Versoza Vs Versoza
Versoza Vs Versoza
MARGARET ANN WAINRIGHT VERSOZA, JOSE MA. VERSOZA, JR., CHARLES JOHN VERSOZA and
VIRGINIA FELICE VERSOZA, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
JOSE MA. VERSOZA, defendant-appellee.
PRINCIPLES:
that an attempt at compromise of future support and failure thereof is not a condition precedent to the
filing of the present suit. It need not be alleged in the complaint. The very opening statement in Article
2035 unmistakably confirms our view. It says that "(n)o compromise upon the following question shall
be valid: ... (4) Future support."15 We cannot afford to give a loose view to this controlling statute. We
may not disregard it. To do so is to misread the law, to write off an explicit congressional will, to cross
the line which circumscribes courts of justice and step into legislative area.
FACTS
A complaint was filed for 1500 monthly support, support in arrears, and damages, and custody
of children, with a petition for support pendente lite against Jose Ma. Versoza by his wife
Margaret Versoza and their three minor children by reason that the defendant has abandoned
plaintiffs without providing for their support and maintains illicit relations with another woman.
Defendant claims that the complaint is premature and state no cause of action because the
complaint involves family members of the same family, and according to him, there must be
earnest efforts toward a compromise first before filed to the court pursuant to Article 222 of CC
because it is a CONDITION PRECEDENT and must be alleged in the complaint.
On February 22, 1965, the lower court resolved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground
showing no earnest efforts been exerted to settle the case amicable before the suit was started.
Upon motion for recon, they allege that they sought amicable settlement but were
unseuccessful but it was denied.
ISSUE
WON earnest towards a compromise must be done first before filing in the court in cases of support.
CONCLUSION
No.
For, support is, amongst others, everything that is indispensable for sustenance. 9 The right to support
cannot be: (1) renounced; (2) transmitted to third persons; nor (3) compensated with what the recipient
owes the obligor.10 Compensation may not even be set up against a creditor who has a claim for support
due by gratuitous title.11 Of course, support in arrears is a different thing altogether. It may be
compensated, renounced and transmitted by onerous or gratuitous title. 12 In Coral vs. Gallego,13 the
Court of Appeals has had occasion to declare that the right to support is not susceptible of future
transactions under Article 1814 of the old Civil Code.
Article 1814 of the Spanish Civil Code was reproduced in Article 2035 of the new Civil Code — in an
expanded form — as follows:
It thus appears that Article 2035 has roots deeper than Article 222. For, whereas Article 222 is inserted
as a new concept in the present Code in a laudable effort to obviate a sad and tragic spectacle
occasioned by a litigation between members of the same family. Article 2035 firmly maintains the
ancient injunction against compromise on matters involving future support. And this is as it should be.
For, even as Article 222 requires earnest efforts at a compromise and inability to reach one as a
condition precedent to the filing and maintenance of a suit "between the members of the same family",
that same article took good care to add: "subject to the limitations in article 2035."
Plaintiffs ask for support past, present and future. There is also the prayer for alimony pendente lite.
Since the present action also revolves on the right to future support and because compromise on future
support is prescribed,14 then the conclusion is irresistible that an attempt at compromise of future
support and failure thereof is not a condition precedent to the filing of the present suit. It need not be
alleged in the complaint. The very opening statement in Article 2035 unmistakably confirms our view. It
says that "(n)o compromise upon the following question shall be valid: ... (4) Future support."15 We
cannot afford to give a loose view to this controlling statute. We may not disregard it. To do so is to
misread the law, to write off an explicit congressional will, to cross the line which circumscribes courts of
justice and step into legislative area.
Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals, 1967B Phild. 82, is to be read as controlling here. In that case, the wife
filed in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija an action for support against her husband who was
then employed in a hospital in the United States. Defendant, by counsel, moved to dismiss, for the
reason that the complaint failed to state a cause of action "because it contained no allegation that
earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made before the filing of the suit, and invoking the
provisions of Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines." The Court of First Instance refused to
entertain the motion to dismiss. Defendant petitioned the Court of Appeals for a writ of prohibition. The
appellate court denied the writ prayed for Defendant petitioned this Court for review. We affirmed. In
that first judicial test, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, held:
While we agree that petitioner's position represents a correct statement of the general rule on the
matter, we are nevertheless constrained to hold that the Court of Appeals and the Court of First
Instance committed no error in refusing to dismiss the complaint, for on its face, the same involved a
claim for future support that under Article 2035 of the Civil Code of the Philippines can not be subject of
a valid compromise, and is, therefore, outside the sphere of application of Article 222 of the Code upon
which petitioner relies. This appears from the last proviso of said Article 222, already quoted....
xxx xxx xxx
Since no valid compromise is possible on these issues, a showing of previous efforts to compromise them
would be superfluous.
It may be that the complaint asks for both future support and support in arrears, as petitioner contends.
But, the possibility of compromise on the latter does not negate the existence of a valid cause of action
for future support, to which Article 222 can not apply. 16
Although the complaint herein seeks custody of minor children and damages as well, the prime object is
support. And, of importance, of course, is future support. The reliefs sought are intimately related to
each other. They all spring from the fact that husband and wife are separated from each other. So it is,
that expediency dictates that they be, as they are now, placed together in one complaint. For,
multiplicity of suits is not favored in law. Since one of the causes of action, that for future support, may
be lodged in court without the compromise requisite in Article 222 of the Civil Code, the complaint
herein, as we have ruled in Mendoza, may not be dismissed.
We, accordingly, hold that the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint.