HOW TO PERFORM

QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT

 It is a measure of harm/loss or potentiality of an event
to cause harm/loss
– Fire Hazard
– Explosion Hazard
– Toxic Hazard
– Corrosive Hazard
– Radioactive Hazards
The probability of suffering a harm or loss.
It is a combination of hazard and Probability
Risk = Probability of occurrence of hazard X Magnitude of hazard

QRA : Systematic analysis of risks from Hazardous activities to

provide input to a decision making process

Measurement of Risk
•Individual Risk
•Societal Risk
 •HAZID
•Hazard Checklist
•HAZOP
•Hazard review
•FMEA

EVENT TREE ANALYSIS

MODELLING USING
PHAST,FRED
Risk Vs Lifecycle, ability to change
 CASE STUDY
QRA FOR Typical WHP

• Assume WHP has 12 well slots, where 3 of them are splitter wells. From
these, 9 are producers, 3 injectors and 3 spares.
• Production and Test Manifold
• Crude Heater Unit
• Pig Launcher
• Wellhead Utility Facilities
– Hydraulic Power Unit (HPU);
– Open and Closed Drain system
– Relief and Vent System
– Fire water System
– Service and Potable Water system
– Chemical Injection System
– Diesel Fuel System
– Power Supply System
WHP Areas
OBJECTIVES
• Evaluate the consequences and frequencies of Major
Accident Events (MAEs) which could occur on the facility
• Provide a numerical estimate of the individual risks (IR) per
annum encountered by the various personnel categories on
the facilities
• Provide a numerical estimate of the combined PLL per year
on the facilities
• To identify and rank the key risk drivers
• Evaluate the acceptability of these risk levels against the
risk tolerability criteria
• To identify practical and effective measures to further
reduce the risk to levels As Low As Reasonably Practicable
(ALARP).
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
FOR TOPSIDE RELEASES
SECTIONALIZATION

• Discrete sections by Shutdown Valves (SDVs).

• An SDV separates an inventory from adjacent inventories upon process
shutdown.
• Normal valves are assumed not to provide any isolation of hydrocarbon
LEAK HOLE SIZES
• A release of flammable material could occur through holes of any
size from small to large releases
➢ Small leaks from holes of 5/10 mm diameter
➢ Medium leaks from holes of 50 mm diameter
➢ Large leaks from holes of 100 mm diameter
INVENTORY DEFINITION
• Physical properties such as pressure, temperature and density
• Volume
The physical properties, hole sizes and release rates of the flammable
inventories are used as input to the consequence modelling
 FREQUENCY ANALYSIS
The release frequency for each of the isolatable sections is
estimated based on a “parts count”
Historical leak frequency data from the UK HSE database
The leak frequency for each isolatable section is used to
calculate the frequency of event outcomes from the event tree
analysis
 TOPSIDES EVENT TREE ANALYSIS

• Event tree analysis is used to examine the development of initiating events

into various possible outcomes
• The topsides process event tree develops the scenario from the initiation of a
leak, taking into consideration the various safety barriers (i.e. ESD, detection
system, etc.)in place that may control or prevent the escalation of process
releases

EVENT TREE MODEL

ACCEPTABLE FREQUENCY DATABASE

 CONSEQUENCE MODELLING
• JET FIRE
A jet fire arises when a release through a hole in a vessel, pipe
or fitting containing flammable gas or liquid under pressure
ignites
• POOL FIRE
A pool fire arises when a release of liquid accumulates on the
deck (or the sea) and ignites
• FLASH FIRE
A flash fire occurs when a cloud accumulates and spreads until
the edge of the cloud reaches a source of ignition
• EXPLOSION
An explosion will occur if a release of vapour mixes with air to
produce a mixture that is close to the stoichiometric
concentration.
• MODELLING TOOLS : PHAST , FRED, CIRRUS
• OUTPUT FROM MODELLING
– The dimensions of the jet fire in terms of jet length, flame lift-off and
thermal radiation contours etc
– The dimensions of the pool fire in terms of pool height and thermal
radiation contours;
– The downwind distance to 100% lower Flammable Limit (LFL)
– The explosion overpressure at various distances from the source
Note 1 :Inventory completely depressurized
 RISK ANALYSIS
• IMPAIRMENT ASSESSMENT
 INDIVIDUAL RISK
• Individual Risk per Annum (IRPA) is defined as the frequency with which
an individual may be expected to sustain fatal harm due to his exposure to
specific hazards in a year.
• The IRPA for all personnel on the WHP are calculated based on the area
and amount of time spent on each area on the decks.
IRPA = fE x Pf x F
• fE = Event outcome frequency per year
• PF = Probability of fatality of individual present in the location
• F = Presence factor of worker category

POTENTIAL LOSS OF LIFE

• Group risk for offshore installations is usually assessed in terms of the
Potential Loss of Life (PLL)
PLL = ∑IRPA× N
IRPA = Individual Risk per annum; and
N = Number of prsonnel working within the location
 ALARP

IR For production
supervisor 1.22 E-05
 NON HYDROCARBON HAZARD ANALYSIS
• Transportation Accidents
• Dropped Objects
• Platform, Crane and Boom Structural Failure
• Ship Collisions; and
• Occupational Risks
 DROPPED OBJECTS ANALYSIS

• The Thang Long WHP will be equipped with a pedestal crane on the South
West side of the platform to transfer supplies and to support operational
and maintenance requirements. A supply vessel will transfer the majority
of the equipment, containers and consumable supplies and tools to the
Thang Long WHP on the weather deck lay-down area and vice versa using
the pedestal crane.
HAZARDS
• Dropped objects - resulting from failure of the hoisting system, lifting
tackle, lifting points, or incorrectly applied rigging (human error). An
object may drop at any point in its lift path. The consequences of the
dropped object depend on the weight, density, drop height and location of
impact
• Structural failure - of the crane or boom
The dropped objects assessment includes:
• Determine dropped object frequency from historical data;
• Identify the exposed areas where loads can be dropped and its
consequence
• Quantify the risk to personnel of various accident scenarios caused by
dropped objects.
ASSUMPTIONS AND DATA
• The generic dropped object probability (fref) is taken as 5 x 10-5 per lift
EVENT TREE FOR CRANE OVERBOARD LIFING
DROPPED OBJECT CONSEQUENCE ASSESSMENT
• The Weather Deck is designed according to applicable structural design
standards and codes to ensure the capability of withstanding possible
dropped load during movement

• The impact energy of dropped object is calculated using

E = mgh
E = Impact energy, kJ;
m = Mass of dropped load, tonnes
g = Gravitational acceleration, 9.81 m/s 2
h = Height from object dropping point to deck, m.
Equipment /activity Weight(tonnes) Impact Energy (kJ)
Corrosion Inhibitor 0.5 19.62
Pour point depressant 10 392.4
Demulsifier 0.5 19.62
Back up chemical 0.5 19.62
injection
CTU for well intervention 18 706.32
Service water tank 5 196.2

IR due to Dropped Objects

Personnel category IR (per year)
Technician Instrument 1.68 E-10
Technician Electrical 1.68 E-10
Technician Mechanical 1.68 E-10
Production Supervisor 8.42 E-11
Personnel No of Individual Risk (per year) Total %
Category People
OVERALL RISK RESULTS
Topside Riser Pipelin Blowout Transportation Ship collision Dropped Structural Occupational
e accident Objects failure accidents

Technician 1 8.03E-06 5.8E- 4.78E- 1.84E-07 1.52E-03 8.23E-03 1.68E-10 3.25E-09 7.66E-06 1.69E-04 25
Instrument 07 08

Technician Electrical 1 7.64e-06 6.5e- 4.78E- 1.84E-07 1.52E-03 8.23E-03 1.68E-10 3.25E-09 7.66E-06 1.68e-04 24.9
07 08

Technician 1 6.82e-06 4.95e 4.78E- 1.84E-07 1.52E-03 8.23E-03 1.68E-10 3.25E-09 7.66E-06 1.67E-04 24.8
Mechanical -07 08

Production 2 1.22E-05 9.3E- 4.78E- 1.84E-07 1.52E-03 8.23E-03 1.68E-10 3.25E-09 7.66E-06 1.71E-04 25.3
Supervisor 07 08

Hazard Category PLL(per year) Percentage (%)

Topside process 6.80E-05 4.16
Riser 7.19E-06 0.44
Pipeline 4.78E-07 0.03
Blowouts 2.21E-06 0.14
Transportation 1.52E-03 93.10
Ship collision 8.23E-07 0.05
Dropped Object 1.35E-09 0.01
Structural Failure 2.99E-08 0.01
Occupational accidents 3.40E-05 2.08
Total 1.63E-03 100
 CONCLUSIONS
• The Production Supervisor is estimated to have the highest IRPA
among all personnel which is 1.71E-04 per year due to high travel
frequency and duration of time spend in hazardous areas on the
platform. This IRPA is within the ALARP region;
• The overall Potential Loss of Life (PLL) for all events is calculated to
be 1.63E-03 per year (one fatality every 613 years);
• The dominant risk contributors for IRPA and PLL are Transportation
Accidents followed by Topsides Process. Transportation accidents is
the main contributor due to the high frequency of the standby
vessel visiting the FPSO for personnel transportation purposes;
• The Emergency Overnight Shelter, where personnel muster, could be
impaired by explosion scenarios in the process areas which give rise
to explosion overpressures of 0.35 to 0.61 bar
• Small releases from jet fire events from all the isolatable sections
have the potential to impair both of the riser ESDVs.
• The highest jet fire length for a topside blowout event was found to
be 108.76 m.
• This could potentially engulf the entire WHP. However, the
estimated frequency of this event occurring is 7.19E-06 per year;
 RECOMMENDATIONS

• Based on the overpressure of 0.61 bar, the blast-wall should

be rated at least 0.61 bar. Ensure that the structure of the
platform is able to withstand blast Overpressure of 0.61 bar. To
have an increased level of confidence (and the possibility to
reduce) on the blast wall rating, a CFD analysis is
recommended.
• Consider relocating both the riser ESDVs to the vertical section
of the riser below the Main Deck to minimise potential for
impairment due to topsides jet fire and Explosion
overpressure.
 TOPSIDES FATALITY ESTIMATION

Immediate Fatalities Due to Instantly Ignited Events (Jet Fire)

• The immediate fatality rate is estimated from the proportion of the deck
covered by the 12.5 kW/m2 radiation contour
• If the 12.5 kW/m2 contours from a jet or pool fire impacts the location of
interest, then the probability of fatality in this location is assumed to be 1,
otherwise 0
Immediate Fatalities from Delayed Ignition Events (Flash Fire & Explosion)
• The probability of fatality is 1 when personnel is within the LFL of a flash fire
• If the distance to 0.35 bar overpressure from an explosion reaches the
locations of interest, the probability of fatality is 0.5 or else 0
Pf= PFL+PFM(1-PFL)+PFE(1-PFL)(1-PFM)

PFL-Probability of Local Fatality due to fire/explosion

PFM-Probability of fatality during Mustering/escalation
PFE- Probability of fatality during Evacuation (life-raft =0.13 , SBV =0.01)
MANNING LEVEL AND PRESENCE FACTOR

VISITS PLATFORM ONCE IN TWO WEEKS

ACCEPTABLE SOURCE FOR LEAK FREQUENCIES
JET FIRE FOR SMALL RELEASE FROM PRODUCTION WELLHEAD TO
FPSO(SECTION 1)