TC-13

ARMY INSTITUTE OF LAW, MOHALI

BEFORE THE HON’BLE SESSIONS COURT

CRIMINAL APPL. NO. _____

IN THE MATTER OF
RAJ………. ………...APPELLANT
V.

STATE……. ………PROSECUTION

UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE SESSIONS COURT UNDER SECTION 374

OF CODE OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973.

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENCE

 CONTENTS
Contents................................................................................................................................................2
List of Abbrevations...............................................................................................................................3
Index of Authorities...............................................................................................................................4
Table of Cases........................................................................................................................................5
Statement of Jurisdiction.......................................................................................................................6
Statement of Facts.................................................................................................................................7
Issues.....................................................................................................................................................8
Arguments Advance..............................................................................................................................9
Contention 1: That the accused has not committed offence punishable u/s 324 and 326 of IPC......9
Contention 2: That the accused in not punishable for offence u/s 506 of IPC.................................12
Prayer..................................................................................................................................................14

1
 LIST OF ABBREVATIONS

ABBREVIATIONS FULL FORM

No. Number

Hon’ble Honourable

CrPC Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

Ors. Others

v. Versus

i.e. That is

p.m. Prime Meridian

FIR First Information Report

IPC Indian Penal Code, 1860

SCC Supreme Court Cases

EBC Eastern Book Company

Para Paragraph

Sec Section

Sd/- Signed

SC Supreme Court

HC High Court

AIR All India Reporter

Edn. Edition

2
 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
STATUES & ACTS

 THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860

 THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973
 INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1872

BOOKS AND DIGESTS

 EBC’S PENAL CODE, 1860 (EBC, 2021)

 C.K. TAKWANI , I INDIAN PENAL CODE (EASTERN BOOK COMPANY)
 THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, RATANLAL & DHIRAJLAL, 36TH EDN.
 THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, BATUK LAL, 23RD EDN.

ONLINE DATABASES AND WEBSITES

 WWW.SCCONLINE.COM
 EBC READER
 INDIANKANOON.ORG
 HTTP://WWW.AIRONLINE.IN

3
 TABLE OF CASES
Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1996 SC 755.
B.N. Mutto and Anr. v. Dr. T.K. Nandi (1979) 2 SCR 409.
Bakhshish v. R AIR 1925 L 549
Ganga Prasad v State of Uttar Pradesh (1987) 2 SCC 232.

Gurcharan Singh v. State 1993 CrLJ 1622 (Del).

Habib v. State of Bihar AIR 1972 SC 283

Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh 1953 CriLJ 2912.
Mathai v State of Kerala AIR 2005 SC 710 : 2005 AIR SCW 368.
Mohinder Singh v State AIR 1953 SC 415 : (1953) Cr LJ 1761.
Prakash Chander v. The State 1995 CriLJ 368.
Prakash v. State of Karnatka (2014) 12 SCC 13
Ramakant Rai v. Madan Rai and Ors AIR 2004 SC 77.
Sharad Birdichand Sharda v.
1984 CriLJ 1738.
Maharashtra
Sharad Birdichand Sharda v.
1984 CriLJ 1738.
Maharashtra
Shivaji Sahebrao Bobade v. State of
1973 CriLJ 1783.
Maharashtra
Shyamal Ghosh v. State of West
(2012) 7 SCC 646.
Bengal
Yogendra Morarji v. State of Gujarat AIR 1980 SC 660.

4
 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defence has approached Hon’ble Sessions Court u/s 374 of Code of Criminal Procedure,
19731.

1
374. Appeals from convictions. —(1) Any person convicted on a trial held by a High Court in its extraordinary
original criminal jurisdiction may appeal to the Supreme Court.
(2) Any person convicted on a trial held by a Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge or on a trial held
by any other court in which a sentence of imprisonment for more than seven years 1 [has been passed against
him or against any other person convicted at the same trial], may appeal to the High Court.
(3) Save as otherwise provided in sub-section (2), any person,— (a) convicted on a trial held by a Metropolitan
Magistrate or Assistant Sessions Judge or Magistrate of the first class, or of the second class, or (b) sentenced
under section 325, or (c) in respect of whom an order has been made or a sentence has been passed under
section 360 by any Magistrate, may appeal to the Court of Session

5
 STATEMENT OF FACTS
 Ramesh got admitted in the hospital on 20.01.2022 at 13:30 hours, complaining of
injuries on his left shoulder and left arm. He got his statement recorded to the effect
that he was attacked by Raj with a Knife because of a previous enmity.
 Dr. Neenu conducted medical examination of Ramesh and reported a total of three
injuries. One injury was an incised wound on the left shoulder joint, the second injury
on the left arm and the third injury being another incised wound near the left wrist.
Injury number one and three were opined by her to have been caused by a sharp
weapon whereas injury number one was said to have been caused by a blunt weapon.
She further advised the conduct of x-ray of injury number one and two. Dr. Naresh
conducted the X-ray of Ramesh.
 The report on the basis of the X-ray was prepared by Dr. Somnath who opined that
Injury number one was a fracture. On the basis of the report of Dr. Somnath, Dr.
Neenu opined that the injury number one was grievous in nature. Raj was arrested in
relation to the present case, the Knife in question was also recovered.
 After investigation, final report under Section 173 of Cr.P.C. was filed against Raj
under Section 326, 324, 325, 506 IPC. The prosecution examined Ramesh, the
Investigating Officer, the Witnesses to the recovery of the Knife, Dr. Neenu and Dr.
Somnath.
 As such, the trial court convicted Raj for the offences under Section 326, 324, 506
IPC and he was sentenced to undergo 4 years of rigorous imprisonment along with
fine of Rs. 1000/-. Raj has now filed appeal before the Ld. Sessions Judge challenging
his conviction.

6
 ISSUES
ISSUE 1: WHETHER THE ACCUSED HAS COMMITTED OFFENCE PUNISHABLE
U/S 324 & 326 OF THE IPC OR NOT?

ISSUE 2: WHETHER THE ACCUSED HAS COMMITEED OFFENCE PUNISHABLE

U/S 506 OF IPC OR NOT?

7
 ARGUMENTS ADVANCE
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Sessions Court that the Section 324 defines
voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons or means whereas Section 326 of IPC defines
voluntarily causing grievous hurt by dangerous weapon or means. Furthermore, Section 506
of IPC deals with criminal intimidation. The prosecution has levelled groundless allegations;
therefore, defence would be furthering the following arguments in his defence and would
apprise the Hon’ble court of faults in the case of prosecution.

Contention 1: That the accused has not committed offence punishable u/s 324 and 326 of
IPC.

§ 101 of The Evidence Act provides that burden of proving the fact is on who asserts it. The
Apex Court in the case of Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab 2 has observed that in a criminal
case the burden of proving guilt of an accused beyond all reasonable doubt always lies upon
prosecution. Reasonable doubt must grow out of the evidence in the case. 3 In that case,
accused persons are entitled to the benefit of doubt.4 It is a well-established principle of law
that the accused person is under no obligation to substantiate their defence version. 5 Even
failure on the part of the accused to establish his case will not automatically be a ground to
hold that prosecution has proved its case.6
The defence urges that the facts of the case do not sufficiently prove the guilt of the accused
to the hilt. Therefore, the Defence presents the case in the following submissions. In the case
of Sharad Birdichand Sharda v. Maharashtra7 it has been held that in the cases where the
evidence is of circumstantial nature the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is
to be drawn should be fully established and should be consistent only with the hypothesis of
guilt of the accused and excludes every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved.
In the case at hand, the medical examination cannot be taken as sole ground for conviction. In
criminal cases all the elements i.e., Intention, preparation and attempt should be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution might have proved mens rea from previous
animosity between the accused and the victim. Moreover, In Bakhshish v. R.8, it was

2
Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1996 SC 755.
3
Ramakant Rai v. Madan Rai and Ors, AIR 2004 SC 77; B.N. Mutto and Anr. v. Dr. T.K. Nandi, (1979) 2 SCR
409.
4
Yogendra Morarji v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1980 SC 660.
5
Gurcharan Singh v. State, 1993 CrLJ 1622 (Del).
6
3 Woodroffe & Amir Ali, Law of Evidence, 3571, (B.M. Prasad, Manish Mohan, eds. 20 th ed. 2017).
7
Sharad Birdichand Sharda v. Maharashtra, 1984 CriLJ 1738.
8
Bakhshish v. R, AIR 1925 L 549

I
observed that a person mortally wounded makes a statement bringing his enemies on the
scene as his last opportunity to do them an injury.
The accused has falsely been charged in the case at hand and it is a case of mistaken identity.
The conviction cannot be based solely on victims’ testimony, without any other evidence or
witness who corroborate the same. Where the only evidence against the accused person is
that of identification by one person’s statement as a rule of prudence it should not be
considered sufficient to justify the conviction. 9 It has rightly been held by the Hon’ble Apex
Court in the case of Prakash v. State of Karnatka10, that it would have been more appropriate
for an identification parade to have been conducted, absence of TIP certainly casts a doubt
about the accused's presence at the scene. TIP is to check veracity of witness.11

It is a rule of evidence that testimony of a witness should be corroborated with the former
statements made by such witness and/or with other independent witnesses/evidence available.
This is so because if there is found any loopholes in the veracity on the part of the
prosecution, on the ground of reasonable doubt the accused may be set free. However, in rape
cases, this might seem to throttle the justice needed to be served if the said principle is
followed too rigidly. In other words, too much reliance on rules of corroboration would be
problematic in cases where the woman is the sole eye-witness is reluctant to report rape cases
or where there are other witnesses but have turned hostile, or if due to the peculiar nature of
the crime committed there are no eye-witnesses available. The Courts have thus relied on the
principle that conviction can be made on the sole uncorroborated testimony of the
prosecutrix(victim) alone. However, it comes with a rider, or rather a piece of caution, that
such uncorroborated testimony of the prosecutrix should be of a ‘sterling quality’. The case
of State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh12 holds significance here in which the Apex Court held
that it is no more res Integra that conviction for an offence under Section 376 of IPC can be
based on the sole testimony of a victim.

It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of circumstantial nature the
circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in first instance be
fully established.13 Court laid following 5 essential (panchsheel) principles to convict an
accused solely on the basis of circumstantial evidence in the landmark case of Sharad

9
Habib v. State of Bihar, AIR 1972 SC 283
10
Prakash v. State of Karnatka, (2014) 12 SCC 13
11
Shyamal Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, (2012) 7 SCC 646.
12
2001SCC 1987.
13
Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1953 CriLJ 2912.

II
Birdichand Sharda v. Maharashtra14, the said principles are : The circumstances from
which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established; 15 the facts so
established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to
say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty;
The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency; they should exclude every
possible hypothesis except the one to be proved; and there must be a chain of evidence so
complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the
innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been
done by the accused16

In Ishwar Singh v State of Uttar Pradesh,17 the Supreme Court observed:

It is the duty of the prosecution, and no less of the Court, to see that the alleged weapon of the
offence, if available, is shown to the medical witness and his opinion invited as to whether all
or any of the injuries on the victim could be caused with that weapon. Failure to do so may
sometimes, cause aberration in the course of justice.

In Ganga Prasad v State of Uttar Pradesh,18 the prosecution allegation was that a spade
(phawra) was used as an instrument of an offence. The complainant had sustained three
lacerated wounds and one contusion. The Supreme Court held that the injuries in the nature
of lacerated wound or contusion could not be caused by an impact of a sharp-edged weapon
unless the blunt side of it is used on the human body. Such injuries are only possible by the
use of a hard and blunt object. The conviction of the accused undersection 326 of the IPC,
recorded by the court below was set aside.

The principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Mohinder Singh v State19, that the weapon
of offence recovered in a case should be shown to an expert and he should be asked to say
whether the injuries found on the deceased could be caused with that weapon. No such thing
was done in the present case.

In Mathai v State of Kerala20, it was held that according to the evidence of the doctor, injury
caused was grievous. However, considering the size of the stone used for the assault, it could

14
Sharad Birdichand Sharda v. Maharashtra, 1984 CriLJ 1738.
15
Shivaji Sahebrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, 1973 CriLJ 1783.
16
Prakash Chander v. The State, 1995 CriLJ 368.
17
18
Ganga Prasad v State of Uttar Pradesh, (1987) 2 SCC 232.
19
Mohinder Singh v State, AIR 1953 SC 415 : (1953) Cr LJ 1761.
20
Mathai v State of Kerala, AIR 2005 SC 710 : 2005 AIR SCW 368.

III
not be said that a dangerous weapon was used. Whether a particular article could per se cause
any serious wound or grievous hurt or injury had to be determined factually. The evidence of
the doctor clearly showed that the hurt or the injury that was caused was covered under the
expression “grievous hurt” as defined under section 320, IPC. The inevitable conclusion was
that a grievous hurt had been caused. It is not that in every case a stone would constitute a
dangerous weapon. It would depend upon the facts of the case. The facts involved in a
particular case, depending upon various factors like the size, sharpness, would throw light on
the question whether the weapon was a dangerous or deadly weapon or not. In the instant
case considering the size of the stone which was used, as revealed by material on record, it
could not be said that a dangerous weapon was used. In the present case the first injury,
termed as ‘grievous’ by medical practitioner is questionable. The weapon associated was
blunt and no recovery has been made. In these circumstances, punishing the accused u/s 326
and 324 of IPC would be a grave violation of the principle of natural justice.

Often, in the course of cross examination, it may be elicited whether a particular injury could
have been self-inflicted or accidental. Where an injury is suggested to be and accepted as
possible by an accidental fall or self-inflicted, the issue may turn on whether it is also
possible to have been caused in the manner attributed to the accused assailant. There was no
cross-examine to explore such angle. The first injury which is grievous and was caused by
blunt object and different from other two, might have been self-inflicted.

Contention 2: That the accused in not punishable for offence u/s 506 of IPC

Section 503 of IPC 1860 defines the offence of criminal intimidation. To commit the offence,
a person intentionally threatens another with the fear of injury to his person, property or
reputation to escape. The other person has to do an act that is against the law.

The Provision gets segregated into two for better understanding.

 The primary portion talks about intentionally putting another person into the fearful
situation to harm his person, reputation or property or to any such person’s reputation
or property in whom that person has vested interested.
 The secondary portion deals with the intent of the intimidator. Intent could further get
divided into two.
i. Intent that alarms the threatened victim
ii. Intent makes the victim commit an illegal act or not do something the victim
is legally bound to do.

IV
In the landmark judgement of Narender Kumar & Ors v. State 21, Hon’ble Supreme Court
laid down the following necessary ingredients to constitute the offence of criminal
intimidation:

 The threat of injury to the victim

i. The threat of injury or harm to the victim’s body, reputation or property.
ii. The threat of injury or harm to any person or such person’s body, reputation or
property in which victim has vested interest
 Intention
i. Threat intended to alarm the victim.
ii. Committing an act against the law to escape the threat
iii. Omitting an act otherwise required by law to escape the threat

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that there was no alarm of threat to the
victim. Also the illegal act in question has been proven beyond reasonable doubt by the
Prosecution.

The act that causes a person to end up doing something he/she is not legally bound to do for
avoiding the harm that may arise if he does not do it, or cause that person to omit something
he/she is legally bound to do under fear of harm to them by the person intimidating them is
criminal intimidation. Both the ingredients should essentially exist together for the offence to
be complete. The non-existence of any one of them may refute the charge against the
accused. The communication of the threat may happen either orally, in written form or even
by gestures. Thus, even showing provoking gestures can be intimidating. Even a threat to hurt
the reputation of a deceased person in whom the threatened person is interested is covered
under Section 503. Let us understand some terms used in Section 503 IPC, 1860.

It is clearly mention in section 503 about the essential condition to fulfill for criminal
intimidation .That why in these case defence is not fulfill any condition of a criminal
intimidation . And in these case there is not caused any grevious hurt to defence .That why
appellant is not liable under section 506 of ipc .

21
1960 SCR (2) 375.

V
 PRAYER

In the light of facts stated, arguments advanced & authorities cited, the counsel of
behalf of the Defence humbly prays before the Hon’ble Sessions Court of Mohali,
Punjab to kindly adjudge & declare that:

1. APPELLANT IS NOT GUILTY UNDER SECTION 326, 324 R/W SECTION

506 OF IPC.

2. DEFENCE HAS MISLED THE COURT AND THE PUBLIC OFFICIAL BY

PROVIDING THE FALSE INFORMATION IN THE FIR.

Or pass any other order, direction & relief that it deems fit in the interest of equity,
justice & good conscience.

For this Act of Kindness, the Defence shall duty bound forever pray.

ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

SD/-

COUNSEL FOR THE APPELLANT