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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF ZAMBIA APPEALNO. 47/2015

HOLDEN AT LUSAKA
(Criminal Jurisdiction)

BETWEEN:

SAMUEL MWABA MUTAMBALILO APPELLANT

AND

THE PEOPLE RESPONDENT

Coram: Phiri, Muyovwe and Kaoma JJS

On the 14thJuly, 2016 and pt November, 2016

For the Appellant: Mr. K. Muzenga, Deputy Director, Legal Aid

Board

For the Respondent: Ms. G. Nyalugwe, State Advocate, National

Prosecutions Authority

JUDGMENT

MUYOVWE, JS, delivered the Judgment of the Court

Cases referred to:

1. Mutambo and 5 Others vs. The People (1965) Z.R. 24

2. Chisoni Banda vs. The People (1990-92) Z.R. 70
.3.. Edward Sinyama vs. The People (1993-94) Z.R. 16
.4: R ~ Andrews [1987] A.C. 281
5. R v Ratten [1972] A.C. 378
6. R. v Pennell [2003] 1 N.Z.L.R. 289

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Legislation referred to:

1. The Criminal Procedure Code, Cap 88 of the Laws of Zambia

2. The Penal Code, Cap 87 of the Laws of Zambia

The appellant was convicted by the High Court sitting at

Kabwe of the offence of murder contrary to Section 200 of the Penal

Code, Cap 87 of the laws of Zambia.

The particulars of the offence alleged that on the 17th day of

September 2013 at Mkushi in the Central Province of the Republic

of Zambia the appellant murdered Stanley Fwalanga (hereinafter

called "the deceased"). Suffice to state that although the deceased

died on the 17th September 2013, the incident which is in

contention happened in May 2013.

The summary of the events which are not in dispute leading to

the death of the deceased are as follows: It was during the month

of May 2013 when Oswald Siwila a general worker at Dausea Farm

was awakened by a knock around midnight. When he opened the

door he found the deceased outside and since he was new in the

area, he did not know the deceased. Oswald Siwila observed that

the deceased was burnt from the neck up to the waist. He said the

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deceased told him that he had been burnt by the appellant whom

he referred to as Bashi Mwaba. According to Oswald Siwila, the

deceased who was shivering said he needed clothes and fire to

warm himself. Oswald Siwila then gave the deceased clothes and

sat him by the fire so that the deceased could warm himself. The

witness then went to wake up his neighbour Reagan Chilekwa, a

member of the neighbourhood watch, who recognised the deceased.

Fred Fwalanga and his wife were informed around 01:00 hours of

the serious condition the deceased was in. The deceased told his

relatives that he owed the appellant KlO and when he failed to pay

him, he poured hot water on him and that this happened at the

appellant's house. The followingmorning the deceased was rushed

to the hospital where doctors confirmed that the burns were a

result of the hot water which had been poured on him. Apparently,

the deceased lived with Fred Fwalanga and the appellant was his

neighbour. The deceased was found at Oswald Siwila's house

which was about one hour's walk from Fred Fwalanga's house,

while the deceased's clothes were found early in the . morning

outside the house of another neighbour to Fred Fwalanga by the

name of Mabvuto Phiri. According to Mabvuto Phiri, he was also a

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neighbour to the appellant though he lived about a kilometre away

from Oswald Siwila's house.

Meanwhile, the matter was reported to Mkushi Police Station

and although the deceased was in a critical condition he was able to

talk and he informed Sergeant Nyirongo who interviewed him that.

the appellant burnt him with hot water. The deceased was

immediately admitted at Mkushi General Hospital. Interestingly, a

statement was only recorded from him in hospital on the 4th

September, 2013. The statement was produced and admitted in

evidence without any objection from the defence. The following is

the statement recorded by Detective Chief Inspector Kenneth

Chiyala on 4th September 2013:

"I do recall very well on the 27th May, 2013 at around 18:00
hours, as I was coming from my grandmother going home, I
passed through the home of M/Samuel Matambalilo whom I
owed some money. When I reached there M/Samuel
Matambalilo started asking me as to when I will pay him the
money lowe him and I told him that I paid the money to his
son when he was out. He started complaining that we the
people of that area we were not good. He was saying these
words whilst drinking home brewed beer. Then he went into
the grass thatched kitchen whilst complaining without me
knowing what he went to do. I just felt hot water being poured
on me and I looked as to see who poured water on me I just
saw M/Samuel Matambalilo holding a pot. Then I had to

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 undress the T-Shirt of which even my skin started peeling off.
That is how I left the T-Shirt in his yard and started straggling
to go home. When I reached the main road I failed to move
and just slept on the road. After sometime I just heard people
lifting me and when I opened the eyes I saw M/Samuel was
among the people who lifted me and took me in the bush after
sometime in the bush I started forcing myself until I reached
at the Farm of a certain white man and found two Security
Guards whom I requested to spend a night and asked them if
they can inform my relatives. Then on 28/05/2013 at around
02:00 hours I just saw my relatives who came and picked me
and took me to the Police and later taken to the Clinic then
later referred me to Mkushi District Hospita1."

Suffice to note that the appellant was apprehended and

charged with the offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm.

Trial could not proceed as the deceased passed on before he could

testify.

For some unknown reason, the postmortem was only

conducted after the body of the deceased was exhumed on the 7th

February, 2014. The postmortem report revealed that the deceased

died as a result of the infected burn wounds to his chest, abdomen,

neck, and both arms which caused severe lung oedema, pneumonia
...
and acute respiratory failure.

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 In his defence, the appellant said on the 27th May, 2013 he

was with his family and they retired to bed around 20:30 hours.

The followingday around 16:00 hours, he was apprehended on an

allegation that he had burnt the deceased. The appellant denied

that the deceased passed through his home on the material day

around 18:00 hours; that he did not pour hot water on the

deceased and he denied that the deceased owed him KlO.

According to the appellant, his house is located in a busy area and

if he had burnt the deceased, it would have attracted members of

the public. The appellant said he only heard in court that the

deceased was burnt and that he was found at Dausea Farm which

was about 2km away. The appellant confirmed that he used to

appear at the Subordinate Court on a charge of assault but the

deceased never appeared until he died. It was the appellant's

evidence that he had a cordial relationship with the deceased and

that the deceased even used to help him with work. The appellant

said he could not understand why the deceased accused him of

pouring hot water on his body.

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 In her judgment, the learned judge found that the deceased

had consistently told people that it was the appellant who burnt

him. She also relied heavily on the statement recorded by the police

and found the appellant guilty as charged and sentenced him to the

mandatory death sentence.

On behalf of the appellant, Mr. Muzenga the learned Deputy

Director of Legal Aid Board advanced two grounds of appeal

couched in the following terms:

1. The learned trial Court erred in law and in fact when it relied
on the hearsay evidence of the deceased without considering
whether or not it could be admitted as being res gestae an
exception to the rule against hearsay.

2. The learned trial Court misdirected itself in law and in fact

when it relied on the inadmissible statement of the deceased
as the basis for convicting the appellant.

Mr. Muzenga, in his filed heads of argument, argued grounds

one and two together. It was submitted, inter alia, that the learned

trial judge did not address her mind to whether or not the

statement made by. the deceased to .. Oswald Siwila that the 0'

appellant burnt him met the requirements for it to be accepted as

an exception to the hearsay rule under the res gestae principle. It

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 was pointed out that this was in spite of both Counsel submitting

on the issue. Counsel contended that the trial court appeared to

have been preoccupied with the reliability or consistency of the

deceased's allegation rather than the admissibility of the statement.

It was Counsel's submission that this approach by the learned trial

judge was a misdirection. He cited the case of Mutambo and 5

Others vs. The People1 where it was stated that:

"Evidence of a statement made to a witness by a person who is

not himself called as a witness mayor may not be hearsay. It
is hearsay and inadmissible when the object of the evidence is
to establish the truth of what is contained in the statement. It
is not hearsay and is admissible when it is proposed to
establish by the evidence, not the truth of the statement, but
the fact that it was made."

Counsel contended that had the learned trial judge addressed

her mind to the conditions precedent to the acceptance of a

statement under the res gestae principle, she would not have relied

on it and the appellant would not have been convicted. Further,

that since the inadmissible evidence was erroneously accepted and

relied on by the trial court leading to the conviction of the appellant

he must be acquitted as there exists no other evidence to support

the conviction. In support of this argument, Mr. Muzenga referred

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us to the cases of Chisoni Banda vs. The People2 and Edward

Sinyama vs. The People.3

Mr. Muzenga submitted that from the holdings in Chisoni

Banda2 and Edward Sinyama3 there is a requirement that the

statement in issue must be made in conditions of approximate

though not in exact contemporaneity by a person so intensely

involved and so in the throes of the event that there is no

opportunity for concoction or distortion that the actor or maker of

the statement must at the time of making it be intensely involved in

the throes of the event or activity. Counsel submitted that this

tends to guard against the danger of distortion and/ or concoction.

Mr. Muzenga alluded to the evidence of Oswald Siwila who had the

first contact with the deceased. He made reference to the fact that

when Oswald Siwila asked the deceased what had happened, the

deceased responded that "it was bashi Mwaba who did that." Mr.

Muzenga's argument is that since Oswald Siwila was a key witness

for the prosecution, he needed to establish the circumstances under

which that statement was made. It was submitted that Oswald

Siwila should have revealed to the trial court his observations on

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the deceased, whether he was panting for breath as a possible sign

of fleeing from the scene of crime and all the other evidence which

could have effectively established contemporaneity and involvement

in the throes of the event. According to Mr. Muzenga, a lot of time

passed from the time of the alleged burning to the time the

deceased got to Oswald Siwila to ask for fire. Counsel argued that

the circumstances in this case do not meet the requirements under

the res gestae principle.

Further, Counsel contended that the statement recorded by

the police three months after the incident was inadmissible as to

the truth thereof. Counsel argued that the burden lay on the

prosecution to establish beyond all reasonable doubt that the

statement was made in accordance with the res gestae principle. In

the present case, he submitted that the prosecution failed to

discharge its burden.

In conclusion, he submitted that in the absence of the

inadmissible hearsay evidence relied on by the trial court, there is

no other evidence upon which a conviction could be competent and,

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therefore, this appeal should be allowed and the appellant should

be set at liberty.

In response, Ms. Nyalugwe, the learned Counsel for the State

filed lengthy submissions. With regard to the statement made by

the deceased to Oswald Siwila, Ms. Nyalugwe submitted that it is

admissible as res gestae. She contended that the appellant's

conviction was not based solely on the statement of the deceased as

argued by learned Counsel for the appellant. She submitted that

there are two statements on record which are in contention, that is,

the statement made by the deceased to Oswald Siwila on the night

of the incident around 24:00 hours and the statement recorded by

Detective Chief Inspector Kenneth Chiyala three months after the

incident. Ms. Nyalugwe took the view that both statements are vital

pieces of evidence for their unique reasons and that the learned

trial Judge was on firm ground when she referred to them in her

judgment.

She submitted with regard to the statement made by the

deceased to Oswald Siwila on the night of the incident, the

statement is admissible only to the extent that the deceased did

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make the statement and not to ascertain the truthfulness of the

contents thereof. Counsel argued that this statement to Oswald

Siwila qualifies for admission under the res gestae principle and

that the learned trial judge neither erred in fact or in law when she

relied on the statement to convict the appellant. It was contended

further that the mere fact that the learned judge never specifically

considered the statement under the res gestae principle, neither

takes away what the statement is nor renders it inadmissible as

such. She relied on the decision in Edward Sinyama vs. The

People3 on the test trial courts ought to use when admitting a

statement as part of res gestae. Counsel submitted that according

to the evidence of Oswald Siwila, the appellant burnt the deceased

and the deceased wanted some help. It was argued that the fact

that the deceased reported the incident to Oswald Siwila coupled

with the condition he was in at the time the report was made, are

clear signs that the deceased was still burdened with and actively

affected by the event that it was not reasonably plausible or

possible for him to fabricate the events of that night. Counsel

submitted that in addition, the deceased remained at Oswald

Siwila's house while Oswald Siwila alerted the deceased's relatives

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 and that this could have given him ample time for reasoned

reflection or concoction, but the deceased recounted what he had

told Oswald Siwila to his relatives Fred and Josephine Fwalanga in

the presence of Oswald Siwila, with the same accuracy and

consistency. It was contended that there being nothing on record to

show that the deceased had or could possibly have had a malicious

motive to make false claims against the appellant, is something

which should go to the deceased's credit and can be used to discard

the possibility of concoction or distortion. Counsel referred us to

the evidence by Oswald Siwila in the court below where he said:

"He was knocking at my door, he told me to wake up as he was

not alright ... the person told me that he had been burnt ... this
person was burnt from neck up to the waist ... I asked him what
happened and he said it was Bashimwaba who did that."

According to Counsel, the excerpt from Oswald Siwila's

evidence strongly indicates that the deceased was still in the throes

of the event and it adequately describes the condition of the

deceased at the time he made the report: to Oswald Siwila. Counsel

emphasised that the deceased's condition was also reflected in the

evidence of Fred Fwalanga, Josephine Fwalanga, Detective Sergeant

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Godlack Nyirongo and Detective Chief Inspector Kenneth Chiyala

who gave a thorough description of the condition and state of the

deceased. In the words of Ms. Nyalugwe, it can be reasonably

inferred from the facts and evidence on record that the deceased

person was "skinned alive" by the appellant who, she contended,

being a man of reasonable prudence, ought to have known or been

aware of the likely consequences of his actions. She submitted that

the act of pouring hot water on the deceased was unlawful and

caused grievous harm within the meaning of Section 204 (a) and

(b) of the Penal Code, Cap 87 and that such harm resulted in the

death of the deceased contrary to Section 200 of the Penal Code.

It was contended that although the record shows that the

deceased asked for fire from Oswald Siwila at the time he made the

report, it does not take away the primary purpose of the deceased's

presence at Oswald Siwila's house which, Ms. Nyalugwe submitted,

was to report his assailant and seek for help. She submitted that

the consistency with which the deceased recounted what had

happened to him speaks to the truthfulness of the statement and

the reasonable inference to be drawn is that the deceased did not

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fabricate or concoct his narration of events. It was contended that

owing to the very state he was in and the severity of the InJunes,

there was no room for reasoned reflection or error. Counsel

submitted that the deceased died as a result of the severe burn

wounds of the chest, abdomen, neck and both arms which caused

severe lung oedema, pneumonia and acute respiratory failure as

disclosed by the post mortem report.

It was submitted that the circumstances of the event were so

unusual and that the deceased was involved in the pressure of the

event such that there was no possibility of concoction. Further,

that the statement was sufficiently spontaneous although not made

in condition of exact contemporaneity, the event which provided the

trigger mechanism for the statement was still operative. Counsel

contended that from the analysis of the facts of this case and the

evidence on record, it clearly shows that the statement qualifies as

part of res gestae and therefore admissible. Counsel submitted that

had proper consideration been given to the issues raised by Counsel

for the appellant in their submissions in the court below, the

learned judge would have inevitably found that the prosecution

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had proved beyond all reasonable doubt that the statement of the

deceased formed part of res gestae and was admissible as such.

Ms. Nyalugwe submitted that the appellant was convicted on clear

evidence and therefore, his conviction should be upheld and his

appeal should be dismissed.

At the hearing, Mr. Muzenga undertook to file his reply to the

State's submissions within a week. To date we have not received

his heads of argument in reply.

We have considered the evidence m the court below, the

judgment appealed against and the submissions by learned

Counsel for the parties.

We will now deal with both grounds together as they are

interrelated.

From the outset, we wish to state that there are two issues for

consideration and these are: whether the statement the deceased

made to Oswald Siwila that the appellant burnt him was an

exception to the hearsay rule under the res gestae principle; and

whether the statement Detective Chief Inspector Kenneth Chiyala

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recorded from the deceased three months after the incident was

admissible.

We now address the admissibility of the statement the

deceased made to Oswald Siwila as he is the person to whom the

deceased first made the statement that it was the appellant who

burnt him.

We agree with the learned Counsel for the parties that the

learned judge ought to have considered whether the deceased's

statement was admissible under the res gestae principle. Mr.

Muzenga attacked the statement for not being contemporaneous

with the event. Counsel looked at the time that had elapsed from

the time of the incident, which was said to be around 18:00 hours,

to the time of the deceased's first report to Oswald Siwila which was

around midnight. Mr. Muzenga's argument is that five to six hours

was too long a time for the statement to be contemporaneous with

the event. On the other hand, Ms. Nyalugwe contended that from

the testimony of Oswald Siwila, when the deceased was making the

statement to him, he was severely burnt and was obviously ina

trauma.

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 In our view, the factor to consider is not the time that passed

between the event and the making of the statement but, whether

going by what transpired between the event and the making of the

statement, the deceased had had an opportunity for reasoned

reflection which would have motivated him to concoct or distort the

story surrounding the event.

In R v Andrews,4 the facts were that shortly after a man was

attacked and robbed by two men, he named his attackers to the

police, referring to the co-defendant O'NeiII by name and to the

appeIIant, Donald Andrews as "Donald" or "Donavan." The victim

died before trial. (emphasis ours) The House of Lords held that the

evidence was rightly admitted as part of res gestae. They accepted

the accuracy and value of Lord Wilberforce's clarification of the law

in the case of R v Ratten5 in which case Lord Ackner, with whom

the remaining members of the court agreed, summarised the

position which confronts the trial judge:

"1. The primary question which the judge must ask himself is -
can the possibility of concoction or distortion be disregarded?

2. To answer that question a judge must first consider the

circumstances in which the particular statement was made, in
order to satisfy himself that the event was so unusual or

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 \

startling or dramatic as to dominate the thoughts of the

victim, so that his utterance was an instinctive reaction to
that event, thus giving no real opportunity for reasoned
reflection. In such a situation the judge would be entitled to
conclude that the involvement or the pressure of the event
would exclude the possibility of concoction or distortion,
providing that the statement was made in conditions of
approximate but not exact contemporaneity.

3. In order for the statement to be sufficiently 'spontaneous' it

must be so closely associated with the event which has excited
the statement, that it can be fairly stated that the mind of the
declarant was still dominated by the event. Thus the judge
must be satisfied that the event, which provided the trigger
mechanism for the statement, was still operative. (In R. v
Pennell [2003] 1 N.Z.L.R. 289.6 The fact that the statement
was made in answer to a question is but one factor to consider
under this heading.

4. Quite apart from the time factor, there may be special

features in the case, which relate to the possibility of
concoction or distortion ..... The judge must be satisfied that
the circumstances were such that having regard to the special
feature of malice, there was no possibility of any concoction or
distortion to the advantage of the maker or the disadvantage
of the accused.

5. As to the possibility of error in the facts narrated in the

statement, if only the ordinary fallibility of human recollection
is relied upon, this goes to the weight to be attached to and
not to the admissibility of the statement and is therefore a
matter for the jury. However, here again there may be special
features that may give rise to the possibility of error. In the
instant case there was evidence that the dec'eas"edhad drunk
too excess, well over double the permitted limit for driving a
motor car. Another example would be where the identification
was made in circumstances of particular difficulty or where the
declarant suffered from defective eyesight. In such

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circumstances, the trial judge must consider whether he can

exclude the possibility of error.

R. v Andrews4 was decided on the principles laid down in R v

Ratten.5 In the Ratten5 case, Lord Wilberforce considered the test

to be applied before evidence is accepted as res gestae. In

particular, he emphasised the importance of spontaneity as the

basis for the test. He said:

"The possibility of concoction, or fabrication, where it exists,

is an entirely valid reason for exclusion, and is probably the
real test which judges in fact apply. In their Lordships'
opinion this should be recognised and applied directly as the
relevant test: the test should be not the uncertain one whether
the making of the statement was in some sense part of the
event or transaction. This may often be difficult to establish;
such external matters as the time which lapses between the
events and the speaking of the words (or vice versa), and
differences in location being relevant factors but not, taken by
themselves, decisive criteria. As regards statements made
after the event, it must be for the Judge, by preliminary ruling,
to satisfy himself that the statement was so clearly made in
circumstances of spontaneity or involvement in the event that
the possibility of concoction can be disregarded "

In our own case of Edward Sinyama vs. The People3 we held

that if the statement has,. otherwise been made m conditions of

approximate though not exact contemporaneity by a person so.

intensely involved and so in the throes of the event that there is no

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opportunity for concoction or distortion to the disadvantage of the

defendant or the advantage of the maker, then the true test and the

primary concern of the Court must be whether the possibility of

concoction or distortion should be disregarded in the particular

case. We also said that the possibility has to be considered against

the circumstances in which the statement was made.

In the case in casu, firstly, the deceased who was so badly

burnt, after gaining consciousness ended up at Oswald Siwila's

home far away from his home. Oswald Siwila said he observed that

the deceased was burnt from the neck up to the waist and that he

had no shirt. According to Oswald Siwila, the deceased was

shivering and said he needed clothes and fire to warm himself.

And according to the post mortem report, the deceased died as a

result of the severe burn wounds of the chest, abdomen, neck, both

arms which caused severe lung oedema, pneumonia and acute

respiratory failure. Based on Oswald Siwila's observations and the

post mortem report, it is evident that the burns were severe such

that at the time the deceased had contact with Oswald Siwila, he

was still so much in the throes of the incident that he could not

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 We have also considered the appellant's defence, and notably,

apart from saying he was at home with his wife and children, his

own testimony was that he had a cordial relationship with the

deceased who even used to help him with work. We take the view

that therefore, the deceased had no motive to falsely implicate the

appellant, of all people, of such a serious crime.

As regards the admissibility of the deceased's statement

recorded by Detective Chief Inspector Kenneth Chiyala, we note that

Sections 237 of the Criminal Procedure Code, Cap 88 give

guidance regarding the recording and production of a statement by

a terminally ill person. Section 237 provides that:

"Whenever it appears to any magistrate that any person

dangerously ill or hurt and not likely to recover is able and
willing to give material evidence relating to any offence triable
by the High Court, and it shall not be practicable to take the
deposition, in accordance with the provisions of this Code, of
the person so ill or hurt, such magistrate may take in and shall
subscribe the same, and certify that it contains accurately the
whole of the statement made by such person, and shall add a
statement of his reason for taking the same, and of the date
and place when and where the same was taken, and shall
preserve such statement and file it for record."

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I
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was the appellant who burnt him. Grounds one and two, therefore,

fail.

In sum, we uphold the Judgment of the court below and

dismiss the appeal for lack of merit.

G.S PHIRI
SUPREME COURT JUDGE

~ .
E.N.C. MUYOVWE
SUPREME COURT JUDGE

.........~p.:::E.::::'....~
R.M.C. KAOMA
SUPREME COURT JUDGE

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