FINAL PROJECT (RESEARCH PAPER)

“NUCLEAR TERRORISM”

COURSE: INSURGENCY AND TERRORISM

Submitted to: DR Shahid Afridi

Submitted by: Haseen Alam Riza (NDU-BS-19/F-1361)

TABLE OF CONTENT:
1. Abstract
2. Introduction
3. Research Questions
4. Hypothesis
5. Significance of the Research
6. Theoretical Framework
7. Methodology
8. Literature Review
 NUCLEAR WEAPONS POSSESSION BY STATES
 Nuclear warheads, plutonium production around the world
 TERRORIST GROUPS SEEKING NUCLEAR WEAPONS
 Terrorist Groups and their Capabilities
 NUCLEAR TERRORISM IN SOUTH ASIA
 Vulnerability of Nuclear Terrorism in South Asia
 Risk of Nuclear Terrorism
 Security measures taken by Pakistan
9. Policy Recommendations
10. Conclusion
11. Bibliography
NUCLEAR TERRORISM

ABSTRACT:
The purpose of this article is to examine nuclear terrorism and provide a thorough assessment
of the hazards it poses. Nuclear terrorism poses a real threat. This study examines potential
methods in which a terrorist organisation could commit nuclear terrorism while taking into
account the significant obstacles that any terrorist organisation would encounter in doing so.
Furthermore, this study examines terrorist reasons for committing nuclear terrorism, as well as
how well nuclear terrorism fits into the beliefs, aspirations, and strategic and organisational
objectives of various organisations. Nuclear weapons and related technology have rapidly
expanded, posing severe challenges to global peace. Keeping nuclear assets safe has become a
major challenge for the international community. Non-state actors and terrorist groups have
grown in power around the world, undermining existing security institutions. Such is the
situation with Pakistan and India, two adversarial neighbours with a history of clashes and wars
whose nuclear-weapons status provides strategic stability in South Asia. This research examines
the situation in Pakistan and India, looking at their relationship, terrorist threats, and
vulnerability to nuclear terrorism.

INTRODUCTION:
For a long time, academics researching political violence have struggled to come up with an
accurate functional definition of terrorism. In simple terms, it is characterised as "the wide use
of political violence by non-state actors with coercive determination affecting numerous
states.". It is important to remember that direct interactions between governments have been
omitted from most, if not all, international definitions of terrorism. Terrorism, then, is defined
as the act of non-state violent actors, rather than direct ties between states. Though threats
exchanged between states regarding the use of nuclear weapons may cause anxiety, they are
not intended to imply what is commonly referred to as "nuclear terrorism."
Nuclear terrorism can be defined in a number of ways. It is a type of terrorism in which
members of a terrorist organisation carry out a nuclear-weapons assault. The most terrifying
scenario is terrorists obtaining nuclear weapons by stealing or acquiring them on the dark
market. An unintentional explosion or act of nuclear terrorism might kill 100,000 or more
people. Terrorist’s intent on carrying out suicide attacks would not require aircraft or missiles to
deliver the weapon; instead, it could be delivered by truck or boat. According to a 1977
research conducted by the US government, a small group of persons (rogue elements) might
design and build a rudimentary nuclear weapon with only minimal mechanical equipment if
they obtain enough fissile material. In comparison to nuclear devices, fissile material may be
subject to less strict security regulations.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS:
The paper aims to find the answers for the following questions:
 How and when the terrorist groups seek nuclear weapons?
 What is the future of nuclear terrorism in south Asia under the presence of two nuclear powers
i.e. Pakistan and India?
 What should be the measures taken into consideration by Pakistan to avoid nuclear war in
future?

HYPOTHESIS:
In contemporary era the threat of terrorist groups acquiring nuclear weapons or material is
greater than ever before. Keeping in which the national interest of both India and Pakistan, the
research gaps can be filled through making effective policies which will lead to a secure attitude
and stability in the South Asian region.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH:

The study signifies the importance evolution and emergence of nuclear materials in the world
over time. The Research will explore the underlying reasons behind possession of nuclear
weapons by different actors which results in fomenting such activities that lead to nuclear
terrorism threats. While doing so the research also explores the possible future of nuclear
terrorism in the South Asian region focusing on the case study of India and Pakistan. There
remain some gaps between the pace of progress and the scope and urgency of the threat that if
left unfilled could lead to unparalleled catastrophe. Pakistan’s and India’s capabilities to protect
nuclear security inationally are one of the crucial aspect for preventing nuclear terrorism. Policy
recommendations and measures specifically for Pakistan are significant to fulfill it.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK:
Nuclear terrorism and its risks in South Asia will be examined through the prism of deterrence
theory and structural realism, i.e. offensive realism, in this research study. Nuclear deterrence
theory rationalises states' acquisition of nuclear weapons. The proliferation of nuclear weapons
in India and Pakistan, i.e. the south Asian region, raises the risk of crises, accidents, nuclear war,
and, most crucially, nuclear terrorism. Military power has been transformed into an extremely
expensive and hazardous tool of statecraft thanks to nuclear weapons. It is also extremely
deadly if these nuclear weapons get into the wrong hands, i.e. terrorists.
The long-standing and highly developed idea of deterrence that originated from the Cold War is
shared by two states in the South Asian region, namely India and Pakistan. Deterrence theory is
frequently described in terms of adversarial relationships in which one tries to scare the other
into doing nothing. Instead of physically impeding or halting a certain line of action, these
measures to dissuade undesirable acts are mostly psychological in origin. Deterrence strategies
try to sway the enemy's perceptions or shape one's image in such a way that the enemy
believes it is in its best interests to refrain from attacking. This idea explains the buildup of
nuclear arsenals in India and Pakistan. Nuclearization in South Asia has heightened the risk of
nuclear terrorism. With the spread of nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan, the risk of
nuclear-related crises, accidents, nuclear war, and, most crucially, nuclear terrorism has
increased. In South Asia, non-state entities have constituted a significant danger to nuclear
deterrent stability. They had even pushed nuclear-armed India and Pakistan to the verge of
conflict, which may have turned nuclear. Deterrence stability between nuclear India and
Pakistan could be jeopardised by transnational terrorists and growing military asymmetry
between the two countries.
Furthermore, offensive realism states that an actor enhances its relative power in order to achieve
regional hegemony. States and non-state entities are doing so in order to gain a stronghold on the
global stage. Pakistan developed its nuclear programme in order to deflect Indian threats and
play a larger regional role, but several prominent terrorist leaders, such as Al-Qaida, have stated
that they want to acquire nuclear weapons. Pakistan's uranium-based nuclear weapons
programme is a major worry in South Asia, as it raises serious fears about terrorism. Terrorists
could gain access to the country's nuclear programme, as Osama bin Laden has stated that his
organisation is devoted to obtaining nuclear and chemical weapons for the sake of defending
Muslims, which he describes as his Islamic responsibility.

METHODOLOGY:
The research is conducted through a qualitative analysis by means of archival research relying
on secondary sources. Methodology is qualitative with secondary data collection methods.

LITERATURE REVIEW:

NUCLEAR WEAPONS POSSESSION BY STATES:

  Nuclear warheads, plutonium production around the world

TERRORIST GROUPS SEEKING NUCLEAR WEAPONS:

It's also important to make a clear distinction between state actors' possible attainment and
use of nuclear weapons and non-state actors' procurement and eventual use of such weapons.
It's critical to realise that the first does not always lead to the second. Terrorist organisations'
threats of nuclear weapons compel all members of the international community to take actual
action. Some western academics believe that rogue regimes may be able to participate in
nuclear-related trade. The Westerners are concerned that states seeking nuclear weapons, such
as Iraq, North Korea, Libya, Iran, and Sudan, will invest millions of dollars in nuclear research
and development, only to auction off or transfer them to non-state entities, fully aware that
they will be held responsible for the actions of their potential customers.
The problem of sovereign nations procuring and employing nuclear weapons is vastly different
from the problem of non-state actors acquiring and employing nuclear arsenals. As a result of
the Cold War, there has been a lot of research into how changing elements of nuclear arsenals
affect state-to-state relationships. On this issue alone, there are numerous volumes of research
material available. At the same time, our current understanding of non-state actors who could
seek to acquire weapons of mass devastation to further their horrific goals is limited. 1
Nuclear security can be strengthened, reducing the risk of nuclear terrorism. Nuclear security
can be defined as the defensive measures taken to prevent a non-state, malicious actor from
stealing nuclear weapons or damaging a nuclear plant. Nuclear terrorism is not a new concept;
in fact, it dates back to the dawn of the atomic age. Following the demise of the Soviet Union,
fears about loose nukes grew as a result of the Soviet Union's nuclear sites' inadequate security.
Given the international community's experience with the threat of terrorism over the last
decade, there has been an allure to regard all irregular warfare as stereotypical, involving
various types of attacks such as car bombs, small arms, and improvised explosive devices, which
may be generally correct. Moreover, the dynamics have changed, and some international
terrorist groups would be eager to obtain nuclear weapons in order to cause havoc. 2

 Terrorist Groups and their Capabilities

A nuclear attack would be among the most difficult forms of attack for terrorists to achieve,
according to a report published by Harvard University's 'Project on Managing the Atom,' but
with the necessary fissile materials, a skilled and well-organized terrorist group could probably
make, transport, and detonate at least a crude nuclear bomb capable of destroying the heart of
any major city in the world. Terrorist organisations can obtain nuclear weapons in a variety of
methods.3 It can either acquire a nuclear weapon from a state or sell completed nuclear
weapons to violent non-state actors to use against rival states. The third option is that a state's
nuclear scientists may exchange technical information with terrorist groups if they share
common ideology or goals.

NUCLEAR TERRORISM IN SOUTH ASIA:

 Vulnerability of Nuclear Terrorism in South Asia

The state of the South Asian region remains distinct from that of all other regions for a variety
of reasons, including the presence of two nuclear powers (Pakistan and India) with a history of
wars and confrontation over the unresolved Kashmir issue, which is the main bone of
contention between nuclear rivals. Terrorist groups from around the world are disrupting the

1
T.J. Badey (2001) “Nuclear Terrorism: Actor-based Threat Assessment, Intelligence & National Security”, 16:2, 39-
54.
2
John Mark Mattox (2010) Nuclear Terrorism: The ‘Other’ Extreme of Irregular Warfare, Journal of Military Ethics,
9:2, 160-176.
3
Shameer Modongal (2016) Deterrence of nuclear terrorism in the context of South Asia, Defense & Security
Analysis, 32:2, 192-198.
peace in both countries. South Asia is in the midst of a terrorism war, which is why the risk of
nuclear terrorism in the region is higher than in any other. The South Asian region is home to
over 32 terrorist groups, making it extremely vulnerable to such attacks.
Given Pakistan's porous border with Afghanistan, it's very likely that any stolen fissile material
might be carried anywhere. Nuclear terrorism could also take the form of sabotage or an attack
on a nuclear power plant. To dispel misconceptions regarding Pakistan's nuclear security, the
country has improved its nuclear safety and security requirements. Pakistan has implemented
the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of
Sealed Radioactive Sources. Pakistan’s Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA) keeps track of any
radioactive sources supplied to other countries. According to a 2003 study, Al-Qaeda in
Afghanistan was involved in the development of the dirty bomb, from which it could try to
transfer it to neighbouring governments for nuclear terrorism.4

 Risks of Nuclear Terrorism

Al-top Qaida's commanders have stated that they want to get their hands on nuclear weapons.
Despite the fact that many Al-Qaida-affiliated clerics have stated that such weapons are
inherently sinful, the matter remains unclear. 5 In his biography, former CIA Director George
Tenet said that Al-most Qaeda's senior commanders are still intent on getting weapons of mass
destruction, despite the fact that the greatest threat is nuclear. "He is confident that this is
where Osama bin Laden and his operators really want to go," he continued”. 6 As per John J.
Klein, Al-Qaida and other violent extremist organisations have expressed a desire in deploying
nuclear weapons against the United States or its allies for more than a decade. 7
In the case of India and Pakistan, both are nuclear-capable governments with a history of
hostility dating back to the subcontinent's split and the unsolved Kashmir dispute. After the
nuclear tests in 1998, the region's stability was preserved thanks to mutual deterrence, which
led to the Lahore Declaration and CBMs on several unresolved concerns. However, as a result of
the recent wave of terrorism, relations between the two nuclear arch-rivals have reached an
all-time low. On the one hand, Pakistan has to pay a higher human and material cost in its fight
against terrorism, while the international world accuses Pakistan of being the terrorist
organisations' hub. India's military outposts of Pathankot and Uri were attacked by terrorists in
2016, and the Indian Parliament was attacked in December 2001, indicating that the country's
nuclear facilities are also under threat. However, no country has mentioned the threat of

4
Frank Gardner, ‘Al-Qaeda “was making dirty bomb”’, BBC News, 31 January 2003, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/1/hi/uk/2711645.stm.
5
Garfinkle, ‘Does Nuclear Deterrence Apply in the Age of Terrorism?’
6
G. Allison, ‘Nuclear Deterrence in the Age of Nuclear Terrorism’, Technology Review, November/December 2009,
71.
7
J.J. Klein, ‘Deterring and Dissuading Nuclear Terrorism’, Journal of Strategic Security 5, no. 1 (2012): 15–29.
nuclear terrorism to India. The potential of nuclear terrorism in the South Asian region is higher
than in any other location in the world due to the complexity of regional dynamics. 8
Pakistan's uranium-based nuclear weapons development is a major point of discussion in South
Asia. Western media and governments are concerned about Pakistan's comparatively large
stockpile of HEU. Terrorists are more likely to acquire access to Pakistan's HEU stockpile
because to the country's current political turmoil, which is being carried out by a young
government. In December 1999, Osama bin Laden said that his organisation was devoted to
obtaining nuclear and chemical weapons for the sake of defending Muslims, which he saw as
his Islamic responsibility.9

 Policy recommendations: Security measures taken by Pakistan

If both India and Pakistan are concerned about nuclear terrorism, the best way to deal with it is
to mitigate the risk and tighten the security at civilian and government nuclear sites. But
governments would be better off focusing their efforts on combatting the spread and use of
conventional weapons. Moreover, international should to contribute security in the nuclear
field in order to improve security for nuclear weapons and materials at vulnerable site and
around the world.
Considering Pakistan's history of proliferation, such as the proliferation of the A.Q Khan
network which the Pakistani government reportedly denied and declared to be an individual
act. Pakistan has been implementing UNSC 1540 resolutions since 2004 and has built many
domestic legal export control procedures for the safety and security of its nuclear programme
in order to improve its image as a responsible international player in addressing nuclear
terrorism dangers. Such actions have been praised by the international community at
numerous forums, and the Pakistani government's efforts have raised Pakistan's status as a
responsible nuclear power in the international system. Both Pakistan and India have exchanged
a list of nuclear facilities and committed not to strike them as part of nuclear CBMs. The
literature published in India about Pakistan's nuclear weapons is mostly biassed and an attempt
to blame Pakistan for regional instability. However, Indian researchers raise concerns that if
Pakistan hands over this list of Indian nuclear facilities to any terrorist organisation, the latter
will be able to strike those sites.10 Such unfounded rumours and propaganda against Pakistan
are not conducive to peace in South Asia. Pakistan has captured Kulbhushan Yadav, an Indian
RAW naval commander who has confessed to planning strikes on Pakistan's key sites as well as
sabotaging the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.
8
Shameer Modongal (2016) Deterrence of nuclear terrorism in the context of South Asia, Defense & Security
Analysis, 32:2, 192-198.
9
Reshmi Kazi (2009) Pakistan's HEU-based Nuclear Weapons Programme and Nuclear Terrorism: A Reality Check,
Strategic Analysis.
10
Shameer Modongal (2016) Deterrence of nuclear terrorism in the context of South Asia, Defense & Security
Analysis, 32:2, 192-198.
Because they lack cutting-edge technology, the Pakistani military has designed security
mechanisms for nuclear weapons that are not just difficult, but nearly impossible to breach for
individuals or terrorist groups. There is a well-designed people reliability programme in place,
as well as electronic safety systems. Pakistan has a sufficient nuclear arsenal scattered among a
small number of sites in disassembled form, making it difficult for non-state actors to acquire a
nuclear bomb in two phases. The nuclear arsenal is thought to be well safeguarded. In 2004,
the Strategic Plans Division began extensive changes to its nuclear command, control, and
security systems. The SPD is said to be praised for its general handling of Pakistan's nuclear
weapons. Furthermore, SPD has established a special unit dedicated to the security of nuclear
plants, consisting of approximately 10,000 men. Pakistani officials have also claimed that their
nuclear arsenal is protected by authentic coding technology with measures that prevent any
unauthorised individual from gaining access to the nuclear weapons system. The 'Permissive
Action Links' is a code system developed by the United States that is fundamental to the
weapon's construction, exceedingly difficult to evade, and has limited try capabilities that allow
the system to permanently disable the weapon if the erroneous code is entered too many
times.11
Pakistan has promised the IAEA that it will take certain steps to bolster its nuclear security. For
example, in June 2007, the administration declared that Pakistan is implementing a "National
Security Action Plan (NSAP)" with the help of the IAEA. The Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory
Authority has been tasked by the Pakistani government with ensuring the physical safety of
nuclear and other hazardous materials. Pakistan introduced new domestic export restrictions
legislation in September 2004 in order to reduce the risk of nuclear technologies and materials
proliferating.
In a televised interview, Khalid Banuri, Director of the SPD's 'Arms Control and Disarmament
Division,' categorically dismissed any security threat to Pakistan's nuclear weapons. "The entire
world was of the opinion that Pakistan could not manufacture a nuclear bomb," he said. But
didn't Pakistan make the nuclear bomb?" He went on to say that the world is mistaken about
Pakistan's nuclear security. Pakistan is capable of safeguarding its nuclear weapons.”. 12. Even
though Pakistan is a new candidate in the nuclear sphere compared to other nuclear powers,
the fact is that not a single security gap or breach has been detected since the inception of the
'Nuclear Command Authority (NCA),' despite the fact that the international community is
concerned. Pakistan's isolation within the global nuclear community, as a result of its non-
proliferation attitude, prevents Pakistan's preventive measures from being of exceptional
quality. Clearly, more needs to be done, with major external assistance, to raise Pakistani
nuclear plant performance to a world-class level and ensure long-term plant safety. 13 With
11
Ibid.
12
Rizwan Zeb (2014) Pakistan’s nuclear weapons: how safe is safe enough? Transparency versus opacity, Defense
& Security Analysis, 30:3, 230-244.
13
Chaim Braun, ‘Security Issues Related to Pakistan’s Future Nuclear Power Program’, in Henry D. Sokolski, n. 82.
adequate external support, as well as advancement in other nuclear infrastructures and
technological capabilities within Pakistan, Pakistan's nuclear facilities may be able to meet
standards comparable to those of other developed nuclear states.
CONCLUSION:
Terrorism in Pakistan has escalated and continues to grow since September 11, 2001. Terrorist
organisations are getting more audacious in their targets and regions of operation, particularly
the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). In the view of the West, Pakistan is a very dangerous
country because of the threat of terrorism, political instability, booming economic conditions,
and a growth in religious extremism and sectarianism. Though the threat of nuclear terrorism is
real and no longer hypothetical, Pakistan is not the only country that should be considered a
hotspot. Pakistan has adopted a number of international and internal measures to counter the
threat of nuclear terrorism.
Pakistan has been working hard to ensure that its nuclear programme is well-protected,
particularly after the proliferation of the A. Q. Khan network. It has devoted itself to ensuring
that a similar incident does not occur again. Experts and academics have praised Pakistan's
efforts, noting that the country has been more upfront and open in informing the world about
its command and control systems than any other nuclear-armed state. The safety and security
of Pakistan's nuclear assets, on the other hand, will almost certainly remain a cause of
international worry. Questions about Pakistan's nuclear programme will continue to be raised
due to the presence of religious extremist groups, terrorist organisations, and political
instability. These are the areas where Pakistani decision-makers must pay quick attention.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:
 Thomas J. Badey, ‘Defining International Terrorism: A Pragmatic Approach’, Terrorism
and Political Violence, 10/1 (Spring 1998) pp.90–107.
 T.J. Badey (2001) “Nuclear Terrorism: Actor-based Threat Assessment, Intelligence &
National Security”, 16:2, 39-54.
 John Mark Mattox (2010) Nuclear Terrorism: The ‘Other’ Extreme of Irregular Warfare,
Journal of Military Ethics, 9:2, 160-176.
 Shameer Modongal (2016) Deterrence of nuclear terrorism in the context of South Asia,
Defense & Security Analysis, 32:2, 192-198.
 Frank Gardner, ‘Al-Qaeda “was making dirty bomb”’, BBC News, 31 January 2003,
http://news.bbc. co.uk/1/hi/uk/2711645.stm.
 Garfinkle, ‘Does Nuclear Deterrence Apply in the Age of Terrorism?’
 G. Allison, ‘Nuclear Deterrence in the Age of Nuclear Terrorism’, Technology Review,
November/December 2009, 71.
 J.J. Klein, ‘Deterring and Dissuading Nuclear Terrorism’, Journal of Strategic Security 5,
no. 1 (2012): 15–29.
 Shameer Modongal (2016) Deterrence of nuclear terrorism in the context of South Asia,
Defense & Security Analysis, 32:2, 192-198.
 Reshmi Kazi (2009) Pakistan's HEU-based Nuclear Weapons Programme and Nuclear
Terrorism: A Reality Check, Strategic Analysis.
 Shameer Modongal (2016) Deterrence of nuclear terrorism in the context of South Asia,
Defense & Security Analysis, 32:2, 192-198.
 David Albright, ‘Securing Pakistan’s Nuclear Infrastructure’, in Lee Feinstein, James C.
Clad, Lewis A. Dunn, and David Albright, A New Equation: U.S. Policy toward India and
Pakistan after September 11, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington,
DC, 2002, at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/wp27.pdf, Accessed September,
2018.
 Paul Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security
Issues’, Congressional Research Service, November 14, 2007.
 Reshmi Kazi (2009) Pakistan's HEU-based Nuclear Weapons Programme and Nuclear
Terrorism: A Reality Check, Strategic Analysis, 33:6, 861-876.
 Rizwan Zeb (2014) Pakistan’s nuclear weapons: how safe is safe enough? Transparency
versus opacity, Defense & Security Analysis, 30:3, 230-244.
 Chaim Braun, ‘Security Issues Related to Pakistan’s Future Nuclear Power Program’, in
Henry D. Sokolski, n. 82.