TRANSPORTATION LAW - Digests Midterm

BY: OSTAN, Evan

1) Baliwag Transit v. CA and Sps. Sotero Cailipan, Jr and Zenaida Lopez and George Cailipan

FACTS:

George Cailipan was a passenger of Baliwag Bus who suffered multiple serious physical injuries
when he was thrown off said bus driven in a careless and negligent manner by Leonardo Cruz,
the bus driver, along Brgy. Patubig, Marilao, Bulacan. He was confined in the hospital for
treatment, incurring medical expenses, which were borne by his parents in the sum of about
P200,000.00 plus other incidental expenses of about P10,000.00.

Sps Cailipan filed a complaint for damages arising from breach of contract of carriage. But,
Baliwag Transit alleged that the cause of the injuries sustained by George was solely
attributable to his own contributory negligence act, in that, without warning and provocation, he
suddenly stood up from his seat and headed for the door of the bus as if in a daze, opened it
and jumped off while said bus was in motion, in spite of the protestations by the driver and
without the knowledge of the conductor.

A 3rd party complaint against Fortune Insurance & Surety Company, Inc., on its 3rd party liability
insurance in the amount of P50,000.00 was instituted. However, Fortune Insurance claimed
limited liability, the coverage being subject to a Schedule of Indemnities forming part of the
insurance policy.

Fortune Insurance and Baliwag filed Motions to Dismiss the complaint filed against them on the
ground that George, in consideration of the sum of P8,020.50, had executed a “Release of
Claims.”

Sotero, father of George, opposed the motion to dismiss. He testified that George who at the
time of the incident was a student, living with his parents and totally dependent on them for
their support; that the expenses for his hospitalization were shouldered by them his parents;
and that they had not signed the “Release of Claims.”

ISSUE:

Is there a legal effect of the "Release of Claims" executed by George?

HELD:

Since the suit is one for breach of contract of carriage, the Release of Claims executed by him,
as the injured party, discharging Fortune Insurance and Baliwag from any and all liability is valid.

The contract of carriage is actually between George, as the paying passenger, and Baliwag, as
the common carrier. Since a contract may be violated only by the parties thereto, as against
each other, in an action upon that contract, the real parties in interest, either as plaintiff or as
defendant, must be parties to said contract.

(real party-ininterest-plaintiff – one who has a legal right;

real party-in-interest-defendant – one who has a correlative legal obligation whose act or
omission violates the legal right of the former).

PRINCIPLE

George is of legal age, a graduating student of Agricultural Engineering, and had the capacity to
do acts with legal effect (Article 37 in relation to Article 402, Civil Code). Thus, he may sue and
be sued even without the assistance of his parents.

"Release of Claims" has the effect of a compromise agreement since it was entered into for the
purpose of making a full and final compromise adjustment and settlement of the cause of
action involved.
2) British Airways Inc. v. CA (G.R. No. 92288, February 9, 1993).

FACTS:

Respondent First International Trading and General Services Co. is a licensed domestic
recruitment and placement agency. It received a telex message from its principal ROLACO
Engineering and Contracting Services in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia to recruit Filipino contract
workers in behalf of said principal.

ROLACO paid to the Jeddah branch of petitioner British Airways, Inc. airfare tickets for 93
contract workers with specific instruction to transport said workers to Jeddah on or before
March 30, 1981

Respondent First International was informed by petitioner British Airways that ROLACO had
forwarded 93 prepaid tickets. First International instructed its travel agent, ADB Travel and
Tours. Inc., to book the 93 workers with petitioner but the latter failed to fly said workers,
thereby compelling private respondent to borrow money in the amount of P304,416.00 in order
to purchase airline tickets from the other airlines for the 93 workers it had recruited who must
leave immediately since the visas of said workers are valid only for 45 days and the Bureau of
Employment Services mandates that contract workers must be sent to the job site within a
period of 30 days.

On June 1981, Respondent was again informed by petitioner that it had received a prepaid ticket
advice from its Jeddah branch for the transportation of 27 contract workers. First International
instructed its travel agent to book the 27 contract workers with the petitioner but the latter was
only able to book and confirm 16 seats on its June 9, 1981flight.

On the date of the scheduled flight only 9 workers were able to board said flight while the
remaining 7 workers were rebooked to June 30, 1981 which bookings were again cancelled by
the petitioner without any prior notice to either respondent or the workers.

Thereafter, the 7 workers were rebooked to the July 4,1981 flight of petitioner with 6 more
workers booked for said flight; but the confirmed bookings of the 13 workers were again
cancelled and rebooked to July 7, 1981.

First International paid the travel tax of the said workers as required by British Airways but when
the receipt of the tax payments was submitted, the latter informed First International that it can
only confirm the seats of the 12 workers on its July 7, 1981 flight, but the confirmed seats of
said workers were again cancelled without any prior notice either to First International or said
workers.

The 12 workers were finally able to leave for Jeddah after First International had bought tickets
from the other airlines.

On July 1981, First International sent a letter to petitioner demanding compensation for the
damages in the amount of P350,000.00 it had incurred by the latter’s repeated failure to
transport its contract workers despite confirmed bookings and payment of the corresponding
travel taxes.

ISSUE:

WON petitioner British Airways is liable.

HELD:

Yes, petitioner airlines repeated failures to transport First International’s workers in its flight
despite confirmed booking of said workers clearly constitutes breach of contract and bad faith
on its part.

Respondent First International has fully complied with the obligation, namely, the payment of
the fare and its willingness for its contract workers to leave for their place of destination.

While, British Airways remiss in its obligation to transport the contract workers on their flight
despite confirmation and bookings made by First International’s traveling agent.

PRINCIPLE

This case is a Contract to Carry. Its elements are consent, consideration and object certain.

1. CONSENT - British Airways consent to the contract was manifested by its acceptance of the
PTA or prepaid ticket advice that ROLACO has prepaid the airfares of the First International’s
contract workers advising the appellant that it must transport the contract

workers on or before the end of March, 1981 and the other batch in June, 1981

2. CONSIDERATION - the fare paid for the passengers by the principal of First International

3. OBJECT CERTAIN - the transport of the passengers from the place of departure to the place

of destination
3) De Guzman v. CA (G.R. No. L-47822, December 22, 1988)

FACTS:

Petitioner Pedro de Guzman, a merchant and dealer of General Milk Company Inc. in
Pangasinan contracted with private respondent Ernesto Cendana for hauling 750 cartons of
milk.

However, only 150 cartons made it, as the other 600 cartons were intercepted by hijackers along
Marcos Highway. Therefore, petitioner filed an action against private respondent.

ISSUE:

WON the high jacking in this case with robbery can be properly regarded as a fortuitous event
that can exempt the carrier.

HELD:

Yes, Cendana is not liable for the value of the undelivered merchandise which is lost because of
an event entirely beyond his control. Armed men hold up the second truck owned by Cendana
which carried petitioner's cargo.

PRINCIPLE

The limits of the duty of extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods carried are
reached where the goods are lost as a result of a robbery which is attended by "grave or
irresistible threat, violence or force."
4) Fabre v. CA (G.R. No. 111127, July 26, 1996)

FACTS:

A minibus drove by Porfirio Cabil, owned by Sps. Fabre, met an accident at Ba-ay in Lingayen,
Pangasinan while transporting 33 members of Word for the World Christian Fellowship Inc.
(WWCF) to Caba, La Union.

Amyline Antonio, who suffered from paraplegia and permanently paralyzed from the waist down,
was awarded damages.

ISSUE: WON Cabil and Fabre are liable.

HELD:

Yes, the Court finds Cabil, negligently, drives the minibus. And, employers Fabres, who own the
bus, fail to exercise due diligence in the selection of their driver. Due diligence in selection of
employees is not satisfied by finding that the applicant possessed a professional driver’s
license. The employer should also examine the applicant for his qualifications, experience and
record of service.

Being a common carrier, employers Fabres are bound to exercise “extraordinary diligence” for
the safe transportation of the passengers to their destination. This duty of care is not excused
by proof that they exercised the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and
supervision of their employee.

Hence, Petitioners are ordered to pay jointly and severally the private respondent Amyline
Antonio for the damages caused by the accident.

PRINCIPLE:

Art. 1732 [NCC]. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in
the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air for
compensation, offering their services to the public.

This article makes "no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying
of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity.
Neither does it distinguish between a carrier offering its services to 'general public,' [i.e., the
general community or population, and one who offers services or solicits business only from a
narrow segment of the general population.]

Art. 1759 provides: Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers
through the negligence or willful acts of the former’s employees, although such employees may
have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common
carriers.
5) Bascos v. CA (G.R. No. 101089, April 7, 1993)

FACTS:

Private Respondent Rodolfo Cipriano of Cipriano Trading Enterprise (CIPTRADE) bound itself to
haul 2,000 m/tons of soya bean of Jibfair Shipping Agency Corp. from Magallanes Drive, Del
Pan, Manila to Calamba, Laguna.

Cipriano subcontracted Estrellita Bascos to deliver 400 sacks of soya bean. However, petitioner
Bascos failed to do so. As a consequence of that failure, Cipriano paid Jibfair Shipping Agency
the amount of the lost goods.

Now, Cipriano demanded reimbursement from petitioner but the latter refused to pay. Eventually,
Cipriano filed a complaint for a sum of money and damages with writ of preliminary attachment
for breach of a contract of carriage.

Bascos interposed that the truck carrying the cargo was hijacked along Canonigo St., Paco,
Manila on the night of October 21, 1988 and that the hijacking was immediately reported to
CIPTRADE and that petitioner and the police exerted all efforts to locate the hijacked properties.

ISSUE:

1) WON petitioner Bascos is a common carrier.

2) WON the hijacking referred herein is a force majeure.

HELD:

1. Yes, Here, petitioner Bascos has made the admission that she is in the trucking business,
offering her trucks to those with cargo to move. Judicial admissions are conclusive and no
evidence is required to prove the same.

2. No, common carriers are obliged to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
goods transported by them. Accordingly, they are presumed to have been at fault or to have
acted negligently if the goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated. There are very few instances
when the presumption of negligence does not attach and these instances are enumerated in
Article 1734. In those cases where the presumption is applied, the common carrier must prove
that it exercises extraordinary diligence in order to overcome the presumption.

The Court holds that the limits of the duty of extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
goods carried are reached where the goods are lost as a result of a robbery which is attended
by "grave or irresistible threat, violence or force."

To establish grave and irresistible force, petitioner presents her accusatory affidavit, Jesus
Bascos’ affidavit, and Juanito Morden’s "Salaysay." However, both the trial court and the Court
of Appeals have concluded that these affidavits are not enough to overcome the presumption.
Petitioner’s affidavit about the hijacking is based on what has been told her by Juanito Morden.
It is not a first-hand account. While it had been admitted in court for lack of objection on the part
of private respondent, the respondent Court has discretion in assigning weight to such evidence.
We are bound by the conclusion of the appellate court.

In a petition for review on certiorari, We are not to determine the probative value of evidence but
to resolve questions of law. Secondly, the affidavit of Jesus Bascos does not dwell on how the
hijacking took place. Thirdly, while the affidavit of Juanito Morden, the truck helper in the
hijacked truck, is presented as evidence in court, he himself is a witness as could be gleaned
from the contents of the petition. Affidavits are not considered the best evidence if the affiants
are available as witnesses. The subsequent filing of the information for carnapping and robbery
against the accused named in the affidavits does not necessarily mean that the contents of the
affidavits are true because they are yet to be determined in the trial of the criminal cases.

The presumption of negligence is raised against petitioner. It is petitioner’s burden to overcome

Given the foregoing, it is the Court's opinion that the petitioner’s claim cannot be sustained. The
petition is hereby dismissed, affirming CA's decision.

PRINCIPLE

Article 1732 (Civil Code) defines a common carrier as “a person, corporation or firm, or
association engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by
land, water or air, for compensation, offering their services to the public.”

The test to determine a common carrier is “whether the given undertaking is a part of the
business engaged in by the carrier which he has held out to the general public as his occupation
rather than the quantity or extent of the business transacted.”

Art. 1732 makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of
persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local
idiom, as a “sideline”). It also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or
enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such
service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish
between a carrier offering its services to the “general public,” i.e., the general community or
population, and one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the
general population.

Article 1745 (6), a common carrier is hold responsible — and will not be allowed to divest or to
diminish such responsibility — even for acts of strangers like thieves or robbers except where
such thieves or robbers in fact act with grave or irresistible threat, violence or force.
6) FGU Insurance v. G.P. Sarmiento (G.R. No. 141910, August 6, 2002).

FACTS:

G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation (GPS) delivered 30 units of Condura S.D. white
refrigerators aboard an Isuzu truck, driven by Lambert Eroles, from Concepcion Industries, Inc.,
along South Superhighway in Alabang, Metro Manila, to the Central Luzon Appliances in
Dagupan City.

In the north diversion road along McArthur highway in Barangay Anupol, Bamban, Tarlac, it
collided with another truck, causing it to fall into a deep canal, resulting in damage to the
cargoes.

FGU Insurance Corporation (FGU), an insurer of the shipment, paid to Concepcion Industries,
Inc., the value of the covered cargoes.

FGU, in turn, being the subrogee of the rights and interests of Concepcion Industries, Inc.,
sought reimbursement of the amount it had paid to the latter from GPS. GPS refused to pay.

ISSUE:

1) WON GPS is a common carrier.

2) WON it is still liable.

HELD:

1) No, SC rules that GPS is not a common carrier being an exclusive contractor and hauler of
Concepcion Industries, Inc.

2) Yes, it is liable. GPS recognizes the existence of a contract of carriage between it and
petitioner’s assured, and admits that the cargoes it has assumed to deliver have been lost or
damaged while in its custody.

This gives rise to a presumption of lack of care and corresponding liability on the part of the
contractual obligor (GPS) the burden being on it to prove otherwise which it has failed while
driver Eroles without proof of his negligence, is not obliged to pay FGU.

PRINCIPLE

ART. 1732 - Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the
business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for hire
or compensation, offering their services to the public, whether to the public in general or to a
limited clientele in particular, but never on an exclusive basis.

The true test of a common carrier is the carriage of passengers or goods, providing space for
those who opt to avail themselves of its transportation service for a fee.
7) Asia Lighterage v. CA (G.R. No. 147246, August 19, 2003).

FACTS:

General Milling Corporation was the consignee of Asia Lighterage. The latter was contracted to
deliver a cargo to the consignee's warehouse at Pasig City. The cargo did not arrived because
the transport of said cargo was suspended due to a warning of an incoming typhoon, however,
the petitioner proceeded to pull the barge to Engineering Island off Baseco to seek shelter.

Later on, the carrier incurred a list because of a hole it sustained after hitting an unseen
protruberance underneath the water. Upon reaching the Sta. Mesa spillways, the barge again ran
aground due to strong current. To avoid the complete sinking of the barge, a portion of the
goods was transferred to three other barges.

The next day, the towing bits of the carrier broke. It sank completely, resulting in the total loss of
the remaining cargo. Private respondent, Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc., as insurer,
indemnified the General Milling Corp. for the lost cargo. Prudential Guarantee, as subrogee,
sought recovery from Asia Lighterage.

ISSUE:

1. WON Petitioner is a common carrier.

2. WON it exercised extraordinary diligence.

HELD:

1. Yes, Asia Lighterage is a common carrier being engage in lighterage and drayage and it offers
its barges to the public for carrying or transporting goods by water for compensation. Petitioner
is clearly a common carrier, whether its carrying of goods is done on an irregular rather than
scheduled manner, and with an only limited clientele. It needs not have public routes or issues
tickets.

2. No, Asia Lighterage is hold liable for the loss of the cargo. It fails to prove that the typhoon is
the proximate cause and only cause of the loss of the cargo, and that it has exercised due
diligence before, during and after the occurrence of the typhoon to prevent or minimize the loss.

It has sustained damage even before the towing bits of the barge broke when it hit a sunken
object while docking at the Engineering Island. The patch-work is not enough for the barge to
sail safely. Thus, when petitioner persists to proceed with the voyage, it recklessly exposes the
cargo to further damage.

PRINCIPLE

Article 1732 of the Civil Code defines common carriers as persons, corporations, firms or
associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both,
by land, water, or air, for compensation, offering their services to the public.

It makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons
or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity(sideline); that
there was no distinguishment between a person or enterprise offering transportation service on
a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or
unscheduled basis.

It does not distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the general public, and one who
offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general population.

Art. 1734. Common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the
goods, unless the same is due to any of the following causes only:

(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity;

(2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;

(3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;

(4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers;

(5) Order or act of competent public authority.

FACTS:

Estela L. Crisostomo contracted to facilitate her booking and accommodation in a tour dubbed
“Jewels of Europe” from respondent Caravan Travel and Tours International, Inc. The package
tour included the countries of England, Holland, Germany, Austria, Liechstenstein, Switzerland
and France at a total cost of P74,322.70. Petitioner was given a 5% discount on the amount,
which included airfare, and the booking fee was also waived because petitioner’s niece, Meriam
Menor, was respondent company’s ticketing manager.

Menor went to petitioner's residence on June 12, 1991 (Wednesday) to deliver petitioner’s travel
documents and plane tickets. Petitioner, in turn, gave Menor the full payment for the package
tour. Menor then told her to be at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport on Saturday, two hours
before her flight on board British Airways.

Petitioner went to NAIA on Saturday, June 15, 1991, to take the flight for the first leg of her
journey from Manila to Hongkong. She learned that her plane ticket was for the flight scheduled
on June 14, 1991. She thus called up Menor to complain.

Menor asked petitioner to take another tour – the “British Pageant” – which included England,
Scotland and Wales in its itinerary which the latter agreed. Petitioner paid US$785.00 or
P20,881.00 (at the then prevailing exchange rate of P26.60). She gave respondent US$300 or
P7,980.00 as partial payment and commenced the trip in July 1991.

Upon return to the Philippines, petitioner asked for reimbursement from respondent Caravan
Travel and Tours the amount of P61,421.70, representing the difference between the sum she
paid for “Jewels of Europe” and the amount she owed respondent for the “British Pageant” tour.

Respondent refused to pay contending that the same was non-refundable.

Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent for breach of contract of carriage and damages.

ISSUE:

WON Caravan Travel and Tours is a common carrier; thus, liable for the breach of contract and
damages.

HELD:

No, respondent Caravan Travel and Tours International, Inc. does not undertake to transport
petitioner Crisostomo from one place to another since its covenant with its customers is simply
to make travel arrangements in their behalf. Its services as a travel agency include booking
customers for tours and facilitating travel permits.

Petitioner’s contractual relation with respondent is the latter’s service of arranging and
facilitating petitioner’s booking and ticketing in the package tour.

In one hand, the object of a contract of carriage is the transportation of passengers or goods. It
is in this sense that the contract between the parties in this case was an ordinary one for
services and not one of carriage.

Record shows that respondent exercised due diligence in performing its obligations under the
contract and followed standard procedure in rendering its services to petitioner. Respondent
books petitioner for the tour, prepares the necessary documents and procures the plane tickets.
It also arranges petitioner’s hotel accommodation as well as food, land transfers and
sightseeing excursions, in accordance with its avowed undertaking.

PRINCIPLE

Article 1732 (Civil Code) defines a common carrier as “a person, corporation or firm, or
association engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by
land, water or air, for compensation, offering their services to the public.”

Since the contract between the parties is an ordinary one for services, the standard of care
required of respondent is that of a good father of a family under Article 1173 of the Civil Code.
This connotes reasonable care consistent with that which an ordinarily prudent person would
have observed.
9) Adolfo Santos vs. Abraham Sibug and Court of Appeals G.R. No. L-26815, May 26, 1981

FACTS:

Petitioner Santos was the owner of a passenger jeep, but he had no certificate of public
convenience (CPC) for the operation of the vehicle as a public passenger jeep. Santos then
transferred his jeep to the name of Vicente U. Vidad, a duly authorized passenger jeepney
operator, so that it could be operated under the latter’s CPC.

Abraham Sibug was bumped by a passenger jeep operated by Vidad and driven by Severe
Gragas. Sibug filed a complaint for damages against Vidad and Gragas.

Sheriff of Manila levied the jeep owned by Santos and scheduled a public auction. Prior to the
sale, Santos presented a third party claim admitting of the arrangement he had with Vidad
regarding the CPC alleging actual ownership of the motor vehicle.

Sibug submitted to the Sheriff a bond issued by Philippine Surety Insurance Company.

Before the auction, Santos instituted an action for damages and injunction with a prayer for
preliminary mandatory injunction against Sibug, Vidad, sheriff, and Philippine Surety.

The lower court affirmed the ownership of Santos over the jeep and ordered payment of
damages to Sibug until the jeep can be returned.

ISSUE:

WON Santos may still prove his ownership over the levied motor vehicle.

HELD:

No, the Court rules that the agreement entered into by Santos and Vivad is a “Kabit System,”
which is prohibited by law. It is not approved by the Public Service Commission (PSC), hence,
Vivad is the owner of the jeep in legal terms.

Since Vivad is the owner of the jeep according to law, then it cannot be said that the Sheriff has
seized the property belonging to a stranger. The Court holds that auction sale as valid.

PRINCIPLE

"Kabit system" whereby a person who has been granted a certificate of convenience allows
another person who owns motor vehicles to operate under such franchise for a fee.

It is contrary to public policy and, thus void.

FACTS:

Respondent spouses Nicasio M. Ocampo and Francisca Garcia procured in installment from
Delta Motor Sales Corporation 5 Toyota Corona Standard cars to be used as taxicabs. Since
they had no franchise to operate the taxicabs, the spouses contracted with petitioner Lita
Enterprises for the use of the latter’s certificate of public convenience in consideration of an
initial payment of P1,000 and a monthly rental of P200 per taxicab unit.

The taxicars were registered in the name of Lita Enterprises, the possession however remain
with the spouses who operated and maintained the same unde the name ACME taxi.

One of the taxicabs driven by their employee, Emeterio Martin, collided with a motorcycle
causing the death of its driver, Florante Galvez. A criminal case was filed against Martin, while a
civil case for damages was instituted by Rosita Sebastian Vda. de Galvez, heir of the victim,
against petitioner as registered owner of the taxicab.

The two taxicabs were levied upon and sold at public auction. Thereafter, respondent Nicasio
Ocampo decided to register his taxicabs in his name. He requested the manager of petitioner to
turn over the registration papers to him, but the latter allegedly refused. Hence, he and his wife
filed a complaint for reconveyance of motor vehicles with damages wherein petitioner ordered
to transfer the registration certificate of the other three Toyota cars not levied upon.

ISSUE:

WON respondent spouses are liable for the amount which the petitioner has paid due to
spouses' driver negligence

HELD:

No, the relationship between the respondent spouses and the petitioner is" Kabit system."

Having entered into an illegal contract, neither can seek relief from the courts, and each must
bear the consequences of his acts.

PRINCIPLE

"Kabit system" whereby a person who has been granted a certificate of convenience allows
another person who owns motor vehicles to operate under such franchise for a fee.

A certificate of public convenience is a special privilege conferred by the government. Abuse of

Under Art. 1409 (CC), even not penalized as a criminal offense, "kabit system" is contrary to
public policy and, therefore, void and inexistent.
11) Dangwa Trans Co., Inc. vs. CA (G.R. No. 95582 October 7, 1991)

FACTS:

Petitioner driver Theodore M. Lardizabal ran over passenger Pedrito Cudiamat.

ISSUE:

WON petitioner is negligent and liable for the damages.

HELD:

Yes, by contract of carriage, the carrier assumes the express obligation to transport the
passenger to his destination safely and observe extraordinary diligence with a due regard for all
the circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered by the passenger is right away
attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier.

Pedrito falls from the platform of the bus when it suddenly accelerates forward and is run over
by the rear right tires of the vehicle. Under such circumstances, he is not guilty of negligence.

Common carriers have the duty to its passengers, including common carriers by railroad train,
streetcar, or motorbus, to stop their conveyances a reasonable length of time in order to afford
passengers an opportunity to board and enter, and they are liable for injuries suffered by
boarding passengers resulting from the sudden starting up or jerking of their conveyances.

PRINCIPLE

Article 1733(CC). Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of
public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods
and for the safety of the passengers transported by them...

Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human
care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons
12) Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) & Rodolfo Roman v. Marjorie Navidad & Prudent
Security Agency G.R. No. 145804, February 6, 2003

FACTS:

Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks when Junelito Escartin, the security
guard assigned to the area approached Navidad and a misunderstanding took place that led to
a fist fight. Navidad, later, fell on the LRT tracks.

When Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad
was struck by the moving train and killed. The widow of Nicanor, Marjorie Navidad, along with
her children, filed an action for damages against Escartin, Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit
Organization Inc. and Prudent.

RTC held that Prudent and Escartin were liable but CA exonerated Prudent and Escartin from
any liability for the death of Navidad and held that LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable.

ISSUE:

Is the CA correct?

HELD:

LRTA’s liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from
the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the
common carrier.

Contract of carriage is deemed created when Navidad pays the fare and enters the premises,
entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection under a contractual relation.

Even Rodolfo yet boards the train, a contract of carriage theretofore has already existed when
the he enters the place where passengers are supposed to be after paying the fare and getting
the corresponding token therefor.

But, the Court rules that there is no showing that petitioner Roman himself is guilty of any
culpable act or omission, hence, he must be absolved from liability.

PRINCIPLE

Common carriers are required to carry their passengers safely using the utmost diligence of
very cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances. Such duty of a common carrier to
provide safety to its passengers so obligates it not only during the course of the trip but for so
long as the passengers are within its premises and where they ought to be in pursuance to the
contract of carriage.
13) National Steel Corporation v. CA, December 12, 1997

FACTS:

National Steel Corporation (NSC) hired MV Vlasons I, a private vessel owned by Vlasons
Shipping, Inc. (VSI). They entered into a contract of voyage charter hire wherein the contract
states that NSC hired VSI's vessel to make one voyage to load steel products at Iligan City and
discharge them at North Harbor, Manila.

Upon opening the three hatches containing the shipment, nearly all the skids of tinplates and
hot rolled sheets were allegedly found to be wet and rusty. NSC filed a complaint for damages.

ISSUE:

WON VSI is a common carrier or a private carrier.

HELD:

It is a private carrier. It does not offer its services to the general public. It's responsibility and
liability over NSC's cargo are determined primarily by the stipulations under the contract of
carriage or charter party and the Code of Commerce. The burden of proof lies on the part of
NSC and not the VSI.

PRINCIPLE

The true test of a common carrier is the carriage of passengers or goods, provided it has space,
for all who opt to avail themselves of its transportation service for a fee.

A carrier which does not qualify under the above test is deemed a private carrier. Private
carriage is undertaken by special agreement and the carrier does not hold himself out to carry
goods for the general public.
14) First Philippine Industrial Corporation vs CA G.R. No. 125948 December 29, 1998

FACTS:

Petitioner was a grantee of a pipeline concession under RA 387, as amended, to contract, install
and operate oil pipelines. It applied for a mayor's permit, but before the mayor's permit could be
issued, the respondent City Treasurer required petitioner to pay a local tax pursuant to the Local
Government Code.

It filed a letter-protest addressed to the respondent City Treasurer, but the latter denied the
same contending that petitioner cannot be considered engaged in transportation business, thus
it cannot claim exemption under Section 133 (j) of the Local Government Code.

Petitioner filed with the RTC Batangas a complaint for tax refund with prayer for writ of
preliminary injunction against respondents, contending that the imposition of tax upon them
violated Sec. 133 of the Local Government Code.

Respondent argued that the pipelines were not included in the term "common carrier" which
refers solely to ordinary carriers such as trucks, trains, ships and the like. The term "common
carrier" under the said code pertains to the mode or manner by which a product is delivered to
its destination.

The lower court dismissed the complaint, ruling that exemption granted under Sec. 133 (j)
encompasses only "common carriers" so as not to overburden the riding public or commuters
with taxes. The petitioner was not a common carrier, but a special carrier extending its services
and facilities to a single specific or "special customer" under a "special contract."

ISSUE:

WON the petitioner is a common carrier and, therefore, exempt from the business tax.

HELD:

Yes, CA decision is being REVERSED and SET ASIDE. SC rules that petitioner is a common
carrier and thus, exempt from business tax. It is engaged in the business of transporting or
carrying goods, i.e. petroleum products, for hire as a public employment. It undertakes to carry
for all persons indifferently, that is, to all persons who choose to employ its services, and
transports the goods by landand for compensation.

The fact that petitioner has a limited clientele does not exclude it from the definition of a
common carrier. The definition of "common carriers" in the Civil Code makes no distinction as
to the means of transporting, as long as it is by land, water or air. It does not provide that the
transportation of the passengers or goods should be by motor vehicle. In fact, in the United
States, oil pipe line operators are considered common carriers.

The legislative intent in excluding from the taxing power of the local government unit the
imposition of business tax against common carriers is to prevent a duplication of the so-called
"common carrier's tax."

PRINCIPLE

The test for determining whether a party is a common carrier of goods is:

1. He must be engaged in the business of carrying goods for others as a public employment,
and must hold himself out as ready to engage in the transportation of goods for person
generally as a business and not as a casual occupation;

2. He must undertake to carry goods of the kind to which his business is confined;

3. He must undertake to carry by the method by which his business is conducted and over his
established roads; and

4. The transportation must be for hire.

Section 133 (j), of the Local Government Code, provides:

Sec. 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units. — Unless
otherwise provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities,
and barangays shall not extend to the levy of the following:

(j) Taxes on the gross receipts of transportation contractors and persons engaged in the
transportation of passengers or freight by hire and common carriers by air, land or water, except
as provided in this Code.
15) Calvo v. UCPB General Insurance (G.R. No. 148496, March 19, 2002)

FACTS:

Virgines Calvo and San Miguel Corporation (SMC) entered into a contract for the transfer of
certain cargo the port of Manila to the warehouse of SMC. The cargo was insured by UCPB
General Insurance Co., Inc. When the shipment arrived and unloaded from the vessel, Calvo
withdrew the cargo from the arrastre operator and delivered the same to SMC’s warehouse.

After inspection, it was found out that some of the goods were torn. UCPB, being the insurer,
paid for the amount of the damages and as subrogee thereafter, filed a suit against Calvo.

Calvo contended that it was a private carrier not required to observe such extraordinary
diligence in the vigilance over the goods.

As customs broker, she does not indiscriminately hold her services out to the public but only to
selected parties.

ISSUE:

WON Calvo is a common carrier liable for the damages for failure to observe extraordinary
diligence.

HELD:

Calvo is a common carrier. The transportation of goods holds an integral part of Calvo’s
business.

PRINCIPLE

Article 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the
business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air for
compensation, offering their services to the public.

The law makes no distinction between a carrier offering its services to the general community
or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general population.
16) Saludo Jr. vs. CA (G.R. 95536 March 23,1992)

FACTS:

Maria Saludo's mother, Crispina Galdo Saludo, died in Chicago Illinois, shipper Pomierski and
Son Funeral Home of Chicago made the necessary preparations and arrangements for the
shipment of the remains from Chicago to the Philippines.

Pomierski brought the remain to C.M.A.S. (Continental Mortuary Air Services) at the airport
(Chicago) which made the necessary arrangements such as flights, transfers, etc. C.M.A.S.
booked the shipment with PAL thru the carrier's agent Air Care International, with Pomierski F.H.
as the shipper and Maria Saludo as the consignee.

The route was from Chicago to San Francisco on board TWA Flight 131 of October 27, 1976 and
from San Francisco to Manila on board PAL Flight No. 107 of the same date, and from Manila to
Cebu on board PAL Flight 149 of October 29, 1976.

Maria Saludo upon arriving at San Francisco Airport, she then called Pomierski that her mother's
remain was not at the West Coast terminal, and Pomierski immediately called C.M.A.S., which in
a matter of 10 minutes informed him that the remain was on a plane to Mexico City, that there
were two bodies at the terminal, and somehow they were switched.

On October 28, 1976, the remain of Crispina Saludo arrived at San Francisco from Mexico on
board American Airlines. The remain was received by PAL at 7:45 p.m. This casket bearing the
remains of Crispina Saludo, which was mistakenly sent to Mexico and was opened, was
resealed by Crispin F. Patagas for shipment to the Philippines.

The shipment was immediately loaded on PAL flight for Manila and arrived on October 30, 1976,
a day after its expected arrival on October 29, 1976.

Aggrieved by the incident, the petitioners instituted an action against respondents and were
asked to pay for damages.

ISSUE:

WON the delay in the delivery of the Crispina's remain is due to the fault of respondent airline
companies.

HELD:

No, Crispina's remain intends to be shipped as agreed upon is really placed in the possession
and control of PAL on October 28, 1976 and it is only from that date that private respondents
became responsible for the agreed cargo under their undertakings in PAL Airway Bill. Therefore,
they cannot be held liable for subsequent events caused thereby.
The PAL Airway Bill is not evidence of receipt of delivery of the cargo but merely as confirmation
of the booking; thus, it is made for the San Francisco-Manila flight scheduled on October 27,
1976. Actually, it was not until October 28, 1976 that PAL received physical delivery of the body
at San Francisco.

PRINCIPLE

Under Article 1736 of the Civil Code, extraordinary responsibility of the common carrier begins
from the time the goods are delivered to the carrier. This responsibility remains in full force and
effect even when they are temporarily unloaded or stored in transit, unless the shipper or owner
exercises the right of stoppage in transitu, and terminates only after the lapse of a reasonable
time for the acceptance, of the goods by the consignee or such other person entitled to receive
them.

And, there is delivery to the carrier when the goods are ready for and have been placed in the
exclusive possession, custody and control of the carrier for the purpose of their immediate
transportation and the carrier has accepted them.
17) Lasam vs. Smith (G.R. No. 19495 Feb 2, 1924)

FACTS:

The defendant was engaged in the business of carrying passengers for hire in La Union and
surrounding provinces. Defendant transported plaintiffs from San Fernando to Currimao, Ilocos
Norte.

The car was driven by a licensed chauffeur, but after having reached the town of San Juan, the
chauffeur allowed his assistant, Bueno, to drive the car. Bueno held no driver’s license, but had
some experience in driving.

The car functioned well until after the crossing of the Abra River in Tagudin, when, according to
the testimony of the witnesses for the plaintiffs, defects developed in the steering gear so as to
make accurate steering impossible, and after zigzagging for a distance of about half a kilometer,
the car left the road and went down a steep embankment.

It overturned and the plaintiffs pinned down under it. Lasam escaped with a few contusions and
a dislocated rib, but his wife, Joaquina, received serious injuries, among which was a compound
fracture of one of the bones in her left wrist. She also suffered nervous breakdown

A complaint was filed about a year and a half after and alleges that the accident was due to
defects of the car and the negligence of the chauffeur.

ISSUE:

Is there a breach of contract and not due to a fortuitous event?

HELD:

Yes, it is sufficient to reiterate that the source of the defendant’s legal liability is the contract of
carriage; that by entering into that contract he bound himself to carry the plaintiffs safely and
securely to their destination.

It is not suggested that the accident in question is due to an act of God or to adverse road
conditions which could have been foreseen. It is caused either by defects in the automobile or
else through the negligence of its driver.

PRINCIPLE

Defendant's failure to fulfill his obligation is not due to causes mentioned in article 1105 of the
Civil Code, “No one shall be liable for events which could not be foreseen or which, even if
foreseen, were inevitable, with the exception of the cases in which the law expressly provides
otherwise and those in which the obligation itself imposes such liability.
18) Marana vs. Perez G.R. 22272, June 26, 1967

FACTS:

Rogelio Corachea was a passenger in a taxicab (operated by Pascual Perez) when he was
stabbed and killed by the driver, Simeon Valenzuela. Valenzuela was prosecuted for homicide in
the Court of First Instance of Batangas.

On December 6 1961, while appeal was pending in the Court of Appeals, Antonia Marañan,
Rogelio's mother, filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Batangas to recover damages
from Perez and Valenzuela.

Antonia Marañan argued that Perez and Valenzuela were both liable for the death of her son,
Corachea. Specifically for Perez, his liability arises from breach of contract of carriage.

On one hand, Perez alleged that the death was a caso fortuito for which the carrier was not
liable. He relied solely on the ruling enunciated in Gillaco v. Manila Railroad Co., 97 Phil. 884,
that the carrier was under no absolute liability for assaults of its employees upon the
passengers.

ISSUE:

Is Perez liable?

HELD:

Yes, the facts in Gillaco case and the one at bar are very different. In the Gillaco case, the
passenger is killed outside the scope and the course of duty of the guilty employee. Here, the
killing is perpetrated by the driver of the very cab transporting the passenger, in whose hands
the carrier has entrusted the duty of executing the contract of carriage.

Unlike the Gillaco case, the killing of the passenger here takes place in the course of duty of the
guilty employee and when the employee is acting within the scope of his duties.

In addition, the Gillaco case is decided under the provisions of the Civil Code of 1889 which
does not impose upon common carriers absolute liability for the safety of passengers against
willful assaults or negligent acts committed by their employees.

The death of the passenger in the Gillaco case is truly a fortuitous event which exempted the
carrier from liability.

PRINCIPLE

In the New Civil Code, Art. 1759 which categorically states that Common carriers are liable for
the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the former's
employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in
violation of the orders of the common carriers.
19) Bachelor Express Inc. vs. CA (G.R. No. 85691, July 31, 1990)

FACTS:

A bus owned by Bachelor Express, Inc. (BEI) and driven by Cresencio Rivera picked up a
passenger which was seated at the rear portion suddenly stabbed a PC soldier which caused
commotion and panic among the passengers.

When the bus stopped, passengers Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut were found lying
down the road, the former already dead as a result of head injuries and the latter also suffering
from severe injuries which caused her death later. The passenger assailant alighted from the
bus and rantoward the bushes but was killed by the police.

Thereafter, the heirs of Ornomino Beter and Narcisa Rautraut (Ricardo Beter and Sergia Beter
are the parents of Ornominio while Teofilo Rautraut and Zotera Rautraut are the parents of
Narcisa) filed a complaint for “sum of money” against Bachelor Express, its alleged owner
Samson Yasay, and the driver Rivera.

ISSUE:

WON petitioner observed extraordinary diligence to safeguard the lives of its passengers.

HELD:

No, from the findings of the Court, the bus driver did not immediately stop the bus at the height
of the commotion; the bus was speeding from a full stop; the victims fell from the bus door
when it was opened or gave way while the bus was still running; the conductor panicked and
blew his whistle after people had already fallen off the bus; and the bus was not properly
equipped with doors in accordance with law.

It is clear that the petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of fault and negligence
found in the law governing common carriers.

PRINCIPLE

ART. 1756 NCC. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to
have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755.

ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy,
are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety
of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.

ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for
all the circumstances.
20) Japan Airlines vs. CA (G.R. No. 118664 August 7, 1998)

FACTS:

Respondents Jose Miranda, Enrique Agana, Maria Angela Nina Agana and Adelia Francisco
were on a Japan Airlines (JAL) flight from San Franciso, California bound for Manila with
overnight stopover at Narita, Japan. Then, the flight was cancelled because NAIA’s closed
indefinitely after the Mt. Pinatubo eruption.

Respondents filed an action for damages after JAL refused to pay their hotel and
accommodation expenses for their unexpected additional stay in Japan.

The Lower Court ruled that when JAL was prevented from resuming its flight to Manila due to
the NAIA closure because of the Mt. Pinatubo eruption, a force majeure, the losses or damages
in the form of hotel and accommodation expenses the respondents incurred, cannot be charged
to JAL.

But, nominal damages were awarded. Japan Airlines denied on its obligation to look after the
comfort and convenience of its passengers when it declassified respondents from transit
passengers to new passengers as a result of which respondents were obliged to make the
necessary arrangements themselves for the next flight to Manila.

ISSUE:

1. WON JAL has the obligation to shoulder the hotel and meal expenses of its stranded
passengers.

2. WON it is liable for damages.

HELD:

1. No, the Mt. Pinatubo eruption prevented JAL from proceeding to Manila on schedule, and the
event can be considered force majeure; their delayed arrival was not imputable to JAL.

2. JAL is liable for the respondents living expenses during their unexpected stay in Narita since
airlines have the obligation to ensure the comfort and convenience of its passengers.

PRINCIPLE

When a party is unable to fulfill his obligation because of force majeure, the general rule is that
he cannot be held liable for damages for non-performance.

Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of a plaintiff, which has been violated or
invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized and not for the purpose of
indemnifying any loss suffered by him.
21) Philippine National Railways vs. CA (G.R. No. L055347, October 4, 1985)

FACTS:

Winifredo Tupang, husband of the respondent Rosario Tupang, boarded Philippine National
Railways (PNR) from Libmanan, Camarines Sur to Manila. Due to some mechanical defect, the
train stopped at Sipocot, Camarines Sur for repairs.

However passing Iyam Bridge at Lucena, Quezon, Winifredo fell off the train and died. The train
did not stop despite the alarm raised by the other passengers that somebody fell from the train.
Instead, Perfecto Abrazado, the train conductor, called the station agent at Candelaria, Quezon
and requested for verification of the information.

ISSUE:

1. WON PNR observed extraordinary diligence.

2. WON Winifredo is negligent

HELD:

1. No, the records show that the train boarded by Winifredo is over-loaded that he and many
other passengers has no choice but to sit on the open platforms between the coaches of the
train.

Furthermore, the train is at top speed when it approaches the Iyam Bridge which is under repair.
It also continues running despite the alarm raised by other passengers that a person has fallen
off the train.

2. Winifredo is chargeable with contributory negligence, as the Court finds, since he opts to sit
on the open platform between the coaches, he must have hold tightly on the upright metal bar
of the platform to avoid falling off from the speeding train. As such, there is no moral damages
and exemplary damages awarded.

PRINCIPLE

A common carrier has the obligation to transport its passengers to their destinations and to
observe extraordinary diligence in doing so. Death or any injury suffered by any of its
passengers gives rise to the presumption that it was negligent in the performance of the said
obligations.

PNR fails to overthrow such presumption with clear and convincing evidence.
22) Compania Maritama vs. CA (G.R. No. L 31379)

FACTS:

Respondent Vicente Concepcion, being a Manila based contractor, had to ship his construction
equipment to Cagayan de Oro. On August 28, 1964, Concepcion shipped 1 unit pay-loader, 4
units of 6x6 Roe trucks, and 2 pieces of water tanks through petitioner.

The equipments were loaded in the MV Cebu, which left Manila on August 30, 1964 and arrived
at Cagayan de Oro on September 1, 1964. The Reo trucks and water tanks were safely unloaded;
however, the pay-loader suffered damage while being unloaded.

Respondent Concepcion wrote petitioner Compania Maritima to replace the broken pay-loader
and also asked for damages but there was no response.

ISSUE:

WON the act of Concepcion of misdeclaring the true weight of the pay-loader the proximate and
only cause of the damage of the pay-loader.

HELD:

No, Compania Maritima is liable for the damage to the pay-loader. It requires common carriers
to render service with the greatest skill and foresight and to use all reasonable means to
ascertain the nature and characteristics of goods tendered for shipment and to exercise due
care in the handling and stowage including such methods as their nature requires.

PRINCIPLE

Common carriers are presumed to be at fault or to have acted negligently in case the goods
transported by them are lost, destroyed, or had deteriorated; unless they exercise extraordinary
diligence.