160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Monje

*

G.R. No. 146689. September 27, 2002.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

FERNANDO (FERDINAND) MONJE Y ROSARIO @
Fernan, LORDINO (BERNARD) MAGLAYA Y ALVAREZ
@ Odeng (acquitted), CHRISTOPHER BAUTISTA Y
ROSARIO @ Totde (acquitted), and MICHAEL CASTRO Y
OSIAS @ Iking (acquitted), accused. FERNANDO
(FERDINAND) MONJE y ROSARIO @ Fernan, ac-cused-
appellant.

Criminal Procedure; Right of Confrontation; The cross-

examination of a witness is an absolute right, not a mere privilege,
of the party against whom he is called; Cross-examination serves
as a safeguard to combat

______________

* EN BANC.

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unreliable testimony, providing means for discrediting a witness’

testimony, and is in the nature of an attack on the truth and
accuracy of his testimony.—It bears stressing that the cross-
examination of a witness is an absolute right, not a mere
privilege, of the party against whom he is called. With regard to
the accused, it is a right guaranteed by the fundamental law as
part of due process. Article III, Sec. 14, par. (2), of the 1987
Constitution specifically mandates that “the accused shall enjoy
the right to meet the witnesses face to face,” and Rule 115, Sec. 1,
par. (f), of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure enjoins that in all
criminal prosecutions the accused shall be entitled to confront and
cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Cross-
examination serves as a safeguard to combat unreliable
testimony, providing means for discrediting a witness’ testimony,
and is in the nature of an attack on the truth and accuracy of his
testimony.
Same; Same; The ultimate purpose of cross-examination is to
test the truth or falsity of the statements of a witness during direct
examination.—The purpose of cross-examination, however, is not
limited to bringing out a falsehood, since it is also a leading and
searching inquiry of the witness for further disclosure touching
the particular matters detailed by him in his direct examination,
and it serves to sift, modify, or explain what has been said, in
order to develop new or old facts in a view favorable to the cross-
examiner. The object of cross-examination therefore is to weaken
or disprove the case of one’s adversary, and break down his
testimony in chief, test the recollection, veracity, accuracy,
honesty and bias or prejudice of the witness, his source of
information, his motives, interest and memory, and exhibit the
improbabilities of his testimony. In other words, the ultimate
purpose of cross-examination is to test the truth or falsity of the
statements of a witness during direct examination.
Unfortunately, for the accused, these objectives of cross-
examination were never attained in this case because of the
continued failure and refusal of witness Cordero to appear for his
cross-examination. How can the truth be ascertained if the cross-
examination is not completed?
Same; Same; Where a party had the opportunity to cross-
examine a witness but failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily
forfeits his right to cross-examine and the testimony given by the
witness on direct examination will be allowed to remain on record,
but when the cross-examination is not or cannot be done or
completed due to causes attributable to the party offering the
witness, or to the witness himself, the uncompleted testimony is
thereby rendered incompetent and inadmissible in evidence.—We
discussed at length in Seneris the effects of the absence or the
incomplete cross-examination of a witness on the admissibility in
evidence of his testimony on direct examination. The basic rule is
that the testimony of a witness

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given on direct examination should be stricken off the record
where there was no adequate opportunity for cross-examination.
Of course, there are notable modifications to the basic rule which
make its application essentially on a case-to-case basis. Thus,
where a party had the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but
failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits his right to
cross-examine and the testimony given by the witness on direct
examination will be allowed to remain on record. But when the
cross-examination is not or cannot be done or completed due to
causes attributable to the party offering the witness, or to the
witness himself, the uncompleted testimony is thereby rendered
incompetent and inadmissible in evidence. The direct testimony of
a witness who dies before the conclusion of the cross-examination
can be stricken only insofar as not covered by the cross-
examination, and the absence of a witness is not enough to
warrant striking of his testimony for failure to appear for further
cross-examination where the witness has already been sufficiently
cross-examined, which is not true in the present case, or that the
matter on which further cross-examination is sought is not in
controversy.
Same; Same; Criminal Law; Murder; Evidence;
Circumstantial Evidence; A reasonable inference about a matter in
issue, more specifically, about the likely existence of a fact in issue
is necessary to achieve sufficient circumstantial evidence to
support not only a conviction but the death sentence.—Combining
the testimony of Cordero with those of the other prosecution
witnesses, the identity of the perpetrator or perpetrators of this
abominable crime could not have been deduced. A reasonable
inference about a matter in issue, more specifically, about the
likely existence of a fact in issue is necessary to achieve sufficient
circumstantial evidence to support not only a conviction but the
death sentence. Having allegedly seen the victim and the accused
on that fateful evening of 24 April 1997 from a distance of six (6)
arms length, what did the witness observe about the behavior of
the victim in relation to the accused? Did the witness notice
anything unusual about the appearance of the accused at 11:00
o’clock that evening of 24 April 1997, and again at 2:00 o’clock the
following morning? Were there marked differences observed
between the appearance of the accused at 11:00 o’clock that
evening and their appearance at 2:00 o’clock the following
morning? What clothes were they wearing? What were their sizes
—height, build, or possibly their estimated weight? What was the
color of the tricycle or tricycles; was there only one or were there
two (2) tricycles? Did the vehicle or vehicles have any
distinguishing marks, dents, or other peculiar physical
distinguishing appearances? Did the witness or witnesses notice
any marks or signs of physical struggle on the bodies of the
accused when seen at 2:00 o’clock in the morning of 25 April
1997? These are only a few of the questions which could have been
propounded to witness Cordero to ascertain the truth or falsity of
his

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testimony. But, unfortunately, he failed to attend the scheduled

hearings for his cross-examination. Thus, he left more questions
than answers on the circumstances of the tragedy that befell the
Paulino family.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Without the benefit of
a full cross-examination, the ex parte statements of a witness are
too uncertain, shaky and unreliable to be included in the review of
controverted facts; It is a well-entrenched doctrine that courts
should only consider and rely on duly established evidence and
never on mere conjectures or suppositions.—The foregoing order
notwithstanding, the trial court convicted the accused and
sentence him to death on the basis of the testimony of Cordero,
but at the same time acquitting his three (3) co-accused after
observing that such testimony was an “unexplained development.”
Without the benefit of a full cross-examination, the ex parte
statements of the witness are too uncertain, shaky and unreliable
to be included in the review of controverted facts. They cannot be
allowed to form part of the evidence and their consideration by
the court a quo was clearly unwarranted. It is a well-entrenched
doctrine that courts should only consider and rely on duly
established evidence and never on mere conjectures or
suppositions. Professor Wigmore explains that legal relevancy of
evidence denotes “some-thing more than a minimum of probative
value,” suggesting that such evidentiary relevance must contain a
“plus value.” This may be necessary to prevent the court from
being satisfied by matters of slight value, capable of being
exaggerated by prejudice and hasty conclusions. Evidence without
this “plus value” may be logically relevant but not legally
sufficient to convict. It is incumbent upon the court to balance the
probative value of such evidence against the likely harm that
would result from its admission.
Evidence; Circumstantial Evidence; Test of Sufficiency of
Circumstantial Evidence; The test in determining the sufficiency of
circumstantial evidence can be summed up as follows—Is the
evidence sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis proving
innocence, except the guilt of the accused, given the circumstances
of the case?—The verdict in a criminal case can be sustained only
when there is relevant evidence from which the court can properly
find or infer that the accused is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Thus, the test in determining the sufficiency of circumstantial
evidence can be summed up as follows: Is the evidence sufficient
to exclude every reasonable hypothesis proving innocence, except
the guilt of the accused, given the circumstances of the case? In
reviewing criminal cases that could very well exact the ultimate
penalty of death, we should do more than merely determine
whether the trial court could reasonably conclude that the
established facts were more probable than not. We must,

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in every instance, determine whether the trial court could

reasonably conclude that the facts were certain to have occurred.
Same; Same; Basic Guidelines in Assaying Probative Value of
Circumstantial Evidence.—In assaying the probative value of
circumstantial evidence, four (4) basic guidelines must be
observed: (a) It should be acted upon with caution; (b) All the
essential facts must be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt; (c)
The facts must exclude every other theory but that of guilt of the
accused; and, (d) The facts must establish with certainty the guilt
of the accused as to convince beyond reasonable doubt that he was
the perpetrator of the offense. The peculiarity of circumstantial
evidence is that the series of events pointing to the commission of
a felony is appreciated not singly but collectively. The guilt of the
accused cannot be deduced from scrutinizing just one (1)
particular piece of evidence. It is more like a puzzle which when
put together reveals a convincing picture pointing to the
conclusion that the accused is the author of the crime. Same;
Same; Requisites.—Under the rules, circumstantial evidence is
sufficient to convict an accused if the following requisites concur:
(a) There is more than one circumstance; (b) The facts from which
the inferences are derived are proved; and, (c) The combination of
all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
Same; Same; Criminal Law; Rape with Homicide;
Circumstantial evidence finds application in crimes such as rape
with homicide.—Circumstantial evidence finds application in
crimes such as rape with homicide. The nature of the crime of
rape, where usually only the victim and the rapist are present at
the crime scene, makes prosecutions for the complex crime of rape
with homicide particularly difficult since the victim can no longer
testify against the perpetrator of the crime. Circumstantial
evidence must form a complete and unbroken chain which, taking
the evidence as a whole, leads directly to the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt excluding any reasonable inference
other than that of guilt. Flight; Although as a general rule flight is
an indication of guilt, the same should not be flippantly considered
—“flight” is a circumstance from which an inference of guilt may
be drawn only when it is unexplained and with an evident purpose
of evading prosecution.—Accused-appellant allegedly “fled” to
Cagayan after the filing of the Information, supposedly when he
learned he was included therein, which the trial court considered
as evidence of a guilty conscience. Although as a general rule
flight is an indication of guilt, the same should not be flippantly
considered. “Flight” is a circumstance from which an inference of
guilt may be drawn only when it is unexplained and with an
evident purpose of evading prosecution. The

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accused-appellant adequately explained that he went home to

Cagayan upon the prodding of an uncle after a quarrel with his
cousin who chided him as one they had to feed or “palamunin”
since he was allegedly jobless. Accused-appellant went to his
home province after more than two (2) weeks from the filing of the
Information. Thus, he did not leave the place immediately after
learning he was being implicated in the crime. There was no
indication whatsoever that he intentionally made his presence
scarce in his community to evade prosecution.
Presumption of Innocence; While the Supreme Court as a rule
desists from disturbing the findings and conclusions of the trial
court, especially with respect to the credibility of witnesses, it must
not bow to the superior and immutable rule that the guilt of the
accused must be proved beyond reasonable doubt because the law
presumes that the accused is innocent.—Admittedly, the evidence
for the defense is weak and that the facts established do not
entirely rule out the possibility that the accused could be
responsible for the crime. However, from our understanding of
basic procedural due process, his conviction must come from the
strength of the prosecution evidence and not from the weakness of
his defense; never upon possibilities. Proof, to sustain conviction,
must withstand the test of reason and the constitutional right of
confrontation. Mere suspicion of guilt, no matter how strong,
cannot be permitted to sway judgment. So, too, while this Court
as a rule desists from disturbing the findings and conclusions of
the trial court, especially with respect to the credibility of
witnesses, we must bow to the superior and immutable rule that
the guilt of the accused must be proved beyond reasonable doubt
because the law presumes that the accused-appellant is innocent.
This presumption must prevail until the end unless overcome by
strong, clear and compelling evidence.
Criminal Procedure; Appeals; Remand of Cases; Due Process;
Speedy Disposition of Cases; To order the remand of a criminal
case to the court a quo to enable the prosecution to present
additional evidence would violate the constitutional right of the
accused to due process, and to speedy determination of his case.—
A proposal has been expressed for the remand of this case to the
trial court for further proceedings, apparently to enable the
prosecution to prove again what it failed to prove in the first
instance. We cannot agree because it will set a dangerous
precedent. Aside from its being unprocedural, it would open the
floodgates to endless litigations because whenever an accused is
on the brink of acquittal after trial, and realizing its inadequacy,
the prosecution would insist to be allowed to augment its evidence
which should have been presented much earlier. This is a
criminal prosecution, and to order the remand of this case to the
court a quo to enable the prosecution to present additional
evidence would

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violate the constitutional right of the accused to due process, and

to speedy determination of his case. The lamentable failure of the
prosecution to fill the vital gaps in its evidence, while prejudicial
to the State and the private offended party, should not be treated
by this Court with indulgence, to the extent of affording the
prosecution a fresh opportunity to refurbish its evidence.

AUTOMATIC REVIEW of a decision of the Regional Trial

Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Br. 12.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
     Public Attorney’s Office for accused-appellant.
BELLOSILLO, J.:

To administer by final judgment the dreaded lethal

injection on the basis of cumulus circumstantial evidence—
consisting mainly of the testimony of a witness who failed
and refused to return to court and submit to cross-
examination four (4) times—is judicial tyranny of the
highest order, which this Court should never commit. In
conscience and in absolute fidelity to our trust, we cannot
agree to what would amount to a blatant misuse of the
strong arm of the law, in complete disregard of the
constitutional guaranties of the accused. Where the life of a
human being—who is presumed to be innocent—is at
stake, we should require nothing less than proof beyond
reasonable doubt. And if proof is by circumstantial
evidence, the circumstances must be established to form an
unbroken chain of events leading to one fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all
others, as the author of the crime. Otherwise, indubilis reus
est absolvendus. All doubts must be resolved in favor of the
accused.
To illustrate: A met B with blood-stained clothes
hurriedly coming out of the room still holding a knife
dripping with blood. A entered the room and saw his wife
lifeless on the floor with blood still oozing from a stab
wound on her chest. There was no other person in the room
which had only one door for ingress and egress. By a chain
of unbroken circumstancial evidence, there can be no
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other conclusion than that B and B alone, and no other,

could have stabbed A’s wife to death.
The case before us is a classic example of circumstantial
evidence of what the above illustration is not. Aside from
the unexplained non-appearance of the “principal witness”
at his scheduled cross-examination no less than four (4)
times, the chain of circumstances brought out by the
witness is too weak—not unbroken—to incriminate the
accused-appellant in the crime charged. The possibility of
other people being responsible therefor is not remote
considering that it supposedly happened in a wide open
ricefield freely accessible to people from all walks of life, as
may be shown hereunder:
 Fernando (Ferdinand) Monje y Rosario alias Fernan,
together with Lordino (Bernard) Maglaya y Alvarez alias
Odeng, Christopher Bautista y Rosario alias Totde and
Michael Castro y Osias alias Iking were charged with rape
with homicide for the
1 brutal rape and killing of 15-year old
Imee Diez Paulino. On 13 November 2000, after trial, the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, of Malolos, Bulacan,
acquitted Maglaya, Bautista and Castro but convicted
Monje of the crime charged and sentenced him to death,
and to indemnify the heirs of the victim P75,000.00 as
actual2 damages and P50,000.00 as moral damages, plus
costs.
As the trial court found, in the evening of 24 April 1997
at around 9:00 o’clock Imee Diez Paulino asked permission
from her mother to play bingo at the house of their
barangay captain at Francisco Homes, San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan. Three (3) days later, Imee’s lifeless body was
found lying in the ricefields naked, except for her brassiere,
with several injuries including a fractured skull that
caused massive brain hemorrhage. The body was already in
a state of decomposition. The medico-legal officer surmised
that the injuries on the skull were caused by fist blows or
by a hard blunt instrument. The genital examination
disclosed that Imee was brutally raped before she was
killed. Her hymen was completely lacerated and there was
a 2.5-centimeter laceration of the per-

______________

1 Rollo, p. 11.
2 Decision penned by Judge Crisanto C. Concepcion, RTC-Br. 12,
Malolos, Bulacan, in Crim. Case No. 795-M-97, Rollo, pp. 28-31.

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ineum. The medico-legal officer further opined that such

laceration could not have been caused by an ordinary-sized
penis but by a much bigger object forcibly inserted to the
vagina. The blood clots in the vaginal area showed that
Imee was still alive when the object was forced into her.
During the wake, Michael Cordero, a tricycle driver
plying the vicinity of Francisco Homes, told Maria Isabel
Diez Paulino, mother of Imee, that in the evening of 24
April 1997 at around 11:00 o’clock he saw the victim back-
riding with accused-appellant Fernando Monje with three
(3) other persons in the sidecar whom he did not know.
From a distance of about six (6) arms length he allegedly
saw Imee, accused-appellant Monje, and the three (3)
unidentified persons alight from the tricycle and walk
towards the ricefields. At about 1:00 o’clock the following
morning only Monje and his three (3) companions returned
to the tricycle.
When placed on the witness stand Cordero identified the
three (3) companions of Monje as Lordino Maglaya, also a
tricycle driver, Christopher Baustista, a taxi driver, and
Michael Castro, a bus conductor, all residents of Francisco
Homes.
Another prosecution witness Jojit Vasquez testified that
at about midnight of 24 April 1997 he eloped with Irene,
sister of Imee, and they went to the vacant house of a
certain Alvin situated also at Francisco Homes. At about
2:00 o’clock the following morning, 25 April 1997, Monje
and Maglaya followed by Bautista and Castro arrived at
the same house on board two (2) tricycles, but Bautista and
Castro left after a short while. Monje appeared surprised,
especially upon seeing Irene. At around 3:00 o’clock Jojit
and Irene left the house and proceeded to Cubao where
they boarded a bus for Pangasinan.
Monje denied complicity in the crime charged and
pleaded for his acquittal. He claimed that on 24 April 1997
at about 9:00 o’clock in the evening he was already sleeping
in his uncle’s house in Francisco Homes, San Jose Del
Monte, Bulacan. He further claimed that he never woke up
until 6:00 o’clock the following morning.
Nobody saw the actual commission of the crime. But
death now lurks upon accused-appellant Monje on the basis
alone of the following circumstantial evidence put together
by the court a quo: (a)
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the testimony of Michael Cordero to the effect that he saw

the accused and his three (3) companions with victim Imee
Paulino back-riding with the accused on a tricycle at
around 11:00 o’clock in the evening of 24 April 1997
heading towards a ricefield, and that at around 1:00 o’clock
the following morning he saw accused-appellant with three
(3) companions returning to the tricycle without the victim;
(b) the testimony of Jojit Vasquez that at around 2:00
o’clock in the morning of 25 April 1997 he saw the accused
and his unidentified companions in the house of a certain
Alvin; (c) the fact that the decomposing body of the victim
was later found in a ricefield naked except for a brassiere;
and, (d) that the accused went home to Cagayan two (2)
weeks after he learned that an Information had been filed
implicating him in the crime.
Quite significantly, these circumstances do not establish
an unbroken chain of events that would show the complicity
of the accused in the rape-slay of victim Imee Paulino.
Apparently, the case for the prosecution is woven
principally around the testimony of witness Michael
Cordero. It must be emphasized however that his
testimony was not sufficiently tested on the crucible of
cross-examination, specifically, that significant portion of
his direct examination where he purportedly saw the
accused and three (3) unidentified persons returning to the
tricycle from the ricefield without the victim around 1:00
o’clock the following morning.
After his initial cross-examination by defense counsel,
witness Cordero failed and refused to return to court for
the continuation of his cross-examination. In other words,
except for his brief cross-examination which had barely
scratched the surface, so to speak, and despite the
insistence of the defense counsel to pursue his cross-
examination and the repeated warnings from the trial
court that it would be constrained to strike out and
disregard his testimony should he fail to appear again, the
witness stubbornly
3 refused to return to court for his cross-
examination.
It bears stressing that the cross-examination of a
witness is an absolute right, not a mere privilege, of the
party against whom he is called. With regard to the
accused, it is a right guaranteed by the

______________

3 TSN, 28 November 1997, p. 24; id., 19 June 1998, p. 2; id., 17 Sep-

tember 1998, pp. 1-8.

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fundamental law as part of due process. Article III, Sec. 14,

par. (2), of the 1987 Constitution specifically mandates that
“the accused shall enjoy the right to meet the witnesses
face to face,” and Rule 115, Sec. 1, par. (f), of the 2000 Rules
of Criminal Procedure enjoins that in all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall be entitled to confront and4
cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial.
Cross-examination serves as a safeguard to combat
unreliable testimony, providing means for discrediting a
witness’ testimony, and is in the nature of an attack on the
truth and accuracy of his testimony. The purpose of cross-
examination, however, is not limited to bringing out a
falsehood, since it is also a leading and searching inquiry of
the witness for further disclosure touching the particular
matters detailed by him in his direct examination, and it
serves to sift, modify, or explain what has been said, in
order to develop new or old facts in a view favorable to the
cross-examiner. The object of cross-examination therefore
is to weaken or disprove the case of one’s adversary, and
break down his testimony in chief, test the recollection,
veracity, accuracy, honesty and bias or prejudice of the
witness, his source of information, his motives, interest and
5

memory, and exhibit the improbabilities of his testimony.

In other words, the ultimate purpose of cross-
examination is to test the truth or falsity of the statements
of a witness during direct examination. Unfortunately, for
the accused, these objectives of cross-examination were
never attained in this case because of the continued failure
and refusal of witness Cordero to appear for his cross-
examination. How can the truth be ascertained if the cross-
examination is not completed?
In the Sur-Rejoinder of Mme. Justice Consuelo Ynares-
Santiago, it is submitted that Cordero was sufficiently
cross-examined on the substantial points 6 of his direct
testimony, citing People v. Seneris which held that
testimony may not be stricken from the record where the
witness has already been sufficiently cross-examined.

______________

4 Francisco, Evidence, Third Ed., 1996, p. 459, citing People v. Cole, 43

N.Y. 508-512, and Bradley v. Mirick, 91 N.Y. 293.
5 Id., at 560.
6 G.R. No. L-48883, 6 August 1980, 99 SCRA 92.

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We discussed at length in Seneris the effects of the absence

or the incomplete cross-examination of a witness on the
admissibility in evidence of his testimony on direct
examination. The basic rule is that the testimony of a
witness given on direct examination should be stricken off
the record where there was no adequate opportunity for
cross-examination. Of course, there are notable
modifications to the basic rule which make its application
essentially on a case-to-case basis. Thus, where a party had
the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to
avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits his right to cross-
examine and the testimony given by the witness 7 on direct

examination will be allowed to remain on record. But when

the cross-examination is not or cannot be done or
completed due to causes attributable to the party offering
the witness, or to the witness himself, the uncompleted
testimony is thereby8 rendered incompetent and
inadmissible in evidence. The direct testimony of a witness
who dies before the conclusion of the cross-examination can
be stricken 9only insofar as not covered by the cross-
examination, and the absence of a witness is not enough to
warrant striking of his testimony for failure to appear for
further cross-examination where the witness has already
been sufficiently cross-examined, which is not true in the
present case, or that the matter on which10 further cross-
examination is sought is not in controversy.
Under the facts of the present case, the prosecution
witness Michael Cordero alone was responsible for his
failure to appear on four (4) scheduled hearings for his
cross-examination. He was absent from the hearings
without valid cause on record. In Seneris, the prosecution
witness Mario Nemenio was not responsible for his failure
to appear and complete his cross-examination owing to his
untimely death. Hence, it was impossible for him to return
to court

______________

7 See Savory Luncheonetter v. Lakas ng Manggagawang Pilipino, G.R.

No. L-38964, 31 January 1975, 62 SCRA 258.
8 See Ortigas, Jr. v. Lufthansa, et al., G.R. No. L-28773, 30 June 1975,
64 SCRA 610.
9 People v. Seneris, et al., citing Curtice v. West, 2 NYS 507.
10 People v. Seneris, et al., citing Lew Choy v. Lim Sing, 216 P. 888, 125
Wash. 631.

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 People vs. Monje

for his cross-examination. On the other hand, Cordero was

directed by the trial court to complete his cross-
examination in four (4) scheduled hearings but which he
failed to attend without giving any justifiable reason.
In the instant case, it is beyond cavil that the accused
was not afforded adequate opportunity to cross-examine,
not of his own design but because of the unexplained failure
of the witness to appear on the succeeding four (4)
scheduled hearings despite repeated warnings from the
court. As may be noted, the defense counsel was barely
through with his preliminary questions at the initial stage
of his cross-examination. In fact, the defense counsel
repeatedly manifested his desire to further cross-examine
witness Cordero as counsel still had “important matters” to
clear up with 11 the witness regarding some “conflicting
testimonies.”
In the case before us, no less than the presiding judge
himself recognized the need for further cross-examination
when he warned that witness Cordero should return
otherwise his testimony “not touched upon by the cross-
examination would be stricken off the record.” And the
cross-examiner was insisting on the constitutional right of
the accused to confront the witnesses against him and to
cross-examine them. Even the other witness, Jojit Vasquez,
failed to appear on 8 October 1998 when required as may
be gathered from the order of the trial court issued on that
date. In the instant case, prosecution witness Cordero
failed to appear four (4) times for his cross-examination
without justifiable reason, thus depriving the cross-
examiner of the right to confront him and test his
credibility and shed light on matters vital to the defense.
Combining the testimony of Cordero with those of the
other prosecution witnesses, the identity of the perpetrator
or perpetrators of this abominable crime could not have
been deduced. A reasonable inference about a matter in
issue, more specifically, about the likely existence of a fact
in issue is necessary to achieve sufficient circumstantial
evidence to support not only a conviction but the death
sentence. Having allegedly seen the victim and the accused
on that fateful evening of 24 April 1997 from a distance of
six (6) arms length, what did the witness observe about the
behavior of

______________

11 TSN, 17 September 1998, p. 4.

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People vs. Monje

the victim in relation to the accused? Did the witness notice

anything unusual about the appearance of the accused at
11:00 o’clock that evening of 24 April 1997, and again at
2:00 o’clock the following morning? Were there marked
differences observed between the appearance of the accused
at 11:00 o’clock that evening and their appearance at 2:00
o’clock the following morning? What clothes were they
wearing? What were their sizes—height, build, or possibly
their estimated weight? What was the color of the tricycle
or tricycles; was there only one or were there two (2)
tricycles? Did the vehicle or vehicles have any
distinguishing marks, dents, or other peculiar physical
distinguishing appearances? Did the witness or witnesses
notice any marks or signs of physical struggle on the bodies
of the accused when seen at 2:00 o’clock in the morning of
25 April 1997? These are only a few of the questions which
could have been propounded to witness Cordero to
ascertain the truth or falsity of his testimony. But,
unfortunately, he failed to attend the scheduled hearings
for his cross-examination. Thus, he left more questions
than answers on the circumstances of the tragedy that
befell the Paulino family.
Cordero’s cross-examination did not even delve on the
matter that Monje and his three (3) unidentified
companions returned to the tricycle without the victim.
Besides, even if we take into account Cordero’s partial
cross-examination, the same would not have proved beyond
reasonable doubt that Monje was the perpetrator of the
heinous crime. At the very least, what it tended to
establish was that at around 11:00 o’clock in the evening of
24 April 1997 Cordero saw Imee in the company of Monje
and three (3) unidentified persons. But was this enough to
deny the accused his fundamental right to life and to be
free?
Right from the beginning, Cordero was already a
reluctant witness for the prosecution. He could not be
found in the address given by the prosecution when the
first subpoena ad testificandum was served. On the second
attempt to secure his attendance in court, he could not
again be located. Only his mother was at the given address
but she even refused to sign and acknowledge receipt of the

12
subpoena. Cordero was cross-examined on 24 October
1997

______________

12 Original Records, Vol. I, p. 33.

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174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Monje

but only briefly because of lack of time and the court had to
call the other scheduled cases, on 29 January 1998 Cordero
could not be cross-examined because, as the court observed,
he appeared physically and emotionally unfit to go on with
his cross-examination. He never showed up in court on the
subsequent trial dates, i.e., 19 March, 28 August, 17
September and 8 October 1998. No valid excuse or
justification can be discerned from the records to explain
his continued refusal to appear for his cross-examination.
Being the supposed “star witness” for the prosecution,
the presence of Cordero in court was the responsibility of
the public prosecutor, and it was incumbent upon him to
take the initiative in ensuring the attendance of his
witnesses at the trial; more so in this case where, as
admitted no less by the public prosecutor himself,
“Cordero’s testimony was very vital considering that the
evidence against the accused were (sic) purely
circumstantial
13 and none of the witnesses saw the actual
rape-slay.” The public prosecutor could have easily moved
for an arrest, or in the alternative, to have the witness
cited in contempt for his willful failure to appear at the
trial as a material witness for the prosecution.
Quite significantly, during the hearing on 17 September
1998 the defense counsel moved that the testimony of
Cordero be stricken off the record. But the public
prosecutor prayed for a last chance to present Cordero on
the next scheduled hearing, which was granted by the trial
court with a warning that should Cordero “fail to give any
satisfactory explanation for his failure to appear, his 14

testimony given so far will be stricken off the record.”

Then, on 8 October 1998 the court a quo made good its
warning, albeit qualifiedly, and ordered thus—

Despite due notice, the last two (2) witnesses for the prosecution,
Michael Cordero and Jojit Vasquez, as shown in the return of
service by the Court Process Server, again failed to appear
without justifiable cause or reason. For that reason, as agreed
upon by the prosecution and the defense, the testimony so far
given by witness Michael Cordero not touched upon by the cross-
examination partially conducted by the defense counsel is

______________

13 Id.
14 Id., p. 77.

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VOL. 390, SEPTEMBER 27, 2002 175

People vs. Monje

hereby stricken off the record, saving that part of his testimony
upon which he was 15 duly cross-examined by the defense counsel
(italics supplied).

The foregoing order notwithstanding, the trial court

convicted the accused and sentence him to death on the
basis of the testimony of Cordero, but at the same time
acquitting his three (3) co-accused after observing that
such testimony was an “unexplained development.” Without
the benefit of a full cross-examination, the ex parte
statements of the witness are too uncertain, shaky and
unreliable to be included in the review of controverted
facts. They cannot be allowed to form part of the evidence
and their consideration by the court a quo was clearly
unwarranted.
It is a well-entrenched doctrine that courts should only
consider and rely on duly established evidence and never
on mere conjectures or suppositions. Professor Wigmore
explains that legal relevancy of evidence denotes
“something more than a minimum of probative value,”
suggesting that
16 such evidentiary relevance must contain a
“plus value.” This may be necessary to prevent the court
from being satisfied by matters of slight value, capable of
being exaggerated by prejudice and hasty conclusions.
Evidence without this “plus value” may be logically
relevant but not legally sufficient to convict. It is
incumbent upon the court to balance the probative value of
such evidence against the likely harm that would result
from its admission.
The verdict in a criminal case can be sustained only
when there is relevant evidence from which the court can
properly find or infer that the accused is guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. Thus, the test in determining the
sufficiency of circumstantial evidence can be summed up as
follows: Is the evidence sufficient to exclude every
reasonable hypothesis proving innocence, except the guilt
of the accused, given the circumstances of the case? In
reviewing criminal cases that could very well exact the
ultimate penalty of death, we should do more than merely
determine whether the trial court could reasonably
conclude that the established facts were more probable
than not. We must, in every instance, determine whether

______________

15 Id., p. 82.
16 See I Wigmore Sec. 28, 409-410.

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176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Monje

the trial court could reasonably conclude that the facts

were certain to have occurred.
It bears stressing that even the trial judge who was
privy to the entire proceedings below did not lend full
credence to the entire testimony of Cordero. On the
contrary, he even expressed doubt as to their veracity.
Consider the following: When Cordero executed his sworn
statement before the police authorities he declared that he
did not know the identities of the three (3) companions of
Monje, but when finally placed on the witness stand he
readily identified them as Maglaya, Bautista and Castro.
No explanation was proffered on why he flip-flopped on his
testimony. Perplexed, the trial court described this as an
unexplained development—

While the Court believes that he indeed saw at that time accused
Monje with the victim before she was found dead at the same
vicinity they were seen, the Court also believes that in both
instances he saw with said accused in the same vicinity three
other persons not known to him, like he said to the police. That is
why his testimony at the trial that those three persons were the
three other accused known to him and he pointed to in court as the
companions of accused Monje when he saw them with the victim
that fatal night, came as an unexplained development. If he saw
and recognized that night his co-tricycle driver accused Monje, he
could not have failed to recognize accused Lordino “Odeng”
Maglaya, another tricycle driver at Francisco Homes, and most
probably also accused Christopher Bautista and Michael Castro
who were residents of Francisco Homes like he was, if indeed, these
were the three unknown 17 persons he saw that night with accused

Monje and victim Imee.

Interestingly, the trial judge acquitted the three (3) other

accused based on the weakness of the testimony of Cordero
and Vasquez. Strangely, however, based on the same weak
evidence, the trial judge convicted the accused-appellant.
Could it not be that the most logical step for the court a quo
was to acquit likewise herein accused Monje in view of the
clearly weak and unreliable testimony of witnesses Cordero
and Vasquez? In hindsight, even if we take into account
Cordero’s partial cross-examination, the same would not
have established an unbroken chain of circumstances
proving beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was the
perpetra-

______________

17 Judgment of 13 November 2000, supra at 3-4; Rollo, pp. 30-31.

177

VOL. 390, SEPTEMBER 27, 2002 177

People vs. Monje

tor of the heinous crime. At most, what it tended to

establish was that at about 11:00 o’clock in the evening of
24 April 1997 Cordero saw Imee in the company of Monje
and three (3) unidentified persons and nothing more—
nothing of the rape and slaying of Imee!
Indeed, other than the anemic testimony of Cordero,
there is no evidence effectively linking the accused to the
rape and brutal slaying of Imee Diez Paulino. The
testimony of the second witness for the prosecution, Jojit
Vasquez, as to the presence of the accused and his
companions in the house of a certain Alvin, is likewise
disappointingly unreliable to establish a logical
relationship between the commission of the crime and
complicity of the accused therein. This evidence, even if
tied up with the testimony of Cordero that accused was last
seen with the victim, does not establish a causal
connection, nor support an inference, much less a
conclusion, that accused had something to do with the rape
and killing of the victim.
In assaying the probative value of circumstantial
evidence, four (4) basic guidelines must be observed: (a) It
should be acted upon with caution; (b) All the essential
facts must be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt; (c)
The facts must exclude every other theory but that of guilt
of the accused; and, (d) The facts must establish with
certainty the guilt of the accused as to convince beyond
reasonable doubt that he was the perpetrator of the
offense. The peculiarity of circumstantial evidence is that
the series of events pointing to the commission of a felony
is appreciated not singly but collectively. The guilt of the
accused cannot be deduced from scrutinizing just one (1)
particular piece of evidence. It is more like a puzzle which
when put together reveals a convincing picture pointing 18 to
the conclusion that the accused is the author of the crime.
Under the rules, circumstantial evidence is sufficient to
convict an accused if the following requisites concur: (a)
There is more than one circumstance; (b) The facts from
which the inferences are derived are proved; and, (c) The
combination of all the cir-

______________

18 People v. Licayan, G.R. No. 144422, 28 February 2002, 378 SCRA

281.

178

178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Monje

cumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond

reasonable doubt.
Circumstantial evidence finds application in crimes such
as rape with homicide. The nature of the crime of rape,
where usually only the victim and the rapist are present at
the crime scene, makes prosecutions for the complex crime
of rape with homicide particularly difficult since the victim19

can no longer testify against the perpetrator of the crime.

Circumstantial evidence must form a complete and
unbroken chain which, taking the evidence as a whole,
leads directly to the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt excluding any reasonable inference other than that
of guilt.
Conceding arguendo that indeed Imee was last seen
alive at 11:00 o’clock in the evening of 24 April 1997 in the
company of the accused, yet, there was no other
circumstance tending to prove that he was the one who
raped and killed her. In fact, the time of the rape as well as
the killing was not even satisfactorily established. The
medico-legal officer did not give a categorical answer as to
the exact time of death of the victim. On the contrary, he
merely gave an approximation, i.e., “two (2), three (3), four
(4) days or more.” In fact, this approximation is of no help
at all because if we reckon it from the time when the
decomposing body of the victim was found, i.e., on 27 April
1997, the three (3) dates when the victim supposedly died
would be 25 April (counting two [2] days from 27 April), 24
April (counting three [3] days from 27 April), 23 April
(counting four [4] days from 27 April), and 22 April
backwards (counting more than four [4] days). This would
have been absurd and in no way coincide with the date
when the victim was supposedly last seen alive.
Notably, no mention was made of the circumstances
leading to the discovery and retrieval of the decomposing
body of the victim. Plainly, there is no basis to deduce,
much less conclude, that the victim was brought to and
later recovered from the same ricefield. So much time
elapsed from the moment Imee was last seen alive on 24
April 1997 and when her decomposing body was found on
27 April 1997. Possibilities abound as to what actually
happened

______________

19 Id.

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People vs. Monje

between 24 and 27 April 1997. The prosecution miserably

failed to fill the void with satisfactory and convincing
evidence.
Accused-appellant allegedly “fled” to Cagayan after the
filing of the Information, supposedly when he learned he
was included therein, which the trial court considered as
evidence of a guilty conscience. Although as a general rule
flight is an indication of guilt, the same should not be
flippantly considered. “Flight” is a circumstance from
which an inference of guilt may be drawn only when it is
unexplained and with an evident purpose of evading
prosecution. The accused-appellant adequately explained
that he went home to Cagayan upon the prodding of an
uncle after a quarrel with his cousin who chided him as one
they had to feed or “palamunin” since he was allegedly
jobless. Accused-appellant went to his home province after
more than two (2) weeks from the filing of the Information.
Thus, he did not leave the place immediately after learning
he was being implicated in the crime. There was no
indication whatsoever that he intentionally made his
presence scarce in his community to evade prosecution.
Admittedly, the evidence for the defense is weak and
that the facts established do not entirely rule out the
possibility that the accused could be responsible for the
crime. However, from our understanding of basic
procedural due process, his conviction must come from the
strength of the prosecution evidence and not from the
weakness of his defense never upon possibilities. Proof, to
sustain conviction, must withstand the test of reason and
the constitutional right of confrontation. Mere suspicion of
guilt, no matter how strong, cannot be permitted to sway
judgment.
So, too, while this Court as a rule desists from
disturbing the findings and conclusions of the trial court,
especially with respect to the credibility of witnesses, we
must bow to the superior and immutable rule that the guilt
of the accused must be proved beyond reasonable doubt
because the law presumes that the accused-appellant is
innocent. This presumption must prevail until the end
unless overcome by strong, clear and compelling evidence.
A proposal has been expressed for the remand of this
case to the trial court for further proceedings, apparently to
enable the prosecution to prove again what it failed to
prove in the first instance. We cannot agree because it will
set a dangerous precedent. Aside
180

180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Monje

from its being unprocedural, it would open the floodgates to

endless litigations because whenever an accused is on the
brink of acquittal after trial, and realizing its inadequacy,
the prosecution would insist to be allowed to augment its
evidence which should have been presented much earlier.
This is a criminal prosecution, and to order the remand of
this case to the court a quo to enable the prosecution to
present additional evidence would violate the
constitutional right of the accused to due process, and to
speedy determination of his case. The lamentable failure of
the prosecution to fill the vital gaps in its evidence, while
prejudicial to the State and the private offended party,
should not be treated by this Court with indulgence, to the
extent of affording the prosecution a fresh opportunity to
refurbish its evidence.
 In fine, we are not unmindful of the gravity of the crime
charged; but justice must be dispensed with an even hand.
Regardless of how much we want to punish the
perpetrators of this ghastly crime and give justice to the
victim and her family, the protection provided by the Bill of
Rights is bestowed upon all individuals, without exception,
regardless of race, color, creed, gender or political
persuasion—whether privileged or less privileged—to be
invoked without fear or favor. Hence, the accused deserves
no less than an acquittal; ergo, he is not called upon to
disprove what the prosecution has not proved.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the court a quo
finding accused FERNANDO (FERDINAND) MONJE y
Rosario alias Fernan guilty of rape with homicide is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE for insufficiency of evidence;
at least, on reasonable doubt. Consequently, he is
ACQUITTED of the crime charged and is ordered
IMMEDIATELY RELEASED from custody unless lawfully
held for another cause.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED
to implement this Decision immediately and to report to
this Court the action taken hereon within five (5) days from
receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.

          Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Puno, Vitug, Panganiban,

Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales and Callejo, Sr.,
JJ., concur.
181

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Hantex Trading Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

     Mendoza, J., No part in deliberation.

Judgment reversed and set aside, accused-appellant

acquitted and ordered released.

Notes.—It is the province of cross-examination to test

the credibility of witnesses, expose falsehood or half-truth,
uncover the truth which rehearsed direct-examination
testimonies may successfully suppress, and demonstrate
inconsistencies on substantial matters which create
reasonable doubt. In short, cross-examination is an
indispensable instrument of criminal justice to give
substance and meaning to the Constitutional right of the
 accused to confront the witnesses against him and to show
that the presumption of innocence has remained steadfast
and firm. (People vs. Pido, 200 SCRA 45 [1991])
Mere opportunity and not actual cross-examination is
the essence of the right to cross-examine. (People vs. Narca,
275 SCRA 696 [1997])

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