112 Galanter
112 Galanter
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Philip Galanter
Texas A&M University
College Station, TX, USA
galanter@tamu.edu
In previous writing I’ve described what has arguably become the most widely cited theory of
generative art. Based on notions from complexity science, and in particular Murray Gell-Mann and
Seth Lloyd’s notion of “effective complexity,” I argue that generative art is not a subset of
computer art. Rather, generative art turns on the use of autonomous systems and the artist ceding
control to those systems. As part of this theory for generative art, I’ve introduced a series of
problems. These are not problems in the sense that they require single correct solutions. Rather
they are questions that the artist will consider when making a piece; that critics and historians will
typically address in their analysis; and that insightful audience members will ponder. They are
problems that typically offer multiple opportunities and possibilities. It is notable that, for the most
part, these problems equally apply to both digital and non‐digital generative art; to generative art
past, present, and (it is believed) future; and to ordered, disordered, and complex generative art. In
addition, these same problems or questions are generally trivial, irrelevant, or nonsensical when
asked in the context of non‐generative art. In a sense the applicability of these questions can
cleanly divide art into generative art and non-generative art. More importantly, the exploration of
these questions can illuminate the analysis and critique of generative art. More recently a new form
of neural-network-based artificial intelligence called “deep learning” has appeared on the scene.
Deep learning has been applied to digital art creation. In this paper I explore whether the problems
in generative art noted above hold up well in this new artificial intelligence context for generative
art. The conclusion reached is that our current complexity-based theory of generative art can
easily assimilate the use of deep learning.
Art theory. Generative art. Neural networks. Inceptionism. Deep learning. Artificial intelligence. Complexity theory.
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In addition, some find it surprising that not all rule- More recently “deep learning” has overcome this
based art is generative art. For example, some perceived limitation. The need for data has been
rules are suggestive but insufficient to determine a satisfied to some extent by the “big data”
final design. Others are constraint rules that tell the movement whereby large databases have been
artist what not to do, but again are not sufficient to released for public use and access via the Internet.
fix a specific form. Of particular interest to artists are image databases
of artworks that have been released by various
1.1 Artificial neural networks and deep learning museum and university initiatives. These can be
used to learn art styles, and then modify new input
In this same chapter the topic of artificial neural images to produce output images exhibiting that
networks (or simply “neural networks”) is briefly style. In addition, the need for increased
mentioned. Neural networks are inspired by computation has been met by Moore’s Law and
nature’s biological computer, the brain. Just as recently affordable GPU-based computing clusters.
neurons establish networks where associations are
created based on the strength of synapse Deep learning systems now typically implement
connections, artificial neural networks use weighted dozens of layers, and layer operations can include
virtual connections to associate various input not only traditional weighted sums, but also the
patterns with corresponding output patterns. application of convolution matrices and other
techniques. Some of the first art applications were
Traditional neural networks typically have three explored by Google Research, resulting in a style
layers. A layer of nodes for input data is widely and technique known as inceptionism (Mordvintsev
connected to a middle “hidden” layer that gathers et al. 2015).
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2. PROBLEMS IN GENERATIVE ART THEORY human or the computer?” Many will reflexively
answer that the programmer, i.e. the human, is the
In the same chapter noted above I introduced a artist. This question is particularly sharp in that it
number of problems in generative art theory resonates with a major vector in humanities
(Galanter 2016a). These are not problems requiring discourse, that being poststructuralism and notions
single correct solutions. Rather, these are problems such as “the death of the author.” Some might see
that invite consideration by the artist when creating digital generative art as the very embodiment of the
generative art; that theorists will want to consider in shift of attention away from traditional views of the
their analysis; and that well-informed audience author.
members will want to ponder. These are problems
that encourage multiple possibilities and In other writing I’ve introduced a point of view I’ve
opportunities. called “complexism.” It is an attempt to reconcile
the decades long “war” between the modernist
It is posited that these problems generally apply to culture of science and the postmodern culture of
all forms of generative art including digital and non- the humanities (Galanter 2016b). This is done by
digital forms, as well as past, present, and future applying insights from complexity science in a
work. But of equal importance, these same cultural studies setting. In that critique I offer a
problems when applied to non-generative art can theory of authorship that suggests when authorship
seem irrelevant, trivial, or even nonsensical. would be most appropriately credited to the
computer rather than the programmer. And, in fact,
The fact that this body of problems applies to all the example offered is a subset of deep learning-
generative art, but only generative art, is a very based generative art.
good sign in terms of art theory. It means that this
generative art theory isn’t arbitrary or forced, but Whatever side one might take in the question of
rather that it has content significance and whether a computer can truly be considered an
consistency. author, it’s clear that it is a non-trivial and
meaningful question. And the introduction of deep
But how well will these problems capture new, learning AI-based generative art only increases the
previously unanticipated, forms of generative art? importance of that question.
An analysis of the new forms of artificial
intelligence-based generative art afforded by deep Compare this, for example, to the question “Who is
learning offers a strong test case. We can try to the author of the Mona Lisa?” In the case of non-
apply these problems in generative art theory to generative art the question is not a philosophical
deep learning art. If they are found to be relevant conundrum, it is merely a question of fact.
rather than irrelevant, substantial rather than trivial,
and sensible rather than not, this should reinforce 2.2 The problem of intent
overall confidence in the associated generative art
theory. The problem of intent asks, “Why is the artist
working with and ceding control to generative
In the remaining sections each of these problems is systems?”
introduced, and then discussed in the context of
generative and non-generative art. Then the It was noted earlier that the category “generative
problem is considered relative to AI-based art” is a reference to how the art was made, but it
generative art afforded by deep learning. Specific says nothing about why the artist chose to work
responses to the problem are not the point. The that way. For example, John Cage, William
question is whether these problems are sensibly Burroughs, and Ellsworth Kelly all used
applicable to deep learning-based generative art at randomization to create art. But they did so for
all. (The noted chapter presents a much more quite different reasons. Cage used randomization
detailed treatment of these problems, but without to put into practice a Zen attitude of non-judgement
the following consideration of AI-based generative in aesthetic consideration. Burroughs, on the other
art.) hand, hoped to unleash the unconscious via
randomization as a Dada-esque tactic. And Kelly’s
2.1 The problem of authorship intent was to explore the creation of form through
random erosion.
Regarding generative art, the problem of
authorship asks, “How do traditional views of For some artists it is the generative system itself
authorship shift regarding credit, expression, and that is the topic of exploration. For others it is
provenance?” merely a means to some practical end. And still
others are looking to exercise what I’ve called “truth
When first encountering digital generative art, a to process” where a visible trace of the generative
novice will frequently ask “Who is the artist, the system is evident in the artefact (Galanter 2009b).
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Like generative art in general, AI-based generative A reasonable step in the direction of machine
art comfortably fits into this discourse. The vast creativity in the arts would be the capability to
majority of non-generative art, however, was discriminate between high- and low- quality art. For
practiced long before postmodernism arrived on the example, an evolutionary computing system could
scene, and is largely irrelevant relative to that use such a capability as a fitness function. This
discourse. would lead to an overall generative art system that
modifies its own behaviour.
2.7 The problem of locality, code and
malleability In previous writing I’ve taken a different tack than
Boden (Galanter 2009a). The core idea is that the
The problem of locality, code, and malleability asks, difference between a non-creative and creative
“Is the art in the object, the system, the code, or system is the difference between a “complex
something else entirely?” system” and a “complex adaptive system.” As
noted previously, complex systems are those that
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exhibit features such as emergence, connectionist serves as a good example of the notion of “truth to
agents, feedback, nonlinearity, deterministic chaos, process” mentioned earlier.
self-organization, and so on. Complex adaptive
systems have these same features, but in addition Similar to both digital and non-digital generative
they modify their structure or behaviour to maintain systems, deep learning AI-based generative art
their integrity in response to changes in the systems can be at both extremes. They can be
environment. So, for example, a weather system is about generativity, or not about generative systems
a complex system, but a beehive is a complex at all, or something in between.
adaptive system.
However, the question of whether generative art
There is more that can be said about this paradigm can be about more than generative systems is
for creativity, but it’s worth pointing out here that trivially irrelevant when asked in the context of non-
this approach avoids troublesome considerations generative art.
regarding consciousness and awareness, and it
can be extended beyond humans.
3. CONCLUSION
When it comes to non-generative art any creativity
is credited to the artist and not the artist’s brushes The goal here was to determine whether deep
or pencils. But in the case of generative art, where learning AI-based generative art would comfortably
the system surprises the artist it’s reasonable to fit within generative art theory that is based on the
wonder whether the artist has contributed all of the artist ceding control to autonomous systems for the
creativity on display. And in the case of AI-based creation of art.
generative art systems the problem of creativity
becomes even more relevant. It was noted that a set of “problems” can be used in
the discussion of generative art, and that these
2.9 The problem of meaning same problems can seem irrelevant, trivial, or even
nonsensical when applied to non-generative art.
The problem of meaning asks, “Can and should
generative art be about more than generative So these problems can serve a dual function. On
systems?” the one hand they can invite a discussion for any
given piece of generative art. In addition, the
One of the advantages of theorizing generative art degree to which the problems are relevant to a
as simply a way of making art is that it maximises given kind of art production method can indicate
artistic options. As noted in the problem of intent, how appropriate it is to think of that method as a
the same generative system can have different generative art system.
meanings to different artists.
The ease with which those problems can be
For some a generative system might simply be a applied to deep learning AI-based artworks is
pragmatic solution to a production need. For strong confirmation that they fit within this paradigm
example, in animated filmmaking one might use an for generative art. And in the analysis of deep
L-system-based generative tool for populating a earning Ai-based generative art no need to modify
forest scene with trees. This would be much easier, this current generative art theory was discovered
i.e. less expensive, than modelling hundreds of along the way.
trees by hand. But the film itself would not be about
generative art, or L-systems, or even trees.
4. REFERENCES
However, some generative artworks are about
Balter, M. (2002) From a Modern Human's Brow –
generative systems and little more. For example,
or Doodling? Science, 295, pp.47–248.
Haacke’s Condensation Cube is a non-digital
generative artwork. It is a clear, sealed, Baudrillard, J. (1994) Simulacra and simulation.
approximately 76 cm cube, with about a quarter of Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press.
an inch of water in it. The water evaporates and
Boden, M. A. (2004) The creative mind: myths and
then condenses on the walls of the cube. This
mechanisms. London, Routledge.
creates ever-changing patterns of condensation
and droplets that flow back to the bottom of the Carroll, N. (1999) Philosophy of art: a
cube. The piece isn’t merely about the patterns on contemporary introduction. London, Routledge.
the cube. It’s actually about the generative system
creating the patterns. Condensation Cube was Galanter, P. (2003) What is Generative Art?
originally titled Weather Cube, but Haacke changed Complexity theory as a context for art theory.
International Conference on Generative Art, Milan,
the name to better reflect its literal function. It
Italy, 2003, Generative Design Lab, Milan
Polytechnic Art.
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