Introduction

In this paper I aim to address Kant’s distinction between a synthetic and an analytic
method and see how it can help us to clarify his lines of reasoning in the Critique of
Pure Reason. Addressing Kant’s method in the Critique of Pure Reason is an essential
task in order to understand the aims and results of the book. Moreover, this undertaking
can help us to better appreciate the status of the conclusions reached by Kant. Kant
describes the synthetic method as one going from principles to consequences, while the
analytic method goes the other way around. He then identifies these different
‘directions’ of philosophical argumentation with a ‘progressive’ and a ‘regressive’
procedure. This vague formulation is not easy to interpret. If we here understand as
principles the principles of the pure understanding and as consequences the aspects of
our knowledge they are able to justify, it seems easy to conclude that the synthetic
method should be able to identify, without any previous consideration of some sort of
given knowledge, sufficient conditions for deducing some aspects of our knowledge. It
seems so because in the synthetic procedure the ‘principles’ appear to be sufficient to
deduce ‘conclusions’ on some aspects of our knowledge. On the other hand, the analytic
method would accept some given aspects of knowledge and identify their necessary
conditions. As we will see however, when we look closer to Kant’s own arguments, the
identification of the synthetic method with a procedure avoiding any reference to given
knowledge in its premises does not seem to be tenable.
Should transcendental proofs follow the synthetic or the analytic method for Kant? Can
the synthetic method identify sufficient conditions of knowledge, avoiding any previous
consideration of given knowledge? Does the Critique of Pure Reason follow analytic or
synthetic procedures? These are exactly the questions that I would like to answer.
I will first consider in section 2 how some commentators have accounted for Kant’s
distinction. Then in section 3 I will suggest that in order to make sense of Kant’s
contrasting claims we should differentiate a broader and a narrower sense that Kant
attributes to the distinction between the analytic and the synthetic method. Then in
section 4 and 5 I will analyse the broader and the narrower sense of the distinction
respectively. The latter identifies a specific way in which Kant deals with this matter
when he is differentiating between mathematical and philosophical procedures. To
finish, I will analyse Kant’s arguments in the Critique of Pure reason with the narrower
sense of the distinction in mind. I will focus on the ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’ and on
the second version of the ‘Transcendental Deduction’. I will evaluate if he uses the
analytic or the synthetic method and if the latter is able to identify, avoiding any
consideration of some sort of given knowledge, sufficient conditions for deriving some
aspects of knowledge.

Guyer, Bird, and Ameriks on the Synthetic and the Analytic Method
Kant’s distinction between a synthetic and an analytic method has been a continuous
source of difficulties for many interpreters of the Critique. What is particularly puzzling
is his claim, made in the Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics, that the Critique of
Pure Reason uses the synthetic method, while the Prolegomena proceeds analytically.
Paul Guyer has argued that Kant’s characterization of the synthetic and the analytic
method does not mark any relevant difference in the argumentative procedures used in
the Critique and the Prolegomena. Guyer describes the analytic method as one taking
the necessity and universality of some propositions for granted and identifying which
conditions are necessary for accounting for those propositions. On the other side, the
synthetic method avoids any claim of necessity and universality for its premises, even
though these characteristics would be essential for its conclusions. Guyer then claims
that Kant’s contention in the Prolegomena does not reflect what Kant actually does in
the two books under consideration. More specifically, the Critique of Pure Reason often
uses analytic methods, thus taking for granted necessary and universal propositions in
its premises. Guyer concludes that Kant’s distinction is only a source of confusion that
reflects the different and contrasting lines of reasoning adopted in the Critique. I agree
with Guyer that the Critique also proposes arguments that follow the analytic method,
but I think that Kant’s distinction deserves a closer consideration, especially for
understanding the differences Kant wants to point out between the Critique and the
Prolegomena.
A totally different view is proposed by Graham Bird, who claims that Kant’s distinction
only refers to the fact that in the Prolegomena Kant examines in details mathematics
and natural science, thus grounding his arguments on established sciences, while the
Critique proceeds from a scrutiny of experience in general not limited to any particular
science. This way of accounting for the distinction between the synthetic and the
analytic method is surely right in grasping important differences between the
Prolegomena and the Critique, but a further reflection needs to be carried out. In fact,
when Kant defines the synthetic and the analytic method in his logic lectures he does
not consider if the premises come from established sciences or not.
Another view on the distinction between an analytic and a synthetic method is proposed
by Karl Ameriks, who holds that Kant’s main argument in the Critique, that is the
‘Transcendental Deduction’, is a regressive argument. It is Kant himself that
characterized the analytic method as a regressive method, but Ameriks claims that his
account of the ‘Transcendental Deduction’ as a regressive argument does not conflict
with Kant’s claim in the Prolegomena that the Critique proceeds synthetically. Ameriks
aims to challenge those interpretations of the ‘Transcendental Deduction’ which claim
that it identifies sufficient conditions of empirical knowledge. To defend his position,
Ameriks maintains that the distinction between the analytic and the synthetic method
refers only to the conclusions of an argument, which, in the case of the synthetic
method, should be synthetic a priori propositions. He then stresses that his account of
the ‘Transcendental Deduction’ as a regressive argument identifies synthetic a priori
propositions both in the premises and in the conclusions of the argument, and is thus
compatible with Kant’s definition of the synthetic method. As I have already said with
reference to Guyer’s account, I think that Ameriks is right in identifying a regressive
(and in this sense analytic) argument in the Critique of Pure Reason. However,
Ameriks’ way of distinguishing between analytic and synthetic methods does not reflect
completely Kant’s own presentation of the issue. In fact, Kant does not identify the
synthetic method only by claiming the synthetic a priori character of its conclusions. He
seems to be also concerned with other characteristics of the argument as a whole.
What is lacking in these accounts of the distinction between an analytic and synthetic
method is a close consideration of the different, and sometimes contrasting, meanings
that Kant attributes to it. Focusing on these different meanings will allow us to
appreciate how the contrasting claims advanced by these commentators only reflect
Kant’s different uses of the concepts at issue. We will thus be able to overcome some of
the problems that arise in relation to Kant’s account of analysis and synthesis.

The Different Senses of the Distinction between Analytic and Synthetic

Methods
It must be taken into consideration that the distinction between an analytic and a
synthetic method was not Kant’s invention. It was already discussed by ancient
mathematicians and it was commonly used by Kant’s modern predecessors and
contemporaries. 17th and 18th century discussions on the distinction between analytic
and synthetic methods concerned the procedures to be used in philosophical inquiries
and demonstrations, and their relationship with mathematics. However, at that time
there was not a unique way to understand and present this distinction. Synthesis was
often associated with the procedure of Euclidean geometry which starts from
definitions, axioms and postulates to obtain theorems and problems. As an opposite to
this procedure, one could understand analysis as a process directed toward the
formulation of definitions and the identification of axioms. Analysis possessed also a
meaning which was connected to the method of the ancient geometer Pappus. This
method proceeds by assuming as true the very thing that needs to be proved. Moreover,
analysis was used to refer to algebra. Both analysis and synthesis were also associated
to Lullus’ ‘ars magna’, which was further developed by Leibniz’s ‘ars combinatoria’. In
this context analysis identified the process of isolating simple concepts, whereas
synthesis was the re-composition of them into complex concepts. Given these different
senses of synthesis and analysis it is not always easy to discern which one is used by the
author in question. It is also possible to find different senses of the distinction combined
together.
In this regard, Kant makes no exception. As we already noted, in his logic lectures he
simply stresses that the synthetic method goes from principles to consequences, whereas
the analytic method proceeds from consequences to principles. This suggests a model of
synthesis and analysis derived from the Euclidean model. However, Kant’s vague
formulation can be interpreted in various different ways. The ambiguity in Kant’s use of
the distinction is confirmed by the fact that sometimes he argues that philosophy can
proceed only analytically, sometimes he stresses that it can also proceed synthetically,
sometimes, as in the Prolegomena, he seems to stress that the whole Critique of Pure
Reason is synthetic. A clue to solve this confusion can be found in Kant himself. In fact,
in his logic lectures of the 1780’s he identifies different senses in which the distinction
between the synthetic and the analytic method can be understood. Accordingly, after
having distinguished analysis and synthesis in the usual way as ending and starting with
principles, he stresses:

Analytic method is also a means of discovery [Erfindens] and of exposition [Vortrags], in

that I speak popularly. The true method of exposition is synthetic, however, for even if I
have thought the thing analytically, the synthetic method is what first makes it a system.

In addition to the general meanings associated with the analytic and the synthetic
method, Kant here attributes two other senses at first only to analysis. Thus, analysis
can be also understood as a method of discovery and as a method of exposition. When
referring to discovery, Kant has probably algebra in mind, which in mathematics was
often associated with a method of discovery and named analysis. Nothing further is said
about discovery and no synthetic method of discovery is discussed. On the other hand,
analytic expositions are opposed to synthetic expositions, which have the characteristic
of being systematic.
An important sense in which Kant understands the synthetic method is thus strongly
related to a systematic exposition. In this sense, linking synthesis to the derivation of
conclusions from principles indicates the systematic presentation of a science starting
from its very basic concepts. However, there is at least another sense in which Kant
understands the distinction between analytic and synthetic methods and the latter is
usually introduced when Kant differentiates between philosophical and mathematical
procedures. In this sense synthesis is related to the possibility of a priori deriving non-
trivial conclusions from concepts thanks to a reference to intuition.
That said, I think we can identify two main senses in which Kant uses the attribution
synthetic with reference to philosophical methods. In a broader sense, the attribution
only refers to the form of exposition of Kant’s philosophy, while in a narrower sense,
used when Kant distinguishes the method of philosophy from that of mathematics, the
attribution identifies a distinctive line of reasoning. According to the first sense, this
distinction identifies two different ways following which a theory can be presented.
Hence, the first Critique is synthetic because it proceeds systematically and shows how
the whole rests on determinate principles.

The Broader Sense of the Distinction

As I have already said, the most famous passage in which Kant presents the distinction
between an analytic and a synthetic method appears in the Prolegomena to any Future
Metaphysics, where he stresses that the Prolegomena and the Critique of Pure Reason
proceed using very different methods:

In the Critique of Pure Reason I worked on this question synthetically, namely by inquiring
within pure reason itself, and seeking to determine within this source both the elements and
the laws of its pure use, according to principles. This work is difficult and requires a
resolute reader to think himself little by little into a system that takes no foundation as
given except reason itself, and that therefore tries to develop cognition out of its original
seeds without relying on any fact whatever. Prolegomena should by contrast be preparatory
exercises; they ought more to indicate what needs to be done in order to bring a science into
 existence if possible, than to present the science itself. They must therefore rely on
something already known to be dependable, from which we can go forward with
confidence and ascend to the sources […]. The methodological procedure of prolegomena
[…] will therefore be analytic.

Kant here distinguishes the synthetic method by stressing that it pursues its inquiries
within pure reason itself, not relying on any fact whatever. This can suggest that the
method of the Critique consists in identifying, without any consideration of some kind
of given knowledge, some basic propositions which function as sufficient conditions for
deriving aspects of our knowledge. Whether this characterization of the method of the
Critique is adequate or not, what is difficult to explain in this passage is Kant’s
unspecific claim that the Critique proceeds synthetically, which suggests that the
‘whole’ Critique is synthetic.
My suggestion is that Kant, in the Prolegomena, does not use the distinction between
the two methods in order to identify a specific line of reasoning, but he has in mind two
different expository strategies. It is sufficient to compare the tables of contents of the
Critique and the Prolegomena to see how the former is structured according to Kant’s
division of the human cognitive faculties. In this sense the synthetic nature of the first
Critique is identical with its systematic structure, which is lacking in the Prolegomena.
The Critique is synthetic because it can organize its contents systematically and show
how they derive from very simple rational principles. The possibility to perform this
task is what marks the scientificity of the first Critique. This sense of synthesis is used
by Kant also in the Critique of Practical Reason (5: 10). In this text he says that after an
analytic recognition of the first principles, the matter should be exposed synthetically
starting from them and descending to their conclusions. In this context the synthetic
exposition is nothing but the systematic presentation of the contents according to the
previously identified principles. On the other hand, the Prolegomena is organized
around specific questions (e.g. ‘is metaphysics possible at all?’, ‘how is cognition from
pure reason possible?’, etc.) which allow us to grasp more easily the problems at stake.
The fact that Kant, in the Prolegomena, relies on the results of established sciences can
also be related to a different expository strategy that does not mark an essential
difference in the argumentative procedure.
Unquestionably, Kant also introduces in the passage from the Prolegomena elements
that suggest two different argumentative procedures (the derivation of the pure laws of
reason according to principles in the Critique and the reliance on something already
known in the Prolegomena). This only shows that the different senses of synthesis and
analysis we are here identifying are not always clearly distinguished by Kant. That said,
the first purpose of Kant in the Prolegomena could only have been the discrimination of
two different expository strategies (a systematic presentation relating different
cognitions to a limited set of principles and a ‘rhapsodic’ exposition introducing
essential concepts by means of their derivability from well established sciences),
otherwise it would be impossible to understand how the whole Critique could be
synthetic. This is also suggested by the fact that in the passage from the Prolegomena
Kant makes explicit reference to a system in connection to the synthetic method.
Moreover, he stresses that the Prolegomena does not present the science itself, but only
shows that a science is possible. Recall that for Kant scientificity is closely linked to
systematicity. Thus, in this context, the attribution ‘synthetic’ is attributed to the first
Critique in general and is connected to its systematic structure.

The Narrower Sense of the Distinction

Besides the broader sense of synthesis identified in the previous sections, following
which a synthetic exposition is a systematic presentation relating the whole of a science
to simple principles, Kant uses the distinction between a synthetic and an analytic
method in at least another, narrower, sense. He does so especially when he discusses the
differences between the method of mathematics and the method of philosophy.
Kant started to use the distinction between a synthetic and an analytic method in order
to differentiate mathematical from philosophical inquiries well before the publication of
the first Critique. In fact, he thought that one of the main mistakes of the school of
Leibniz and Wolff was the confusion between the method of mathematics and the
method of philosophy. Kant argued that the mathematical method was unwarranted
when it was used to obtain conclusions about real existing objects, as the objects of
metaphysics. In 1764, in the so called Prize Essay, which bears the title Inquiry
Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality, he
then argues than while mathematics can proceeds synthetically, philosophy can only
proceed analytically:

There are two ways in which one can arrive at a general concept: either by the arbitrary
combination of concepts, or by separating out that cognition which has been rendered
distinct by means of analysis [Zergliederung]. Mathematics only ever draws up its
definitions in the first way. For example, think arbitrarily of four straight lines bounding a
plane surface so that the opposite sides are not parallel to each other. Let this figure be
 called a trapezium. The concept which I am defining is not given prior to the definition
itself; on the contrary, it only comes into existence as a result of that definition. […] In this
and in all other cases the definition obviously comes into being as a result of synthesis. The
situation is entirely different in the case of philosophical definitions. In philosophy, the
concept of a thing is always given, albeit confusedly or in an insufficiently determinate
fashion. The concept has to be analysed [zergliedern]; the characteristic marks which have
been separated out and the concept which has been given have to be compared with each
other in all kinds of contexts; and this abstract thought must be rendered complete and
determinate.

In 1764 Kant’s strategy for resolving problems that he saw as pressing for the
philosophy of his times was the suggestion that philosophy could make any
advancement only if it clarified the method it must use. In this context, Kant uses the
distinction between analytic and synthetic methods as an essential instrument. Thus,
whereas mathematics can start its inquiries by defining its concepts thanks to a synthetic
procedure (which is here connected to an ‘arbitrary connection of concepts’),
philosophy should always start from concepts already given and obtain its definitions as
a result of analysis. Mathematics is able to perform this arbitrary connection because its
concepts have a special relationship with sensibility. Accordingly, Kant argues that ‘in
mathematics, the object isconsidered under sensible signs in concreto, whereas in
philosophy theobject is only ever considered in universal abstracted concepts’.
These claims can be puzzling if read together with the Prolegomena. In fact, as we saw
in the previous section, Kant there claims that the whole Critique is synthetic. Of
course, Kant changed his mind since his Prize Essay in many respects, but it is easy to
see how the difference with the Prolegomena lies in a change of focus. Whereas the
Prolegomena identifies two different expository strategies, the Prize Essay tries to
isolate two different ways of arguing.
In the Critique of Pure Reason, especially in the section entitled ‘Discipline of Pure
Reason in Dogmatic Use’, Kant develops the concepts presented in the Prize Essay and
introduces some relevant changes. First of all, even if he still considers the different
ways in which mathematics and philosophy deal with definitions, the syntheticity of
mathematics is not confined to its way of defining, but it is something essential to its
procedures in general, which Kant identifies as ‘constructions of concepts’. Moreover,
here Kant better clarifies the way in which mathematical procedures relate to sensibility.
He can do so because he has introduced the concept of pure intuition in his philosophy.
Thus, mathematics is synthetic and capable of a priori deriving non-trivial conclusions
from its concepts because it can immediately relate its concepts to a corresponding
object in pure intuition by means of constructions.
With respect to the Prize Essay, in the ‘Discipline of pure Reason in Dogmatic Use’
Kant is also more willing to allow a synthetic procedure to philosophy. Thus, he first
stresses that when the concept of a triangle is given to a philosopher ‘he can analyze
[zergliedern] and make distinct the concept of a straight line, or of an angle, or of the
number three, but he will not come upon any other properties that do not already lie in
these concepts’. Then, after a couple of pages he adds the specification: ‘there is, to be
sure, a transcendental synthesis from concepts alone, with which in turn only the
philosopher can succeed, but which never concerns more than a thing in general, with
regard to the conditions under which its perception could belong to possible
experience’.
It is true that Kant closes the second reflection of the Prize Essay with an opening to a
possible future use of synthesis in philosophy, however nothing is said about what this
synthesis amounts to. It is easy to see how Kant, at that time, did not have the means to
propose a division within synthetic reasoning itself and the synthetic method was thus
equated with the method of mathematics. On the other hand, in the Critique of Pure
Reason Kant thought he had found a peculiar synthetic philosophical argument which
was different from mathematical synthesis. As we saw, the narrower sense of synthesis
here presented concerns the possibility of a priory relating a concept to intuition. Even
though philosophy cannot perform mathematical constructions (immediately relating a
concept to an object in pure intuition), it is nonetheless able to connect a priori concepts
to pure intuition, in a very different way from mathematics though. Philosophy cannot a
priori construct an object in intuition, but it can show how the categories, in relation to
the pure intuition of time, function as rules that determine the synthesis of the manifold
in intuitions. It is this possibility to connect a priori concepts to intuition that identifies a
peculiar philosophical synthesis for Kant.
With respect to its broader counterpart, this narrower understanding of the distinction
between the synthetic and the analytic method is closer to the Kantian distinction
between analytic and synthetic a priori judgments. Accordingly, the syntheticity of
synthetic a priori judgments is also related to their ability to a priori connect concepts to
pure intuition. However, these two distinctions should not be seen as synonymous or
equivalent, not least because one classifies judgments and the other methods. In fact, the
Prolegomena shows that synthetic a priori judgments can be investigated using an
analytic method. That said, it seems plausible to suggest that for Kant the synthetic
method (in the narrower sense here identified) necessarily involves synthetic a priori
judgments. In fact, Kant argues that mathematics and philosophy can proceed
synthetically and they are also able to produce synthetic a priori judgments.
Recapitulating the results of the latter three sections, Kant uses the distinction between
analytic and synthetic methods in a broader and a narrower sense. In a broader sense the
distinction only refer to two different expository strategies, where a synthetic
presentation is distinctive for being systematic. This is the sense used in the passage
from the Prolegomena analysed in section 4. According to it, the whole Critique of
Pure Reason is synthetic. In a narrower sense, the distinction refers to two different
argumentative procedures. Thus, the synthetic method is able to a priori derive non-
trivial conclusions from a set of concepts thanks to a reference to pure intuition. On the
other hand, the analytic method is not able to produce new knowledge, but is only able
to clarify concepts already given. Kant introduces this narrower sense of the distinction
when he is dealing with the difference between mathematics and philosophy. In fact,
these two sciences can be distinguished by means of the different ways in which they
refer to intuition.
We should now ascertain where the Critique of Pure Reason can be considered
synthetic according to the narrower sense of the distinction here presented. Moreover,
we should also see whether Kant’s recognition of a synthetic procedure in philosophy
involved the possibility of identifying, avoiding any previous consideration of some
kind of given knowledge, sufficient conditions for deriving some aspects of our
knowledge. In order to do so, I will analyse the arguments which Kant proposes in the
first Critique and I will try to understand how philosophy can argue synthetically.

The Analytic and the Synthetic Method in the Critique of Pure Reason
As far as an analysis of the entire Critique would require a lot more than an article, I
will limit my inquiry to the ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’ and the ‘Analytic of Concepts’. I
will first consider Kant’s arguments for the a priority of space and time. Then, I will
analyse Kant’s argument for the a priority of the categories in the second version of the
‘Transcendental Deduction’.
Conclusion
Following the reflections carried out in this paper, it is possible to draw some
conclusions concerning Kant’s use of analytic and synthetic methods in the Critique of
Pure Reason.
First of all, it cannot be argued that the Critique proceeds only following a synthetic
method, unless one uses the broader understanding of the synthetic method that we have
identified in the Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics. According to the latter, the
distinction between a synthetic and an analytic method only refers to two different ways
of exposition used in the Critique and the Prolegomena respectively. Bird correctly
emphasizes this sense of the distinction. Accordingly, the Critique is synthetic thanks to
its systematic character. However, this sense cannot be employed to account for those
passages in which Kant seeks to differentiate mathematical and philosophical synthesis.
Guyer is thus right when he stresses that in the Critique we can find both analytic and
synthetic arguments, but he uses a description of the synthetic method that is too
demanding, and thus concludes that the argumentative procedures of the Critique are
inconsistent. According to his presentation, synthetic arguments avoid any claim of
necessity and universality for their premises and are able to obtain necessary and
universal propositions as conclusions. However, we have seen that when Kant attributes
a synthetic method to philosophy he seems to have in mind the recognition of the
possibility of a priori deriving some conclusions concerning our experience and
perception from the categories, thanks to a reference to pure intuition. This recognition
is the result of the second step of the ‘Transcendental Deduction’, which presupposes
the identification of space and time as a priori intuitive representations and the
recognition of the categories as conditions of the combination of the manifold of
intuitions into the concept of an object. As I have stressed above, Kant identifies these
elements of our knowledge by following an analytic procedure. Thus, Kant’s method in
the Critique should be seen as a coordination of analytic and synthetic methods. The
analytic stages of Kant’s argument identify necessary conditions in our sensible and
conceptual representations, while the synthetic stage is able to show a necessary
connection between the latter and the former. In this respect, the different arguments we
have analysed in section 6 are different steps of a unique argument.