PTL‟s described previously.

Operators should note that the proposed compliance time for the initial inspection of the fittings
on Model Viscount 810 airplanes is shorter than that proposed for the Model Viscount 744 and
745D airplanes because the fittings on Model Viscount 810 airplanes are of a different
configuration. The fittings on Model Viscount 810 airplanes are loaded to higher stress levels,
which makes them more susceptible to fatigue cracking than the fittings on the Model Viscount
744 and 745D airplanes.

As a result of recent communications with the Air Transport Association (ATA) of America, the
FAA has learned that, in general, some operators may misunderstand the legal effect of AD‟s on
airplanes that are identified in the applicability provision of the AD, but that have been altered or
repaired in the area addressed by the AD. The FAA points out that all airplanes identified in the
applicability provision of an AD are legally subject to the AD. If an airplane has been altered or
repaired in the affected area in such a way as to affect compliance with the AD, the owner or
operator is required to obtain FAA approval for an alternative method of compliance with the AD,
in accordance with the paragraph of each AD that provides for such approvals. A note has been
included in this notice to clarify this long-standing requirement.

The FAA estimates that 29 airplanes of U.S. registry would be affected by this proposed AD, that
it would take approximately 4 work hours per airplane to accomplish the proposed actions, and
that the average labor rate is $60 per work hour. Based on these figures, the total cost impact of
the proposed AD on U.S. operators in estimated to be $6,960, or $240 per airplane.

The total cost impact figure discussed above is based on assumptions that no operator has yet
accomplished any of the proposed requirements of this AD action, and that no operator would
accomplish those actions in the future if this AD were not adopted.

The regulations proposed herein would not have substantial direct effects on the States, on the
relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, in accordance with Executive
Order 12612, it is determined that this proposal would not have sufficient federalism implications
to warrant the preparation of a Federalism Assessment.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this proposed regulation (1) is not a “significant
regulatory action “ under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a “significant rule” under the DOT
Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26,
1979); and (3) if promulgated, will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative,
on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. A
copy of the draft regulatory evaluation prepared for this action is contained in the Rules Docket.
A copy of it may be obtained by contacting the Rules Docket at the location provided under the
caption ADDRESSES.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety

The Proposed Amendment

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation
Administration proposes to amend part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39)
as follows:

PART 39 – AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. App. 1354(a), 1421 and 1423; 49 U.S.C. 106(g); and 14 CFR 11.89.

Sec. 39.13 [Amended]

2. Section 39.13 is amended by adding the following new airworthiness directive:

British Aerospace Regional Aircraft Limited (Formerly British Aerospace Commercial

Aircraft Limited, Vickers-Armstrongs Aircraft Limited); Docket 94-M-111.AD

Applicability: All Model Viscount 744, 745D and 810 airplanes certificated in any category.

Note1: This AD applies to each airplane identified in the preceding applicability provision,
regardless of whether it has been modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the
requirements of this AD. For airplanes that have been modified, altered, or repaired so that the
performance of the requirements of this AD is affected, the owner/operator must use the authority
provided in paragraph (d) to request approval from the FAA.

This approval may address either no action, if the current configuration eliminates the unsafe
condition; or different actions necessary to address the unsafe condition described in this AD.
Such a request should include an assessment of the effect of the changed configuration on the
unsafe condition addressed by this AD. In no case does the presence of any modification,
alteration, or repair remove any airplane form the applicability of this AD.

Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. (Page 21058).

To prevent structural degradation of the attachment of the horizontal stabilizer to the

fuselage, accomplish the following:

(a) For Model Viscount 744 and 745D airplanes: Within 3,000 landings or 3 years after
the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs first, perform a high frequency eddy
current (HFEC) inspection to detect cracking of the bolt holes on the top fittings of the
root joint of the tailplane spar, in accordance with British Aerospace Alert Preliminary
Technical Leaflet (PTL) 264, Issue 3, dated September 1, 1992. Repeat the inspection
thereafter at intervals not to exceed 3,000 landings or 3 years, whichever occurs first.
 (b) For Model Viscount 810 airplanes: Within 1,000 landings or 1 year after the effective
date of this AD, whichever occurs first, perform an HFEC inspection to detect cracking
of the bolt holes on the top fittings of the root joint of the tailplane spar, in accordance
with British Aerospace Alert PTL 127, Issue 3, dated June 1, 1992. Repeat the
inspection thereafter at intervals not to exceed 3,000 landings or 3 years, whichever
occurs first.

(c) If any cracking is found during the inspections required by paragraph (a) or (b) of this
AD, prior to further flight, replace the cracked fitting with a serviceable part, in
accordance with British Aerospace Alert PTL 264, Issue 3, Dated September 1, 1992
(for Model 744 and 745D airplanes), or Alert PTL 127, Issue 3, dated June 1, 1992 (for
Model 810 airplanes); as applicable.

(d) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that

provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager,
Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators
shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance
Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Standardisation
Branch, ANM-113.

Note 2: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance

with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Standardisation Branch, ANM-113.

(e) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with Secs. 21.197 and 21.199 of
the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane
to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on April 25, 1995

James V. Devany,

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate,

Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 95-10587 Filed 4-28-95; 8:45am]

BILLING CODE 4910-13-U

APPENDIX 3C: DETAILED COMPARISON AOF-AOM

(Contents page)

1. Identification of Similarities between AOF and AOM during the Period of

disabled Flight.

1.1 With Respect to Engines

1.1.1. AOF

1.1.2. AOM

1.1.3. Comments

1.2 With Respect to Aircraft Attitude

1.2.1. AOF

1.2.2. AOM

1.2.3. Comments

1.3. With Respect to Track Reconstruction

2. Consequences on Evidences and Probabilities

2.1 With Respect to Engines

2.1.1. AOF

2.1.2. AOM

2.1.3. Comments

2.2. With Respect to Airframe

4. Conclusions
 APPENDIX 3C: DETAILED COMPARISON AOF-AOM

1. IDENTIFICATION OF SIMILARITIES BETWEEN AOF AND AOM DURING

THE PERIOD OF DISABLED FLIGHT

1.1 With Respect To Engines

1.1.1 AOF: chronologically

 Loud but engines sounded normal

 Sound of engine power going on and off erratically

 Pushing black smoke as the engines revved up

 Some propellers stopped: two of the propellers were stopped, or turning very
slowly

 The loud noise of engines

 All propellers were rotating

 Occasional bursts of power

1.1.2 AOM: chronologically

 A single loud sound

 (Nr 3 engine) propeller was bent in towards the plane (feathered or coarse pitch)

 It was bent towards the place

 I did not notice anything wrong with the propellers

 The sound of the engines was peculiar: they seemed to be labouring

 ……making a funny noise

 ……pulling hard and making a dreadful noise

 ……heard a heavy sound getting louder and louder

 Its sound was enormous: no variations in its continuous sound, all propellers
rotating……

 ……heard a noise……saw 3 small black clouds. I did not notice a particular

alteration in the noise
  ……it was funny noise……very loud, rough and like the noise of a Hoover
finishing up…… it was making a particular noise, like if it had a motor bike inside

 ……the plane sounded normal

 ……the noise of this plane appeared to be normal

 ……the noise cut out, suddenly……so fast that I didn‟t think it was distance away
from caused it

 ……I could not give my opinion as to the noise of it

 ……I heard a loud bang, like an explosion blowing up a quarry. It died away like
thunder

 ……I heard a very very heavy noise

 ……I heard an unusual sound

 ……I heard noise like thunder

 ……I heard a heavy noise like thunder

 ……I heard a noise like thunder but short, rather like a tyre burst

 ……I heard a heavy bang like thunder, short and sharp like a tyre burst, but
heavier

1.1.3 Comments

Similar Sequence

 Engines sounding normal

 Propeller(s) feathered, then unfeathered

 Louder and louder noise

 Occasional bursts of power (AOF), with small black clouds (AOM)

but AOF does not present any separation in flight, and the noise emitted by the crash has
not been observed since the observers concentrated their attention on the aircraft
crashing.
1.2 WITH RESPECT TO AIRCRAFT ATTITUDE

1.2.1 AOF: Chronologically

 Very low

 Flying just below the cloud-base

Inspector‟s Comments

The Viscount was sufficiently under control to be climbed again at least to an altitude at
which it would not arouse particular attention on the ground (from 7.10 to 7.27)

 Flying close overhead and circling

 Flying erratically (“fluttering”)

 Flying so low that it very nearly hit roofs….

Inspectors Comments

The pilot, whilst trying to maintain visual contact with the ground, was forced to re-enter
cloud to avoid the possibility of collision with ground objects.

Flying very low….going in and out of cloud

Approaching very low…as if to land, then power was applied, and it climbed away,
turning right all the time

A right hand turn was made

Still very low over the ground, but not at all times beneath the very low cloud base
prevailing

The ground track appears to have been erratic and to have included a change of direction
(on the right)

The aircraft was descending…the left wing was “drooping” (left bank in an intended
turn?)… it was ”zig-zagging”

…” drop down vertically in what “(could have been an incipient spin)

1.2.2 AOM: chronologically

 ……I saw an aircraft flying very low……it was circling round……it did this about
twice

 ……It appeared to be weaving or going in a zig-zag manner

 ……at low altitude, slightly climbing, steadily……

  ……turning left, quite fast and descending……it was descending, unsteady in roll,
down to a height so low that the grass was bent by the air flow

 ……steep turn on the right,……climbing steady

 ……it dived suddenly……very steep by the right

 ……the plane seemed well under control

 ……climbing slowly steadily……

 ……seemed to me to be unsteady and apparently descending……

 ……what drew my attention was the abrupt change of course……it turned to the
right with a very sharp angle of bank

 ……it was turning back to the right……

1.2.3 Comments

 both aircraft are unsteady when descending or levelled at very low altitude, zig-
zagging or steep right turning

 more steady when climbing, but difficult to observe for AOF since the low altitude
of the clouds basis

 both aircraft gave the impression “as if to land”, without success

1.3 TRACKS RECONSTRUCTION

Both “disabled flights” present similar characteristics:

 Similar duration

 Same lateral instability, in particular steep right turns

 Same longitudinal instability, pitch down tendency possibility countered by

increased engine power
2. CONSEQUENCES ON EVIDENCES AND PROBABILITES

The identification of similarities between AOF and AOM during the period of disabled
flight may give further light on the technical evidence and the probabilities stated in the
1968 final report of AOF accident.

2.1 ENGINES

2.1.1 AOF

 Engines revving up and down

 Unusual engine noises

 Occasional bursts of power

 Two propellers stopped, or turning very slowly, being observed during the “disabled
flight”

 None of the 4 propellers feathered at the time of impact

Wreckage Examination: “Report on the condition of the engines” (R-R)

 The oil filters were free from any metallic deposits, but they had been contaminated
with white sludge deposits (id for 3 of the engines, the Nr 4 engine being not
contaminated)

 Samples of the sludge found in the oil filters have been laboratory examined, and the
chemical analysis was found to be:-

- 2% oil

- 28% magnesium corrosion products

- the majority of the remainder being sodium, carbonate and water

 It is considered (by R-R) that the oil system contaminated was undoubtedly caused
after impact, primarily during the fire fighting operations. In any case, the engines
could not possibly have operated for the time that this aircraft had been airborne,
with an oil system contaminated in this way, without showing considerable distress if
not complete failure of all main line bearings.

 No comment has been introduced in the R-R report about the FCUs.

2.1.2 AOM

 Engines labouring

 (Nr 3 engine) propeller bent towards the plane

 Unusual engine noises

 Small black clouds

  Non of the 4 propeller feathered at the time of impact

 All engines were lit at the time of impact

Wreckage Examination – Appendix 4b Part 1 (R-R)

 The LP fuel filter contained a white gelatinous substance (engine Nr 1, Nr 2, Nr 3)

 The results of the analysis of this substance if an analysis has been made, are not
available

 The technical advice about the presence of this gelatinous substance is not available

 No FCU was recovered

2.1.3 Comments

 The observations reported by the witnesses, with respect to feathering/unfeathering,

sounding, crash conditions are identical

 The wreckage examination, by R-R, concluded in both cases for normal operating
conditions of the engines, at the time of the impact. However, it may be observed
that:-

- No comments on the FCU functioning have been made

- A white gelatinous substance was observed on the oil filters of AOF, and
found (and possible analysed, but not referred to in the report) in the fuel
filters of AOM

2.2 AIRFRAME

Most of the conclusions reached by the investigation of the airframe wreckage relate to
“no evidence”, which does not mean that there is evidence of the opposite.

In particular, in 1968, the problems relating to the spigot of the tabs had not arisen. So
the substantiation of no control surface malfunction or no overstressing in flight is to be
re-assessed.

It may be of interest to observe that AOF crashed 27mn after the initial event, after the
same time flown by AOM when it lost its elevator. It is possible that a single
experienced pilot fighting for 27mn to keep its aircraft airborne be more tired that the 2
crew of EI-AOM, and gave up to crash.

The statement that the “radio-telephony” (was) capable of being used is not evidenced in
the report: the substantiation of this statement is also, today, of interest.

With reference to 2.1.8: Summary of Probabilities (on the case of AOF)

2.1.8.2: Engine or Propeller Trouble

2.1.8.4: Inadvertent Spin

 The statement that “automatic feathering (with consequent stopping of engine and
propeller) could have occurred during the practising of recovery from stalls, as happened
in the incident of 12 June……” is supporting the assumption given as contributing factor
of the first loss of control of EI-AOM: both events presented a period of negative
accelerations, which could explain the conditions of the initial dive, the necessity of a
recovery manoeuvre which may result in an overstress of some flight control surfaces
and associated components (transmission, spigot……).

With respect to argument that Captain O‟Keefe did not warn the ATC, the experience of
AOM is of interest: there were to skilled pilots in AOM, and the first (and single) distress
message was received 13 to 15mn after the initial loss of control.

In the case of AOF, the Captain was the only one skilled pilot on board, having to
counter the high level forces as in the AOM on the stick. In addition, the evidence that
the R/T transceivers were operative after the dive is not today available.

3. CONCLUSIONS

In 1968, the similarities between the periods of the disabled flight of EI-AOF and EI-
AOM could not be identified, since the track reconstruction of EI-AOM was based on
inadequate information.

The technical investigations performed by the manufacturers did not include, generally,
in “evidences” but in “no evidences”, since, in particular, they could not focus on those
“weak points” which were identified later on.

As a consequence, the conclusions of the 1968 AOF accident report should have to be re-
assessed, taking advantage of the lessons learned at the occasion of the other accidents
occurred later on, in particular the one occurred to EI-AOM, its “sister-ship” in terms of
design status and maintenance methods.
EI-AOF
EI-AOM
APPENDICES 4

4a: The Viscount Aircraft

4b: Flight Controls

4c: Metal Fatigue

4d: Flutter

Appendix 4a THE VISCOUNT AIRCRAFT

4a.1 General View

4a.2 View “General Arrangement

4a.3 Leadings Particulars

4a.4 Tail Related Views

4a.5 DART Engine Views

Appendix 4a

The Viscount Aircraft

The Viscount designed and manufactured by VICKERS ARMSTRONGS Ltd., is a pressurised

passenger carrying aircraft powered by four propeller turbine engines.

The Viscount 630 prototype first flew in July 1948 whilst the prototype of the first 700 series, a
slightly larger and more powerful aircraft, flew in August 1952. This was followed by a stretched
higher weight model, the 800 series. All together, 445 Viscounts were built. The Viscount Type
Certificate was finally withdrawn in July 2000.

The Viscount was certified to the British Civil Airworthiness Requirements (BCAR) Section D
issues 2 and 3 effective 1 January 1951. It was subsequently certificated by the United States
Department of Transportation Federal Administration Aviation under CAR 10 on the basis of a
United Kingdom Certificate of Airworthiness issued for each aircraft. This recognised the UK
certification basis as being equivalent to CAR 4b effective May 18, 1954. There were three basic
variants:

(i) 700 Series

(ii) 800 Series

(iii) 810 Series

The 700 Series Viscount was powered by four Rolls-Royce R.Da.3 Mk 506 and later by R.Da.6
MK 510 engines; all 700‟s fitted with this latter engine being known as 700 D‟s.

The Type 745 was the first to have the Mk 50 engines and offered improvements in operating
weights, range and speed. Extensive modifications were carried out to the wing spars to increase
their life, particularly necessary for operation over short range route networks. These included a
significant increase in bottom spar boom area and a change in its material from DTD 363A to L65.
The 745 had a maximum take-off weight of 64,500lb and a landing weight of 57,500lb.

The higher all-round power of the R.Da.6 justified a stretched Viscount resulting in the 800 Series.
The overall length of the fuselage was increased by 46.0in giving a 15% increase in capacity. The
wing structure was similar to that of the 745. The maximum landing weight increased to
59,500lb. The tail planes and elevators were to significantly changed through the various models.
The two-turbined Dart engine had reached its limit in R.Da.6. An additional turbine stage was
introduced which resulted in improved performance and this engine was termed the R.Da.7. A
derated (Mk 520) version was first used on the Viscount 806 but these were later replaced by the
Mk510 engines. The Viscount 810 Series used the R.Da.7 Mk 525 and Mk 530. The 810 Series
wing structure was improved in relation to the 800 Series with a further increase in the take-off
and landing weights to 72,500 lb and 64,000 lb respectively.

Aer Lingus EI-AOM was an 800 Series aircraft carrying the designation of Model 803 and Serial
Number 178.

Aircraft details are to be found in the 1970 report.

4.a.1.
Appendix 4a.4 Views Tail Related

Two Pictures of the Viscount Tail

Fig. 1: Fin Leading Edge to Fuselage (Station 871)
Fig. 2: Tail Centre Section Spar to Fuselage (Station 934)
Fig. 3: Elevator Torque Tube to Gimbles (Tailcone)
Fig. 4: Spring Servo Mechanism Levers to Elevator (Port Elevator Torque Tube)
Appendix 4a.5 DART Engine Views

1. Right Hand View

2. Left Hand View
3. “General Arrangement” View
 Appendix 4bFlight Controls

Flight Controls

The functions of the elevator tabs:

A manually controlled trim tab, working as a secondary control surface, is hinged at the rear of
the starboard elevator. The tab is controlled by two handwheels in the cockpit through a chain,
cable, rod and gear mechanism. The tab moves in the opposite direction to the elevator and is
adjusted in order to “trim out” or remove excessive pilot control forces. The primary pitch control
of the aircraft is by direct deflection of the elevators by the pilot through the control column.
However, when the autopilot is engaged, pitch control adjustments are made by means of a servo
motor connected to the tab.

A spring servo tab is fitted to the inner position of the port elevator. This tab moves in the
opposite sense to the main control and operates through a mechanism mounted on the port
elevator torque tube. For normal operation when the control forces are light, the tab acts as part of
the elevator. However, when pilot control forces exceeds 25 pounds, a spring in the tab control
mechanism compresses and the tab is deflected so as to produce an aerodynamic force that aids
the pilot in moving the elevator. A skew bar mechanism in the tab control system utilises a
spindle called a spigot (part number 70120-367) which is a lifed item and features elsewhere in
this report.

Outboard of the spring tab on the port elevator is the anti-balance tab. This moves in the same
sense as the main control and is automatic in operation. This anti-balance or anti-servo tab is used
to aid the pilot in returning the elevator to the neutral position and prevents it from moving to full
deflection due to aerodynamic forces.
Fig. 1: Flight Controls in Aircraft
Fig. 2: The Elevator Structure
Fig. 3: Elevator Access Panels
Fig. 4: Elevator and Rudder Trim Tab Controls
Fig. 5: Controls Aft of Pressure Bulkhead
Fig. 6: Elevator Torque Tube
Fig. 7: Elevator – Controls Relationship
 Appendix 4c Metal Fatigue

Fig. 1: Example of fatigue crack on the tailplane spar joint fitting

Fig. 2: Typical position of a crack on the tailplane spar joint fitting

Fig. 3: Idem (above view)

Fig. 4: Areas of concern, corrosion related, in 1969

Appendix 4c

Metal Fatigue

Metal Fatigue is the phenomenon whereby if a part is subjected to repeated loads at a level well
below that required to cause failure in a single application, a crack will eventually initiate and
propagate to failure.

The repetitive loads may cover a wide range, such as that affecting an aircraft wing or tail, ranging
from very small frequent loads from turbulence and manoeuvres, up to those from heavy gusts
which occasionally occur in flight. It is the cumulative effect of this “spectrum of loads” which
eventually, usual after thousands of hours, results in the appearance of fatigue cracking.

An example of fatigue caused by low repetitive loads but over a high number of cycles may be
observed in propeller blades. Each time a rotating blade passes the side of the fuselage, a small
load input is produced. Should some defect be present, such as a corrosion pit or a stone nick,
then over some millions of propeller revolutions a fatigue crack and blade separation could take
place.

In the case of tailplane flutter such as occurred to an Indonesian Viscount in 1980 and probably
affected EI-AOM, very high loads are involved. Flutter resulted in the bending of both tailplanes
upwards and downwards symmetrically with a large tip deflections at a rate of six times per
second.

In some cases, flutter can cause almost immediate failure of the structure and much depends upon
the severity and the detail design of the structure. In the case of EI-AOM, the tailplane could only
have been expected to last minutes rather than hours.

Following is a brief explanation of the setting of fatigue lives, the substantiation of the Viscount
Tailplane and some service background.

(a) The Criteria

Both the British and the United States requirements applicable at the time of the certification of
the Viscount specified that the structure be substantiated against either Safe Life or Fail Safe
Standards.
The Safe Life Concept requires that those parts of the structure whose failure could result in loss
of the aircraft must be able to remain safely in use up to a pre-determined retirement life. Safe
Life components are not normally subject to any inspection program related to fatigue although
they may be examined periodically for such problems as wear or corrosion.

Safe life structures are basically simpler and easier to stress and substantiate than fail-safe designs
but they do have the greater disadvantage of being subject to catastrophic fatigue failure at a level
which may be extremely remote but is unacceptable by today‟s standards.

There is, unfortunately, an inherent scatter in the initiation and propagation of metal fatigue which
in a practical flight structure cannot be absolutely catered for. Factors are applied to fatigue test
results and to calculations in order to determine an acceptable retirement life for the component
concerned. In all cases, fatigue scatter factors are predicated by the acceptance of a small, but
nevertheless real, risk of failure.

In some aspects the real life situation is even less attractive. The most thorough test and
evaluation program cannot cater fully for an unforeseen severe operating environment, corrosion,
accidental damage or a manufacturing defect – all of which can very readily initiate premature
fatigue cracking. There are many recorded cases of aircraft being lost in this way from such
diverse initiating causes as a surface scribe mark, a badly fitted bust in a hole, a heat treatment
error, a corrosion pt, etc..

The fail-safe concept is based upon providing sufficient redundancy in a structure that a failure on
one part will not result in the loss of the whole. This redundancy may be provided by alternative
load paths or by known satisfactory crack propagation characteristics, both considered in
conjunction with residual strength capability and the provision for inspection.

The Viscount was designed almost entirely to the Safe Life concept with the result that the
fuselage pressure cabin, the five lower booms of the wing main spar, the tailplanes and various
smaller components all had specified retirement times.

Unfortunately, the state of the art in the 1950‟s did not lead to very precise life calculations aside
from the inherent problems of scatter mentioned earlier. It should be noted that 50 years later life
estimation methods are not much better, which is one reason Safe Life structures are not now
allowed in the certification of new civil transport category aircraft.

Another difficulty was the Vickers, in line with some other manufacturers at the time, for practical
test rig reasons, did not carry out fatigue tests to a full spectrum of the loads expected in service or
were required to. Instead, single load level repetitive tests were carried out and the results
adjusted by calculations based on the known fatigue endurance of similar structures. The 800
Series Viscount wing test was an advance over the 700 series in that an additional ground-air-
ground cycle was added.

(b) The Tailplane

The tailplane life was established by a combination of tests, calculations and service experience.

Although not specifically required by the applicable design and certification standards, Vickers
carried out a series of static and fatigue tests of tailplanes in the 1950s.
The test rig consisted of the rear unpressurised fuselage section fitted with a pair of tailplanes.
The fuselage was supported by a vertical rigged frame

Load was applied by a single hydraulic jack on each side, applying load to four pads and, through
a link to a beam, simulating elevator loads.

The derivation of applied loads is quite complex with tailplanes and in this case Vickers installed
strain-range-counters in airline aircraft in service. A single load level was applied in the range of
that regularly found to occur in service and endurance test points were obtained representing
cycles to failure. The method Vickers used to calculate the safe life of the structure was to adopt
the shape of a standard fatigue endurance curve (in this case the average joint curve derived by
Heywood and published by the Royal Aeronautical Society as Data Sheet E.05.01) and fixing its
position along the endurance axis by means of a test failure point. Once the endurance curve and
load spectrum were established, the damage rate was obtained by using a linear cumulative
damage hypothesis.

It should be explained for those not familiar with aircraft design that generally speaking,
horizontal tail surfaces or tailplanes are subjected to flight loads in a downwards direction. This is
usually called „negative lift‟.

In flight, the mass of the aircraft is countered by the lift produced by the movement of the wings
through the air. In order to give a practical range of passenger loadings and to provide
controllability and balance, designs are arranged to produce a negative lift or load acting
downwards on the tailplanes as they pass through the air. This enables pilot control to be
maintained when manoeuvring or lowering flaps as the aircraft is kept in balance by movement of
the elevator control surfaces attached to the tailplanes.

To allow for scatter in test results and other variables, a factor was applied to the mean estimated
life in order to establish a safe retirement life. The standard practice at this time was to apply a
scatter factor of five.

The above method of life estimation was state-of-the-art fifty years ago but would not be
permitted today even for the setting of transport aeroplane damage tolerance inspections.

It is now accepted that a fully randomised spectrum of loads must be applied to cover load
sequence effects and such matters as fretting. Prior static loading and high test loading rates
should be avoided.

Vickers carried out fatigue tests on three pairs of tailplanes. One pair was new, one pair taken
from a service aircraft with over 5,000 landings (very good practice) and one pair which had been
subject to static strength tests (not good practice). In the first test the centre section failed, in the
second the spar upper boom failed at the root and in the third the upper boom root end steel fitting
failed.

Vickers clearly carried out extensive and dedicated work to ensure the safety of the tailplane in the
light of best practice at the time. The approach used, the material and design philosophy
employed were similar to that used on the wing.

In the light of serious fatigue problems which later developed in the wing spar booms, it would not
be entirely surprising if some problems subsequently manifested themselves in the tailplane, albeit
with perhaps some additional factor.
(c) Service Experience

As mentioned earlier, corrosion is one subject which can have a marked influence on fatigue. In
this respect, it is interesting to note that the CAA occurrence reports list one British Viscount 800
series with a corroded tailplane spar top boom under the steel root fitting. This is a matter of
considerable concern when one considers the boom had only been fitted 2,076 flying hours
previously.

It was a fatal airline accident in Australia on December 31, 1968 which highlighted both the
unconservative nature of the life estimations carried out and mandated by the Regulatory
Authorities, and also how a manufacturing or maintenance error could destroy confidence in the
retirement life approach.

In the Australian case, a Viscount 720C VH-RMQ, suffered an inner wing spar lower boom
fatigue failure resulting in the loss of the wing in flight.

The safe life of the boom concerned was promulgated as 11,400 flights whilst the failure occurred
at only 8,090 flights. The most obvious reason for the premature failure was the lack of
interference fit of a steel bush in the DTD 363 aluminium ally spar. The interference fit was a life
enhancement measure. Unfortunately, the story did not end there as other cracks were found both
in the accident aircraft and more significantly in several aircraft spars inspected at Weybridge. A
total of 19 spar booms were examined and fatigue cracks were discovered in 16 of them. One
boom was found to have ten small cracks. Even more disturbing was the discovery of fatigue
cracks in some 800 Series Viscount booms which were thicker, hence less highly stressed, and
manufactured from a copper based alloy, L65, with significantly better fatigue characteristics.

Following the discovery, the Viscount retirement lives were reduced on a global basis. The
Australian regulatory authority took a different view, believing the risks were too great, and
required the withdrawal of Viscounts from service.

The fuselage pressure cabin also introduced concerns including severe corrosion in some lower
skin panels. Corrosion, of course, can have a major effect on the initiation of premature fatigue
cracking. Remedial action included special inspections, replacing of skin belly panels and flying
at reduced cabin pressure in order to conserve life.

The point of the above comments in only intended to show the unconservative, or at least fatigue
sensitive, nature of the Viscount form a long-term structural integrity viewpoint.

Although designed in accordance with internationally agreed standards of fifty years ago, the
aircraft could not possibly meet today‟s damage tolerance standards.

A very extensive LIFE EXTENSION REVIEW was carried out by BRITISH AEROSPACE in the
1980‟s for 800 series Viscount. This confirmed the continuing structural integrity of the aircraft
subject to specified modifications, inspections and retirement lives.
 Appendix 4d Flutter

4d.1 Characteristics of separation sequence vs air speed (Extract from

Aeroloading Note No. 627 – Dec 6, 1965)

4d.2 Example of separation process (Extract from Bouraq Accident Report –

Viscount PK IVS – Aug 26, 1980)
Appendix 4d

Flutter

Flutter is a violent vibration caused by the interaction of structural flexibility, mass and
aerodynamic forces.

As a simplified example, visualise what happens to a control surface when the aerofoil ahead of it
flexes slightly, perhaps due to a small gust. We are talking here of wing flexure interacting with
aileron rotation, tailplane with elevator or fin with rudder. Assume also that the mass of the
control surface is behind its hinge line, as is usual.

If the aerofoil moves slightly upward, the mass of the control surface causes the control to lay
behind and rotate with its trailing edge down. Because of structural flexibility this tends to happen
even if the control system is held firmly. The deflected configuration momentarily increases lift
on the aerofoil and acts to increase its initial displacement. Eventually, structural stiffness
overcomes the aerodynamic forces and the aerofoil starts to return to its normal position. As the
aerofoil moves down, the control surface again lags behind, but now rotates training edge up and
so again accentuates the displacement, this time downward.

Above a certain speed, there is sufficient aerodynamic energy for successive vibrations like this to
build up progressively. This is flutter.

This simple type of flutter can be suppressed by adding balance weights to the control surface
ahead of its hinge line. Doing this eliminates the tendency for the control surface to lag behind the
vertical flexure of wing or tail and consequently the two motions no longer interact.

However, full mass is too heavy, is often impractical and cannot counteract all flutter tendencies.

Apart from speed, the extent of a flutter interaction is determined by resonance and phase
relationships between the two interacting deflections. Pushing a swing illustrates this. A swing
goes high with very gently pushes provided the pushes are applied exactly in time with the
frequency at which the swing oscillates backwards and forwards.

A swing has just one normal frequency whereas an airframe has very many structural frequencies
at which it bends, twists and rotates. Many of those frequencies vary with speed, as do
aerodynamic loads. The extent to which two vibrations such as tailplane bending and elevator
rotation can interact and may cause flutter depends on their predominant frequencies, and how
close together those frequencies come within the flight envelope.

During aircraft design, specialist flutter engineers evaluate all possible interactions over a wide
range of frequencies. In order to ensure that critical frequencies do not merge thereby eliminating
the possibility of dangerous interactions.

Once the aircraft is in service, maintenance engineers must keep structural frequencies where they
belong – well separated. Crucial to this are mass balance of controls, security of balance weights,
control circuit stiffness and control surface free play. Even an excessively thick coat of paint or
small repair can upset proper balance of a control surface and cause flutter. This is particularly
important for control surface tabs.

The term “flutter” sounds innocuous, but it is not. It is violently destructive. Avoidance depends
on meticulous design, maintenance of balance and allowable free play, and compliance with speed
limits.
Appendix 4d.1

Characteristics of Separation Sequence vs Air Speed

(Extract from Aeroloading Note No. 627-Dec 6, 1965)

 Between 200 and 232,5kts. = No Separation

Wing protected by stall

Tail protected by elevator stop

 Between 232,5 and 302kts.

Wing protected by stall

Tail can be broken by large elevator application

(From -22° at 232,5kts. to -8° at 302kts.)

 Between 302 and 353kts.

Wing can be broken, not further protected by stallo

(from -5° to -3° applied on the elevator)

Tail can be broken

(from -8° to -3° applied on the elevator)

 Between 353 and 392kts.

Wing breaks first

Appendices 5

5.1 1968 Track Reconstruction

5.2 Mid-Air Collisions Scenario

5.4 As per Witnesses Scenarios

Appendix 5.1a 1968 Track Reconstruction

 The reconstruction was based on the information given by the Shannon R/T transcripts. The
positions of the AOM when emitting to Shannon are identified as follows:

 A source of inaccuracy exists in the fact that it is not clear when AOM exactly left the way “as
the flight plan” through Tuskar to fly direct to Strumble.

 A source of doubt is linked to the fact that the wreckage was discovered near to Tuskar, at a
position quite near from the one AOM should be if it followed its flight plan via Tuskar.

 Another source of inaccuracy results from the ETA Strumble give at 11.03

 Another source of inaccuracy results from the fact that “by Bannow” is not a precise position.

Consequently, a large “uncertainty zone” around the AOM position at 10.58 is defined:

(1) is a circular arc based on the position of AOM, as calculated from the time of the message
“by Bannow”.

(2) is a circular arc based on the estimate Strumble at 11.03.

(3) is a circular arc based on the estimate at 10.58 if AOM flew as per the flight plan, via
Tuskar, estimating Strumble at 07.

The following map shows tracks:

- via Tuskar, as per the flight plan (blue)

- direct Strumble, as acknowledged at 10.41 (red)

Appendices 5.2

5.2a Location of UK Ranges in 1968

5.2b Dangerous Areas over the St. Georges Channel (1968)
5.2c Military Activities (1968)

5.2c.1 In UK
5.2c.2 In Ireland
5.2d Drones Characteristics (1968)

5.2e Missiles Characteristics (1968)

5.2e.1 Surface to Air = Naval
5.2e.2 Surface to Air = Air Force
5.2e.3 Air to Air
5.2f Air Targets at the RAE Aberporth Range – Extract from Issue 3, Nov. 1968
5.2f.1 Safety (of Jindivik)
5.2f.2 Safety (of Meteor)
5.2g Irish Air Corps Aircraft (1968)
Hunting P56 Provost MK 51 Characteristics
5.2.i Page 1 of 3
5.2.i Page 2 of 3
5.2.i Page 3 of 3
Appendix 5.4

5.4a Lower Routes within Shannon F.I.R. in 1968

5.4b EI-AOM Flight Reconstruction

5.4c Astronomic Data (Sun Related) at the Time of the first EI-AOM Spin

5.4d Sensitivity of the DART Engine to the Negative Accelerations

5.4e Rigging, Symmetry and Control Surface Check at Aer Lingus on Viscount in
1968

5.4f Fuel and Water Methanol Systems

5.4g R/T Propagation Aspects

5.4h Timing of the Shannon Recorder

Appendix 5.4b Track Reconstruction

Map 1: General View of the Track Reconstruction

Map 2: Track Reconstructed and Witnesses Position between Youghal and Tramore

Map 3: Track Reconstructed and Witnesses Position between Tramore and Tuskar Rock

Map 4: Idem

Map 5: Idem

Map 1: General View of the reconstructed Tracks

(1) According to Shannon R/T Transcript

(2) According to Ground Witnesses Statements

Map 2: Track Reconstructed and Witnesses Position from Youghal to Tramore

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
2.01.2.3 2.02.2.1 2.03.2.1 2.04.2.1 2.05.1.3
6. 7. 8. 9. 10.
2.06.1.3 2.07.1.3 2.08.1.1 2.09.1.2 2.10.1.1

NB: Dotted Line when the Viscount was not observed.

 Map 3:

Track Reconstructed and Witnesses Position between Tramore and Tuskar Rock (continued)

Map 4:
Track Reconstructed and Witnesses Position between Tramore and Tuskar Rock (continued)

Map 5:
Track Reconstructed and Witnesses Position from Tramore to Tuskar Rock (3 Views)
1. 3.02.2.2 2. 3.01.2.3 3. 4.01.2.3 4. 5.01.2.3 5. 5.02.2.1
and 7.04.1 NA (2 persons)
6. 5.03.2.3 7. 6.01.1.3 8. 6.08.1 9. 6.02.1.2 10. 6.03.1.3
NA and 6.04.1.3
11. 6.05.1.1 12. 13. 7.01.1 14. 7.06.1.1 15. 7.05.1.1
6.06.1.3 and NA; 7.02.1 NA
6.07.1.1 and 7.03.1 NA
16. 7.07.1.1 17. 7.08.1.1 18. 7.11.1.1 19. 7.12.1.1 20. 7.13.1.1

21. 7.14.1.1 22. 7.16.1.1 23. 7.19.1.1

NB: Dotted Line when the Viscount was not observed.

 Appendix 5.4c Astronomic Data (Sun Related) at the Time of the first EI-AOM Spin

These data were used by the Team to cross-check the statement of witness 2.01.2.3

5.4c
Appendix 5.4d Sensitivity of the Dart Engine to the Negative Accelerations

5.4d.1 Extract of the Rolls-Royce operating instruction for DART 520, 525 and 530 in
the Vickers Viscount
5.4d.2 + 5.4d.3Extract of the Rolls-Royce operating instructions for DART in the
Fokker Friendship

5.4.d.2
5.4.d.3
Appendix 5.4e Rigging, Symmetry and Control Surface Check at Aer Lingus on Viscount in
1968

This appendix is provided for illustrating the accuracy requested from the
maintenance people when checking Viscount parameters like:-

 Rigging

 Symmetry

 Friction and Pre-load

 Control Surfaces Movements

These operations necessitated specialised very skilled personnel. 5.4e.1

Engineering Volume:2 Visc Part:2 Date:23-12-63 7 Section:8 Page:1

Manual
FORM
No:TD.2316
RIGGING, SYMMETRY & CONTROL SURFACE CHECK

SHEET 1 OF 3
Item Requirements Observed Signature Signature
No. and Limits
1. Rigging Check

1.1 Main Plane 2°.30' 15' 2°.30" S.A.L. 100

Incidence P 3°.23"

1.2 Main Plane Dihedral 3°.16' 15' S 3°.15" S.A.L. 100

2°.50' 15' P 3°.00"
Inner Plane Stn.0-
131

Outer Plane Stn. 131 S 2°.55" S.A.L. 100

outboard

Both measured above

spar
1.3 Tail Plane Incidence -2°.46' 15' 2°.55" S.A.L. 100
13°.43' 15'
1.4 Tailplane dihedral
measured above 13°.50" S.A.L. 100
spar
2. Symmetry Check

2.1 Hose to outer wing Limit 0.5" .000 S.A.L. 100

2.2 Outboard engine to
outer wing
Limit 0.5" .000 S.A.L. 100
2.3 Tail to outer wing Limit 0.5" .000 S.A.L. 100
2.4 Tailplane to wing Limit 1.0" .000 S.A.L. 100
2.5 Fin tip to tailplane
stn. 46.5
Limit 0.5" .000 S.A.L. 100
 2.6 Fin base to tailplane
stn. 46.5
Limit 0.5" .000 S.A.L. 100
2.7 Port Centre of inner
spinner to centre of
outer spinner Limit 0.5" 10°.5⅝" S.A.L. 100
2.8 Stbd. Centre of inner
spinner to centre of
outer spinner Limit 0.5" 10°.5¾" S.A.L. 100

3. 3.1 Spring Tab Friction

& Pre-load

Elevator
½(A-B) must S.A.L. 255 S.A.L. 89
Friction not exceed
2 lbs
10 lbs
3.2 Elevator ½(A-B) equal
to (+10 lb
Pre-load S.A.L. 255 S.A.L. 89
(25 = Pull
27 lbs
( - 0 lb
(+2 lb

(25 = Push
25 lbs S.A.L. 89
( - 0 lb
S.A.L. 255

3.3 Rudder ½(A-B) must

not exceed
Friction S.A.L. 255 S.A.L. 89
15 lbs
1 lb
Rudder ½(A+B) =
25+5 lb – 0 lb
Pre-load 25 lbs S.A.L. 255 S.A.L. 89

Note: Where, with the Control Lock engaged:

(a) Load on Pilots control as tab is just moving away from control

(b) Load on Pilots control as tab returns to neutral

AER LINGUS
5.4e.2

Engineering Volume:2 Part:2 Date:31-3-59 7 Section:8 Page:2

Manual Visc
FORM
No:TD.2316
RIGGING, SYMMETRY & CONTROL SURFACE CHECK

SHEET 2 OF 3
Item Requirements and Observed Signature Signature
No. Limits
4. Control Surface
Movements
20° Angular
4.1 ELEVATOR 13.94 + 0.1
UP
S.A.L. 100 S.A.L. 255
- 0 in Linear 14.00"
13° Angular
DOWN
2.1" Min Linear 9.10" S.A.L. 100 S.A.L. 255
4.2 ANTI-BALANCEUP 15° Angular
1.57 + 0.05
TAB
- 0 ins Linear 1.57" S.A.L. 100 S.A.L. 255
10°30" Angular
DOWN
1.05 + 0.05

- 0 ins Linear 1.05" S.A.L. 100 S.A.L. 255

4.3 SPRING TABS UP 10° Angular
1.04" (Min) Linear 1.04" S.A.L. 100 S.A.L. 255
WITH LOCKS ON
20° Angular
2.08 (Min) Linear 2.10" S.A.L. 100 S.A.L. 255

DOWN
4.4 SPRING TABS UP 3°.51" Angular
0.4" (Min) Linear 0.4" S.A.L. 100 S.A.L. 255
WITH LOCKS ON
20° Angular
2.03" + 0.05

- 0.0 ins 2.10" S.A.L. 100 S.A.L. 255

DOWN
Linear
4.5 TRIM TAB EACH WAY 12° Angular
1.25" (Min) Linear 1.40" S.A.L. 100 S.A.L. 255
15° Angular
15.6" (Min) Linear 15.85" S.A.L. 100 S.A.L. 255
4.6 RUDDER EACH
WAY
10° Angular
1.05" (Min) Linear 1.10" S.A.L. 100 S.A.L. 255

4.7 RUDDER EACH

WAY

TAB
4.8 AILERON EACH 20° Angular
WAY
6.08" (Min) Linear 6.15" S.A.L. 100 S.A.L. 255
20° Angular
 1.3" (Min) Linear 1.3" S.A.L. 100 S.A.L. 255
1.39" (Nominal)
4.9 AILERON EACH
WAY Linear
20° Angular
BALANCE TAB
1.39" (Min Linear) 1.4" S.A.L. 100 S.A.L. 255
4.10 AILERON EACH
WAY

TRIM TAB

AER LINGUS

5.4e.3

Engineering Manual Volume:2 Visc Part:2 Date:31-3-59 Section:2 Page:3

FORM No:TD.2316

RIGGING, SYMMETRY & CONTROL SURFACE CHECK

SHEET 3 OF 3
Item No. Requirements Observed Signature Signature
and Limits
5. FLAPS STOP

Angles to be measured 19° 19°.10" S.A.L. 255 S.A.L. 255

33° + 1°.30"
on top surface of No. 1
- 0.30" 33° S.A.L. 255 S.A.L. 255
Flap at inboard end. 40° 40°.10" S.A.L. 255 S.A.L. 255
47° 47° S.A.L. 255 S.A.L. 255
RETURN

19° 20° S.A.L. 255 S.A.L. 255

34°.30" 34°.30" S.A.L. 255 S.A.L. 255
41°.30" 41° S.A.L. 255 S.A.L. 255
47° 47° S.A.L. 255 S.A.L. 255

At the NORMAL UP position the initial flap angle is 1°. This

must be added to flap to give actual flap angle. Limits on Flap
angle 1° (unless stated).

Full flap movement of 51° should not be obstructed as it may be

used later.

The Elevator and Aileron movements are to be measured at the

inboard ends and the Rudder movement at the lower and with the
tab neutral.

Check that the inboard and outboard inclinomoter readings of each

flap do not vary by more than 1° - 15".

Aileron balance tab nominal movement (1.39") must be obtained if

at all possible (measured at inboard end).
AER LINGUS
Appendix 5.4f Fuel and Water Methanol Systems

This Appendix is provided for a better understanding of the level of loads which can be suffered
by fuel tanks and pipes during a spin or a spiral, which develops large lateral accelerations.

Such efforts may be at the origin of a fuel spray phenomenon.

Appendix 5. 4.g R/T Propagation Aspects

5.4.g.1 Radio facility index in Ireland in 1968

5.4.g.1
5.4.g.2 Radio propagation aspects of the accident to Aer Lingus Viscount EI-AOM.

5.4.g.2.1
5.4.g.2.2
5.4.g.2.3
Appendix 5.4.h Timing of the Shannon Recorder
Appendix 7a «BAe Systems » Answer to RFQ, dated
November 27th, 2000