Transparency and Algorithmic Governance PDF
Transparency and Algorithmic Governance PDF
2019
David Lehr
University of Pennsylvania
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Artificial Intelligence and Robotics Commons, Other
Computer Engineering Commons, Political Theory Commons, Public Administration Commons, Public
Law and Legal Theory Commons, Science and Technology Law Commons, and the Science and
Technology Policy Commons
Repository Citation
Coglianese, Cary and Lehr, David, "Transparency and Algorithmic Governance" (2019). Faculty Scholarship
at Penn Law. 2123.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/2123
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu.
COGLIANESE & LEHR_ME REVIEW FINAL-CC.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/19 7:46 PM
ARTICLES
TRANSPARENCY AND
ALGORITHMIC GOVERNANCE
* Edward B. Shils Professor of Law and Political Science and Director of the Penn Program
on Regulation, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
** Research Affiliate, Penn Program on Regulation; J.D. Candidate, 2020, Yale Law School.
We thank Lavi Ben Dor, Harrison Gunn, Alexandra Johnson, and Jessica Zuo for their helpful
research and editorial assistance, as well as Alissa Kalinowski, Caroline Raschbaum, and their
colleagues on this journal for their careful editorial guidance. We are grateful for constructive
substantive comments provided by Stuart Benjamin, Richard Berk, Harrison Gunn, Richard
Pierce, and Arti Rai. We also acknowledge appreciatively a spirited discussion at Duke Law
School’s 2018 conference on artificial intelligence in the administrative state, which sparked
our interest in developing this extended analysis of transparency issues.
1
COGLIANESE & LEHR_ME REVIEW FINAL-CC.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/19 7:46 PM
Introduction .................................................................................................. 2
I. Toward a Black-Box Government?........................................................... 6
A. Methods of Algorithmic Governance ......................................... 6
B. What Makes Machine Learning Distinctive? ........................... 14
II. Legal Principles of Open Government .................................................. 18
A. Types of Transparency ............................................................. 20
B. Legal Demands for Reason-Giving .......................................... 22
C. Law’s Pragmatism About Open Government .......................... 25
III. Reason-Giving in Algorithmic Governance ......................................... 29
A. Situating Fishbowl and Reasoned Transparency ..................... 32
B. The Adequacy of Reason-Giving in Algorithmic Governance 38
1. Substantive Due Process ..................................................... 39
2. Procedural Due Process ...................................................... 40
3. Arbitrary and Capricious Review ....................................... 42
4. Reasoned Transparency Under Conditions of Limited
Fishbowl Transparency ...................................................... 47
C. Technical Advances in Algorithmic Transparency .................. 49
Conclusion .................................................................................................. 55
INTRODUCTION
When Abraham Lincoln declared in 1863 that government “of the people,
by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth,”1 he spoke to
enduring values of liberty and democracy. Today, these values appear to
face an emerging threat from technology. Specifically, advances in machine-
learning technology—or artificial intelligence2—portend a future in which
About Machine Learning, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653, 669 (2017). Part I of the present Article
provides a brief discussion of the basic properties of the computational tools we have in mind.
3. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER STEINER, AUTOMATE THIS: HOW ALGORITHMS CAME TO
RULE OUR WORLD 4–7 (2012) (providing examples of how algorithms have “displaced hu-
mans in a growing number of industries”); Darrell M. West & John R. Allen, How Artificial
Intelligence Is Transforming the World, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Apr. 24, 2018),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/how-artificial-intelligence-is-transforming-the-world/
(“There are numerous examples where [artificial intelligence (AI)] already is making an im-
pact on the world and augmenting human capabilities in significant ways.”). See generally EXEC.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, AUTOMATION, AND THE ECONOMY
(2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/documents/Arti-
ficial-Intelligence-Automation-Economy.PDF (discussing implications of artificial intelligence
for the economy).
4. See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL COMM. ON
TECH., PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (2016), https://obama
whitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/whitehouse_files/microsites/ostp/NSTC/pre
paring_for_the_future_of_ai.pdf (describing opportunities and challenges associated with the
use of artificial intelligence in the private and public sectors); P’SHIP FOR PUB. SERV. & IBM
CTR. FOR THE BUS. OF GOV’T, THE FUTURE HAS BEGUN: USING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
TO TRANSFORM GOVERNMENT (2018), http://www.businessofgovernment.org/report/us-
ing-artificial-intelligence-transform-government [hereinafter IBM CTR., THE FUTURE HAS
BEGUN] (presenting case studies of government agencies’ use of artificial intelligence).
5. See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL COMM. ON
TECH., supra note 4, at 1 (observing that “[t]he effectiveness of government itself is being in-
creased as agencies build their capacity to use AI to carry out their missions more quickly,
responsively, and efficiently”); STEPHEN GOLDSMITH & SUSAN CRAWFORD, THE RESPONSIVE
CITY: ENGAGING COMMUNITIES THROUGH DATA-SMART GOVERNANCE 107–08 (2014) (dis-
cussing the use of machine learning and other data intensive strategies at the local level of
COGLIANESE & LEHR_ME REVIEW FINAL-CC.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/19 7:46 PM
ing just over the horizon, agencies could soon develop systems that use algo-
rithms to make key decisions automatically, raising the increasingly realistic
prospect of robotically created regulations and algorithmically resolved ad-
judications.
Existing and future applications of machine learning in governmental set-
tings present important new questions about the proper scope for and design
of algorithmic governance. One of the most salient questions centers on
transparency and arises from the relatively inscrutable nature of these new
techniques.6 Unlike the traditional statistical analysis on which governmen-
tal decisionmakers have long relied—an analysis in which humans specify
models relating input variables to output variables—machine-learning tech-
niques have a decidedly “black box” character to them.7 This makes it diffi-
cult to understand and put into intuitive prose how learning algorithms reach
government); Joel Tito, Destination Unknown: Exploring the Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Govern-
ment 6 (Sept. 2017) (unpublished working paper) (on file with the Centre for Public Impact),
https://publicimpact.blob.core.windows.net/production/2017/09/Destination-Unknown-
AI-and-government.pdf (noting that “the impact on governments of AI adoption will be enor-
mous”).
6. See, e.g., VIKTOR MAYER-SHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A
REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 179 (2013) (point-
ing to “the risk that big-data predictions, and the algorithms and datasets behind them, will
become black boxes that offer us no accountability, traceability, or confidence”); FRANK
PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY
AND INFORMATION 8 (2015) (raising alarm over “authority increasingly expressed algorithmi-
cally” because “[t]he values and prerogatives that the encoded rules enact are hidden within
black boxes”); Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249,
1254 n.23 (2008) (decrying the “opacity of automated systems” and recommending steps for
agencies to take to ensure they provide “meaningful notice”); Karen Yeung, Algorithmic Regu-
lation: A Critical Interrogation, REG. & GOVERNANCE 12–13 (2017), https://onlineli-
brary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/rego.12158 (arguing that, because they are “opaque, in-
scrutable ‘black boxes,’” algorithms present a fundamental challenge to the aspiration of a
“liberal society . . . to be a transparent order”) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
7. Michael Luca, Jon Kleinberg & Sendhil Mullainathan, Algorithms Need Managers, Too,
HARV. BUS. REV. (2016) (“Algorithms are black boxes . . . . [They] often can predict the fu-
ture with great accuracy but tell you neither what will cause an event nor why.”). Moreover,
a government official relying on these advanced analytic techniques to address a public prob-
lem will not obtain from them any clear understanding of what is causing the problem the
official seeks to solve. This is because machine-learning algorithms are predictive tools that
do not directly support the drawing of causal inferences, which means, for the purpose of
governmental transparency, that a government official will not find from the use of these al-
gorithms a causal reason for adopting a particular policy. See infra Section I.B.
COGLIANESE & LEHR_ME REVIEW FINAL-CC.DOCX(DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/19 7:46 PM
the results they do.8 It may be one thing for private-sector organizations to
rely on inscrutable algorithms, but governmental decisionmakers have long
been bound by principles of transparency.9
Can algorithmic governance be squared with legal demands for transpar-
ency? In this Article, we consider this question in depth and offer a compre-
hensive assessment of issues of transparency implicated by methods of algo-
rithmic governance.10 We begin in Part I by highlighting current and
prospective uses for machine learning by governmental entities, explaining
what makes machine learning different from other types of analysis, and
drawing a key distinction between machine-learning applications that sup-
port human decisions versus those that substitute for human decisions. In
Part II, we articulate the principles of transparency applicable to government
in the United States to show what current legal standards demand. We dis-
tinguish between “fishbowl transparency” and “reasoned transparency,”11
8. See, e.g., JUDEA PEARL & DANA MACKENZIE, THE BOOK OF WHY: THE NEW SCIENCE
OF CAUSE AND EFFECT 359 (2018) (noting that, with machine-learning techniques, “the pro-
grammer has no idea what computations [the algorithm] is performing or why they work”);
Cliff Kuang, Can AI Be Taught to Explain Itself?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Nov. 21, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/21/magazine/can-ai-be-taught-to-explain-itself.html
(observing “that artificial intelligences often excel by developing whole new ways of seeing, or
even thinking, that are inscrutable to us”).
9. On the rationale for and principles of transparency as applied to governmental entities,
see Cary Coglianese et al., Transparency and Public Participation in the Federal Rulemaking Process:
Recommendations for the New Administration, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 924, 926, 961 (2009), and
Seth F. Kreimer, The Freedom of Information Act and the Ecology of Transparency, 10 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 1011 (2008). With respect to private uses of machine learning, it should be noted that the
European Union (EU) has imposed transparency-related regulatory obligations on private use
of personalized data, with liability extending to private entities beyond Europe. Regulation
2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection
of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement
of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation),
2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 [hereinafter EU General Data Protection Regulation]. Although our
analysis here focuses on the transparency of governmental uses of machine-learning algo-
rithms in the United States, the EU’s so-called right to explanation does bear affinities with
parts of American administrative law applicable to federal agencies.
10. In an earlier article, we raised transparency as one of several issues implicated by
governmental use of machine learning, but we could only provide a brief sketch there of the
open-government legal issues presented by algorithmic governance. See Cary Coglianese &
David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision Making in the Machine-Learning Era, 105
GEO. L.J. 1147, 1205–13 (2017). Our present Article tackles the important issue of transpar-
ency head on, providing the comprehensive legal analysis that our earlier work lacked.
11. See infra Section II.A (defining and discussing these terms).
COGLIANESE & LEHR_ME REVIEW FINAL-CC.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/19 7:46 PM
explaining that both are implicated by, and relevant to, algorithmic govern-
ance—but also noting that under neither conception do current legal stand-
ards demand anything close to total transparency. In Part III, we assess
whether machine learning’s ostensibly black-box features will prevent gov-
ernments that use this technology from meeting legal standards of transpar-
ency. We conclude that, when governments use algorithms responsibly, ma-
chine learning can pass muster under prevailing norms. Moreover, we point
to a widening panoply of techniques that data scientists are developing to
make learning algorithms more explainable. Overall, we find reason to be
optimistic that, notwithstanding machine learning’s black-box qualities, re-
sponsible governments can provide sufficient transparency about their use of
algorithms to supplement, and possibly even replace, human judgments.
12. See Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 10, at 1158 n.40 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., West & Allen, supra note 3.
COGLIANESE & LEHR_ME REVIEW FINAL-CC.DOCX(DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/19 7:46 PM
14. See Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 10, at 1167–76 (discussing how machine learning
might be used in determining government actions).
15. See Stuart Minor Benjamin, Algorithms and Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1445, 1450–52
(2013) (applying the related concept of an “algorithm-based decision”). In using the term “out
of the loop,” we do not mean to suggest that humans are not involved in the process at all.
Even with an outcome-determinative system, humans design the system and make the deci-
sion to use it—and can make the decision to discontinue its use. In other words, machine-
learning algorithms do not possess lives of their own. See PAUL SCHARRE, ARMY OF NONE:
AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS AND THE FUTURE OF WAR 30, 32 (2018) (“Fully autonomous sys-
tems sense, decide, and act entirely without human intervention” but “[a]utonomy doesn’t
mean the system is exhibiting free will or disobeying its programming”). For an accessible
discussion of “loop-related” terminology, see id. at 28–32.
16. See Mohana Ravindranath, In Chicago, Food Inspectors Are Guided by Big Data, WASH.
POST (Sept. 28, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/on-it/in-chicago-food-in-
spectors-are-guided-by-big-data/2014/09/27/96be8c68-44e0-11e4-b47c-f5889e061e5f_
story.html.
17. See JANE MARTIN & RICK STEPHENSON, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., RISK-BASED
COLLECTION MODEL DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING 142–58 (2005), http://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-soi/05stephenson.pdf.
18. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY OFFICE OF RESEARCH & DEV., TOXICITY
FORECASTER (TOXCAST™) (2016), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-12/
documents/tox_cast_fact_sheet_dec2016.pdf; Robert Kavlock et al., Update on EPA’s ToxCast
Program: Providing High Throughput Decision Support Tools for Chemical Risk Management, 25
CHEMICAL RES. TOXICOLOGY 1287, 1295 (2012).
COGLIANESE & LEHR_ME REVIEW FINAL-CC.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/19 7:46 PM
19. Richard Berk, Forecasting Consumer Safety Violations and Violators, in IMPORT SAFETY:
REGULATORY GOVERNANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 131, 136 (Cary Coglianese et al. eds.,
2009)
20. See HESHA J. DUGGIRALA ET AL., DATA MINING AT FDA (2015),
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/ScienceResearch/DataMiningatFDA/UCM443675.pdf;
Taxiarchis Botsis et al., Novel Algorithms for Improved Pattern Recognition Using the US FDA Adverse
Event Network Analyzer, 205 STUDENT HEALTH TECH. INFO. 1178–82 (2014).
21. FELIX F. BAJANDAS & GERALD K. RAY, IMPLEMENTATION AND USE OF ELECTRONIC
CASE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS IN FEDERAL AGENCY ADJUDICATION 49–51 (May 23, 2018),
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2018.05.23%20eCMS%20Final%20
report_2.pdf.
22. See Ofer Matan et al., Handwritten Character Recognition Using Neural Network
Architectures (Nov. 1990) (unpublished paper presented at Proceedings of the 4th USPS Ad-
vanced Technology Conference), http://yann.lecun.com/exdb/publis/pdf/matan-90.pdf.
23. See IBM CTR., THE FUTURE HAS BEGUN, supra note 4, at 17.
24. By “back-end infrastructures,” we mean to refer to various computing capabilities
often needed to make machine learning operational. This includes sufficient data storage
needed to support the use of the large data sets on which machine learning operates best.
Furthermore, the deployment of machine-learning algorithms—putting them into practice
and allowing them to, say, dictate what adjudicatory action is taken—requires developing
ancillary computer programs that turn a machine-learning prediction into an action. See Lehr
& Ohm, supra note 2, at 701 n.173 and accompanying text.
25. See Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 10, at 1167–76.
COGLIANESE & LEHR_ME REVIEW FINAL-CC.DOCX(DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/19 7:46 PM
26. See, e.g., BAJANDAS & RAY, supra note 21, at 7 (noting that although currently the So-
cial Security Administration uses an algorithmic system to support quality checks on how dis-
ability claims are handled by humans, “eventually deep learning algorithms may be able to
process some claims to final resolution”).
27. For a discussion of a successful private-sector analogue—the fully automated dispute
resolution system developed and already used by eBay to settle tens of millions of disputes
each year—see Colin Rule, Resolving Disputes in the World’s Largest Marketplace, ACRESOLUTION,
Fall 2018, at 8–11 (2008) and BENJAMIN H. BARTON & STEPHANOS BIBAS, REBOOTING
JUSTICE: MORE TECHNOLOGY, FEWER LAWYERS, AND THE FUTURE OF LAW 111–15 (2017).
In June 2018, the Administrative Conference of the United States adopted a recommendation
that agencies that have electronic case records “should consider how to analyze and leverage”
these sources of data “to improve their adjudicative processes, including through the use of
natural language processing, machine learning, and predictive algorithms.” Admin. Conf. of
the U.S., Recommendation 2018-3, Electronic Case Management in Federal Administrative Adjudica-
tion, 83 Fed. Reg. 30,686, 30,687 (June 29, 2018).
28. Cf. Cary Coglianese, E-Rulemaking: Information Technology and the Regulatory Process, 56
ADMIN. L. REV. 353, 370–71 (2004) (describing how information technology might “trans-
form[] rules from text contained in the Code of Federal Regulations to software packages akin to
COGLIANESE & LEHR_ME REVIEW FINAL-CC.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/19 7:46 PM
31. For a discussion of the inherent normativity involved in setting regulatory standards,
see Cary Coglianese & Gary E. Marchant, Shifting Sands: The Limits of Science in Setting Risk
Standards, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1255, 1262, 1277 (2004). In suggesting that normative choices
necessarily underlie rulemaking, we certainly do not mean to suggest that such choices have
no bearing on adjudication. With adjudication, however, a learning algorithm’s objective
function is based on underlying rules, while ultimately rules themselves must be based on nor-
mative or policy choices.
32. Ian Lovett, To Fight Gridlock, Los Angeles Synchronizes Every Red Light, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
1, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/02/us/to-fight-gridlock-los-angeles-synchro
nizes-every-red-light.html.
COGLIANESE & LEHR_ME REVIEW FINAL-CC.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/19 7:46 PM
automatically, as the promulgated rule, the variant that yields the best out-
comes in the modeled environment, however “best” is defined in advance by
the system designers at the regulatory agency.
Yet, as we have already indicated, even in the most sophisticated cases of
robotic rulemaking, human involvement will not be entirely absent. The
objective function incorporated into any ABM/MAS must reflect normative
choices that must be made by humans. Furthermore, the system could not
itself come up with the multiple possible permutations of the rule from which
it selects the best. Some standard templates for different rules would need to
be identified in advance by humans. Still, this process could be substantially
automated; a human could program such a system, for instance, to try every
possible regulatory variant within a very large range. In such a case, it would
be quite reasonable to say that the system, not the human, has in effect cho-
sen the rule autonomously. Of course, because of resource constraints on
running complicated algorithms repeatedly, in practice it might be more
likely the case that humans would first whittle down the possible rule permu-
tations to a more manageable number, from which the system then would
choose the optimal one.
Although this vision of regulating by robot has not yet fully materialized
for workplace health standards or any other federal rulemaking, the fact that
machine learning is already making rules in slightly different, but fundamen-
tally analogous, ways to govern traffic in the city of Los Angeles shows the
potential for robotic rulemaking in the future. Perhaps at some point in the
future the U.S. Department of Transportation’s Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) could mandate the installation of
sensors throughout the nation’s pipelines—much like Los Angeles has in-
stalled sensors in all of its roads—and a PHMSA-mandated algorithmic con-
trol system could automatically block off certain sections whenever an algo-
rithm detects unsafe conditions.33 Similar automated rulemaking systems
might be helpful for regulating high-speed trading on securities markets—or
in any other setting where government needs to set and adapt rules rapidly.
The need for rapid, automatic rulemaking systems seems increasingly plau-
sible, if not inevitable, as a response to the private economy’s growing reli-
ance on machine learning, especially as critical infrastructures and economic
activities themselves increasingly operate automatically by algorithms. It is
not at all far-fetched to think that, to regulate a growing data-driven algo-
rithmic private economy, government will need to develop its own automatic
regulatory systems in response.34
33. See Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 10, at 1167–69 (elaborating on this possibility).
34. See generally Cary Coglianese, Optimizing Regulation for an Optimizing Economy, 4 U. Pa. J.
COGLIANESE & LEHR_ME REVIEW FINAL-CC.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/19 7:46 PM
L. & PUB. AFF. 1, 1–13 (2018) (discussing the need for the government to make use of machine
learning and other digital advances in order to keep better pace with innovations in the private
sector).
35. Our account here is highly stylized and general. We make no claim to describe all
the myriad ways that machine-learning algorithms can be structured, nor do we provide a
comprehensive introduction to machine learning.
36. See Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 640 n.14
(2017) (defining an algorithm as “a well-defined set of steps for accomplishing a certain goal”).
37. See Lehr & Ohm, supra note 2, at 671–72.
38. See PATANJALI KASHYAP, MACHINE LEARNING FOR DECISION MAKERS: COGNITIVE
COMPUTING FUNDAMENTALS FOR BETTER DECISION MAKING 8, 40, 45 (2017).
COGLIANESE & LEHR_ME REVIEW FINAL-CC.DOCX(DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/19 7:46 PM
mized.” In traditional statistical analysis, humans play the key role in setting
up the analysis, leaving little to the algorithm. For example, in a traditional
regression analysis, humans specify what input variables in the data set the
regression should consider and how they should be put together to yield a
prediction, or estimate, of the outcome variable—that is, whether the input
variables should be added together, multiplied by each other, or take on
other functional forms. All that is left for the regression to learn is how the
variables—or combinations of variables, as specified by the humans—are
weighted. In contrast, with machine learning humans do not specify how
input variables should be put together to yield predictions. The algorithm
itself tries many possible combinations of variables, figuring out how to put
them together to optimize the objective function.39 In other words, the algo-
rithm “learns” how to make accurate predictions or estimates.
This is not to say that humans have no role in the machine-learning con-
text. Human analysts exert substantial control over myriad aspects of an algo-
rithm’s functioning. They are still required to provide the algorithm with its
data, select a particular kind (or family) of algorithm to implement, and
“tune” details of the algorithm’s optimization process.40 Humans also play a
major role in evaluating a learning algorithm’s performance. Although the
algorithm learns how to make useful predictions on a set of training data, it
is not possible to make any meaningful assessment of the algorithm’s accu-
racy with this same historical data set; for a variety of reasons, the real-world
data onto which the “trained” algorithm is eventually applied in order to
make predictions will likely differ from the historical data. Human analysts
thus purposely separate out some historical data from the training data set
before they use it. These separate historical data—called the “test data”—are
excluded from the training data and, thus, not considered by the algorithm
during training. After training, human analysts assess the algorithm’s accu-
racy by using the separate test data, making adjustments to the algorithm as
necessary to increase accuracy as measured in the test data.41 This is very
much a process of trial and error—one in which complex, powerful algorithms
make predictions using methods repeatedly guided and nudged, but not dic-
tated, by humans in the establishment and refinement of the algorithm.
42. See Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 10, at 1158 n.40.
43. One of the more widely known examples to date has been the success of Google’s
deep learning system in beating champion human players at the game of Go. See generally
David Silver et al., Mastering the Game of Go Without Human Knowledge, 550 NATURE 354 (2017).
44. See Lehr & Ohm, supra note 2, at 702.
45. See L. Jason Anastasopoulos & Andrew B. Whitford, Machine Learning for Public Admin-
istration Research, with Application to Organizational Reputation, J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY,
Nov. 5, 2018, at 16, OXFORD (advance article), https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muy060
(“Good predictions often require a tradeoff between accuracy and interpretability.”).
46. See Leo Breiman, Random Forests, 45 MACHINE LEARNING 5, 5–6 (2001).
COGLIANESE & LEHR_ME REVIEW FINAL-CC.DOCX(DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/19 7:46 PM
“deep learning” techniques, the inner workings of the algorithms are even
more difficult to divine and translate into prose.47
The difficulty of generating intuitive explanations from machine-learning
algorithms is further exacerbated by the kind of “big data” on which they
often operate. Although in principle both machine-learning algorithms and
more traditional techniques can operate on the same data sets, the predictive
power of machine learning manifests itself in large, complex data sets, so it
tends to be these data sets on which learning algorithms are applied. But
complex data sets necessarily contain complex inter-variable relationships,
making it even more difficult to put into intuitive prose how a machine-learn-
ing algorithm makes the predictions it does.
Even if analysts could discover the inter-variable relationships that a ma-
chine-learning algorithm keys in on, they cannot overlay any causal infer-
ences onto those relationships.48 In other words, they cannot say that a rela-
tionship between an input variable and the output variable is causal in
nature. In fact, some of the patterns that are predictively useful might not be
causal at all, and some may be so non-intuitive as to have never occurred to
humans—perhaps, say, if the third letter of a tax filer’s last name helps in
forecasting cases of tax fraud.
To put machine learning’s advantages and disadvantages into focus, let us
return to our hypothetical example of an automated system that the FAA
might use to award commercial pilot licenses. Such a system could analyze
the data from all of an applicant’s training flights and other records and use
that analysis to forecast the applicant’s risk. Such an algorithm might well
do a better job of selecting safe pilots than the FAA’s current system—a pro-
spect that would be consistent with learning algorithms’ generally superior
performance in other contexts and would presumably counsel in favor of the
FAA giving serious consideration to the use of an algorithmic system. But
when it comes to transparency, such an algorithmic system would not enable
the FAA to provide a conventional, intuitive, prosaic explanation for exactly
why any specific individual was—or was not—selected to receive a license.49
As a result, the use of so-called black-box algorithms would seem, at least
at first glance, to run up against the law’s general requirement that govern-
ment provide adequate reasons for its actions. Their use might seem to un-
dermine basic good-government principles designed to promote accounta-
bility and build trust. The question becomes whether, notwithstanding
50. See, e.g., Adriana S. Cordis & Patrick L. Warren, Sunshine as Disinfectant: The Effect of
State Freedom of Information Act Laws on Public Corruption, 115 J. PUB. ECON. 18, 35–36 (2014)
(finding a decrease in indicators of corruption following the passage of state open records laws).
On the importance of public value creation by government officials, see generally MARK H.
MOORE, CREATING PUBLIC VALUE: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT IN GOVERNMENT (1995).
51. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92
(1914).
52. For example, when it comes to overseeing government agencies’ use of machine
learning under a range of legal doctrines, such as those combatting discrimination, the courts
will require transparency about algorithms and their use. See Coglianese & Lehr, supra note
10, at 1195–1205; Farhad Manjoo, Here’s the Conversation We Really Need to Have About Bias at
Google, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/30/technol-
ogy/bias-google-trump.html.
53. See Coglianese et al., supra note 9, at 926–30 (discussing benefits of transparency in
government).
COGLIANESE & LEHR_ME REVIEW FINAL-CC.DOCX(DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/19 7:46 PM
54. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, Open Government and Its Impact, REG. REV. (May 8, 2011),
https://www.theregreview.org/2011/05/08/open-government-and-its-impact/ (observing
that “little clarity currently exists over what open government means”).
55. Cary Coglianese, The Transparency President? The Obama Administration and Open Govern-
ment, 22 GOVERNANCE 529, 530, 537 (2009). The distinction between fishbowl transparency
and reasoned transparency that we rely on here parallels to a degree the distinction sometimes
made by computer scientists and other scholars between the transparency of algorithms (i.e.,
access to their parameters and the underlying data they analyze) and the explainability of algo-
rithms (i.e., the reasons why they reach certain results). See, e.g., AARON RIEKE, MIRANDA
BOGEN & DAVID G. ROBINSON, PUBLIC SCRUTINY OF AUTOMATED DECISIONS: EARLY
LESSONS AND EMERGING METHODS 24 (2018), http://www.omidyar.com/sites/de-
fault/files/file_archive/Public%20Scrutiny%20of%20Automated%20Decisions.pdf (distin-
guishing “transparency” from “explanation”); Finale Doshi-Velez & Mason Kortz, Account-
ability of AI Under the Law: The Role of Explanation 6 (2017) (unpublished working paper)
(on file with the Ethics and Governance of Artificial Intelligence Initiative), http://nrs.har-
vard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:34372584 (“[E]xplanation is distinct from transparency.”).
However, we eschew the latter terms and rely on the former for two main reasons. First, we
want to make clear that we are assessing algorithmic governance against the legal principles
of governmental transparency that generally apply to all administrative decisions. Second,
even in the context of algorithmic governance, the transparency required of an agency’s deci-
sion to use an algorithmic tool could, at least in principle, demand more than just the “ex-
plainability” of the algorithm itself and its functioning; it could also demand openness about
other factors surrounding the government’s decision to use an algorithmic tool in the first
place.
COGLIANESE & LEHR_ME REVIEW FINAL-CC.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/19 7:46 PM
A. Types of Transparency
Fishbowl transparency, as its name suggests, refers to the public’s ability
to peer inside government and acquire information about what officials are
doing.56 It focuses on public access to information the government holds and
information about what the government does. It includes public access to
government hearings, records stored in filing cabinets, and materials availa-
ble on government computers.
A series of federal statutes demand that the government provide fishbowl
transparency. The Government in the Sunshine Act and the Federal Advi-
sory Committee Act require meetings of multi-member commissions and ad-
visory bodies, respectively, to be open to the public.57 The Freedom of In-
formation Act (FOIA) requires agencies to provide government documents
to members of the public on request.58 The Administrative Procedure Act
(APA)59 requires agencies to publish notices of new regulations they propose
to adopt.60 The E-Government Act calls upon agencies to create websites
and make information accessible via the Internet.61 These and other legal
requirements help ensure that those who are affected by governmental deci-
sions can monitor what officials are doing and respond on an informed basis.
By contrast to fishbowl transparency’s emphasis on public access to infor-
mation about what government is doing, reasoned transparency emphasizes
the usefulness of that information—that is, whether government reveals why
56. A concrete manifestation of this type of transparency, as well as this terminology, can
be found in the principles of public access to information under which the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency has long operated and that were originally outlined in what is known as
the “fishbowl memo” issued in 1983 by then-Administrator William Ruckelshaus. See Press
Release, EPA, Ruckelshaus Takes Steps to Improve Flow of Agency Information [Fishbowl
Policy] (May 19, 1983), https://archive.epa.gov/epa/aboutepa/ruckelshaus-takes-steps-im-
prove-flow-agency-information-fishbowl-policy.html#memo.
57. Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2018); Federal Advisory Com-
mittee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. § 10(a)(1).
58. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552.
59. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 561–570(a), 701–706.
60. Id. § 553(b).
61. E–Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, 116 Stat. 2899 (2002) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5, 10, 13, 31, 40, and 44 U.S.C.)
COGLIANESE & LEHR_ME REVIEW FINAL-CC.DOCX(DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/19 7:46 PM
62. See generally Martin Shapiro, The Giving Reasons Requirement, 1992 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 179
(1992) (discussing federal law’s requirement to give reasons).
63. Coglianese, supra note 55, at 537.
64. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. The elements of procedural due process include a
requirement for some kind of “statement of reasons for the decision” made by the government
official. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 325 n.4 (1976) (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254 (1970)). See generally Henry Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267,
1279–95 (1975); Citron, supra note 6, at 1281–88.
65. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
66. See generally Cary Coglianese et al., Seeking Truth for Power: Informational Strategy and Reg-
ulatory Policymaking, 89 MINN. L. REV. 277 (2004) (discussing the centrality of information to
governmental decisionmaking).
COGLIANESE & LEHR_ME REVIEW FINAL-CC.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/19 7:46 PM
sufficiently why learning algorithms reach the predictions they do. This is
not to say that fishbowl transparency does not matter when governments use
machine learning; rather, that algorithmic governance presents few if any
truly distinctive questions in terms of fishbowl transparency.
67. As Jerry Mashaw has noted, the courts’ application of the due process clauses in the
Constitution “has dramatically increased the demand for transparently rational administrative
adjudication.” Jerry L. Mashaw, Small Things Like Reasons Are Put in a Jar: Reason and Legitimacy
in the Administrative State, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 17, 26 (2001).
68. The same rational basis test also forms the legal analysis under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which has been incorporated into the Fifth Amend-
ment’s due process demands on the federal government. United States v. Carolene Prods.
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (holding that substantive due process analysis of “regulatory
legislation” begins with “the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis”); Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (basing in the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause the
application of equal protection constraints on the federal government); see also Minnesota v.
Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 470 n. 12 (1981) (reasoning that, from a “conclusion
under equal protection” that a law meets the rational basis test, “it follows a fortiori that the
Act does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause”). A more demanding
set of reasons is required under the “strict scrutiny” test when fundamental rights (for due
process) or suspect classifications (equal protection) are implicated by governmental actions.
16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 862 (2018). Given the focus of this Article on general
principles of transparency and how they are implicated by machine learning’s black-box na-
ture, we only discuss the rational basis test here. We recognize, of course, that government
could use machine-learning algorithms to target fundamental rights. But if heightened scru-
tiny under substantive due process were demanded of a machine-learning application, it
would not be due to the algorithm’s black-box nature per se, but to the fundamental rights
COGLIANESE & LEHR_ME REVIEW FINAL-CC.DOCX(DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/19 7:46 PM
other legal entity deprived of protected interests with notice of its action and
an opportunity to be heard.69 The precise procedural steps required can vary
markedly across different adjudicatory settings, but the affected individual
must be provided enough information about the government’s decisionmak-
ing to permit the individual a fair opportunity to correct for potential errors.70
At its core, procedural due process requires impartial decisionmaking based
on accurate evidence and relevant legal rules. As the Supreme Court noted
in Goldberg v. Kelly,71 “[t]o demonstrate compliance with this elementary re-
quirement, the decision maker should state the reasons for his determination
and indicate the evidence he relied on.”72
Even beyond these constitutional requirements for due process, statutory
rules of administrative procedure direct federal agencies to provide reasoned
transparency. When Congress has dictated in other statutes that agencies
provide an on-the-record hearing73—that is, engage in so-called formal ad-
judication or rulemaking—the APA requires that agencies provide “a state-
ment of findings and conclusions, and the reasons or basis therefor, on all the
material issues of fact, law, or discretion.”74 The APA further provides that
such actions subject to formal procedures must be justified on the basis of
substantial evidence.75 Of course, most agency actions are not subject to the
APA’s formal requirements. Still, even for certain informal actions, agencies
must provide reasons. The APA requires that in informal—or “notice-and-
comment”—rulemaking, agencies must provide a “concise statement of the
basis and purpose” of the rule ultimately adopted.76 In addition, under the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, the most significant rules adopted by Ex-
ecutive Branch agencies must be accompanied by a “written statement” that
77. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.). Similar requirements for the most significant
rulemakings have been imposed by executive order. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed.
Reg. 51,735 (1993).
78. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); see also id. § 702 (providing the right of judicial review for any
person “adversely affected” by final agency action).
79. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
80. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971) (reasoning
that although agencies are not necessarily required to make formal findings, courts must ex-
amine the “full administrative record that was before the [agency] at the time [of its] deci-
sion”); see also Encino Motorcars, L.L.C. v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2127 (2016); State Farm,
463 U.S. at 42; SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94–95 (1943).
81. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 105 (1983) (inter-
nal citations omitted).
82. Mashaw, supra note 67, at 26.
83. Not even the change in political ideology of an administration’s leadership, occa-
sioned by a presidential election, constitutes a sufficient reason for agency action. State Farm,
463 U.S. at 42; see also Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 657–58 (1995)
(observing that “[a] reason-giving mandate will . . . drive out illegitimate reasons when they
are the only plausible explanation for particular outcomes”).
COGLIANESE & LEHR_ME REVIEW FINAL-CC.DOCX(DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/19 7:46 PM
84. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416 (noting that under the arbitrary and capricious standard,
the agency must show that it “acted within the scope of [its] statutory authority” and its deci-
sion “was based on a consideration of the relevant factors”).
85. Some statutes require agencies to maintain a publicly accessible rulemaking docket
with all such information. E.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (2018). The advent of the
federal web portal, Regulations.gov, now makes it relatively easy for agencies to provide such
docket information online.
86. See, e.g., United States v. N.S. Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252 (2d Cir. 1977)
(“It is not in keeping with the rational process to leave vital questions, raised by comments
which are of cogent materiality, completely unanswered.”).
87. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)–(9) (2018).
88. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B).
89. Connor Raso, Agency Avoidance of Rulemaking Procedures, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 65 (2015).
COGLIANESE & LEHR_ME REVIEW FINAL-CC.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/19 7:46 PM
Procedural due process might seem to hold more bite. But even there, the
Court has made it clear that the reasons agencies must provide in the adju-
dicatory context “need not amount to a full opinion, or even formal findings
of fact and conclusions of law.”97 More generally, the demands of procedural
due process are now encapsulated under a balancing test that calls upon
courts to make pragmatic judgments about how strict procedural demands
should be, expressly taking into account the impact of potential procedural
demands on governmental resources.98
With respect to the APA, although the arbitrary and capricious test is often
referred to as “hard look” review, the Supreme Court has made clear that
“the scope of review under the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard is narrow,
and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”99 The
Court has instructed judges to “uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if
the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.”100
The Supreme Court has also made clear that judicial inquiry into an
agency’s reasoning does not entail anything like the extensive discovery pro-
cess that typically takes place in civil litigation. Rather, review is limited to
what the agency had available in its record at the time of its decision.101
Courts cannot compel the cross-examination of evidence supplied by the
agency.102 Courts also ordinarily must not “probe the mental processes of
the Secretary in reaching his conclusions”103—they merely can look to the
reasons that agency officials have provided.104
Furthermore, when the reasons that an agency offers depend on highly
technical matters, such as those demanding statistical and scientific expertise,
courts give the agency considerable deference. In its decision in Baltimore Gas
& Electric Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,105 the Supreme Court cau-
tioned that courts should not second-guess a government agency when it is
“making predictions, within its area of special expertise, at the frontiers of
science.”106 The Court emphasized that, “[w]hen examining this kind of sci-
entific determination, as opposed to simple findings of fact, a reviewing court
must generally be at its most deferential.”107
Judges by and large do not hold agencies to extremely high standards of
rationality under the arbitrary and capricious standard. Rather, as Adrian
Vermeule has noted, they are simply looking to rule out “clear and indefen-
sible legal error or irrationality.”108 Vermeule has reported that, of the sixty-
four cases since 1982 in which the Supreme Court has considered an agency
action under the arbitrary and capricious test, the Court has upheld the
agency decision over ninety percent of the time.109
It is clear that, although administrative law does demand both fishbowl and
reasoned transparency, the demands of each are far from onerous.110 Trans-
parency law has been largely pragmatic. Fishbowl transparency requirements
include exemptions that take into account administrative imperatives, and
111. This is not to say that agency practices under FOIA have been optimal—or even
sufficient. Some observers have lamented what they perceive to be the high costs of FOIA
compliance. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Freedom of Information Act Has No Clothes, REGULATION,
Mar.–Apr. 1982, at 15, 16. Others have noted that government agencies are far from prompt
or forthcoming in responding to requests for information. See, e.g., SEAN MOULTON & GAVIN
BAKER, CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE GOV’T, MAKING THE GRADE: ACCESS TO INFORMATION
SCORECARD 2015 (Mar. 2015), https://www.foreffectivegov.org/ sites/default/files/info/ac-
cess-to-information-scorecard-2015.pdf; Delayed, Denied, Dismissed: Failures on the FOIA Front,
PROPUBLICA (July 21, 2016, 8:01 AM), https://www.propublica. org/article/delayed-denied-
dismissed-failures-on-the-foia-front (noting that government agencies are far from prompt or
forthcoming in responding to requests for information). For findings from a government audit
of FOIA practices, see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-18-452T, FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT: AGENCIES ARE IMPLEMENTING REQUIREMENTS BUT NEED TO TAKE
ADDITIONAL ACTIONS (2018).
112. See supra notes 108–109 and accompanying text.
COGLIANESE & LEHR_ME REVIEW FINAL-CC.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/19 7:46 PM
ious governmental action can take place entirely independently of any appli-
cation of machine learning. The possibility of dishonest, oppressive, or even
evil government should never be dismissed—but it is a concern separate from
our focus here.
Arguably equally concerning, though, would be the possibility that a gov-
ernment agency uses machine learning merely irresponsibly or in a techni-
cally uninformed manner. As mentioned, the development of machine-
learning algorithms, especially for the kinds of specialized applications to
which they would be applied by government officials, is a challenging en-
deavor. It requires expertise in statistics and computer or information sci-
ence. It also requires knowledge of how policy choices can be embedded in
mathematical choices made while designing the algorithm. It is certainly
conceivable—and perhaps likely under current conditions—that many gov-
ernment agencies will not have staff with the requisite expertise to make these
choices in an informed way.113 Indeed, perhaps this is why governmental
authorities that have so far looked to machine learning have tended to con-
tract with private companies to obtain the relevant expertise to develop their
algorithmic applications. To oversee adequately the private contracting of
algorithmic design, though, governments still need sufficient in-house exper-
tise to ask the right questions and demand that their contractors act respon-
sibly and with the appropriate degree of transparency.
Of course, we also must recognize that in many instances government of-
ficials will use machine learning in myriad ways that will hardly even impli-
cate transparency law at all. When the U.S. Postal Service uses machine-
learning algorithms in its mail-sorting equipment to “read” handwritten zip
codes, and when the National Weather Service uses machine-learning algo-
rithms to help generate weather forecasts, no serious transparency concerns
arise.114 Even less banal uses, such as the use of machine learning to identify
targets for subsequent human inspection or auditing, may also easily satisfy
transparency law—if for no reason other than that the legal demands in some
of these circumstances will be minimal. Agency use of algorithms for law
113. On the need for adequate resources and human capital to take advantage of algo-
rithmic governance, see Coglianese, supra note 34; Robert L. Glicksman, David L. Markell &
Claire Monteleoni, Technological Innovation, Data Analytics, and Environmental Enforcement, 44
ECOLOGY L.Q. 41, 47 (2017) (“Optimal use of big data . . . will require [government] to hire
experts in data analytics and make significant investments in computer systems capable of
collecting, transporting, storing, and analyzing the data.”).
114. For background on the U.S. Postal Service’s use of hand-writing learning algorithms
and the National Weather Service’s use of machine learning in meteorological forecasting, see
Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 10, at 1162.
COGLIANESE & LEHR_ME REVIEW FINAL-CC.DOCX(DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/19 7:46 PM
We begin this Part by reiterating the distinction between fishbowl and rea-
soned transparency, both of which could be implicated by specific govern-
mental uses of machine learning. Much criticism of machine learning em-
phasizes fishbowl transparency, but any problems with fishbowl transparency
created by the government’s application of machine learning are neither new
nor particularly difficult to resolve. It is reasoned transparency that would
appear to be most distinctively implicated by machine learning’s black-box
nature. Consequently, after initially distinguishing fishbowl and reasoned
transparency, we next turn to the kind of reasons that analysts can offer about
how algorithms work—that is, how they can peer inside the black box. We
conclude that government officials should be able quite easily to satisfy the
demands of reasoned transparency. A high-level explanation of an algorithm’s
functioning is both possible and legally sufficient. Beyond this, we also high-
light in the final section of this Part the many technical advances that ma-
chine-learning researchers are making to improve methods for extracting
reasons from algorithms, enabling officials to go beyond what is legally re-
quired when explaining their algorithms. Given the current ability of agen-
cies to meet prevailing legal demands, combined with the promise of ongoing
technical advances in the explainability of machine learning, whatever un-
ease may remain about algorithmic governance should only wane with time.
As one of us has suggested in another context, in any governmental setting where there may
be multiple potential sources of input, it may be difficult to single out any one source as the
decisionmaker. Cf. Cary Coglianese, The Emptiness of Decisional Limits: Reconceiving Presidential
Control of the Administrative State, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 43 (2017); Cary Coglianese & Kristin Firth,
Separation of Powers Legitimacy: An Empirical Inquiry into Norms About Executive Power, 164 U. PA. L.
REV. 1869 (2016). For another, when human officials have designed an algorithmic system
and chosen to use it as the basis for making decisions, those officials still have some meaningful
claim to having shaped even a particular decision by having created and used the algorithmic
system. Our purpose in this Article is simply to use terms like “determinative” in a conven-
tional sense to connote the government’s reliance on the output of an algorithm as the pivotal
factor that justifies a particular decision.
118. CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES
INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY 13 (2016). O’Neil also worries about what she
characterizes as the “arbitrary” nature of learning algorithms—a reasoned transparency con-
cern. Id.
COGLIANESE & LEHR_ME REVIEW FINAL-CC.DOCX(DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/19 7:46 PM
developed for courts by private contractors who do “not publicly disclose the
calculations used.”119 Researchers study algorithmic transparency by filing
FOIA-type requests with state and local governments, finding “a big gap be-
tween the importance of algorithmic processes for governance and public
access to those algorithms.”120
Clearly, algorithmic governance presents real concerns about fishbowl
transparency.121 Governmental use of machine learning generates a broad
range of potentially disclosable information, including the algorithm’s source
code, its objective function, its specifications and tuning parameters, its train-
ing and test data sets, and the programming details of any ancillary computer
programs that translate its predictions into actions.122 The desire for public
access to some or all of this information is understandable, especially if dis-
closure of at least some information is needed to provide a satisfactory rea-
soned explanation of actions determined by algorithms.
Not surprisingly, concerns about fishbowl transparency have also found
their way into litigation over algorithmic governance. In Wisconsin, a crim-
inal defendant challenged a state trial court’s use of a risk assessment algo-
rithm in determining his sentence.123 Among other claims, the defendant
argued that his due process rights were effectively violated by the trial court
119. See Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias: There’s Software Used Across the Country to Predict
Future Criminals. And it’s Biased Against Blacks., PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.
propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing. For a discus-
sion of the statistical errors in the ProPublica report, see Jennifer Doleac & Megan Stevenson,
Are Criminal Risk Assessment Scores Racist?, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Aug. 22, 2016),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2016/08/22/are-criminal-risk-assessment-
scores-racist/.
120. Robert Brauneis & Ellen P. Goodman, Algorithmic Transparency for the Smart City, 20
YALE J.L. & TECH. 103, 132–33 (2018).
121. Others have raised similar concerns. See, e.g., Citron, supra note 6, at 1291–93 (dis-
cussing tension between FOIA and the limited information governments have provided about
automated decision systems used by governments); Joshua A. Kroll et al., supra note 36, at 638
(noting that machine learning “is particularly ill-suited to source code analysis”—which the
authors describe as “the most obvious approach” to providing transparency about automated
decision tools).
122. See generally Lehr & Ohm, supra note 2 (describing various features of a machine-
learning algorithm).
123. State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016). The case centered on the court’s
reliance on the “COMPAS” algorithm that figured in the investigative report cited in Angwin,
supra note 119. COMPAS does not appear to be a machine-learning algorithm. See Coglianese
& Lehr, supra note 10, at 1205 n.232. However, the legal issues presented in the case are still
relevant here to our analysis of machine-learning algorithms.
COGLIANESE & LEHR_ME REVIEW FINAL-CC.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/19 7:46 PM
because of “the proprietary nature” of the algorithm on which the trial court
had relied.124 The algorithm had been developed by a private firm that con-
sidered it “a trade secret” and thus would “not disclose how the risk scores
are determined or how the factors are weighed.”125 The defendant argued
that this secrecy “denied [him] information which the [trial] court considered
at sentencing,” constituting a violation of his rights to procedural due pro-
cess.126 Ultimately, the Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s
argument, pointing to the fact that the private firm had released a full list of
variables used in calculating risk scores and then noting that the risk analysis
was entirely “based upon [the defendant’s own] answers to questions and
publicly available data about his criminal history.”127 The court held that
the availability of this information afforded the defendant the requisite “op-
portunity to verify that the questions and answers listed on the [risk assess-
ment] report were accurate.”128
The outcome in the Wisconsin case suggests that governmental authorities
can lawfully use algorithms without divulging all the potentially disclosable
information about them. Although under some circumstances some infor-
mation about algorithms might well need to be released under FOIA, trans-
parency law certainly does not require full disclosure of everything.129 A gov-
ernment agency that uses machine learning to identify facilities to inspect,
for example, would presumably not need to disclose information about how
its algorithm operates, as that information would be covered by the exemp-
tion for law enforcement-related information.130 Moreover, as the Wisconsin
case confirms, if a government agency contracts with a private company to
design and deploy an algorithm, that company can lawfully claim that vari-
ous pieces of algorithmic information are trade secrets that must be protected
from disclosure.131 In addition, some of the underlying data used in particu-
lar machine-learning applications might be subject to various legal privacy
protections, such as where data are drawn from individual medical, educa-
tional, credit, or census records.132
Admittedly, from the standpoint of anyone concerned about robust fish-
bowl transparency, the fact that information can be lawfully withheld due to
trade secret and other FOIA exemptions might do little more than restate
the problem. Legal or not, the information is still withheld from the public.
In some circumstances, a reasonable case might well be made on policy
grounds against the withholding of information—and for greater disclosure
than the law requires.133 On the other hand, valid and important policy rea-
sons do exist to protect the confidentiality of certain types of information, so
the law’s exemptions from disclosure might still be justified on policy
grounds.134 It is not our purpose here to engage in a policy debate over how
much fishbowl transparency the government should provide, nor is it to an-
alyze the proper scope of data privacy laws on policy grounds. Rather, in
highlighting how, under current law, governmental entities that rely on algo-
rithmic systems need not disclose all potentially disclosable information
about these systems, we seek to draw two main implications about the role
for fishbowl transparency in analyzing the legal viability of machine learning.
The first implication is that any questions about the optimal level of fish-
bowl transparency run orthogonal to an analysis of machine learning and its
black-box character. For example, consider concerns about government
agencies outsourcing algorithmic development to private contractors. Noth-
ing about machine learning raises distinctive concerns about the role of pri-
vate actors in supporting government functions or about the protection of
confidential business information used by government officials. Debates over
the relationship between public and private actors extend much more
broadly than the current debate about machine learning. Some policymak-
ers and scholars advocate greater privatization of government services, while
others oppose extensive outsourcing and urge greater reliance on govern-
ment bureaucrats.135 In much the same vein, consider claims about the need
132. See, e.g., Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936; The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1232g; The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)-(x) (2018).
133. On related issues, one of us has put forward recommendations for best practices in
transparency that go beyond disclosure that is legally mandated. Coglianese et al., supra note
9, at 934–46. Our legal analysis here does not necessarily mean that compliance with the law
defines the entirety of good government practices.
134. Coglianese et al., supra note 66, at 330–31.
135. See generally JOHN J. DIIULIO, JR., BRING BACK THE BUREAUCRATS: WHY MORE
FEDERAL WORKERS WILL LEAD TO BETTER (AND SMALLER!) GOVERNMENT (2014); PAUL R.
VERKUIL, VALUING BUREAUCRACY: THE CASE FOR PROFESSIONAL GOVERNMENT (2017);
COGLIANESE & LEHR_ME REVIEW FINAL-CC.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/19 7:46 PM
Mildred E. Warner, Reversing Privatization, Rebalancing Government Reform: Markets, Deliberation and
Planning, 27 POL’Y & SOC’Y 163 (2008).
136. MEIR PEREZ PUGATCH, THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DEBATE (2006).
137. This is Brauneis and Goodman’s chief recommendation. Brauneis & Goodman,
supra note 120, at 164–66.
138. Edward L. Glaeser et al., Crowdsourcing City Government: Using Tournaments to Improve
Inspection Accuracy, 106 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 1 (2016).
139. Coglianese, supra note 34.
140. See, e.g., Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 10, at 1190–91 (discussing use of advisory
committees and rulemaking proceedings). For further discussion of the role of advisory com-
mittees and notice-and-comment rulemaking, see supra notes 57 and 60 and accompanying
text.
COGLIANESE & LEHR_ME REVIEW FINAL-CC.DOCX(DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/19 7:46 PM
141. Hous. Fed’n of Teachers, Local 2415 v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 251 F. Supp. 3d
1168 (S.D. Tex. 2017). It is not altogether clear from the court’s opinion whether the algo-
rithm at issue was a machine-learning algorithm, but the relevant legal issues we discuss here
are indistinguishable from those that would be implicated by learning algorithms.
142. Id. at 1177.
143. Id. at 1176.
144. Id. at 1180.
145. Id. at 1179.
COGLIANESE & LEHR_ME REVIEW FINAL-CC.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/19 7:46 PM
trade secrets.”146 Rather, the court said that the question for the jury was
simply whether “a policy of making high stakes employment decisions based
on secret algorithms [is] incompatible with minimum due process.”147 If it is
incompatible, the remedy would be for the school district to find some other
policy that does not rely on secret algorithms, not to repudiate a firm’s trade
secrets.148 The upshot is that reasoned transparency can become affected by
limits on fishbowl transparency whenever sufficient reasons for decisions
based on machine learning require the disclosure of confidential source code
or other trade secrets.
Importantly, though, the preliminary nature of the district court’s decision
in the Texas case means that the court did not rule out the possibility that,
with further evidence presented at a trial, a jury could still properly find for
the school district.149 It might be possible to protect trade secrets while still
providing teachers with sufficient information to satisfy the demands of pro-
cedural due process. Just as in the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision, cir-
cumstances may exist where the government can rely on a private contractor
but still put forward enough non-proprietary information to provide ade-
quate reasons for machine learning decisions. We thus turn next to what it
means for government to offer adequate reasons in the context of algorithmic
governance.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1173 (explaining the summary judgment standard).
COGLIANESE & LEHR_ME REVIEW FINAL-CC.DOCX(DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/19 7:46 PM
does not need to give a reason for its action; rather, the action simply must
be one that is capable of being supported by a reason.154 When translated
into a technical demand with respect to machine learning, substantive ra-
tionality will be satisfied by disclosing merely the outcome variable used in
the machine-learning analysis and the objective function whose optimization
yields predictions for the outcome.155 These two pieces of information will
reveal the goal of the decisionmaking process and that it was indeed that very
goal that the algorithm in fact attempted to achieve, which is all that is
needed to satisfy the rational basis test.156
assess the reliability and fairness of a system of procedure, one must also consider the overall
rate of error”); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972) (describing the purpose of due pro-
cess as extending beyond procedural fairness but including the desire “to minimize substan-
tively unfair or mistaken deprivations” of protected interests).
159. This is similar to the Fair Credit Reporting Act’s reliance on revealing input infor-
mation as a way to correct potentially erroneous credit scoring. Fair Credit Reporting Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2018).
160. See Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 10, at 1158 n.40 and accompanying text.
161. Kroll et al., supra note 36, at 637.
162. When the government relies on a physical rather than an algorithmic device—say,
a thermometer—it would generally suffice to justify penalizing a person who failed to meet a
temperature requirement (e.g., for storing food safely) that a thermometer measures temper-
ature levels accurately and that the specific use of that thermometer to show noncompliance
followed proper techniques. When comparable showings can be made for machine learning
as for thermometers or other physical machines, there should be no question that they can
satisfy the reason-giving demanded of the government under constitutional and statutory law.
COGLIANESE & LEHR_ME REVIEW FINAL-CC.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/19 7:46 PM
Presumably any responsible agency using a machine-learning algorithm would be able to jus-
tify that use by explaining an algorithm’s objective function, releasing data used in the indi-
vidual case, and disclosing the results of validation tests.
163. Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 10, at 1184–91.
164. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); see also Schweiker v. McClure, 456
U.S. 188, 200 (1982) (“Due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the
particular situation demands.”).
165. Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 10, at 1185–86.
166. See id. at 1186–91 (discussing validation and “cross-examination” of adjudicatory
algorithms).
167. Id. at 1191.
COGLIANESE & LEHR_ME REVIEW FINAL-CC.DOCX(DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/19 7:46 PM
as “hard look” review, but the arbitrary and capricious standard has never
required a full explanation of the kind that psychologists, historians, or polit-
ical scientists might demand if they wanted to understand exactly why gov-
ernment officials reached a decision.168 If the courts have no need to peer
into the minds of government administrators,169 they presumably should
have little worry that they cannot peer into the “minds” of machine-learning
algorithms either.
Arbitrary and capricious review applies to any agency action, but it is es-
pecially salient in the context of judicial review of rulemaking. What will
matter to the courts is that the agency has sufficiently justified its design of
and reliance on a particular algorithmic tool. The agency will need to reveal
and justify its choice of an outcome variable and objective function. As the
selection of an objective function and design of an algorithm necessarily en-
tail making tradeoffs that call for policy judgment,170 an agency will need to
explain its choices about these tradeoffs in terms of factors that are consistent
with the agency’s statutory authority, and it will need to respond to mean-
ingful public comments submitted during a rulemaking.171 Agencies will also
need to validate that the algorithm performs as intended and that it achieves
the justified objectives. The courts will scrutinize agencies’ reasoning about
these choices and their validation efforts, but, in the end, the legal test is sup-
posed to be “whether there has been a clear error of judgment” in designing
and validating an algorithm to achieve a valid purpose—not whether the
specific results of a machine-learning algorithm will be intuitively explaina-
ble.172
168. See supra notes 108–109 and accompanying text; see also Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541
F.2d 1, 97–98 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (explaining that although the courts should educate themselves
about the evidence the agency considered in making its decision, in the final analysis, a judge
is to “look at the decision not as the chemist, biologist or statistician that [they] are qualified
neither by training nor experience to be, but as a reviewing court exercising [their] narrowly
defined duty of holding agencies to certain minimal standards of rationality”).
169. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
170. See, e.g., Richard Berk et al., Fairness in Criminal Justice Risk Assessments: The State
of the Art (May 30, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Cornell University Library),
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1703.09207.pdf.
171. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (explaining
that “the court must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the rele-
vant factors”); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983) (describing as arbitrary and capricious an agency decision “so implausible that it could
not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise”).
172. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416.
COGLIANESE & LEHR_ME REVIEW FINAL-CC.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/19 7:46 PM
173. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43; Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 462
U.S. 87, 103 (1983).
174. Marsh v. Or. Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 371 (2011) (quoting Kleppe v. Sierra
Club, 427 U.S. 390, 412 (1976)).
175. Trout Unlimited v. Lohn, 559 F.3d 946, 959 (9th Cir. 2009).
176. We acknowledge that, in the past, courts have deferred to human decisionmaking
by expert agencies, whereas arguably such deference might be less suited to decisions made
by outcome-determinative algorithmic systems, especially in cases of rules generated by auto-
mated rulemaking systems. We grant that some aspects of current law could well impose
certain impediments if agencies rely on automated rulemaking by robot. For example, an
agency would need to demonstrate “good cause” if the use of such a system were to bypass
the normal notice-and-comment process. See supra note 88. Yet, for purposes of arbitrary and
capricious review, we see no fundamental impediment when the agency is able to justify ade-
quately the way it has designed and operated its algorithmic system. An algorithmic system
is simply a tool selected by the agency to aid agency officials in fulfilling their statutory respon-
sibilities. Even when that tool is an automated rulemaking system, such a system can only be
designed in such a manner that comports with human policy and design choices embedded
within it. Cf. Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 10, at 1180–84. The agency rule will simply be
one that has nested within it the possibility for a series of subsidiary, automated rule “deci-
sions” made contingent on algorithmic predictions. Granted, the agency rule will thus be
much more complicated than otherwise, but conceptually, it will not be fundamentally differ-
ent than when an agency embeds within its rules other contingencies or requires the use of
other tools to measure those contingencies. Just as with the selection of any other tool (e.g.,
an air quality monitoring device or even a thermometer), agencies will need to justify their
choices, but when these choices call for technical expertise, as they necessarily will with ma-
chine learning, the applicable legal standard remains a deferential one.
COGLIANESE & LEHR_ME REVIEW FINAL-CC.DOCX(DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/19 7:46 PM
viability analysis” and “that the Service gave no explanation for relying on
one model—the ‘most realistic’ one—out of the thirty-one possible models
that could result from mixing and matching the independent variables.”184
The court rejected Alaska’s arguments, concluding that the Service had
satisfied the relevant legal tests for reason-giving. The court observed that:
There is no “better” way to assess a species’ likelihood of extinction. Plaintiffs do not
suggest a more accurate method for estimating the abundance of marine mammals,
nor do they point to a superior method of projecting the observed population trend into
the future. “If no one propose[s] anything better, then what is available is the best.”185
Of course, today or in the near future, the use of machine-learning algo-
rithms might well provide that better, or more accurate, way to predict spe-
cies extinction.186
It is telling that the court’s assessment of the agency’s analysis depended
on factors that could easily be met if agencies rely on inscrutable machine-
learning algorithms: process (e.g., peer review) and predictive performance
(i.e., accuracy). The court did not delve into the inner workings of the statis-
tical models or ask why the models performed well. It did not demand any
replication or even the submission of the underlying data to the court. Ulti-
mately, the court rejected Alaska’s arguments entirely on pragmatic grounds:
The most important thing to remember is that even if plaintiffs can poke some holes in
the agency’s models, that does not necessarily preclude a conclusion that these models
are the best available science. Some degree of predictive error is inherent in the nature
of mathematical modeling. The standard under the ESA is that “the Service must
utilize the ‘best scientific . . . data available,’ not the best scientific data possible.” In
this case, plaintiffs do not point to any superior data that the Service should have
considered. And the State’s own peer reviewer concluded that although the model
assumptions “could have been more detailed” or “better discussed,” “the assumptions
made considering what is known about beluga biology and life history were
reasonable.” Thus, it ultimately makes no difference that plaintiffs can point to a few
shortcomings here and there in the Service’s modeling. The agency’s population via-
bility analysis represents the best available science and is therefore entitled to
deference.187
Even if Alaska had claimed that another statistical approach would have
been superior, the court still probably would have deferred to the agency.
When litigation turns into a “‘battle of the experts’ . . . the courts tradition-
ally reject” the challenger’s claims and declare the agency the winner.188
The district court’s approach in Alaska v. Lubchenco is emblematic of courts’
more general deferential posture toward agency reason-giving under the
APA. Although many courts will scrutinize agencies’ reasoning, even when
it is based on mathematical or other technical analysis, it is the outlier court
that demands much more than the Lubchenco court.189 In most cases, it will
likely be enough for government officials to satisfy the arbitrary and capri-
cious test if they can show that (a) an algorithmic system was constructed to
advance a legally valid purpose by revealing the goal of an algorithm, (b) it is
functioning correctly to advance that purpose (i.e., the program is not mal-
functioning and it is producing validated results), and (c) it is being used as
intended.190 Demanding much more would go far beyond any notion of rea-
son-giving demanded of government officials today.
192. As noted earlier, the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the challenged use of an
algorithmic risk assessment on procedural due process grounds because the appellant had ac-
cess to sufficient non-proprietary information. State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 753–54
(Wis. 2016). The federal district court in Texas, on the other hand, held that the proprietary
nature of the algorithm, in that case at least, raised a question for a jury as to whether the
plaintiffs had available enough information to satisfy demands of procedural due process.
Hous. Fed’n of Teachers, Local 2415 v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1175
(S.D. Tex. 2017).
193. See generally Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the
Criminal Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1343 (2018) (discussing how the trade secret status of
algorithmic components may affect criminal proceedings).
194. To be clear, there may certainly be instances in which an objective function does
contain information that could be considered a trade secret and that goes beyond revealing
merely the predictive goal of the algorithm. Particularly, “regularization” methods used to
prevent overfitting to, in very rough and broad terms, push the algorithm to make predictions
in particular ways can involve adding additional mathematical terms to the objective function.
In other words, the objective function may contain more than simply an indication of how it
is assessing “accuracy,” such as by reference to residuals or errors. Cf. Lehr & Ohm, supra
note 2, at 704–05 (discussing the use of regularization to reduce an algorithm’s disparate im-
pacts). The mathematical additions to objective functions could perhaps be deemed trade
secrets if they were developed by private companies. But this is unlikely to be problematic for
two reasons. First, those additions could always be excerpted before disclosure, leaving only
the non-confidential parts of the objective function to be disclosed; this would still indicate
whether the goal pursued by the algorithm is legitimate—the purpose of disclosing the objec-
tive function in the first place. Second, as we discuss, in camera review is always an option.
COGLIANESE & LEHR_ME REVIEW FINAL-CC.DOCX(DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/19 7:46 PM
without needing to divulge any protected source code or other trade se-
crets.195 Third, even if the proprietary nature of a private contractor’s un-
derlying source code does bar the government from disclosing necessary in-
formation, that information can always be reviewed by a court in camera,
thus protecting any trade secrets or confidential business information. In the
rulemaking context, independent peer reviews could be conducted under
non-disclosure agreements. Finally, as noted in Section III.A, agencies could
proactively work to avoid any conflict between trade secret protection and
reasoned transparency simply by drafting contracts with their private con-
sultants to clarify what information must be treated confidentially and what
information may be disclosed.196
In most instances, we would expect the fishbowl transparency issues to be
worked out without much difficulty because of the pragmatic nature of trans-
parency law’s demands. We note as well that we have been assuming all
along that the agency will be using machine-learning systems in outcome-
determinative ways. Where this is not the case, the agency will presumably
be able to provide an alternative explanation that does not require the dis-
closure of any confidential information. The important takeaway is that in
most cases the demands of reasoned transparency will be able to be met while
still respecting authorized limitations on fishbowl transparency.197
195. Furthermore, as Joshua Kroll and his coauthors have pointed out, the source code
may not reveal anything more about the functioning of a machine-learning algorithm. See
Kroll et al., supra note 36, at 638.
196. See supra notes 120–137 and accompanying text.
197. Our focus throughout this article is on federal transparency law in the United States
as it applies to the actions of government agencies. We note that, at a more general level, the
analysis we provide here might accord with how the EU’s “right to explanation” may eventu-
ally be understood under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). See generally EU
General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 9. At least one early assessment suggests that
private organizations using machine learning may simply need to provide “a basic explanation
of how the model is working” to satisfy the GDPR’s requirement of “meaningful information”
about the “logic” and “significance” of the automated algorithmic system. Andrew Burt, Is
There a ‘Right to Explanation’ for Machine Learning in the GDPR?, IAPP: PRIVACY TECH (June 1,
2017), https://iapp.org/news/a/is-there-a-right-to-explanation-for-machine-learning-in-
the-gdpr/#.
COGLIANESE & LEHR_ME REVIEW FINAL-CC.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/19 7:46 PM
198. To the extent that legal considerations have helped motivate some of this interest,
we suspect that a driving force has been the EU’s GDPR with its ambiguous right to explana-
tion. See generally EU General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 9, § 71. The GDPR
applies to private-sector uses of machine learning, and uncertainty over what counts as a suf-
ficient explanation for purposes of the new EU regulation presumably has produced signifi-
cant enough stakes to attract the attention of both researchers and market actors. Of course,
researchers have long attempted to get reasons, of sorts, out of machine-learning algorithms.
Indeed, some of the basic methods that we describe in this section were developed earlier in
the 2000s. See, e.g., RICHARD A. BERK, STATISTICAL LEARNING FROM A REGRESSION
PERSPECTIVE 226–29, 277–92 (1st ed. 2008) (describing partial dependence plots). But these
early methods are limited in two ways. First, as a technical matter, they are limited in applica-
bility; as we will discuss, for some particularly advanced machine-learning techniques in use
today, analogues to these basic methods either have not yet been developed or have been
developed only more recently. Second, these methods do not serve the same purpose, and
were not developed in response to the same pressures, as the cutting-edge techniques we dis-
cuss later in this Section. Some early machine-learning methods, like random forests, were
initially applied to social science problems, and it is social scientists’ objective to attempt to
model phenomena. As a result, the goal of many reason-giving methods was to give social
scientists tools for telling descriptive stories about what processes could be generating the data
they observed. That goal contrasts with the goal motivating development of many cutting-
edge techniques we discuss later—reducing the opacity of algorithms whose applications in
sensitive contexts mandates a certain level of reason-giving. This goal emerged from a host of
primarily legal and policy scholars who critiqued applications of machine learning for being
too opaque. See Lehr & Ohm, supra note 2, at 658–64. This concern has in turn sparked
innovation from technical scholars, often working in tandem with the legal scholars. See, e.g.,
ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (ACM FAT), ACM FAT* CONF.,
https://fatconference.org/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2019); Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency
in Machine Learning, FAT/ML, http://www.fatml.org/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2019).
199. See Andrew D. Selbst, A Mild Defense of Our New Machine Overlords, 70 VAND. L. REV.
EN BANC 87 (“Black boxes can generally be tested, and the relationship between inputs and
outputs is often knowable, even if one cannot describe succinctly how all potential inputs map
COGLIANESE & LEHR_ME REVIEW FINAL-CC.DOCX(DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/19 7:46 PM
to outputs. To say that something is a black box is not to say we can understand nothing
about it.”) Note that the methods we discuss in this Section are what Selbst and Barocas would
refer to in their work as post hoc methods—those that do not place any constraints on how
the algorithm is initially specified. See Selbst & Barocas, supra note 151, at 34–35. By contrast,
they also contemplate opportunities to increase the scrutability of algorithms by restricting the
algorithm’s complexity—by, for example, limiting the number of input variables or choosing
(and appropriately tuning) algorithms that are, by their nature, less complex than others. We
do not address these because, as we mention at the outset, many analysts as well as government
officials will properly welcome complexity; it is this complexity that enables machine learning’s
prowess. Furthermore, given our discussion of the level of reasoned transparency necessitated
by the law, administrative uses of machine learning should face no significant legal demands
to be less complex. If anything, the courts have indicated that they will give greater deference
to agencies under the Administrative Procedure Act when issues are complex. See Motor Ve-
hicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983); Balt. Gas & Elec.
Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983).
200. Individual-level explanations are also sometimes referred to in the technical litera-
ture as local explanations, and group-level explanations are referred to as global explanations.
See, e.g., Riccardo Guidotti et al., A Survey of Methods for Explaining Black Box Models, 105 ACM
COMPUTING SURVS. 93:1, 93:6 (2018).
COGLIANESE & LEHR_ME REVIEW FINAL-CC.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/19 7:46 PM
his case. A group-level explanation, on the other hand, does not try to reveal
why a particular entity’s prediction resulted; rather, it reveals patterns or
trends in the factors affecting predictions across entities. It might reveal, say,
what features of pilots tend to lead to predictions of flight worthiness (or non-
worthiness) across all pilots examined by the algorithm.
Within both individual- and group-level explanations, we can also distin-
guish between methods explaining the importance of input variables and
those explaining the functional forms of input variables.201 The former at-
tempts to reveal, roughly speaking, the magnitude of the effect of a given
input variable—say, the applicant’s age—on the ability of the algorithm to
make successful forecasts. A method aimed at explaining importance will
essentially seek to measure how much that variable matters relative either to
that variable not being considered at all by the algorithm (i.e., the algorithm
dropping age from the analysis) or to having the values the variable takes on
randomized (i.e., stripping the age variable of any predictively useful infor-
mation it may contain).202 When implemented on a group level, measures of
importance are often interpreted as reductions in overall accuracy across all
individuals examined—for example, if the variable about the applicant’s age
were removed from consideration or randomly shuffled, the algorithm would
make a certain percentage more errors across all candidates when predicting
that they are not worthy of certification.203 Technical methods for achieving
this kind of group-level meaning about variable importance have existed for
a while for less complex machine-learning algorithms, but have recently
started to be developed or refined for more complex ones.204
When importance methods are implemented on an individual level, they
take on a slightly different interpretation. Because they do not operate across
multiple individuals, they cannot be interpreted as percentage reductions in
accuracy when a variable is dropped or randomly shuffled. Rather, they are
often interpreted as indicating how “pivotal” an input variable is to an indi-
vidual’s prediction. In other words, they indicate how likely it is that, if an
201. In the regression literature, input variables are also referred to as independent vari-
ables, while output variables are referred to as dependent variables.
202. See Lehr & Ohm, supra note 2, at 679–81.
203. See id.
204. See, e.g., Anupam Datta et al., Algorithmic Transparency via Quantitative Input Influence:
Theory and Experiments with Learning Systems, 2016 IEEE SYMP. ON SECURITY & PRIVACY 598,
601, 608-09; Marina M.-C. Vidovic et al., Feature Importance Measure for Non-Linear
Learning Algorithms (Nov. 22, 2016) (unpublished conference paper) (on file with Cornell
University Library), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1611.07567.pdf (analyzing different methods for
teaching complex machine-learning algorithms).
COGLIANESE & LEHR_ME REVIEW FINAL-CC.DOCX(DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/19 7:46 PM
input variable, like the age of the candidate, were dropped or randomly shuf-
fled, a candidate’s predicted flight worthiness would change. If dropping that
variable or randomly shuffling its value has no effect on a candidate’s ulti-
mate prediction, then one could say that the variable is not “important” or
“pivotal.” Analytic methods that accomplish this kind of individual-level ex-
planation of importance are actively being developed.205
In addition to methods aimed at explaining the importance of an input
variable, technical methods are being refined to explain input variables’ func-
tional forms, adding a different kind of meaning. The importance methods
discussed above do not give any indication of the direction or manner in
which the input variable about an applicant’s age affects the predicted out-
come; they do not say, for instance, that an increase in a pilot’s age tends to
be associated with an increase in the predicted outcome variable (or a higher
probability, if the outcome variable is a binary prediction). That is what
methods explaining functional forms attempt to explain.206 To explain func-
tional form, however, these methods produce, as a practical matter, a differ-
ent form of output. The importance of an input variable can be indicated by
a number indicating, say, the percent increase in error (for a group-level ex-
planation) or the probability of a different prediction (for an individual-level
explanation). By contrast, the functional form of a variable is often revealed
on a graphical plot. Such plots indicate, roughly speaking, the effect that
increases or decreases in a given input variable, like the applicant’s age, have
on the outcome variable, holding the values of all other input variables con-
stant. Notably, unlike importance measures, explanations of functional
forms are available only on the group level, not the individual level. Further-
more, while group-level explanations of functional form have been available
for some time for less complex machine-learning methods, they have only
started to be developed for more complex algorithms, like various forms of
deep learning.207
205. See, e.g., Grégoire Montavon et al., Explaining NonLinear Classification Decisions with Deep
Taylor Decomposition, 65 PATTERN RECOGNITION 211 (2017) (focusing data analysis on individ-
ual data points); Wojciech Samek et al., Explainable Artificial Intelligence: Understanding, Visualizing
and Interpreting Deep Learning Models, ITU J., Oct. 2017 (analyzing individual predictions in ma-
chine leaning and artificial intelligence); Wojciech Samek et al., Interpreting the Predictions of Com-
plex ML Models by Layer-wise Relevance Propagation, in 9887 LNCS: ARTIFICIAL NEURAL
NETWORKS AND MACHINE LEARNING – ICANN 2016 (Alessandro E.P. Villa, Paolo Masulli,
and Antonio Javier Pons Rivero, eds., 2016) (summarizing a technique that explains predic-
tions in machine learning); Vidovic et al., supra note 204.
206. See Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 10, at 1212; Lehr & Ohm, supra note 2, at 709–
10.
207. See Lehr & Ohm, supra note 2, at 709–10; see, e.g., Marco Tulio Ribeiro et al., Model-
COGLIANESE & LEHR_ME REVIEW FINAL-CC.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/19 7:46 PM
Agnostic Interpretability of Machine Learning (Jun. 16, 2016) (unpublished conference paper)
(on file with Cornell University Library), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1606.05386.pdf (arguing for
explaining machine learning predictions using model-agnostic approaches).
COGLIANESE & LEHR_ME REVIEW FINAL-CC.DOCX(DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/19 7:46 PM
CONCLUSION
If machine-learning applications are designed and managed well, govern-
mental reliance on them should be able to withstand legal challenges based
on principles of reason-giving. The fact that the use of such algorithms can
satisfy legal demands for transparency does not mean that algorithms should
immediately be deployed in any particularly administrative domain. But it
does mean that scholars, policymakers, and the public ought to be receptive
to the use of machine-learning algorithms where they can improve public
administration. The responsible use of algorithms—even in outcome-deter-
minative ways—will not contravene legal principles of transparency. Alt-
hough the potential for outcome-determinative uses of machine learning by
governments loom on the horizon, algorithms will likely be applied more of-
ten to assist, rather than supplant, human judgment. If, as we have shown,
even outcome-determinative applications of machine learning can meet the
law’s demands, then there should be even less concern over the less determi-
native uses.
Of course, there is always something to be said for promoting transpar-
ency even beyond what agencies must do to withstand judicial scrutiny of
their reasoning.208 After all, to have trust and confidence in their govern-
ment, citizens may well hold more demanding expectations for meaningful
information than do the courts. We are thus heartened that data scientists
are already finding ways to do more than is required to coax explanatory
information out of ostensibly black-box algorithms. We are not only confi-
dent that governments will be able to meet demands for explainability in
their use of algorithms, especially under prevailing legal standards, but we
are cautiously optimistic that algorithmic governance might in important cir-
cumstances even enhance public trust and legitimacy in government. In
some cases, well-designed algorithms may increase public trust by achieving
faster and fairer outcomes for those individuals who interact with govern-
ment agencies and are subject to their decisions.209
In the future, a government that makes use of so-called black-box algo-
rithms need not be a black-box government. With responsible practices,
government officials can take advantage of machine learning’s predictive
prowess while remaining faithful to principles of open government. Algo-
rithmic governance can meet the law’s demands for transparency while still
enhancing efficacy, efficiency, and even legitimacy in government.
209. Earlier we noted that eBay has had a successful experience in relying on an auto-
mated dispute resolution process to settle tens of millions of disputes each year. Strikingly,
eBay has found that “parties who engaged in the process were more likely to return and pur-
chase other items through eBay, a pretty remarkable result from settling a dispute.” BARTON
& BIBAS, supra note 27, at 113.