WAR THEORY:

THE EVOLUTION OF WAR AND

MILITARY THOUGHT
SYLLABUS
AY22
JOINT PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION
PHASE I INTERMEDIATE LEVEL COURSE

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
Twenty-first Century Leaders for Twenty-first Century Challenges

23 July 2021
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE
FOREWORD 1

TABLE OF CONTENTS 2

COURSE DESCRIPTION, QUESTIONS AND OBJECTIVES 3

COURSE ORGANIZATION AND NARRATIVE 3

ACSC PROGRAM LEARNING OUTCOMES 5

AY 2021-2022 SPECIAL AREAS OF EMPHASIS 5

COURSE REQUIREMENTS 6

COURSE ADMINISTRATION 7

COURSE SCHEDULE
DAY 1 9
DAY 2 12
DAY 3 14
DAY 4 16
DAY 5 18
DAY 6 19
DAY 7 21
DAY 8 22
DAY 9 26
DAY 10 28
DAY 11 30
DAY 12 33
DAY 13 35
DAY 14 37
DAY 15 39
DAY 16 41

APPENDIX: COURSE FACULTY 43

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 WAR THEORY
COURSE OVERVIEW

COURSE DESCRIPTION
War Theory introduces military theory, addressing both the nature and character of war. It
examines the theoretical writings of classical military theorists, as well as the evolution of
warfare and military thought over the last two centuries. The course explores outstanding
historical cases of military innovation, assessing the utility of military theories to understanding
conflict across the warfighting domains. The course also considers the evolution of warfare,
analyzing both change and continuity in armed conflict. In applying military theory to
contemporary security challenges, students will be better able to anticipate and respond to
complex problems across the range of military operations.

COURSE OBJECTIVES
1. Comprehend both the nature and character of war, as well as continuity and change in
warfare across the conflict continuum.
2. Comprehend the evolution of military theory across the warfighting domains over the last
two centuries.
3. Relate military theory and the instruments of national power to an understanding of
contemporary and future security challenges.

COURSE QUESTIONS
1. What is the nature of war?
2. How have military thought and the conduct of war evolved, in and through the warfighting
domains, over the last two centuries?
3. How have war’s fundamental nature and character endured and/or changed?
4. Which military theories are most relevant for understanding the nature and the character of
war today and in the future?

COURSE ORGANIZATION AND NARRATIVE

War Theory seeks to prepare leaders of the joint force to be “strategically minded, critical
thinkers and skilled joint warfighters.” 1 To this end, the course asks students to grapple with
complex political, technological, economic, and social changes influencing the Profession of
Arms over the last two centuries and, in turn, expand their thinking beyond the level of tactics to
that of operations, strategy, and policy. This course stresses critical thinking about the role of the
Profession of Arms in the contemporary environment. It drives students to think deeply about
war, instilling in them the ability to anticipate and recognize change in armed conflict, and to
communicate such understanding with clarity and precision.

War Theory has three phases, with each phase of the course organized around answering a core
question about the nature and character of war. Phase I explores the nature of war, seeking to
deepen students’ understanding of war as a political, social, and cultural phenomenon, with its
own fundamental purpose and logic. It introduces the classical military theorists— Thucydides,

1
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCS Visions for Joint Officer Development (Washington, DC: Department
of Defense, 2005), p. 2.

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Antoine-Henri Jomini, Carl von Clausewitz, and Sun Tzu—to comprehend the purpose, role, and
function of armed forces.

Phase II of the course considers the evolution of theory and principles of war, and deterrence
across the warfighting domains since the turn of the twentieth century. It introduces students to
the seminal theoretical contributions of J.F.C. Fuller, Heinz Guderian, Georgii Isserson, Alfred
Thayer Mahan, Julian S. Corbett, Giulio Douhet, J.C. Slessor, Bernard Brodie, and Thomas
Schelling. These theorists provide a framework to comprehend current joint doctrine, as well the
interrelationship between service doctrine and joint doctrine. By exploring a number of historical
cases of military operations, students gain a better understanding of the utility of military theory,
as applied to operations across the warfighting domains.

Phase III of the course examines present and future military challenges in the context of great
power competition, analyzing both continuity and change in armed conflict. It introduces
contemporary military thought on competition along the peace-war continuum, and concepts of
hybrid warfare proposed more recently by Valery Gerasimov, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui,
and John R. Boyd. In this phase, students explore the integration of operations in and through
the space and cyber domains at the operational level of war. They also consider irregular warfare
in terms of continuity and change, as well as through the lens of great power competition.
Students apply military theory to understand and address current and future operational
challenges, thereby gaining a better understanding of the role of the Profession of Arms in the
contemporary security environment. Students examine factors such as information, geopolitics,
deterrence, society, culture, and religion in the planning and execution of joint operations, while
becoming more versed in the capabilities and limitations of US military forces to conduct the full
range of military activities in pursuit of national interests.

War Theory employs an interdisciplinary approach to the study of war, integrating the disciplines
of philosophy, history, political science, security studies, and psychology with current joint and
service doctrinal concepts. The course methodology combines the study of foundational theories
of war with application and close analysis of historical and contemporary case studies. Students
thus derive lessons, concepts, and ideas for decision making in strategy, planning, and
operations.

Each day's readings introduce a primary theoretical perspective, as well as material that explains,
contests, or illustrates that perspective. This methodological approach illustrates how theory and
principles of war apply to the actual conduct of military operations. Case studies stress the
importance of adaptation and innovation in military planning and execution, giving students the
chance to evaluate and discuss the relative success or failure of past military leaders and
planners, throughout the continuum of competition and conflict.

Given the complexity of the global security environment, it is critical for military professionals
to develop their own understanding of theoretical concepts of war and prepare themselves
intellectually for the successful management of violence on behalf of the state. War Theory aims
to provide this preparation.

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ACSC PROGRAM LEARNING OUTCOMES (JPME I)

War Theory develops Program Learning Outcomes addressing Intermediate-Level College Joint
Learning Areas and Objectives for Joint Professional Military Education (JPME), established by
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff via the Officer Professional Military Education Policy
(OPMEP), CJCSI 1800.01F, signed 15 May 2020. The ACSC Curriculum for AY 22 supports
the following ACSC Program Learning Outcomes, by producing graduates who are able to:

1 – analyze the effects of great power competition and adapt and innovate to rapid changes
in twenty-first century warfare;
• Lessons WT-504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518,
519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, and 528 meet this outcome.

2 – understand the capabilities and limitations of military force and how they are best
integrated with the instruments of national power, allies, and partners:
• Lessons WT-504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518,
519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, and 528 meet this outcome.

3 – apply military theory, strategy, doctrine, and joint warfighting principles, in order to
plan, execute and adapt campaigns and globally integrated operations:
• None of the War Theory lessons meet this outcome.

4 – comprehend the concepts of surprise, complexity and uncertainty as they pertain to

leadership and the profession of arms; and
• Lessons WT-504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526,
527, and 528 meet this outcome.

5 – make ethical decisions based on the shared values of the profession of arms.
• Lessons WT-500, 501, 502, and 503 meet this outcome.

AY 2020-2021 SPECIAL AREAS OF EMPHASIS FOR JPME-1

War Theory supports the following AY 2021-2022 Special Areas of Emphasis (SAE) for Joint
Professional Military Education (JPME), listed below with points of explanation:

SAE 1 – Return to Great Power Competition

1. A broad understanding of strategic competitions and historic rivalries.
• Lessons WT-503, 506, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, and 516 meet this objective.

4. An understanding of the current and future role of technology in the changing

character of war.
• Lessons WT-519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 526, and 527 meet this objective.

5. Consideration of new operational constructs, operating concepts, and capabilities

as a way of maintaining friendly competitive advantage in the face of increasingly
capable threats.
• Lessons WT-519, and 520 meet this objective.

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SAE 2 – Global Integrated Operations in the Information Environment
1. The importance of understanding human, physical, and informational aspects of the
security environment.
• Lessons WT-523, 524, 526, 527, and 528 provide an understanding of the current
strategic landscape.
• All course lessons address the characteristics of the modern battlefield.

SAE 3 – Strategic Deterrence in the Twenty-first Century

1. Deterrence Theory and Concepts
• Lessons WT-517, 518, 519, 520, 521, and 522 meet this objective.

SAE 4 – Modern Electromagnetic Spectrum Battlefield

1. Comprehend how the EMS pervades every aspect of military, commercial, and
adversary EMS operations.
• Lessons WT-519, 520, 521, 522, 526, and 527 meet this objective.

2. Comprehend how the EMS is a critical enabler to superiority in all other domains and
must be considered first in planning and executing any joint Force operation.
• Lessons WT-519, 520, 521, 522, 526, and 527 meet this objective.

3. Comprehend how congested the EMS is and how it effects military operations.
• Lessons WT-521, 522, 526, and 527 meet this objective.

SAE 5 – Space as a Warfighting Domain

1. Comprehension of the space domain (e.g., orbits, missions); US space system
capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities; and joint Force/coalition reliance on
space.
• Lessons WT-521 and 522 meet this objective.

2. Awareness of potential adversary space capabilities and their reliance on space

systems.
• Lessons WT-521 and 522 meet this objective.

SAE 6 – Ability to Write Clear, Concise Military Advice Recommendations

• Lessons WT-525, 600E, 601E, and 603E meet this objective.

COURSE REQUIREMENTS
1. READINGS. Before lecture and seminar, students must complete all assigned readings for
the day. Students should read the explanation given in the syllabus before reading the
assigned books and articles. The syllabus also provides information on current joint doctrine,
as it relates to the topic of the day. Students are encouraged to explore the connections
between military theory, operational art, and current joint doctrine.

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2. LECTURES. Course lectures will be presented in a group setting with all seminars in
attendance. The lectures will usually be in Wood Auditorium, but other venues may be used
to accommodate special circumstances. These lectures provide additional context for the
readings and create a common foundation from which the individual seminars can engage in
constructive dialogue. In accordance with Air University policies, lectures are not for
attribution.

3. SEMINAR PARTICIPATION. Student contribution to seminar discussions is vital to the

success of the course. Students must prepare for each seminar by completing all the assigned
readings. Each member of the seminar is expected to contribute to the discussion.

4. WRITTEN ASSIGNMENTS. Two written, graded assignments and one written, ungraded
assignment fulfill the requirements of the War Theory course:

WT-600E - A single-page, ungraded response paper;

WT-601E - A two-to-four-page midterm paper worth 20 percent of the final course grade;
WT-603E - A four-to-six-page final paper, worth 50 percent of the final course grade.

Students must consult the Air University Style Guide and ACSC Student Guide for
information regarding proper formatting and citation requirements.

5. IN-CLASS GROUP PRESENTATION. On Day 14, students will present a graded, 15–
20-minute group briefing to the seminar (WT-602E), analyzing a case study in irregular
warfare using the theories of Mao Zedong and David Galula, as well as ideas from any of the
theorists read and discussed up to that point in the course. The grade for this briefing will be
a group grade and will be worth 30 percent of the final course grade. Course instructors
will assign these presentations on Day 2.

6. METHODS OF EVALUATION. WT-601E is worth 20 percent of the final course grade;

WT-602E is worth 30 percent of the final course grade; WT-603E is worth 50 percent of the
final course grade.

7. SPECIAL NOTE FOR WT-601E: For this assignment only, students receiving a grade of B-
or below will be given the opportunity to rewrite the paper to bring the assignment grade up to a B.

COURSE ADMINISTRATION
There are two types of readings in this course: 1) readings from books issued by ACSC; and 2)
selected chapters and articles posted on Canvas. To provide clarity, the syllabus denotes all
readings posted on Canvas as “[EL]” (electronic). Students can access the syllabus, course
calendar, and selected readings, as well as other supplemental materials on Canvas. In addition,
lecture slides will be posted no later than 24 hours following the lecture.

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The syllabus includes sections on “related joint doctrine” for all course lessons. Students are
encouraged to read the related joint doctrine. Students can find joint doctrine at the Joint Chiefs
of Staff Joint Electronic Library website (https://www.jcs.mil/doctrine). Both course lectures and
seminars will discuss the connections between military theory and current joint doctrine.
ACSC provides students with copies of the following course books, which must be returned at
the conclusion of the course:
• Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.
• Corbett, Julian S. Some Principles of Maritime Strategy. Mineola, NY: Dover
Publications, Inc., 2004 [1911].
• Douhet, Giulio. The Command of the Air. Translated by Dino Ferrari. 1942. Reprint, with
new foreword, Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2019.
• Galula, David. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. Westport, CT: Praeger
Security International, 2006 [1964].
• Gartzke, Eric, and John R. Lindsay, eds. Cross-Domain Deterrence: Strategy in an Era of
Complexity. New York: Oxford University Press, 2019.
• Gordon, Michael R., and Gen Bernard E. Trainor. The Generals’ War: The Inside Story
of the Conflict in the Gulf. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1995.
• Howard, Michael. War in European History. 1976. Reprint, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2009.
• Kilcullen, David. The Dragons and the Snakes: How the Rest Learned to Fight the West.
New York: Oxford University Press, 2020.
• Liang, Col Qiao and Col Wang Xiangsui. Unrestricted Warfare. Brattleboro, VT: Echo
Point Books and Media, 2015.
• Liddell Hart, Basil H. Strategy, (2nd revised edition). New York: Penguin Books, 1991.
• Olsen, John Andreas, ed. Airpower Reborn: The Strategic Concepts of John Warden and
John Boyd. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2015.
• Paret, Peter, ed. Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1986.
• Pinker, Steven. The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined. New
York: Penguin, 2011.
• Schelling, Thomas C. Arms and Influence. 1966. Reprint, New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 2008.
• Slessor, John C. Air Power and Armies. 1936. Reprint, Tuscaloosa, AL: University of
Alabama Press, 2009.
• Strassler, Robert, ed. The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the
Peloponnesian War. New York, NY: The Free Press, 1996.
• Tzu, Sun. The Art of War. Translated by Samuel Griffith. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1963.

Please refer any questions to:

- Course Director: Dr. John Minney (e-mail: john.minney.1@au.af.edu; Office: rm. 154B)
- Deputy Course Director: CDR Keith Henderson (e-mail: keith.henderson.2@au.af.edu; Office
rm. 150)
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 WAR THEORY
COURSE SCHEDULE

DAY 1 – COURSE INTRODUCTION

DATE: 06 August 2021

LESSON OBJECTIVES
1. Review the course objectives, course questions, and course narrative.
2. Review the course syllabus, methods of evaluation, and expectations for seminar.
3. Comprehend the purpose of military theory and history for the military professional.
4. Comprehend the distinction between the nature and character of war.

LESSON OVERVIEW
WT-500 (L): Course Overview (Minney)
Overview: War Theory introduces military theory, addressing both the nature and character
of war. This course examines the theoretical writings of classical military theorists, as well
as the evolution of warfare and military thought over the course of the twentieth century and
into the twenty-first century as well. This lecture introduces students to the course
objectives, schedule, and requirements, as well as the overall narrative and three phases of
the course. Additionally, this lecture introduces the distinction between the nature and
character of war and addresses the contemporary relevance of military theory and history for
the military professional.
CONTACT HOURS: 30-minute lecture

WT-501 (S): Course Introduction

Overview: In this seminar, instructors introduce themselves to their seminars, discuss
classroom policies, and through an examination of the assigned readings for the day set the
stage for seminar discussions scheduled for Day 2.
CONTACT HOURS: 1.5-hour seminar

WRITTEN ASSIGNMENT
ASSIGNMENT FOR ONE-PAGE (UNGRADED) RESPONSE PAPER DISTRIBUTED (WT-
600E).
MIDTERM PAPER ASSIGNMENT DISTRIBUTED (WT-601E)
FINAL PAPER ASSIGNMENT DISTRIBUTED (WT-603E)

REQUIRED READING
1. Vego, “On Military Theory,” Joint Forces Quarterly 62 (July 2011): 59-67. [EL]

This article presents a definition of military theory and argues for the importance of
understanding theory for the military professional. It serves as one of many potential
frameworks for understanding theories presented to students during the course.

2. Winton, “An Imperfect Jewel: Military Theory and the Military

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 Profession,” Journal of Strategic Studies 34, no. 6 (December 2011): 853-877. [EL]

This article presents a potential framework for understanding military theory and can be used
by the students as a means of assessing theories and ideas they will encounter during the
course.

3. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States,
12 July 2017, Chapter 1, “Theory and Foundations”, I-1-I-21, and Appendix B, “The
Profession of Arms” B1-B3. [EL]

This reading is the introductory chapter in the foundational joint doctrine manual for the US
military. It outlines fundamental principles of US joint doctrine, highlighting their origins in
classical military theory. As you review the principles guiding the employment of US joint
forces, note the influence of the different military theories and theoretical concepts studied in
this course. Appendix B reviews the fundamental principles of the US military as part of the
Profession of Arms.

RELATED JOINT DOCTRINE

1. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States,
12 July 2017.

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 Phase I: What is the nature of warfare?
War as Human Nature, Science, and Politics

11
 DAY 2 – WAR AS HUMAN NATURE

DATE: 09 August 2021

LESSON OBJECTIVES
1. Comprehend the different perspectives of Thucydides, Hobbes, and Locke on the relationship
between human nature, government, and war.
2. Discuss the arguments of Thucydides, Hobbes, and Locke as they relate to humans’ historical
propensity for conflict.
3. Understand historical trends related to war, the reasons humans fight, and the importance of
human nature for understanding the contemporary security environment.

LESSON OVERVIEW
WT-502 (L): Classical Thinkers on the Nature and Character of War (Price)
Overview: What can we learn from the classical thinkers about war and human nature?
Starting with the archaeological record, the lecture will introduce the debates, context and
enduring influence of key thinkers including Thucydides, Vegetius, Machiavelli, Hobbes,
Rousseau, and Locke, touching also upon the foundation laid by Aristotle on the enduring
relationship between art, science, creativity, and innovation. It will show how these debates
resonate in current thinking on the nature and character of war within history, the social
sciences, and for the training and education of military professionals.
CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

WT-503 (S): War as Human Nature

Overview: Is war an inseparable part of human nature? Is war changing? If so, have we
managed to escape our nature? The answers to these questions are critical for our
understanding of war. The readings offer explanations for the continued resort to armed
conflict throughout human history. The aim of the seminar is not to offer definitive answers
to these complex questions, but to encourage students to explore and develop their own
understandings of war.
CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

GROUP PRESENTATION ASSIGNMENT

ASSIGNMENT FOR GROUP PRESENTATION (WT 602E) DISTRIBUTED

REQUIRED READING
1. Strassler, ed., The Landmark Thucydides, ix-xxii, 16-17, 41-45, 96-97, 123-128, 199-201,
351-357, 407-410.

Historical Background: Thucydides’ The History of the Peloponnesian War is perhaps the
world’s oldest known military history. Written over two thousand years ago, the book deals
with the decades-long conflict between Athens and Sparta in the ancient world. In these
selections, the author makes clear the idea of human nature as a motivation for war, what
people and states expect from war, and some of the common results of war on people and
societies.

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2. Ebenstein and Ebenstein, eds. Great Political Thinkers: Plato to the Present. 355-379
(selections from Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan), 380-407 (selections from John Locke, Two
Treatises of Government). [EL]

Theory [Key Concept]: Hobbes asserts the “natural condition of mankind” is a state in which
life is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” Is Hobbes right to depict human existence as
a “war of all against all”? In other words, can human nature adequately explain the
recurrence of war? Locke’s discussion of the state, and how it should operate given the
inherent nature of man, is one of the most important works written on government in modern
Western history. It forms much of the basis for how the founders of the United States
thought about how to frame the new US government – what does Locke say about power and
human nature?

RECOMMENDED READING (OPTIONAL)

1. Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature, 31-56.

Pinker examines classical arguments concerning human nature against the historical record
and findings from anthropology, evolutionary biology, sociology, and psychology. Does the
evidence better support the arguments of Thucydides, Hobbes, or Locke, or is a new
understanding of human nature and war needed?

RELATED JOINT DOCTRINE

1. Joint Publication 1, Appendix B (The Profession of Arms), B1-B3.

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 DAY 3 – WAR AS SCIENCE

DATE: 12 August 2021

LESSON OBJECTIVES
1. Comprehend elements of both continuity and change in warfare in the late eighteenth century
and the Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon.
2. Comprehend Jomini’s fundamental principles of warfare, including offensive, objective,
strategy, lines of operation, mass, maneuver, decisive points, and strategic combinations.
3. Discuss Jomini’s scientific approach to war and its deep and abiding influence on Western
militaries, especially in the United States.

LESSON OVERVIEW
WT-504 (L): Jomini and the Science of War (Hayworth)
Overview: Antoine-Henri de Jomini, a Swiss officer who rose to the rank of general of
brigade in Napoleon’s army before switching his allegiance to Russia in 1813, emerged as
one of the earliest and most influential military scholars of the Napoleonic period. He
developed his ideas on the principles of war through careful study of the campaigns of the
era, and particularly those of Prussia’s Frederick the Great. This lecture provides an
overview of Jomini’s life and times to examine the formative influences that shaped his
military theories. It begins by looking at the nature and character of war in the eighteenth
century. The lecture also considers the impact of the Enlightenment and the French
Revolution on Jomini’s ideas and explores his relationship with Napoleon Bonaparte.
CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

WT-505 (S): War as Science

Overview: Jomini’s seminal work, The Art of War, first appeared in 1838. Jomini, a product
of the Enlightenment and the Age of Reason, applied the scientific method, as he understood
it, to the study of warfare. His theories and principles still strongly influence Western, and
particularly US, military operations. This seminar examines the writings of Jomini and their
enduring influence on US military doctrine and American approaches to warfare. Are
Jomini’s principles for the employment of military force still applicable today? What might
Jomini’s ideas miss about war – both in its nature and evolving character?
CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

WRITTEN ASSIGNMENT
**ONE-PAGE (UNGRADED) RESPONSE PAPER WT-600E IS DUE**

REQUIRED READING
1. Howard, War in European History, 54-93.
Background [Strategic Context]: This reading examines changes in European warfare during
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, providing historical context for the theories of
Jomini and Clausewitz.

2. Jomini, The Art of War, 1-19, 44-75. [EL]

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 Theory [Key Concept]: Antoine-Henri de Jomini served as a commander and staff officer in
the armies of Napoleonic France, and wrote extensively about military strategy and
operations, attempting to capture in theory what made Napoleon Bonaparte one of the most
revolutionary and successful military leaders in history. The Art of War is his most widely
translated and well-known work. Note in his writing the connections to current concepts
from our joint doctrine.

3. Shy, “Jomini,” Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. Paret, 164-185.

Refinement: This essay discusses Jomini’s intellectual and military experiences, providing
context for his key theories and principles. Shy also examines the historical promulgation
and perpetuation of Jomini’s ideas.

RECOMMENDED READING (OPTIONAL)

1. Guerlac, “Vauban: The Impact of Science on War,” Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. Paret,
64-90.
2. Palmer, “Frederick the Great, Guibert, Bülow: From Dynastic to National War,” Makers of
Modern Strategy, ed. Paret, 91-119.
RELATED JOINT DOCTRINE
1. Joint Publication 1, Chapter 1 (Levels of Warfare), I-7 to I-8.
2. Joint Publication 3-0, Appendix A (Principles of Joint Operations), A-1 to A-4; Chapter 3
(Joint Functions), III-1 to III-48; and Chapter V (Joint Operations across the Conflict
Continuum), V-7 to V-14.
3. Joint Publication 5-0, Chapter IV pp IV-18 to IV-39 (Elements of Operational Design).

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 DAY 4 – WAR AS POLITICS

DATE: 16 August 2021

LESSON OBJECTIVES
1. Comprehend Clausewitz’s arguments about the relationship between politics and war,
including the relationship between political objectives and military objectives in war.
2. Comprehend Clausewitz’s views on the trinity, friction, centers of gravity (COG), absolute
war vs. real war, the principle of continuity, limited war, and decisive victory.
3. Discuss Clausewitz’s arguments about effective civil-military relations, specifically the
responsibilities of statesmen and commanders.

LESSON OVERVIEW
WT-506 (L): “Professional Jominian” vs. “Natural Clausewitzian:” Generals Lee and
Grant in the Chancellorsville and Wilderness/Overland Campaigns (T. Beckenbaugh)
Overview: Confederate Gen Robert E. Lee’s victory at the Battle of Chancellorsville in
May 1863 was perhaps his greatest. It was also a Jominian masterpiece. However, Lee’s
victory at Chancellorsville did little to alter the strategic situation in the East. Lee’s last
opponent, Lt Gen Ulysses S. Grant, freely admitted that he read neither Jomini nor
Clausewitz at West Point, although he employed the latter’s ideas with brutal effectiveness
against Lee during the Overland Campaign of the Spring-Summer of 1864. Despite tactical
losses in most of the battles of the Overland Campaign, Grant trapped Lee at Petersburg and
ground the Army of Northern Virginia down, eventually forcing Lee’s—and the
Confederacy’s—surrender in 1865. How do the decisions and actions of these two men
illuminate the distinction between the theories of Jomini and Clausewitz?
CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

WT-507 (S): War as Politics

Overview: Carl von Clausewitz, a Prussian contemporary of Jomini, is arguably the most
influential of military theorists. While Jomini offered a more systematic and scientific study
of war, Clausewitz developed a more nuanced, philosophical tome on the nature of war and
the complexity of waging it. For Clausewitz, war was “not merely an act of policy but a true
political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means”
(On War, p. 87). To this point, war could not be reduced to a set of military axioms, for it
was far too complex and unpredictable, a paradoxical trinity of reason, chance, and
primordial violence. How do Jomini and Clausewitz compare in their views of war? Is
Clausewitz’s understanding of war still relevant?
CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

REQUIRED READING
1. Clausewitz, On War, Book II: chaps. 1-4; Book I: chaps. 1, 2, 4, 7; and Book VIII: chaps. 1-
8.
Theory [Key Concept]: This classic study of war can be challenging, not because Clausewitz
was a poor writer but because his ideas are sophisticated and complex. By his own
admission, his book was never completed, and some of his ideas were never fully developed

16
 to his own satisfaction. Yet, On War remains the most influential work of military theory to
this day. Recalling his professional military education, Gen Colin Powell wrote, “Clausewitz
was an awakening for me. His On War, written 106 years before I was born, was like a beam
of light from the past, still illuminating present-day military quandaries.” 2

RECOMMENDED READING (OPTIONAL)

1. Paret, “Clausewitz,” Makers of Modern Strategy, 186-213.
RELATED JOINT DOCTRINE
1. Joint Publication 1, Chapter 1 (Levels of Warfare), I-7 to I-8.
2. Joint Publication 3-0, Appendix A (Principles of Joint Operations), A-1 to A-4; Chapter 3
(Joint Functions), III-1 to III-48; Chapter V (Joint Operations across the Conflict
Continuum), V-7 to V-14.
3. Joint Publication 5-0, Chapter IV pp IV-18 to IV-39 (Elements of Operational Design).

2
Colin Powell with Joseph E. Persico, My American Journey (New York: Random House, 1995), 207.

17
 DAY 5 – WAR AS POLITICS

DATE: 19 August 2021

LESSON OBJECTIVES
1. Comprehend Clausewitz’s concepts of strategy, the engagement, moral factors, economy of
force, maneuver, the culminating point of victory, and the relationship between offense and
defense.
2. Recognize Clausewitz’s concepts of war termination in the First Gulf War.
3. Discuss the relevance of Clausewitz’s concepts for contemporary joint operations.

LESSON OVERVIEW
WT-508 (S): War as Politics
Overview: Clausewitz wrote that "War is an act of force to compel our enemy to do our
will” (p. 75). If Clausewitz is correct, what is the implication of his statement for war
termination? This seminar will explore the issue of war termination in the First Gulf War,
using the case to engage Clausewitz’s ideas about strategy, limited war, center of gravity,
and the culminating point of victory, as well his concepts of uncertainty, chance, and
friction.
CONTACT HOURS: 3.0-hour seminar

REQUIRED READING
1. Clausewitz, On War, Book III: chaps. 1-5, 11, 14, 17, Book VI: chaps. 1-5, and 26, Book
VII: chaps. 1-7, 13, 15, 16, 22.
Extension [Concept Refinement]: These selections from Clausewitz cover his ideas on
strategy, moral factors, maneuver, the relationship between offense and defense, and the
culminating point of victory.

2. Gordon and Trainor, The Generals’ War, 400-432.

Application [Case Study]: As you read about US decision-making and events surrounding the
end of hostilities against Iraq in the First Gulf War, try to apply Clausewitz’s ideas about
strategy, limited war, centers of gravity, and friction, as well as other related concepts.

RELATED JOINT DOCTRINE

1. Joint Publication 1, Chapter 1 (Levels of Warfare), I-7 to I-8.
2. Joint Publication 3-0, Appendix A (Principles of Joint Operations), A-1 to A-4; Chapter 3
(Joint Functions), III-1 to III-48; and Chapter V (Joint Operations across the Conflict
Continuum), V-7 to V-14.
3. Joint Publication 5-0, Chapter IV pp IV-18 to IV-39 (Elements of Operational Design); and
Chapter IV, pp IV-41 to IV-44 (Defeat and Stabilization Mechanisms).

18
 DAY 6 – THE INDIRECT APPROACH

DATE: 26 August 2021

LESSON OBJECTIVES
1. Comprehend the “indirect approach” to war and military strategy.
2. Recognize Sun Tzu’s ideas about strategy, deception, surprise, and intelligence.
3. Comprehend Liddell Hart’s arguments about strategy and success in war.

LESSON OVERVIEW
WT-509 (L): Sun Tzu: A Non-Western Perspective (Kerr)
Overview: Western militaries have studied Sun Tzu’s famous dictums about war since they
were first translated into French in the late eighteenth century. Like any work translated
from its original language, many of the nuanced meanings were lost in translation. Western
staff and war colleges studying The Art of War are prone to miss key insights that are readily
apparent to people who are not only fluent in Mandarin Chinese, but also understand the
cultural assumptions behind Sun Tzu’s writing. Surprisingly, few of the English language
translations of The Art of War were written by native Chinese speakers and the best one
available today is nearly impossible to buy outside of Asia (even via the Internet). This
lecture examines the historical and cultural context of Sun Tzu’s work, affording additional
perspective for seminar discussion.
CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

WT-510 (S): The Indirect Approach

Overview: This seminar examines the “indirect approach” to war and military strategy. The
classic treatise is Sun Tzu’s The Art of War, written in 500 BCE. Sun Tzu stressed the
importance of achieving victory through indirect methods, arguing that “to subdue the
enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.” (p 77) Liddell Hart, writing first in the
aftermath of the First World War, and then following the dawn of the nuclear age,
emphasized Sun Tzu’s ideas on the indirect approach to war. From a historical analysis of
25 centuries of warfare, Liddell Hart concluded that “throughout the ages, decisive results in
war have only been reached when the approach was indirect. In strategy, the longest way
round is apt to be the shortest way home.” (Strategy, pp. 4-5). In his view, the indirect
approach to warfare conferred to the victor a moral and psychological advantage over the
enemy. How are the theories of Sun Tzu and Liddell Hart different from those of Clausewitz
and Jomini, and how are they similar? Does the indirect approach provide us insights into
some of the contemporary security challenges we face?
CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

REQUIRED READING
1. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel Griffith, 63-110, 144-149.

Theory [Key Concept]: Sun Tzu’s The Art of War is deceptively simple. It might appear like
a “cookbook” on war and strategy, but its pithy maxims convey deeper meaning. It remains
one of the most influential books on war ever written.

19
2. Liddell Hart, Strategy, xi-6, 319-360.

Extension [Concept Refinement]: As you read Liddell Hart’s writings on strategy and the
“indirect approach,” examine his treatment of Sun Tzu’s ideas, and consider his experience
as an officer and military intellectual in twentieth century Britain.

RECOMMENDED READING (OPTIONAL)

1. Yuen, “Deciphering Sun Tzu,” Comparative Strategy 27:2 (3 April 2008): 183-200. [EL]

RELATED JOINT DOCTRINE

1. Joint Publication 1, Chapter 1 (Range of Military Operations), V-1 to V-5.
2. Joint Publication 3-13, Chapter 1 (Overview), I-5 to I-13.
3. Joint Publication 5-0, Chapter IV pp IV-18 to IV-39 (Elements of Operational Design); and
Chapter IV, pp IV-41 to IV-44 (Defeat and Stabilization Mechanisms).

20
 DAY 7 – WRITING DAY AND STUDENT MEETINGS WITH FACULTY

DATE: 30 August 2021

LESSON OBJECTIVES
1. Order ideas and outline a two-to-four-page paper.
2. Discuss thesis statement with seminar instructor.

LESSON OVERVIEW
WT-512 (S): Writing Day and Student Meetings with Faculty
Overview: In lieu of seminar, students will write and meet with faculty to discuss and
review thesis statements for the midterm paper, due on 2 September 2021.
REQUIRED READING
None.

RELATED JOINT DOCTRINE

None.

21
Phase II: How have war and military thought evolved across
the warfighting domains over the last two centuries?
Technology and the Evolution of War

22
 DAY 8 – LAND DOMAIN—MANEUVER WARFARE:
THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM OF THE LETHALITY OF MODERN FIREPOWER

DATE: 02 September 2021

LESSON OBJECTIVES
1. Comprehend the technological and doctrinal developments that emerged prior to the First
World War, their contribution to static warfare, and efforts to innovate and adapt to
overcome the deadlock.
2. Comprehend J.F.C. Fuller’s theory of strategic paralysis, Heinz Guderian’s conception of
mechanized warfare, and Georgii Isserson’s theory of Deep Battle.
3. Recognize these theories of mechanized warfare (and other military theories) to explain the
outcome of Operation Bagration in 1944.
4. Discuss the relative contributions of the tank and Modern System tactics to the return of
maneuver on the Western Front in 1918, as well as to the development of German
“blitzkrieg” warfare.

LESSON OVERVIEW
WT-511 (L): World War I and the Evolution of Combined Arms Maneuver Warfare
(Campbell)
Overview: This lecture introduces the concept of domains and outlines successive
developments before and during the First World War leading to later twentieth century
understanding of modern maneuver warfare. In responding to the challenges posed by static
warfare in Europe, the belligerents strove to harness new technologies, along with ideas
about how to apply these technologies in a quest for decisive battles leading to victory. The
differing national military interpretations of these lessons have shaped subsequent events, as
well as understanding and perceptions of war’s evolving character, down to the present day.
CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

WT-512 (S): Maneuver Warfare

Overview: Interwar Europe was a period of great transition, as military strategists struggled
to understand the impact of technological change on the modern battlefield. They sought to
find an approach that would avoid a repetition of the bloody trench stalemate from 1914-
1918 and return maneuver to the battlefield. Military theorists and practitioners J.F.C. Fuller
in Great Britain, Heinz Guderian in Germany, and Georgii Isserson in the Soviet Union
recognized and wrote on the potential of armored warfare. How well did the military leaders
and analysts of the interwar period understand the importance or role of weapons introduced
during World War I? In examining Operation Bagration (the Soviet summer offensive of
1944), how successful were the belligerents in developing doctrine that reflected the
capabilities of the technologies of the day?
CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

REQUIRED READING
1. Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University, 2004, 32-50. [EL]

23
 Theory [Key Concept]: This chapter presents a theory of force employment, termed the
Modern System. Biddle argues that victory and defeat in battle results from mastery of
modern system tactics—cover, concealment, dispersion, deep positions, reserves, small-unit
independent maneuver, suppression, and combined arms integration. He further contends that
only a small number of countries have managed to master these complex tactics, explaining
why Western militaries have certain advantages in war.

2. Fuller, On Future Warfare, (London: Sifton Praed, 1928), 83-105. [EL]

Extension [Concept Refinement]: Fuller, who was one of the earliest advocates of
mechanized warfare, argued the tank can deliver a crippling morale blow, thus achieving a
quick and decisive victory. We will return to the idea of strategic paralysis again in our
discussions of airpower.

3. Guderian, Panzer Leader, trans. Constantine Fitzgibbon (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1952), 39-
46. [EL]
Extension [Concept Refinement]: Guderian, a contemporary of Fuller, played a central role
in the development of interwar German armor doctrine. His conception of mechanized
warfare differed in important ways from that of Fuller.
4. Isserson, The Evolution of the Operational Art, trans. Bruce W. Menning, (Ft. Leavenworth:
Combat Studies Institute Press, 2013), 7-14, 43-74, 105-111. [EL]
Extension [Concept Refinement]: Isserson explained the concept of Deep Battle as a
reaction to the lessons of the Great War during the interwar years. Largely forgotten in the
wake of Stalin’s purges, the concept was resurrected after the German invasion of 1941 and
became not only the blueprint for Soviet victories later in the war, but also continues to
influence contemporary Russian military thought.

5. Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East, (Washington D.C.: Center of
Military History, 2002), 313-345. [EL]
Application [Case Study]: As you read about Operation Bagration, the Soviet summer
offensive of 1944, examine whether the battle history offers support for the ideas of Fuller,
Guderian, and/or Isserson, and develop your own explanation for the Soviet victory and
German defeat.

RECOMMENDED READING (OPTIONAL)

1. Holborn, “The Prusso-German School: Moltke and the Rise of the General Staff,” Makers of
Modern Strategy, ed. Paret, 281-295.
2. Rothenberg, “Moltke, Schlieffen, and the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment,” Makers of
Modern Strategy, ed. Paret, 296-325.
3. Howard, “Men against Fire: The Doctrine of the Offensive in 1914,” Makers of Modern
Strategy, ed. Paret, 510-526.

24
4. Geyer, “German Strategy in the Age of Machine Warfare, 1914-1945,” Makers of Modern
Strategy, ed. Paret, 527-598.
5. Bond and Alexander, “Liddell Hart and De Gaulle: The Doctrines of Limited Liability and
Mobile Defense,” Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. Paret, 598-623.
RELATED JOINT DOCTRINE
1. Joint Publication 1, Chapter 1 (Levels of Warfare), I-7 to I-8.
2. Joint Publication 3-0, Appendix A (Principles of Joint Operations), A-1 to A-4; and Chapter
3 (Joint Functions), III-1 to III-48; Chapter V (Joint Operations across the Conflict
Continuum), V-7 to V-14.
3. Joint Publication 5-0, Chapter IV pp IV-18 to IV-39 (Elements of Operational Design); and
Chapter IV, pp IV-41 to IV-44 (Defeat and Stabilization Mechanisms).

25
 DAY 9 – MARITIME DOMAIN—COMMAND OF THE SEA OR SEA DENIAL

DATE: 09 September 2021

LESSON OBJECTIVES
1. Comprehend the naval theories of Mahan and Corbett, and compare their different ideas
about naval strategy, command of the sea, and sea denial.
2. Recognize the theories of Mahan and Corbett while discussing the outcome of naval
operations in the Pacific Theater in World War II.
3. Comprehend the importance of sea power and the maritime domain for both historical and
contemporary security environments.

LESSON OVERVIEW
WT-513 (L): Command of the Sea versus Sea Denial: The Naval Campaign in the Pacific
Theater, 1941-1945 (Hendrickson)
Overview: This lecture first discusses Mahan and Corbett in a broader context of naval
theory, connecting their ideas to the body of theoretical approaches to the use of naval
power. Second, it discusses the Pacific War from a strategic to operational perspective,
focusing on how the participants adjusted their strategic approaches to changing
circumstances in the theater. This lecture provides a case study to understand how these
theories were applied in the largest naval war in human history.
CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

WT-514 (S): Naval Theorists—Command of the Sea or Sea Denial?

Overview: Which set of ideas, Mahan’s or Corbett’s, better accounts for the “influence of
sea power upon history,” since the military-technological revolution of the late-nineteenth
and early-twentieth centuries? Are Mahan and/or Corbett’s ideas still relevant to our
understanding of maritime warfare and naval strategy today?
CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

REQUIRED READING
1. Mahan, The Influence of Seapower Upon History, Chapter 1. [EL]

Background [Strategic Context]: Mahan is arguably the most lasting and influential naval
theorist and historian. The opening chapter in Mahan’s seminal work on seapower introduces
his ideas on naval strategy, including his main principles governing command of the sea.
Note the influence of Jomini on his understanding of strategy and maritime operations.

2. Corbett, Principles of Maritime Strategy, 13-16, 49-56, 87-104, 128-135, 157-173, 182-184,
211-215, 235-245.

Extension [Concept Refinement]: Corbett, a contemporary of Mahan, emerged as Britain’s

foremost naval theorist prior to the First World War. In this work, he lays out his views on
maritime strategy, stressing the importance of command of the sea, the principle of the “fleet
in being,” and the relationship between land and naval forces. Note the influence of
Clausewitz on his thinking.
26
3. Gooch, “Maritime Command: Mahan and Corbett,” in Seapower and Strategy, eds. Colin S.
Gray and Roger W. Barnett (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1989), 27-45. [EL]

Extension [Concept Refinement]: This reading summarizes the main points of both theorists,
while comparing and contrasting them in the context of the operational execution of naval
strategy.

Note on Application: Lecture discussion of the evolution and uses of sea power in WWII
will serve as the application for this lesson.

RECOMMENDED READING (OPTIONAL)

1. Crowl, “Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian,” Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. Paret,
444-480.

RELATED JOINT DOCTRINE

1. Joint Publication 1, Chapter 1 (Range of Military Operations), V-1 to V-5.
2. Joint Publication 3-0, Appendix A (Principles of Joint Operations), A-1 to A-4.
3. Joint Publication 5-0, Chapter IV pp IV-18 to IV-39 (Elements of Operational Design).

27
 DAY 10 – AIR DOMAIN—THE ORIGINS OF AIR POWER

DATE: 13 September 2021

LESSON OBJECTIVES
1. Comprehend emerging concepts of air superiority, strategic bombing, interdiction, and close
air support in the writings of Douhet and Slessor.
2. Understand the development of the air arm during the First World War, which underpinned
the emerging theories governing the uses of airpower during the interwar period.
3. Recognize similarities and differences in the theories of Douhet and Slessor regarding the
employment of airpower.
4. Discuss the influence of other military theories on the writings of Douhet and Slessor.

LESSON OVERVIEW
WT-515 (L): “Zero to Airpower:” World War One and the Genesis of Airpower Theory
(Minney)
Overview: This lecture explores the early use of the airplane during World War One, as the
major combatants pondered how the new weapon affected access, maneuver, and effects on
the battlefield. The lecture covers the rapid technological change that occurred during the
war, and early attempts to define air doctrine. It introduces the theorists Giulio Douhet and
J.C. Slessor, examining their wartime experiences as a basis for their thoughts on the air
weapon after the war. It will conclude by reviewing air operations in Italy during WWII and
asking whether either theorist accurately forecast the character and nature of war in the air.
CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

WT-516 (S): The Origins of Airpower Theory

Overview: By the end of World War One, more questions than answers remained about the
new air weapon. During the interwar period, bold claims for the power of air forces to
supplant land and sea power matured alongside arguments for the emergence of independent
air services. Airmen and theorists like Giulio Douhet in Italy and J.C. Slessor in Great
Britain extolled airpower’s prospects, establishing foundations for their theories of airpower
employment; this included discussions of air superiority, strategic bombing, interdiction, and
close air support. Discourse on the capabilities and limitations of airpower continues to this
day. What problems does airpower theory attempt to resolve? In what other forms of
military theory do we see the origins of airpower theory? What are the common threads
between the ideas of these airpower theorists? Where do they diverge? How does classical
airpower theory apply to the modern warfighter? Finally, how does this debate about the role
of airpower reflect larger discussions about the nature and character of “modern” war?
CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

REQUIRED READING
1. Douhet, The Command of the Air, 3-28, 45-56, 86-90, 103-125.

Theory [Key Concept]: Douhet’s The Command of the Air, first published in 1921, continues
to influence American airpower thinking. In this seminal work, Douhet develops his

28
 arguments about air superiority, aerial maneuver, offensive operations, and the importance of
bombers. Note the influence of other military theories on his writings.

2. Slessor, Air Power and Armies, 1-10, 61-90, 200-215.

Extension [Concept Refinement]: Slessor, a contemporary of Douhet, drew on his experience

flying in the First World War to make the case for a strategy of air interdiction in support of
land forces. This book, based on a series of lectures he delivered in the early 1930s while on
the faculty at the British Army Staff College, was very much ahead of its time. Note the
similarities and differences between the ideas of Slessor and Douhet. Consider the relevance
of these airpower theories today, especially in the context of possible analogies between the
global security position of the British Empire in the 1930s, and the contemporary United
States.

Note on Application: Lecture discussion of the evolution and uses of air power in WWII will
serve as the application for this lesson.

RECOMMENDED READING (OPTIONAL)

1. MacIsaac, “Voices from the Central Blue: The Air Power Theorists,” Makers of Modern
Strategy, ed. Paret, 624-647.

RELATED JOINT DOCTRINE

1. Joint Publication 3-0, Appendix A (Principles of Joint Operations), A-1 to A-4; and Chapter
V (Joint Operations across the Conflict Continuum), V-7 to V-14.
2. Joint Publication 5-0, Chapter IV pp IV-18 to IV-39 (Elements of Operational Design).

29
 DAY 11 – NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

DATE: 16 September 2021

LESSON OBJECTIVES
1. Comprehend the three classical approaches to nuclear deterrence.
2. Comprehend Schelling’s arguments about nuclear deterrence and coercion, specifically the
contrast of brute force with coercion, the distinction between deterrence and compellence, the
importance of relinquishing the initiative, the challenges of extended deterrence, and the
dangers of brinkmanship.

LESSON OVERVIEW
WT-517 (L): Nuclear Revolution or Evolution? Nuclear Deterrence Theory (Deaile)
Overview: This lecture introduces the key concepts and terminology used in the study of
nuclear deterrence theory. In examining the emergence of deterrence theory, it presents three
classical approaches to nuclear deterrence. It concludes with a discussion of the
contemporary US approach to nuclear deterrence, emphasizing the continued challenges of
extended deterrence.
CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

WT-518 (S): Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence

Overview: The atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 ended
the Second World War and ushered in the nuclear age. The existence of nuclear weapons
transformed our understandings about the use and threatened use of force in international
disputes. Atomic and nuclear weapons raised questions about the varying advantage of
defense over offense. Some strategists maintained that the advent of nuclear weapons
undermined the very utility of war as a tool of statecraft while others argued that these new
weapons gave military power a decidedly different political purpose—to deter rather than
wage war. Are nuclear weapons simply more destructive or fundamentally different from
conventional weapons? Does the existence of nuclear weapons confirm or negate ideas we
have read from the classical war theorists, suggesting that the very nature of war, as they
understood it, has changed?
CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

REQUIRED READING
1. Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, Project RAND Report R-335 (Santa Monica, CA:
RAND, 15 January1959), 173-222. [EL]

Theory [Key Concept]: This chapter in Brodie’s central work outlines the arguments about
the relative strength of attack and defense in nuclear war. Brodie offers assessments and
recommendations about how strategy must be developed, and investments made to respond
to the new challenges thus revealed. How do Brodie’s arguments both rely on and contrast
with theorists read earlier in the course?

2. Schelling, Arms and Influence, 1-62.

30
 Extension [Concept Refinement]: Schelling won the 2005 Nobel Prize in Economics for his
work on nuclear deterrence theory. His theory of a “diplomacy of violence” was highly
influential on US Cold War strategy and it continues to shape thinking about strategy and
nuclear weapons to this day.

RECOMMENDED READING (OPTIONAL)

1. Freedman, “The First Two Generations of Nuclear Strategists,” Makers of Modern Strategy,
ed. Paret, 735-778.

RELATED JOINT DOCTRINE

Joint Publication 1, Chapter 1 (Levels of Warfare), I-7 to I-8 and (Range of Military Operations),
V-1 to V-5.

31
Phase III: Which military theories are most relevant for
understanding the nature and the character of war today
and in the future?
The Present and Future of Warfare

32
 DAY 12 – THE RETURN TO GREAT POWER COMPETITION

DATE: 20 September 2021

LESSON OBJECTIVES
1. Comprehend the dynamics of contemporary conflict across the competition continuum.
2. Comprehend the fundamental tenets of joint military doctrine for operations across the
competition continuum.
3. Review Chinese and Russian theories of war in terms of both the classical understanding of
war and great power competition below the level of conflict.

LESSON OVERVIEW
WT-519 (L): Great Power Competition: A 30-Year Journey (Podliska)
Overview: For the better part of five decades, America was embroiled in a Cold War with
the Soviet Union. This rivalry ended in 1991, and America, as a unipolar power, spent the
next 30 years employing its instruments of national power to establish and strengthen liberal
democracies around the world. China and Russia, rather than joining this system, embarked
on a geopolitical challenge to American hegemony in terms of security, norms, trade, and
information. This lecture explores the history and nature of this great power competition and
the implications for grand strategy.
CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

WT-520 (S): The Conflict Continuum

Overview: After two decades focused on combatting international terrorism, the United
States now finds itself in competition with two great power rivals: China and Russia. The
return to great power competition has brought a new style of warfare, less focused on force-
on-force battle and more designed to exert influence and power without resorting to
violence. This seminar discusses how the US should respond to these new threats using all
aspects of national power, as well as military responses at the operational level of war.
CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

REQUIRED READING
1. Qiao and Wang, Unrestricted Warfare, 1-5, 93-98, 103-108, 115-125, 153-171, 175-186.

Theory [Key Concept]: In 1999, Col Qiao Liang of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force
and Col Wang Xiangsui of the People’s Liberation Army published this book on warfare in
the modern age. Much like military theorists in the interwar period, they sought to
understand how new technologies had changed warfare in the wake of Operation Desert
Storm. They concluded that a technologically inferior nation could indeed defeat a stronger
nation by employing means other than force-on-force. Have the methods they espoused
changed either the nature or the character of war?

2. Gerasimov, “The Value of Science is in the Foresight,” Military Review (January-February

2016): 23-29. [EL]

33
 Theory [Key Concept]: Gen Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian
Federation Armed Forces, examines the future of war. Increased blurring of the war-peace
binary, he argues, suggests that non-military means are not auxiliary to the use of force, but
are the preferred way to win. Give particular attention to his arguments about the “single
intelligence-information space,” information technologies, and asymmetrical actions.
Analyze the role of cyberspace attacks and information operations in the Gerasimov doctrine.

3. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning, 16 March 2018. [EL]

Extension [Concept Refinement]: Given the dynamic and complex operating environment,
now and into the foreseeable future, the Joint Staff introduced the “integrated campaigning”
concept which calls for aligning services, combatant commands, and multinational and inter-
governmental partners to achieve national objectives across the “continuum of competition.”
Is the traditional “peace/war binary” now truly obsolete?

4. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine Note 1-19, Competition Continuum, 3 June 2019 [EL]

Extension [Concept Refinement]: Joint Doctrine Note 1-19 refines the concept of the
“Competition Continuum” introduced in the Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning.
What are the implications for the role of military power in politics, or even domestic defense,
absent a clear demarcation between peace and war? How does the military interact with the
other elements of national power (Diplomatic, Informational, Economic)? Does this concept
imply that we are always in a state of “war?”

RECOMMENDED READING (OPTIONAL)

1. Gartzke and Lindsay, Cross-Domain Deterrence: Strategy in an Era of Complexity (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2019), Introduction, 27-49.

RELATED JOINT DOCTRINE

See required readings.

34
 DAY 13 – MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE SPACE DOMAIN

DATE: 23 September 2021

LESSON OBJECTIVES
1. Comprehend the fundamental tenets of joint military doctrine for operations in space.
2. Comprehend the dynamics of contemporary spacepower, including the commercial and
military space activities of the US and peer competitors.
3. Recognize theories of space power in terms of classical understanding of maritime strategy.
4. Comprehend how fundamentals of deterrence theory can be applied in space.

LESSON OVERVIEW
WT-521 (L): Sovereignty and the Law of War in Space (Harrington)
Overview: This lecture explores the fundamental differences between space and other
domains and the challenge of applying war theory in this distinct domain. To that end, this
lecture addresses the unique characteristics of operating in space, space as the ultimate high
ground, and concepts of sovereignty in space.
CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

WT-522 (S): Military Operations in the Space Domain

Overview: The US military’s dependence on space capabilities is not lost on its adversaries.
This vulnerability suggests that space is not the “benign domain” of popular imagination,
and the US must prepare for its constellation of satellites to be the first targets in the next
war. Are military operations in space an auxiliary to operations in traditional domains of
warfighting, or a new form of warfare itself? How likely are stand-alone acts of space war
today and in the future? Has the militarization of the final frontier—space—changed the
nature and/or character of modern war? This seminar takes up these issues through an
examination of current US joint doctrine governing space operations, ideas related to the
application of accepted military theories to space, and notions of integrated strategic
deterrence (or cross-domain deterrence).
CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

REQUIRED READING
1. Dolman, “Geostrategy in the Space Age: An Astropolitical Analysis,” Journal of Strategic
Studies 22, no. 2-3 83-106. [EL]

Theory [Key Concept]: Dolman theorizes that states pursue national interests in space, much
as they do on earth. He argues that space is merely the latest arena for geopolitical
competition, relating its unique geography – the importance of various orbits and points – to
the pursuit of national interests.

2. Bowen, “From the Sea to Outer Space: The Command of Space as the Foundation of
Spacepower Theory,” Journal of Strategic Studies 42, no. 3-4 (2019), 532-556. [EL]

35
 Extension [Concept Refinement]: Building on Mahan’s fundamentals of seapower, Bowen
centers his theory of spacepower on the concept of “command of space.” Does this approach
hold utility for understanding or developing space-based strategy?

3. Moltz, “The Changing Dynamics of Twenty-First Century Space Power,” Strategic Studies
Quarterly, Spring 2019, 66-94. [EL]

Background [Strategic Context]: Moltz argues that predictions regarding the decline of US
space power are overblown and fail to differentiate between purely governmental space
enterprises and cooperative government-commercial space enterprises. He contends the
dynamism and innovation in the West offer advantages over China’s and Russia’s state
owned and operated space programs.

4. Space Capstone Publication (SCP), Spacepower: Doctrine for Space Forces, ii-26. [EL]

Application: This is the first official publication of space theory by the US Space Force as an
independent service. The reading defines the space domain, summarizes national
spacepower, and gives expression to the concept of military spacepower.

5. Joint Publication 3-14, Space Operations, I-1 to I-12. [EL]

Background [Operational Context]: This chapter outlines the basis of current US military
doctrine governing operations in and through the space domain.

RECOMMENDED READING (OPTIONAL)

1. Gartzke and Lindsay, Cross-Domain Deterrence: Strategy in an Era of Complexity (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2019), Introduction, 27-49.

RELATED JOINT DOCTRINE

See required readings.

36
 DAY 14 – IRREGULAR WARFARE

DATE: 30 September 2021

LESSON OBJECTIVES
1. Comprehend the theories of irregular warfare as outlined by Mao Zedong and David Galula.
2. Comprehend the range of violence covered by the term “irregular warfare,” including
insurgency, civil war, and terrorism, and the similarities and differences between these
conflicts and a more traditional understanding of conventional war.
3. Understand historical examples of irregular warfare using the theoretical models of Mao and
Galula, as well the other classical theorists.

LESSON OVERVIEW
WT-523 (L): Theory and Practice of Irregular Warfare (Dean)
Overview: This lecture defines and describes the phenomenon of irregular warfare, and then
goes on to examine classical theories concerning irregular warfare, from the perspective of
diverse national experiences. It also presents practical examples illustrating the range of
conflicts categorized as irregular, and contrasts these with the various theoretical
frameworks used to understand this form of warfare.
CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

WT-524 (S): Irregular Warfare

Overview: Irregular warfare is as old and enduring as human conflict itself. Irregular
warfare encompasses multiple forms of organized violence, including terrorism, civil war,
revolution, insurrection, small scale proxy warfare, and religious, ethnic, or tribal conflict.
Indeed, forthcoming course readings characterize cyber conflict as a manifestation of
irregular war. If these wars are so prevalent and persistent, why has classical war theory not
addressed them in any comprehensive way? How do we come to a comprehensive
understanding of these difficult conflicts, and how does theory improve our conception of
the kind of war we are most likely to continue to fight in the future?
CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

GROUP PRESENTATION ASSIGNMENT

***GROUP PRESENTATION DUE TODAY***
(See WT-602E assignment for details)

REQUIRED READING
1. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, xi-xiv, 1-47.

Theory [Key Concept]: Galula served as an officer in the French Army during the insurgent
war in Algeria in the 1950s. He drew on his experience and his further study of irregular
warfare for this book, which is one of the first and most important theoretical examinations
of how insurgencies work, how a counterinsurgency war should be fought, and what armies
must do in order to succeed in these kinds of conflicts.

37
2. Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 12-18, Mao Tse-tung on Guerilla
Warfare, trans. Samuel B. Griffith, 5 April 1989, 3-8, 41-50, 88-103. [EL]
Extension [Concept Refinement]: Mao, the leader of the Chinese Communist Revolution and
brutal dictator of Communist China, produced this book as a guide for the successful
application of lessons learned during the Chinese Civil War. It contains the now classic
“Mao-ist” understanding of the stages of an insurgency, and since its publication has been the
inspiration for revolutionary wars in Latin America, Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia.

3. Kilcullen, The Dragons and the Snakes: How the Rest Learned to Fight the West, 38-65.

Extension [Concept Refinement]: This chapter explains how irregular forces learn and adapt
to counter insurgency techniques in the modern age.

Application - Note on Case Studies: As part of the exercise WT-602E, students will brief an
overview and analysis of one of the four case studies during graded group presentations.

RELATED JOINT DOCTRINE

1. Joint Publication 3-0, Chapter V (Joint Operations across the Conflict Continuum), V-7 to V-
14.
2. Joint Publication 5-0, Chapter IV pp IV-18 to IV-39 (Elements of Operational Design); and
Chapter IV, pp IV-41 to IV-44 (Defeat and Stabilization Mechanisms).

38
 DAY 15 – CYBER AND INFORMATION WARFARE IN THE GRAY ZONE

DATE: 4 October 2021

LESSON OBJECTIVES
1. Comprehend the concepts of “gray zone” and “hybrid warfare,” in the context of a
“continuum of competition.”
2. Discuss arguments about the relative continuing merit of the traditional “peace-war binary,”
and apply this analysis to the question of whether traditional boundaries between military and
civil spheres in the realm of national security are still applicable.
3. Comprehend the concepts of “integrated campaigning” and “multi-domain operations,” and
how the US joint force intends to apply these concepts in the future operating environment.

LESSON OVERVIEW
WT-525 (L): The Cyber Age and Russian Information Operations (Schwonek)
Overview: This lecture explores the role of cyber warfare and information operations in
contemporary Russian strategy. Although lampooned as artless and profligate of manpower,
Soviet and Russian strategic thought is quite sophisticated. It has long prized integration of
military and non-military instruments and careful preparation of the battlespace. From Deep
Battle to the theory of reflexive control and the Gerasimov doctrine, controlling and
manipulating information and perceptions have been crucial. In current conditions which
require the Russian Federation to avoid attacking an opponent’s army or cities, a genuine
indirect strategy has emerged, with the potential “to subdue the enemy without fighting.”
CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

WT-526 (S): Cyber and Information Warfare and the Continuum of Competition
Overview: Senior leaders in the US Department of Defense, along with other civilian
leaders and academics, reason that US military asymmetry renders competitors unlikely to
engage the US and our allies in conventional conflict. Rather, we anticipate that
competition will take place below the threshold of armed conflict in the “gray zone”
between peace and war. Recently, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff posited that we
have entered an era of a “continuum of conflict,” and must operate on the assumption that
competition and war are constant, with actions occurring simultaneously along the full
spectrum of conflict. The continuum includes competition eroding international norms,
beyond and across long-understood physical and other boundaries in space, the
electromagnetic spectrum, the cyber domain, and the information space. How do the joint
force and our allies and partners organize, present forces, and exercise command and control
in such an environment, where actions must be synchronized across domains, across the
elements of national power, at speed, in order to protect our national interests? How do we
present our adversaries with multiple simultaneous dilemmas across the breadth and depth
of the battlespace? How do governments, international organizations, and civil society
respond to this kind of “gray zone” warfare, and what are the implications of this continuum
of conflict for our traditional understanding of war, peace, and the role of the military?
CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

39
REQUIRED READING
1. Osinga, “The Enemy as Complex Adaptive System: John Boyd and Airpower in the
Postmodern Era,” Airpower Reborn: The Strategic Concepts of John Warden and John Boyd,
ed. Olsen, 62-92.
Theory [Key Concept]: Col John Boyd, a USAF fighter pilot who flew the F-86 Sabre during
the Korean War, developed lessons from his combat experience into a generalized theory of
conflict. He presented his ideas as a series of briefing slides. This chapter offers a summary
and analysis of Boyd’s main arguments. As you read, apply Boyd’s ideas to information,
space, and cyber warfare, as well as air operations. For those interested in reviewing Boyd’s
slides, see http://dnipogo.org/john-r-boyd/ and
https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/AUPress/Books/B_0151_Boyd_Discourse_Winn
ing_Losing.pdf

2. Thomas, “Russia’s Reflexive Control Theory and the Military,” Journal of Slavic Military
Studies 17 (2004): 237-256. [EL]

Extension [Concept Refinement]: This article reviews the Russian theory of reflexive control.
Compare these ideas with those of Boyd.

3. Sanchez, Lin, and Korunka, “Applying Irregular Warfare principles to Cyber Warfare,” Joint
Forces Quarterly 92, (1st Quarter 2019): 15-22. [EL]

Application: The authors compare frameworks for understanding conventional and irregular
warfare, and assert that cyber war is more easily understood in terms of irregular operations
such as disruption, population influencing, direct action, etc.

4. Kilcullen, The Dragons and the Snakes: How the Rest Learned to Fight the West, 115-166.
Extension [Concept Refinement]: Kilcullen introduces the concept of “Liminal Warfare” to
describe Russian warfare below the level of armed conflict. How would the classical
theorists we have studied respond to these ideas?

RELATED JOINT DOCTRINE

1. Joint Publication 1, Chapter 1 (Levels of Warfare), I-7 to I-8; and (Range of Military
Operations), V-1 to V-5.
2. Joint Publication 3-0, Chapter V (Joint Operations across the Conflict Continuum), V-7 to V-
14.
3. Joint Publication 5-0, Chapter IV pp IV-41 to IV-44 (Defeat and Stabilization Mechanisms).

40
 DAY 16 – MILITARY THEORY AND US JOINT DOCTRINE: HOW WE FIGHT

DATE: 7 October 2021

LESSON OBJECTIVES
1. Comprehend political, social, economic, and technological changes transforming
contemporary armed combat, and the connections between theory, practical experience, and
current joint military doctrine.
2. Discuss the implications of these changes for the future of warfare, specifically the nature
and/or character of war in the future.
3. Recognize the theories studied in this course to the contemporary and future security
environment.

LESSON OVERVIEW
WT-527 (Movie): The Fog of War: Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara
Overview: This documentary movie follows the life and career of former Secretary of
Defense Robert S. McNamara, who held that position during the Kennedy and Johnson
Administrations. He also worked on the staff of the Twentieth Air Force under Gen Curtis
LeMay during WWII. In the movie, McNamara shares his views and experiences regarding
war and its relation to politics and national strategy, ethics, and organizational leadership.
As you watch this film, consider how McNamara’s life and experiences, and the way he
describes and assesses these things, relate to ideas and themes discussed and read about in
the course. How do these lessons fit into your own assessments of war and the future of
armed conflict?
CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour movie

WT-528 (S): Military Theory and US Joint Doctrine

Overview: This course has explored the consequences of societal, political, organizational,
and technological changes over the course of the last 300 years. We have observed both
fundamental change and persistent continuity in the practice of war. War is fundamentally a
human activity, and ways and means of violence evolve in conjunction with humankind. As
the course draws to a conclusion, you may wish to consider the following questions. How
does current joint doctrine mirror theory and practice? How do ideas and lessons learned
inform the way we fight? How might we expect the nature and/or character of war change
in the future? This seminar engages these fundamental questions, as it reviews the main
themes, theories, and readings of the course.
CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour seminar

WRITTEN ASSIGNMENT
**FINAL PAPER IS DUE (WT-603E) ON 8 OCTOBER**

REQUIRED READING
1. Review: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1, March 2013. I-1 – I-21 [EL]
This reading is the introductory chapter in the foundational joint doctrine manual for the US
military. It outlines fundamental principles of our doctrine and makes explicit connections

41
 between much of the classical military theory contained in the course, and US doctrine. As
you review the principles guiding the employment of US joint forces, note the influence of the
different military theories and theoretical concepts studied in this course.

RELATED JOINT DOCTRINE

None.

42
 APPENDIX: COURSE FACULTY

Lt Col Joseph D. Beal is an instructor and Deputy Department Chair in the Joint Warfighting
Department at the Air Command and Staff College. Lieutenant Colonel Beal is a Command Pilot
and Weapons Officer with over 3000 flight hours. His operational and staff tours include
assignments to AMC, PACAF, and USAFE. He holds Master’s degrees from the University of
Alabama, Air Force Institute of Technology, and Air University. Lieutenant Colonel Beal is a
SAASS graduate and completed in residence IDE at the Advanced Studies of Air Mobility
(ASAM). Prior to his arrival at ACSC, Lieutenant Colonel Beal was Deputy Commander, 437th
Operations Group, and Commander, 437th Operations Support Squadron.

Dr. Terry Beckenbaugh is an Associate Professor in the Department of Airpower at Air

University’s Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) at Maxwell Air Force Base.  He came to
ACSC from the US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,
where he taught for nine years in the Department of Military History. Dr. Beckenbaugh received
his PhD in 19th Century US History from the University of Arkansas, and his Masters and
Bachelors in US History and History, respectively, from Shippensburg University of
Pennsylvania.  Beckenbaugh has taught at a variety of undergraduate and graduate civilian
institutions. He is currently working on a book on the White River Campaign in Arkansas in the
spring-summer of 1862 and has numerous publications and conference presentations.

Dr. James D. Campbell is the Chair of the Joint Warfighting Department at the Air Command
and Staff College. A retired US Army brigadier general, Dr. Campbell served as an Infantryman
and Strategic Plans and Policy Officer for 30 years, with assignments at all levels of command
and staff, in both the Regular Army and the National Guard. Most recently he served as the
Deputy Chief, Operations Plans Division at US Central Command, and prior to his retirement
served as the 39th Adjutant General of Maine with the state cabinet-level position of
Commissioner of the Maine Department of Defense, Veterans and Emergency Management. Dr.
Campbell holds a M.A. in European History and a PhD in British History from the University of
Maine. He is a graduate of the CAPSTONE course at the National Defense University, the US
Army War College, and was an International Security Studies Fellow at the Fletcher School of
Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. Dr. Campbell has published works on subjects ranging
from Homeland Defense, to Irregular Warfare, and 19th and early 20th century British Military
History. His current research interests focus on British Imperial military operations and the Army
in India.

Lt Col John “Garick” Chamberlin, PhD is an Assistant Professor of Military and Security
Studies in the Department of Airpower at the United States Air Force’s Air Command and Staff
College (ACSC). He holds a doctorate degree in History from Purdue University, an MA in
National Security Affairs from Naval Postgraduate School, and a BS in Middle East Studies
43
from Excelsior College (USNY). Lieutenant Colonel Chamberlin has split his Air Force career
roughly equally between intelligence and education assignments, having taught at the Defense
Language Institute and the US Air Force Academy, and commanded a Student Squadron at
Squadron Officers School prior to his assignment to ACSC. In the Intelligence field, he was
attached to the RC-135 both as an enlisted aviator and as an intelligence officer, and also served
on the Third Air Force and US Air Forces in Europe staffs and as the Chief of Wing Intelligence
for the 22 ARW at McConnell AFB. Lieutenant Colonel Chamberlin has over a dozen
deployments to the Middle East, as well as one to Kosovo. His research focuses on the
diplomatic and military history of the Early American Republic, primarily related to North
African affairs.
Dr. Melvin G. Deaile is the Director of the School of Advanced Nuclear and Deterrence Studies
(SANDS) and an Associate Professor in the Department of International Studies at Air
University’s Air Command and Staff College. He teaches classes on nuclear deterrence, nuclear
strategy, joint warfighting, and classical military thought. Dr. Deaile hails from Fresno, CA
native, and is a retired Air Force colonel, where he served two tours in the B-52 Stratofortress
and a tour in the B-2 Spirit. He has flown combat operations as part of Operations Desert Storm
and Operation Enduring Freedom, including a record setting 44.3 hour combat mission, and
deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. He is the recipient of the Distinguished Flying
Cross and a distinguished graduate of the USAF Weapon School. Dr. Deaile recently published
his first book, Always at War, which chronicles the development of SAC’s organizational culture
under Gen Curtis LeMay. He is the author of multiple articles, editorials, and book reviews on
nuclear weapons and their role in national security.
Dr. William Dean is an Associate Professor of History at the Air Command and Staff College at
Maxwell AFB, AL. He is a graduate of the Univ. of the South (Sewanee) and received his
doctorate and master’s degrees from the University of Chicago in European military and
diplomatic history. He was a Chateaubriand recipient from the French government and has won
the Military Officer of America Association (MOAA) award for civilian educator of the year and
the Major General John Alison Award for Air Force Special Operations. He has published on
French colonial warfare, intelligence, and air power issues in Revue Hisotrique des Armees,
Penser les Ailes Francais, Defense Intelligence Review, and several chapters in various books.

Dr. Everett Carl Dolman is Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the US Air Force’s
Air Command and Staff College (ACSC). His focus is on international relations and theory, and
he has been identified as Air University’s first space theorist. Dr. Dolman began his career as an
intelligence analyst for the National Security Agency, and moved to the United States Space
Command in 1986. In 1991, he received the Director of Central Intelligence’s Outstanding
Intelligence Analyst award. Dr. Dolman received his PhD in Political Science from the
University of Pennsylvania in 1995. He then taught international relations and international
political economy at The College of William & Mary, Southern Illinois University-Edwardsville,

44
and Berry College before taking his current position at Maxwell AFB in Alabama. Dr. Dolman
received the Air Force’s Educator of the Year Award for 2003/04. His published works include
Astropolitik: Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age (2002); The Warrior State: How Military
Organization Structures Politics (2004), Pure Strategy: Power and Principle in the Information
Age (2005), and Can Science End War? (2015). He has written numerous book chapters as well
as articles for the Journal of Strategic Studies, Comparative Strategy, Journal of Small Wars and
Insurgencies, Soviet and Post-Soviet Review, Citizenship Studies, Politics and Society, Journal of
Political and Military Sociology, and The Air and Space Power Review. Dr. Dolman is also co-
founder and editor emeritus of Astropolitics: The International Journal of Space Power and
Policy. Research Interest/Expertise includes: Military Strategy, Space and Cyber Power, Civil-
Military Relations, Intelligence, Military Theory and Philosophy

Dr. Kelly A. Grieco is an Assistant Professor of Military and Security Studies in the Department
of International Security at the Air Command and Staff College (ACSC). She was previously the
Course Director for War Theory and currently services as the Director of Instruction for
International Security. She teaches courses in war theory, international security, military
effectiveness, and contemporary national security debates. She holds a PhD in Political Science
from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where she was an affiliate of the Security
Studies Program (SSP). She is also a graduate (A.B., Government, summa cum laude) of
Dartmouth College. She has held fellowships from the MIT Center for International Studies
(CIS), the Smith Richardson Foundation, and the Tobin Project. In 2019, she was selected to
participate in the German Marshall Fund’s Young Strategists Forum in Tokyo, Japan. Her
research interests include US grand strategy, military strategy, US alliances, coalition warfare,
military effectiveness, military coercion, and the effect of emerging technologies on the character
of war. She has published on numerous topics, including coalition warfare, the 2018 National
Defense Strategy, unmanned aerial systems, military coercion, the air littoral, and Arctic
security.
Dr. Jordan R. Hayworth is an Associate Professor of Military and Security Studies in the
Department of Leadership and Research Development at the Air Command and Staff College.
He serves as the Director of Electives and Deputy Department Chair. He received his B.A. in
History from High Point University in the Piedmont-Triad region of North Carolina. He earned
his M.A. and PhD in European History from the University of North Texas in Denton, Texas,
where he studied under Dr. Michael V. Leggiere as a Student Fellow of the Military History
Center. His doctoral dissertation won the 2016 Edward M. Coffman First Manuscript Prize
through the Society for Military History. His first book, Revolutionary France’s War of
Conquest in the Rhineland: Conquering the Natural Frontier, 1792-1797 was published by
Cambridge University Press in spring 2019. Currently, he is writing a new history of the 1794
Fleurus Campaign during the French Revolutionary Wars.
CDR Keith A. Henderson is an instructor of Joint Warfighting at Air Command and Staff
College at Maxwell AFB in Montgomery, Alabama. Commander Henderson is a 1998 graduate
45
of the U.S. Naval Academy where he received a BS in Political Science. He also has an MA in
Military Operational Art and Science from Air Command and Staff College and an MS in Joint
Campaign Planning from National Defense University. A career Naval Aviator, he has deployed
on multiple ships in support of contingency operations around the world. His staff tours include
assignments at U.S. Africa Command, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE),
and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.
Dr. Jon Hendrickson is an Assistant Professor of Military and Security Studies in the Joint
Warfighting Department.  After being awarded a Tyng Scholarship to Williams College, he
earned his PhD in military history from The Ohio State University, where he was awarded a
Mershon Center Fellowship to conduct research in Vienna, Rome, Paris, and London.  This
research lead to the publication of Crisis in the Mediterranean, a book on the shifting alliances
and naval races in the Mediterranean before World War I.  After graduating from Ohio State, he
was awarded the Class of 1957 Post-Doctoral Fellowship in Naval History at the US Naval
Academy, and taught at Coastal Carolina University.  He has published and presented several
papers on naval and military history, ancient history, and diplomatic history.

Dr. Kevin C. Holzimmer is Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the Air Command and
Staff College (ACSC).  Before his current position at ACSC, he was a research professor at the
USAF Air Force Research Institute and taught at the School for Advanced Air and Space
Studies.  Dr. Holzimmer has published numerous studies on World War II in the Pacific,
including General Walter Krueger: Unsung Hero of the Pacific War (University Press of
Kansas).  He is currently working on a book-length project that examines how the principal air,
land, and sea commanders forged an effective joint team that successfully fought the Japanese in
Douglas MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific Area.  In addition to his academic pursuits, Dr.
Holzimmer has worked on recent policy concerns, first with GEN David H. Petraeus’
USCENTCOM Joint Strategic Assessment Team (9 October 2008- February 2009) and most
recently conducting fieldwork in charting a US Air Force strategy based upon President Obama’s
famous “pivot to Asia” speech.  He holds a PhD in military history from Temple University.

Dr. Wes Hutto is Assistant Professor of Military and Security Studies in the Department of
International Security, at the USAF Air Command and Staff College. He holds a PhD in Political
Science from the University of Alabama. He serves as Course Director of International Security
I: The Context of International Security and offers electives on comparative regional security and
multinational military exercises. His research interests include international security, military
science, multinational military exercises and US foreign policy, and comparative regional
security. He has published in Defence Studies and RUSI Journal.

Dr. Paul Johstono is an associate professor in the Leadership Department at the Air Command
and Staff College (ACSC). He earned his PhD in History from Duke University in 2012. Prior to
joining ACSC he was an associate professor for history of warfare at The Citadel in Charleston,

46
SC. Dr. Johstono studied History, Classics, and Philosophy at Furman University in Greenville,
SC, and completed his doctoral training between the military history, classics, and public policy
programs at Duke. His first book, The Army of Ptolemaic Egypt, 323-204 BC, was published at
the end of 2020. His scholarly work studies military institutions, martial culture, leadership, and
irregular warfare in antiquity. He is on the editorial board for the Brill series on War in World
History. He is developing projects on the Roman victory over Hellenistic powers, leadership and
decision-making in ancient warfare, a project on Alexander the Great, and a follow-on to his first
book. He contributes to several PME projects on military ethics, designed and leads tours and
staff rides on the Montgomery Bus Boycott, helped launch the Eaker Leader Development
Course, was deputy director for the ACSC Leader Development Course.

Lt Col Ian W. Kemp is an instructor of Joint Warfighting at Air Command and Staff College at
Maxwell AFB in Montgomery, Alabama. Lieutenant Colonel Kemp is a 1997 graduate of
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University where he received a BS in Aerospace Engineering. He
also has a MA in Education (Curriculum Development) from the University of Phoenix and a
MS in Military Operational Art and Science from Air Command and Staff College. A combat
rescue helicopter pilot and Joint Personnel Recovery Center director, he has served in permanent
party and deployed assignments supporting steady-state and contingency operations around the
world. His staff tours include assignments at U.S. Forces Korea, Air Combat Command, First
Air Force (where he commanded the Air Force Rescue Coordination Center), and U.S. Air
Forces in Europe and Air Forces Africa.

Dr. Robert M. Kerr is an Associate Professor in the Joint Warfighting Department. He also
previously served as Course Director for International Security 2: The Use of Armed Force. He
holds a PhD in Political Geography from the University of Oregon, and an MA in Geosciences
from the University of South Carolina. His BA is in History with an emphasis on the Islamic
World from Grand Valley State University. In addition to teaching at ACSC, Dr. Kerr has
worked at the Air Force Culture and Language Center, and taught courses at the US Air Force
Special Operations School, the Senior NCO Academy, and the Air Advisor Academy. In 2008-
2009 he spent 15 months in NE Baghdad with the 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division and 1st
Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division as an embedded political/cultural advisor.

Dr. Michael Kraig is Associate Professor of International Security at the Air Command and
Staff College.  He earned his PhD in political science from the University at Buffalo, New York,
with a major in international security studies and a minor in comparative politics.  Dr. Kraig
served in several senior capacities with the Stanley Foundation, a non-profit, non-partisan NGO
devoted to advocating security policy options for the United States and its competitors that
would moderate the extremes of their geopolitical disagreements. He was a frequent traveler to
Washington, DC, Europe, and the Middle East to give scholarly presentations to senior policy
leaders, policy analysts, and academics. His publications include the book, Shaping US Military

47
Forces for the Asia Pacific: Lessons from Conflict Management in Past Great Power Eras,
published by Rowman & Littlefield Press. He has also authored numerous articles on US-Iran
relations, nuclear deterrence in the developing world between regional rivals, and military theory
and its relation to US conventional force posture in East Asia, in the Journal of Peace Research,
India Review, Security Studies, and Strategic Studies Quarterly.

Lt Col Michael P. Kreuzer, PhD is the Deputy Department Chair and Assistant Professor for
International Security at Air Command and Staff College. He holds a PhD in Public and
International Affairs from Princeton University, a Masters of Public Administration from the
University of Alaska Anchorage, a Masters of Strategic Intelligence from American Military
University, and a BS in History from the US Air Force Academy. He is a career intelligence
officer who has served multiple combat deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan, and was the
Director of Operations for Distributed Ground Station-1. Prior to his current assignment, he was
the Associate Military Provost for the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center at
the Presidio of Monterey, CA. His research interests include the adoption of emerging
technologies by states and military forces, and the organizational capacity required to adapt to
changes in the operating environment.

Dr. Brent Lawniczak is an Assistant Professor of Military and Security Studies in the
Department of Joint Warfighting at Air University’s Air Command and Staff College (ACSC). A
retired Marine aviator (UH-1N/UC-12), he has served in multiple theaters in various capacities.
He is a graduate of Michigan State University, and the United States Marine Corps Command
and Staff College. He earned his PhD in Public Administration and Public Policy (International
Relations) from Auburn University. He served as the Senior Marine Corps Advisor to the
Commandant of ACSC from 2008-2012. Additionally, Brent was qualified as a Command Pilot,
Forward Air Controller (Airborne) (FAC(A)), Forward Air Controller (FAC)/Joint Terminal
Attack Controller (JTAC), and Weapons and Tactics Instructor. His interests and expertise
include joint planning, operational design, joint fires, maritime and amphibious operations,
aviation operations, policy formulation, American politics, international relations, the U.S.
Constitution, and U.S. military history.
Dr. Sebastian H. Lukasik is an Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies in the
Department of Airpower at the United States Air Force’s Air Command Staff College (ACSC).
He received a PhD in American History from Duke University. He has served as Course Director
for the Leadership and Warfare course and the Airpower I course. Prior to arriving at ACSC, he
taught as a visiting instructor at Duke University and North Carolina State University. In
addition to teaching courses in the ACSC core curriculum, he offers elective classes on Combat
Motivation and Morale in Historical Perspective, Cultural History of Flight, and war and society
in the era of the World Wars. Research Interest/Expertise includes: Military Culture; Combat
Motivation and Morale in modern Warfare; the First World War; Cultural History of Flight;
Grand Strategy and Strategic Culture.

48
Dr. Robert (Bob) Mahoney is a Professor in the Department of Joint Warfighting at the Air
Command and Staff College. He has a PhD in History from the George Washington University,
a MS in National Resource Strategy from the Eisenhower School, National Defense University
(NDU), a MS in Management from Webster University, and a BS in Engineering Sciences from
the United States Air Force Academy. Prior to arriving at ACSC, Dr. Mahoney was the Dean of
the Marine Corps War College and an Assistant Professor at the Eisenhower School at NDU. His
book, The Mayaguez Incident, was published by Texas Tech Press. He is a retired USAF colonel
with over 27 years of service, commanded a KC-135 flying squadron, was on the AMC and
CJCS staff, and was a command pilot with over 3,500 hours in the T-37, T-38 and KC-135. His
research interests include the US Constitution, Joint Warfighting, Joint Planning, Operational
Design, Leadership, US Air Force History, Vietnam War era, WW II, Revolutionary War, and
Civil War.

Wg Cdr Rich Milburn currently serves as the UK Liaison Officer to ACSC and is an instructor
in the Department of International Security as well as the Deputy Course Director for
International Security 1. He is a graduate of both ACSC and SAASS. Milburn is an Aerospace
Battle Manager, who has spent considerable time in tactical Air Command and Control posts,
including a tour of duty in Iraq in 2003 and two tours of duty in Afghanistan in 2007 and
2010. His final assignment prior to being at Maxwell was as the Head of the Battle Management
Branch at the NATO Deployable Air Command and Control System, Recognised Picture
Production Centre and Sensor Fusion Post (DARS), part of NATO’s Deployable Air Command
and Control Centre (DACCC).

Dr. John L. Minney is an Assistant Professor of Military and Security Studies in the Joint
Warfighting Department., and currently serves as the War Theory Course Director. He holds an
MA and a PhD in History from the University of Alabama. He is a graduate of both the Air
Command and Staff College and the Air War College in-residence programs. Prior to his arrival
at ACSC he worked as an Assistant Professor of History at Concordia College Alabama and has
taught as an Adjunct Professor of History at the University of Alabama, Auburn University
Montgomery, and Troy University. A retired US Air Force lieutenant colonel, Dr. Minney is a
Master Navigator, and has flown the F-111, F-15E, KC-135, and C-130 aircraft. His research
interests and expertise are in military history, airpower history, the relationship between USAF
doctrine and technology, and grand strategy.

Dr. S. Mike Pavelec is a Professor of Airpower History, and current Chair of the Department of
Airpower at the Air Command and Staff College. He has extensive teaching experience within
JPME, including the Naval War College, the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies
(SAASS), and the Joint Advanced Warfighting School (NDU). He earned his PhD at The Ohio
State University in 2004 and teaches Airpower I and II and War Theory. He also offers electives
on "World War I in the Air" and "The Evolution of Airpower Technology and Theory." A
prolific researcher and writer, he has five books in print and one under contract. His most recent

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book is Airpower Over Gallipoli, 1915-1916 (Naval Institute Press, 2020), in addition to journal
articles and book chapters on airpower, history, space, and cyber. He can be seen on National
Geographic’s TV show Nazi Megastructures as well as the Science Channel's What on Earth.
Research Interest/Expertise includes: Airpower, Space, Cyber, Technology, Theory, Strategy,
and the Philosophy of War.

Lt Col William Phillips is an instructor of Joint Warfighting at Air Command and Staff College
at Maxwell AFB in Montgomery, Alabama. Lieutenant Colonel Phillips is a 2001 graduate of the
Air Force Academy where he received a BS in Computer Science. He also has an MBA from
Trident University International and a MS in Strategic Studies from Air War College. He flew
KC-135s at Fairchild before volunteering for the RQ-4 in 2008 and has worked in the High-
Altitude ISR community since that time, culminating in command of the 99th Expeditionary
Reconnaissance Squadron from 2016 to 2017. He completed multiple staff assignments
including the Joint Staff J-3, the 613 AOC, and PACAF/A3. His most recent assignment was
completing Air War College in residence in AY21.

Dr. Bradley F. Podliska is an Assistant Professor of Military and Security Studies in the
Department of Joint Warfighting at Air University’s Air Command and Staff College (ACSC).
He has a PhD in Political Science (International Relations major) from Texas A&M University, a
M.A. in National Security Studies from Georgetown University, and a B.A. (with honors) in
International Relations from the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Dr. Podliska is a graduate of
the Joint and Combined Warfighting School, ACSC (correspondence), and Squadron Officer
School (correspondence). Prior to arriving at ACSC, Dr. Podliska worked as an intelligence
analyst for the Department of Defense and as an investigator for the US House of
Representatives Select Committee on Benghazi. His publications include a book, Acting Alone:
A Scientific Study on American Hegemony and Unilateral Use-of-Force Decision Making
(Lexington Books) as well as a book chapter and articles and on national security, military
operations, and American institutions. He served as an Air Force Reserves intelligence officer
with US Joint Forces Command and US European Command Directorate of Intelligence (J2)
staff assignments.

Dr Matthew R. Schwonek currently serves as Chairman of the Department of International

Security, Air Command and Staff College (ACSC). He is Associate Professor of Comparative
Military Studies. His responsibilities include teaching ACSC core courses in military theory,
international relations, and security studies. He also teaches elective courses on politics and
security in Central Europe. He received a Doctor of Philosophy Degree in East Central
European and Russian History from the Ohio State University in 1994. Before coming to ACSC
in 1996, he served as assistant director of Ohio State’s Center for Slavic and East European
Studies. His research interests include European military and diplomatic history, the history of
Poland, Russia/Soviet Union, and the Balkans. He has published articles and book chapters on

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the history of Polish arms. He is currently completing a political and military biography of Gen.
Kazimierz Sosnkowski, spanning a career from terrorist to commander in chief.

Dr. M.V. “Coyote” Smith serves as a Professor of Strategic Space Studies in the Schriever
Scholars Space Concentration at the Air Command and Staff College. A retired colonel, Dr.
Smith joined the Air Force in 1976 as a cadet in the Civil Air Patrol. He earned a bachelor’s
degree in physiology from Saint Michael’s College in 1986, a master’s degree in political
science from the University of South Dakota in 1993, and a PhD in strategic studies from the
University of Reading (UK) in 2011. He is also a graduate of the USAF Weapons School, Air
Command and Staff College, and the School of Advanced Airpower Studies. He served as a
strategist in three wars; at the combined air operations center during Operation Allied Force, at
USCENTCOM during Operation Enduring Freedom, and at the Pentagon on Secretary
Rumsfeld’s Strategic Planning Council during Operation Iraqi Freedom. He retired from active
duty in 2016 after a 30-year career, having served in various flying, missile, space, and academic
assignments. He loves the Air Force and believes you should, too!

Dr. Christopher M. Stamper retired in 2010 after 21 years as a naval helicopter pilot. Since
then, he has taught for every department at ACSC but has primarily been an instructor of Joint
Warfighting. He holds a Bachelor of Science Degree in Oceanography from the US Naval
Academy, a Master of Arts in National Security and Strategic Studies from Naval War College,
and a Doctorate in Public Administration from Capella University. His research interests are in
Public Policy and Public Administration of Peacekeeping Operations, East African Affairs, Joint
Planning, African Professional Military Education, and Contemporary African Military
Operations. He has taught at both the US Naval Academy and the Air War College.

Lt Col Andrew J. Swartzer, PhD, is an Assistant Professor of Military and Security Studies in
the Department of Airpower at the United States Air Force’s Air Command and Staff College
(ACSC). He currently teaches War Theory, Airpower I and II, and an elective on the history of
technology. He graduated with a B.S. in Biomedical Sciences from Auburn University, an
M.S.A. in Information Resources Management from Central Michigan University, and an M.S.
in Adult Education from Troy University. Dr. Swartzer received his PhD in History from Auburn
University in 2020. His dissertation was selected as the winner of Auburn University’s 2021
Distinguished Dissertation Award and is currently nominated for the Council of Graduate
Schools (CGS)/ProQuest Distinguished Dissertation Award. A career Space and Missile officer,
he has held operational assignments in the Minuteman III ICBM and the Global Positioning
System (GPS) and has served in multiple joint and training assignments. Prior to his selection for
the Advanced Academic Degree (AAD) program through the Air Force Institute of Technology’s
Civilian Institute Program (AFIT/CIP), he served as an ACSC instructor and Deputy Department
Chair in the Department of Airpower. He and his wife, Amy, have four children.

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Dr. Samantha A. Taylor Is an Assistant Professor of Military and Security Studies in the
Schriever Space Scholars Department of Spacepower at Air Command and Staff College. Dr
Taylor joined ACSC in 2021 and teaches War Theory and Joint War Fighting. Before coming to
ACSC she started her career in Professional Military Education with a Postdoctoral Fellowship
at U.S. Naval War College where she taught Theater National Security Decision Making in
2017. In 2018 she left USNWC and taught as Visiting Professor at US. Army War College in the
Department of National Security and Strategy where she taught theories of war, international
relations, and national security strategy and policy-making. Her PhD is in US diplomatic and
military history with an emphasis on the Cold War to 1998 from the University of Southern
Mississippi. Along with US diplomatic and military history Dr. Taylor studies European military
and diplomatic history, World War I, World War II, US national security strategy and policy
making, cultural history, international relations, and mass communications.
Dr. Mary Elizabeth Walters is an Assistant Professor of Military and Security Studies in the
Department of Airpower. Walters received both her MA and PhD in military history from the
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. She teaches Airpower I, Airpower II, War Theory,
and electives on strategy and Star Wars, the Balkans, and peacekeeping. Her book project,
Hospitality is the Law of the Mountains: The 1999 Kosovo War, argues that Albanians –
motivated by the Albanian concept of hospitality – took strangers into their homes and
communities and changed the course of the refugee crisis. Their actions bought time for the U.S.
military to mobilize, rebuild Albania’s shattered infrastructure, and bring in massive amounts of
aid. Previous published work includes “‘Tree Hugging Work’: The Shifting Attitudes and
Practices of the U.S. Marine Corps Toward Peace Operations in the 1990s” in Marine Corps
History and “A Tantalizing Success: The 1999 Kosovo War” in The Strategy Bridge. Before
joining ACSC, Walters was an assistant professor in the History Department at Kansas State
University where she taught graduate and undergraduate courses on American military history,
the history of strategy, and the Vietnam War(s).
Dr. Michael E. Weaver is an associate professor of history in the Department of Airpower. He
joined the faculty of ACSC in 2002 after completing his doctorate at Temple University under
the tutelage of Russell Weigley. Weaver specializes in aviation history, the Cold War, the
Vietnam War, and World War II. Weaver’s second book, The Air War in Vietnam (Texas Tech
University Press) should be in print in the fall of 2021. His first book was Guard Wars: the 28th
Infantry Division in World War II (Indiana University Press, 2010). Weaver has published
articles on the Cuban Missile Crisis, aircraft capabilities, air combat training, and air economic
intelligence during World War II in Diplomatic History, The Journal of Aeronautical History,
Air Power History, and Intelligence and National Security. His next article, “Operation Coronet
Organ and the Real Origins of Red Flag,” is scheduled to be in print in the fall of 2021 in The
Journal of Cold War Studies.

Dr. Jonathan K. Zartman is an associate professor of international security studies in the

Department of Research at Air Command and Staff College. He received his Ph. D. in 2004 from the

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University of Denver’s Graduate School of International Studies. He taught at the Samarkand State
Institute of Foreign Languages in Samarkand, Uzbekistan as a Fulbright Fellow (2005-2006). He has
also received a David L. Boren Fellowship for language study and research in Dushanbe, Tajikistan
at the Technological University of Tajikistan (2000-2001). He has taught at the University of
Northern Colorado, and Metropolitan State College of Denver. He is the editor of Conflict in the
Modern Middle East: An Encyclopedia of War, Revolution and Regime Change. He has written on
negotiation, Islamic ethics and sustainable peacebuilding. He is editing a book of Tajik history titled
Two Tajik Heroes by Saddridin Aini. His research interests include the process of radicalization,
terrorist ideology, the Persian-speaking world and the broader MENA region. His work promotes
understanding of indigenous cultural identity in the service of building peace.

Dr. Brent D. Ziarnick is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Spacepower at the Air
University’s Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Dr. Ziarnick is a
command space operations officer in the Air Force Reserve with extensive experience in Global
Positioning System (GPS) engineering, offensive space control, and theater space command and
control. In civilian life he was a launch operations engineer at Spaceport America, New Mexico
where he developed the long-range plan for the world’s first purpose-built inland commercial
spaceport’s vertical launch activity. He holds doctorates in economic development from New
Mexico State University and military strategy from Air Univeristy, a master’s degree in space
systems engineering from the University of Colorado-Colorado Springs, a bachelor’s degree in space
operations from the United States Air Force Academy, and is a graduate of both the Air Command
and Staff College and the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies. Dr. Ziarnick is the author of
three books and multiple articles and editorials on space power theory and strategy. His latest book,
To Command the Skies, is a biography of Strategic Air Command Commander, Gen Thomas Power.

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