1

PEOPLE v. POMAR
November 3, 1924, G.R. No. L-22008, Johnson, J.

FACTS:
Julio Pomar is the manager and person in charge of La Flor de la Isabela, a
tobacco factory pertaining to La Campania General de Tabacos de Filipinas,
a corporation duly authorized to transact business in the City of Manila.
under his employ is Macaria Fajardo, whom he granted vacation leave by
reason of her pregnancy. However, Pomar did not pay her the wages she is
entitled to corresponding to 30 days before and 30 days after her delivery
and confinement. Despite demands made by her, Pomar still refused to pay
Fajardo.

The CFI found Pomar guilty of violating section 13 in connection with

section 15 of Act No. 3071. POmar appealed questioning the
constitutionality of the Act.

Said section 13 was enacted by the Legislature of the Philippine Islands in

the exercise of its supposed police power, with the praiseworthy purpose of
safeguarding the health of pregnant women laborers in “factory, shop or
place of labor of any description,” and of insuring to them, to a certain
extent, reasonable support for one month before and one month after their
delivery.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Act 3071 has been adopted in the reasonable and lawful
exercise of the police power of the state.

RULING:
The police power of the state is a growing and expanding power. As
civilization develops and public conscience becomes awakened, the police
power may be extended, as has been demonstrated in the growth of public
sentiment with reference to the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors.
But that power cannot grow faster than the fundamental law of the state,
nor transcend or violate the express inhibition of the people’s law – the
constitution. If the people desire to have the police power extended and
applied to conditions and things prohibited by the organic law, they must
first amend that law.

It will also be noted from an examination of said section 13, that it takes no
account of contracts for the employment of women by the day nor by the
piece. The law is equally applicable to each case. It will hardly be contended
that the person, firm or corporation owning or managing a factory, shop or
place of labor, who employs women by the day or by the piece, could be
compelled under the law to pay for sixty days during which no services were
rendered.
 2

For all of the foregoing reasons, we are fully persuaded, under the facts and
the law, that the provisions of section 13, of Act No. 3071 of the Philippine
Legislature, are unconstitutional and void.
Therefore, the sentence of the lower court is hereby revoked, the complaint
is hereby dismissed.
People v. Young

Facts.
Young witnessed two older man beating a young boy and he proceeded to
intervene, believing the boy was being assaulted, and attacked the two men.
As it turns out, the two men were undercover detectives who were
attempting to arrest the boy for disorderly conduct and the boy happened to
be resisting arrest. When Young decided to attack the two men he had no
knowledge they were undercover officers. Young was charged with assault.

Issue.

Whether a criminal defendant can be convicted of assault when they intend

to cause bodily harm or immediate apprehension of bodily harm to another
person, even if the assault is justified based on mistake of fact?

Held.

Yes. A criminal defendant can be convicted of assault when they intend to

cause bodily harm or immediate apprehension of bodily harm to another
person, even if the assault is justified based on mistake of fact.

Concurrence.

None

Discussion.

A defendant can be criminally liable when they intend to cause bodily harm
or immediate apprehension of harm to another person regardless if there is
a mistake of fact present. Because the motive behind the intent makes no
difference, Young can be convicted of assault of the officers because he
intended to cause them bodily harm. The jury can find Young not guilty of
assault, but that doesn't change the fact he should still be charged and tried
for it.
 3

G.R. No. 76338-39 February 26, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.

RENATO TAC-AN Y HIPOS, accused-appellant.

FACTS:

Accused Renato Tac-an appeals from the decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Tagbilaran City, convicting him of qualified illegal possession of a firearm
and ammunition.

The above-named accused, while acting under the influence of drugs and
without any license or permit from the proper authorities, did have ill his
possession custody and control an unlicensed firearm, a SMITH & WESSON
Airweight caliber .38 revolver and without any justifiable cause and with
intent to kill, used the said firearm and ammunitions to shoot one Francis
Ernest Escano III hitting and inflicting upon the latter the following gunshot
wounds.

Appellant contends that he had voluntarily surrendered and that the trial
court should have considered that mitigating circumstance in his favor.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Renato's voluntary surrender warrant him a mitigating

circumstance.

HELD:

No. Renato surrendered his gun, not himself, by handing over the weapon
through the balustrade of the faculty room. Secondly, he surrendered the
gun to his brother, who was not in any case a person in authority nor an
agent of a person in authority. Thirdly, Renato did not surrender himself he
was arrested by Capt. Lazo. The fact that he did not resist arrest, did not
constitute voluntary surrender. Finally, if it be assumed that Renato had
surrendered himself, such surrender cannot be regarded as voluntary and
spontaneous. Renato was holed up in the faculty room, in effect holding
some teachers and students as hostages. The faculty room was surrounded
by Philippine Constabulary soldiers and there was no escape open to him.
 4

G.R. No. L-34785 July 30, 1979THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

plaintiff,vs.
RENATO BARRIOS Y ALMOGUERA and RICO NAZARIO Y IBAÑEZ,
accused.

CASE Nature:
An Automatic Review of the decision of the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila

SC Ruling:
Decision under automatic review is hereby affirmed, with the sole
modification that the penalty imposed on the two accused is reclusion
perpetua
Legal Doctrine:
Art. 14, Section

FACTS:
The accused Barrios and Ibañez killed a taxi driver, Teodoro Molina by
stabbing him and robbing all his earnings. Both of the accused admit to the
crime they have committed however they have an excuse that they only
stabbed the victim because he fought back after pulling him out to the rear
sit of the taxi in order to frisk him for his belongings. The driver was even
able to shout for helped, as seen by one of the witness, Generoso Quimpo,
Jr.?

ISSUES:
Whether or not the accused can be awarded of an aggravating circumstance
of craft or on abuse of superior strength when they robbed and killed the
taxi driver? (NO)
RULING:
The evidence of the prosecution that the crime was committed was
established beyond reasonable doubt. The trial court imposed the death
penalty on both accused because of the finding that the commission of the
crime was attended by the aggravating circumstances of craft and abuse of
superior strength without any mitigating circumstance. The evidence of the
prosecution has not established the aggravating circumstances of craft and
abuse of superior strength. The trial court found that craft was present
because the two accused stopped the taxi cabby pretending to be
passengers. There is no evidence that the two accused pretended to be
passengers. In fact, it is not clear how the taxicab was stopped. It is clear
from the foregoing testimony that when Generoso M. Quimpo, Jr. looked out
of the window from his house, the taxicab was already at a standstill and
that only two men were struggling at the rear seat of the taxicab, the driver
of the taxicab and one man. This testimony of the prosecution witness also
rules out the existence of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
 5

strength. Only one man was struggling with the taxi driver at the rear seat
of the taxicab and the witness saw only one man coming out of the rear of
the taxicab and running towards the opposite direction going to Estrada
Street. It is settled that an aggravating circumstance should be proven as
fully as the crime itself in order to aggravate the penalty.
 6

US v. Serapio [23 P 584]

June 28, 2015

FACTS: Defendant was charged with the crime of libel. Upon said complaint
the defendant was duly arraigned. Upon arraignment the defendant, by his
attorneys, presented the following demurrer:I. The facts alleged in the
complaint do not constitute a crime. II. It appears from the allegation in the
complaint that if there were a crime it has prescribed. With reference to the
second ground, counsel for the defense maintains that the crime has
prescribed under the provisions of the laws in force in the Islands and
supports such conclusion by asserting that in the absence of a definite
provision in Act No. 277 of the Philippine Commission, which fixes the time
during which the penal action arising from the crime of libel may be
exercised, the time which article 131 of the Penal Code fixes for the
prescription of the crimes of calumny and insults is strictly applicable.

Against this contention of the defense, the Attorney-

General and the private prosecutor maintain that the prescription of a
general nature contained in said article 131 is not applicable, for two
reasons: First, because the crime of libel is entirely distinct and independent
from calumny and insults; and Second, because that provision of the code
in the matter of prescription of crimes is not applicable to the crimes created
and punished by special laws promulgated by the Philippine Commission or
the Philippine Legislature.

ISSUE: whether the rules of the Penal Code cannot be applied in the penalty
to be imposed in the crimes punished by a special Act.

RULING: But it is no less certain that by applying the rule that a criminal
act is not prescriptible unless the law expressly fixes such description." In
our opinion this is the correct rule. The doctrine of prescription or the
limitation of time within which an action may be brought, is of purely
statutory origin. Both under the common and the civil law a right of action
never died by mere lapse of time. The court, in the absence of express law,
has no authority to fix a period of prescription or limitation. Under the Penal
Code the word "prescription" is used with reference to the time within which
the action must be brought. (See Penal Code, art. 130, paragraphs 6 and
7.).By prescription or limitation of actions, the right of action is not
extinguished, neither under the common nor under the civil law. Both the
Civil and Penal Codes provide when the action is extinguished and when it
is prescribed simply. These statutes (of prescription or limitation)did not
destroy the right. They simply provided in effect, that, after the lapse of the
time prescribed by law, the defendant might object, if he desired, to being
 7

sued. If the defendant failed, in some proper way, to object, or, in other
words, interpose the statutory defense, the action could be maintained. The
statute provided a special defenses imply. If the defense of prescription or
limitation is not expressly raised, it is waived and is not available. It cannot
be raised by demurrer. It must be expressly pleaded. Our conclusions, then,
following the rule heretofore adopted by this court, are:First. That by reason
of article 7 of the Penal Code, some of the general provisions of said code do
not apply to the penal laws of the United States Commission, unless, by
express provision of law, they are made applicable.Second. That there is no
general or special provision of law making any of the provisions of the Penal
Code applicable to the Libel of Law of the United States Commission (Act No.
277), except the provision as to subsidiary imprisonment when a fine is
imposed. (Act No. 1732.).Third. That the period of prescription fixed by
article 131 of the Penal Code for calumny and insults, does not apply to the
crime of libel as defined and punished under Act No. 277 of the United
States Commission.
Fourth. That unless a period of prescription or limitation is fixed by law for a
particular offense or crime, the action for such offense or a crime is not
barred by lapse of time.Fifth. That the law defining and punishing the crime
of libel (Act No. 277) has not fixed a period of prescription or limitation
within which an action for such crime shall be instituted.

For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the lower court, sustaining
the second ground of demurrer, is hereby reversed, and it is hereby ordered
that the cause be remanded to the lower court from which it came, with
direction that the defendant Jose S. Serapio be ordered to appear and plead
to the complaint presented in this cause.
 8

People vs. Sunico, et al [C.A., 50 o.g. 5880]

June 28, 2015

FACTS: The accused were election inspectors and poll clerks whose duty
among others was to transfer the names of excess voters in other precincts
to the list of a newly created precinct. Several voters were omitted in the list.
Because their names were not in the list, some of them were not allowed to
vote. The accused were prosecuted for violation of Secs. 101 and 103 of the
Revised Election Code. The accused claimed that they made the omission in
good faith. The trial court seemed to believe that notwithstanding the fact
that the accused committed in good faith the serious offense charged, the
latter are criminally responsible therefor, because such offense is malum
prohibitum, and, consequently, the act constituting the same need not be
committed with malice or criminal intent to be punishable.

ISSUE: Is the act of the accused merely a mala prohibita?

HELD: The acts of the accused cannot be merely mala prohibita - they are
mala in se. The omission or failure to include a voter’s name in the registry
list of voters is not only wrong because it is prohibited; it is wrong per se
because it disenfranchises a voter and violates one of his fundamental
rights. Hence, for such act to be punishable, it must be shown that it has
been committed with malice. There is no clear showing in the instant case
that the accused intentionally, willfully and maliciously omitted or failed to
include in the registry list of voters the names of those voters. They cannot
be punished criminally.
*the Revised Election Code, as far as its penal provisions are concerned, is a
special law, it being not a part of the RPC or its amendments.
 9

MAGNO v. CA

CaseSummary
Magno entered into a lease agreement for the equipment he needs with LS
Finance with thecondition that he pay a warranty deposit. By his admission,
the petitioner asked the VP of LSFinance to look for a third party who can
lend him the money for the warranty deposit. Withouthis knowledge, VP of
Mancor, the company that distributes the equipment he needs, issued
thewarranty deposit with 3% interest. When the petitioner was unable to
pay the lease and the leaseagreement has been terminated by LS Finance,
he found out about the involvement the VP of Mancor. Later, he was
convicted by RTC for issuing bouncing checks to the VP of Mancor as
payment for the amount used by the latter to pay the warranty deposit for
the lease agreement. Inan appeal for certiorari with the SC, the court found
him not guilty of violating BP 22.
Decision
Petitioner was acquitted.
Doctrine
with a willing court system to apply the full harshness of the special law in
question, using the "mala prohibita" doctrine, the noble objective of the law
is tainted with materialism and opportunism in the highest degree. Re: BP
22: the law was devised to safeguard the interest of the banking system and
the legitimate public checking account user. It did not intend to shelter or
favor nor encourage users of the system to enrich themselves through
manipulations and circumvention of the noble purpose and objective of the
law. Least should it be used also as a means of jeopardizing honest-to-
goodness transactions with some color of "get-rich" scheme to the prejudice
of well-meaning businessmen who are the pillars of society. Under the
utilitarian theory, the "protective theory" in criminal law, "affirms that the
primary function of punishment is the protective (sic) of society against
actual and potential wrongdoers. "Cardinal Rule: The accused is presumed
innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt

RELEVANT FACTS

Appeal by certiorari under rule 45 of Revised Rules of Court from the

decision of CA which affirmed in toto the decision of RTC QC Branch 104
finding the accused petitioner (P) guilty of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg
22 (BP22)4 counts of the offense charged illustrated by the OSG April 1983:
P in the process of putting up a car repair shop but did not have complete
equipment that could make his venture workable and lacked funds to
purchase the equipment needed to make his business operational
 10

Representing Ultra Sources International Corp, P approached Corazon Teng,

VP of Mancor Industries for needed equipment of which Mancor is a
distributor

Teng referred P to LS Finance and Management Corp (LS) advising VP Joey

Gomez that Mancor was willing and able to supply equipment needed if LS
could accommodate P and provide him credit facilities.

Magno v. CA

FACTS: Sometime in April 1983, Petitioner was in the process of putting up

a car repair shop, but he did not have complete equipment that could make
his venture workable. He also lacked the funds with which to purchase the
necessary equipment to make such business operational. Thus, petitioner,
representing Ultra Sources International Corporation, approached Corazon
Teng, (private complainant) Vice President of Mancor Industries (hereinafter
referred to as Mancor) for his needed car repairs service equipment of which
Mancor was a distributor. Corazon Teng referred Magno to LS Finance and
Management Corporation (LS Finance for brevity) advising its Vice President,
Joey Gomez, that Mancor was willing and able to supply the pieces of
equipment needed if LS Finance could accommodate petitioner and provide
him credit facilities. The arrangement went through on condition that
petitioner has to put up a warranty deposit of thirty per centum (30%) of the
total value of the pieces of equipment to be purchased, amounting to
P29,750.00. Since petitioner could not come up with such amount, he
requested Joey Gomez on a personal level to look for a third party who could
lend him the equivalent amount of the warranty deposit, however, unknown
to petitioner it was Corazon Teng who advanced the deposit in question, on
condition that the same would be paid as a short term loan at 3% interest.
As part of the arrangement, petitioner and LS Finance entered into a leasing
agreement. After documentation was completed, the equipment were
delivered to petitioner who in turn issued a postdated check and gave it to
Joey Gomez who unknown to petitioner delivered it to Corazon Teng. When
the check matured, petitioner requested through Joey Gomez not to deposit
the check as he (Magno) was no longer banking with Pacific Bank. The
petitioner issued another set of six (6) postdated checks Two (2) were
deposited and cleared while four (4) others were which were momentarily
held by Corazon Teng did not have sufficient funds which became the cause
of the charges. Subsequently, petitioner could not pay LS Finance the
monthly rentals, thus it pulled out the garage equipments. After joint trial
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, the
accusedpetitioner was convicted for violations of BP Blg. 22 on the four (4)
cases as follows: “x x x finding the accused appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of offense of violations of B.P. Blg. 22 and sentencing the
accused to imprisonment for one year in each Criminal Case Nos. Q-35693,
Q-35695, Q-35696 and to pay complainant the respective amounts reflected
in subject checks”.
 11

ISSUE: Is the petitioner punishable for violating B.P. Blg. 22 which is a

special statutory law, violations of which are mala prohibita?

HELD: No. Despite there being no error that the petitioner had violated B.P.
Blg. 22, a mala prohibitum law (which does not look at the intent of the
violator), the transaction did not ripen into a purchase, but

remained a lease with rentals being paid for the loaned equipment, which
were pulled out by lessor (Mancor) when the petitioner failed to continue
paying, possibly due to economic constraints or business failure. It was
lawful and just that the warranty deposit should not be charged against the
petitioner. The petitioner was a victim of a modus operandi. And, with a
willing court system to apply the full harshness of the special law in
question, using a mala prohibita doctrine, the noble objective of the law is
tainted with materialism and opportunism to the highest degree. For all
intents and purposes, the law was devised to safeguard the interest of the
banking system and the legitimate public checking account user. Least
should be it used as a means of jeopardizing honest-to-goodness
transactions with some color of “get-rich” scheme to the prejudice of well-
meaning businessmen who are the pillars of society.

RATIONALE: Under the utilitarian theory, the “protective theory” in criminal

law, affirms that the primary function of punishment is the protective (sic) of
society against actual and potential wrongdoers.” Following the aforecited
theory, in petitioner’s stead the “potential wrongdoer,” whose operation
could be a menace to society, should not be glorified by convicting the
petitioner. The appellate courts admittedly relied solely on the rule that
cases of mala prohibita cases only question whether or not the law had been
violated, proof of criminal intent not being necessary for the conviction of an
accused. Note. – Essential requisite of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
is knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the
insufficiency of his funds. Mere act of issuing a worthless check is a special
offense punishable by the Anti Bouncing Checks Law and the offense is
Malum Prohibitum (People vs. Grospe, 157 SCRA 154)
 12

People v Macatanda [109 S 35]

June 28, 2015

FACTS: Charged with and convicted on a plea of guilty, in the Court of First
Instance of Lanao del Norte, Branch IV in Iligan City, for the crime of cattle
rustling, Saglala Macatanda. From the judgment of conviction, Saglala
Macatanda (hereinafter referred to as appellant) appealed direct to this
Court. The Solicitor General comes up with a reply that Article 64 of the
Revised Penal Code does not apply to penalties prescribed by special laws.
He considers P.D. 533, otherwise known as "Anti- Cattle Rustling Law of
1974" as a special law, and in accordance with existing rulings, 8 the
penalty should not be governed by the Revised Penal Code.

ISSUE: Whether the contention of the Solicitor-General is valid.

RULING: The court do not agree with the Solicitor General that P.D. 533 is a
special law, entirely distinct from and unrelated to the Revised Penal Code.
From the nature of the penalty imposed which is in terms of the
classification and duration of penalties as prescribed in the Revised Penal
Code, which is not for penalties as are ordinarily imposed in special laws,
the intent seems clear that P.D. 533 shall be deemed as an amendment of
the Revised Penal Code, with respect to the offense of theft of large cattle
(Art. 310), or otherwise to be subject to applicable provisions thereof such as
Article 104 of the Revised Penal Code on civil liability of the offender, a
provision which is not found in the decree, but which could not have been
intended to be discarded or eliminated by the decree. Article 64 of the same
Code should, likewise, be applicable, under which the presence of two
mitigating circumstances, as found by the trial court, that of plea of guilty
and extreme poverty, without any aggravating circumstances to offset them,
entitles appellant to a lowering by one degree of the penalty for the offense,
which under P.D. No. 533 is prision mayor, maximum, to reclusion
temporary medium.
 13

Dunlao v CA [August 22,1996]

June 28, 2015
FACTS: Petitioner is a duly licensed retailer and wholesaler of scrap iron in
Davao City using the business name Dunlao Enterprise. Fortunato Mariquit
and Carlito Catog, both employees of Lourdes Farms, were instructed by its
proprietor, Mrs. Lourdes Du, to go to petitioners premises together with
police officers Pfc. Epifanio Sesaldo and Pat. Alfredo Ancajas to verify
information received that some farrowing crates and G.I. pipes stolen from
Lourdes Farms were to be found thereat. Upon arrival at petitioners
compound, the group saw the farrowing crates and pipes inside the
compound. After he was informed by the police operatives that said pipes
were owned by Lourdes Farms and had been stolen from it, petitioner
voluntarily surrendered the items. These were then taken to the police
station. Dunlap was found guilty. Petitioner then appealed his conviction to
the Court of Appeals. On May 10, 1993, the appellate court promulgated its
decision affirming the judgment of the trial court. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: whether intent to gain need not be proved in crimes punishable by a

special law such as P.D. 1612.

RULING: The law has long divided crimes into acts wrong in themselves
called acts mala in se, and acts which would not be wrong but for the fact
that positive law forbids them, called acts mala prohibita. This distinction is
important with reference to the intent with which a wrongful act is done.
The rule on the subject is that in acts mala in se, the intent governs, but in
acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry is, has the law been violated? When an
act is illegal, the intent of the offender is immaterial.
In the case of Lim v. Court of Appeals involving violation of the Anti-Fencing
Law, we said:
On the aspect of animus furandi, petitioner is of the belief that this element
was not clearly established by the Peoples evidence and he, therefore, draws
the conclusion that respondent court seriously erred in presuming the
existence of intent to gain. Again, this supposition ignores the fact that
intent to gain is a mental state, the existence of which is demonstrated by
the overt acts of a person (Soriano vs. People, 88 Phil. 368 [1951]; 1 Reyes,
Revised Penal Code, Eleventh Rev. Ed., 1977, p. 45; 1 Aquino, Revised Penal
Code, 1988 Ed., p. 197). And what was the external demeanor which
petitioner showed from which the trial court and respondent court inferred
 14

animus furandi? These circumstances were vividly spelled in the body of the
judgment which petitioner chose to blandly impugn and over which he
remains indifferent even at this crucial stage. Withal, the sinister mental
state is presumed from the commission of an unlawful act in bringing out
the tires from his bodega which were loaded on his pick-up (People vs. Sia
Teb Ban, 54 Phil. 52 [1929]; 1 Reyes, supra at P. 46; Section 3(b), Rule 131,
Revised Rules on Evidence). At any rate, dolo is not required in crimes
punished by a special stature like the Anti-Fencing Law of 1979 (U.S. vs. Go
Chico, 14 Phil. 128 [1909]; 1 Reyes, supra at p. 58) because it is the act
alone, irrespective of the motives which constitutes the offense (U.S. vs. Siy
Cong Bieng, et al., 30 Phil. 577 [1915]; 1 Reyes, supra, at p. 59; 1 Aquino,
supra, at p. 52).
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARTIN SIMON y
SUNGA, respondent. The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Ricardo M.Sampang for accused-appellant.

FACTS: Martin Simon Sunga was sentenced with the punishment of

reclusion perpetua for violating the Dangerous Drug Act (RA No. 6425). He
allegedly sold four tea bags of marijuana to a Narcotics Command during a
buy-bust operation which was sold for P40.00. The said buy-bust operation
was executed on or about October 22, 1988. In this case, the respondent
was praying for a lesser punishment under the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent can avail of the lesser punishment
pursuant to Art. 22 of the RPC.

RULING: Yes, the respondent can avail of the lesser punishment prescribed
by Art 22 of the RPC. Republic Act No. 7659 already took effect on December
31, 1993 after its publication on December 16, 1993 while the respondent
was still serving his sentence. Hence, the respondent was given an
indeterminate penalty of arresto mayor or prision correctional instead of
serving its full sentence of reclusion perpetua. The Indeterminate Sentence
Law is applicable to this case since drug offenses are not included in nor
has appellant committed any act which would put him within the exceptions
to said law and the penalty to be imposed does not involve reclusion
perpetua or death, provided, of course that the penalty as ultimately
resolved will exceed one year of imprisonment. Republic Act No. 6425, as
now amended by Republic Act No. 7569, has unqualifiedly adopted the
penalties under the Revised Penal Code in their technical signification and
effects. In fact, for purposes of determining the maximum of said sentence,
we have applied the provisions of he amended Section 20 of said law to
arrive at prision correctional and Article 64 of the Code to impose the same
in the medium period. Such offense, although provided for in a special law,
is now in the effect punished by and under the Revised Code.
 15

Zari vs. Flores

Facts:
On July 15, 1976, Hon. Judge Remegio Zari, through a letter addressed to
the Supreme Court, recommended the dismissal from the service of Mr.
Diosdado Flores as Deputy Clerk of Court. It was alleged in the letter that
Mr. Flores was convicted for libel, a crime involving moral turpitude, on
April 8, 1967.Judge Zari also alleged that when the Mr. Flores applied for
the position of Deputy Clerk of Court, he submitted an affidavit dated June
10,1969 which contains a statement "That I am a person of good moral
character and integrity and have no administrative, criminal or police
record. "In recommending the dismissal from service of Mr. Flores, Judge
Zari added the ground of Gross discourtesy to superior officers as
manifested by his uncalled for and unjustified use of strong and
contemptuous language in addressing the City Judges, when he wrote a
letter, dated March 11, 1976.On the other hand, Mr. Flores answered the
allegations that his conviction for libel did not involve moral turpitude, and
that the use of strong language could not be considered contemptuous as he
was merely expressing the sentiments of an aggrieved employee who
deserves a better treatment from his superior. The District Judge (Apostol)
who conducted the investigation of the administrative case recommended
that Mr. Flores be separated from the service on the ground that conviction
for libel is a crime allegedly involving moral turpitude and P.D. 807 (Civil
Service Decree of the Philippines) provides that one of the grounds for
disciplinary action is conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.

Issue:
w/n libel is a crime involving moral turpitude – No.w/n conviction of crime
of libel alone warrants dismissal of Mr.Flores – No.

Ruling:
The Court defines Moral Turpitude as any act done contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty or good morals. It is an act of baseness, vileness, or
depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellow men,
to society in general contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right
and duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty, or good morals
 16

Moral Turpitude implies something immoral in itself, regardless of the fact

that it is punishable by law or not. It must not merely be mala prohibita, but
the act itself must be inherently immoral. The doing of the act itself, and not
its prohibition by statute fixes the moral turpitude. Some of the particular
crimes which have been held to involve moral turpitude are adultery,
concubinage, rape, arson, evasion of income tax, barratry, bigamy,
blackmail, bribery, criminal conspiracy to smuggle opium, dueling,
embezzlement, extortion, forgery, libel, making fraudulent proof of loss on
insurance contract, murder, mutilation of public records, fabrication of
evidence, offenses against pension laws, perjury, seduction under promise of
marriage, estafa, falsification of public document, estafa thru falsification
of public document. However, the Court has impliedly held in the case of
Burguete vs. Mayor that the mere filing of an information for libel against a
municipal officer is not a sufficient ground for dispensing him. The same
may be said with regard to serious slander, which is another form of libel.
Libel does not necessarily involve moral turpitude. Conviction of libel alone
is not sufficient to warrant disciplinary action, the respondent's conviction
for libel shows his propensity to speak ill of others. It is true that conviction
for libel does not automatically justify removal of a public officer. However,
the fact of conviction for libel of Mr. Flores, taken together with the letter he
wrote to then Executive City Judge Genovea, shows the tendency of the
respondent to malign people. However, the dismissal of Mr. Flores is proper
on the ground that his sworn statement is not true and by interfering in the
cases pending before the sala of Judge Zari, which is a ground for serious
disciplinary action and severe disciplinary action respectively.
 17

Dela Torre vs Comelec

Facts:

Petitioner Rolando P. Dela Torre was disqualified by the COMELEC from

running for the position of Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna in the May 8, 1995
elections on the ground that he was convicted by the MTC of violation the
Anti-Fencing Law, citing Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991
which provides as follows:

“Sec. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from

running for any elective local position:

“(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral

turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment within two (2) years after serving sentence;”

Petitioner contended that the provision is not applicable to him because he

was granted probation by the MTC.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the crime of fencing involves moral turpitude.

2. Whether or not a grant of probation affects Section 40(a)’s applicability.

Held:

1. Yes. Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or

depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to
society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and
duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty, or good morals.

The elements of the crime of fencing which are:

 18

1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;

2. The accused who is not a principal or accomplice in the crime of robbery

or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or
disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item,
object or anything of value, which have been derived from the proceeds of
the said crime;

3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item,
object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime
of robbery or theft; and

4. There is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for
another.”

Moral turpitude is deducible from the third element. Actual knowledge by

the “fence” of the fact that property received is stolen displays the same
degree of malicious deprivation of one’s rightful property as that which
animated the robbery or theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of
moral turpitude. And although the participation of each felon in the
unlawful taking differs in point in time and in degree, both the “fence” and
the actual perpetrator/s of the robbery or theft invaded one’s peaceful
dominion for gain - thus deliberately reneging in the process “private duties”
they owe their “fellowmen” or “society” in a manner “contrary to xxx
accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty or good
morals.” The duty not to appropriate, or to return, anything acquired either
by mistake or with malice is so basic it finds expression in some key
provisions of the Civil Code on “Human Relations” and “Solutio Indebiti.

2. No. The legal effect of probation is only to suspend the execution of the
sentence. Petitioner’s conviction of fencing subsists and remains totally
unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation. In fact, a judgment of
conviction in a criminal case ipso facto attains finality when the accused
applies for probation, although it is not executory pending resolution of the
application for probation. (G.R. No. 121592, July 5, 1996)
 19

JOHN ERIC LONEY v. PEOPLE, GR NO. 152644, 2006-02-10

Facts:

Petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B. Hernandez are
the President and Chief Executive Officer, Senior Manager, and Resident
Manager for Mining Operations, respectively, of Marcopper Mining
Corporation ("Marcopper"), a corporation engaged in mining in the...
province of Marinduque

Marcopper had been storing tailings... from its operations in a pit in Mt.
Tapian, Marinduque. At the base of the pit ran a drainage tunnel leading to
the Boac and Makalupnit rivers. It appears that Marcopper had placed a
concrete plug at the tunnel's end.

On 24 March 1994, tailings gushed out of or near the tunnel's end. In a few
days, the Mt. Tapian pit had discharged millions of tons of tailings into the
Boac and Makalupnit rivers.

the Department of Justice separately charged petitioners in the Municipal

Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque ("MTC") with violation of

Article 91(B),... sub-paragraphs 5 and 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1067 or

the Water Code of the Philippines

("PD 1067"),... Section 8... of Presidential Decree No. 984 or the National
Pollution Control Decree of 1976 ("PD 984"),... Section 108... of Republic Act
No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining

Act of 1995 ("RA 7942"),... Article 365... of the Revised Penal Code ("RPC")
for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property.

Petitioners moved to quash the Informations on the following grounds: (1)

the Informations were "duplicitous" as the Department of Justice charged
more than one offense for a single act; (2) petitioners John Eric Loney and
Steven Paul Reid were not yet officers of Marcopper when... the incident
 20

subject of the Informations took place; and (3) the Informations contain
allegations which constitute legal excuse or justification.

After carefully analyzing and weighing the contending arguments of the

parties and after taking into consideration the applicable laws and
jurisprudence, the Court is convinced that as far as the three (3) aforesaid
laws are concerned, only the Information for [v]iolation of

Philippine Mining Act should be maintained. In other words, the

Informations for [v]iolation of Anti-Pollution Law (PD 984) and the Water
Code (PD 1067) should be dismissed/quashed because the elements
constituting the aforesaid violations are absorbed by the same elements...
which constitute violation of the Philippine Mining Act (RA 7942).

petitioners manifested that they were willing to be arraigned on the charge

for violation of Article 365 of the RPC but not on the charge for violation of

RA 7942 as they intended to appeal the Consolidated Order in so far as it

maintained the Informations for that offense

Petitioners subsequently filed a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial
Court, Boac, Marinduque, assailing that portion of the Consolidated Order
maintaining the Informations for violation of RA 7942.

Branch 94 granted public respondent's appeal but denied petitioners'

petition. Branch 94 set aside the Consolidated Order in so far as it quashed
the Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984 and ordered those...
charges reinstated.

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals alleging
that Branch 94 acted with grave abuse of discretion because (1) the
Informations for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, RA 7942 and the Article 365
of the RPC "proceed from and are based on a single act or... incident of
polluting the Boac and Makalupnit rivers thru dumping of mine tailings"...
and (2) the duplicitous nature of the Informations contravenes the ruling in
People v. Relova.

Petitioners further contended that since the acts... complained of in the

charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942 are "the very same
acts complained of" in the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC, the
latter absorbs the former. Hence, petitioners should only be prosecuted for
violation of Article 365 of... the RPC

Court of Appeals affirmed Branch 94's ruling.

Petitioners contend that they should be charged with one offense only
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property because (1) all the
charges filed against them "proceed from and are based on a single act or
incident of polluting the Boac and Makalupnit rivers thru... dumping of
 21

mine tailings" and (2) the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC
"absorbs" the other charges since the element of "ack of necessary or
adequate protection, negligence, recklessness and imprudence" is common
among them.

On petitioners' claim that the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC
"absorbs" the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942

Issues:

Whether all the charges filed against petitioners except one should be
quashed for duplicity of charges and only the charge for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property should stand

Ruling:

No Duplicity of Charges in the Present Case

The Filing of Several Charges is Proper

The contention has no merit.

this Court had ruled that a single act or incident might offend against two or
more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the
prosecution of the accused for more than one offense.

The only limit to this rule is the Constitutional prohibition that no person
shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for "the same offense."

In People v. Doriquez,... we held that two (or more)... offenses arising from
the same act are not "the same"... x x x if one provision [of law] requires
proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not, x x x.
Phrased elsewise, where two different laws (or articles of the same code)
define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a...
prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if
each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of
the other.[27] (Emphasis supplied)

Consequently, the filing of the multiple charges against petitioners, although

based on the same incident, is consistent with settled doctrine.

suffice it to say that a mala in se felony (such as Reckless Imprudence

Resulting in Damage to Property) cannot absorb... mala prohibita crimes
(such as those violating PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942). What makes the
former a felony is criminal intent (dolo) or negligence (culpa); what makes
the latter crimes are the special laws enacting them.
 22

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARMANDO MENDOZA

G.R. No. 220759, July 24, 2017
PERALTA, J.:

Facts: During a buy-bust operation, PO2 Ricote, together with the CI, met
the appellant in a sari-sari store and the CI introduced P02 Ricote as a
buyer of marijuana. Appellant then told PO2 Ricote that the price per teabag
of marijuana was ₱50.00 to which the latter agreed to buy 4 teabags.
Appellant then took out from his right pocket the four teabags of suspected
dried marijuana leaves and handed them to PO2 Ricote who, in tum, gave
the marked two pieces of one hundred peso bills to the former. PO2 Ricote
then scratched his head as a pre-arranged signal, and PO3 Parena, who was
inside a parked vehicle which was three meters away from the sari-sari
store, immediately run to help in arresting appellant.
Appellant denied the charges and claimed that he, together with friends,
were along the road, repairing a pedicab. When they all went to a sari-sari
store to rest, they were joined by a certain Andy Makabenta. He then saw
the arrival of a white vehicle and a motorcycle with two people riding on it. A
person alighted from the motorcycle and held the wrist of Makabenta, while
another police officer alighted from the vehicle and pointed to him saying
"you also apprehend that.”

Issue: Whether or not appellant is guilty of illegal sale of marijuana.

Ruling: Yes. In every prosecution for the illegal sale of marijuana, the
following elements must be proved: (1) the identities of the buyer and. the
seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold
and the payment therefor.34 What is material to the prosecution for illegal
sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually
took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus
delicti.
In this case, PO2 Ricote, the poseur-buyer, positively identified appellant as
the seller of the four teabags of suspected marijuana and to whom he
handed the marked two pieces of one hundred peso bills as payment
therefor. The substance sold by appellant to PO2 Ricote was sent for
analysis and upon the examination, it showed that the four teabags yielded
 23

a positive result for marijuana, a dangerous drug. The marijuana was

presented to the court and was identified by PO2 Ricote to be the marijuana
he bought from appellant based on the markings he made thereon.
Ratio Decidendi: The positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
prevail over appellant's defense of denial.
Gist: This is an appeal from the Decision of the CA, which affirmed the
Decision of the RTC finding appellant guilty of selling marijuana.

PEOPLE v. ROBERT NUÑEZ y LAGASCA

G.R. No. 112092. March 1, 2001

FACTS:

Accused was found guilty of Illegal possession of firearm resulting to the

death of the victim and pursuant to P.D. 1866 in relation to the 1987
Constitution the court sentences the said accused to suffer the penalty of
life imprisonment and with costs.

ISSUE:

WON accused is guilty of illegal possession of firearms resulting in death?

From: unsplash.com

HELD:

Appellant was convicted of “illegal possession of firearms resulting to the

death of the victim.” At the time of the commission of the crime, the existing
jurisprudence was People v. Quijada. The SC held then that the use of an
unlicensed firearm in a killing results in two separate crimes — one for the
aggravated form of illegal possession of firearm and two, for homicide or
murder. In the meantime, however, Congress passed Republic Act No. 8294,
27 which lowered the penalties for illegal possession of firearms. Further,
Section 1, third par. of R.A. No. 8294 provides — If homicide or murder is
committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed
firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.

In the present case, there were four cases filed against appellant which were
all separately tried. Hence, the evidence as to the homicide and frustrated
homicide cases were neither adopted nor presented before the trial court
trying the illegal possession case. For this reason, there is a dearth of
 24

evidence on record to support the finding of homicide and/or frustrated

homicide.

The Court held that accordingly, appellant should only be convicted of

simple illegal possession of firearms. The lowered penalties as provided in
R.A. No. 8294, being favorable to the accused, should be applied
retroactively.

Appellee: People of the Philippines

Appellant: Walpan Ladjaalam alias “Warpan”

FACTS:
Four Informations were filed against appellant Walpan Ladjaalam in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City (Branch 16), three of which he
was found guilty, to wit: 1) maintaining a drug den in violation of Section
15-A, Article III, of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972); 2)
illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in violation of Presidential
Decree No. 1866 as amended by Republic Act. No. 8294; and 3) direct
assault with multiple attempted homicide. The following information was
provided by the prosecution:

1) In the afternoon of September 24, 1997, more than thirty (30) policemen
proceeded to the house of appellant and his wife to serve the search warrant
when they were met by a volley of gunfire coming from the second floor of
the said house. They saw that it was the appellant who fired the M14 rifle
towards them.
2) After gaining entrance, two of the police officers proceeded to the second
floor where they earlier saw appellant firing the rifle. As he noticed their
presence, the appellant jumped from the window to the roof of a neighboring
house. He was subsequently arrested at the back of his house after a brief
chase.
3) Several firearms and ammunitions were recovered from appellant’s house.
Also found was a pencil case with fifty (50) folded aluminum foils inside,
each containing methamphetamine hydrochloride.
4) A paraffin test was conducted and the casts taken both hands of the
appellant yielded positive for gunpowder nitrates.
5) Records show that appellant had not filed any application for license to
possess firearm and ammunition, nor has he been given authority to carry
firearms.
 25

ISSUE:
Whether or not such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an
aggravating circumstance.

HELD:
No. Section 1 of RA 8294 substantially provides that any person who shall
unlawfully possess any firearm or ammunition shall be penalized, “unless
no other crime was committed”. Furthermore, if homicide or murder is
committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed
firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. Since the crime
committed was direct assault and not homicide or murder, illegal possession
of firearms cannot be deemed an aggravating circumstance.

People v. Temporada

Facts:
Beth Temporada was sued by Rogelio Legaspi (defrauded of Php57,600.00),
Dennis Dimaano (defrauded of Php66,520.00), Soledad Atte (defrauded of
Php66,520.00), Luz Minkay (defrauded of Php69,520.00), and Evelyn
Estacio (defrauded of Php88,520.00) [for purposes of this digest, we refer to
the respective criminal cases as A, B, C, D, and E] for estafa (5 counts). The
trial court convicted Temporada and imposed the following penalties:

Crim. Case A

Indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional as minimum, to nine (9) years and one (1) day of prision mayor,
as maximum.

Crim. Case B, C, and D

Indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional as minimum to ten (10) years and one day of prision mayor as
maximum.

Crim. Case E

Indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional as minimum, to eleven (11) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as maximum.

ISSUE: Whether or not the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is

correct.

HELD: No. The penalty for estafa is prisión correccional maximum to prisión
mayor minimum. If the amount defrauded exceeds Php22k, the penalty to
 26

be imposed shall be in its maximum period PLUS one year for every
Php10,000.00 in excess of Php22,000.00 (provided that the total penalty
shall not exceed 20 years). Otherwise, the penalty to be imposed shall be the
medium period (absent any other circumstances).

If looked at closely, the penalty for estafa is composed of two penalties, to

wit, prisión correccional maximum AND prisión mayor minimum. It was
erroneous for the RTC to presume that the maximum penalty for estafa
(those in which the amount defrauded exceeds Php22k) is prisión mayor
minimum which if taken on its face is 6 years 1 day to 8 years. The period
prescribed must first be divided into three periods, thus (Author’s note: NOT
DISCUSSED IN THE CASE but discussed in the cited cases in the case):

Prisión correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum divided in three

periods is:

MINIMUM: 4 years 2 months 1 day to 5 years 5 months 10 days

MEDIUM: 5 years 5 months 11 days to 6 years 8 months 20 days
MAXIMUM: 6 years 8 months 21 days to 8 years

Thus, the maximum penalty referred to as the maximum penalty in estafa in

cases where the amount defrauded exceeds Php22k is 6 years 8 months 21
days to 8 years. The court may choose from within this range. After choosing
from within that range, then it may add an additional year for every
Php10,000.00 in excess of Php22k. In this case, the SC chose to add the
additional years to 6 years 8 months 21 days.

In applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty lower in degree of

prisión correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum is prision
correccional minimum to prision correccional medium or 6 months 1 day – 1
year 8 months 20 days TO 1 year 8 months 21 days – 2 years 11 months 10
days. The trial court can choose from within this range. The RTC is correct
in fixing the minimum of four (4) years and two (2) months.

Applying the above rules, this is how Temporada’s penalty should look like:

Crim. Case A
 27

ARLENE N. LAPASARAN v. PEOPLE, GR No. 179907, 2009-02-12

Facts:

In September 2001, private complainant Menardo Villarin (Menardo) and his

sister Vilma Villarin (Vilma) met petitioner Arlene N. Lapasaran, who worked
at Silver Jet Travel Tours Agency (Silver Jet) at SIMCAS Building, Makati.

For a fee of P85,000.00,... petitioner undertook the... processing of the

papers necessary for the deployment... and employment of Menardo in
South Korea

Petitioner informed Menardo that he would be employed as "factory worker,"

which was, subsequently, changed to "bakery worker."

Menardo paid the said fee in installments, the first in September 2001 in the
amount of P10,000.00, which was received by a certain Pastor Paulino
Cajucom... the second installment was P35,000.00; while the third and last
payment was

P40,000.00; the last two installments were delivered to the petitioner

Menardo finally left for South Korea on November 25, 2001

Unfortunately, he was incarcerated by South Korean immigration

authorities and was immediately deported to the Philippines because the
travel documents issued to him by the... petitioner were fake

He immediately contacted petitioner and informed her of what happened.

Thereupon, petitioner promised to send him back to South Korea, but the
promise was never fulfilled.
 28

Menardo and his sister Vilma demanded the... return of the money they
paid, but petitioner refused

It was later found out that petitioner was no longer connected with Silver
Jet.

separate charges for illegal recruitment and estafa against petitioner before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.

she pleaded not guilty to both charges.

In her defense, petitioner testified that she owned a travel agency named
A&B Travel and Tours General Services, engaged in the business of visa
assistance and ticketing. She averred that it was Vilma who solicited her
assistance to secure a tourist visa for Menardo. She... admitted transacting
with the Villarins, but committed only to securing a tourist visa and a two-
way airplane ticket for Menardo, for which she received P70,000.00 as
payment. She denied having recruited Menardo Villarin; she likewise denied
having promised him employment in

South Korea.

On February 15, 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision finding petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment and estafa.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC Decision with a
modification in the penalty imposed in Criminal Case No. 03-215332 for
estafa

Issues:

WHETHER OR NOT THE LAWS ON ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT AND ESTAFA

ARE APPLICABLE IN THESE CASES.

Ruling:

Both the trial and appellate courts found the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses credible and convincing

The best arbiter of the issue of the credibility of the witnesses and their
testimonies is the trial court

In the first case, petitioner was charged with illegal recruitment, defined and
penalized by the Labor Code as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042.

Illegal recruitment is committed when it is shown that petitioner gave the

complainant the distinct... impression that she had the power or ability to
send the complainant abroad for work, such that the latter was convinced to
part with his money in order to be employed
 29

To be engaged in the practice of recruitment and placement, it is plain that

there... must, at least, be a promise or an offer of employment from the
person posing as a recruiter whether locally or abroad

Petitioner's misrepresentations concerning her purported power and

authority to recruit for overseas employment, and the collection... from
Menardo of various amounts, clearly indicate acts constitutive of illegal
recruitment.

Petitioner's claim that she did not represent herself as a licensed recruiter,
but that she merely tried to help the complainants secure a tourist visa
could not make her less guilty of illegal recruitment, it being enough that
she gave the impression of having had the authority... to recruit workers for
deployment abroad

CA correctly affirmed the imposition of the indeterminate penalty of six (6)

years and one (1) day to eight (8) years, and the payment of a fine of
P200,000.00,... petitioner was charged with violation of Article 315(2)(a) of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC) which punishes estafa committed as follows

(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power,

influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary
transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.

(a) the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of

deceit; and (b) damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is
caused to the offended party... it has been sufficiently proven that petitioner
represented herself to Menardo as capable of sending him to South Korea for
employment, even if she did not have the authority or license for the
purpose.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of

merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 28, 2007 and its
Resolution dated September 12, 2007,... are AFFIRMED.
 30

Astorga vs People GR No. 154130 October 1, 2003/August 20, 2004

Facts:

On September 1, 1997, private offended parties together with SPO3 Andres

B. Cinco, Jr. and SPO1 Rufo Capoquian, were sent to the Island of Daram,
Western Samar to conduct intelligence operations on possible illegal logging
activities. At around 4:30-5:00 p.m., the team found two boats measuring
18 meters in length and 5 meters in breadth being constructed at Barangay
Locob-Locob.

There they met petitioner Benito Astorga, the Mayor of Daram, who turned
out to be the owner of the boats. A heated altercation ensued between
petitioner and the DENR team. Petitioner called for reinforcements and,
moments later, a boat bearing ten armed men, some wearing fatigues,
arrived at the scene. The DENR team was then brought to petitioner’s house
in Daram, where they had dinner and drinks. The team left at 2:00 a.m.

Issue: W/N the petitioner is guilty of the crime of Arbitrary Detention.

Held:

No, on the ground of reasonable doubt. The determinative factor in Arbitrary

Detention, in the absence of actual physical restraint, is fear. After a careful
review of the evidence on record, the court find no proof that petitioner
 31

instilled fear in the minds of the private offended parties. The court failed to
discern any element of fear from the narration of SPO1 Rufo Capoquian, the
police officer who escorted the DENR Team during their mission. SPO1
Capoquian in fact testified that they were free to leave the house and roam
around the barangay. Furthermore, he admitted that it was raining at that
time. Hence, it is possible that petitioner prevented the team from leaving
the island because it was unsafe for them to travel by boat.

As held in several cases, when the guilt of the accused has not been proven
with moral certainty, the presumption of innocence of the accused must be
sustained and his exoneration be granted as a matter of right. When the
circumstances are capable of two or more inferences, as in this case, one of
which is consistent with the presumption of innocence while the other is
compatible with guilt, the presumption of innocence must prevail and the
court must acquit. It is better to acquit a guilty man than to convict an
innocent man.

G.R. No. 110592; January 23, 1996

PEOPLE VS. VELASCO

FACTS:
Sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of P20,000.00 by the Regional
Trial Court of Manila was appellant Yolanda Velasco y Pamintuan, after
having been found guilty of unlawfully selling “shabu,” in violation of
Section 15 of Article III in relation to Section 2(e-2), (f), (m), and (o) of Article
1 of “The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972” (R.A. 6425).
Velasco was apprehended in a buy-bust operation in the afternoon of June
28, 1991. Velasco was caught in flagrante delicto as she was handing shabu
to a designated poseur-buyer. Five more decks were found in her pockets.
Appellant argues that the court erred in admitting the said decks of shabu
as evidence against her since those were acquired through a warrantless
arrest. Hence, its inadmissibility. Secondly, appellant questions the RTC’s
jurisdiction over the case given the quantity allegedly obtained in her
possession.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the decks of shabu are inadmissible as evidence for
having been acquired through a warrantless arrest.
2.) Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.

RULING:
1.) Yes. Section 5(a) of Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides
that an arrest when done lawfully either by a peace officer or any private
person may be done if the person to be arrested is actually committing, has
committed or attempting to commit an offense.
Appellant was caught in flagrante delicto thus her denial and defense of
frame-up cannot be justified under the said provision. Moreover, appellant
failed to establish that the members of the buy-bust team are policemen
 32

engaged in mulcting or other unscrupulous caprice when they entrapped

her.

2.) Yes. The enforcement of R.A. 7659, which amended the penalty provided
for in R.A. 6425, agrees with the appellants argument that under the
foregoing directive, since the amount of shabu involved in the instant case is
only 0.8020 gram, the proper imposable component penalty is prision
correccional to be applied in its medium period, in the absence of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Applying the indeterminate
Sentence Law, the maximum shall be taken from the medium of prision
correccional, which is two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day, to four
(4) years and two (2) months, while the minimum shall be taken from the
penalty next lower in degree, which is arresto mayor, the range of which is
one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months.”
R.A. 7691 expanded the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. The said act
vested these courts with exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses
punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six years. However, R.A. 7691
shows that retroactive provisions apply only to civil cases that have not yet
reached the pre-trial stage. Neither from an express proviso nor by
implication can it be understood as having retroactive application to
criminal cases pending or decided by the Regional Trial Courts prior to its
effectivity. RTC’s jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination of the
cause is not affected by the new legislation.
At the time that the case against appellant was filed, the Regional Trial
Court had jurisdiction over the offense charged in as much as Section 39 of
R.A 6425. In fine, the jurisdiction of the trial court (RTC) over the case of the
appellant was conferred by the aforecited law then in force (R.A. 6425 before
amendment) when the information was filed. Jurisdiction attached upon
the commencement of the action and could not be ousted by the passage of
R.A. 7691 reapportioning the jurisdiction of inferior courts, the application
of which to criminal cases is, to stress, prospective in nature.
 33

People v. Ursua

FACTS:
In 2006, Francisco Ursua was alleged to have raped his 14 year old
daughter (AAA) three times for two consecutive days. AAA was able to report
the incidents and Ursua was indicted for three counts of rape qualified by
relationship. It was alleged that Ursua raped her in the evening of 17
January 2006, dawn of 18 January 2006, and evening of 18 January 2006.
During trial however, AAA testified that for the incident that happened in
the evening of 18 January 2006, Ursua testified that no penile penetration
happened but that Ursua touched her private parts. After trial, Ursua was
convicted of three counts of qualified rape.

ISSUE: Whether or not the decision is correct.

HELD: No. It should only be two counts of qualified rape and one count of
Sexual Abuse under Sec. 5b of Republic Act No. 7610.

But the Informations specifically charged Qualified Rape? How can Ursua be
convicted under a violation of the Anti-Child Abuse Law? Is this not a
violation of his right to be informed of the charges against him?

It is perfectly legal for Ursua to be convicted of Sexual Abuse under Sec. 5b

of R.A. 7610. Concededly, the failure to designate the offense by statute, or
to mention the specific provision penalizing the act, or an erroneous
specification of the law violated, does not vitiate the information if the facts
alleged clearly recite the facts constituting the crime charged, for what
controls is not the title of the information or the designation of the offense,
 34

but the actual facts recited in the information. It bears emphasis, however,
that the designation in the information of the specific statute violated is
imperative to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him the
opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly.

But isn’t it more favorable for the accused to be convicted of Acts of

Lasciviousness in relation to Sec. 5b, R.A. 7610?

No. The crime of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC, in
relation to Section 5(b ), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, can only be committed
against a victim who is less than 12 years old; and (2) that when the victim
is aged 12 years old but under 18, or is above 18 years old under special
circumstances, the proper designation of the offense is sexual abuse or
lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610. Here, AAA was
already 14 years old at the time of the incident.

ORIEL MAGNO v. CA, GR No. 96132, 1992-06-26

Facts:
Petitioner was in the process of putting up a car repair shop sometime in
April 1983, but he did not have complete equipment he lacked funds with
which to purchase the necessary equipment to make such business
operational. Thus, petitioner, representing Ultra Sources International
Corporation, approached Corazon Teng, (private complainant) Vice President
of Mancor Industries (hereinafter referred to as Mancor) for his needed car
repair service equipment of which Mancor was a distributor. (Rollo, pp. 40-
41) (Corazon Teng) referred Magno to LS Finance and Management
Corporation (LS Finance for brevity) advising its Vice-President, Joey Gomez,
that Mancor was willing and able to supply the pieces of equipment needed
if LS Finance could accommodate petitioner and provide him credit facilities
on condition that petitioner has to put up a warranty deposit equivalent to
thirty per centum (30%) of the total value of the pieces of equipment to be
purchased, amounting to P29,790.00. unknown to petitioner, it was
Corazon Teng who advanced the deposit in question, on condition that the
same would be paid as a short term loan at 3% interest. Petitioner and LS
Finance entered into a leasing agreement. After the documentation was
completed, the equipment were delivered to petitioner who in turn issued a
postdated check and gave it to Joey Gomez who, unknown to the petitioner,
delivered the same to Corazon Teng.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a grave abuse of authority
in convicting the respondent of four counts of the aforestated charges.
 35

Ruling:
Finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of violations of B.P.Blg. 22 and sentencing the accused to
imprisonment for one year in each Criminal Case Nos. Q-35693, Q-35695
and Q-35696 and to pay to complainant the respective amounts reflected in
subject checks. As the transaction did not ripen into a purchase, but
remained a lease with rentals being paid for the loaned equipment, which
were pulled out by the Lessor (Mancor) when the petitioner failed to
continue paying possibly due to economic constraints or business failure,
then it is lawful and just that the warranty deposit should not be charged
against the petitioner. To argue that after the termination of the lease
agreement, the warranty deposit should be refundable in full to Mrs. Teng
by petitioner when he did not cash out the "warranty deposit" for his official
or personal use, is to stretch the nicety of the alleged law (B.P. No. 22)
violated. It would have been different if this predicament was not
communicated to all the parties he dealt with regarding the lease agreement
the financing of which was covered by L.S. Finance Management. the
appealed decision is REVERSED and the accused-petitioner is hereby
ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

Himagan v. People

Facts:
Ishmael Himagan was a policeman assigned in Davao City. He was charged
for the murder of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and for the attempted murder of
Benjamin’s younger brother, Barnabe. Pursuant to Section 47 of
Republic Act No. 6975, Himagan was placed into suspension pending the
murder case. The law provides that:

Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and

substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty
imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall
immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated.
Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated
within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused.

Himagan assailed the suspension averring that Section 42 of P.D. 807 of the
Civil Service Decree provides that his suspension should be limited to ninety
(90) days only. He claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over
90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of his
constitutional right to equal protection of laws .

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection

guaranteed by the Constitution.

HELD: No. The language of the first sentence of Sec 47 of RA 6975 is clear,
plain and free from ambiguity. It gives no other meaning than that the
suspension from office of the member of the PNP charged with grave offense
 36

where the penalty is six years and one day or more shall last until the
termination of the case. The suspension cannot be lifted before the
termination of the case. The second sentence of the same Section providing
that the trial must be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment
does not qualify or limit the first sentence. The two can stand independently
of each other. The first refers to the period of suspension. The second deals
with the time from within which the trial should be finished.

The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other
classes of persons charged criminally or administratively insofar as the
application of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is that
policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to
harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in
the legislative discussions.

If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is

reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses
against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed
to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed. the
imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Sec 47 of RA
6975 does not violate the suspended policeman’s constitutional right to
equal protection of the laws.

Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days from arraignment,
should the suspension of accused be lifted?

The answer is certainly no. While the law uses the mandatory word “”shall””
before the phrase “”be terminated within ninety (90) days””, there is nothing
in RA 6975 that suggests that the preventive suspension of the accused will
be lifted if the trial is not terminated within that period. Nonetheless, the
Judge who fails to decide the case within the period without justifiable
reason may be subject to administrative sanctions and, in appropriate cases
where the facts so warrant, to criminal or civil liability. If the trial is
unreasonably delayed without fault of the accused such that he is deprived
of his right to a speedy trial, he is not without a remedy. He may ask for the
dismissal of the case. Should the court refuse to dismiss the case, the
accused can compel its dismissal by certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or
secure his liberty by habeas corpus.
 37

People v. Jalosjos

DOCTRINE

The provision granting an exemption to Members of Congress as a special

privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It
may not be extended by intendment, implication, or equitable
considerations.

FACTS

The Accused-Appellant Romeo Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress,

convicted of two (2) counts of statutory rape and six (6) counts of acts
lasciviousness. Nevertheless, his conviction is pending appeal while he is
confined in the New Bilibid Prison. During the pendency of his appeal, he
won a reelection bid as Representative for the First District of Zamboanga
Del Norte. As such, he filed a motion to be allowed to discharge his mandate
on the grounds that his election win must be given priority over any ruling.

ISSUE

Whether or not the Accused-Appellant must be exempted from penal laws by

reason of his election win.

RULING

NO. The Supreme Court held the immunity from arrest or detention of
Senators and members of the House of Representatives, the latter
 38

customarily as Congressmen, arises from a provision of the Constitution.

The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be
extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended
by intendment, implication, or equitable considerations. No less than the
Constitution provides that members of Congress cannot compel absent
members to attend sessions if the reason is a legitimate one, more so a
confinement for a crime committed which is punishable by imprisonment of
more than 6 months.

Further, the ruling on Aguinaldo v. Santos whereby a public officer cannot

be removed from office for acts done prior to his present term of office, or the
condonation doctrine, does not apply to imprisonment for arising from the
enforcement of criminal law. It only applies to administrative removal of a
public officer.

Further, finally, the Constitution provides that all persons similarly situated
shall be treated alike both rights and responsibilities.

In the present case, firstly, the Accused-Appellant has been convicted for the
crimes committed. Although pending appeal, confinement is public self-
defense whereby society must protect itself. Secondly, the Condonation
Doctrine cannot be applied because the case involves criminal offenses, not
administrative offenses. Finally, the election to the position of Congressman
or Representative is not a reasonable classification in criminal law
enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial
distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their
freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

Petition is DENIED.
 39

People v. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382 (1972)

Limitations on the Power/Authority of the State to Punish Crimes

FACTS: Hon. Simeon N. Ferrer in his capacity as Judge of the CFI of Tarlac,
Branch I dismissed two (2) cases involving criminal complaints for violation
of Anti-Subversion Act on the grounds that the said act is a bill of attainder
and that it is vague and overbroad.

The two cases include that of Feliciano Co who was criminally charged for
violation of Section 4 of Anti-Subversion Act and Nilo Tayag et. al., who were
charged with subversion. In both cases aggravating circumstances are
present. Counsel on both cases moved to quash the complaint on the
ground that the basis of the complaint, the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of
attainder.

ISSUE: The Government appealed the decision of the CFI of Tarlac, Branch
1. The Supreme Court resolved to treat its appeal as a special civil action for
certiorari. Is the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder?

DECISION: The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Anti-Subversion

Act with reservation. On the grounds that the act provides that the guilt of
the accused has to be judicially established. Specifically, the statute
requires that membership must be knowing or active, with specific intent to
further the illegal objectives of the Party. That is what section 4 means when
 40

it requires that membership, to be unlawful, must be shown to have been

acquired "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts." The ingredient of specific
intent to pursue the unlawful goals of the Party must be shown by "overt
acts." This constitutes an element of "membership" distinct from the
ingredient of guilty knowledge. The former requires proof of direct
participation in the organization’s unlawful activities, while the latter
requires proof of mere adherence to the organization’s illegal objectives.

RATIO: That the Government has a right to protect itself against subversion
is a proposition too plain to require elaboration. Self-preservation is the
"ultimate value" of society. It surpasses and transcends every other value,
"for if a society cannot protect its very structure from armed internal attack,
no subordinate value can be protected".

PEOPLE vs ALFREDO BON

FACTS:
Eight (8) Informations were filed within the period 21 August 2000 to
23February 2001 by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Gumaca, Quezon
against Alfredo Bon (appellant) charging him with the rape of AAA and BBB
the daughters of his older brother. All these cases were consolidated for
trial. The rapes were alleged to have been committed in several instances
over a span of six (6) years. Both AAA and BBB testified against appellant,
their uncle and both identified him as the man who had raped them.
The RTC convicted appellant on all eight (8) counts of rape. It further
considered the qualifying circumstances of minority of the victims and the
relationship of the victims and appellants, the latter being the former/s
relative by consanguinity within the third degree.
The court of Appeals downgraded the convictions in criminal case Nos. 6906
and 6908 to attempted rape. The sentence was prescribed by the appellate
court prior to the enactment of RA No. 9346 which ended the imposition of
death penalty. The proximate concern as to the appellant is whether his
penalty for attempted qualified rape which under the penal law should be
two degrees lower than that of consummated rape should be computed from
death or reclusion perpetua.

ISSUE:
Is death penalty the properly penalty for the crimes convicted?
 41

HELD:
The sentence of death imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of
Appeals can no longer be affirmed in view of RA No. 9346 Section 2 of which
mandates that in lieu of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua
shall be imposed. Correspondingly, the Court can no longer uphold the
death sentences imposed by lower Courts, but must, if the guilt of the
accused is affirmed, impose instead the penalty of reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment when appropriate.
Upon the other hand, Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code establishes that
the penalty to be imposed upon the principals of an attempted felony must
be a penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the
consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principals in an attempt to
commit a felony.
The penalty “lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law” for
attempted rape is the prescribed penalty for the consummated rape of a
victim duly proven to have been under eighteen years of age and to have
been raped by her uncle, is death under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal
Code. The determination of the penalty two degrees lower than the death
penalty entails the application of Articles 61 and 71 of the Revised Penal
Code. Following the scale prescribed in Article 71, the penalty two degrees
lower than death is reclusion temporal, which was the maximum penalty
imposed by the Court of Appeals on appellant for attempted rape.
Hence, the Court of Appeals sentenced appellant to suffer the penalty for
attempted rape with a maximum penalty within the range of reclusion
temporal and a minimum penalty within the range of the penalty next lower
or prision mayor. If RA No. 9346 had not been enacted, the Court would
have affirmed such sentence without complication. However, the enactment
of the law has given rise to the problem concerning the imposable penalty.
Appellant was sentenced to a maximum term within reclusion temporal
since that is the penalty two degrees lower than death. With the elimination
of death as a penalty does it follow that appellant should now be sentenced
to a penalty two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua the highest
remaining penalty with the enactment of RA No. 9346. If it so followed,
appellant would be sentenced to prision mayor in lieu of reclusion temporal.
The consummated felony previously punishable by death would now be
punishable by reclusion perpetua. At the same time$ the same felony in its
frustrated stage would under the foregoing premise in this section be
penalized one degree lower from death or also reclusion perpetua. It does
not seem right of course that the same penalty of reclusion perpetua would
be imposed on both the consummated and frustrated felony.
Thus, RA No. 9346 should be construed as having downgraded those
penalties attached to death by reason of the graduated scale under Article
71. Only in that manner will a clear and consistent rule emerge as to the
application of penalties for frustrated and attempted felonies and for
accessories and accomplices. In the case of appellant, the determination of
his penalty for attempted rape shall be reckoned not from two degrees lower
than death but two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua. Hence, the
maximum term of his penalty shall no longer be reclusion temporal as ruled
by the Court of Appeals but instead prision mayor.
 42

Paul Joseph Wright vs The Honorable Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 113213 August 15, 1994

Facts: On March 17, 1993, Assistant Secretary Sime D. Hidalgo of the

Department of Foreign Affairs indorsed to the Department of Justice
Diplomatic Note No. 080/93 dated February 19, 1993 from the Government
of Australia to the Department of Justice through Attorney General Michael
Duffy. Said Diplomatic Note was a formal request for the extradition of
Petitioner Paul Joseph Wright who is wanted for several crimes.

The trial court, in its decision dated 14 June 1993, granting the petition for
extradition requested by the Government of Australia, concluding that the
documents submitted by the Australian Government meet the requirements
of Article 7 of the Treaty of Extradition and that the offenses for which the
petitioner were sought in his country are extraditable offenses under Article
2 of the said Treaty. The trial court, moreover, held that under the
provisions of the same Article, extradition could be granted irrespective of
when the offense — in relation to the extradition — was committed, provided
that the offense happened to be an offense in the requesting State at the
time the acts or omissions constituting the same were committed.

Issue: Whether an extradition treaty can be given retroactive application.

Held: Yes.
 43

Does the Treaty’s retroactive application violate the Constitutional

prohibition against ex post facto laws? Early commentators understood ex
post facto laws to include all laws of retrospective application, whether civil
or criminal. However, Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase, citing Blackstone, The
Federalist and other early U.S. state constitutions in Calder vs. Bull
concluded that the concept was limited only to penal and criminal statutes.
As conceived under our Constitution, ex post facto laws are 1) statutes that
make an act punishable as a crime when such act was not an offense when
committed; 2) laws which, while not creating new offenses, aggravate the
seriousness of a crime; 3) statutes which prescribes greater punishment for
a crime already committed; or, 4) laws which alter the rules of evidence so
as to make it substantially easier to convict a defendant. “Applying the
constitutional principle, the (Court) has held that the prohibition applies
only to criminal legislation which affects the substantial rights of the
accused.” This being so, there is no absolutely no merit in petitioner’s
contention that the ruling of the lower court sustaining the Treaty’s
retroactive application with respect to offenses committed prior to the
Treaty’s coming into force and effect, violates the Constitutional prohibition
against ex post facto laws. As the Court of Appeals correctly concluded, the
Treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural
statute. “It merely provides for the extradition of persons wanted for
prosecution of an offense or a crime which offense or crime was already
committed or consummated at the time the treaty was ratified.”

The provisions of Article 6 of the said Treaty pertaining to the documents

required for extradition are sufficiently clear and require no interpretation.
The warrant for the arrest of an individual or a copy thereof, a statement of
each and every offense and a statement of the acts and omissions which
were alleged against the person in respect of each offense are sufficient to
show that a person is wanted for prosecution under the said article. All of
these documentary requirements were dully submitted to the trial court in
its proceedings a quo. For purposes of the compliance with the provisions of
the Treaty, the signature and official seal of the Attorney-General of
Australia were sufficient to authenticate all the documents annexed to the
Statement of the Acts and Omissions, including the statement itself. In
conformity with the provisions of Article 7 of the Treaty, the appropriate
documents and annexes were signed by “an officer in or of the Requesting
State”
“sealed with . . . (a) public seal of the Requesting State or of a Minister of
State, or of a Department or officer of the Government of the Requesting
State,” and “certified by a diplomatic or consular officer of the Requesting
State accredited to the Requested State.” 19 The last requirement was
accomplished by the certification made by the Philippine Consular Officer in
Canberra, Australia.
 44

Bayot v. Sandiganbayan

Facts:

Petitioner Reynaldo R. Bayot was charged with the crime of Estafa thru
Falsification of Public Documents before the Sandiganbayan. In the
meantime, he ran and was elected mayor of Amadeo, Cavite in January
1980. The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner; hence, he appealed.

While the case was pending on appeal, Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 was
passed amending, among others, Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019. This
authorized suspension of public officers against whom an information may
be pending at any stage.

On motion of the prosecution, the Sandiganbayan issued an order directing

the suspension of petitioner. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
alleging that "to apply the provision of Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 to the
herein accused would be violative of the constitutional guarantee of
protection against an ex post facto law".

Issue:

Whether or not Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 is an ex post facto law

 45

Held:

Paragraph 3 of Article 24 of the Revised Penal Code clearly states that

suspension from the employment or public office during the trial or in order
to institute proceedings shall not be considered as penalty. It is not a
penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact,
if acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to
the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension. Those
mentioned in paragraph Nos. 1, 3 and 4 of said Article 24 are merely
preventive measures before final judgment. Not being a penal provision,
therefore, the suspension from office, pending trial, of the public officer
charged with crimes mentioned in the amendatory provision committed
before its effectivity does not violate the constitutional provision on ex post
facto law. Further, the claim of petitioner that he cannot be suspended
because he is presently occupying a position different from that under which
he is charged is untenable. The amendatory provision clearly states that any
incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a
valid information under Republic Act 3019 or for any offense involving fraud
upon the government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as
a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of
participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Thus, by
the use of the word "office" the same applies to any office which the officer
charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under which he
was charged. Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 61776 to 61861. March
23, 1984

NASI-VILLAR v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 176169, 14 November 2008

FACTS:

On or about the month of January 1993, Rosario Nasi-Villar, conspiring

together, confederating with and mutually helping one another through
fraudulent representation and deceitful machination, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously recruit Nila Panilag for employment
abroad, demand and receive the amount of PhP6,500.00 as placement fee,
the said accused being a non-licensee or non-holder of authority to engage
in the recruitment of workers abroad to the damage and prejudice of the
herein offended party.

On 3 July 2002, After due trial, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) found the
evidence presented by the prosecution to be more credible than that
presented by the defense and thus held petitioner liable for the offense of
Illegal Recruitment under the Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995).

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) raising as sole issue the
alleged error by the trial court in finding her guilty of illegal recruitment on
the basis of the trial court’s appreciation of the evidence presented by the
 46

prosecution. The appellate court affirmed with modification the decision of

the RTC, declaring that petitioner should have been charged under the
Labor Code and not under R.A. No. 8042.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration under an Information that

erroneously designated the offense as covered by R.A. No. 8042, but alleged
in its body acts which are punishable under the Labor Code, but was denied
by the CA.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT the CA erred in failing to consider that R.A. No. 8042
cannot be given retroactive effect and the decision of the RTC constitutes a
violation of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto law.

RULING:

No. the CA’s conviction of petitioner under the Labor Code is correct. There
is no violation of the prohibition against ex post facto law nor a retroactive
application of R.A. No. 8042, as alleged by petitioner.

Effectivity of Labor Code of the Philippines and R.A. No. 8042, reads:

Article 2. Date of effectivity. — This Code shall take effect six months after
its promulgation. (1 November 1974, supplied)

Section 43. Effectivity Clause. — This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15)
days from its publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two (2) national
newspapers of general circulation whichever comes earlier. (15 July 1995,
supplied)

In this case, what was applicable in 1993 is the Labor Code, where under
Art. 38, in relation to Art. 39, the violation of the Code is penalized with
imprisonment of not less than four (4) years nor more than eight (8) years or
a ne of not less than P20,000.00 and not more than P100,000.00 or both.
On the other hand, Sec. 7(c) of R.A. No. 8042 penalizes illegal recruitment
with a penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day
but not more than twelve (12) years and a ne not less than P200,000.00 nor
more than P500,000.00.

The basic rule is that a criminal act is punishable under the law in force at
the time of its commission. Since R.A. No. 8042, a special penal law, did not
yet exist in January 1993 when the crime was allegedly committed, the law
cannot be used as the basis of fling a criminal action for illegal recruitment,
unless it is in favor of the accused. However, the penalty of imprisonment
provided in the Labor Code was raised or increased by R.A. No. 8042.
Therefore, the Supreme Court held that as it was proven that petitioner had
committed the acts she was charged with, she was properly convicted under
the Labor Code, and not under R.A. No. 8042.
 47

YNOT v. IAC

FACTS

Here, the constitutionality of former President Marcos’s Executive Order No.

626-A is assailed. Said order decreed an absolute ban on the inter-provincial
transportation of carabao (regardless of age, sex, physical condition or
purpose) and carabeef. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of
this shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the government, to be
distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the
Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission (NMIC) may see fit,
in the case of carabeef. In the case of carabaos, these shall be given to
deserving farmers as the Director of Animal Industry (AI) may also see fit.
Petitioner had transported six (6) carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to
Iloilo. These were confiscated by the police for violation of the above order.
He sued for recovery, which the RTC granted upon his filing of a
supersedeas bond worth 12k. After trial on the merits, the lower court
sustained the confiscation of the carabaos, and as they can no longer be
produced, directed the confiscation of the bond. It deferred from ruling on
the constitutionality of the executive order, on the grounds of want of
authority and presumed validity. On appeal to the Intermediate Appellate
Court, such ruling was upheld. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
On the main, petitioner asserts that EO 626-A is unconstitutional insofar as
 48

it authorizes outright confiscation, and that its penalty suffers from

invalidity because it is imposed without giving the owner a right to be heard
before a competent and impartial court—as guaranteed by due process.

ISSUE

Whether EO 626-A is unconstitutional for being violative of the due process

clause.

HELD

YES. To warrant a valid exercise of police power, the following must be

present: (a) that the interests of the public, generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, require such interference, and; (b) that the
means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose. In
US v. Toribio, the Court has ruled that EO 626 complies with the above
requirements—that is, the carabao, as a poor man’s tractor so to speak, has
a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of the
order, and that the method chosen is also reasonably necessary for the
purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive. The ban of the
slaughter of carabaos except those seven years old if male and eleven if
female upon issuance of a permit adequately works for the conservation of
those still fit for farm work or breeding, and prevention of their improvident
depletion. Here, while EO 626-A has the same lawful subject, it fails to
observe the second requirement. Notably, said EO imposes an absolute ban
not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement. The object of
the prohibition is unclear. The reasonable connection between the means
employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the disputed measure is
missing. It is not clear how the interprovincial transport of the animals can
prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, as they can be killed anywhere, with
no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining them
in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more that moving
them to another will make it easier to kill them there. Even if assuming
there was a reasonable relation between the means and the end, the penalty
is invalid as it amounts to outright confiscation, denying petitioner a chance
to be heard. Unlike in the Toribio case, here, no trial is prescribed and the
property being transported is immediately impounded by the police and
declared as forfeited for the government. Concededly, there are certain
occasions when notice and hearing can be validly dispensed with, such as
summary abatement of a public nuisance, summary destruction of
pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs. However,
these are justified for reasons of immediacy of the problem sought to be
corrected and urgency of the need to correct it. In the instant case, no such
pressure is present. The manner by which the disposition of the confiscated
property also presents a case of invalid delegation of legislative powers since
the officers mentioned (Chairman and Director of the NMIC and AI
respectively) are granted unlimited discretion. The usual standard and
reasonable guidelines that said officers must observe in making the
distribution are nowhere to be found; instead, they are to go about it as they
 49

may see fit. Obviously, this makes the exercise prone to partiality and
abuse, and even corruption.

Dimatulac vs VillonG.R. No. 127107, October 12, 1998

Facts: A petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus had been filed in
Court to assail the decision of the trial court in dismissing the earlier
decision to set aside the arraignment of the accused and the decision of the
office of the provincial prosecutor in giving due course to the motion for
reinvestigation against the accused in spite of not having been brought into
the custody of the law. The petitioners contended that: the honorable judge
gravely abuse his discretion in dismissing the earlier decision to set aside
the arraignment of the accused and the prosecutor in giving due course to
the motion for reinvestigation against the accused in spite of not having
been brought into the custody of the law. The respondent judge in his
decision mentioned that: the witness is more or less credible to be
consistent with truth, human nature and natural course of things and lack
of motives, the evidence of guilt against him is rather weak compared with
the others, which the court recommends a cash bond of P50,000.00 for his
provisional liberty, and the courts previous
order of no bail for said accused is hereby reconsidered. Ordered too the
Clerk of Court to forward the entire records of the case to the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga for further action, together with the
bodies of accused Francisco Yambao and Juan Magat to bere manded to the
provincial Jail of Pampanga. And the prosecutor resolved that: the murder
 50

case filed changed into homicide as no circumstance would qualify the

killing to murder and the case be dismissed against accused Evelino David,
Justino Mandap a.k.a. Casti David, Francisco Yambao, Juan Magat, Arturo
Naguit, Bladimir Dimatulac, Fortunato Mallari, Aniano Magnaye, Gilberto
Malabanan, Jesus dela Cruz and Joselito Miranda and bail recommended
for20,000.00 for Santiago, Servillano and Martin all surnamed Yabut, and
one John Doe alias Danny as conspirators in the crime of Homicide. The
resolution was appealed in the Office of the Secretary of Justice which ruled
that murder was committed and directed the Provincial Prosecutor to
accordingly amend the information, solely on the basis of the information
that the YABUTs had already been arraigned.

Issue: Whether the judge and the prosecutor committed procedural

irregularities which tantamount to the deprivation of due process of the
aggrieved party.

Ruling: Yes because the respondent Judge cursorily ignored the basic
principle of when a possible miscarriage of justice happens then he could
have directed first the private prosecutor to secure a resolution on the
appeal within a specified time before acting on the case at hand. The Court
ruled that the respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in
rushing the arraignment of the YABUTs on the assailed information for
homicide. Again, the State and the offended parties were deprived of due
process. As for the DOJ, they could have directed the public prosecutors
concerned to show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against
them for neglect of duty or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service in not, inter alia
, even asking the trial court to defer arraignment in view of the pendency of
the appeal, informing the DOJ, from time to time, of the status of the case,
and, insofar as prosecutor Datu was concerned, in disallowing the private
prosecutor from further participating in the case.
 51

LACSON VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Facts:

Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, an

organized crime syndicate involved in bank robberies, were slain by
elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery andIntelligence Task Group (ABRITG).
Among those included in the ABRITG were petitioners and petitioner-
intervenors.

Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the

Criminal Investigation Command, that what actually transpired was a
summary execution and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng
gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desiertoformed a
panel of investigators to investigate the said incident. Said panel found the
incident as a legitimate police operation. However, a review board modified
the panel’s finding and recommended the indictment for multiple murder
against twenty-six respondents including herein petitioner, charged as
principal, and herein petitioner-intervenors, charged as accessories. After a
 52

reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed amended informations before the

Sandiganbayan, where petitioner was charged only as an accessory.

The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the

Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations, the cases
fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2
of R.A. 7975. They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan to cases where one or ore of the “principal accused” are
government officals with Salary Grade 27 or higher, or PNP officials with
rank of Chief Superintendent or higher. Thus, they did not qualify under
said requisites. However, pending resolution of their motions, R.A. 8249 was
approved amending the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the
word “principal” from the phrase “principal accused” in Section 2 of R.A.
7975.

Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. 8249, including

Section 7 which provides that the said law shall apply to all cases pending
in any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate the petitioners’
right to due process and the equal protection clause of the
Constitution as the provisions seemed to have been introduced for the
Sandiganbayan to continue to acquire jurisdiction over the Kuratong
Baleleng case.

RULING:

1.) RIGHTS NOT VIOLATED.

Petitioner and intervenors’ contention that Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249

violate their right to equal protection of the law is too shallow to deserve
merit. No concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented to
warrant such a declaration. Every classification made by the law is
presumed reasonable and the party who challenges the law must present
proof of arbitrariness. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary
when the following concur: (1) it must rest on substantial distinction; (2) it
must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to
existing conditions only, and (4) must apply equally to all members of the
same class; all of which are present in this case.

Paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply “to all cases involving”
certain public officials and under the transitory provision in Section 7, to
“all cases pending in any court.” Contrary to petitioner and intervenors’
argument, the law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng
cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in the
Sandiganbayan but also in “any court.”
 53

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelle, vs. LEO ECHEGARAY y

PILO, accused-appellant.

FACTS:
In 1994 accused-appellant Leo Echegaray was charged and convicted for the
crime of raping his ten-year old stepdaughter, Rodessa Echegaray. He was
then sentenced to Death. The accused-appellant now reiterates his position
in his attempt to seek a reversal of the lower court's verdict through the
following assignment of errors:
"1. THE LOWER COURT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE SINISTER MOTIVE
OF PRIVATECOMPLAINANT'S GRANDMOTHER THAT PRECIPITATED THE
FILING OF THE CHARGE OF RAPE, HENCE IT ERRED IN HOLDING
ACCUSED GUILTY AS CHARGED.2. THE COURT BELOW OVERLOOKED
THE FACT THAT THE HEALED LACERATIONS AT 3 AND 7O'CLOCK COULD
NOT HAVE BEEN DUE TO THE PUMPING OF THE PENIS OF ACCUSED TO
THEVAGINA OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT, HENCE IT ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT ACCUSED COMMITTEDTHE CRIME CHARGED, NOTWITHSTANDING
 54

VEHEMENT DENIAL.3. THE COURT A QUO WHIMSICALLY IGNORED THE

DEFENSE OF ALIBI THAT ACCUSED WAS INPARA

AQUE ON THE DATE AND TIME OF THE IMPUTED CRIME HENCE, IT

ERRED IN HOLDINGTHAT ALIBI IS NOT SUSTAINABLE IN THE CASE AT
BAR."
[
Hence, this case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred on giving the sentence of death
penalty?

RULING: The lower court did not commit any error. Anent the first assigned
error, no amount of persuasion can convince the Court to tilt the scales of
justice in favor of the accused-appellant notwithstanding that he cries foul
insisting that the rape charge was merely concocted and strongly motivated
by greed over a certain lot situated at the NHA-Madrigal Estate Housing
Project, Barangay San Antonio, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City. The
accused-appellant theorizes that prosecution witness Asuncion Rivera, the
maternal grandmother of the victim Rodessa, concocted the charge of rape
so that, in the event that the accused-appellant shall be meted out a death
sentence, title to the lot will be consolidated in her favor. Indeed, the lot in
question is co-owned by the accused-appellant and Conrado Alfonso, the
live-in partner of Asuncion Rivera, according to the records of the National
Housing Authority (Exh. "3"). The accused-appellant would want us to
believe that the rape charge was fabricated by Asuncion Rivera in order to
eliminate the accused-appellant from being a co-owner. So, the live-in
partners would have the property for their own.

We believe, as did the Solicitor-General, that no grandmother would be so

callous as to instigate her10-year old granddaughter to file a rape case
against her own father simply on account of her alleged interest over the
disputed lot.

It is a well-entrenched jurisprudential rule that the testimony of a rape

victim is credible where she has no motive to testify against the accused.

We find no flaws material enough to discredit the testimony of the ten-year

old Rodessa which the trial court found convincing enough and unrebutted
by the defense. The trial court not surprisingly noted that Rodessa's
narration in detail of her father's monstrous acts had made her cry.

Once again, we rule that:

"x x x The testimony of the victim who was only 12 years old at the time of
the rape as to the circumstances of the rape must be given weight for
testimony of young and immature rape victims are credible (People v.
Guibao, 217 SCRA 64 [1993]). No woman especially one of tender age,
practically only a girl, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an
examination of her private parts and thereafter expose herself to a public
 55

trial, if she were not motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit
apprehended and punished (People v. Guibao, supra)."

The accused-appellant points out certain inconsistencies in the testimonies

of the prosecution witnesses in his attempt to bolster his claim that the rape
accusation against him is malicious and baseless. Firstly, Rodessa's
testimony that the accused-appellant was already naked when he dragged
her inside the room is inconsistent with her subsequent testimony that the
said accused-appellant was still wearing short pants when she was dragged
inside the room. Secondly, Rodessa's sworn statement before the police
investigator which indicated that, while the accused was executing pumping
acts, he uttered the words "Masarap ba?", differ from her testimony in court
wherein she related that when the accused took out his penis from her
vagina, the accused said "Masarap, tapos na." Thirdly, the victim's
grandmother, Asuncion Rivera, recounted in her sworn statement that it
was the accused who went to see her to apprise her of the rape committed
on her granddaughter. However, in her testimony in court, Asuncion Rivera
claimed that she was the one who invited the accused-appellant to see her
in her house so as to tell her a secret.

These alleged discrepancies merely pertain to minor details which in no way

pose serious doubt as to the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
Whether or not the accused was naked when he dragged Rodessa inside the
room where he sexually assaulted her bears no significant effect on
Rodessa's testimony that she was actually raped by the accused-appellant.
Moreover, a conflicting account of whatever words were uttered by the
accused-appellant after he forcefully inserted his penis into Rodessa's
private organ against her will cannot impair the prosecution's evidence as a
whole. A determination of which version earmarks the truth as to how the
victim's grandmother learned about the rape is inconsequential to the
judgment of conviction. As we have pronounced in the case of People v.
Jaymalin:

"This Court has stated time and again that minor inconsistencies in the
narration of a witness do not detract from its essential credibility as long as
it is on the whole coherent and intrinsically believable. Inaccuracies may in
fact suggest that the witness is telling the truth and has not been rehearsed
as it is not to be expected that he will be able to remember every single
detail of an incident with perfect or total recall."
After due deliberation, this Court finds that the trial judge's assessment of
the credibility of the prosecution witnesses deserves our utmost respect in
the absence of arbitrariness. With respect to the second assigned error, the
records of the instant case are bereft of clear and concrete proof of the
accused-appellant's claim as to the size of his penis and that if that be the
fact, it could not have merely caused shallow healed lacerations at 3:00 and
7:00 o'clock.
 56

In his testimony, the accused- appellant stated that he could not have
raped Rodessa because of the size of his penis which could have ruptured
her vagina had he actually done so.

The Court gives no probative value on the accused-appellant's self-serving

statement in the light of our ruling in the case of People v. Melivo, supra,
that: "The vaginal wall and the hymenal membrane are elastic organs
capable of varying degrees of distensibility. The degree of distensibility of the
female reproductive organ is normally limited only by the character and size
of the pelvic inlet, other factors being minor. The female reproductive canal
being capable of allowing passage of a regular fetus, there ought to be no
difficulty allowing the entry of objects of much lesser size, including the
male reproductive organ, which even in its largest dimensions, would still be
considerably smaller than the full-term fetus. In the case at bench, the
presence of healed lacerations in various parts of the vaginal wall, though
not as extensive as appellant might have expected them to be, indicate
traumatic injury to the area within the period when the incidents were
supposed to have occurred." (At pp. 13-14, Italics supplied) In rape cases, a
broken hymen is not an essential element thereof.

A mere knocking at the doors of the pudenda, so to speak, by the accused's

penis suffices to constitute the crime of rape as full entry into the victim's
vagina is not required to sustain a conviction.

In the case, Dr. Freyra, the medico-legal examiner, categorically testified

that the healed lacerations of Rodessa on her vagina were consistent with
the date of the commission of the rape as narrated by the victim to have
taken place in April, 1994.

Lastly, the third assigned error deserves scant consideration. The accused-
appellant erroneously argues that the Contract of Services (Exhibit 4) offered
as evidence in support of the accused-appellant's defense of alibi need not
be corroborated because there is no law expressly requiring so.

In view of our finding that the prosecution witnesses have no motive to

falsely testify against the accused-appellant, the defense of alibi, in this
case, uncorroborated by other witnesses, should be completely disregarded.

More importantly, the defense of alibi which is inherently weak becomes

even weaker in the face of positive identification of the accused-appellant as
perpetrator of the crime of rape by his victim, Rodessa.

The Contract of Services whereby the accused-appellant obligated himself

to do some painting Job at the house of one Divina Ang in Paranaque, Metro
Manila, within 25 days from April 4, 1994, is not proof of the whereabouts of
the accused-appellant at the time of the commission of the offense. The
accused-appellant in this case is charged with Statutory Rape on the basis
of the complaint, dated July 14,1994. The gravamen of the said offense, as
 57

stated in paragraph 3, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, is the carnal
knowledge of a woman below twelve years old.

Rodessa positively identified his father accused-appellant, succeeded in

consummating his grievous and odious sexual assault on her is free from
any substantial self-contradiction. It is highly inconceivable that it is
rehearsed and fabricated upon instructions from Rodessa's maternal
grandmother Asuncion Rivera as asserted by the accused-appellant. The
words of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, speaking for the Court, more
than two decades ago, are relevant and worth reiterating, thus:

"x x x it is manifest in the decisions of this Court that where the offended
parties are young and immature girls like the victim in this case, (Cited
cases omitted) there is marked receptivity on its part to lend credence to
their version of what transpired. It is not to be wondered at. The state, as
parens patria, is under the obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those,
who, because of their minority, are as yet unable to take care of themselves
fully. Those of tender years deserve its utmost protection. Moreover, the
injury in cases of rape is not inflicted on the unfortunate victim alone. The
consternation it causes her family must also be taken into account. It may
reflect a failure to abide by the announced concern in the fundamental law
for such institution. There is all the more reason then for the rigorous
application of the penal law with its severe penalty for this offense, whenever
warranted. It has been aptly remarked that with the advance in civilization,
the disruption in public peace and order it represents defies explanation,
much more so in view of what currently appears to be a tendency for sexual
permissiveness. Where the prospects of relationship based on consent are
hardly minimal, self-restraint should even be more marked."

Under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 often referred to as the Death
Penalty Law, Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code was amended, to wit: "The
death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with
any of the following attendant circumstances:1. When the victim is under
eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant ,step-
parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. Apparently,
as a last glimpse of hope, the accused-appellant questions the penalty
imposed by the trial court by declaring that he is neither a father, stepfather
or grandfather of Rodessa although he was a confirmed lover of Rodessa's
mother. On direct examination, he admitted that before the charge of rape
was filed against him, he had treated Rodessa as his real daughter and had
provided for her food, clothing, shelter and education.

The Court notes that Rodessa uses the surname of the accused-appellant,
not Rivera (her mother's maiden name) nor Alfonso (her grandmother's live-
in partner). Moreover, Rodessa's mother stated during the cross-
examination that she, the accused-appellant and her five children, including
Rodessa, had been residing in one house only.
 58

At any rate, even if he were not the father, stepfather or grandfather of

Rodessa, this disclaimer cannot save him from the abyss where perpetrators
of heinous crimes ought to be, as mandated by law. Considering that the
accused-appellant is a confirmed lover of Rodessa's mother,

he falls squarely within the aforequoted portion of the Death Penalty Law
under the term "common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. "The fact
that the ten-year old Rodessa referred to the accused-appellant as "Papa" is
reason enough to conclude that accused-appellant is either the father or
stepfather of Rodessa. Thus, the act of sexual assault perpetrated by the
accused on his young victim has become all the more repulsive and
perverse. The victim's tender age and the accused-appellant's moral
ascendancy and influence over her are factors which forced Rodessa to
succumb to the accused's selfish and bestial craving. The law has made it
inevitable under the circumstances of this case that the accused-appellant
face the supreme penalty of death.

People v Livara

Facts:
Felipe A. Livara, was found guilty of malversation of public funds and
sentenced to imprisonment in the Court of First Instance of Romblon (the
case against him was filed there). He is a member of the Armed Forces,
provincial disbursing officer of the Philippine Constabulary in Romblon. As
finance and accountable officer, he took charge of paying the salaries of the
officers (that’s why the crime is malversation of public funds) because he
cashed out at Taft: 8,000 pesos he obtained via a treasury warrant he
secured from the finance officer at Camp Crame.
LIVARA’S CONTENTION:
Court of First Instance of Romblon had no jurisdiction over the case,
because the alleged crime happened in line with his job as an officer of the
Philippine Constabulary.
HELD:
 59

“
The civil courts and courts-martial have concurrent jurisdiction over
offenses committed by a member of the Armed Forces in violation of military
law and the public law.”

Concurrent Jurisdiction:
Concurrent jurisdiction exists where two or more courts from different
systems simultaneously have jurisdiction (Power to try a case) over a specific
case. This should be taken together with the case of US v Sweet. It
supplements the latter case. US v Sweet says that Civil courts have
jurisdiction over the military. People v Livara adds to this: Both civil courts
and court-martials (not military courts- because military courts only involve
service- connected offenses) HAVE CONCURRENT JURISDICTION over
soldiers of the armed forces of the Philippines.
“The first court to take cognizance of the case does so to the exclusion of the
other”

Double Jeopardy
G.R. No. L-6277–February 26, 1954
Juan D. Crisologo, petitioner vs People of the Philippines and Hon.
Pablo Villalobos, respondents

Facts: The petitioner, Juan D. Crisologo, a captain in the USAFFE during

the last world war at the time of the filing of the present petition a lieutenant
colonel in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, was on March 12, 1946,
accused of treason under Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code in an
information filed in the People’s Court. But before the accused could be
brought under the jurisdiction of the court, he was on January 13, 1947,
indicted for violation of Commonwealth Act No. 408, otherwise known as the
Articles of War, before a military court created by authority of the Army
Chief of Staff, the indictment containing three charges, two of which, the
first and third, were those of treason, while the second was that of having
certain civilians killed in time of war. Found innocent of the first and third
 60

charges, but guilty of the second, he was on May 8, 1947, sentenced by the
Military Court to life imprisonment. On June 17, 1948, the criminal case
was transferred to the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga and there the
charges of treason were amplified. Arraigned in that court upon the
amended information, petitioner presented a motion to quash, challenging
the jurisdiction of the court and pleading double jeopardy because of his
previous sentence in the military court.

Issue: Whether or not the decision of the Military Court constitutes a bar to
further prosecution for the same offense in the civil courts?

Ruling: Well-known is the rule that when several courts have concurrent
jurisdiction of the same offense, the court first acquiring the jurisdiction of
the prosecution retains it to the exclusion of the others. This rule, however,
requires that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall have first
been obtained by the court in which the first charge was filed. (22 C.J.S, PP
186-187).The record in the present case shows that the information for
treason in the People’s Court was filed on March 12, 1946 but petitioners
had not been arrested or brought into the custody of the court–the warrant
of arrest had not been issued–when the indictment for the same offense was
filed in the military court on January 13, 1947.It appearing that the offense
charged in the military court and civil court is the same, that the military
court had jurisdiction to try the case and that both courts derived their
powers from one sovereignty. The sentence meted out by the military court
to the petitioner should, in accordance with the precedence above cited, be a
bar to petitioner’s further prosecution for the same offense in the Court of
First Instance of Zambales.
Wherefore, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted and the
criminal case for treason against the petitioner pending in that court
ordered dismissed.

Arula v. Espino

FACTS:

Arula was recruited by one Capt. Teodoro R. Facelo of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines at Simunul, Sulu, to undergo training on December 17,
1967. On the following January 3, he, together with other recruits, was
taken to Corregidor island. On March 18 a shooting incident occurred at
Corregidor, resulting in, among other things, the infliction of serious
physical injuries upon the petitioner.Despite his wounds he succeeded in
fleeing Corregidor, and on March 23, he filed, a criminal complaint with the
city fiscal of Cavite City for frustrated murder against Capt. Alberto Soteco,
Benjamin Munar alias Lt. Baqui, Reynaldo Munar alias Lt. Rey, Eugenio
Alcantara alias Lt. Alcantara, 4 and nine others.
-
 61

Acting on the criminal complaint, the city fiscal on March 29 sent

subpoenas to the persons above enumerated, advising them that the
preliminary investigation was set for April 3 at 9: 00 o'clock in the morning,
and requiring them to appear at his office on the same date and time. On
April 2 the petitioner sent a letter to the commanding officer of the
Philippine Army, informing the latter that he was "not filing any charges"
with the military authorities against the army personnel responsible for his
injuries, for the reason that he had "already filed the corresponding criminal
complaint" with the city fiscal of Cavite City.
-
On the following day, April 3, the date set for the preliminary investigation,
army lawyers headed by Capt. Jose Magsanoc appeared on behalf of the
respondents and requested for transfer of the preliminary investigation
which, as a result of such request, was reset for April 16. Meanwhile, the
respondent General Espino directed Capt. Alfredo O. Pontejos of his
command to conduct a pre-trial investigation of the Corregidor incident to
pinpoint responsibility therefor. On April 6 Capt. Pontejos, as pre trial
investigator, submitted his written report.
-
On April 14, Capt. Pontejos submitted a supplemental report,
recommending trial by general court martial of

Capt. Solferino Titong

alias
Capt. Mike, trainee Reynaldo Munar
alias
Lt. Rey and trainee Eugenio Alcantara

alias
Lt. Alcantara
.
-

Charges and specifications for violations of articles of war 94

and 97
5
were filed with the general court
-
martial;additional charges and specifications were subsequently filed and
renumbered.
-

On April 19 the
Armed Forces lawyers moved to dismiss the complaint filed with the city
fiscal of Cavite upon

the ground that the civil courts had lost jurisdiction over the case because a
court
 62

-
martial had been convened
.

It is here pertinent to note that on March 21 President Ferdinand Marcos (as

Commander
-
in
-
Chief) ordered aninvestigation of the reported killings of commando trainees
on Corregidor Island, and, on the following day,March 22, directed the
creation of a court
-
martial to try whomsoever might be responsible for the reportedkillings. So
that before the petitioner Arula filed his criminal complaint (on March 23)
with the city fiscal ofCavite, the President had already ordered an
investigation of the Corregidor incident and the convening of acourt
-
martial relative thereto.

ISSUE:
Does the general court
-
martial have jurisdiction over the case? – YES [This in turn depends on the
resolution ofthe sub
-
issues of (a) whether the petitioner is a person subject to military law; (b) if
he is not, whether Corregidor is amilitary reservation; and (c) whether the
filing by the petitioner of a criminal complaint (involving the same offense)
withthe city fiscal of Cavite City forthwith invested the Court of First
Instance of Cavite jurisdiction to try the case to theexclusion of the general
court
-
martial.]
 63

RULING:

Although for infractions of the general penal laws, military courts and civil
courts have concurrent jurisdiction, the ruleenunciated in
Crisologo vs. People of the Philippines
12
accords to the court first acquiring jurisdiction over the person of

the accused by the filing of charges and having him in custody the
preferential right to proceed with the trial. Thus —

As to the claim that the Military Court had no jurisdiction over the case, well
known is
the rule that when severalcourts have concurrent jurisdiction of the same
offense, the court first acquiring jurisdiction of the prosecution

retains it to the exclusion of the others. This rule, however, requires that
jurisdiction over the person of the defendantshall have first been obtained
by the court in which the first charge was filed
(22 C.J.S., pp. 186
-
187). The record in

the present case shows that the information for treason in the People's
Court was filed on March 12, 1946, butpetitioner had not yet been arrested
or brought into the custody of the Court — the warrant of arrest had not
beenissued — when the indictment for the same offense was filed in the
military court on January 13, 1947.
Under therule cited, mere priority in the filing of the complaint in one court
does not give that court priority to take cognizanceof the offense, it being
necessary in addition that the court where the information is filed has
custody or jurisdiction

of the person of the defendant

RODOLFO A. SCHNECKENBURGER versus MANUEL V. MORAN, Judge of
First Instance of Manila
G.R. No. L-44896
July 31, 1936

FACTS:

Rodolfo A Schneckenburger was a duly accredited honorary consul of

Uruguay at Manila, Philippine Islands on June 11, 1934. He was
subsequently charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with the crime
of falsification of a private document. He objected to the jurisdiction of the
court on the ground that both under the Constitution of the United States
and the Constitution of the Philippines the Court of First Instance had no
 64

jurisdiction to try him. His objection having been overruled, he filed a

petition for a writ of prohibition with a view to preventing the Court of First
Instance of Manila from taking cognizance of the criminal action filed
against him.
ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the Court of First Instance has jurisdiction over a case
against a consul?

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that the Court of First Instance of Manila
has jurisdiction to try Rodolfo A Schneckenburger and that his petition for a
writ of prohibition must be denied.
This case involves no question of diplomatic immunity. It is well settled that
a consul is not entitled to the privileges and immunities of an ambassador
or minister, but is subject to the laws and regulations of the country to
which he is accredited. Such jurisdiction included the trial of criminal
actions brought against consuls for, as we have already indicated, consuls,
not being entitled to the privileges and immunities of ambassadors or
ministers, are subject to the laws and regulations of the country where they
reside.

US v. Fowler, 1 Phil. 614

Subject Matter: Applications of the provisions of Art. 2 of the Revised Penal
Code

Facts:

In August 12, 1901, the defendants were accused of the theft of 16

champagne bottles worth 20 dollars while on board the vessel, “Lawton”.
The counsel for defendants alleged to the Court of First Instance of Manila
that they were without jurisdiction over the crime charged. Since it
happened in the high seas and not in the city of Manila or in the territory in
 65

which the jurisdiction of the court extends, they asked that the case be
dismissed.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction over
the criminal case theft committed on board while navigating on high seas on
a vessel not registered in the Philippines.

Held:

No. The Philippine court has jurisdiction over the crime of theft committed
on high seas on board a vessel not registered or licensed in the Philippines.
The English Rule states that such crimes are triable in our country when
crimes are committed on board a foreign vessel sailing from a foreign port
and which enters the Philippine waters. In the case at bar, the vessel
Lawton was navigating the high seas at the commission of the crime. Given
the location of the vessel at the time, such act is not triable within our
jurisdiction.

RAQUIZA v BRADFORD 75 Phil. 50 (1945)

Characteristics of Philippine Criminal Law – General – Exceptions

FACTS:
Petitioners, invoking the writ of habeas corpus were arrested by the United
States Army and have since then been detained under the custody of the
respondents by virtue of a proclamation issued by General MacArthur
providing military measures for the apprehension of Filipino citizens who
have voluntarily collaborated with the enemy. Petitioners have not been
 66

informed of the nature of the accusation against them; no complaint with

any specific offense has been filed against them, and has not been given
even a summary hear in

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to afford relief to the
petitioners?

RULING:
Yes.
RATIO:
The affirmative and dissenting vote is based on the following considerations.
First, the right to due process of law is an immanent and alienable right of
every person which cannot be dispensed either in time of war or in time of
peace. Second, the assailed proclamation is either a bill of attainder or a
military order that apprehends and held in restraint violators without a trial
by a military tribunal. Third, the petitioners being illegally confined without
due process are entitled to be discharge under habeas corpus (Sec 1, Rule
102 of the Rules of Court). Petition was dismissed. (Six members of the
Court voted for the negative and three for the affirmative).

Liang v. People

FACTS:
Liang is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). He
was charged before the MeTC of Mandaluyong City with two counts of grave
oral defamation for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB
worker Joyce Cabal. Thereafter, MeTC judge received an “office of protocol”
from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that Liang is covered
by immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement between
 67

the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of the
ADB (hereinafter Agreement) in the country.

As a result, MeTc judge dismissed the two criminal cases. However, RTC set
aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant of
arrest. Liang elevated the case to the Supreme Court via a petition for review
arguing that he is covered by immunity under the Agreement.

ISSUE:
Whether Liang is covered by the immunity under the agreement.

RULING:
No. Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine
Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB provides that Officers
and staff of the Bank including for the purpose of this Article experts and
consultants performing missions for the Bank shall enjoy immunity from
legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity
except when the Bank waives the immunity.

The immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but subject to the

exception that the acts was done in “official capacity”. Slandering a person is
not covered by the immunity agreement because Philippines laws do not
allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official
duty.

TRINIDAD H. PARDO DE TAVERA, complainant-appellee, vs. VICENTE

GARCIA VALDEZ, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-922 November 8, 1902

Nature of the Action: An appeal from decision of lower court

Facts: Defendant was the editor of “Miau“, a periodical published and

circulated in Manila, which later published an article containing an alleged
 68

injurious matter. Thereafter, defendant was found guilty of the offense

“injurias graves” of Articles 457 and 458 of the Penal Code. Meanwhile,
subsequent to the article’s publication, Act No. 277 was enacted “defining
the law of libel”, and reforming the pre-existing Spanish law on the subject
of calumnia and injurias. Section 13 of the same act provided that laws
which may be in conflict with said act are deemed repealed; provided that it
shall not apply to laws which are applicable to pending actions or existing
causes of action. An appeal was filed claiming that the punishment for
defendant should be that as stated in Act 277.

Issue: Did the lower court erred in applying the punishment?

Ruling: In view of all the circumstances of the case we fix the penalty as four
years of destierro and a fine of 4,000 pesetas, with subsidiary liability to one
day’s banishment for every 12 ½ pesetas not paid, and the costs of both
instances. The judgment of the court below will be modified in accordance
with this opinion, and the record will be returned to that court for the
execution of the sentence as thus modified.

Ratio Decidendi: Yes. The Supreme Court held that since Act No. 277
explicitly stated its inapplicability, the said act cannot be applied to the
present case; that the act is left intact in all its parts as respects pending
actions or existing causes of action. Thus, the punishment must be
determined exclusively by the provisions of the former law.

People v. Bracamonte
G.R. No. 95939; June 17, 1996
FACTS:
On October 6, 1987, appellant Florentino Bracamonte, together with
Manuel Sapon and Ernie Cabral, stood charged with the crime of Robbery
with Double Homicide after they were positively identified by Violeta
Parnala, the owner of the house and the mother of one of the victims.
 69

Parnala and her husband arrived home from the Kingdom of Jehovah’s
Witnesses and were confounded when their housemaid refused to heed their
call from the outside. Parnala was surprised to see three men emerge from
inside the house. The three men then dashed off.

Found inside the house were the bodies of 6-year old Jay Vee and the
Paranala’s housemaid, Rosalina. Some items, amounting to P1,100, were
also found to have been missing. Thus, the charges.
Cabral was tried and convicted of the crime in 1989 while Sapon and
Bracamonte were at large until the latter’s arrest in October of the same
year. Appellant Bracamonte denied the charges and interposed the defense
of alibi. Appellant also contended that there was no circumstantial evidence
that will link him in the crime and that Parnala couldn’t possible know him
to merit identification.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Bracamonte’s defense of alibi and Parnala’s lack of personal
affiliation with Bracamonte are worth discharging the appellant of the crime.
RULING:
It has been said that the defense of alibi is inherently weak since it is very
easy to concoct. In order that this defense may prosper, it must be
established clearly and convincingly not only that the accused is elsewhere
at the time of the commission of the crime, but that likewise it would have
been physically impossible for him to be at the vicinity thereof. In the
instant case, appellant Bracamonte tragically failed to show, by clear and
convincing proof, that it was physically impossible for him to be at the
victims’ house at the time the crime was committed.

Positive identification by an independent witness who has not been shown to

have any reason or motive to testify falsely must prevail over simple denials
and the unacceptable alibi of the accused. Appellant himself admitted that
he was not aware of any reason or motive why Parnala should testify against
him. There is also nothing in law and jurisprudence which requires that in
order for there to be a positive identification by a prosecution witness of a
felon, he must know the latter personally. If this were the case, the
prosecution would rarely get any conviction since, in most instances, the
perpetrator of the crime is unrelated to the victim. The witness’ degree of
closeness or familiarity with the accused, although may be helpful, is by no
means an indispensable requirement for purposes of positive identification.
The Court noted that appellant, together with his two (2) other co-accused,
were charged and convicted of robbery with double homicide. The charge
and the corresponding conviction should have been for robbery with
homicide only although two persons were killed. In this complex crime, the
penalty prescribed in Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code is not affected
by the number of killings accompanying the robbery. The multiplicity of the
victims slain, though, is appreciated as an aggravating circumstance.
 70

PEOPLE v. TAMAYO
Ponente: Tuason, J.Date: March 5, 1950Petition for review on certiorari and
prohibition
RATIO DECIDENDI: Before a judgment becomes final, the trial court has
plenary power to alter or revise the same as law and justice require. No
motion can suspend the 15-day period in which judgment becomes final,
except for a motion for new trial.
 71

FACTS: Timoteo Tamayo, the appellant, was charged with illegal possession
of firearm and ammunition. Tamayo plead guilty and was sentenced to a
fine, but the Provincial Fiscal moved to reconsider the sentence, given the
new penalty enacted prior to the crime itself. The motion was filed in a
timely manner, but the lower court granted the motion and modified the
sentence 7 months after the decision was issued. Hence the appeal.

ISSUE:
1. WON Trial Court has the power to modify its judgment

DECISION:
Petition is GRANTED, modified judgment SET ASIDE. Original judgment
with sentence of fine REINSTATED

HELD
The SC cited Sec. 7 of Rule 120 (then Rule 116) as controlling in this case.
The SC interpreted Sec. 7 to mean that the trial court cannot modify its own
judgment once it becomes final, or 15days after the issue of the judgment.
Government may make any motion it sees proper within the 15-day period,
but such motion cannot operate to suspend the 15-day period and prevent
the judgment from becoming final. The Court mentions other opinions that
claim that Sec. 1 of Rule 121 (then Rule 117; New Trial) on granting a
motion for reconsideration, but says that Sec. 1 is not controlling here, as it
pertains to proceedings whereby errors of law or irregularities are expunged
from the record, or new evidence is introduced, or both steps are taken. In
the instant case, the motion for Sec. 7. Modification of judgment. – A
judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set
aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the
death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the
period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or
totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in writing his
right to appeal, or has applied for probation reconsideration is only for the
modification of the sentence, and not any other purpose. This clearly places
it within the scope of Sec. 7, Rule 120. As a matter of obiter, the Court also
pointed out that RA 4 was enacted on July 19, 1946, but the President had
fixed its effectivity on Aug. 31 by virtue of a Presidential Decree, thus it still
did not apply at the time of the crime.

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. EL CHINO CUÑA (alias SY

CONCO), defendant-appellee.
G.R. No. L-4504 December 15, 1908

Nature of the Action: An appeal from the decision of the trial court

Facts: Defendant was charged for violating Section 5 of Act No. 1461, after
selling a small quantity of opium to Apolinaria Gumpal, a Filipina who was
 72

neither a doctor, pharmacist, vendor of opium with license, nor an

inveterate user of opium duly registered. Thereafter, defendant submitted a
demurrer on the ground that Act No. 1761 repealed Act No. 1461 during the
pendency of this case, and in effect, there was no law in forced penalizing
the alleged offense, and therefore, the court had no jurisdiction over the
case. The RTC sustained the demurrer and dismissed the case; hence, this
appeal.

Issue: Should defendant be convicted of the crime when the law was
eventually repealed?

Ruling: The judgment of the trial court sustaining the demurrer to the
complaint interposed by the accused is reversed, and the record will be
returned to that court for further proceedings in accordance with the law.

Ratio Decidendi: Yes. The reliance on English and American common law
doctrines cannot be given credence since such is not accepted in this
jurisdiction. Thus, the courts have jurisdiction over the case—to try, convict
and sentence offenders. Moreover, even if Act No. 1761 repealed Act No.
1461, no retroactive effect of the law shall take effect in that the new law
penalized the same act in the repealed law; hence, the new law cannot be
said to be more favorable to the accused.

ANG BENG, ET AL.,

petitioners-appellants, vs.
THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION,
respondent-appellee.

FACTS: The petitioners, both Chinese nationals, were prosecuted in and

convicted by the Court of First Instance for violation of the Import Control
 73

Law (Republic Act No. 650. They were also charged before the Deportation
Board. Pending appeal of the criminal case in the Court of Appeals, the
Import Control Law expired, in view of which and with the conformity of the
Solicitor General, petitioners' motion for dismissal was granted and they
were ordered discharged. The Deportation Board, however, submitted to the
President of the Philippines its finding in the Deportation Case and
recommended petitioners' deportation. On January 18, 1954, the President
issued the corresponding order of deportation. On March 1, 1955, the
petitioners filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for
prohibition and certiorari, praying that the President's order of deportation
be declared illegal and that they be released. From the dismissal of the
petition the petitioners have appealed before us.

ISSUE: whether the order deporting the petitioners should be set aside,
because the law defining the crime of which they were convicted had already
expired. The pertinent legal provisions are therefore Articles 366 and 22 of
the Revised Penal Code, to wit: ART. 36. Without prejudice to the provisions
contained in Article 22 of this Code, felonies and misdemeanors, committed
prior to the date of effectiveness of this Code shall be punished in
accordance with the Code or Acts in force at the time of their Commission.
ART. 22. Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so far as they favor the
person guilty of felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is
defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the
publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the
convict is serving the same.

RULE: NO. We cannot subscribe to petitioners' contention that the

expiration of the Import Control Law should be considered favorable to them
in the sense that it erases the stigma of their conviction. There is no law
upholding such proposition. The benefit of retroactivity and liberal
construction accrues when penal laws are repealed. There is no subsequent
repealing law that petitioners could mention. The law violated by them
expired in virtue of its own force. The case of Tamayo, 6 Phil., 225, invoked
by petitioners is irrelevant, as it involved absolute repeal. What is more, the
order of deportation emanated from a branch of the government which
exercises jurisdiction independent from the judiciary. The President, in the
exercise of his executive prerogative and as an act of State, is vested with
full power and discretion to issue orders of deportation. The power to expel
or exclude aliens, being a power affecting international relations, is vested in
the political department of the government, and is to be regulated by treaty
or act of Congress, and to be executed by the executive authority according
to the regulations so established, except as far as the judicial department
has been authorized by treaty or statute, or required by the paramount law
of the Constitution, to intervene. (In re Paterson, 1 Phil., 95; In Re
McGulluch Dick, 38 Phil. 41.)To spearhead all other consideration, it is
fundamental that an executive order for exportation is not dependent on a
prior judicial conviction in a criminal case. This axiom of law was reiterated
in the decision in the case of Tan Tong vs. Deportation Board, (96 Phil., 934)
which pertinently ruled as follows: The power to deport aliens is lodged in
 74

the President of the Republic of the Philippines. As an act of state, it is

vested in the Executive by virtue of this office, subject only to the
regulations prescribed in section 69of the Revised Administrative Code or to
such future legislation as may be promulgated on the subject.(In Re
McGulluck Dick, 38 Phil., 41)

Norma De Joya vs. The Jail Warden of Batangas CityG.R. No. 159418-
19, December 10, 2003J. Callejo Sr.,

FACTS:
 75

Petitioner, Norma De Joya was charged of two separate violations of BP

Blg.22before the Municipal Trial Court in cities of Batangas City. During the
arraignment, the petitioner, assisted by a counsel pleaded not guilty.
Despite due notice, the petitioner and her counsel failed to appear during
the promulgation of the cases by the MTC and no appeal was filed from any
of the said decisions. When the petitioner was finally arrested after five long
years, she filed an urgent motion before the MTC Batangas City asking the
court to apply SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 retroactively pursuant to
Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, and to order her release from
detention. The trial court denied the motion on three grounds: (a) its
decision convicting the petitioner of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 had long
become final and executory; hence, could no longer be amended to change
the penalty imposed therein; (b) the SC Circular should be applied
prospectively; and (c) the SC Circular did not amend B.P. Blg. 22, a
substantive law, but merely encourages trial court judges to have a uniform
imposition offine. Hence, the petition at bar.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled for the writ of habeas corpus?

RULING:
No. Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides that the
writ of habeas corpus is not allowed if the person alleged to be restrained of
his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or
judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record.
In this case, the petitioner was arrested and detained pursuant to the final
judgment of the Municipal Trial Court of Batangas City, convicting her of
violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Irrefragably then, the petitioner is not entitled to a
writ of habeas corpus. Her plea that as provided for in Article 22 of the
Revised Penal Code, SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 as modified by SC
Admin. Circular No. 13-2001 should benefit her has no basis.

Appellee: People of the Philippines

Appellant: Marivic Genosa
G.R. No. 135981
 76

September 29, 2000

“Aggression, if not continuous, does not warrant self-defense. In the absence

of such aggression, there can be no self-defense – complete of incomplete –
on the part of the victim.”

FACTS:
Appellant was married to the victim Ben Genosa. In their first year of
marriage, Marivic and Ben lived happily but soon thereafter, the couple
would quarrel often and their fights would become violent. Ben, a habitual
drinker, became cruel to Marivic; he would provoke her, slap her, pin her
down on the bed or beat her. These incidents happened several times and
Marivic would often run home to her parents. She had tried to leave her
husband at least five times, but Ben would always follow her and they would
reconcile.

On the night of the killing, appellant, who was then eight months pregnant,
and the victim quarreled. The latter beat her, however, she was able to run
to another room. Allegedly there was no provocation on her part when she
got home that night, and it was her husband who began the provocation.
Frightened that her husband would hurt her and wanting to make sure she
would deliver her baby safely, appellant admitted having killed the victim,
who was then sleeping at the time, with the use of a gun. She was convicted
of the crime of parricide. Experts opined that Marivic fits the profile of a
battered woman syndrome and at the time she killed her husband, her
mental condition was that she was re-experiencing the trauma, together
with the imprint of all the abuses that she had experienced in the past.

ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not appellant can validly invoke the Battered Woman
Syndrome as constituting self-defense;

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2.) Whether or not treachery attended the killing.

RULING:
No, the Court ruled in the negative on both issues.

1.) The Court held that the defense failed to establish all the elements of
self-defense arising from the battered woman syndrome, to wit: (a) each of
the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at
least two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner;
(b) the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer
must have produced in the battered persons mind an actual fear of an
imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to
use force in order to save her life; and (c) at the time of the killing, the
 77

batterer must have posed probable – not necessarily immediate and actual –
grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by
the former against the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could
satisfy the requisites of self-defense.

Under the existing facts of the case, however, not all of these were duly
established. Here, there was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful
aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. In fact, she had already
been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their
children’s bedroom. The attack had apparently ceased and the reality or
even imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. Ben was no
longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety.

2.) The Court ruled that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a

quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance,
because the deceased may be said to have been forewarned and to have
anticipated aggression from the assailant. Moreover, in order to appreciate
alevosia, the method of assault adopted by the aggressor must have been
consciously and deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of
accomplishing the unlawful act without risk from any defense that might be
put up by the party attacked. Here, there is no showing that appellant
intentionally chose a specific means of successfully attacking her husband
without any risk to herself from any retaliatory act that he might make. It
appears that the thought of using the gun occurred to her only at about the
same moment when she decided to kill her batterer-spouse. Thus, in the
absence of any convincing proof that she consciously and deliberately
employed the method by which she committed the crime in order to ensure
its execution, the Court resolved the doubt in her favor.

PEOPLE vs. JULMAIN

 78

FACTS:

On January 19, 1947, on the way to Jolo, while in between the seas of
Zamboanga and Basilan, Salip Monsola killed Moro Aye and threw him
overboard, off the unregistered vinta. Because of the crime, Moro’s wife Ulka
Aye and his children landed at Pangasaan, Basilan Island riding the same
vinta, although they were supposed to land in Kambing, Luuk, Sulu.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not Sec. 14 par 3, Rule 106 shall apply in the aforementioned
case.

2. WON the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga was the court appropriate
to handle the case.

HELD:

1. No. Sec 14 par 3 Rule 106 states that “where an offense is committed on
board a vessel registered or licensed in accordance with the laws of teh
Philippines, in the course of its voyage, the criminal action may be instituted
or tried int eh proper court of the first port of entry or of any municipality or
province through which the vessel passed during its voyage” This will not
apply because the vinta is unregistered or unlicensed, therefore, the scene f
the crime must be considered as an ordinary place.

2. Yes. The crime happened in the waters within the jurisdiction of the
Court of First Instance of Zamboanga. Even if the vinta is registered, CFI of
Zamboanga is still the rightful court because it handles the first port of
entry, Pangasaan, Basilan.

People v. Rodriguez - 186 Cal. App. 2d 433 (1960)

RULE:
 79

An act is criminally negligent when a man of ordinary prudence would

foresee that the act would cause a high degree of risk of death or great
bodily harm. Whether the conduct of defendant was wanton or reckless so
as to warrant conviction of manslaughter must be determined from the
conduct itself and not from the resultant harm. Criminal liability cannot be
predicated on every careless act merely because its carelessness results in
injury to another. The act must be one which has knowable and apparent
potentialities for resulting in death. Mere inattention or mistake in judgment
resulting even in death of another is not criminal unless the quality of the
act makes it so. The fundamental requirement fixing criminal responsibility
is knowledge, actual or imputed, that the act of the accused tended to
endanger life.

FACTS:
Defendant's home caught on fire with her children inside. A baby died as a
result. Defendant was not at home at the time of the fire. The trial court
found defendant guilty of involuntary manslaughter and denied a new trial.
On defendant’s appeal, the appellate court reversed the judgment of
conviction and the order denying a new trial.

ISSUE:
Did the evidence prove criminal negligence on the part of defendant who was
convicted of involuntary manslaughter for the death of her child due to fire
while she was away from home?

ANSWER:
No.

CONCLUSION:
The evidence failed to establish that defendant had the knowledge, actual or
imputed, that her actions tended to endanger life and that the fatal
consequences of the negligent act could reasonably have been foreseen. The
only reasonable view of the evidence was that the death of the baby was the
result of misadventure and not the natural and probable result of a
criminally negligent act. There was no evidence that defendant realized her
conduct would have in all probability produced death. There was also no
evidence as to the cause of the fire or connecting defendant in any way with
the fire. Although defendant might have been negligent, mere negligence was
not sufficient to authorize a conviction of involuntary manslaughter.
 80

KHOSROW MINUCHER vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARTHUR

SCALZO (G.R. No. 142396 February 11, 2003)

Facts
Violation of the “Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,” was filed against Minucher
following a “buy-bust operation” conducted by Philippine police narcotic
agents accompanied by Scalzo in the house of Minucher, an Iranian
national, where heroin was said to have been seized. Minucher was later
acquitted by the court.

Minucher later on filed for damages due to trumped-up charges of drug

trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo.

Scalzo on his counterclaims that he had acted in the discharge of his official
duties as being merely an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration of
the United States Department of Justice.

Scalzo subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground

that, being a special agent of the United States Drug Enforcement
Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic immunity. He attached to his
motion Diplomatic Note of the United States Embassy addressed to DOJ of
the Philippines and a Certification of Vice Consul Donna Woodward,
certifying that the note is a true and faithful copy of its original. Trial court
denied the motion to dismiss.

ISSUE

Whether or not Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to diplomatic immunity.

RULLING

YES.

A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity

from suit as long as it can be established that he is acting within the
directives of the sending state.

The consent or imprimatur of the Philippine government to the activities of

the United States Drug Enforcement Agency, however, can be gleaned from
the undisputed facts in the case.

The official exchanges of communication between agencies of the

government of the two countries
Certifications from officials of both the Philippine Department of Foreign
Affairs and the United States Embassy
Participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics Command in the “buy-
bust operation” conducted at the residence of Minucher at the behest of
Scalzo.
 81

These may be inadequate to support the “diplomatic status” of the latter but
they give enough indication that the Philippine government has given its
imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities within Philippine territory of
agent Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency.

The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to conduct surveillance on

suspected drug suppliers and, after having ascertained the target, to inform
local law enforcers who would then be expected to make the arrest.

In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the

poseur-buyer during the buy-bust operation, and then becoming a principal
witness in the criminal case against Minucher,

Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official
function or duties.
 82

WHO vs. Aquino

G.R. No. L-35131; November 29, 1972

FACTS:
Petitioner, Dr. Leonce Verstuyft, was assigned on December 6, 1971 by the
WHO to the Regional Office in Manila as Acting Assistant Director of Health
Services. He is entitled to diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the Host
Agreement executed on July 22, 1951 between the Philippine Government
and the World Health Organization.

When petitioner Verstuyft’s personal effects contained in twelve (12) crates

entered the Philippines as unaccompanied baggage on January 10, 1972,
they were accordingly allowed free entry from duties and taxes.

The crates were directly stored at the Eternit Corporation’s warehouse at

Mandaluyong, Rizal, “pending his relocation into permanent quarters.”

Nevertheless, as above stated, respondent judge, Hon. Benjamin H. Aquino,

issued on March 3, 1972 upon application on the same date of respondents
Constabulary Offshore Action Center (COSAC) officers search warrant for
alleged violation of RA No. 4712 directing the search and seizure of the
dutiable items in said crates.

Upon protest of March 6, 1972 of Dr. Francisco Dy, WHO Regional Director
for the Western Pacific stationed in Manila, Secretary of Foreign Affairs
Carlos P. Romulo, personally wired on the same date respondent judge
advising that Dr. Verstuyft is entitled to immunity from search.

The Office of the Solicitor General filed an extended comment stating the
official position of the executive branch of the Philippine Government that
petitioner Verstuyft is entitled to diplomatic immunity. The Solicitor General
accordingly joined petitioner Verstuyft’s prayer for the quashal of the search
warrant. Respondent judge nevertheless summarily denied quashal of the
search warrant.

Hence, the petition at bar.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner Verstuyft is entitled “to all privileges and
immunities, exemptions and facilities accorded to diplomatic envoys in
accordance with international law” under section 24 of the Host Agreement.

RULING:
Yes. It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of
separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political
question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the
executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic
immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the
government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept
 83

the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law

officer of the government, the Solicitor General in this case, or other officer
acting under his direction.

Hence, even assuming arguendo as against the categorical assurance of the

executive branch of government that respondent judge had some ground to
prefer respondents COSAC officers’ suspicion that there had been an abuse
of diplomatic immunity, the continuation of the search warrant proceedings
before him was not the proper remedy. He should, nevertheless, in deference
to the exclusive competence and jurisdiction of the executive branch of
government to act on the matter, have acceded to the quashal of the search
warrant, and forwarded his findings or grounds to believe that there had
been such abuse of diplomatic immunity to the Department of Foreign
Affairs for it to deal with, in accordance with the aforementioned
Convention, if so warranted.
 84

US vs. Guinto
G.R. NO. 76607
FEBRUARY 26, 1990

FACTS:

In the first case, the private respondents are suing several officers of the
U.S. Air Force stationed in Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding
conducted by them for contracts for barber services in the base.

In the second case, private respondents filed a complaint for damages

against private petitioners for his dismissal as cook in the U.S. Air Force
Recreation Center at the John Hay Air Station.

In the third case, private respondent, who was employed as a barracks boy
in a U.S. Base, was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by
the individual petitioners, officers of the U.S. Air Force and special agents of
the Air Force Office of Special Investigators. He then filed a complaint for
damages against the individual petitioners claiming that it was because of
their acts that he was removed.

In the fourth case, a complaint for damages was filed by the private
respondents against the private petitioners, for injuries allegedly sustained
by the plaintiffs as a result of the acts of the defendants. According to the
plaintiffs, the defendants beat them up, handcuffed them and unleashed
dogs on them which bit them in several parts of their bodies and caused
extensive injuries to them.

These cases have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of
state immunity. The United States of America was not impleaded in the
complaints below but has moved to dismiss on the ground that they are in
effect suits against it to which it has not consented. It is now contesting the
denial of its motions by the respondent judges.

ISSUE:

WON the Doctrine of State Immunity is not applicable thereby making the
State liable.

HELD:

NO. While suable, the petitioners are nevertheless not liable. It is obvious
that the claim for damages cannot be allowed on the strength of the
evidence, which have been carefully examined.
 85

The traditional rule of immunity exempts a State from being sued in the
courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a
necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of
States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are
constantly developing and evolving. In addition, because the activities of
states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them – between
sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and
proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now
extends only to acts jure imperii. The restrictive application of State
immunity is now the rule in the United States, the United Kingdom and
other states in Western Europe.

The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the

proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its
commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be
said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed
to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business
contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its
sovereign functions. In this case, the projects are an integral part of the
naval base, which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and
the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest
order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business
purposes.

There is no question that the United States of America, like any other state,
will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered
into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity, as in the cases at bar. It
is only when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity
that no such waiver may be implied. A State may be said to have descended
to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its
consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts.

The private respondents invokes Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which holds
the government liable if it acts through a special agent. The argument, it
would seem, is premised on the ground that since the officers are designated
“special agents,” the United States government should be liable for their
torts.

There seems to be a failure to distinguish between suability and liability and

a misconception that the two terms are synonymous. Suability depends on
the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the
established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not
necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held
liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the
mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does
 86

waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to
prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.

The said article establishes a rule of liability, not suability. The government
may be held liable under this rule only if it first allows itself to be sued
through any of the accepted forms of consent. Moreover, the agent
performing his regular functions is not a special agent even if he is so
denominated, as in the case at bar. No less important, the said provision
appears to regulate only the relations of the local state with its inhabitants
and, hence, applies only to the Philippine government and not to foreign
governments impleaded in our courts.

The complaints against the petitioners in the court below were aptly
dismissed.
 87

Shauf v. CA

Facts:
Loida Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married to an American who is a
member of the US Air Force, was rejected for a position of Guidance
Counselor in the Base Education Office at Clark Air Base, for which she is
eminently qualified.
By reason of her non-selection, she filed a complaint for damages and an
equal employment opportunity complaint against private respondents, Don
Detwiler (civilian personnel officer) and Anthony Persi (Education Director),
for alleged discrimination by reason of her nationality and sex.
Shauf was offered a temporary position as a temporary Assistant Education
Adviser for a 180-day period with the condition that if a vacancy occurs, she
will be automatically selected to fill the vacancy. But if no vacancy occurs
after 180 days, she will be released but will be selected to fill a future
vacancy if she’s available. Shauf accepted the offer. During that time, Mrs.
Mary Abalateo’s was about to vacate her position. But Mrs. Abalateo’s
appointment was extended thus, Shauf was never appointed to said
position. She claims that the Abalateo’s stay was extended indefinitely to
deny her the appointment as retaliation for the complaint that she filed
against Persi. Persi denies this allegation. He claims it was a joint decision of
the management & it was in accordance of with the applicable regulation.
Shauf filed for damages and other relief in different venues such as the Civil
Service Commission, Appeals Review Board, Philippine Regional Trial Court,
etc.
RTC ruled in favor of Shauf ordering defendants to pay $39,662.49 as actual
damages + 20% of such amount as attorney’s fees + P100k as moral &
exemplary damages.
Both parties appealed to the CA. Shauf prayed for the increase of the
damages to be collected from defendants. Defendants on the other hand,
continued using the defense that they are immune from suit for acts
done/statements made by them in performance of their official
governmental functions pursuant to RP-US Military Bases Agreement of
1947. They claim that the Philippines does not have jurisdiction over the
case because it was under the exclusive jurisdiction of a US District Court.
They likewise claim that petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative
remedies thus case should be dismissed. CA reversed RTC decision.
According to the CA, defendants are immune from suit.
Shauf claims that the respondents are being sued in their private capacity
thus this is not a suit against the US government which would require
consent.
Respondents still maintain their immunity from suit. They further claim
that the rule allowing suits against public officers & employees for criminal
& unauthorized acts is applicable only in the Philippines & is not part of
international law.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
 88

Issue: WON private respondents are immune from suit being officers of the
US Armed Forces

Held:
No, they are not immune.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision and resolution of respondent Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 17932 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Private respondents are hereby ORDERED, jointly and severally, to pay
petitioners the sum of P100,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as and
for attorney's fees, and the costs of suit.

Ratio:
They state that the doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may
not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and
personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded
the officers and agents of the government is removed the moment they are
sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually arises where the
public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in
him.
It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his
personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his
act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority
or jurisdiction
Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications vs. Aligaen Inasmuch as the
State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of
government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action
against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or
violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against
the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same
tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State
officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while
claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and
property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an
assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the
State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued
without its consent. "The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state
immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice

In the case at bar, there is nothing in the record which suggests any
arbitrary, irregular or abusive conduct or motive on the part of the trial
judge in ruling that private respondents committed acts of discrimination for
which they should be held personally liable.
There is ample evidence to sustain plaintiffs' complaint that plaintiff Loida
Q. Shauf was refused appointment as Guidance Counselor by the
defendants on account of her sex, color and origin.
She received a Master of Arts Degree from the University of Santo Tomas,
Manila, in 1971 and has completed 34 semester hours in psychology?
guidance and 25 quarter hours in human behavioral science. She has also
 89

completed all course work in human behavior and counselling psychology

for a doctoral degree. She is a civil service eligible. More important, she had
functioned as a Guidance Counselor at the Clark Air Base at the GS-1710-9
level for approximately four years at the time she applied for the same
position in 1976.
In filling the vacant position of Guidance Counselor, defendant Persi did not
even consider the application of plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf, but referred the
vacancy to CORRO which appointed Edward B. Isakson who was not eligible
to the position.

Article XIII, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution provides that the State shall
afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment
opportunities for all. This is a carry-over from Article II, Section 9, of the
1973 Constitution ensuring equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race,
or creed..
There is no doubt that private respondents Persi and Detwiler, in
committing the acts complained of have, in effect, violated the basic
constitutional right of petitioner Loida Q. Shauf to earn a living which is very
much an integral aspect of the right to life. For this, they should be held
accountable

Respondents alleged that petitioner Loida Q. Shauf failed to avail herself of

her remedy under the United States federal legislation on equality of
opportunity for civilian employees, which is allegedly exclusive of any other
remedy under American law, let alone remedies before a foreign court and
under a foreign law such as the Civil Code of the Philippines.
SC: Petitioner Loida Q. Shauf is not limited to these remedies, but is entitled
as a matter of plain and simple justice to choose that remedy, not otherwise
proscribed, which will best advance and protect her interests. There is,
thus, nothing to enjoin her from seeking redress in Philippine courts which
should not be ousted of jurisdiction on the dubious and inconclusive
representations of private respondents on that score.
 90

People v. Gonzales
G.R. No. 217022

FACTS:

The RTC and CA convicted Salve Gonzales for the crime of

Parricide. On September 16, 2009, around 7 o'clock in the evening, he and
Ronald got home from school. Appellant also got home from work around
the same time. Shortly after, she discovered they had no current in the
house because Ronald sold the bronze wire connected to the electric meter.
Then, appellant's co-workers came to fetch her. When she came back home,
she was drunk. Using a hanger, she hit Ronald several times until the
hanger snapped. Still, she did not stop. She got hold of the broom and using
its wooden handle, hit Ronald's head and body. At that time, Rhey was lying
on the lower bunk of their double-deck bed. He cried when he saw what was
going on. His two other siblings Racel and Raymart also cried. vomit on
Ronald's bed and his jogging pants were wet with urine. Ronald could not
eat and looked very weak. Meanwhile, appellant asked Ronald why he sold
the bronze electrical wire. Ronald confessed he sold the bronze electrical
wire because he needed money for his project. She then again took hold of
the broom and inserted its handle into Ronald's mouth. Later in the evening,
when Rhey arrived home, he learned that their aunt Glena Gonzales brought
Ronald to the East Avenue Medical Center. Together with his uncle Teody
Gonzales, he went to the hospital to check Ronald's condition. Ronald died
around 10 o'clock in the evening of September 17, 2009.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in convicting the accused.

HELD:

No. Parricide and its elements proven Article 246 of the Revised
Penal Code defines parricide, viz: Article 246. Parricide. - Any person who
shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or
any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of
parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death. Parricide is committed when (1) a person is killed; (2) the accused is
the killer; and (3) deceased is either the legitimate spouse of the accused, or
any legitimate or illegitimate parent, child, ascendant or descendant of the
accused. The presence of the third element is undisputed. Appellant is
Ronald's mother. As for the first and second elements, appellant's minor
 91

children Rhey and Racel Gonzales categorically identified appellant as the

person who killed Ronald. They each gave an eyewitness account of how
appellant inflicted multiple blows on Ronald's head and body, first using a
hanger until it snapped, and then, the broom's wooden handle. Appellant
Salve Gonzales y Torno is found guilty of Parricide.

JOHN PHILIP GUEVARRA, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE IGNACIO ALMODOVAR, respondent.

FACTS:

– On October 29, 1984, the Petitioner who was then 11 years old was
playing with best friend Teodoro Almine Jr. and three other children in their
backyard. The children were target-shooting bottle caps placed 15 to 20
meters away with an air rifle borrowed from a neighbour.

– In the course of game, Teodoro was hit by a pellet on his left collar bone
which caused his unfortunate death.

– The examining fiscal after investigation exculpated petitioner due to his

age and because the unfortunate appeared to be an accident.

– Victim’s parents appealed to Ministry of Justice, who ordered fiscal to file a

case against petitioner for Homicide through reckless imprudence.

– On October 25, 1985, the petitioner moved to quash the said information
on the following grounds:

a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense

b) Information contains averments which if true would constitute a legal

excuse or justification

c) That the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged and the
person of defendant

– His primary argument was that the term discernment connotes intent
under the exempting circumstance found under Article 12, Section 3 of the
RPC. If this was true, then no minor between the age of 9 to 15 may be
convicted of quasi offense under Article 265 which is criminal negligence.

– On April 4, 1986, the said motion was denied with respect to the first and
third grounds relied upon decision on and part was deferred until evidence
shall have been presented during trial.

– A petition for certiorari was filed.

 92

ISSUE:
WHETHER AN ELEVEN (11) YEAR OLD BOY COULD BE CHARGED WITH
THE CRIME OF HOMICIDE THRU RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE

HELD:

Yes.
Intent and discernment are two different concepts. Intent means: a
determination to do certain things; an aim; the purpose of the mind,
including such knowledge as is essential to such intent. Discernment
means: the mental capacity to understand the difference between right and
wrong.

The second element of dolus is intelligence; without this power, necessary to

determine the morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act,
no crime can exist, and because … the infant 3 (has) no intelligence, the law
exempts (him) from criminal liability.

In evaluating felonies committed by means of culpa, three (3) elements are

indispensable, namely, intelligence, freedom of action, and negligence.
Obviously, intent is wanting in such felonies. However, intelligence remains
as an essential element, hence, it is necessary that a minor above nine but
below fifteen years of age be possessed with intelligence in committing a
negligent act which results in a quasi-offense. For him to be criminally
liable, he must discern the rightness or wrongness of the effects of his
negligent act. Indeed, a minor over nine years of age but below fifteen may
be held liable for a quasi-offense under Article 365 of the RPC. A reading of
the said Article would reveal such fact as it starts off with the phrase “Any
person. . .” without any distinction or exception made. Ubi lex non distinquit
nec nos distinguere debemos.

Minors 9yrs to 15yrs are presumed to be without criminal capacity; but this
presumption may be rebutted if it could be proven that they were capable of
appreciating the nature and criminality of the act, that is, that (they) acted
w/ discernment.

Because of this, Guevarra was not exempted.

 93

People v. De Leon G.R. No. 180762 (2009)

Articles invoked Section 3, PD 1613, amending the law on arson Sec. 3(2).
Other Cases of Arson. – The penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed if the property burned is any of the following: 2.
Any inhabited house or dwelling
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------Section 4, PD 1613, amending the law
on arson If the crime of arson is committed by a syndicate, i.e., if it is
planned or carried out by a group of three or more persons, the penalty shall
be imposed in its maximum period

FACTS OF THE CASE:

This is an appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed
with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Nueva Ecija
finding herein appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
arson and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
to pay the heirs of the private complainant P2,000.00 as temperate damages
and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.

At around 8:30 in the evening of April 5, 1986, Aquilina Mercado Rint

(Aquilina) and her sister Leonisa Mercado (Leonisa), together with their
nephew Narciso Mercado, Jr., (Junior) were inside a hut owned by their
father.

The loud and insistent barking of their dog prompted Aquilina to peep
through the window and saw five men approaching the premises whom she
recognized as Gaudencio Legaspi and herein appellants.

Aquilina and Leonisa hurriedly went out of the hut and hid behind a pile of
wood nearby while Junior was dispatched to call for help.

From their hiding place, they saw appellants surround the hut and set to
fire the cogon roofing. o While the hut was burning, Leonisa grabbed a
flashlight from her sister and focused the same at the group in order to see
them more clearly. o Upon seeing a light focused on them, Gaudencio
ordered the others to leave and the men immediately fled the premises. o By
the time Junior arrived with his uncles, the hut was already razed to the
ground.
 94

Aquilina and Leonisa valued the hut at P3,000.00 and claimed that a pair of
earrings, some beddings, rice, P1,500.00 in cash and plenty of wood were
also lost in the fire.

They also testified that prior to the incident, appellants had been to the
premises, destroyed the plants, the fence and a hut which was first built
therein. o Appellants likewise physically attacked their father and issued
threats that if he would not give up his claim on the land, something
untoward would happen to him; and that their father Rafael filed several
cases for Malicious Mischief, Forcible Entry and Serious Physical Injuries
against appellants.
On the other hand, all appellants denied the charges against them.

The trial court found them guilty beyond reasonable doubt for arson, and
sentenced them to 1 day of prison mayor, as minimum, to 14 years and one
(1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to pay jointly and severally
the victims the sum of P3,000.00 representing the value of the burned hut.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court ruling with modification o In lieu
of the trial court’s sentenced, the CA imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, and damages amounting to P22,000 (P2,000 as temperate
damages and P20,000 as exemplary damages)

Hence the instant appeal

ISSUE Whether or not the RTC erred in finding the petitioners guilty of
arson

HELD No, the lower court held correctly. Put simply, owing to the
concurrence of the elements per the examinations of the trial court, the
Court exercised its respect for the former’s findings of fact. Proof of the
corpus delicti is indispensable in the prosecution of arson, as in all kinds of
criminal offenses. Corpus delicti means the substance of the crime; it is the
fact that a crime has actually been committed. In arson, the corpus delicti is
generally satisfied by proof of the bare occurrence of the fire, e.g., the
charred remains of a house burned down and of its having been
intentionally caused. Even the uncorroborated testimony of a single
eyewitness, if credible, may be enough to prove the corpus delicti and to
warrant conviction.32 The corpus delicti has been satisfactorily proven in
the instant case.
 95

People vs. Delim

This case is with regard to Art 8 and 13 of the Revised Penal Code
"the act of one is the act of all"

FACTS OF THE CASE:

It is due to the automatic review of the decision of the RTC Branch 46

(Urdaneta City) finding the appellants, guilty beyond reasonable doubt and
sentencing them to death for the murder of Modesto Bantas.

Appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge. The appellants and victim are
“related” for modesto is an adopted son of their father. On January 23,1999
Marlon, Robert and Ronald Delim charged into the house and poked a gun
at modesto and herded him outside the house. Leon and Manuel Delim both
armed stayed put and made sure that randy and rita stayed put.

Modesto's lifeless body was then found on January 25, 1999. Marlon,
Ronald, and Leon used denial and alibi as their evidence against the charge.
*alibis are the weakest of all defenses since it is easy to contrive and difficult
to disprove

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Is conspiracy and treachery present in this case to ensure that murder can
be the crime?

Yes there is:

CONSPIRACY- is determined when two or more persons agree to commit a
felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy must be proven with the same
quantum of evidence as the felony itself, more specifically by proof beyond
reasonable doubt. It is not essential that there be proof as to the existence of
a previous agreement to commit a crime. It is sufficient if, at the time of
commission of the crime, the accused had the same purpose and were
united in its executed.
 96

appellants acted in unison when they abducted Modesto. So their acts were
synchronized and executed with precision evincing a preconceived plan to
kill Modesto

There is no:
TREACHERY- there is treachery when the offender commits any of the
crimes against person, employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and especially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party
might make.
For it to be appreciated prosecution needs to prove:
a. employment of means of execution which gives the person no opportunity
to defend himself
b. the means of execution is deliberately and consciously adopted
in the appellants case there are no evidence to the particulars on how
Modesto was assaulted and killed and this in fact does mean that treachery
cannot be proven since it cannot be presumed that modesto was defenseless
during the time that he was being attacked and shot at by the appellants.
Sheer numbers by the appellants when they attacked modesto does not
constitute proof that the three took advantage of their numerical superiority
and their handguns when Modesto was shot and stabbed.

HELD:
APPELLANTS ARE GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE
FELONY OF HOMICIDE (THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURTS WERE
MODIFIED TO LOWER THE CRIME FROM MURDER TO HOMICIDE)
 97

People vs. Lacerna (1997)

Subject:
Exceptions to the rule against warrantless arrest; Search of luggage inside a
vehicle requires existence of probable cause; Consented search valid if
intelligently made; To be punishable, to “give away a prohibited drug
should be with the intent to transfer ownership; Elements of illegal sale of
prohibited drugs; Criminal intent need not be proved in prosecution of acts
mala prohibita ; Intent to perpetrate the act, not intent to commit the crime
necessary in prosecution of acts prohibited by special laws

Facts:
Noriel and Marlon Lacerna were inside a taxi when the group of police
Officer Carlito Valenzuela of the Western Police District signaled the taxi
driver to park by the side of the road in lieu of a police checkpoint. PO3
Valenzuela asked permission to search the vehicle. The officers went about
searching the luggage in the vehicle. They found 18 blocks wrapped in
newspaper with a distinct smell of marijuana emanating from it. When the
package was opened, PO3 Valenzuela saw dried marijuana leaves. According
to Noriel and Marlon, the bag was a “padala” of their uncle. Marlon admitted
that he was the one who gave the 18 bundle blocks of marijuana to his
cousin Noriel as the latter seated at rear of the taxi with it. He however
denied knowledge of the contents of the package.
Marlon was charged before the RTC for “giving away” marjuana to another.
Noriel on the other hand was acquitted for insufficiency of evidence. The
court noticed that Noriel manifested “probinsyano” traits and was, thus,
unlikely to have dealt in prohibited drugs.
Marlon objected on the RTC’s decision, stating that the lower court erred in
saying that the act of “giving away to another” is not defined under RA 6425
or the Dangerous Drugs Act. He also said that he was not aware of the
contents of the plastic bag given to him by his uncle. Marlon also raised that
his right against warrantless arrest and seizure was violated.
 98

Issue:

Held:
Exceptions to the rule against warrantless arrest

1. Five generally accepted exceptions to the rule against warrantless

arrest have been judicially formulated as follows:
a. search incidental to a lawful arrest
b. search of moving vehicles
c. seizure in plain view,
d. customs searches,
e. waiver by the accused themselves of their right against
unreasonable search and seizure
2. Search and seizure relevant to moving vehicles are allowed in
recognition of the impracticability of securing a warrant under said
circumstances. In such cases, however, the search and seizure may
be made only upon probable cause, i.e. upon a belief, reasonably
arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an
automobile or other vehicle contains an item, article or object which
by law is subject to seizure and destruction. Military or police
checkpoints have also been declared to be not illegal per se as long as
the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to body
search, and the inspection of the vehicle is merely visual.

Search of luggage inside a vehicle requires existence of probable cause

3. In this case, the taxi was validly stopped at the police checkpoint.
Such search however is limited to visual inspections without
occupants being subjected to a physical or body searches- 3 search of
a luggage inside the vehicle should require the existence of probable
cause.
In several decisions, there was probable cause in the following
instances
a. where the distinctive odor of marijuana emanated from the plastic
bag carried by the accused.
b. where an informer positively identified the accused, who was
observed to have been acting suspiciously.
c. where the accused fled when accosted by policemen.
d. where the accused who were riding a jeepney were stopped and
searched by policemen who had earlier received confidential
reports that said accused would transport a large quantity of
marijuana.
e. where the moving vehicle was stopped and searched on the basis of
intelligence information and clandestine reports by a deep
penetration agent or spy one who participated in the drug
smuggling activities of the syndicate to which the accused belonged
that said accused were bringing prohibited drugs into the country.
 99

4. Probable cause in this case is not evident. The mere act of slouching
in the seat when the taxi passed along. PO3 Valenzuela’s checkpoint
does not constitute probable cause to justify search and seizure.
Consented search valid if intelligently made

5. Aniag, Jr. vs. COMELEC outlawed a search based on an implied

acquiescence, because such acquiescence was not consent within the
purview of the constitutional guaranty, but was merely passive
conformity to the search given under intimidating and coercive
circumstances.
6. In this case, Marlon was “urbanized in mannerism and speech” when
he expressly said that he was consenting to the search as he allegedly
had nothing to hide and had done nothing wrong- This declaration is
a confirmation of his intelligent and voluntary acquiescence to the
search. The marijuana bricks were, therefore, obtained legally through
a valid search and seizure, thus admissible.

To be punishable, to “give away” a prohibited drug should be with the intent

to transfer ownership
7. As distinguished from “delivery,” which is an incident of sale, “giving
away” is a disposition other than a sale. It is, therefore, an act short of
a sale which involves no consideration. The prohibited drug becomes
an item or merchandise presented as a gift or premium (giveaway),
where ownership is transferred.
8. By merely handing the plastic bag to Noriel, Marlon cannot be
punished for giving away marijuana as a gift or premium to another.
Intent to transfer ownership should be proven.
Elements of illegal sale of prohibited drugs
9. The elements of illegal possession of prohibited drugs are as follows
a. the accused is in possession of an item or object which is
identified to be a prohibited drug.
b. such possession is not authorized by law.
c. the accused freely and consciously possessed the prohibited drug.
10. Evidence established beyond reasonable doubt that Marlon was
in possession of the plastic bag containing the prohibited drugs
without the requisite authority. He cannot deny knowledge of the
package as its smell is pervasive.
Criminal intent need not be proved in prosecution of acts mala prohibita
11. Criminal intent need not be proved in the prosecution of acts
mala prohibita. The prohibited act is so in2urious to the public
welfare that, regardless of the person’s intent, it is the crime itself.
Intent to perpetrate the act, not intent to commit the crime necessary in
prosecution of acts prohibited by special laws
12. Intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act must
be distinguished. A person may not have consciously intended to
commit a crime; but if he did intend to commit an act, and that act is,
by the very nature of things, the crime itself, then he can be held
liable for the malum prohibitum.
 100

13. The rule is that in acts mala in se there must be a criminal

intent, but in those mala prohibita it is sufficient if the prohibited act
was intentionally done. Thus, in illegal possession of prohibited drugs,
the prosecution is thus not excused from proving that the act was
done “freely and consciously”, which is an essential element of the
crime.
14. In this case, Marlon failed to overcome the presumption of his
knowledge of the contents of the package. He was thus held liable for
illegal possession of prohibited drugs.

People of the Guevarra vs. Almodovar

G.R.No. 75256 26January1989

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The Petitioner John Philip Guevarra, petitioned the court for a special civil
action for certiorari against the Hon. Judge Ignacio Almodovar of the city
court of Legaspi. The petitioner, then 11 years old was target shooting with
his best friend Teodoro Amine, Jr. and three other children in the backyard
in the morning of 29October1984. Unfortunately, Teodoro was hit by a pellet
on the left collar bone, w/c then caused his death.

ISSUE OF THE CASE:

Can an 11- year old boy be charged w/ the crime of homicide thru reckless
imprudence?

- Intent and discernment are two different concepts. Intent means: a

determination to do certain things; an aim; the purpose of the mind,
including such knowledge as is essential to such intent. Discernment
means: the mental capacity to understand the difference between right and
wrong
- While they (intent and discernment) are products of mental processes w/in
a person; intent refers to the desired of one’s act (active) while discernment
refers to the moral significance that a person ascribes to an act (passive)
- Minors 9yrs to 15yrs are presumed to be without criminal capacity; but
this presumption may be rebutted if it could be proven that they were
capable of appreciating the nature and criminality of the act, that is, that
(they) acted w/ discernment
 101

- Discernment is embraced w/in the concept of intelligence w/c is one of the

elements of a culpable felony, thus it is important that a minor 9yrs to below
15 yrs of age to have acted w/ discernment to show that he acted w/
intelligence thus being liable for the offense under Art 365 of the R.PC

HELD:
PETITION DISMISSED FOR LACK OF MERIT AND THE TRO EFFECTIVE
17SEPTEMBER1986 IS LIFTED. LET IT BE REMANDED TO THE LOWER
COURT FOR TRIAL ON THE MERITS. NO COSTS.

Soriano v. People

Facts:
Frederico Soriano was authorize, by his principal, Emilia Saenz, who is an
owner of a building to collect rents and transmit it to her. Eagle Cinema Co.
Inc. who rented the said building owned by Saenz was indebted for rents
due on account of the lease that was caused by the disturbance of the war.
Eagle Cinema Co. Inc. properties that was inside the building were then lost
and have been found, inside the house of Soriano after repeatedly denying to
have any knowledge about the lost equipment and accessories. He also
disclaimed any responsibility of their loss.
On August 22, 1945, Soriano was charged on the crime of theft of one
electric motor marled “Cyclix" with Western Electric company cable, and one
lanternslide projector with their corresponding accessories, which belongs to
Eagle Cinema Co., Inc.
After trial he was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Iloilo and
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty with the accessory penalties of
the law, and to pay the costs. He then appealed to the Court of Appeals,
which modified the above judgment and sentence.
Issue:
whether or not the acts of the accused (Soriano) constitute theft

Ruling:
Yes. The crime Soriano stands charged and convicted is covered by first
paragraph of article 308 of the Revised penal code which says “Theft is
committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence
 102

against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal
property of another without the latter’s consent.

Ratio Decidendi:
Even though the equipment, including those articles, were mortgaged to
Saenz to guarantee the payment of the rents due on the building, yet there
has been no foreclosure and neither she nor the petitioner had the authority
to take away and conceal those articles from the owner or the police
authorities. The Eagle Cinema Co., Inc., had the right to possess said
articles.
With regard to the element of taking or asportation, there is no doubt that it
existed, notwithstanding that the petitioner had been entrusted with the
keys of the building where they were kept. This point has been settled Viada,
numerous decisions of the Supreme court of Spain and of the Philippiness
some of which authorities are cited above.

As to the element of intent, it is clear that when the petitioner carried away
and concealed from the owner and the police authorities the above-
mentioned materials, he acted with intent of gain. Intent is a mental state,
the existence of which is shown by the overt acts of a person, which in the
present case unmistakably point to that intent.

EDUARDO P. MANUEL, Petitioner

-versus-
People of the Philippines, Respondent

Facts:

On July 28, 1975, Eduardo was married to Rubylus Gaña. He met the
private complainant Tina B. Gandalera in Dagupan City sometime in
January 1996. Tina was then 21 years old, while Eduardo was 39. Eduardo
proposed marriage on several occasions, assuring her that he was single.
Eduardo even brought his parents to Baguio City to meet Tina’s parents,
and was assured by them that their son was still single.

Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo. It appeared in their marriage contract

that Eduardo was “single.”

The couple was happy during the first three years of their married life.
However, starting 1999, Manuel started making himself scarce and went to
their house only twice or thrice a year. Tina was jobless, and whenever she
asked money from Eduardo, he would slap her. Sometime in January 2001,
Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did not return. Worse, he stopped
giving financial support.

Sometime in August 2001, Tina made inquiries from the (NSO) in Manila
where she learned that Eduardo had been previously married. In his
 103

defense, Eduardo insisted that he married Tina believing that his first
marriage was no longer valid because he had not heard from Rubylus, his
former wife from the first marriage, for more than 20 years.

The trial court ruled that the prosecution was able to prove beyond
reasonable doubt all the elements of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code. It declared that Eduardo’s belief, that his first marriage had
been dissolved because of his first wife’s 20-year absence, even if true, did
not exculpate him from liability for bigamy.

Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA. He alleged that he was not
criminally liable for bigamy because when he married the private
complainant, he did so in good faith and without any malicious intent. He
maintained that at the time that he married the private complainant, he was
of the honest belief that his first marriage no longer subsisted. He insisted
that conformably to Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, there must be
malice for one to be criminally liable for a felony. He was not motivated by
malice in marrying the private complainant because he did so only out of his
overwhelming desire to have a fruitful marriage. He posited that the trial
court should have taken into account Article 390 of the New Civil Code. To
support his view, the appellant cited the rulings of this Court in United
States v. Peñalosa and Manahan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals.

CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC with modification

as to the penalty of the accused. The CA averred that Eduardo’s defense of
good faith and reliance on the Court’s ruling in United States v. Enriquez
were misplaced; what is applicable is Article 41 of the Family Code, which
amended Article 390 of the Civil Code. It held that before Manuel could
lawfully marry the private complainant, there should have been a judicial
declaration of Rubylus’ presumptive death as the absent spouse.

Eduardo now filed the instant petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of bigamy.

Held:

YES.

RPC states that: Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be
imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the
absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.

The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve and ensure the
juridical tie of marriage established by law. The phrase “or before the absent
 104

spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment

rendered on the proceedings” in Article 349 of the RPC means that the
requirement for a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse is
for the benefit of the spouse present, as protection from the pains and the
consequences of a second marriage, precisely because he/she could be
charged and convicted of bigamy if the defense of good faith based on mere
testimony is found incredible.

The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he
married the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good
faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo;
such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the
law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the law.

The burden of proof is upon the petitioner. He should have adduced in

evidence a decision of a competent court declaring the presumptive death of
his first wife as required by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation
to Article 41 of the Family Code and that could constitutes proof that the
petitioner acted in good faith, and would negate criminal intent on his part
when he married the private complainant and, as a consequence, he could
not be held guilty of bigamy in such case.

The above Article of the Family Code now clearly provides that for the
purpose of the present spouse contracting a second marriage, he or she
must file a summary proceeding as provided in the Code for the declaration
of the presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the latter’s
reappearance. This provision is intended to protect the present spouse from
a criminal prosecution for bigamy under Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code
because with the judicial declaration that the missing spouses
presumptively dead, the good faith of the present spouse in contracting a
second marriage is already established.
 105

People v. Cano

Facts:
September 21, 1960, on the National Highway at San Isidro, municipality of
San Fernando, Province of Pampanga, accused Ambrocio Cano, being then
the driver and person in charge of La Mallorca Pambusco bus with body No.
846, drive, manage and operate said vehicle in a careless, negligent and
imprudent manner, causing, as a result thereof the said bus driven by him
to hit and bump a Philippine Rabbit Bus with body No. 257, then driven by
Clemente Calixto, thereby causing damages to the said Philippine Rabbit
Bus in the amount of P5,023.55, and on the same occasion inflicting
physical injuries to the passengers of the said buses.

Issue:
Whether or not reckless imprudence is a crime in itself

Held:
No.

Ratio:
The proposition that "reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply
a way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal
liability" is too broad to deserve unqualified assent. In intentional crimes,
the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally
 106

penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous
recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the "imprudencia punible." Much of
the confusion has arisen from the common use of such descriptive phrases
as "homicide through reckless imprudence", and the like; when the strict
technical offense is more accurately, "reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide", or "simple imprudence causing damages to property."

People v. Delos Santos

Facts
In the early morning of October 5, 1995, at the Maitum Highway in Cagayan
de Oro City, a team of PNP members undergoing a Special Training Course
were performing an Endurance Run. They were jogging at the right side of
the lane. A speeding Isuzu Elf ran into them, resulting to deaths and
injuries. The accused surrendered to the Governor, and was eventually
convicted of Multiple Murder, Multiple Frustrated Murder, and Multiple
Attempted Murder. He was sentenced to death by the Trial Court. Hence,
this automatic review.

Issue
Whether there was intentional killing or attempt to kill the policemen, or a
mere reckless imprudence

Held
From the convergence of circumstances, we are inclined to believe that the
tragic event was more a product of reckless imprudence than of a malicious
intent on Glenn’s part. First, as testified to by prosecution rebuttal witness
Danilo Olarita, the place of the incident was “very dark” as there was no
moon. And according to PAGASA’s observed weather report within the
vicinity of Cagayan de Oro City covering a radius of 50 kilometers, at the
time the event took place, the sky was overcast, i.e., there was absolutely no
break in the thick clouds covering the celestial dome globe; hence, there was
no way for the moon and stars to be seen. Neither were there lampposts that
illuminated the highway. Second, the jogging trainees and the rear guards
 107

were all wearing black T-shirts, black short pants, and black and green
combat shoes, which made them hard to make out on that dark and cloudy
night. The rear guards had neither reflectorized vests or gloves nor
flashlights in giving hand signals. Third, Glenn was driving on the proper
side of the road, the right lane. On the other hand, the jogging trainees were
occupying the wrong lane, the same lane as Glenn’s vehicle was traversing.
Worse, they were facing the same direction as Glenn’s truck such that their
backs were turned towards the oncoming vehicles from behind. Fourth, no
convincing evidence was presented to rebut Glenn’s testimony that he had
been momentarily blinded by the very bright and glaring lights of the
oncoming vehicle at the opposite direction as his truck rounded the curve.
He must have been still reeling from the blinding effect of the lights coming
from the other vehicle when he plowed into the group of police trainees.
Indeed, as pointed out by appellant, instinct tells one “to stop or swerve to a
safe place the moment he sees a cow, dog, or cat on the road, in order to
avoid bumping or killing the same;” and more so if the one on the road is a
person. It would therefore be inconceivable for Glenn, then a young college
graduate with a pregnant wife and three very young children who were
dependent on him for support, to have deliberately hit the group with his
truck.

We are convinced that the incident, tragic though it was in light of the
number of persons killed and seriously injured, was an accident and not an
intentional felony. It is significant to note that there is no shred of evidence
that Glenn had an axe to grind against the police trainees that would drive
him into deliberately hitting them with intent to kill. Glenn’s offense is in
failing to apply the brakes, or to swerve his vehicle to the left or to a safe
place the movement he heard and felt the first bumping thuds. Had he done
so, many trainees would have been spared.

The test for determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act

whereby injury or damage results to the person or property of another is
this: Could a prudent man, in the position of the person to whom negligence
is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable
consequence of the course actually pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty
on the actor to refrain from that course or to take precautions to guard
against its mischievous results, and the failure to do so constitutes
negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the
admonition born of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence can
be held to exist.

Glenn showed an inexcusable lack of precaution.

Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code states that reckless imprudence
consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from
which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution
on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking
into consideration (1) his employment or occupation; (2) his degree of
 108

intelligence; (3) his physical condition; and (4) other circumstances

regarding persons, time and place.

Glenn, being then a young college graduate and an experienced driver,

should have known to apply the brakes or swerve to a safe place
immediately upon hearing the first bumping thuds to avoid further hitting
the other trainees. By his own testimony, it was established that the road
was slippery and slightly going downward; and, worse, the place of the
incident was foggy and dark. He should have observed due care in
accordance with the conduct of a reasonably prudent man, such as by
slackening his speed, applying his brakes, or turning to the left side even if
it would mean entering the opposite lane (there being no evidence that a
vehicle was coming from the opposite direction). It is highly probable that he
was driving at high speed at the time. And even if he was driving within the
speed limits, this did not mean that he was exercising due care under the
existing circumstances and conditions at the time.

Considering that the incident was not a product of a malicious intent but
rather the result of a single act of reckless driving, Glenn should be held
guilty of the complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple
homicide with serious physical injuries and less serious physical injuries.

Reodica v CA 292 SCRA 87

Facts:
Isabelita Reodica was allegedly recklessly driving a van and hit Bonsol
causing him physical injuries and damage to property amounting to P
8,542.00. Three days after the accident a complaint was filed before the
fiscal’s office against the petitioner. She was charged of "Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Slight Physical Injury."
After pleading not guilty trial ensued. RTC of Makati rendered the decision
convicting petitioner of "quasi offense of reckless imprudence, resulting in
damage to property with slight physical injuries" with arresto mayor of 6
months imprisonment and a fine of P 13,542.00. Petitioner made an appeal
before the CA which re-affirmed the lower court’s decision. In its motion for
reconsideration, petitioner now assails that the court erred in giving its
penalty on complex damage to property and slight physical injuries both
being light offenses over which the RTC has no jurisdiction and it can’t
impose penalty in excess to what the law authorizes.
reversal of decision is still possible on ground of prescription or lack of
jurisdiction.

Issue:
Whether or not reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property and
reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries are light felonies.
 109

Ruling:
2. Classification of each felony involved
Reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries is a light felony.
Public censure is classified under article 25 of RPC as a light penalty and it
belongs on the graduated scale in Article 71 of the RPC as a penalty next
lower to arresto menor.

Reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property is punishable by a

correctional penalty of arresto mayor and thus belongs to less grave felony
and not as a light felony as claimed by petitioner.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA, & BENJAMIN SAMSON y MAGDALENA,
accused-appellants.
G.R. No. L-74324
November 17, 1988

FACTS:

The deceased Miranda, a 25-year old retardate, and the accused Pugay were
friends. On one evening, a town fiesta fair was held in the public plaza.
There were different kinds of ride and one was a ferris wheel. Later, the
accused Pugay and Samson with several companions arrived. These persons
appeared to be drunk as they were all happy and noisy. As the group saw
the deceased walking nearby, they started making fun of him. They made
the deceased dance by tickling him with a piece of wood.

The accused Pugay suddenly took a can of gasoline from under the engine of
the ferns wheel and poured its contents on the body of the former. Gabion
told Pugay not to do so while the latter was already in the process of pouring
the gasoline. Then, the accused Samson set Miranda on fire making a
human torch out of him.
 110

The accused Pugay admitted that he poured a can of gasoline on the

deceased believing that the contents thereof was water and then the accused
Samson set the deceased on fire. The accused Samson, on the other hand,
alleged in his statement that he saw Pugay pour gasoline on Miranda but
did not see the person who set him on fire.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused-appellants Pugay and Samson criminally liable?

HELD:

Yes. If his act resulted into a graver offense, as what took place in the
instant case, he must be held responsible therefor. Article 4 of the aforesaid
code provides, inter alia, that criminal liability shall be incurred by any
person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended.

Having taken the can from under the engine of the ferris wheel and holding
it before pouring its contents on the body of the deceased, this accused
knew that the can contained gasoline. The stinging smell of this flammable
liquid could not have escaped his notice even before pouring the same.
Clearly, he failed to exercise all the diligence necessary to avoid every
undesirable consequence arising from any act that may be committed by his
companions who at the time were making fun of the deceased.

There can be no doubt that the accused Samson knew very well that the
liquid poured on the body of the deceased was gasoline and a flammable
substance for he would not have committed the act of setting the latter on
fire if it were otherwise. Giving him the benefit of doubt, it call be conceded
that as part of their fun-making he merely intended to set the deceased’s
clothes on fire. His act, however, does not relieve him of criminal
responsibility. Burning the clothes of the victim would cause at the very
least some kind of physical injuries on his person, a felony defined in the
Revised Penal Code.

Therefore, the SC agree with the Solicitor General that the accused is only
guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence defined in Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code. As no sufficient evidence appears in the record
establishing any qualifying circumstances, the accused Samson is only
guilty of the crime of homicide defined and penalized in Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended.
 111

People v. Aposaga
 112

Ah Chong v. US

Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea

The act itself does not make man guilty unless his intention were so.

FACTS:
The defendant Ah Chong worked as a cooked while the deceased Pascual
Gilberto who was a house boy. The two of them shared a room having a door
with no permanent lock. As a means of securing it, a chair was placed
against the door. At around 10 in the evening, Ah Chong who was sleeping
was awakened by someone trying to forcefully open the door. He called twice
but there was no response. Fearing that the intruder might be a thief, Ah
Chong took his knife and struck the intruder when it entered the room. It
turned out that the said intruder was his roommate Pascual. Despite his
plea of self-defense, said defendant was found guilty with homicide by the
Court of First Instance.

ISSUE:
Whether the defendant by reason of mistake of facts criminally liable.

RULING:
 113

The Court held that there is no criminal liability when one commits an
offense or act due to ignorance of facts provided that it was not due to
negligence or bad faith. Such ignorance of the fact is sufficient to negative
the particular intent which under the law, is an essential element to the
crime of murder charged cancels the presumption of intent and works for an
acquittal. In the case, the defendant struck the fatal blow on the belief that
the intruder was a robber, on which his life and property was in danger. It is
clear that he acted in good faith without negligence and without any
criminal intent in exercising his right to self-defense. There can be no crime,
large or small, without an evil mind. The author of the Penal Code deemed
criminal intent or malice to be an essential element of the various crimes
and misdemeanors. It is a principle that the essence of an offense is the
wrongful intent, without which it cannot exist. In other words, punishment
is the sequence of wickedness, without which it cannot be. And neither in
philosophical speculation nor in religious or moral sentiment would any
people in any age allow that a man should be deemed guilty unless his mind
was so. This doctrine confirmed by the maxim actus non facit reum nisi
mens sit rea in which the act itself does not make a man guilty unless his
intention were so. Thus, the Court held that the defendant should be
acquitted.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANTONIO Z. OANIS and ALBERTO GALANTA, defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. L-47722
July 27, 1943

FACTS:

Captain Godofredo Monsod (Provincial Inspector of Cabanatuan) was

instructed to arrest Balagtas, a notorious criminal, and, if overpowered, to
get him dead or alive. The same instruction was given to the Chief of Police
Oanis who knew the whereabouts of Irene, the paramour of Balagtas. Upon
arriving at Irene’s house, Oanis approached Mallare and asked her where
Irene’s room was. Mallare indicated the place and upon further inquiry also
said that Irene was sleeping with her paramour.

Defendants Oanis and Galanta (Corporal of the Philippine Constabulary)

then went to the room of Irene, and upon seeing a man sleeping with his
back towards the door where they were, simultaneously or successively fired
at him with their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers. Awakened by the gunshots,
 114

Irene saw her paramour already wounded, and looking at the door where the
shots came, she saw the defendants still firing at him. It turned out later
that the person shot and killed was not Balagtas but a peaceful and
innocent citizen named Tecson, Irene’s paramour.

Consequently, Oanis and Galanta were charged with the crime of murder.

The trial court found appellants guilty of homicide through reckless

imprudence. Hence, the present appeal. It is contended that, as appellants
acted in innocent mistake of fact in the honest performance of their official
duties, both of them believing that Tecson was Balagtas, they incur no
criminal liability. Appellants rely on the case of U.S. v. Ah Chong.

ISSUE:

Whether or not appellants are criminally liable for the death of Tecson.

HELD:

Yes. The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence,

the killing being intentional and not accidental.

Although an officer in making a lawful arrest is justified in using such force

as is reasonably necessary to secure and detain the offender, overcome his
resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes, and protect
himself from bodily harm yet he is never justified in using unnecessary force
or in treating him with wanton violence, or in resorting to dangerous means
when the arrest could be effected. And a peace officer cannot claim
exemption from criminal liability if he uses unnecessary force or violence in
making an arrest. Notoriety rightly supplies a basis for redoubled official
alertness and vigilance; it never can justify precipitate action at the cost of
human life.

Appellants’ invocation of honest mistake of fact is misplaced. In the instant

case, appellants found no circumstances whatsoever which would press
them to immediate action. The person in the room being then asleep,
appellants had ample time and opportunity to ascertain his identity without
hazard to themselves, and could even effect a bloodless arrest if any
reasonable effort to that end had been made, as the victim was unarmed.
This, indeed, is the only legitimate course of action for appellants to follow
even if the victim was really Balagtas, as they were instructed not to kill
Balagtas at sight but to arrest him, and to get him dead or alive only if
resistance or aggression is offered by him.

As the deceased was killed while asleep, the crime committed is murder with
the qualifying circumstance of alevosia. There is, however, a mitigating
circumstance of weight consisting in the incomplete justifying circumstance
– a person incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a
duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office (Par. 5)
 115

There are two requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken as a
justifying one: (a) that the offender acted in the performance of a duty or in
the lawful exercise of a right; and (b) that the injury or offense committed be
the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the
lawful exercise of such right or office.

In the instance case, only the first requisite is present — appellants have
acted in the performance of a duty. The second requisite is wanting for the
crime by them committed is not the necessary consequence of a due
performance of their duty. According to article 69 of the Revised Penal Code,
the penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall, in
such case, be imposed.

People v. Aquino
 116

People vs Amadeo Peralta, et al.

G.R. No. L-19069
October 29, 1968

Facts:
On February 16, 1958, in the municipality of Muntinglupa, province of
Rizal, two known warring gangs inside the New Bilibid Prison as “Sigue-
Sigue” and “OXO” were preparing to attend a mass at 7 a.m. However, a
fight between the two rival gangs caused a big commotion in the plaza where
the prisoners were currently assembled. The fight was quelled and those
involved where led away to the investigation while the rest of the prisoners
were ordered to return to their respective quarters.

In the investigation, it was found out that the accused, “OXO” members,
Amadeo Peralta, Andres Factora, Leonardo Dosal, Angel Paramog, Gervasio
Larita and Florencio Luna (six among the twenty-two defendants charged
therein with multiple murder), are also convicts confined in the said prisons
by virtue of final judgments.
 117

They conspired, confederated and mutually helped and aided each other,
with evident premeditation and treachery, all armed with deadly weapons,
did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously killed “Sigue-Sigue”
sympathizers Jose Carriego, Eugenio Barbosa and Santos Cruz, also
convicts confined in the same institution, by hitting, stabbing, and striking
them with ice picks, clubs and other improvised weapons, pointed and/or
sharpened, thereby inflicting upon the victims multiple serious injuries
which directly caused their deaths.

Issues
(a) Whether of not conspiracy attended the commission of the multiple
murder?

(b) Whether or not an aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism is

present in the commission of the crime?

Held:
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Generally,
conspiracy is not a crime unless when the law specifically provides a penalty
thereof as in treason, rebellion and sedition. However, when in resolute
execution of a common scheme, a felony is committed by two or more
malefactors, the existence of a conspiracy assumes a pivotal importance in
the determination of the liability of the perpetrators. Once an express or
implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co-
principals regardless of the extent and character of their respective active
participation in the commission of the crime/s perpetrated in furtherance of
the conspiracy because in contemplation of law the act of one is the act of
all.

The collective criminal liability emanates from the ensnaring nature of

conspiracy. The concerted action of the conspirators in consummating their
common purpose is a patent display of their evil partnership, and for the
consequences of such criminal enterprise they must be held solidarity liable.
However, in order to hold an accused guilty as co-principal by reason of
conspiracy, it must be established that he performed an overt act in
furtherance of the conspiracy, either by actively participating in the actual
commission of the crime, or by lending moral assistance to his co-
conspirators by being present at the scene of the crime, or by exerting moral
ascendancy over the rest of the conspirators as to move them to executing
the conspiracy.

Conspiracy alone, without execution of its purpose, is not a crime

punishable by law, except in special instances (Article 8, Revised Penal
Code) which, do not include robbery.

Reverting now to the case at bar, the trial court correctly ruled that
conspiracy attended the commission of the murders. To wit, although there
is no direct evidence of conspiracy, the court can safely say that there are
 118

several circumstances to show that the crime committed by the accused was
planned. First, all the deceased were Tagalogs and members of sympathizers
of “Sigue-Sigue” gang (OXO members were from either Visayas or
Mindanao), singled out and killed thereby, showing that their killing has
been planned. Second, the accused were all armed with improvised weapons
showing that they really prepared for the occasion. Third, the accused
accomplished the killing with team work precision going from one brigade to
another and attacking the same men whom they have previously marked for
liquidation and lastly, almost the same people took part in the killing of the
Carriego, Barbosa and Cruz.

In view of the attendance of the special aggravating circumstances of quasi-

recidivism, as all of the six accused at the time of the commission of the
offenses were serving sentences in the New Bilibid Prison by virtue of
convictions by final judgments that penalty for each offense must be
imposed in its maximum period, which is the mandate of the first paragraph
of article 160 of the RPC. Hence, severe penalty imposed on a quasi-
recidivist is justified because of the perversity and incorrigibility of the
crime.

Accordingly, the judgment a quo is hereby modified as follows: Amadeo

Peralta, Andres Factora, Leonardo Dosal, Angel Paramog, Gervasio Larita
and Florencio Luna are each pronounced guilty of three separate and
distinct crimes of murder, and are each sentenced to three death penalties;
all of them shall, jointly and severally, indemnify the heirs of each of the
three deceased victims in the sum of P12,000; each will pay one-sixth of the
costs.

People VS. Ulep G.R. No. 132547

September 20, 2000

FACTS: Finding the accused Ulep guilty of murder with death penalty as sentence, the case
is on automatic review. The court a quo appreciated the presence of treachery, qualifying the
offense to murder. Wapili, the victim had a high fever one night and appeared to have gone
crazy. He was talking to himself in his room, then got violent. He ran outside the house
naked bearing weapon(s). His brother-in-law sought help from the police, to which accused
SPO1 Ulep and two other policemen responded. Wapili walked towards the three police
officers who are armed with M-16 rifles. SPO1 Ulep fired a warning shot in the air and told
Wapili to put down his weapons or they would shoot him. But Wapili continued advancing
towards the police officers. When Wapili was only about two to three meters away from
them, SPO1 Ulep shot the victim, hitting him in various parts of his body. As the victim
slumped to the ground, SPO1 Ulep came closer and pumped another bullet into his head
and literally blew his brains out. ISSUE: Whether or not SPO1 Ulep is guilty of murder.
RULING: No, SPO1 Ulep is not guilty of murder. The Court disagrees with the conclusion
that the killing was attended by treachery, thus qualifying the offense to murder. We discern
nothing from the evidence that the assault was so sudden and unexpected and that
 119

accusedappellant deliberately adopted a mode of attack intended to insure the killing of

Wapili, without the victim having the opportunity to defend himself. On the contrary, the
victim could not have been taken by surprise as he was given more than sufficient warning
by accused-appellant before he was shot, i.e., accused-appellant fired a warning shot in the
air, and specifically ordered him to lower his weapons or he would be shot. The killing of
Wapili was not sought on purpose. Accused-appellant went to the scene in pursuance of his
official duty as a police officer after having been summoned for assistance. The situation that
the victim, at the time accused-appellant shot him in the head, was prostrate on the ground
is of no moment when considering the presence of treachery. The decision to kill was made
in an instant and the victim's helpless position was merely incidental to his having been
previously shot by accused-appellant in the performance of his official duty. There is
treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make. Considering the rule that treachery cannot be inferred but must be proved as fully and
convincingly as the crime itself, any doubt as to its existence must be resolved in favor of
accusedappellant. Thus, for failure of the prosecution to prove treachery to qualify the killing
to murder, accused-appellant is only convicted of homicide. Judgement is modified. People
VS. Ulep G.R. No. 132547

September 20, 2000

FACTS: Finding the accused Ulep guilty of murder with death penalty as sentence, the case
is on automatic review. The court a quo appreciated the presence of treachery, qualifying the
offense to murder. Wapili, the victim had a high fever one night and appeared to have gone
crazy. He was talking to himself in his room, then got violent. He ran outside the house
naked bearing weapon(s). His brother-in-law sought help from the police, to which accused
SPO1 Ulep and two other policemen responded. Wapili walked towards the three police
officers who are armed with M-16 rifles. SPO1 Ulep fired a warning shot in the air and told
Wapili to put down his weapons or they would shoot him. But Wapili continued advancing
towards the police officers. When Wapili was only about two to three meters away from
them, SPO1 Ulep shot the victim, hitting him in various parts of his body. As the victim
slumped to the ground, SPO1 Ulep came closer and pumped another bullet into his head
and literally blew his brains out. ISSUE: Whether or not SPO1 Ulep is guilty of murder.
RULING: No, SPO1 Ulep is not guilty of murder. The Court disagrees with the conclusion
that the killing was attended by treachery, thus qualifying the offense to murder. We discern
nothing from the evidence that the assault was so sudden and unexpected and that
accusedappellant deliberately adopted a mode of attack intended to insure the killing of
Wapili, without the victim having the opportunity to defend himself. On the contrary, the
victim could not have been taken by surprise as he was given more than sufficient warning
by accused-appellant before he was shot, i.e., accused-appellant fired a warning shot in the
air, and specifically ordered him to lower his weapons or he would be shot. The killing of
Wapili was not sought on purpose. Accused-appellant went to the scene in pursuance of his
official duty as a police officer after having been summoned for assistance. The situation that
the victim, at the time accused-appellant shot him in the head, was prostrate on the ground
is of no moment when considering the presence of treachery. The decision to kill was made
in an instant and the victim's helpless position was merely incidental to his having been
previously shot by accused-appellant in the performance of his official duty. There is
treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make. Considering the rule that treachery cannot be inferred but must be proved as fully and
convincingly as the crime itself, any doubt as to its existence must be resolved in favor of
accusedappellant. Thus, for failure of the prosecution to prove treachery to qualify the killing
to murder, accused-appellant is only convicted of homicide. Judgement is
 120

Accordingly, for failure of the

modified.

prosecution to prove treachery to

qualify the killing to murder,
accused-appellant
may only be convicted of
homicide.
Incomplete justification is a
special or privileged mitigating
circumstance, which, not only
cannot be offset by
aggravating circumstances but
also reduces the penalty by one or
two degrees than that prescribed
by law.15
Undoubtedly, the instant case
would have fallen under Art. 11,
par. 5 of The Revised Penal Code
had the two
 121

(2) conditions therefor concurred

which, to reiterate:
first, that the accused acted in the
performance of a duty or the
lawful exercise of a right or
office; and
second, that the injury or offense
committed be the necessary
consequence of the due
performance of such
duty or the lawful exercise of
such right or office.
But on this case, only the first
condition was fulfilled. Hence,
Art. 69 is applicable, although its
"that the
majority of such conditions be
present," is immaterial since there
 122

are only two (2) conditions that

may be
taken into account under Art. 11,
par. 5. Article 69 is obviously in
favor of the accused as it provides
for a
penalty lower than that prescribed
by law when the crime committed
is not wholly justifiable. The
intention of
the legislature, obviously, is to
mitigate the penalty by reason of
the diminution of either freedom
of action,
intelligence, or intent, or of the
lesser perversity of the offender.
The court also acknowledged in
favor of accused-appellant the
 123

mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender.
The police blotter of Kidapawan
Municipal Police Station shows
that immediately after killing
Wapili, accused-
appellant reported to the police
headquarters and voluntarily
surrendered himself.
The Supreme Court ruled SPO1
ERNESTO ULEP is found guilty
of Homicide, instead of murder
People VS. Ulep G.R. No. 132547

September 20, 2000

FACTS: Finding the accused Ulep guilty of murder with death penalty as
sentence, the case is on automatic review. The court a quo appreciated the
presence of treachery, qualifying the offense to murder. Wapili, the victim
had a high fever one night and appeared to have gone crazy. He was talking
to himself in his room, then got violent. He ran outside the house naked
bearing weapon(s). His brother-in-law sought help from the police, to which
accused SPO1 Ulep and two other policemen responded. Wapili walked
towards the three police officers who are armed with M-16 rifles. SPO1 Ulep
fired a warning shot in the air and told Wapili to put down his weapons or
they would shoot him. But Wapili continued advancing towards the police
officers. When Wapili was only about two to three meters away from them,
SPO1 Ulep shot the victim, hitting him in various parts of his body. As the
 124

victim slumped to the ground, SPO1 Ulep came closer and pumped another
bullet into his head and literally blew his brains out.

ISSUE: Whether or not SPO1 Ulep is guilty of murder.

RULING: No, SPO1 Ulep is not guilty of murder. The Court disagrees with
the conclusion that the killing was attended by treachery, thus qualifying
the offense to murder. We discern nothing from the evidence that the
assault was so sudden and unexpected and that accusedappellant
deliberately adopted a mode of attack intended to insure the killing of
Wapili, without the victim having the opportunity to defend himself. On the
contrary, the victim could not have been taken by surprise as he was given
more than sufficient warning by accused-appellant before he was shot, i.e.,
accused-appellant fired a warning shot in the air, and specifically ordered
him to lower his weapons or he would be shot. The killing of Wapili was not
sought on purpose. Accused-appellant went to the scene in pursuance of his
official duty as a police officer after having been summoned for assistance.
The situation that the victim, at the time accused-appellant shot him in the
head, was prostrate on the ground is of no moment when considering the
presence of treachery. The decision to kill was made in an instant and the
victim's helpless position was merely incidental to his having been
previously shot by accused-appellant in the performance of his official duty.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
Considering the rule that treachery cannot be inferred but must be proved
as fully and convincingly as the crime itself, any doubt as to its existence
must be resolved in favor of accusedappellant. Thus, for failure of the
prosecution to prove treachery to qualify the killing to murder, accused-
appellant is only convicted of homicide. Judgement is modified.
Accordingly, for failure of the prosecution to prove treachery to qualify the
killing to murder, accused-appellant
may only be convicted of homicide.
Incomplete justification is a special or privileged mitigating circumstance,
which, not only cannot be offset by
aggravating circumstances but also reduces the penalty by one or two
degrees than that prescribed by law.15
Undoubtedly, the instant case would have fallen under Art. 11, par. 5 of The
Revised Penal Code had the two
(2) conditions therefor concurred which, to reiterate:
first, that the accused acted in the performance of a duty or the lawful
exercise of a right or office; and
second, that the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence
of the due performance of such
duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office.
But on this case, only the first condition was fulfilled. Hence, Art. 69 is
applicable, although its "that the
 125

majority of such conditions be present," is immaterial since there are only

two (2) conditions that may be
taken into account under Art. 11, par. 5. Article 69 is obviously in favor of
the accused as it provides for a
penalty lower than that prescribed by law when the crime committed is not
wholly justifiable. The intention of
the legislature, obviously, is to mitigate the penalty by reason of the
diminution of either freedom of action,
intelligence, or intent, or of the lesser perversity of the offender.
The court also acknowledged in favor of accused-appellant the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender.
The police blotter of Kidapawan Municipal Police Station shows that
immediately after killing Wapili, accused-
appellant reported to the police headquarters and voluntarily surrendered
himself.
The Supreme Court ruled SPO1 ERNESTO ULEP is found guilty of
Homicide, instead of mur

US VS. CALIXTO VALDEZ

G.R No. L-16486 22 March 1921

FACTS: Sometime in November 1919, a small boat was sent out to raise the
anchor. The crew of this boat consisted of the accused, Calixto Valdez and
six others among who was the deceased, Venancio Gargantel. During their
work, the accused began to abuse the men with offensive words. Gargantel
complained, saying that it would be better if he would not insult them. The
accused took this as a display of insubordination, thus, he moved towards
Gargantel, with a big knife in hand, threatening to stab him. At the instant
when the accused had attained to within a few feet of Gargantel, the latter,
evidently believing himself in great and immediate peril, threw himself into
the water and disappeared beneath its surface to be seen no more.

As alleged in the information, that said Gargantel had died by drowning, as

a consequence of having thrown himself into the water and upon seeing
himself threatened and attacked by the accused. The Judgment rendered
against the accused. Having been convicted as the author of the homicide,
the accused alleged on appeal that he was only guilty of the offense of
inflicting serious physical injuries, or at most of frustrated homicide.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is liable for the death of Venancio
Gargantel.

HELD:

The Supreme Court disallowed the appeal of the accused, enunciated the
following doctrine:
 126

“ That even though the death of the injured person should not be considered
as the exclusive and necessary effect of the very grave wound which almost
completely severed his axillary artery , occasioning a hemorrhage impossible
to stanch under the circumstances in which that person was placed,
nevertheless as the persistence of the aggression of the accused compelled
his adversary, in order to escape the attack, to leap into the river, an act
which the accused forcibly compelled the injured person to do after having
inflicted, among others, a mortal wound upon him and as the aggressor by
said attack manifested a determined resolution to cause the death of the
deceased, by depriving him of all possible help and putting him in the very
serious situation narrated in the decision appealed from, the trial court, in
qualifying the act prosecuted as consummated homicide, did not commit
any error of law, as the death of the injured person was due to the act of the
accused.”

The accused must, therefore, be considered the responsible author of the

death of Venancio Gargantel, and he was properly convicted of the offense of
homicide. The trial judge appreciated as an attenuating circumstance the
fact that the offender had no intention to commit so great a wrong as that
committed. (Par.3, Art 9 Penal Code)

US v. Bindoy

FACTS:
On May 6, 1930, Donato Bindoy offered some tuba to Tibay, Faustino Pacas'
wife. She refused and Bindoy threatened to injure her if she did not accept.
Pacas stepped in to defend his wife and attempted to take away from Bindoy
the bolo he carried. The disturbance attracted the attention of Emigdio
Omamdam. In the course of the struggle, Bindoy succeeded in disengaging
himself from Pacas, wrenching the bolo from the latter's hand, with such
violence that the point of the bolo reached Omamdam's chest, who was then
behind Bindoy. The trial court held that Bindoy was guilty of the crime of
homicide. Bindoy appealed, alleging that the death of Omamdam was
caused accidentally and without malicious intent.

ISSUE:
WON the crime of which Bindoy was found guilty of can be mitigated on the
ground of accident.

HELD:
Yes. Decision is reversed. Bindoy is acquitted according to Article 8, No. 8 of
the Revised PenalCode

RATIO:
1.There is no evidence to show that Bindoy deliberately and intentionally
killed Omamdam.
No evidence that Omamdam took part in the fight between Bindoy and
Pacas.
 127

No evidence that Bindoy was aware of Omamdam's presence.

No evidence that there was disagreement or ill feelings between Bindoy &
Omamdam. Onthe contrary, they were nephew & uncle, & were on good
terms with each other.
2.The witness for the defense corroborates the defendant to the effect that
Pacas and Bindoy were actually struggling for the possession of the bolo,
and that when the latter let go, the former had pulled so violently that it flew
towards Omamdam, who was therefore hit in the chest, without Bindoy's
seeing him, because Omamdam had passed behind him. The testimony of
this witness was not contradicted by any rebuttal evidence adduced by the
fiscal.
3. If, in the struggle, the defendant had attempted to wound his opponent,
and instead of doing so, had wounded Omamdam, he would be liable for his
act, since whoever willfully commits a felony or a misdemeanor incurs
criminal liability, although the wrongful act done is different from that
which he intended. This is not the case here. Bindoy did not try to wound
Pacas. He was only trying to defend his possession of the bolo, which Pacas
was trying to wrench away from him. His conduct was perfectly lawful.

People vs Marasigan

Facts: On 21 January 1945, Urbano Marasigan dressed in a Japanese

uniform and armed with a rifle raided the house of Macario Sories, who are
associated with the guerrillas as a messenger. He was asked by Marasigan if
he was a guerilla and answered in the negative. But he was then brought to
his father’s house. His father and sibling Nicasio and Maximo were asked
the same question. But Nicasio was not taken due to his old age. The
siblings were then brought towards the mountain and were never heard
from. A month later Marasigan yelled at Macario’s wife not to wait for her
husband for he is already dead. He was accompanied also by is father to
Nicasio’s house and pleaded for forgiveness. The People’s Court convicted
him of treason. He contended that it was impossible for him to be part of the
raid as he was arrested and remained in Japanese custody from 21 January
until the month of March. His counsel also raised the mitigating
circumstance of lack instruction.

Issue: Whether or not Marasigan’s action was mitigated by lack of

instruction?

Decision: Judgment modified. Mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction

found in favour of Marasigan and penalty modified accordingly. Marasigan
had not gone to and studied in the public schools and can neither read nor
write English. His schooling was confined to studying and finishing the cat
on, an elementary Spanish reader for beginners
 128

URBANO vs. IAC

157 SCRA 1, G.R. 72964
January 7, 1988

FACTS:

On October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano went to his ricefield and
found the place where he stored his palay flooded with water coming from
the irrigation canal nearby which had overflowed. Urbano saw Javier and
the latter admitted that he was the one responsible. A quarrel between them
ensued. Urbano unsheathed his bolo hacked Javier hitting him on the right
palm of his hand, which was used in parrying the bolo hack. Urban was also
hacked Javier on the left leg with the back portion of said bolo, causing a
swelling on said leg.

Upon the intercession of Councilman, Urbano and Javier agreed to settle

their differences. Urbano promised to pay P700.00 for the medical expenses
of Javier. Hence, on October 27, 1980, the two accompanied by Solis
appeared before the San Fabian Police to formalize their amicable
settlement.

However, on November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to the hospital with a
lockjaw and was having convulsions. The doctor found that it was caused by
 129

tetanus toxin. He noticed the presence of a healing wound in Javier's palm

which could have been infected by tetanus.

On November 15, 1980 Javier died in the hospital. An information for

homicide was filed against Urbano. The RTC found Urbano guilty of the
crime charged.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from the time Javier
was wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano from any
liability for Javier's death (YES)

HELD:

The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by
Urbano was infected with tetanus at the time of the infliction of the wound.

We look into the nature of tetanus-

The incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time between injury and the
appearance of unmistakable symptoms, ranges from 2 to 56 days. However,
over 80 percent of patients become symptomatic within 14 days. A short
incubation period indicates severe disease, and when symptoms occur
within 2 or 3 days of injury the mortality rate approaches 100 percent.

Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's

body depends on the incubation period of the disease.

In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm
when he parried the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. This incident
took place on October 23, 1980. After 22 days, or on November 14, 1980, he
suffered the symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The
following day, November 15, 1980, he died.

If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already
infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically probable that
Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because
the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking
incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore,
the onset time should have been more than six days. Javier, however, died
on the second day from the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that
at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of
tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound
could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident.
Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could
have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before
he died.
 130

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and
logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And
since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused
caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable
doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that
the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause
later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The
infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.

People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee

Julio Guillen, defendant-appellant

FACTS:

On March 10, 1947, in an event sponsored by the Liberal Party at Plaza

Miranda in Quiapo, Manila, Guillen planted a hand grenade near the stage
and threw another one toward then President Manuel Roxas in an apparent
assassination attempt born out of Guillen's spite for the President over the
latter's perceived failure to fulfill his promises and his call for the passage of
the so-called parity measure. General Castaneda managed to kick the
grenade off the stage. However, its explosion caused the death of Simeon
Varela (Barrela). It also caused the injuries of Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro
Carillo, and Emilio Maglalang.

Guillen pleaded not guilty to the consequent charges of murder and multiple
frustrated murder filed against him. At one point, he even tried to use the
insanity excuse, but he was found to have been mentally stable.

Later on, by his own admission, he confessed to his crimes. He was

subsequently found guilty of all the charges and was sentenced to death.
 131

ISSUE:

Whether or not the conviction of the accused was proper.

HELD:

No, the SC ruled that Guillen's actions on March 10, 1947 and their
penalties were covered by Art. 48 of the RPC, not sub-section 1 of Art. 49.
The Court said that by a single act -- throwing a hand grenade at President
Roxas -- he committed two grave felonies:
(a) murder and (b) multiple attempted murder.

At the same time, the murder of Varela was attended by the qualifying
circumstance of treachery, given that the victim was not able to put up a
defense against the attack, even though he was not the principal target.

And lastly, the Court ruled that the injuries sustained by the other victims
constitute attempted and not frustrated murder. The Court reasoned that
Guillen's failed attempt to kill President Roxas was due to some reason or
accident (General kicking the grenade off the stage) other than his own
spontaneous desistance.

Art. 48, RPC: "Penalty for complex crimes -- When a single act constitutes
two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary
means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall
be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period."
People v. Pinto
G.R. No. 39519

Facts:
A police operation to serve a search warrant in the premises of Francisco
Bello thru policemen Daniel Pinto, Jr. and Narciso Buenaflor, Jr for alleged
position of rifle and submachine gun. On the night of the execution to serve
the warrant a shooting incident happened. One vehicle which carry
members of Tiongson family, driver and a priest was fired by the operatives.
Richard Tiongson died the following day while Maria Theresa was fatally
wounded. Despite the incident, the police operative pursued its mission to
haunt for Francisco Bello. When they reached the residence of Bello’s
parents they found out different types of firearms. Thereafter, the Chief of
Police, declared the search terminated and the entire searching party left for
the headquarters. Bello and his party arrived in Daraga, Albay and stayed in
the house ofInocencia Malbas. Early in the morning successive burst of
gunfire were heard, Bello, who was in the balcony was gradually fall down,
with his hands above his head. He died due to multiple gunshot wounds.
Rosalio Andes was also shot and was killed allegedly fought back with
authorities. He died due to multiple gunshot wounds.

Issue:
 132

Whether or not the killings (Tiongson, Bello and Andes) and frustrated
murder (MT Tiongson) were perpetrated in the course of the performance of
their official duties as peace officers in obedience to the lawful order of their
superiors?

Ruling:

NO, the accused-appellant killed the victims and injured one person not in
the performance of their official duty as peace officers in obedience to the
lawful order of their superior. In order that the justifying circumstance of
fulfillment of a duty under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code may be
successfully invoked, the defense has to prove that these two requisites are
present: (a) the offender acted in the performance of a duty and (b) the
injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due
performance or lawful exercise of such duty. In the absence of the second
requisite, the justification becomes an incomplete one thereby converting it
into a mitigating circumstance under Articles 13 and 69 of the same Code.
Armed with only a search warrant and the oral order to apprehend Bello,
they went beyond the ambit of their mission and deprived Bello and two
other persons of their lives. The fact that the victims were different from the
ones the appellants intended to injure cannot save them from conviction.
Aberratio ictus or mistake in the identity of the victim carries the same
gravity as when the accused zeroes in on his intended victim. The main
reason behind this conclusion is the fact that the accused had acted

People v. Jaurigue et al, C.A. No. 384 (1946)

Case. Petition to review lower court decision finding Avelina guilty of
homicide with ACs

Facts. Victim Amado was courting Avelina. In one occasion, while Avelina’s
cousing washed the latter’s hankerchief, Amado stole it. Amado proposed
her love to Avelina. Avelina refused. Amado grabbed her, kissed her, and
touched her chest. To this, Avelina slapped him, threw fist blows, and
kicked him. Avelina told her mother the next day. Her mother gave her a fan
knife for protection.

Not long after, Amado intruded in Avelina’s house while she was asleep. He
kissed her hand which woke her up. She screamed for help, he hid under
the bed. Her parents arrive in the room. He apologized.

Days after, Avelina and her family attended services in the Seventh Day
Adventists chapel. Avelina’s father got there first, Avelina followed and sat
on one of the benches. Amado saw Avelina, sat beside her and put his hand
in her right thigh. Avelina tried to get her knife with right hand. Amado held
her right hand to stop her. Avelina quickly grabbed the knife with her left
hand and stabbed Amado in the neck.
 133

Amado staggered. Avelina’s father saw Amado bleeding. Her father asked
why she did it, she said she could not endure it anymore. CFI found Avelina
guilty of homicide with the aggravating circumstance of having committed
the act in a place of worship, inter alia. Avelina appealed.

Issue. Is the AC of offending a place of worship applicable? -No

Ratio. While it is true that the crime occurred in a chapel, this does not
necessarily denote the attachment of said AC. As per law, for a proper
appreciation of AC of having committed the crime in a place of worship,
there should be premeditation that the offender intended to do it in the
place of worship. As the facts show, Avelina did not plan to kill Amado nor
to kill him in a chapel. Avelina had in her case the fan knife just for
protection whenever and wherever she might need it. It just so happened
that Amado provoked her in the chapel and that was where Avelina could
not bear it anymore. With this in mind, the present court ruled that the
lower court erred in assigning the AC in its judgment against Avelina.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs.
BONIFACIO BADRIAGOG.R. No. 183566 May 8, 2009VELASCO, JR.,

FACTS:
On the morning of September 13, 2002, Adrian Quinto was asked by his
mother to bring a letter to one Berting Bello at Barangay Guindapunan,
Leyte. He drove a tricycle to deliver the letter along with his younger brother,
Oliver. After finishing the errand they headed back to the town plaza where
their mother was waiting for them. Before they could reach their destination,
however, they were approached by Bonifacio Badriago at Sitio Mombon in
Carigara. Accused-appellant then suddenly hacked him with a sundang or
long bolo on his lumbar area.

Accused-appellant aimed a second time but Adrian was able to somehow

shield himself. His lower left arm suffered a hack wound as a result. Struck
with panic, he jumped off the tricycle but could not runaway. He was able to
push Oliver off the tricycle so he could run away and call for help. He lost
consciousness and only woke up while confined at Carigara District
Hospital. His mother later informed him that Oliver was also attacked and
did not survive. Accused-appellant was charged before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of the crime frustrated murder and murder. Accused-appellant,
 134

in his Brief filed before the CA. the instant appeal is partially granted.
Accordingly, in Criminal Cases No. 4255 accused-appellant is found guilty
only of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE and in criminal case no. 4276 accused-
appellant is found guilty of MURDER.

ISSUES:
1.WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONVICTING
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE
ANDMURDER DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
2.WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
APPRECIATING THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF VOLUNTARY
SURRENDER, INCOMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE, AND LACK OF INTENTION
TO COMMIT SO GRAVE A WRONGHELD:1.

NO. From the evidence presented to the trial court, accused-appellant was
able to perform all the acts that would necessarily result in Adrian’s death.
His intention to kill can be presumed from the lethal hacking blows Adrian
received. His attack on Adrian with a bolo was not justified. His claim of
self-defense was not given credence by both the trial and appellate courts.
Neither are there any of the qualifying circumstances of murder, parricide,
and infanticide. The circumstances, thus, make out a case for frustrated
homicide as accused-appellant performed all the acts necessary to kill
Adrian; Adrian only survived due to timely medical intervention as testified
to by his examining physician. The records also show that Adrian was
suddenly attacked with a bolo, and the most he could do at that moment
was to shield himself somehow from the blow with his arm. Another blow to
Adrian’s back showed the vulnerability of his position as he had his back
turned to accused-appellant and was not able to flee from attack. There is
treachery even if the attack is frontal if it is sudden and unexpected, with
the victims having no opportunity to repel it or defend themselves, for what
is decisive in treachery is that the execution of the attack made it impossible
for the victims to defend themselves or to retaliate. The court held that the
circumstantial evidence available was enough to convict accused-appellant.
From accused-appellant’s own admission that he indeed injured Adrian,
causing him near-fatal injuries, the rest of the evidence, albeit
circumstantial, made out a clear case for Oliver’s murder. First, the victims
were together in Adrian’s pedicab when the attack took place; second,
accused-appellant hacked Adrian with a bolo; third, Adrian’s injuries were
caused by a bolo; fourth, Adrian tried to push Oliver to safety before he lost
unconsciousness; fifth, Oliver’s wounds were found to have been caused by
a weapon that made similar hacking wounds as the one made by accused-
appellant when he assaulted Adrian; and sixth, Oliver died on the same day
Adrian sustained stab wounds. Although there is no direct evidence of
Oliver’s actual wounding, the circumstantial evidence presented sufficiently
established that it was accused-appellant who perpetrated the twin attacks
on the brothers. Accused-appellant, thus, cannot argue that the
prosecution’s evidence was insufficient to convict him.
 135

2. NO. For the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender to be

appreciated, the surrender must be spontaneous and in a manner that
shows that the accused made an unconditional surrender to the authorities,
either based on recognition of guilt or from the desire to save the authorities
from the trouble and expenses that would be involved in the accused’s
search and capture. Moreover, it is imperative that the accused was not
actually arrested, the surrender is before a person in authority or an agent
of a person in authority, and the surrender was voluntary. None of these
requisites are present in accused-appellant’s case. In fact, jurisprudence
holds that merely reporting the incident cannot be considered voluntary
surrender within contemplation of the law. By accused-appellant’s own
admission, he only went to the authorities to inform them that Adrian was
injured. What is more, accused-appellant claims he had nothing to do with
the murder of Oliver. Even if we were to consider voluntary surrender as
mitigating, this would only apply to the injury inflicted on Adrian. Accused-
appellant denies culpability in Oliver’s death and this negates any
acknowledgement of guilt. The court likewise find implausible accused-
appellant’s assertion that he employed self
-defense. The records show that the requisites of a successful claim of self-
defense were not met. In the instant case, accused-appellant’s self -serving
claim of self-defense coupled with the fact tha the did not sustain any
injuries from his supposed attacker, Adrian, fails to support any claim of
unlawful aggression, the crucial requisite to his defense. As the appellate
court noted, there was no clear, credible, and convincing evidence that
Adrian was the one who instigated the fight and that accused-appellant was
merely fending off an attack. Unlawful aggression by the victim must be
clearly shown. Looking at the victims’ wounds, however, the court cannot
count the circumstance in accused-appellant’s favor. Adrian suffered a
hacking wound on his left forearm that caused near amputation, and
another one on his lumbar area. These wounds would have been fatal were
it not for timely medical assistance. Oliver, on the other hand, bore the
brunt of the attack with eleven (11) different stab wounds, including one on
the skull and on the chest. The number, location, and nature of these stab
wounds belie accused-appellant’s claim of lack of intention to commit so
grave a wrong against his victim.
 136

RODEL URBANO v. PEOPLE, GR No. 182750, 2009-01-20

Facts:
This petition for review under Rule 45 seeks to reverse and set aside the
Decision[1] dated January 25, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR No. 25371 which affirmed with modification the April 30, 2001
Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 39 in Lingayen,
Pangasinan in Criminal Case No. L-5028. The RTC found petitioner Rodel
Urbano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide.

That on or about the 28th of September 1993 in the evening, in Barangay

Poblacion, Municipality of Lingayen, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines...
he above-named accused, with intent to kill,... did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and maul Brigido Tomelden,
inflicting upon him mortal injuries

CAUSE OF DEATH:
 137

Cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to cerebral concussion with resultant

cerebral hemorrhage due to mauling incident
Which directly caused his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of
the said Brigido Tomelden.
Petitioner, when arraigned, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Following the
parties' waiver of pre-trial, trial on the merits then ensued.
On September 28, 1993, at around 8:00 p.m., the victim Brigido Tomelden
and petitioner were at the compound of the Lingayen Water District (LIWAD)
in Lingayen, Pangasinan, having just arrived from a picnic in the nearby
town of Bugallon, Pangasinan, where, with some other... co-workers, they
drunk beer in a restaurant. While inside the compound, the two had a
heated altercation in the course of which Tomelden hurled insulting
remarks at petitioner.

The exchange of words led to an exchange of blows.

Then petitioner delivered a "lucky punch," as described by... eyewitness Orje

Salazar, on Tomelden's face, which made Tomelden topple down.

The blow,... aused Tomelden's nose to bleed and rendered him...

unconscious.

Petitioner and his other co-workers brought Tomelden to the office of the
LIWAD general manager where he spent the night.

September 29, 1993. Upon arriving home at around 6:00 p.m. of that day,
Tomelden informed his wife, Rosario,... of the fight the previous night and of
his having been rendered unconscious.

He complained of pain in his nape, head, and ear which impelled Rosario to
immediately bring him to the Lingayen Community Hospital where Dr. Daisy
Arellano examined him and treated his lacerated left... index finger,
contusions, and hematoma at the right cerebrum.

On October 2 and 7, 1993, Tomelden went back to the hospital complaining

of dizziness, headache, and other pains.

On October 8, 1993, Rosario brought Tomelden to the Sison Memorial

Provincial Hospital in Dagupan City, where the attending physician, Dr.

Ramon Ramos, diagnosed Tomelden suffering from "brain injury, secondary
to mauling to consider cerebral hemorrhage.

3:00 p.m. of October 10, 1993, and, due to financial constraints, was
thereafter discharged despite signs negating physical condition
improvement.
 138

pon reaching their house, however, Tomelden again complained of extreme

head... pain, prompting his wife to bring him back to the Lingayen
Community Hospital where Dr. Arellano again attended to him.

things turned for the worst, the doctor noting that Tomelden appeared to be
semi-conscious, sleepy, uncooperative, and not responding to any...
stimulant.

Tomelden died at 9:00 p.m. of that day due, per Dr. Arellano, to "cardio-
respiratory arrest secondary to cerebral concussion with resultant cerebral
hemorrhage due to mauling incident."

The defense presented petitioner who denied having any intention to kill,
asserting that hypertension, for which Tomelden was receiving treatment,
was the cause of the latter's death.

On April 30, 2001, the RTC rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty as
charged. The fallo of the RTC's decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the prosecution having established beyond reasonable doubt

the guilt of the accused of the crime of HOMICIDE as defined and penalized
under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code, this Court in the absence of any
modifying circumstances, hereby sentences said... accused to suffer the
indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor
as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of Reclusion
Temporal as maximum and to indemnify the legal heirs of the victim in the
amount of PHP50,000.00, plus cost of... the suit.

The period of preventive imprisonment suffered by the accused shall be

credited in full in the service of his sentence in accordance with Art. 29 of
the Revised Penal Code.

On January 25, 2008, the CA rendered a decision, affirming the conviction

of petitioner,... pointing to the lucky punch as the proximate... cause of
Tomelden's hospitalization and ultimately his death

CA found no qualifying circumstance

Issues:

etitioner now urges the Court to set aside the appealed decision, or at least
modify it, maintaining that the appellate court:

. x x x erred in affirming the decision of the [RTC] finding [him] guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

II. x x x erred in not appreciating the mitigating circumstances of sufficient

provocation on the part of the victim and lack of intent to commit so grave a
wrong in favor of the petitioner.[8]
 139

Ruling:

The combined effects of the testimonies of Salazar and Dr. Arellano,

buttressed by that of Rosario who related about her husband's post
September 28, 1993 severe head pain, clearly establish beyond cavil the
cause of Tomelden's death and who was liable for it.

It was through the direct accounts of the prosecution witnesses of the

events... taken together with the result of the medical examinations... and
autopsy report which described the death of the victim as "cardio-respiratory
arrest secondary to cerebral concussion with resultant cerebral hemorrhage
due to mauling incident" that we are convinced that the "lucky punch" was
the proximate cause of [Tomelden's] death.

The... prosecution had satisfactorily proven

Petitioner next contends that the mitigating circumstances of no intention to

commit so grave a wrong and sufficient provocation on the part of the victim
ought to be appreciated in petitioner's favor.

On this score, we agree with petitioner.

In the instant case, Tomelden's insulting remarks directed at petitioner and

uttered immediately before the fist fight constituted sufficient provocation.

other irritating statements made by the deceased

Petitioner... was the one provoked and challenged to a fist fight.

the provocation came from Tomelden

While intent to kill may be presumed from the fact of the death of the victim,
this mitigating factor may still be... considered when attendant facts and
circumstances so warrant, as in the instant case.

Consider: Petitioner tried to avoid the fight

He tried to parry the blows... petitioner helped carry his unconscious co-
worker

Thus, it is clear that the mitigating circumstance of "no intention to commit

so grave a wrong as that committed" must also be appreciated in favor of
petitioner while finding him guilty of homicide

Withal, with no aggravating circumstance and two mitigating circumstances

appreciable in favor of petitioner, we apply par. 5 of Art. 64, RPC, which
pertinently provides:
 140

When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating

circumstances are present, the court shall impose the penalty next lower to
that prescribed by law,... The prescribed penalty for homicide under Art.
249 of the RPC is reclusion temporal or from 12 years and one day to 20
years. With the appreciation of two mitigating circumstances of no intention
to commit so grave a wrong as that committed and of sufficient
provocation... from the victim,... application of par. 5 of Art. 64, RPC... next
lower penalty... homicide... prision mayor or from six years and one day to
12 years.

the appreciation of two mitigating circumstances in favor of petitioner,

hereby MODIFIED by decreasing the term of imprisonment.

to serve an indeterminate prison term of from two (2) years and four (4)
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum, with whatever imprisonment he has...
already served fully credited in the service of this sentence. The rest of the
judgment is hereby AFFIRMED.

Principles:

doctrinal rule that great weight is accorded the factual findings of the trial
court... particularly with respect to the ascertainment of the credibility of
witnesses.

When the law speaks of provocation either as a mitigating circumstance or

as an essential element of self-defense, the reference is to an unjust or
improper conduct of the offended party capable of exciting, inciting, or
irritating anyone;[12] it is not... enough that the provocative act be
unreasonable or annoying;[13] the provocation must be sufficient to excite
one to commit the wrongful act[14] and should immediately precede the act

Art. 64. Rules for the application of penalties which contain three periods.--
In cases in which the penalties prescribed by law contain three periods,
whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed of three different
penalties, each one of which forms a... period in accordance with the
provisions of Articles 76 and 77, the courts shall observe for the application
of the penalty the following rules, according to whether there are or are no
mitigating or aggravating circumstances:

When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating

circumstances are present, the court shall impose the penalty next lower to
that prescribed by law, in the period that it may deem applicable, according
to the number and nature of such... circumstances.
 141

G.R. No. 174056. February 27, 2007.*THE PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ROGELIO GUMIMBA y MORADANTE alias
ROWING and RONTE ABABO(acquitted), appellants.

FACTS:
Appellants in this case were charged of rape with homicide of an 8 y.o child.
Magallano and Arañas testified that at around 9 o’clock in the evening of 10
April 1997, appellant Rogelio Gumimba went to Magallano’s home and
confessed to him that he alone and by himself raped and killed his niece,
AAA. Subsequently, Magallano accompanied appellant to the residence of
Arañas where he reiterated his confession. That same night, Magallano,
Arañas, appellant and family members of the witnesses proceeded to the
home of Barangay Captain Acapulco who investigated. Appellant repeated
his confession to the barangay captain. Then appellant was turned over to
the police station. During the arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to
the offense. However, appellant manifested though counsel (before the court)
at the following hearing on that he would like to change his earlier plea of
not guilty to a plea of guilty. The RTC ordered appellant’s re-arraignment
and the
 142

latter accordingly entered a plea of guilty. The court conducted an inquiry to

ascertain the voluntariness of appellant’s plea and his full comprehension of
the consequences thereof. The prosecution presented the physician who
conducted the autopsy on the body of the victim, and who testified that the
victim was raped before she was killed. The examination revealed that AAA
sustained four (4) stab wounds in front, two (2) stab wounds in her back
and one (1) lacerated wound each on her neck and on her middle upper
extremity. Furthermore, she found 6 and 12 o’clock laceration wounds on
the external genital organ of the victim. Before resting its case, the
prosecution presented appellant as witness against his co-accused Abapo.
Appellant testified that he and Abapo raped and killed the victim. He
likewise explained that he had previously confessed to Magallano, Arañas
and Acapulco that he alone committed the crime in the hope that the
parents of the victim, who were relatives of his, might take pity on him.
Abapo denied the allegation of his co-accused and stated that he was with
his mother and siblings at the time of the incident. All of them corroborated
with his alibi. The RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime as charged. Appellant was sentenced to suffer the death penalty and
ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amounts of P50,000.00 as
indemnity for the life of the victim,P30,000.00 as moral damages, and costs.
On the other hand, the trial court acquitted Abapo. With the death penalty
imposed on appellant, the case was elevated to this Court on automatic
review. The CA rendered its Decision affirming the appellant’s conviction,
but with modification as to damages awarded to the heirs of the victim.

ISSUES:
1. WON the trial court erred in convicting the accused on the basis of his
improvident plea of guilt.

RULING:
1. NO. when a plea of guilty to a capital offense is entered, there are
three (3) conditions that the trial court must observe to obviate an
improvident plea of guilty by the accused: (1) it must conduct a
searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension by
the accused of the consequences of his plea; (2) it must require the
prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and
the precise degree of his culpability; and (3) it must ask the accused
whether he desires to present evidence on his behalf, and allow him to
do so if he so desires. In the instant case, when the accused entered a
plea of guilty at his re-arraignment, it is evident that the RTC did not
strictly observe the requirements under Section 3, Rule 116 above. A
mere warning that the accused faces the supreme penalty of death is
insufficient. However, notwithstanding the inefficacious plea of guilty,
the totality of the evidence for the prosecution undeniably establishes
appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with
homicide. Apart from his testimony upon changing his plea to a plea
of guilty, appellant gave a subsequent testimony when he was
 143

presented by the prosecution as a witness against his co-accused.

This second testimony which constitutes another judicial confession,
replete with details and made consciously as it was, cured the
deficiencies which made his earlier plea of guilty improvident. The
latter testimony left no room for doubt as to the voluntariness and
comprehension on appellant’s part of his change of plea, as well as
completed his narration of how he raped and killed the victim. Hence,
the Court must rule against appellant as the evidence on record is
ample to sustain the judgment of conviction independent from his
plea.

People vs. Borinaga

Facts:
The victim Harry Mooney, an American who resided in Calubian Leyte,
contracted with Juan Lawaan for the construction of a fish corral. Lawaan
attempted to collect the whole amount of the contract even though the
corralis not yet finished.
Upon Mooney‘s refusal to pay, Lawaan warned and threatened him that
something would happen to him. On that evening, Mooney was in the store
of his neighbor, sitting with his back towards a window when suddenly
Basilio Borinaga struck him with a knife. The knife imbedded on the back of
the seat though. Mooney fell off from the impact but was not injured.
Borinaga left the scene but after ten minutes, here turned to have another
attempt at Mooney but was warded off by Mooney and his neighbor
frightening him by turning a flashlight on him.

Issue:
 144

Whether or not the crime is frustrated murder.

Held:
YES. As an essential condition of a frustrated crime, Borinaga performed all
the acts of execution, attending the attack. There was nothing left that he
could do further to accomplish the work. The cause resulting in the failure
of the attack arose by reason of forces independent of his will. Borinaga also
voluntarily desisted from further acts. The subjective phase of the criminal
act was passed.
Dissenting opinion, J. Villa-Real:
“The acts of execution perfomed by [Borinaga] did not produce the death of
Mooney as a consequence not could they have produced it because the blow
did not reach his body; therefore, the culprit did not perform all the acts of
execution which should produce the felony. There was lacking the infliction
of the deadly wound upon a vital spot of the body of Mooney.”
What the back of the chair prevented was the wounding of Mooney, not his
death. It is the preventing of death by causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator, after all the acts of execution which should produce the felony
as a consequence had been performed, that constitutes a frustrated felony,
according to the law, and not the preventing of the performances of all the
acts of execution which constitute a felony, as in the present case.
Attempted murder only.

PEOPLE v. SY PIO, GR No. L-5848, 1954-04-30

Facts:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila

finding the defendant-appellant herein Sy Pio, alias Policarpio de la Cruz,
guilty of frustrated murder against the person of Tan Siong Kiap, and
sentencing him to suffer an... indeterminate sentence of 6 years, 1 month,
and 11 days of prision mayor, to 14 years, 8 months, and 1 day of reclusion
temporal, to indemnify the offended party Tan Siong Kiap in the sum of
P350, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to... pay
the costs.

The evidence for the prosecution shows that early in the morning of
September 3, 1949, the defendant-appellant entered the store at 511
Misericordia, Sta. Cruz, Manila. Once inside he started firing a .45 caliber
pistol that he had in his hand. The first one shot was Jose Sy.
 145

Tan Siong Kiap, who was in the store and saw the accused enter and
afterwards fire a shot at Jose Sy, asked the defendant-appellant, "What is
the idea?" Thereupon defendant-appellant turned around and fired at him
also. The bullet fired from defendant-appellant's pistol entered... the right
shoulder of Tan Siong Kiap and passed through his back. Upon being hit,
Tan Siong Kiap immediately ran to a room behind the store to hide. From
there he still heard gunshots fired from defendant-appellant's pistol, but
afterwards defendant-appellant ran away.

Tan Siong Kiap was brought to the Chinese General Hospital, where his
wound was treated. He stayed there from September 3 to September 12,
1949, when he was released upon his request and against the physician's
advice. He was asked to return to the hospital for further... treatment, and
he did so five times for a period of more than ten days. Thereafter his wound
was completely healed. He spent the sum of P300 for hospital and doctor's
fees.

The defendant-appellant shot two other persons... before shooting and

wounding Tan Siong Kiap

Issues:

Did the defendant-appellant perform all the acts of execution necessary to

produce the death of his victim?

Ruling:

But while the intent to kill is conclusively proved the wound inflicted was
not necessarily fatal, because it did not touch any of the vital organs of the
body.

In other words, the defendant-appellant knew that he had not actually

performed all the acts of execution necessary to kill his victim. Under these
circumstances, it can not be said that the subjective phase of... the acts of
execution had been completed. And as it does not appear that the
defendant-appellant continued in the pursuit, and, as a matter of fact, he
ran away afterwards a reasonable doubt exists in our mind that the
defendant-appellant had actually believed that he had... committed all the
acts of execution or passed the subjective phase of the said acts. This doubt
must be resolved in favor of the defendant-appellant.

We are, therefore, riot prepared to find the defendant-appellant guilty of...

attempted murder, because he did not perform all the acts of execution,
actual and subjective, in order that the purpose and... intention that he had
to kill his victim might be carried out.

Therefore, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is hereby, modified,

and the defendant-appellant is found guilty of the crime of attempted
 146

murder, and the sentence imposed upon him reduced to an indeterminate

penalty of from 4 years, 2 months, and 1 day of prision... correccional, to 10
years of prision mayor.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs.
BONIFACIO BADRIAGOG.R. No. 183566 May 8, 2009VELASCO, JR.,

FACTS:
On the morning of September 13, 2002, Adrian Quinto was asked by his
mother to bring a letter to one Berting Bello at Barangay Guindapunan,
Leyte. He drove a tricycle to deliver the letter along with his younger brother,
Oliver. After finishing the errand they headed back to the town plaza where
their mother was waiting for them. Before they could reach their destination,
however, they were approached by Bonifacio Badriago at Sitio Mombon in
Carigara. Accused-appellant then suddenly hacked him with a sundang or
long bolo on his lumbar area.
 147

Accused-appellant aimed a second time but Adrian was able to somehow

shield himself. His lower left arm suffered a hack wound as a result. Struck
with panic, he jumped off the tricycle but could not runaway. He was able to
push Oliver off the tricycle so he could run away and call for help. He lost
consciousness and only woke up while confined at Carigara District
Hospital. His mother later informed him that Oliver was also attacked and
did not survive. Accused-appellant was charged before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of the crime frustrated murder and murder. Accused-appellant,
in his Brief filed before the CA. the instant appeal is partially granted.
Accordingly, in Criminal Cases No. 4255 accused-appellant is found guilty
only of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE and in criminal case no. 4276 accused-
appellant is found guilty of MURDER.

ISSUES:
1.WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONVICTING
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE
ANDMURDER DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
2.WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
APPRECIATING THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF VOLUNTARY
SURRENDER, INCOMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE, AND LACK OF INTENTION
TO COMMIT SO GRAVE A WRONGHELD:1.

NO. From the evidence presented to the trial court, accused-appellant was
able to perform all the acts that would necessarily result in Adrian’s death.
His intention to kill can be presumed from the lethal hacking blows Adrian
received. His attack on Adrian with a bolo was not justified. His claim of
self-defense was not given credence by both the trial and appellate courts.
Neither are there any of the qualifying circumstances of murder, parricide,
and infanticide. The circumstances, thus, make out a case for frustrated
homicide as accused-appellant performed all the acts necessary to kill
Adrian; Adrian only survived due to timely medical intervention as testified
to by his examining physician. The records also show that Adrian was
suddenly attacked with a bolo, and the most he could do at that moment
was to shield himself somehow from the blow with his arm. Another blow to
Adrian’s back showed the vulnerability of his position as he had his back
turned to accused-appellant and was not able to flee from attack. There is
treachery even if the attack is frontal if it is sudden and unexpected, with
the victims having no opportunity to repel it or defend themselves, for what
is decisive in treachery is that the execution of the attack made it impossible
for the victims to defend themselves or to retaliate. The court held that the
circumstantial evidence available was enough to convict accused-appellant.
From accused-appellant’s own admission that he indeed injured Adrian,
causing him near-fatal injuries, the rest of the evidence, albeit
circumstantial, made out a clear case for Oliver’s murder. First, the victims
were together in Adrian’s pedicab when the attack took place; second,
accused-appellant hacked Adrian with a bolo; third, Adrian’s injuries were
caused by a bolo; fourth, Adrian tried to push Oliver to safety before he lost
unconsciousness; fifth, Oliver’s wounds were found to have been caused by
 148

a weapon that made similar hacking wounds as the one made by accused-
appellant when he assaulted Adrian; and sixth, Oliver died on the same day
Adrian sustained stab wounds. Although there is no direct evidence of
Oliver’s actual wounding, the circumstantial evidence presented sufficiently
established that it was accused-appellant who perpetrated the twin attacks
on the brothers. Accused-appellant, thus, cannot argue that the
prosecution’s evidence was insufficient to convict him.

2. NO. For the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender to be

appreciated, the surrender must be spontaneous and in a manner that
shows that the accused made an unconditional surrender to the authorities,
either based on recognition of guilt or from the desire to save the authorities
from the trouble and expenses that would be involved in the accused’s
search and capture. Moreover, it is imperative that the accused was not
actually arrested, the surrender is before a person in authority or an agent
of a person in authority, and the surrender was voluntary. None of these
requisites are present in accused-appellant’s case. In fact, jurisprudence
holds that merely reporting the incident cannot be considered voluntary
surrender within contemplation of the law. By accused-appellant’s own
admission, he only went to the authorities to inform them that Adrian was
injured. What is more, accused-appellant claims he had nothing to do with
the murder of Oliver. Even if we were to consider voluntary surrender as
mitigating, this would only apply to the injury inflicted on Adrian. Accused-
appellant denies culpability in Oliver’s death and this negates any
acknowledgement of guilt. The court likewise find implausible accused-
appellant’s assertion that he employed self
-defense. The records show that the requisites of a successful claim of self-
defense were not met. In the instant case, accused-appellant’s self -serving
claim of self-defense coupled with the fact tha the did not sustain any
injuries from his supposed attacker, Adrian, fails to support any claim of
unlawful aggression, the crucial requisite to his defense. As the appellate
court noted, there was no clear, credible, and convincing evidence that
Adrian was the one who instigated the fight and that accused-appellant was
merely fending off an attack. Unlawful aggression by the victim must be
clearly shown. Looking at the victims’ wounds, however, the court cannot
count the circumstance in accused-appellant’s favor. Adrian suffered a
hacking wound on his left forearm that caused near amputation, and
another one on his lumbar area. These wounds would have been fatal were
it not for timely medical assistance. Oliver, on the other hand, bore the
brunt of the attack with eleven (11) different stab wounds, including one on
the skull and on the chest. The number, location, and nature of these stab
wounds belie accused-appellant’s claim of lack of intention to commit so
grave a wrong against his victim.
 149

Mahawan v. People, G.R. No. 176609, December 18, 2008

Facts:
Accused in this case was convicted of the crime of frustrated homicide in the
RTC of Cebu for inflicting gun shot wounds on the complainant, Paradero.

During the trial, the prosecution presented testimony of the victim along
with documentary evidence confirming her surgeries for the wounds.

The prosecution claims that on the day of the incident, the victim was
tending her store when the accused came by and asked to buy some beer.
 150

Responding that there were no more, the victim tried to show the accused
her refrigerator. Accused went inside the store and pulled out his gun and
shot the victim once. The victim grabbed hold of a nearby knife and tried to
defend herself when the accused shot another round that grazed the victim’s
earlobe. The accused then left the scene of the crime.

The defense presented the testimony of the accused w/c was corroborated in
some parts by his neighbor, Artiaga.

They claim that when the accused went by the store to buy cigarettes, the
victim screamed that there was no more and then attacked the accused.
During the scuffle, the accused was able to pull out his weapon and shoot
the victim in self-defense.

The RTC gave more credence to the prosecution and convicted the accused.

Issue: WON the accused’s guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Held:

Yes, the SC held that the plea of self-defense on the part of the accused was
not clearly and convincingly proven and so must fall.

What is clear is that petitioner was the aggressor during the incident. We
have carefully examined the testimony of Paradero and found it to be
credible and trustworthy. She testified in a clear and consistent manner
during the trial. She was faithful and steadfast in recounting her ordeal
despite the grueling cross-examination of the defense. Besides, Paradero
testified that petitioner was drunk at the time of the incident. She also
declared that she had known petitioner since 1988 and that the latter had,
under the influence of alcohol, assaulted several persons. These
circumstances reinforce the allegation petitioner’s propensity for harming
people when he gets drunk.

On the other hand, petitioner narrated that when he went to Paradero’s

store to buy cigarettes, the latter replied in a loud voice that she did not
have any stock of cigarettes. Paradero, then holding a knife, suddenly went
out of the store and attacked him. This testimony does not inspire belief.

Self-defense is inherently a weak defense because, as experience has

demonstrated, it is easy to fabricate and difficult to prove.35 Thus, for this
defense to prosper, the accused must prove with clear and convincing
evidence the elements of self-defense. He must rely on the strength of his
own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution. Even if
the evidence of the prosecution is weak, it cannot be disbelieved if the
accused admitted responsibility for the crime charged.36 In the case before
us, petitioner failed to prove with plausible evidence all the elements of self-
defense. Hence, his plea of self-defense must fail.
 151

Accused is also invoking the equipoise rule but the SC held that they have
earlier found the sole testimony of Paradero to be more credible than that of
petitioner, even if the latter’s testimony was corroborated by Artiaga on some
relevant points. Paradero’s account of the incident was clear and consistent.
On the other hand, petitioner’s narration of the incident, though
corroborated by Artiaga, hardly inspires belief, as it does not conform to
reason and human experience. Further, the RTC and CA upheld the sole
testimony of Paradero over that of petitioner. They concluded that petitioner
failed to prove his claim of self-defense despite the fact that her testimony
was corroborated by Artiaga. Basic is the rule that factual findings of the
trial court deserve great weight and respect especially when affirmed by the
appellate court.46 We found no compelling reason to disturb the ruling of
both courts. Given the foregoing, Paradero’s testimony outweighs the
testimonies of petitioner and Artiaga.

People of the Philippines vs. Mario Castro

G.R. No. 172874, December 17, 2008
574 SCRA 244

FACTS:
The accused had carnal knowledge of his fourteen-year-old sister-in-law.
The trial court found him guilty for the crime of rape.

Accused-appellant assails the credibility of the complainant because she did

not particularly describe the details of the alleged rape as to whether she
 152

was forced to lie down or whether they were standing when he inserted a
part of his organ into her vagina. Neither did she state that accused-
appellant succeeded in inserting his penis into her vagina, thus
undermining her allegation of consummated rape.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimony of the witness was credible.

RULING
The Court held that the findings of the trial court pertaining to the
credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect since it has the
opportunity to examine their demeanor on the witness stand. Unless shown
that the trial court overlooked or misunderstood some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance that could affect the result of the
case, its findings on questions of facts will not be disturbed on appeal.
Based on the record of the case and the Court found nothing which would
warrant a reversal of the trial court’s findings.

In the crime of rape, courts usually give greater weight to the testimony of a
girl who is a victim of sexual assault, especially a minor, as in this case,
because no woman would be willing to undergo a public trial and put up
with the shame, humiliation and dishonor of exposing her own degradation
were it not to condemn an injustice and have the offender apprehended and
punished.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.CEILITO ORITA alias "Lito," defendant-appellant

Facts:
Ceilito Orita was accused of frustrated rape by the RTC. He appealed to the
Court of Appeals for review. The accused poke a “balisong” to college
freshman Cristina Abayan as soon as she got into her boarding house early
morning after arriving from a party. She knew him as a frequent visitor of
another boarder. She was dragged inside the house up the stairs while his
 153

left arm wrapped around her neck, and his right hand poking the Batangas
knife to her neck. Upon entering her room, he pushed her in and got her
head hit on the wall. He immediately undressed while still holding the knife
with one hand, and ordered her to do the same. He ordered her to lie down
on the floor and then mounted her. He asked her to hold his penis and
insert it in her vagina, while still poking the knife to her. She followed, but
the appellant could not fully penetrate her in such a position. Next, he laid
down on his back and commanded her to mount him, but he cannot fully
penetrate her. When Orita’s hands were both flat on the floor, complainant
escaped naked. She ran from room to room as appellant pursued her, and
finally jumped out through a window. She went to the municipal building
nearby and knocked on the back door for there was no answer. When the
door opened, the policemen inside the building saw her crying and naked.
She was given a jacket for covering by the first policeman who saw her. The
policemen dashed to her boarding house but failed to apprehend the
accused. She was brought to a hospital for physical examination. Her PE
revealed that she is still a virgin, with abrasions on the left breast, left and
right knees, and multiple pinpoint marks on her back, among others. The
trial court convicted the accused of frustrated rape.

Crime Committed: Frustrated Rape

Issue: Whether or not the frustrated stage applies to the crime of rape?

Contention of the Accused: The accused contends that there is no crime of

frustrated rape. The trial court erred in disregarding the substantial
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses; and the trial court erred
in declaring that the crime of frustrated rape was committed by the accused.
He was not able to fully penetrate in her. The accused also questions also
the failure of the prosecution to present other witnesses to corroborate the
allegations in the complaint. The accused used the Article 266 of the RPC to
show that he is not guilty of frustrated rape, and Article 6 to stress the
difference of consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies.

Contention of the People: The victim's testimony from the time she knocked
on the door of the municipal building up to the time she was brought to the
hospital was corroborated by Pat. Donceras. Rather than discredit the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, discrepancies on minor details
must be viewed as adding credence and veracity to such spontaneous
testimonies. The accused committed rape.

Ruling: The decision of the RTC is hereby MODIFIED. The accused Ceilito
Orita is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
[consummated] and sentenced to reclusion perpetua as well as to indemnify
the victim in the amount of P30,000.00.

Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal
knowledge of his victim he actually attains his purpose and, from that
moment also all the essential elements of the offense have been
 154

accomplished. Nothing more is left to be done by the offender, because he

has performed the last act necessary to produce the crime. Thus, the felony
is consummated. [Art. 266 and Art. 6]
We have set the uniform rule that for the consummation of rape, perfect
penetration is not essential. Any penetration of the female organ by the male
organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ, without
rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant
conviction.
 155

US VS. CALIXTO VALDEZ

G.R No. L-16486 22 March 1921

FACTS: Sometime in November 1919, a small boat was sent out to raise the
anchor. The crew of this boat consisted of the accused, Calixto Valdez and
six others among who was the deceased, Venancio Gargantel. During their
work, the accused began to abuse the men with offensive words. Gargantel
complained, saying that it would be better if he would not insult them. The
accused took this as a display of insubordination, thus, he moved towards
Gargantel, with a big knife in hand, threatening to stab him. At the instant
 156

when the accused had attained to within a few feet of Gargantel, the latter,
evidently believing himself in great and immediate peril, threw himself into
the water and disappeared beneath its surface to be seen no more.

As alleged in the information, that said Gargantel had died by drowning, as

a consequence of having thrown himself into the water and upon seeing
himself threatened and attacked by the accused. The Judgment rendered
against the accused. Having been convicted as the author of the homicide,
the accused alleged on appeal that he was only guilty of the offense of
inflicting serious physical injuries, or at most of frustrated homicide.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is liable for the death of Venancio
Gargantel.

HELD:

The Supreme Court disallowed the appeal of the accused, enunciated the
following doctrine:
“ That even though the death of the injured person should not be considered
as the exclusive and necessary effect of the very grave wound which almost
completely severed his axillary artery , occasioning a hemorrhage impossible
to stanch under the circumstances in which that person was placed,
nevertheless as the persistence of the aggression of the accused compelled
his adversary, in order to escape the attack, to leap into the river, an act
which the accused forcibly compelled the injured person to do after having
inflicted, among others, a mortal wound upon him and as the aggressor by
said attack manifested a determined resolution to cause the death of the
deceased, by depriving him of all possible help and putting him in the very
serious situation narrated in the decision appealed from, the trial court, in
qualifying the act prosecuted as consummated homicide, did not commit
any error of law, as the death of the injured person was due to the act of the
accused.”

The accused must, therefore, be considered the responsible author of the

death of Venancio Gargantel, and he was properly convicted of the offense of
homicide. The trial judge appreciated as an attenuating circumstance the
fact that the offender had no intention to commit so great a wrong as that
committed. (Par.3, Art 9 Penal Code)

[No. L-2873. February 28, 1950]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee, vs.
EUGENIO GARCIA Y MADRIGAL, defendant and appellant TUASON, J.:

FACTS:
Eugenio Garcia was found guilty of the crime of robbery. He was 17 years of
age at the time of the commission of the crime. The lower court, ignoring
defendant's minority, sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty of from 4
years, 2 months and 1 day of prisión correccional to 8 years of prisión
 157

mayor for the crime of robbery of which he was found guilty. He was also
sentenced to pay the offended party, jointly and severally with the other
accused, the sum of P85 as indemnity. Republic Act No. 47, which amended
article 80 of the Revised Penal Code by reducing from 18 to 16 the age below
which accused have to "be committed to the custody or care of a public or
private, benevolent or charitable institution," instead of being convicted and
sentenced to prison, has given rise to the controversy. The Solicitor General
believes that the amendment by implication has also amended paragraph 2
of article 68of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that when the
offender is over fifteen and under eighteen years of age, "the penalty next
lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper
period."

ISSUE:
Whether or not Garcia being 17 years of age at the time of the commission of
the crime, was entitled to the privileged Mitigating Circumstance of Article
68, Paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code.

RULING:
No. All parts of a statute are to be harmonized and reconciled so that effect
may be given to each and every part thereof, and conflicting intentions in
the same statute are never to be supposed or so regarded, unless forced
upon the court by an unambiguous language. "An amended act is ordinarily
to be construed as if the original statute has been repealed, and anew and
independent act in the amended form had been adopted in its stead; or, as
frequently stated by the courts, so far as regards any action after the
adoption of the amendment, as if the statute had been originally enacted in
its amended form. The amendment becomes a part of the original statute as
if it had always been contained therein, unless such amendment involves
the abrogation of contractual relations between the state and others. Where
an amendment leaves certain portions of the original act unchanged, such
portions are continued in force, with the same meaning and effect they had
before the amendment. So where an amendatory act provides that an
existing statute shall be amended to read as recited in the amendatory act,
such portions of the existing law as are retained, either literally or
substantially, are regarded as a continuation of the existing law, and not as
a new enactment."

[G.R. No. 128287. February 2, 1999.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RIZAL ESPIRITU y KINAO, accused-appellant

Facts:
 158

Appellant Rizal Espiritu was convicted as charged for the crime of murder
and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua by the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City. The conviction was based mainly on his
confession and the corroborating evidence of corpus delicti. His extra-
judicial confession stated that he and Fred Malicdan killed Sato Sanad after
being hired by Gerald Alicoy to do so for the sum of P20,000.00. Aside from
describing the details of how he had his cohort killed Sanad, during the
ocular inspection, he even pointed out the place where the killing had been
committed. And when he executed his extra-judicial confession before the
police and during the preliminary investigation of the case before the city
prosecutor wherein he admitted his participation in the said incident, he
was assisted by Atty. Daniel Mangallay. However, during the trial of the
case, the accused denied any participation in the killing of Sanad. He also
assailed the admissibility of his extra-judicial confession. And, he claimed
that Atty. Mangallay was retained by Alfredo Kinao and not by himself and
that the said lawyer was unable to advise or to explain to him the contents
of his extra-judicial confession before he signed it.

Hence, this appeal.

Issue:
Whether or not the extra-judicial confession of Espiritu is admissible as
evidence.

Held:
The Court ruled that appellant's contention that Atty. Mangallay was
retained not by the appellant personally but by his uncle, Alfredo Kinao, is
not proof of counsel deprivation. The fact remains that Kinao, in hiring the
counsel, acted on behalf of appellant. Besides, appellant did not object when
Atty. Mangallay represented him during the investigations before the police
and the city prosecutor. In fact, he expressly acknowledged Atty. Mangallay
as his counsel. We must clarify that the right to counsel does not mean that
the accused must personally hire his own counsel. The constitutional
requirement is satisfied when a counsel is (1) engaged by anyone acting on
behalf of the person under investigation or (2) appointed by the court upon
petition of the said person or by someone on his behalf.

U.S. v Adiao

Facts:
Customs Inspector Tomas Adiao, apparently took a fancy at a leather belt of
a Japanese national and hid it at his desk. Before he could take it out of the
 159

customs office, the said belt was later found by other customs employees.
Adiao was charged in the Municipal Court of the city of Manila with the
crime of theft. He was found guilty of the lesser crime of frustrated theft. He
appealed to the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila and again he
was found guilty of the crime of frustrated theft, and was sentenced to pay a
fine of P100, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay
the costs. Not satisfied, he still appeals to the SC.

Issue:
Whether or not Adiao is guilty of the crime of frustrated theft?
No, he is guilty of theft, not just frustrated theft.

Ratio:
The SC is of the opinion that the crime cannot properly be classified as
frustrated, as this word is defined in article 3 of the Penal Code, but that
since the offender performed all of the acts of execution necessary for the
accomplishment crime of theft.

From the facts of the case in the lower court: Not decisive- The fact that the
defendant was under observation during the entire transaction and that he
was unable to get the merchandise out of the Custom House. Decisive all
the elements of the completed crime of theft are present.

The court cited several cases where the crime of theft was considered as
consummated, even if the object was found near the place it was stolen
from. “The accused . . . having materially taken possession of the money
from the moment he took it from the place where it had been, and having
taken it with his hands with intent to appropriate the same, he executed all
the acts necessary to constitute the crime which was thereby produced; only
the act of making use of the thing having been frustrated, which, however,
does not go to make the elements of the consummated crime. (Decision of
the SC of Spain, June 13, 1882.)

The Supreme Court also considered that Adiao took advantage of his public
position, an aggravating circumstance with no mitigating circumstances,
and thus imposed the maximum degree of penalty.

Judgment is reversed and the defendant and appellant is sentenced to three

months and one day of arresto mayor, with the costs of all instances against
Adiao. And yes, the leather belt shall be returned to the lawful owner, T.
Murakami.

People vs. Villorente, G.R. No. 100198

FACTS
Accused Charlie Villorente and his mother, Teresita Villorente, with deceit
and abused of confidence abducted Jona Neron, a 15-year old girl from the
house of Claire Tioco, for whom Jona served as domestic servant. Claiming
 160

as Jona’s aunt, Teresita told her that she needed to go home because her
father was sick. In her belief, Jona with the accused took a jeep leaving
Claire’s house. On their way, Teresita took out a smelly white handkerchief
from her pocket, put it over Jona’s head and Jona “lost her senses”. When
they arrived at the Villorentes’ house, Charlie’s father, put some pounded
ginger on Jona’s head and stomach causing her to fall asleep.

When she came to senses, she was directed to sleep in a room with Charlie’s
sisters who gone outside the room while she was sleeping. She was
awakened when Charlie started molesting her. The abusive incident
happened 2 times a night for 3 nights. The RTC found the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Abduction with Rape and
sentencing each accused to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. In their
appeal, the appellants insisted in their innocence and challenged the
credibility of evidence/witnesses.

ISSUE
Whether or not the crime is abduction with rape as ruled by the RTC.

RULING
Yes. The SC affirmed the RTC decision. The crime is forcible abduction with
rape. Under Art. 342 of RPC, the elements of forcible abduction are: (1) That
the person abducted is a woman; regardless of her age, civil status, or
reputation;(2) That the abduction is against her will; (3) That the abduction
is with lewd design. In this case, the element of lewd design on the part of
Charlie may also be inferred from the fact that while Jona was then a naive
fifteen-year old, Charlie was ten years her senior and although unmarried,
was much wiser in the ways of the world than she was.

Inasmuch as the abduction was proven to have been perpetrated as a

necessary means for the commission of the rape, under Art. 48 of the
Revised Penal Code, accused committed the complex crime of abduction
with rape for which the penalty of reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed
by the lower court on both appellants. Charlie and his mother are equally
liable for the crime in view of the conspiracy between them which was
alleged in the information and duly proven at the trial.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. EFREN LAURIO Y ROSALES

G.R. No. 182523 ; 13 September 2012

FACTS:
 161

On 11 December 1998 on or about 9:30 PM, the victim was drinking

a bottle of Red Horse Beer in front of a Sari-Sari Store. Later, he threw the
bottle in the direction of the accused Laurio and Gullab, who were having a
drinking spree. Accused Gullab then went to confront the victim while
Laurio followed. Gullab then punched the victim in the face causing him to
fall to the ground. Thereafter, accused Laurio repeatedly stabbed the victim
while the later was on the ground. Laurio then wrapped the knife with a
white towel then proceeded to a nearby vulcanizing shop to clean his
blooded hands.

Laurio alleged during his testimony that he brought out the knife
only when he saw the victim bring out a knife of his own when he fell to the
ground and that his act of stabbing the victim was merely out of self-
defense.

The RTC rendered a decision finding Laurio guilty for Murder while
finding Gullab guilty of Slight Physical Injuries.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was conspiracy

Whether or not the crime was attended to by treachery, which qualified the
crime of homicide to murder
Whether or not accused Laurio acted in self-defense

HELD:

No, the court finds that there is insufficient positive and direct evidence to
establish beyond reasonable doubt that he had conspired with his co-
accused in the killing of the victim. According to the eyewitness, Gullab
merely stood and watched while his co-accused repeatedly stabbed the
victim. He did not actively participate in the commission of the murder of
the victim. Accused Gullab cannot therefore, be held liable for the Murder
but is liable for Slight Physical Injuries only
Yes, As held by the Supreme Court, the crime can be qualified by treachery
if the stabbing of the victim was done while the latter was lying on the
ground, defenseless. Stabbing the victim repeatedly for seven (7) times when
the latter was already defenseless on the ground afforded accused impunity
without risk to himself arising from any defense which the victim might
make.
A person who invokes self-defense has the burden of proof. He must prove
all the elements of self-defense. However, the most important of all the
elements is unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. Unlawful
aggression must be proved first in order for self-defense to be successfully
pleaded, whether complete or incomplete.
Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault, or at least a threat
to inflict real imminent injury, upon a person. In case of threat, it must be
offensive and strong, positively showing the wrongful intent to cause injury.
It “presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent danger – not
 162

merely threatening and intimidating action.” It is present “only when the one
attacked faces real and immediate threat to one’s life.”

In the present case, the element of unlawful aggression is absent.

Mere allegation by appellant that the victim pulled out a knife is insufficient
to prove unlawful aggression and warrant the justification of the victim’s
killing.
 163

JORGE TAER, vs. CA and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESG.R. No.

85204 June 18, 1990

FACTS: Cirilo Saludes slept in the house of his compadre accused Jorge
Taer, whereat he was benighted. At about 2:00 o'clock dawn, accused Emilio
Namocatcat and Mario Cago arrived at Taer's house with two (2) male
carabaos owned by and which Namocatcat wanted Taer to tend. The said
carabaos were left at Taer's place. After searching in vain for the carabaos at
the vicinity, Dalde and Palaca reported the matter to the police. Reyes
informed Dalde that he saw the latter's lost carabao at Datag, Garcia-
Hernandez. Forthwith Dalde and Palaca went on that day toDatag and there
they found their missing carabaos tied to a bamboo thicket near the
houseaccused Taer. Upon query by Dalde and Palaca why their carabaos
were found at his place, accused Taer, replied that the carabaos reached his
place tied together without any person in company. According to accused
Taer, what he told Dalde and Palaca was that the carabaos were brought to
his place by the accused Namocatcat who asked him to tell anybody looking
for them that they just strayed thereat. Taer was convicted for the crime of
cattle rustling, later affirmed by the CA in toto, finding the evidence of the
prosecution that conspiracy indeed existed between Emilio Namocatcat and
Taer. Taer appealed arguing that the extent of his participation did not go
beyond the participation of the original defendants Saludes and Cago.

Therefore, he submits that the acquittal of these two by the trial court
should also lead to his acquittal and the only evidence proving the alleged
conspiracy between him and Namocatcat was the confession of Namocatcat,
however this should not be considered as admissible because the same is
hearsay under the rule of res inter alios acta.

Issues: Whether or not their conspiracy was proven beyond reasonable

doubt to convict the accused as principal for the crime of cattle rustling as
defined and punished by PD 533

Held:

No. Conspiracy must be established not by conjectures, but by positive and

conclusive evidence. The same degree of proof necessary to establish the
crime is required to support a finding of the presence of criminal conspiracy,
which is, proof beyond reasonable doubt. Thus mere knowledge,
acquiescence to, or approval of the act, without cooperation or agreement to
cooperate, is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy absent the
intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of
the common design and purpose.

At most the facts establish Taer's knowledge of the crime. And yet without
having participated either as principal or as an accomplice, for he did not
participate in the taking of the carabaos, he took part subsequent to the
commission of the act of taking by profiting himself by its effects. Taer is
thus only an accessory after the fact. The most cogent proof that the
 164

prosecution could ever raise was the implication made by the accused
Namocatcat (he did not appeal his conviction to the Court of Appeals) in his
affidavit of confession. However, the settled rule is that the rights of a party
cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. The
testimony, being res inter alios acta, cannot affect another except as
provided in the Rules of Court. This
rule on res inter alios acta specifically applies when the evidence consists of
an admission in an extrajudicial confession or declaration of another
because the defendant has no opportunity to cross-examine the co-
conspirator testifying against him.

WHEREFORE, the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court of

Tagbilaran and affirmed by the respondent Court of Appeals is hereby
MODIFIED in that the herein JORGE TAER is convicted as an accessory of
the crime of cattle-rustling as defined and penalized by PD No. 533
amending Arts. 308, 309, and 310 of the Revised Penal Code and he will
serve the minimum penalty within the range of arresto mayor medium,
which we shall fix at 4 months imprisonment and the maximum penalty of
prision correccional minimum which we shall fix at 2 years.
 165

JUDICIAL PROCEEDING THAT INTERRUPTS THE PRESCRIPTION OF

CRIMEPEOPLE V. MA. THERESA PANGILINAN
G.R. No. 152662, June 13, 2012

FACTS:
On 16 September 1997, Virginia C. Malolos filed an affidavit-complaint for
estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 22 against Ma. Theresa
Pangilinan(respondent) with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.
The complaint alleges that respondent issued nine (9) checks with an
aggregate amount of Nine Million Six Hundred Fifty-Eight Thousand Five
Hundred Ninety-Two Pesos(P9,658,592.00) in favor of private complainant
which were dishonored upon presentment for payment. Consequently the
case was modified, and only on February 3, 2000 that two counts for
violation of BP Blg. 22 were filed against respondent Ma. Theresa Pangilinan
in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. On 17 June 2000,
respondent filed an “Omnibus Motion to Quash the Information and to Defer
the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest” before MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City.
She alleged that her criminal liability has been extinguished by reason of
prescription. In defense of her claim, Pangilinan said that the prevailing law
that governs the prescription of special penal law, B.P. 22, is Section 2 of
Act No. 3326 (An Act To Establish Periods Of Prescription For Violations
Penalized By Special Acts) where the right to file an action to a “proper
court” and not to merely to prosecution office for B.P. 22, prescribes four (4)
years from the commission of the crime. The imputed violation occurred
sometime in 1995, and only on February 3, 2000 that a case was formally
filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court, therefore the action already prescribes.
RTC granted the motion. On the other hand, the complainant argued that
the filing with the office of city prosecutor constitutes an interruption to the
prescription.

ISSUE:
Is filing complaint to city prosecutor office considered a “judicial proceeding”
that can interrupt prescription of crime under B.P. 22?

HELD:
YES. Following a catena of cases, the court held that, there is no more
distinction between cases under the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and those
covered by special laws with respect to the interruption of the period of
prescription; that the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation
in the office of prosecutor against accused interrupts the period of
prescription. Following the factual finding the crime was committed
sometime in 1995, the filing of complaint on September 1997, two (2) years
from the commission of the crime.
 166

People v. Deleon

Facts: Early in the morning of December 21, 1925, Vicente de Leon y Flora
entered the yard of Vicente Magat's house on Domingo Santiago Street,
Manila, and without violence or intimidation against persons nor force upon
things, took, with intent to gain, two game roosters which were in the yard,
one with colored plumage valued at P8 belonging to Diego Magat, and the
other with white plumage and black spots, valued at P10, belonging to
Ignacio Nicolas.
Vicente de Leon y Flora was prosecuted in the municipal court for two
crimes of theft, on the theft of Magat's rooster and the other that of Nicolas'.
Upon being arraigned, the accused pleaded guilty and was sentenced by the
municipal court in each to suffer the penalty of three years, six months and
one day presidio correcional, to return the stolen roosters to their respective
owners and to pay the costs in both cases. The accused appealed from this
judgment to the Court of First Instance, and, upon being arraigned upon the
same informations, pleaded not guilty in both cases, which were tried jointly
by agreement of the parties approved by the court.

Issue: WON the defendant-appellant committed two crimes of theft.

Held: Under sound principles, the act of taking the two roosters, in
response to the unity of thought in the criminal purpose on one occasion, is
not susceptible of being modified by the accidental circumstance that the
article unlawfully belonged to two distinct persons. There is no series of acts
here for the accomplishment of different purposes, but only one of which
was consummated, and which determines the existence of only one crime.
The act of taking the roosters in the same place and on the same occasion
cannot give rise to two crimes having an independent existence of their own,
because there are not two distinct appropriations nor two intentions that
characterize two separate crimes.

Therefore, we are of the opinion that the unity of the intention to take a
thing belonging to another on one occasion and in the same place,
constitutes the commission of only one crime of theft; and fact that the
things taken belong to different persons does not produce a multiplicity of
crimes, which must be punished separately.
 167

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSELITO DEL ROSARIO

G.R. No. 127755 • April 14, 1999
Actus me invito factus non est meus actus
An act done by me against my will is not my act

FACTS:
The accused-appellant was convicted of the robbery with homicide and
sentenced to death. The conviction of the accused was based on the
testimony of a tricycle driver who claimed that the accused was the one who
drove the tricycle, which the suspects used as their get-away vehicle. The
accused was then invited by the police for questioning and he pointed to the
location where he dropped off the suspects. When the police arrived at the
supposed hide-out, a shooting incident ensued, resulting to the death of
some of the suspects. After the incident, the accused was taken back to the
precinct where his statement was taken on May 14, 1996.However, this was
only subscribed on May 22, 1996 and the accused was made to execute a
waiver of detention in the presence of Ex-Judge Talavera. It was noted that
the accused was handcuffed through all this time up on orders of the fiscal
and based on the authorities’ belief that the accused might attempt to
escape otherwise.

ISSUES:
(1)
Whether the Miranda rights of the accused-appellant were violated.

(2)
Whether the warrantless arrest of the accused-appellant was lawful.

RULING:
(1)
YES. It was established that the accused was not apprised of his rights to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel in the course
of the investigation. The Court held that the accused should always be
apprised of his Miranda rights from the moment he is arrested by the
authorities as this is deemed the start of custodial investigation. In fact, the
Court included “invitations” by police officers in the scope of custodial
investigations. It is evident in this case that when the police invited the
accused appellant to the station, he was already considered as the suspect
in the case. Therefore, the questions asked of him were no longer general
inquiries into an unsolved crime, but were intended to elicit information
about his participation in the crime. However, the Miranda rights may be
waived, provided that the waiver is voluntary, express, in writing and made
in the presence of counsel. Unfortunately, the prosecution failed to establish
that the accused made such a waiver.

(2)
 168

NO. There are certain situations when authorities may conduct a lawful
warrantless arrest: (a) when the accused is caught in flagrante delicto; (b)
when the arrest is made immediately after the crime was committed; and
when the one to be arrested is an escaped convict. The arrest of the accused
in this case did not f all in any of these exceptions. The arrest was not
conducted immediately after the consummation of the crime; rather, it was
done a day after. The authorities also did not have personal knowledge of
the facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed the offense
because they were not there when the crime was committed. They merely
relied on the account of one eyewitness. Unfortunately, although the
warrantless arrest was not lawful, this did not affect the jurisdiction of the
Court in this case because the accused still submitted to arraignment
despite the illegality of his arrest. In effect, he waived his right to contest the
legality of the warrantless arrest.
 169

G.R. Nos. 90191-96 January 28, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
plaintiff-appellee,vs.
ANACLETO FURUGGANAN

Facts:
On December 9, 1986, Joseph Ferrer, with 5 companions, decided to go to
the ricefield situated at Sitanga, Dodan, Aparri, Cagayan. They arrived at
the place of Froilan Clemente at around one o'clock in the afternoon. Upon
arrival, they cast their fishing line. After a while, they rested in a nipa hut.
They fell asleep and while in a deep slumber, the prosecution witness
Joseph Ferrer heard a firing of a gun and was thereafter shot.

Ferrer, while pretending to be dead, observed that the three malefactors,

namely, Eleazer Payongan, Basilio Gomer and Anacleto Furungganan were
making sure that their victims were already dead. Ferrer, the lone survivor,
went home despite the fact that he sustained wounds in his leg which,
according to an expert, would have caused his death if not for timely
medical attention.

Furungganan, on the other hand, stated that he, a member of the CHDF,
and Barangay Captain Eleazer Payongan, Basilio Gomer, Jr. and Diomedes
Palattao, also a member of the CHDF, dropped by his house. after a drinking
session, they hiked to the hut of Froilan Clemente. Upon arrival at the hut of
Froilan Clemente, Basilio Gomer and Eleazer Payongan went to the door of
the hut and started firing their guns. Furungganan narrates and alleges
that he was threatened by Payongan to go up the hut or else he himself
would be shot. Overwhelmed by said threat, the former claims he had no
other recourse but to follow. Anent the allegation of conspiracy, he contends
that there is not even a hint of the existence of a preconceived plan or
agreement to commit the crimes charged, appellant having been invited only
by his co-accused to a drinking session. Appellant was found guilty as
charged and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in
each of the five (5) cases for murder and one case of frustrated murder.

Issue:
Whether or not there exists conspiracy in the case at bar.

Held:
The evidence which consisted primarily of the testimony of the lone survivor,
Joseph Ferrer, is replete with irreconcilable inconsistencies which are
neither trifling nor unimportant as to be of little consequence. He twice
categorically declared in open court that they were all fast asleep when he
heard a sudden burst of gunshots.
 170

One can only wonder how Ferrer could have witnessed the firing from
outside when he was, as he stated, in deep slumber. Accused rebuts the
imputation of guilt against him by maintaining that he had no inkling of the
murderous design of his co-accused he having been invited only for a drink
and that he went up the hut only because he was threatened at gunpoint to
do so or else he himself would be shot. Any amount of reliance on such
probability, however, would be purely speculative. albeit no formal
agreement is necessary to prove conspiracy, it must be established by the
same quantum of evidence as any other ingredient of the offense. The same
degree of proof necessary to establish the crime is required to establish a
finding of criminal conspiracy, that is, proof beyond reasonable doubt. In
the case at bar, the fact that appellant was with the other accused when the
crime was committed is not sufficient proof of the existence of conspiracy.
Mere companionship does not establish conspiracy.

Neither can conspiracy be inferred from the mere fact that they had been
drinking together prior to the shooting. It was held that the evidence against
Anacleto Furugganan is not sufficient to establish his participation or
culpability in the alleged criminal conspiracy. Certainly, to stress the
obvious, any doubt as to the guilt of the accused should be resolved in favor
of the presumption of his innocence.
 171

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EVANGELINE ABELLA & MAE ANN

SENDIONG
G.R. No. 213918, June 27, 2018

Facts: Accused-appellants were charged with violation of Section (Sec.) 5,

Article (Art.) II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 in an Information which
alleges that the said accused, conspiring together and mutually aiding one
another not being then authorized by law, feloniously sell and deliver to a
poseur-buyer, one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing an
approximate weight of 0.01 gram of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride,
commonly called "shabu," a dangerous drug.

The prosecution alleged that both accused-appellants transacted with the

poseur-buyer; appellant Abella received the money from the poseur-buyer
and handed it to appellant Sendiong; and Sendiong handed the heat-sealed
transparent sachet to Abella who in turn gave it to poseur-buyer.

Abella averred that the police officers may have conducted a buy-bust
operation but which revealed an instance of instigation. She claimed that
the poseur-buyer convinced the accused-appellants of his intent to buy
shabu.

Issue: Whether or not the buy-bust team validly implemented the

entrapment.

Ruling: Yes, the buy-bust team merely facilitated the apprehension of the
criminals by employing ploys and schemes.

In entrapment, the criminal intent or design to commit the offense charged

originates in the mind of the accused; the law enforcement officials merely
facilitate the apprehension of the criminal by employing ruses and schemes.
In instigation, the law enforcers act as active co-principals. Instigation leads
to the acquittal of the accused, while entrapment does not bar prosecution
and conviction.

In this case, the poseur-buyer merely convinced the accused-appellants that

he would be buying shabu but never told them that he would be buying it
from them. Apparently, the criminal intent or design to sell shabu originated
in the mind of the accused-appellants because they voluntarily and
knowingly transacted with the poseur-buyer to sell him a sachet of shabu at
the price of P300.00.

Ratio Decidendi: Entrapment is the employment of ways and means in order

to trap or capture a lawbreaker.
 172

Gist: This is an appeal from the Decision of the CA affirming the Judgment
of the RTC finding accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of illegal sale of 0.01 gram of shabu in violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of
R.A. No. 9165.

PEOPLE vs. DE LEON, G.R. Nos. L-25375 and 25376 October 8, 1926

Facts: Early in the morning of December 21, 1925, Vicente de Leon y Flora
entered the yard of Vicente Magat's house on Domingo Santiago Street,
Manila, and without violence or intimidation against persons nor force upon
things, took, with intent to gain, two game roosters which were in the yard,
one with colored plumage valued at P8 belonging to Diego Magat, and the
other with white plumage and black spots, valued at P10, belonging to
Ignacio Nicolas.
Vicente de Leon y Flora was prosecuted in the municipal court for two
crimes of theft, on the theft of Magat's rooster and the other that of Nicolas'.
Upon being arraigned, the accused pleaded guilty and was sentenced by the
municipal court in each to suffer the penalty of three years, six months and
one day presidio correcional, to return the stolen roosters to their respective
owners and to pay the costs in both cases. The accused appealed from this
judgment to the Court of First Instance, and, upon being arraigned upon the
same informations, pleaded not guilty in both cases, which were tried jointly
by agreement of the parties approved by the court.
Issue: WON the defendant-appellant committed two crimes of theft.
Held: Under sound principles, the act of taking the two roosters, in
response to the unity of thought in the criminal purpose on one occasion, is
not susceptible of being modified by the accidental circumstance that the
article unlawfully belonged to two distinct persons. There is no series of acts
here for the accomplishment of different purposes, but only one of which
was consummated, and which determines the existence of only one crime.
The act of taking the roosters in the same place and on the same occasion
cannot give rise to two crimes having an independent existence of their own,
because there are not two distinct appropriations nor two intentions that
characterize two separate crimes.

Therefore, we are of the opinion that the unity of the intention to take a
thing belonging to another on one occasion and in the same place,
constitutes the commission of only one crime of theft; and fact that the
things taken belong to different persons does not produce a multiplicity of
crimes, which must be punished separately.
 173

People of the Philippines v Pantaleon

GR No. 158694-96, 13 Mar. 2009

FACTS:

In 1998, Mayor Teofilo Pantaleon, Jr. and Municipal Treasurer

Jaime conspired to illegally disburse and misappropriate the public funds of
Castillejos, Zambales by falsifying the supporting documents relating to 3
fictitious or "ghost" construction projects. It further alleged that the
vouchers were not signed by municipal accountant and budget officer; that
the SB did not adopt a resolution authorizing Mayor Teofilo Pantaleon, Jr. to
enter into a contract with La Paz Construction and/or Ken Swan Tiu; and
that no project was actually undertaken.

Appellants pleaded not guilty. Prosecution presented the following

witnesses:

Engr. Ramos:

He was acting municipal engineer; he prepared 3 programs of

work upon the instruction of Vallejos but never implemented any for it was
already implemented by previous engineer, hence, disbursement not needed.
Appellant instructed him to place dates earlier than Mar. 1998 although he
prepared them on Mar. 1998.

SB Member Aurelio:

No market stall was constructed in the public market in 1998 and

1999, and no infrastructure project could have been made in January 1998
because it was an election period.

Bookkeeper Nida:

She reviewed vouchers in question only after the indicated

amounts had been paid. A voucher is certified by the local budget officer and
by the municipal accountant, and that without her signature, a voucher is
defective.

Ken Swan Tiu:

 174

Owner of La Paz Construction. He did not enter into any contract

with Castillejos, and his company never received any payment. The
signatures were not his.

DEFENSE:

Vallejos:

He paid the vouchers despite the absence of the accountant's

signature because the projects were already completed and the sub-
contractor was already demanding payment and was threatening to sue him
if he would not pay.

He signed the vouchers because the municipal accountant and

budget officer refused, without any valid or legal reason, to sign them.

Pantaleon:

He signed the vouchers and allowed the treasurer to pay the

amounts stated because the accountant and the budget officer were
reluctant to sign; and that the signatures of the accountant and budget
officer were not important. He approved the money because the treasure
told him that there was an appropriation in the approved annual budget.

Admitted that the SB did not adopt a resolution authorizing him

to enter into a contract. Also admitted that he entered into a contract with
Baquilat without inquiring if he was authorized by La Pa Cons.

Sandiganbayan convicted the appellants of complex crime of

malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents (Art.
217, 171, and 48).

ISSUE:

W/N the appellants committed the complex crime of malversation

of public funds through falsification of public documents.

HELD:

Yes. Falsification of public documents is a necessary means to

commit the crime of malversation.

Elements of Malversation (Art. 217) [P-CAM]

Offender be a public officer;

 175

Appellants were mayor and municipal treasurer

He had the custody of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office;
Any disbursement and release of public funds require their approval

The funds or property were public funds or property for which he was
accountable;
The funds disbursed belongs to the municipality and were under the
collective custody of the officials who had to act together to disburse the
funds for their intended municipal use.

He appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or, through

abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them.
The project was never implemented.

The appellants were guilty under Art. 171, pars. 2 and 5. Par. 2 is
committed when (a) the offender causes it to appear in a document that a
person or persons participated in an act or a proceeding; and (b) that such
person or persons did not in fact so participate in the act or proceeding.
Vallejos filled up the spaces for the voucher number and the accounting
entry which were required to be filled up by Nida as the municipal
accountant.

For par 5, Pantaleon and Vallejos instructed Engr. Ramos to place

the dates January 5, 1998 on the first and third programs of work, and
January 14, 1998 on the second program of work, although he prepared the
programs only in March 1998.

Vallejos’ defense that Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over him

because he is SG 24 is immaterial. The critical factor in determining the
Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is the position of his co-accused, the
municipal mayor, who occupies an SG 27 position. Under Section 4 of
Republic Act No. 8249, if the position of one or more of the accused is
classified as SG 27, the Sandiganbayan has original and exclusive
jurisdiction over the offense.

Since appellant committed a complex crime, the penalty for the

most serious crime shall be imposed in its maximum period.
 176

People v. Paycana GR No. 179035, April 16, 2008

Facts
Jesus was charged with the complex crime of parricide with unintentional
abortion for repeatedly stabbing his wife, Lilybeth, who was 7-month
pregnant. In his defense, Jesus averred that he was acting in self-defense as
it was his wife who attacked him first. And that he cannot be liable for the
death of the fetus since it did not acquire a civil personality or was viable.
The court imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and awarded
civil liability and moral damages to the heirs of Lilybeth.

Issue
1. Did the court err in charging Jesus with the crime of unintentional
abortion for the loss of life of an unborn fetus? 2. Differentiate the 7-
month rule under the Civil Code from the 6-month rule under the
Revised Penal Code.

Ruling
1. No. The law provides that if the fetus is killed inside the maternal womb,
the crime is abortion regardless of whether he is viable or not. In this case,
the unborn fetus was killed when Jesus stabbed Lilybeth several times. The
Court, hence, did not punish the accused for the loss-of-life of the unborn
foetus for infanticide, but for the unintentional abortion as suffered by the
mother.

Under Article 40 of the Civil Code, births determine personality. Under

Article 41 of the Civil Code, if the intrauterine life of the fetus is 7 months or
more, it is considered born if it is alive at the time of its complete delivery
from the mother’s womb. On the other hand, if the intrauterine life of the
fetus is less than 7 months, it is considered born if it is still alive after 24-
hours after its complete delivery from the mother’s womb. The 7-months
rule under the Civil Code determines if the fetus is considered born for the
purpose of personality. While, the 6-months rule in the RPC determines if
the fetus is viable for purpose of abortion and infanticide. The embryo, fetus,
and infant are persons since abortion and infanticide are crimes against
person under the Revised Penal Code.
 177

People of the Philippines vs. Alfredo Pascual y Ildefonso

G. R. No. 172326January 19, 2009

FACTS:
Rodolfo Jundos, Jr. was preparing to celebrate noche buena with his son
and that accused-appellant (who appeared to be already drunk) was also
there together with his child; that accused-appellant stayed with them up to
1:00 a.m. of December 25; that during the course of his stay with the group,
accused-appellant left twice to go inside the house but kept on coming back
to continue drinking; that when accused-appellant left for the third time, he
did not come back anymore leaving him (Jundos) alone and his son. Some
20 minutes later, accused-appellant’s wife, Divina, asked him about the
whereabouts of the accused-appellant. Having failed to locate accused-
appellant, Divina went back inside the house. Soon after, Jundos saw
Divina chasing Alfredo running out towards the gate at the same time asked
Jundos for help saying “Kuya, tulungan mo ako, si Boyet” (referring to
Alfredo Pascual).
Thinking that Alfredo Pascual was making trouble, Rodolfo Jundos, Jr.
joined the chase but could not catch up as Alfredo was running very fast. So
Divina told him to instead go upstairs as the accused might have done
something wrong to Ling-ling. Together, Jundos and Divina rushed to the
second floor. As the place was dark, they switched on the light and there
they saw Ling-ling (Lorelyn Pacubas) flat on her back on the floor almost
naked with arms and legs open, her panty and shorts down to her ankle and
t-shirt pulled up above the breast with blood on the right breast. They tried
to wake up Ling-ling but the latter was already dead.

ISSUE:
Was appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with
homicide?

RULING:
Yes. It is settled that in the special complex crime of rape with homicide,
both the rape and the homicide must be established beyond reasonable
doubt. Considering that no one witnessed the
commission of the crime charged herein, the weight of the prosecution’s
evidence must then be appreciated in light of the well-settled rule that an
accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available, as long as
sufficient circumstantial evidence is presented by the prosecution to prove
beyond doubt that the accused committed the crime.
 178

People vs. Mark Dela Cruz

October 08, 2008

Facts:
Appellant Mark Dela Cruz was found guilty of violation of Section 5, Article
II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 after he allegedly sold prohibited drugs to
the poseur-buyer. The prohibited drugs were handed to appellant by
companions identified to be an alias Amay and an alias Tabo. Appellant
denied the charge and said that he was arrested after refusing to give
information about Amay, whom the police were after. His testimony was
corroborated by other witnesses.

Lower court gave weight to the testimony by the poseur-buyer and upheld
the presumption of regularity in the operation conducted by the officers.

Appellant appealed, questioning the identity of the shabu allegedly

confiscated from him in view of Section 21 (1) of RA No. 9165 (inventory of
seized drugs) and Section 21 (3) of the same law (certification of the forensic
laboratory examination results).

Issue: Whether or not the accused is able to prove to the court the elements
of self-defense in order to extenuate him from the crime

Ruling:

The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are: (1)
the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material
to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the
transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in
court of evidence of corpus delicti.

Citing jurisprudence, the failure of the police to comply with the procedure
in the custody of the seized drugs raised doubt as to its origins.

The chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be

preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what the proponent claims it to be. TheCourt believed that the
prosecution failed to clearly establish the chain of custody of the seized
plastic sachets, containing shabu from the time they were first allegedly
 179

received until they were brought to the police investigator. There were no
records to show that the procedural requirements in Section 21 were
complied with.

The presumption of regularity cannot prevail over the constitutional right of

presumption of evidence in view of the circumstances. “The presumption of
regularity is merely just that--a mere presumption disputable by contrary
proof and which when challenged by the evidence cannot be regarded as
binding truth.”
The appellant was acquitted.
PEOPLE vs. DE LEON, G.R. Nos. L-25375 and 25376 October 8, 1926

Facts: Early in the morning of December 21, 1925, Vicente de Leon y Flora
entered the yard of Vicente Magat's house on Domingo Santiago Street,
Manila, and without violence or intimidation against persons nor force upon
things, took, with intent to gain, two game roosters which were in the yard,
one with colored plumage valued at P8 belonging to Diego Magat, and the
other with white plumage and black spots, valued at P10, belonging to
Ignacio Nicolas.
Vicente de Leon y Flora was prosecuted in the municipal court for two
crimes of theft, on the theft of Magat's rooster and the other that of Nicolas'.
Upon being arraigned, the accused pleaded guilty and was sentenced by the
municipal court in each to suffer the penalty of three years, six months and
one day presidio correcional, to return the stolen roosters to their respective
owners and to pay the costs in both cases. The accused appealed from this
judgment to the Court of First Instance, and, upon being arraigned upon the
same informations, pleaded not guilty in both cases, which were tried jointly
by agreement of the parties approved by the court.

Issue: WON the defendant-appellant committed two crimes of theft.

Held: Under sound principles, the act of taking the two roosters, in
response to the unity of thought in the criminal purpose on one occasion, is
not susceptible of being modified by the accidental circumstance that the
article unlawfully belonged to two distinct persons. There is no series of acts
here for the accomplishment of different purposes, but only one of which
was consummated, and which determines the existence of only one crime.
The act of taking the roosters in the same place and on the same occasion
cannot give rise to two crimes having an independent existence of their own,
because there are not two distinct appropriations nor two intentions that
characterize two separate crimes.

Therefore, we are of the opinion that the unity of the intention to take a
thing belonging to another on one occasion and in the same place,
constitutes the commission of only one crime of theft; and fact that the
things taken belong to different persons does not produce a multiplicity of
crimes, which must be punished separately.
 180

People v. De Jesus
GR No. 134815
May 27, 2004

Facts:
SPO3 Eugenio Ybasco was a policeman who worked for a money changer
after his tour of duty. He delivered money for his employer every afternoon
and uses a bicycle for the job. Sometime in February 1994, Dante
Manansala, Eduardo de Jesus, and Crispin Del Rosario agreed to stage a
robbery on March 7, 1994. Their financier was Christopher Nash, a British
national.
They performed the robbery using a car owned by Nash. They confronted
Ybasco and told him that he had a warrant of arrest. They grabbed Ybasco,
handcuffed him, and dragged him to the car. Roberto Acosta, a roving
security guard, saw the incident and pulled out his gun. As Del Rosario
managed to wrest possession of the gun from Acosta, Manansala ordered
Del Rosario to shoot, and the latter obeyed. Acosta expired.
The accused drove to Cabuyao, Laguna. They took the plastic bag containing
the money, but instead of the $250,000 they expected, it contained only
Php5,000. They then transported Ybasco to a sugar farm and told him he
would be freed. Believeing that Ybasco would be freed, Del Rosario took
Php80 from Ybasco’s wallet but returned Php50 for the latter’s fare.
However, De Jesus suddenly shot Ybasco on the head.
De Jesus denied involvement in the robbery because he said he was not in
the area as he was working as a tricycle driver at that time. The only reason
why he was indicted was because Del Rosario, who was his brother-in-law,
had held grudges against him. De Jesus said he only fled when he found out
that there was a warrant of arrest against him because he was told that the
other accused were physically tortured by the police.
The event was witnessed by Yolanda Dela Rapa, who knew the victim Ybasco
because she sold cigarettes to him regularly.
Issue:
Is De Jesus guilty of robbery with homicide?
Ruling:
Yes. His alibi are intrinsically weak defenses and cannot prevail over the
positive and straightforward identification made by Del Rosario. Alibi is easy
to concoct and hard to disprove. His flight from justice works against him.
According to the Supreme Court, flight is an indication of guilt. His reason
that he feared for his life has no basis.
 181

The Supreme Court also discussed the nature of robbery with homicide. In
such crime, the original design of the malefactor is to commit robbery, with
homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent
to commit robbery must precede the taking of human life. Homicide is said
to have been committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery if, for
instance, it was committed to (a) facilitate the robbery or the escape of the
culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent
discovery of the commission of the robbery; or, (d) to eliminate witnesses in
the commission of the crime. As long as there is a nexus between the
robbery and the homicide, the latter crime may be committed in a place
other than the situs of the robbery.
People v. Gayeta

FACTS:

While spouses Benjamin and Conchita were drinking tuba in their home,
two armed men barged into their house and declared a hold-up who were
later identified as herein appellant and one Reano. Benjamin was kicked
and boxed until the latter bled and lost consciousness, by which Conchita
surrendered P2,500. The two armed men then left and barged into another
couple’s home and demanded them for money. The wife, accompanied by
the appellant, went to their store to get money. In the store, the appellant
forced the wife to have sexual intercourse with him. After they had returned
to their home, she told her husband that she had been sexually abused.
The husband had an altercation with the two perpetrators which resulted in
him being hit on the shoulder with a bullet.

The two denied that they took part in the crime claiming that it was
physically impossible for them to be at the scene of the crime for Gayeta was
in Muntinlupa doing his rounds as a member of the Voluntary Lakas
Brigade, while Reano was in another town.

ISSUE:

Whether the accused was guilty of the crimes of robbery and robbery with
rape with his presentation of the Voluntary Lakas logbook.

RULING:

The inherently weak alibi presented by the accused does not hold a stronger
bearing as compared to the positive identification made by the prosecution
witnesses which is given full faith by both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals. Furthermore, presented logbook was neither authenticated nor
identified by the persons who supposedly issued them.

The aggravating circumstance of dwelling was properly appreciated in both

robbery and robbery with rape. There being no evidence to show that the
accused purposely sought nighttime to facilitate the commission of the
 182

offense, this circumstance was ruled out. The original penalty of death is
therefore reduced to reclusion perpetua with no eligibility for parole.

PEOPLE VS. DOMINGO REYES G.R. No. 178300 March 17, 2009 581
SCRA 691 Rights of an Accused, Evidence, Extra-judicial Confessions
OCTOBER 16, 2017

FACTS:
On July 16, 1999, at Sitio Lambakin, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan,
accused-appellant, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another and grouping themselves together with Juanito Pataray Cayaban,
Federico Pataray Cabayan and Rommel Libarnes Acejo, who are still at
large, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of
force and intimidation and with use of firearms, carry away and deprive
Robert Yao, Yao San, Chua Ong Ping Sim, Raymond Yao, Ronald Matthew
Yao, Lennie Yao, Charlene Yao, Jona Abagatnan ang Josephine Ortea
against their will and consent on board their Mazda MVP van for the
purpose of extorting money in the amount of Five Million Pesos
(P5,000,000.00), that during the detention of Chua Ong Ping Sim and
Raymong Yao, said accused with intent to kill, willfully and unlawfully
strangled Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond Yao to death to the damage and
prejudice of their heirs.

Appellant Arnaldo surrendered to the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime

Task Force (PAOCTF) at Camp Crame. Thereupon, appellant Arnaldo, with
the assistance of Atty. Uminga, executed a written extra-judicial confession
narrating his participation in the incident. Appellant Arnaldo identified
appellants Reyes and Flores. Afterwards, appellant Flores, with the
assistance of Atty. Rous, executed a written extra-judicial confession
detailing his participation in the incident.

After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision convicting appellants of the special
complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide and sentencing each
of them to suffer the supreme penalty of death. Appellants were also ordered
to pay jointly and severally the Yao family ₱150,000.00 as civil indemnity,
₱500,000.00 as moral damages and the costs of the proceedings.

ISSUES:
 183

1. Were th eextra-judicial confessions (Pasubali) of the accused admissible

in evidence?

2. Was he afforded the right to counsel of his own choice?

RULING:

1. Yes. The Pasubali of appellants Arnaldo and Flores’s written extra-judicial

confessions clearly shows that before they made their respective
confessions, the PAOCTF investigators had informed them that the
interrogation about to be conducted on them referred to the kidnapping of
the Yao family.

Since the prosecution has sufficiently established that the respective extra-
judicial confessions of appellant Arnaldo and appellant Flores were obtained
in accordance with the constitutional guarantees, these confessions are
admissible. They are evidence of a high order because of the strong
presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and
knowingly confess to a crime, unless prompted by truth and conscience.
Consequently, the burden of proving that undue pressure or duress was
used to procure the confessions rests on appellants Arnaldo and Flores.

We have held that an extra-judicial confession is admissible in evidence if

the following requisites have been satisfied: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it
must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel;
(3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing.

Yes. The phrase “preferably of his own choice” does not convey the message
that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to
preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from handling
the defense. A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by
the accused when he does not raise any objection to the counsel’s
appointment during the course of the investigation, and the accused
thereafter subscribes to the veracity of the statement before the swearing
officer. Appellants Arnaldo and Flores did not object to the appointment of
Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous as their lawyers, respectively, during their
custodial investigation. Appellants Arnaldo and Flores are deemed to have
engaged the services of Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous, respectively.
 184

People v. Macatanda

FACTS: Charged with and convicted on a plea of guilty, in the Court of First
Instance of Lanao del Norte, Branch IV in Iligan City, for the crime of cattle
rustling, Saglala Macatanda. From the judgment of conviction, Saglala
Macatanda (hereinafter referred to as appellant) appealed direct to this
Court. The Solicitor General comes up with a reply that Article 64 of the
Revised Penal Code does not apply to penalties prescribed by special laws.
He considers P.D. 533, otherwise known as "Anti- Cattle Rustling Law of
1974" as a special law, and in accordance with existing rulings, 8 the
penalty should not be governed by the Revised Penal Code.

ISSUE: Whether the contention of the Solicitor-General is valid.

RULING: The court do not agree with the Solicitor General that P.D. 533 is a
special law, entirely distinct from and unrelated to the Revised Penal Code.
From the nature of the penalty imposed which is in terms of the
classification and duration of penalties as prescribed in the Revised Penal
Code, which is not for penalties as are ordinarily imposed in special laws,
the intent seems clear that P.D. 533 shall be deemed as an amendment of
the Revised Penal Code, with respect to the offense of theft of large cattle
(Art. 310), or otherwise to be subject to applicable provisions thereof such as
Article 104 of the Revised Penal Code on civil liability of the offender, a
provision which is not found in the decree, but which could not have been
intended to be discarded or eliminated by the decree. Article 64 of the same
Code should, likewise, be applicable, under which the presence of two
mitigating circumstances, as found by the trial court, that of plea of guilty
and extreme poverty, without any aggravating circumstances to offset them,
entitles appellant to a lowering by one degree of the penalty for the offense,
which under P.D. No. 533 is prision mayor, maximum, to reclusion
temporary medium.
 185

PEOPLE v GERONIMO (100 PHIL 90) October 23, 1956 G.R. L-8936

Facts:
The accused-appellant a member of HUK together his companion;
ambushed and fired upon the party of Mrs. Aurora A. Quezon and her PC
escort whom they considered as their enemies resulting in the killing of Mrs.
Aurora A. Quezon, Baby Quezon, Mayor Bernardo of Quezon City and other
members of PC escort on April 28, 1949.
On August 26, 1950, about one hundred armed HUKS with intent
to gain robbed the Cashier of the Provincial -Treasury, Mr. Vicente Reventar
from his house to the Provincial Capitol and at the point of guns forced him
to open the Treasury Vault and took therefrom Eighty Thousand Pesos
(P80,000). The accused-appellant charged with complex crime as rebellion
with murders, robberies, and kidnapping.

ISSUE: W/N rebellion can be complexed with murder, kidnapping, or

robbery.

Held: NO!

HELD:

Not every act of violence is deemed absorbed in the crime of

rebellion solely because it was committed simultaneously with or in the
course of the rebellion. If the killing, robbing, etc. were done for private
purposes or profit, without any political motivation, the crime would be
separately punishable and would not be absorbed by the rebellion and the
individual misdeed could not be taken with the rebellion to constitute a
complex crime, for the constitutive acts and intent would be unrelated to
each other. The individual crime would not be a means necessary for
committing the rebellion, as it would not be done in preparation or in
furtherance of the latter.
 186

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JASON SY

G.R. No. 185284, June 22, 2009

FACTS:
Accused-appellant Jason Sy was charged before the RTC of San Fernando,
Pampanga with illegal sale of shabu after a buy-bust operation was
conducted by police officers against him. For his defense, he tried to
establish a hulidap theory alleging that the police officers abducted him and
tried to extort money from them.

ISSUE: WON presumption of regularity in the performance of an official duty

can constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt.

HELD:
NO. The Court reiterates that the presumption of regularity does not, by
itself, constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It cannot, by itself,
support a judgment of conviction. Clearly, the prosecution must be able to
stand or fall on its evidence, for it cannot simply draw strength from the
weakness of the evidence for the accused. An accused in criminal
prosecutions is to be presumed innocent until his guilt is proven beyond
reasonable doubt. This constitutional guarantee cannot be overthrown
unless the prosecution has established by such quantum of evidence
sufficient to overcome this presumption of innocence and prove that a crime
was committed and that the accused is guilty thereof. Under our
Constitution, an accused enjoys the presumption of innocence. And this
presumption prevails over the presumption of regularity of the performance
of official duty.
 187

People v. Paycana GR No. 179035, April 16, 2008

Facts:
Jesus was charged with the complex crime of parricide with unintentional
abortion for repeatedly stabbing his wife, Lilybeth, who was 7-month
pregnant. In his defense, Jesus averred that he was acting in self-defense as
it was his wife who attacked him first. And that he cannot be liable for the
death of the fetus since it did not acquire a civil personality or was viable.
The court imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and awarded
civil liability and moral damages to the heirs of Lilybeth. 1. Did the court err
in charging Jesus with the crime of unintentional abortion for the loss of life
of an unborn fetus? 2. Differentiate the 7-month rule under the Civil Code
from the 6-month rule under the Revised Penal Code. Suggested answer: 1.
No. The law provides that if the fetus is killed inside the maternal womb, the
crime is abortion regardless of whether he is viable or not. In this case, the
unborn fetus was killed when Jesus stabbed Lilybeth several times. The
Court, hence, did not punish the accused for the loss-of-life of the unborn
foetus for infanticide, but for the unintentional abortion as suffered by the
mother.

2. Under Article 40 of the Civil Code, births determine personality. Under

Article 41 of the Civil Code, if the intrauterine life of the fetus is 7
months or more, it is considered born if it is alive at the time of its
complete delivery from the mother’s womb. On the other hand, if the
intrauterine life of the fetus is less than 7 months, it is considered
born if it is still alive after 24-hours after its complete delivery from
the mother’s womb. The 7-months rule under the Civil Code
determines if the fetus is considered born for the purpose of
personality. While, the 6-months rule in the RPC determines if the
fetus is viable for purpose of abortion and infanticide. The embryo,
 188

fetus, and infant are persons since abortion and infanticide are crimes
against person under the Revised Penal Code.

People v. Regalario
 189

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v . MARCELO ALETA et al. 584 SCRA

578 (2009)

A witness’ testimony deserves full faith and credit where there exists no
evidence to show any dubious reason or improper motive against the
accused, or why he should implicate the accused in a serious offense. While
the deceased Acob‘s mother Marina was at the community center of
Barangay Nagsurot, Burgos, Ilocos Norte, she heard a commotion at the
yard of Marcelo Aleta, et al. (the Aletas). Soon after returning home, she told
Acob that there was a quarrel at the Aletas‘ compound. Against his mother‘s
pleas, Acob repaired to the Aletas‘ compound. Marina followed and upon
reaching appellants‘ compound, she saw her nephew appellant Rogelio
striking her son Acob twice at the left cheek and at the back of his head with
a piece of wood, causing Acob to fall on the ground. She thereafter saw
Rogelio striking Acob‘s father-in-law Duldulao twice on the face drawing his
eyes to pop up, and again on the head causing him to fall on the ground.
Rogelio then ran towards the family house whereupon Marina heard
gunshots. Rogelio‘s brothers-co-appellants Jovito, Marlo and Ferdinand and
their father Marcelo at once began clubbing Acob and Duldulao with pieces
of wood, mainly on the face and head, as well as on different parts of their
bodies. Even while the victims were already lying prostrate on the ground,
Marcelo, Jovito, Marlo, and Ferdinand continued to hit them. And when
Rogelio emerged from the house, he got another piece of wood and again
clubbed the victims. As found by Dr. Arturo G. Llabore, a medico-legal
officer of the National Bureau of Investigation-Regional Office, San
Fernando, La Union who supervised the exhumation and autopsy of the
bodies of Acob and Duldulao on June 3, 1994, the two victims suffered
multiple abrasions, lacerations, open wounds, contusions and fractures on
their face, head, scalp, arms, legs and thighs; that Acob‘s death was due to
 190

―hemorrhage, intercranial, severe, secondary to traumatic injuries, head‖

while Duldulao‘s was due to ―hemorrhage, intercranial, severe, secondary to
traumatic injuries, head, multiple;‖ that both victims could have died within
one (1) hour after the infliction of the injuries; and that because of the
severity and multiplicity of the injuries sustained, the same could not have
been inflicted by only one person. Ferdinand and Marlo interposed self-
defense and defense of relative, respectively. Additionally, Marlo invoked
voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance. Marcelo, Rogelio and
Jovito invoked alibi. Crediting the prosecution version, the trial court found
the Aletas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder in both cases. The trial
court held that although what triggered the incidents was never explained,
Acob and Duldulao died as a result of the attacks on them, qualified by
abuse of superior strength and cruelty. The Aletas moved for a
reconsideration of the trial court‘s decision which was denied. Hence, the
present appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial and the appellate courts erred in giving full weight
and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses

HELD:

As in most criminal cases, the present appeal hinges primarily on the issue
of credibility of witness and of testimony. As held in a number of cases, the
trial court is best equipped to make the assessment on said issue and,
therefore, its factual findings are generally not disturbed on appeal, unless:
(1) the testimony is found to be clearly arbitrary or unfounded; (2) some
substantial fact or circumstance that could materially affect the disposition
of the case was overlooked, misunderstood, or misinterpreted; or (3) the trial
judge gravely abused his or her discretion. As held in a catena of cases and
correctly applied by both lower courts, Marina‘s positive identification of the
Aletas as the assailants and her accounts of what transpired during the
incidents, which were corroborated on all material points by prosecution
witnesses Loreta Duldulao (Loreta) and Willie Duldulao (Willie), as well as
the findings of the medico-legal officer, carry greater weight than the Aletas‘
claims of self-defense, defense of relative and alibi. More particularly, that
Marina‘s narration was so detailed all the more acquires greater weight and
credibility against all defenses, especially because it jibed with the autopsy
findings. Respecting the defense‘s questioning of Loreta‘s testimony that
Willie had told her that Duldulao was already dead, but was later to claim
that on reaching the scene of the crime, Duldulao was still alive, lying on the
ground and being clubbed by Aleta, et al., the same deserves scant
consideration. Far from being inconsistent, the same is in sync with the
other witnesses‘ claim and Marlo‘s own admission that Aleta, et al.
continued to club the two victims even as they lay motionless and helpless
on the ground. At any rate, inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses
which refer to minor and insignificant details, such as whether Duldulao
was still alive or not, cannot destroy Loreta‘s testimony. Minor
 191

inconsistencies in fact even guarantee truthfulness and candor. A witness‘

testimony deserves full faith and credit where there exists no evidence to
show any dubious reason or improper motive why he should testify falsely
against the accused, or why he should implicate the accused in a serious
offense. That the prosecution witnesses are all related by blood to the Aletas
should a fortiori be credited, absent a showing that they had motive to
falsely accuse the Aletas.

RODEL URBANO v. PEOPLE, GR No. 182750, 2009-01-20

Facts:

This petition for review under Rule 45 seeks to reverse and set aside the
Decision[1] dated January 25, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR No. 25371 which affirmed with modification the April 30, 2001
Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 39 in Lingayen,
Pangasinan in Criminal Case No. L-5028. The RTC found petitioner Rodel
Urbano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide.

That on or about the 28th of September 1993 in the evening, in Barangay

Poblacion, Municipality of Lingayen, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines...
he above-named accused, with intent to kill,... did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and maul Brigido Tomelden,
inflicting upon him mortal injuries

CAUSE OF DEATH:

Cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to cerebral concussion with resultant

cerebral hemorrhage due to mauling incident

Which directly caused his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of
the said Brigido Tomelden.

Petitioner, when arraigned, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Following the
parties' waiver of pre-trial, trial on the merits then ensued.
 192

On September 28, 1993, at around 8:00 p.m., the victim Brigido Tomelden
and petitioner were at the compound of the Lingayen Water District (LIWAD)
in Lingayen, Pangasinan, having just arrived from a picnic in the nearby
town of Bugallon, Pangasinan, where, with some other... co-workers, they
drunk beer in a restaurant. While inside the compound, the two had a
heated altercation in the course of which Tomelden hurled insulting
remarks at petitioner.

The exchange of words led to an exchange of blows.

Then petitioner delivered a "lucky punch," as described by... eyewitness Orje

Salazar, on Tomelden's face, which made Tomelden topple down.

The blow,... aused Tomelden's nose to bleed and rendered him...

unconscious.

Petitioner and his other co-workers brought Tomelden to the office of the
LIWAD general manager where he spent the night.

September 29, 1993. Upon arriving home at around 6:00 p.m. of that day,
Tomelden informed his wife, Rosario,... of the fight the previous night and of
his having been rendered unconscious.

He complained of pain in his nape, head, and ear which impelled Rosario to
immediately bring him to the Lingayen Community Hospital where Dr. Daisy
Arellano examined him and treated his lacerated left... index finger,
contusions, and hematoma at the right cerebrum.

On October 2 and 7, 1993, Tomelden went back to the hospital complaining

of dizziness, headache, and other pains.

On October 8, 1993, Rosario brought Tomelden to the Sison Memorial

Provincial Hospital in Dagupan City, where the attending physician, Dr.

Ramon Ramos, diagnosed Tomelden suffering from "brain injury, secondary
to mauling to consider cerebral hemorrhage.

3:00 p.m. of October 10, 1993, and, due to financial constraints, was
thereafter discharged despite signs negating physical condition
improvement.

pon reaching their house, however, Tomelden again complained of extreme

head... pain, prompting his wife to bring him back to the Lingayen
Community Hospital where Dr. Arellano again attended to him.

things turned for the worst, the doctor noting that Tomelden appeared to be
semi-conscious, sleepy, uncooperative, and not responding to any...
stimulant.
 193

Tomelden died at 9:00 p.m. of that day due, per Dr. Arellano, to "cardio-
respiratory arrest secondary to cerebral concussion with resultant cerebral
hemorrhage due to mauling incident."

The defense presented petitioner who denied having any intention to kill,
asserting that hypertension, for which Tomelden was receiving treatment,
was the cause of the latter's death.

On April 30, 2001, the RTC rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty as
charged. The fallo of the RTC's decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the prosecution having established beyond reasonable doubt

the guilt of the accused of the crime of HOMICIDE as defined and penalized
under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code, this Court in the absence of any
modifying circumstances, hereby sentences said... accused to suffer the
indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor
as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of Reclusion
Temporal as maximum and to indemnify the legal heirs of the victim in the
amount of PHP50,000.00, plus cost of... the suit.

The period of preventive imprisonment suffered by the accused shall be

credited in full in the service of his sentence in accordance with Art. 29 of
the Revised Penal Code.

On January 25, 2008, the CA rendered a decision, affirming the conviction

of petitioner,... pointing to the lucky punch as the proximate... cause of
Tomelden's hospitalization and ultimately his death

CA found no qualifying circumstance

Issues:

etitioner now urges the Court to set aside the appealed decision, or at least
modify it, maintaining that the appellate court:

. x x x erred in affirming the decision of the [RTC] finding [him] guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

II. x x x erred in not appreciating the mitigating circumstances of sufficient

provocation on the part of the victim and lack of intent to commit so grave a
wrong in favor of the petitioner.[8]

Ruling:

The combined effects of the testimonies of Salazar and Dr. Arellano,

buttressed by that of Rosario who related about her husband's post
September 28, 1993 severe head pain, clearly establish beyond cavil the
cause of Tomelden's death and who was liable for it.
 194

It was through the direct accounts of the prosecution witnesses of the

events... taken together with the result of the medical examinations... and
autopsy report which described the death of the victim as "cardio-respiratory
arrest secondary to cerebral concussion with resultant cerebral hemorrhage
due to mauling incident" that we are convinced that the "lucky punch" was
the proximate cause of [Tomelden's] death.

The... prosecution had satisfactorily proven

Petitioner next contends that the mitigating circumstances of no intention to

commit so grave a wrong and sufficient provocation on the part of the victim
ought to be appreciated in petitioner's favor.

On this score, we agree with petitioner.

In the instant case, Tomelden's insulting remarks directed at petitioner and

uttered immediately before the fist fight constituted sufficient provocation.

other irritating statements made by the deceased

Petitioner... was the one provoked and challenged to a fist fight.

the provocation came from Tomelden

While intent to kill may be presumed from the fact of the death of the victim,
this mitigating factor may still be... considered when attendant facts and
circumstances so warrant, as in the instant case.

Consider: Petitioner tried to avoid the fight

He tried to parry the blows... petitioner helped carry his unconscious co-
worker

Thus, it is clear that the mitigating circumstance of "no intention to commit

so grave a wrong as that committed" must also be appreciated in favor of
petitioner while finding him guilty of homicide

Withal, with no aggravating circumstance and two mitigating circumstances

appreciable in favor of petitioner, we apply par. 5 of Art. 64, RPC, which
pertinently provides:

When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating

circumstances are present, the court shall impose the penalty next lower to
that prescribed by law,... The prescribed penalty for homicide under Art.
249 of the RPC is reclusion temporal or from 12 years and one day to 20
years. With the appreciation of two mitigating circumstances of no intention
to commit so grave a wrong as that committed and of sufficient
provocation... from the victim,... application of par. 5 of Art. 64, RPC... next
 195

lower penalty... homicide... prision mayor or from six years and one day to
12 years.

the appreciation of two mitigating circumstances in favor of petitioner,

hereby MODIFIED by decreasing the term of imprisonment.

to serve an indeterminate prison term of from two (2) years and four (4)
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum, with whatever imprisonment he has...
already served fully credited in the service of this sentence. The rest of the
judgment is hereby AFFIRMED.

Principles:

doctrinal rule that great weight is accorded the factual findings of the trial
court... particularly with respect to the ascertainment of the credibility of
witnesses.

When the law speaks of provocation either as a mitigating circumstance or

as an essential element of self-defense, the reference is to an unjust or
improper conduct of the offended party capable of exciting, inciting, or
irritating anyone;[12] it is not... enough that the provocative act be
unreasonable or annoying;[13] the provocation must be sufficient to excite
one to commit the wrongful act[14] and should immediately precede the act

Art. 64. Rules for the application of penalties which contain three periods.--
In cases in which the penalties prescribed by law contain three periods,
whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed of three different
penalties, each one of which forms a... period in accordance with the
provisions of Articles 76 and 77, the courts shall observe for the application
of the penalty the following rules, according to whether there are or are no
mitigating or aggravating circumstances:

When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating

circumstances are present, the court shall impose the penalty next lower to
that prescribed by law, in the period that it may deem applicable, according
to the number and nature of such... circumstances.
 196

.PEOPLE VS. REGALARIO

GR. NO. 174483 ,March
31,2009
FACTS:
That on February 22, 1997 at
about 11:00 in the evening, at
Brgy. Natasan, Municipality of
Libon, province
of Albay, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused,
conspiring,
confederating and helping one
another, with intent to kill, did
then and there willfully,
unlawfully and
 197

feloniously with cruelty,

treachery, abuse of superior
strength, nighttime attack,
assault, strike and hit
ROLANDO SEVILLA with
wooden clubs (bahi) used as
their night sticks, hitting the
latter at the different
parts of his body and tying
down his hands and feet with a
rope, thereby inflicting upon
the latter serious and
mortal wounds which directly
caused his death, to the
damage and prejudice of his
legal heirs.
 198

ISSUE: WON the court erred

in appreciating the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of
superior strength in
killing Rolando Sevilla?
HELD: We(SC) likewise rule
that both the CA and the trial
court were correct in
appreciating the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of
superior strength in killing
Rolando Sevilla. To take
advantage of superior strength
is to use force out of
proportion to the means
available to the person
 199

attacked to defend himself. In

order to
be appreciated, it must be
clearly shown that there was
deliberate intent on the part of
the malefactors to take
24
advantage thereof. In this
case, as testified to by the
prosecution eyewitnesses,
accused-appellants Ramon,
Sotero and Bienvenido, with
the exception of Marciano,
were armed with nightsticks
(bahi) while Noel was
holding a knife. Clearly they
took advantage of their
 200

superiority in number and

arms in killing the victim, as
shown by numerous wounds
the latter suffered in different
parts of his body
PEOPLE VS. REGALARIO
GR. NO. 174483 ,March
31,2009
FACTS:
That on February 22, 1997 at
about 11:00 in the evening, at
Brgy. Natasan, Municipality of
Libon, province
of Albay, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this
 201

Honorable Court, the accused,

conspiring,
confederating and helping one
another, with intent to kill, did
then and there willfully,
unlawfully and
feloniously with cruelty,
treachery, abuse of superior
strength, nighttime attack,
assault, strike and hit
ROLANDO SEVILLA with
wooden clubs (bahi) used as
their night sticks, hitting the
latter at the different
parts of his body and tying
down his hands and feet with a
 202

rope, thereby inflicting upon

the latter serious and
mortal wounds which directly
caused his death, to the
damage and prejudice of his
legal heirs.
ISSUE: WON the court erred
in appreciating the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of
superior strength in
killing Rolando Sevilla?
HELD: We(SC) likewise rule
that both the CA and the trial
court were correct in
appreciating the qualifying
 203

circumstance of abuse of
superior strength in killing
Rolando Sevilla. To take
advantage of superior strength
is to use force out o

People v. Narvaez

FACTS:
Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of murder (qualified by treachery) of
David Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia. On August 22, 1968, Narvaez shot
Fleischer and Rubia during the time the two were constructing a fence that
would prevent Narvaez from getting into his house and rice mill. The
defendant was taking a nap when he heard sounds of construction and
found fence being made. He addressed the group and asked them to stop
destroying his house and asking if they could talk things over. Fleischer
responded with "No, gadamit, proceed, go ahead." Defendant lost his
 204

"equilibrium," and shot Fleisher with his shotgun. He also shot Rubia who
was running towards the jeep where the deceased's gun was placed. Prior to
the shooting, Fleischer and Co. (the company of Fleischer's family) was
involved in a legal battle with the defendant and other land settlers of
Cotabato over certain pieces of property. At the time of the shooting, the civil
case was still pending for annulment (settlers wanted granting of property to
Fleisher and Co. to be annulled). At time of the shooting, defendant had
leased his property from Fleisher (though case pending and ownership
uncertain) to avoid trouble. On June 25, defendant received letter
terminating contract because he allegedly didn't pay rent. He was given 6
months to remove his house from the land. Shooting was barely 2 months
after letter. Defendant claims he killed in defense of his person and
property.

ISSUE: Whether or not he should be liable for subsidiary imprisonment

since he is unable to pay the civil indemnity due to the offended party.

Held: No.

Ratio: He is not liable to be subsidiarity imprisoned for nonpayment of civil

indemnity. RA 5465 made the provisions of Art. 39 applicable to fines only
and not to reparation of damage caused, indemnification of consequential
damages and costs of proceedings. Although it was enacted only after its
conviction, considering that RA 5465 is favorable to the accused who is not
a habitual delinquent, it may be given retroactive effect pursuant to Art. 22
of the RPC.

People v. Jaurigue et al, C.A. No. 384 (1946)

Case. Petition to review lower court decision finding Avelina guilty of

homicide with ACs

Facts. Victim Amado was courting Avelina. In one occasion, while Avelina’s
cousing washed the latter’s hankerchief, Amado stole it. Amado proposed
her love to Avelina. Avelina refused. Amado grabbed her, kissed her, and
touched her chest. To this, Avelina slapped him, threw fist blows, and
 205

kicked him. Avelina told her mother the next day. Her mother gave her a fan
knife for protection.

Not long after, Amado intruded in Avelina’s house while she was asleep. He
kissed her hand which woke her up. She screamed for help, he hid under
the bed. Her parents arrive in the room. He apologized.

Days after, Avelina and her family attended services in the Seventh Day
Adventists chapel. Avelina’s father got there first, Avelina followed and sat
on one of the benches. Amado saw Avelina, sat beside her and put his hand
in her right thigh. Avelina tried to get her knife with right hand. Amado held
her right hand to stop her. Avelina quickly grabbed the knife with her left
hand and stabbed Amado in the neck.

Amado staggered. Avelina’s father saw Amado bleeding. Her father asked
why she did it, she said she could not endure it anymore. CFI found Avelina
guilty of homicide wit the aggravating circumstance of having committed the
act in a place of worship, inter alia. Avelina appealed.

Issue. Is the AC of offending a place of worship applicable? -No

Ratio. While it is true that the crime occurred in a chapel, this does not
necessarily denote the attachment of said AC. As per law, for a proper
appreciation of AC of having committed the crime in a place of worship,
there should be premeditation that the offender intended to do it in the
place of worship. As the facts show, Avelina did not plan to kill Amado nor
to kill him in a chapel. Avelina had in her case the fan knife just for
protection whenever and wherever she might need it. It just so happened
that Amado provoked her in the chapel and that was where Avelina could
not bear it anymore. With this in mind, the present court ruled that the
lower court erred in assigning the AC in its judgment against Avelina.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANTONIO Z. OANIS and ALBERTO GALANTA, defendants-appellants.

G.R. No. L-47722

July 27, 1943

FACTS:
 206

Captain Godofredo Monsod (Provincial Inspector of Cabanatuan) was

instructed to arrest Balagtas, a notorious criminal, and, if overpowered, to
get him dead or alive. The same instruction was given to the Chief of Police
Oanis who knew the whereabouts of Irene, the paramour of Balagtas. Upon
arriving at Irene’s house, Oanis approached Mallare and asked her where
Irene’s room was. Mallare indicated the place and upon further inquiry also
said that Irene was sleeping with her paramour.

Defendants Oanis and Galanta (Corporal of the Philippine Constabulary)

then went to the room of Irene, and upon seeing a man sleeping with his
back towards the door where they were, simultaneously or successively fired
at him with their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers. Awakened by the gunshots,
Irene saw her paramour already wounded, and looking at the door where the
shots came, she saw the defendants still firing at him. It turned out later
that the person shot and killed was not Balagtas but a peaceful and
innocent citizen named Tecson, Irene’s paramour.

Consequently, Oanis and Galanta were charged with the crime of murder.

The trial court found appellants guilty of homicide through reckless

imprudence. Hence, the present appeal. It is contended that, as appellants
acted in innocent mistake of fact in the honest performance of their official
duties, both of them believing that Tecson was Balagtas, they incur no
criminal liability. Appellants rely on the case of U.S. v. Ah Chong.

ISSUE:

Whether or not appellants are criminally liable for the death of Tecson.

HELD:

Yes. The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence,

the killing being intentional and not accidental.

Although an officer in making a lawful arrest is justified in using such force

as is reasonably necessary to secure and detain the offender, overcome his
resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes, and protect
himself from bodily harm yet he is never justified in using unnecessary force
or in treating him with wanton violence, or in resorting to dangerous means
when the arrest could be effected. And a peace officer cannot claim
exemption from criminal liability if he uses unnecessary force or violence in
making an arrest. Notoriety rightly supplies a basis for redoubled official
alertness and vigilance; it never can justify precipitate action at the cost of
human life.

Appellants’ invocation of honest mistake of fact is misplaced. In the instant

case, appellants found no circumstances whatsoever which would press
 207

them to immediate action. The person in the room being then asleep,
appellants had ample time and opportunity to ascertain his identity without
hazard to themselves, and could even effect a bloodless arrest if any
reasonable effort to that end had been made, as the victim was unarmed.
This, indeed, is the only legitimate course of action for appellants to follow
even if the victim was really Balagtas, as they were instructed not to kill
Balagtas at sight but to arrest him, and to get him dead or alive only if
resistance or aggression is offered by him.

As the deceased was killed while asleep, the crime committed is murder with
the qualifying circumstance of alevosia. There is, however, a mitigating
circumstance of weight consisting in the incomplete justifying circumstance
– a person incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a
duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office (Par. 5)

There are two requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken as a
justifying one: (a) that the offender acted in the performance of a duty or in
the lawful exercise of a right; and (b) that the injury or offense committed be
the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the
lawful exercise of such right or office.

In the instance case, only the first requisite is present — appellants have
acted in the performance of a duty. The second requisite is wanting for the
crime by them committed is not the necessary consequence of a due
performance of their duty. According to article 69 of the Revised Penal Code,
the penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall, in
such case, be imposed.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
MARIVIC GENOSA, appellant.

G.R. No. 135981

January 15, 2004

FACTS:
 208

This case stemmed from the killing of Ben Genosa, by his wife Marivic
Genosa, appellant herein. During their first year of marriage, Marivic and
Ben lived happily but apparently thereafter, Ben changed and the couple
would always quarrel and sometimes their quarrels became violent.
Appellant testified that every time her husband came home drunk, he would
provoke her and sometimes beat her. Whenever beaten by her husband, she
consulted medical doctors who testified during the trial. On the night of the
killing, appellant and the victim were quarreled and the victim beat the
appellant. However, appellant was able to run to another room. Appellant
admitted having killed the victim with the use of a gun. The information for
parricide against appellant, however, alleged that the cause of death of the
victim was by beating through the use of a lead pipe. Appellant invoked self
defense and defense of her unborn child. After trial, the Regional Trial Court
found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide
with an aggravating circumstance of treachery and imposed the penalty of
death.

On automatic review before the Supreme Court, appellant filed an URGENT

OMNIBUS MOTION praying that the Honorable Court allow (1) the
exhumation of Ben Genosa and the re-examination of the cause of his
death; (2) the examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists and
psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she killed her
husband; and finally, (3) the inclusion of the said experts’ reports in the
records of the case for purposes of the automatic review or, in the
alternative, a partial re-opening of the case a quo to take the testimony of
said psychologists and psychiatrists. The Supreme Court partly granted the
URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION of the appellant. It remanded the case to the
trial court for reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion
on the “battered woman syndrome” plea. Testimonies of two expert
witnesses on the “battered woman syndrome”, Dra. Dayan and Dr. Pajarillo,
were presented and admitted by the trial court and subsequently submitted
to the Supreme Court as part of the records.

ISSUE:

1. Can the appellant be granted the justifying circumstance of Self-defense?

2. May the appellant herein validly invoke the “battered woman syndrome”
as constituting self defense?

HELD:

1. NO, without continuous aggression there can be no self-defense. And

absence of aggression does not warrant complete or incomplete self-defense.
Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It
presupposes actual, sudden and unexpected attack or an imminent danger
thereof on the life or safety of a person.
 209

In the present case, however, according to the testimony of the appellant

there was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of the
husband and her fatal attack upon him. She had already been able to
withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their children’s bedroom.
During that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The
reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether.
He was no longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or
safety.

2. NO, appellant herein failed to prove that she is afflicted with the “battered
woman syndrome” (BWS).

The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the “cycle of violence”
supposedly characterizing the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No
doubt there were acute battering incidents but appellant failed to prove that
in at least another battering episode in the past, she had gone through a
similar pattern. Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to
the third phase of the cycle.

In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in

itself establish the legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner.
Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-defense. Settled in
our jurisprudence, is the rule that the one who resorts to self-defense must
face a real threat on one’s life; and the peril sought to be avoided must be
imminent and actual, not merely imaginary. Thus, the Revised Penal Code
provides that the following requisites of self-defense must concur: (1)
Unlawful aggression; (2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it; and (3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself.

Where the brutalized person is already suffering from BWS, further evidence
of actual physical assault at the time of the killing is not required. Incidents
of domestic battery usually have a predictable pattern. To require the
battered person to await an obvious, deadly attack before she can defend
her life “would amount to sentencing her to ‘murder by installment.’ Still,
impending danger (based on the conduct of the victim in previous battering
episodes) prior to the defendant’s use of deadly force must be shown.
Threatening behavior or communication can satisfy the required imminence
of danger. Considering such circumstances and the existence of BWS, self-
defense may be appreciated.

CHERRYL B. DOLINA, PETITIONER, VS. GLENN D. VALLECERA,

RESPONDENT. (G.R. No. 182367; December 15, 2010)

SUMMARY: The filiation of the child to the parent must first be established
before support from said parent can be granted by the court
 210

FACTS OF THE CASE: Antonia Perla filed a petition with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary protection order against the respondent for alleged
woman and child abuse under RA 9262 and asked for financial support.

She alleged that respondent is the father of her child. The man, however,
made a denial of the claim of his being the father of the child and that the
signature appearing in the child Certificate of Live Birth is not his signature.
The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that there is no prior
judgment establishing the filiation of the child hence, there is no basis to
order support.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC made error in judgment in dismissing the
case and in requiring the petitioner to first prove filiation before support is
granted

RULING: No, the RTC made no error in so doing.

Dolina evidently filed the wrong action to obtain support for her child. The
object of RA 9262 under which she filed the case is the protection and safety
of women and children who are victims of abuse or violence. Although the
issuance of a protection order against the respondent in the case can
include the grant of legal support for the wife and the child, this assumes
that both are entitled to a protection order and to legal support.

Dolina’s remedy is to file for the benefit of her child an action against
Vallecera for compulsory recognition in order to establish filiation and then
demand support. Alternatively, she may directly file an action for support,
where the issue of compulsory recognition may be integrated and resolved.

What is the proper remedy?

[1] Action for Compulsory Recognition to Establish Filiation. Afterwards, she
can demand support; or
[1] Action for Support, where one of the issues is filiation.

To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper action, first

establish the filiation of the child, if the same is not admitted or
acknowledged. Since Dolina’s demand for support for her son is based on
her claim that he is Vallecera’s illegitimate child, the latter is not entitled to
such support if he had not acknowledged him, until Dolina shall have
proved his relation to him. (Art. 195, Family Code). The child’s remedy is to
file through her mother a judicial action for compulsory recognition. If
filiation is beyond question, support follows as matter of obligation. In short,
illegitimate children are entitled to support and successional rights but their
filiation must be duly proved.
G.R. No. 179267 : June 25, 2013 Constitutionality of 9262 Case) |
JESUS C. GARCIA, Petitioner ,v. THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T.
DRILON, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court-Branch 41, Bacolod
City, and ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, for herself and in behalf of minor
 211

children, namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE, all

surnamed GARCIA, Respondents. PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

FACTS: On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed,

for herself and in behalf of her minor children, a verified petition(Civil Case
No. 06-797) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City for the
issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her husband, Jesus
C. Garcia (petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim of
physical abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a result
of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner, with threats of deprivation of
custody of her children and of financial support.

Private respondent married petitioner in 2002 when she was 34 years old
and the former was eleven years her senior. They have three (3) children,
namely: Jo-Ann J. Garcia, 17 years old, who is the natural child of
petitioner but whom private respondent adopted; Jessie Anthone J. Garcia,
6 years old; and Joseph Eduard J. Garcia, 3 years old.

Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence

against the private respondent and her children exists or is about to recur,
the RTC issued a TPOon March 24, 2006 effective for thirty (30) days,

Two days later, or on April 26, 2006, petitioner filed an Opposition to the
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of the TPOseeking the denial of the
renewal of the TPO. Subsequently, on May 23, 2006, petitioner movedfor the
modification of the TPO to allow him visitation rights to his children.

On May 24, 2006, the TPO was renewed and extended yet again, but subject
only to the following modifications prayed for by private respondent:

Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of financial support;

failed to faithfully comply with the TPO; and committed new acts of
harassment against her and their children, private respondent filed another
application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte.

On August 23, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO,effective for thirty (30) days,
which reads as follows:

In its Orderdated September 26, 2006, the trial court extended the
aforequoted TPO for another ten (10) days, and gave petitioner a period of
five (5) days within which to show cause why the TPO should not be
renewed, extended, or modified. Upon petitioner's manifestation,however,
that he has not received a copy of private respondent's motion to
modify/renew the TPO, the trial court directed in its Orderdated October 6,
2006 that petitioner be furnished a copy of said motion. Nonetheless, an
 212

Orderdated a day earlier, October 5, had already been issued renewing the
TPO dated August 23, 2006. The pertinent portion is quoted hereunder:

it appearing further that the hearing could not yet be finally terminated, the
Temporary Protection Order issued on August 23, 2006 is hereby renewed
and extended for thirty (30) days and continuously extended and renewed
for thirty (30) days, after each expiration, until further orders, and subject to
such modifications as may be ordered by the court.

After having received a copy of the foregoing Order, petitioner no longer

submitted the required comment to private respondent's motion for renewal
of the TPO arguing that it would only be an "exercise in futility."

During the pendency of Civil Case No. 06-797, petitioner filed before the
Court of Appeals (CA) a petitionfor prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698),
with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order, challenging (1)
the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for being violative of the due process and
the equal protection clauses, and (2) the validity of the modified TPO issued
in the civil case for being "an unwanted product of an invalid law."

On May 26, 2006, the appellate court issued a 60-day Temporary

Restraining Order(TRO) against the enforcement of the TPO, the amended
TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto.

Subsequently, however, on January 24, 2007, the appellate court dismissed

the petition for failure of petitioner to raise the constitutional issue in his
pleadings before the trial court in the civil case, which is clothed with
jurisdiction to resolve the same. Secondly, the challenge to the validity of
R.A. 9262 through a petition for prohibition seeking to annul the protection
orders issued by the trial court constituted a collateral attack on said law.

His motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision having been denied
in the Resolutiondated August 14, 2007, petitioner is now the Supreme
Court.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the issue of constitutionality was not raised at the earliest
possible opportunity?

2. Whether or not RA 9262 is violative of the equal protection clause?

 213

3. Whether or not RA 9262 is violative of the due process clause of the

constitution?

4. Whether or not the law is violative of the policy to protect the family as a
basic social institution?

5. Whether or not the law is an undue delegation of judicial power to the

barangay officials?

HELD: Petition for Review is denied. Before delving into the arguments
propounded by petitioner against the constitutionality of R.A. 9262, we shall
first tackle the propriety of the dismissal by the appellate court of the
petition for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698) filed by petitioner.

As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the

earliest opportunity so that if not raised in the pleadings, ordinarily it may
not be raised in the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not be
considered on appeal.Courts will not anticipate a question of constitutional
law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.

In defending his failure to attack the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 before

the RTC of Bacolod City, petitioner argues that the Family Court has limited
authority and jurisdiction that is "inadequate to tackle the complex issue of
constitutionality." We disagree.

REMEDIAL LAW: Family Court's jurisdiction to consider the

constitutionality of a statute.

At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts, of
the same level as Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369, otherwise known
as the "Family Courts Act of 1997," family courts have exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of domestic violence against women
and children.In accordance with said law, the Supreme Court designated
from among the branches of the Regional Trial Courts at least one Family
Court in each of several key cities identified.To achieve harmony with the
first mentioned law, Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now provides that Regional Trial
Courts designated as Family Courts shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over cases of VAWC defined under the latter law:

SEC. 7. Venue. The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence against women
and their children under this law. In the absence of such court in the place
where the offense was committed, the case shall be filed in the Regional
Trial Court where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the
option of the complainant.
 214

Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains
possessed of authority as a court of general original jurisdiction to pass
upon all kinds of cases whether civil, criminal, special proceedings, land
registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or insolvency.It is
settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a
statute,"this authority being embraced in the general definition of the
judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by the
criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law."The Constitution vests
the power of judicial review or the power to declare the constitutionality or
validity of a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential
decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court,
but in all RTCs.We said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CAthat, "plainly the
Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts should have jurisdiction
in cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of
appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts in cases where such
constitutionality happens to be in issue." Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution reads in part as follows:

SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the
law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower
courts in:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation,
order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
Thus, contrary to the posturing of petitioner, the issue of constitutionality of
R.A. 9262 could have been raised at the earliest opportunity in his
Opposition to the petition for protection order before the RTC of Bacolod
City, which had jurisdiction to determine the same, subject to the review of
this Court.

Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence Against Women

and Their Children, lays down a new kind of procedure requiring the
respondent to file an opposition to the petition and not an answer.Thus:

SEC. 20. Opposition to petition. (a) The respondent may file an opposition to
the petition which he himself shall verify. It must be accompanied by the
affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent
protection order should not be issued.

(b) Respondent shall not include in the opposition any counterclaim, cross-
claim or third-party complaint, but any cause of action which could be the
subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action. (Emphasis
supplied)

We cannot subscribe to the theory espoused by petitioner that, since a

counterclaim, cross-claim and third-party complaint are to be excluded from
the opposition, the issue of constitutionality cannot likewise be raised
 215

therein. A counterclaim is defined as any claim for money or other relief

which a defending party may have against an opposing party.A cross-claim,
on the other hand, is any claim by one party against a co-party arising out
of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either of the
original action or of a counterclaim therein. Finally, a third-party complaint
is a claim that a defending party may, with leave of court, file against a
person not a party to the action for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or
any other relief, in respect of his opponent's claim. As pointed out by Justice
Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, the unconstitutionality of a statute is not a
cause of action that could be the subject of a counterclaim, cross-claim or a
third-party complaint. Therefore, it is not prohibited from being raised in the
opposition in view of the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio
alterius.

Moreover, it cannot be denied that this issue affects the resolution of the
case a quo because the right of private respondent to a protection order is
founded solely on the very statute the validity of which is being attackedby
petitioner who has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement. The alleged unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, for all intents
and purposes, a valid cause for the non-issuance of a protection order.

That the proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-797 are summary in nature
should not have deterred petitioner from raising the same in his Opposition.
The question relative to the constitutionality of a statute is one of law which
does not need to be supported by evidence.Be that as it may, Section 25 of
A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC nonetheless allows the conduct of a hearing to
determine legal issues, among others:

SEC. 25. Order for further hearing. - In case the court determines the need
for further hearing, it may issue an order containing the following:

(a) Facts undisputed and admitted;

(b) Factual and legal issues to be resolved;
(c) Evidence, including objects and documents that have been marked and
will be presented;
(d) Names of witnesses who will be ordered to present their direct
testimonies in the form of affidavits; and
(e) Schedule of the presentation of evidence by both parties which shall be
done in one day, to the extent possible, within the 30-day period of the
effectivity of the temporary protection order issued.

To obviate potential dangers that may arise concomitant to the conduct of a

hearing when necessary, Section 26 (b) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC provides
that if a temporary protection order issued is due to expire, the trial court
may extend or renew the said order for a period of thirty (30) days each time
until final judgment is rendered. It may likewise modify the extended or
renewed temporary protection order as may be necessary to meet the needs
of the parties. With the private respondent given ample protection, petitioner
could proceed to litigate the constitutional issues, without necessarily
 216

running afoul of the very purpose for the adoption of the rules on summary
procedure.

In view of all the foregoing, the appellate court correctly dismissed the
petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining
order (CA-G.R. CEB - SP. No. 01698). Petitioner may have proceeded upon
an honest belief that if he finds succor in a superior court, he could be
granted an injunctive relief. However, Section 22(j) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC
expressly disallows the filing of a petition for certiorari, mandamus or
prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the trial court. Hence,
the 60-day TRO issued by the appellate court in this case against the
enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders pursuant
thereto was improper, and it effectively hindered the case from taking its
normal course in an expeditious and summary manner.

CIVIL LAW: no injunctions against Temporary Protection Orders

As the rules stand, a review of the case by appeal or certiorari before

judgment is prohibited. Moreover, if the appeal of a judgment granting
permanent protection shall not stay its enforcement,with more reason that a
TPO, which is valid only for thirty (30) days at a time,should not be
enjoined.

The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid, does

not of itself entitle a litigant to have the same enjoined.In Younger v. Harris,
Jr.,the Supreme Court of the United States declared, thus:

Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in their entirety or

with respect to their separate and distinct prohibitions, are not to be
granted as a matter of course, even if such statutes are unconstitutional. No
citizen or member of the community is immune from prosecution, in good
faith, for his alleged criminal acts. The imminence of such a prosecution
even though alleged to be unauthorized and, hence, unlawful is not alone
ground for relief in equity which exerts its extraordinary powers only to
prevent irreparable injury to the plaintiff who seeks its aid.

The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status quo until the trial
court hears fully the merits of the case. It bears stressing, however, that
protection orders are granted ex parte so as to protect women and their
children from acts of violence. To issue an injunction against such orders
will defeat the very purpose of the law against VAWC.

Notwithstanding all these procedural flaws, we shall not shirk from our
obligation to determine novel issues, or issues of first impression, with far-
reaching implications. We have, time and again, discharged our solemn duty
as final arbiter of constitutional issues, and with more reason now, in view
of private respondent's plea in her Commentto the instant Petition that we
should put the challenge to the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 to rest. And so
we shall.
 217

It is settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy,
or expediency of a statute.Hence, we dare not venture into the real
motivations and wisdom of the members of Congress in limiting the
protection against violence and abuse under R.A. 9262 to women and
children only. No proper challenge on said grounds may be entertained in
this proceeding. Congress has made its choice and it is not our prerogative
to supplant this judgment. The choice may be perceived as erroneous but
even then, the remedy against it is to seek its amendment or repeal by the
legislative. By the principle of separation of powers, it is the legislative that
determines the necessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any law.We
only step in when there is a violation of the Constitution. However, none was
sufficiently shown in this case.

POLITICAL LAW: equal protection of the laws in relation to RA 9262

Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. The oft-repeated disquisition in the early case of Victoriano v.
Elizalde Rope Workers' Unionis instructive:

The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in

the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore,
a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against
inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a
statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate
operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the
circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of
rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are different in
fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection
clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does
not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is
directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows

classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of
knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice
because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not
invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of
inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in
no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of
a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the
classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for
real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it
must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply
equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the standard
is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
 218

Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential yardstick, we find that R.A.

9262 is based on a valid classification as shall hereinafter be discussed and,
as such, did not violate the equal protection clause by favoring women over
men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the State extends its
protection.

I. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.

The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that
women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the
widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real
differences justifying the classification under the law. As Justice McIntyre
succinctly states, "the accommodation of differences ... is the essence of true
equality."

II. The classification is germane to the purpose of the law.

The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A.
9262, which is to address violence committed against women and children,
spelled out in its Declaration of Policy, as follows:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared that the State values the
dignity of women and children and guarantees full respect for human rights.
The State also recognizes the need to protect the family and its members
particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their personal
safety and security.

Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed
against women and children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms
guaranteed under the Constitution and the provisions of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the
Child and other international human rights instruments of which the
Philippines is a party.

In 1979, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the CEDAW, which the
Philippines ratified on August 5, 1981. Subsequently, the Optional Protocol
to the CEDAW was also ratified by the Philippines on October 6, 2003.This
Convention mandates that State parties shall accord to women equality with
men before the lawand shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family
relations on the basis of equality of men and women.The Philippines likewise
ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its two protocols.It is,
thus, bound by said Conventions and their respective protocols.

III. The classification is not limited to existing conditions only, and apply
equally to all members
 219

Moreover, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing

conditions when it was promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for as
long as the safety and security of women and their children are threatened
by violence and abuse.

R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who suffer violence and
abuse. Section 3 thereof defines VAWC as:

x x x any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman

who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has
or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common
child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or
without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical,
sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including
threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:

A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;

B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed

against a woman or her child. It includes, but is not limited to:

a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her

child as a sex object, making demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks,
physically attacking the sexual parts of the victim's body, forcing her/him to
watch obscene publications and indecent shows or forcing the woman or her
child to do indecent acts and/or make films thereof, forcing the wife and
mistress/lover to live in the conjugal home or sleep together in the same
room with the abuser;

b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual

activity by force, threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical
or other harm or coercion;

c) Prostituting the woman or child.

C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to

cause mental or emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to
intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or
humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It includes causing
or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse
of a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness
pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful
or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of common
children.

D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman

financially dependent which includes, but is not limited to the following:
 220

1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in

any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity, except in cases
wherein the other spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral
grounds as defined in Article 73 of the Family Code;
2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to
the use and enjoyment of the conjugal, community or property owned in
common;
3. destroying household property;
4. controlling the victims' own money or properties or solely controlling the
conjugal money or properties.

It should be stressed that the acts enumerated in the aforequoted provision

are attributable to research that has exposed the dimensions and dynamics
of battery. The acts described here are also found in the U.N. Declaration on
the Elimination of Violence Against Women.Hence, the argument advanced
by petitioner that the definition of what constitutes abuse removes the
difference between violent action and simple marital tiffs is tenuous.

There is nothing in the definition of VAWC that is vague and ambiguous that
will confuse petitioner in his defense. The acts enumerated above are easily
understood and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the
prohibited acts. They are worded with sufficient definiteness that persons of
ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited, and need
not guess at its meaning nor differ in its application.Yet, petitioner
insiststhat phrases like "depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or
her child of a legal right," "solely controlling the conjugal or common money
or properties," "marital infidelity," and "causing mental or emotional
anguish" are so vague that they make every quarrel a case of spousal abuse.
However, we have stressed that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a
reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld not absolute
precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest.
Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the
metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be
held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings
or detailed in its provisions.

There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262 singles out the
husband or father as the culprit. As defined above, VAWC may likewise be
committed "against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or
dating relationship." Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word "person"
who has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman
encompasses even lesbian relationships. Moreover, while the law provides
that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former
marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the
application of the principle of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code.

POLITICAL LAW: due process clause of the Constitution in relation to RA

9262; characteristics of a Temporary Protection Order
 221

Petitioner bewails the disregard of R.A. 9262, specifically in the issuance of

POs, of all protections afforded by the due process clause of the
Constitution. Says he: "On the basis of unsubstantiated allegations, and
practically no opportunity to respond, the husband is stripped of family,
property, guns, money, children, job, future employment and reputation, all
in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what happened."

A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence

against women and their children, their family or household members, and
to grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended
parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and
facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life.

"The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the

victim or offended party is afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail
access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to safeguard the victim
from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any designated family
or household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the
perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize the employment and
support of the victim. It also enables the court to award temporary custody
of minor children to protect the children from violence, to prevent their
abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support."

The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and
verified by the petitionerthereby undertaking full responsibility, criminal or
civil, for every allegation therein. Since "time is of the essence in cases of
VAWC if further violence is to be prevented,"the court is authorized to issue
ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing when the life, limb
or property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to
believe that the order is necessary to protect the victim from the immediate
and imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent such violence, which is about
to recur.

There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis to
issue an ex parte order. The victim is required not only to verify the
allegations in the petition, but also to attach her witnesses' affidavits to the
petition.

The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of

the right to due process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is
issued without notice and hearing because the time in which the hearing
will take could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of
his property,in the same way, the victim of VAWC may already have suffered
harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even
death, if notice and hearing were required before such acts could be
prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary
requirements of procedural due process must yield to the necessities of
protecting vital public interests,among which is protection of women and
children from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.
 222

It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court
shall likewise order that notice be immediately given to the respondent
directing him to file an opposition within five (5) days from service.
Moreover, the court shall order that notice, copies of the petition and TPO be
served immediately on the respondent by the court sheriffs. The TPOs are
initially effective for thirty (30) days from service on the respondent.

Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the
immediate issuance and service of the notice upon the respondent requiring
him to file an opposition to the petition within five (5) days from service. The
date of the preliminary conference and hearing on the merits shall likewise
be indicated on the notice.

The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself shall verify,
must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause
why a temporary or permanent protection order should not be issued.

It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for
protection order should be apprised of the charges imputed to him and
afforded an opportunity to present his side. Thus, the fear of petitioner of
being "stripped of family, property, guns, money, children, job, future
employment and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of
what happened" is a mere product of an overactive imagination. The essence
of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and
submit any evidence one may have in support of one's defense. "To be
heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard
also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral
arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due
process.

It should be recalled that petitioner filed on April 26, 2006 an Opposition to

the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of the TPO that was granted only
two days earlier on April 24, 2006. Likewise, on May 23, 2006, petitioner
filed a motion for the modification of the TPO to allow him visitation rights to
his children. Still, the trial court in its Order dated September 26, 2006,
gave him five days (5) within which to show cause why the TPO should not
be renewed or extended. Yet, he chose not to file the required comment
arguing that it would just be an "exercise in futility," conveniently forgetting
that the renewal of the questioned TPO was only for a limited period (30
days) each time, and that he could prevent the continued renewal of said
order if he can show sufficient cause therefor. Having failed to do so,
petitioner may not now be heard to complain that he was denied due
process of law.

Petitioner next laments that the removal and exclusion of the respondent in
the VAWC case from the residence of the victim, regardless of ownership of
the residence, is virtually a "blank check" issued to the wife to claim any
property as her conjugal home.
 223

The wording of the pertinent rule, however, does not by any stretch of the
imagination suggest that this is so. It states:

SEC. 11. Reliefs available to the offended party. -- The protection order shall
include any, some or all of the following reliefs:

(c) Removing and excluding the respondent from the residence of the
offended party, regardless of ownership of the residence, either temporarily
for the purpose of protecting the offended party, or permanently where no
property rights are violated. If the respondent must remove personal effects
from the residence, the court shall direct a law enforcement agent to
accompany the respondent to the residence, remain there until the
respondent has gathered his things and escort him from the residence;

Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and excluded from private

respondent's residence, regardless of ownership, only temporarily for the
purpose of protecting the latter. Such removal and exclusion may be
permanent only where no property rights are violated. How then can the
private respondent just claim any property and appropriate it for herself, as
petitioner seems to suggest?

The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified.

Petitioner argues that "by criminalizing run-of-the-mill arguments, instead

of encouraging mediation and counseling, the law has done violence to the
avowed policy of the State to "protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution."

Under Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court shall not refer the
case or any issue thereof to a mediator. The reason behind this provision is
well-explained by the Commentary on Section 311 of the Model Code on
Domestic and Family Violence as follows:

This section prohibits a court from ordering or referring parties to mediation

in a proceeding for an order for protection. Mediation is a process by which
parties in equivalent bargaining positions voluntarily reach consensual
agreement about the issue at hand. Violence, however, is not a subject for
compromise. A process which involves parties mediating the issue of
violence implies that the victim is somehow at fault. In addition, mediation
of issues in a proceeding for an order of protection is problematic because
the petitioner is frequently unable to participate equally with the person
against whom the protection order has been sought.

POLITICAL LAW: undue delegation of judicial power to barangay officials in

relation to RA 9262

Petitioner contends that protection orders involve the exercise of judicial

power which, under the Constitution, is placed upon the "Supreme Court
 224

and such other lower courts as may be established by law" and, thus,
protests the delegation of power to barangay officials to issue protection
orders. The pertinent provision reads, as follows:

SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How.
Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to the protection order issued by
the Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing
acts under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act.A Punong Barangay who receives
applications for a BPO shall issue the protection order to the applicant on
the date of filing after ex parte determination of the basis of the application.
If the Punong Barangay is unavailable to act on the application for a BPO,
the application shall be acted upon by any available Barangay Kagawad. If
the BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad, the order must be accompanied
by an attestation by the Barangay Kagawad that the Punong Barangay was
unavailable at the time of the issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall be effective
for fifteen (15) days. Immediately after the issuance of an ex parte BPO, the
Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall personally serve a copy of the
same on the respondent, or direct any barangay official to effect its personal
service.

The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any

proceeding before the Punong Barangay.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. On the other hand, executive power "is
generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the
power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due
observance."

As clearly delimited by the aforequoted provision, the BPO issued by the

Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any available Barangay
Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical
harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or
her child physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus,
purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local
Government Code to "enforce all laws and ordinances," and to "maintain
public order in the barangay."

We have held that "(t)he mere fact that an officer is required by law to
inquire into the existence of certain facts and to apply the law thereto in
order to determine what his official conduct shall be and the fact that these
acts may affect private rights do not constitute an exercise of judicial
powers."

In the same manner as the public prosecutor ascertains through a

preliminary inquiry or proceeding "whether there is reasonable ground to
 225

believe that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably
guilty thereof," the Punong Barangay must determine reasonable ground to
believe that an imminent danger of violence against the woman and her
children exists or is about to recur that would necessitate the issuance of a
BPO. The preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is,
concededly, an executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true with
the issuance of a BPO.

We need not even belabor the issue raised by petitioner that since barangay
officials and other law enforcement agencies are required to extend
assistance to victims of violence and abuse, it would be very unlikely that
they would remain objective and impartial, and that the chances of acquittal
are nil. As already stated, assistance by barangay officials and other law
enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty to enforce the law and to
maintain peace and order.

Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided, an unequivocal

breach of, or a clear conflict with the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or
argumentative one, must be demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no
doubt in the mind of the Court. In other words, the grounds for nullity must
be beyond reasonable doubt.In the instant case, however, no concrete
evidence and convincing arguments were presented by petitioner to warrant
a declaration of the unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262, which is an act of
Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive
department. As we said in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, courts must assume
that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary
powers, and passed laws with full knowledge of the facts and for the
purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the
majority.
 226

Overgaard v. Valdez A.C. No. 7902, March 31, 2009

Facts: The complainant, engaged the services of respondent as his legal

counsel in two cases filed by him and two cases filed against him. Despite
the receipt of the full amount of legal fees, the respondent refused to
perform any of his obligations under their contract for legal services, ignored
the complainant’s request for a report of the status of the cases entrusted to
his care, and rejected the complainant’s demands for the return of the
money paid to him. Complainant Overgaard filed a complaint for disbarment
against Valdez before the IBP. During the investigation, respondent Valdez
did not participate despite due notice. He was declared in default for failure
to submit an answer and attend the mandatory conference. He did not
submit a position paper or attend the hearing. The Court held that
respondent Valdez committed multiple violations of the canons of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and hereby DISBARRED and his name is
ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.

Issue: whether respondent’s abandonment of his client constitutes a

violation of his oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility?

Held: Yes, the court find that respondent’s disbarment should be upheld.
From the facts of the case, and based on his own admissions, it is evident
that he has committed multiple violations of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. In abruptly abandoning his law office without advising his
client and without making sure that the cases he was handling for his client
were properly attended to during his absence, and without making
arrangements whereby he would receive important mail, the respondent is
clearly guilty of gross negligence. A lawyer cannot simply disappear and
abandon his clients and then rely on the convenient excuse that there were
threats to his safety. Even assuming that there were serious threats to his
person, this did not give him the permission to desert his client and leave
the cases entrusted to his care hanging. He should have at least exercised
reasonable and ordinary care and diligence by taking steps to ensure that
the cases he was handling were attended to and that his client’s interest was
safeguarded. If it was not possible for him to handle the cases entrusted to
his care, he should have informed the complainant of his predicament and
asked that he be allowed to withdraw from the case to enable the client to
engage the services of another counsel who could properly represent him.
Deplorably, the respondent just disappeared, deserted his client and forgot
about the cases entrusted to his care, to the complainant’s damage and
 227

prejudice. The respondent’s disbarment is not anchored on his failure to do

anything in relation the cases entrusted to his care, but on his
abandonment of his client. He will not be absolved from liability on the basis
alone of these inconsequential acts which he claims to have accomplished
because the glaring fact remains that he has failed to perform his essential
obligations to his client, to the courts and to society. As the complainant’s
lawyer, the respondent is expected to serve his client with competence and
diligence.30 This includes not merely reviewing the cases entrusted to his
care and giving the complainant sound legal advice, but also properly
representing his client in court, attending scheduled hearings, preparing
and filing required pleadings, prosecuting the cases entrusted to his care
with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting for
his client or the court to prod him to do so. He should not idly sit by and
leave the rights of his client in a state of uncertainty.
 228

Rustan Ang vs. CA and Irish Sagud (G.R. No. 182835 April 20, 2010)

FACTS:

Irish and Rustan were classmates at Wesleyan University in Aurora

Province. Rustan courted Irish and they became on-and-off sweethearts.
When Irish learned afterwards that Rustan had taken a live-in partner,
whom he had gotten pregnant, Irish broke up with him.

Rustan, however, got in touch with Irish and tried to convince her to elope
with him, saying that he did not love the woman he was about to marry.
Irish rejected the proposal. Irish changed her cellphone number but Rustan
somehow managed to get hold of it and sent her text messages. Irish replied
to his text messages but it was to ask him to leave her alone.

Irish, later on, received through multimedia message service (MMS) a picture
of a naked woman with spread legs and with Irish’s face superimposed on
the figure. The sender’s cellphone number, stated in the message, was one
of the numbers that Rustan used.

After she got the obscene picture, Irish got other text messages from Rustan.
He boasted that it would be easy for him to create similarly scandalous
pictures of her. And he threatened to spread the picture he sent through the
internet.

Irish filed a case of violation of R.A. No. 9262 against Rustan.

Rustan argued that he cannot be held liable under R.A. No. 9262. Section
3(a) of R.A. 9262 provides that violence against women includes an act or
acts of a person against a woman with whom he has or had a sexual or
dating relationship. Thus:

SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act,

(a) Violence against women and their children refers to any act or a series of
acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife,
or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child
whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which
result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or
 229

suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery,

assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.

Further, Section 3(e) provides that a dating relationship includes a situation

where the parties are romantically involved over time and on a continuing
basis during the course of the relationship. Thus:

(e) Dating relationship refers to a situation wherein the parties live as

husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or are romantically
involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the
relationship. A casual acquaintance or ordinary socialization between two
individuals in a business or social context is not a dating relationship.
(Underscoring supplied.)

Hence, Rustan claims that, being romantically involved, implies that the
offender and the offended woman have or had sexual relations. According to
him, romance implies a sexual act. He cites Websters Comprehensive
Dictionary Encyclopedia Edition which provides a colloquial or informal
meaning to the word romance used as a verb, i.e., to make love; to make
love to as in He romanced her.

Rustan also claims that since the relationship between Irish and him was of
the on-and-off variety (away-bati), their romance cannot be regarded as
having developed over time and on a continuing basis.

ISSUES:

a) Whether “dating relationship” exist even without sexual intercourse.

b) Whether the on and off relationship (away-bati) of Irish and Rustan can
be considered as “dating relationship” as contemplated by law.

RULING:

a) The dating relationship that the law contemplates can exist even without
a sexual intercourse taking place between those involved.

The law did not use in its provisions the colloquial verb romance that
implies a sexual act. It did not say that the offender must have romanced
the offended woman. Rather, it used the noun romance to describe a
couples relationship, i.e., a love affair.

R.A. 9262 provides in Section 3 that violence against women x x x refers to

any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman x x x
with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship. Clearly,
the law itself distinguishes a sexual relationship from a dating relationship.
Indeed, Section 3(e) above defines dating relationship while Section 3(f)
defines sexual relations. The latter refers to a single sexual act which may or
may not result in the bearing of a common child. The dating relationship
 230

that the law contemplates can, therefore, exist even without a sexual
intercourse taking place between those involved.

b) An away-bati or a fight-and-kiss thing between two lovers is a common

occurrence. Their taking place does not mean that the romantic relation
between the two should be deemed broken up during periods of
misunderstanding.

THINGS DECIDED:

a) The elements of the crime of violence against women through harassment

under R.A. No. 9262 are:

1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended
woman;

2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of

acts of harassment against the woman; and

3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological

distress to her.

b) The dating relationship that the law contemplates can exist even without
a sexual intercourse taking place between those involved.

c) An away-bati or a fight-and-kiss thing between two lovers is a common

occurrence. Their taking place does not mean that the romantic relation
between the two should be deemed broken up during periods of
misunderstanding.
 231

People vs. Dungo 199 SCRA 860

Facts:
Rosalino Dungo stabbed Mrs. Sigua, with a knife from the envelope he was
carrying, inside the field office of the Department of Agrarian Reform. Mrs.
Sigua died and an information for murder was filed against Dungo. The
accused raised the defense of insanity. During the trial, the prosecution
presented the victim’s husband, Atty. Sigua, to testify that the accused
visited their house to confront him on why his wife was making it difficult
for the accused to transfer the landholding his father to him. The trial court
convicted him because the act of concealing a fatal weapon and the act of
taking flight in order to evade arrest indicates that accused was sane during
the time he committed the stabbing.

The case went up to the Supreme Court for automatic review.

Issue: Whether it is permissible to receive evidence of the accused’s mental

condition for a reasonable period both before and after the time of the act in
question.

RULING:
Yes. The Court held that “Evidence of insanity must have reference to the
mental condition of the person whose sanity is in issue, at the very time of
doing the act which is the subject of inquiry. However, it is permissible to
receive evidence of his mental condition for a reasonable period both before
and after the time of the act in question. Direct testimony is not required
nor the specific acts of derangement essential to establish insanity as a
defense.”
 232

People v. Rafanan, Jr., G.R. No. 54135, November 21, 1991

Facts:
The prosecution’s evidence shows that on February 27, 1976, complainant
Estelita Ronaya who was then only fourteen years old was hired as a
househelper by the mother of the accused, Ines Rafanan alias ‘Baket Ines’
with a salary of P30.00 a month.

The accused Policarpio Rafanan and his family lived with his mother in the
same house at Barangay San Nicolas, Villasis, Pangasinan. Policarpio was
then married and had two children.

On March 16, 1976, in the evening, after dinner, Estelita Ronaya was sent
by the mother of the accused to help in their store which was located in
front of their house about six (6) meters away. Attending to the store at the
time was the accused.

At 11 ;00 o’clock in the evening, the accused called the complainant to help
him close the door of the store and as the latter complied and went near
him, he suddenly pulled the complainant inside the store and said, ‘Come.
let us have sexual intercourse,’ to which Estelita replied, ‘I do not like,’ and
struggled to free herself and cried.

The accused held a bolo measuring 1–1/2 feet including the handle which
he pointed to the throat of the complainant threatening her with said bolo
should she resist. Then, he forced her to lie down on a bamboo bed,
removed her pants and after unfastening the zipper of his own pants, went
on top of the complainant and succeeded having carnal knowledge of her
inspite of her resistance and struggle.

After the sexual intercourse, the accused cautioned the complainant not to
report the matter to her mother or to anybody in the house, otherwise he
would kill her.

When Estelita’s mother confronted her and asked her why she went home
that evening, the complainant could not answer but cried and cried.
It was only the following morning on March 18, 1976 that the complainant
told her mother that she was raped by the accused. Upon knowing what
happened to her daughter, the mother Alejandra Ronaya, immediately
 233

accompanied her to the house of Patrolman Bernardo Mairina of the Villasis

Police Force who lives in Barrio San Nicolas, Villasis, Pangasinan. Patrolman
Mairina is a cousin of the father of the complainant. He advised them to
proceed to the municipal building while he went to fetch the accused. The
accused was later brought to the police headquarter with the bolo, Exhibit
‘E', which the accused allegedly used in threatening the complainant.

At arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. The case then

proceeded to trial and in due course of time, the trial court, as already
noted, convicted the appellant.

Issue:

Whether the lower court erred in convicting appellant who at the time of the
alleged rape was suffering from insanity.

Ruling:

Appellant’s plea of insanity rests on Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code

which provides:

“Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability.— The

following are exempt from criminal liability: 1. An imbecile or an insane
person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.

Where the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law
defines as a felony (delito), the court shall order his confinement in one of
the hospitals or asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which he
shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the
same court.

Although the Court has ruled many times in the past on the insanity
defense, it was only in People vs. Formigones that the Court elaborated on
the required standards of legal insanity, quoting extensively from the
Commentaries of Judge Guillermo Guevara on the Revised Penal Code, thus:

“The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this exempting
circumstance may be taken into account, it is necessary that there be a
complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, that the
accused be deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his own
acts; that he acts without the least discernment; that there be a complete
absence of the power to discern, or that there be a total deprivation of
freedom of the will. For this reason, it was held that the imbecility or
insanity at the time of the commission of the act should absolutely deprive a
person of intelligence or freedom of will, because mere abnormality of his
mental faculties does not exclude imputability.

The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Without

positive evidence that the defendant had previously lost his reason or was
 234

demented, a few moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it

will be presumed that he was in a normal condition. Acts penalized by law
are always reputed to be voluntary, and it is improper to conclude that a
person acted unconsciously, in order to relieve him from liability, on the
basis of his mental condition, unless his insanity and absence of will are
proved.”

The standards set out in Formigones were commonly adopted in subsequent

cases. A linguistic or grammatical analysis of those standards suggests that
Formigones established two (2) distinguishable tests: (a) the test of cognition
—"complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the [criminal] act,” and
(b) the test of volition—"or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of the
will.” But our caselaw shows common reliance on the test of cognition,
rather than on a test relating to “freedom of the will;” examination of our
caselaw has failed to turn up any case where this Court has exempted an
accused on the sole ground that he was totally deprived of “freedom of the
will,” i.e., without an accompanying “complete deprivation of intelligence.”

Schizophrenia pleaded by appellant has been described as a chronic mental

disorder characterized by inability to distinguish between fantasy and
reality, and often accompanied by hallucinations and delusions.

The law presumes every man to be sane. A person accused of a crime has
the burden of proving his affirmative allegation of insanity.

Here, appellant failed to present clear and convincing evidence regarding his
state of mind immediately before and during the sexual assault on Estelita.
It has been held that inquiry into the mental state of the accused should
relate to the period immediately before or at the very moment the act is
committed. Appellant rested his case on the testimonies of the two (2)
physicians (Dr. Jovellano and Dr. Nerit) which, however, did not purport to
characterize his mental condition during that critical period of time. They
did not specifically relate to circumstances occurring on or immediately
before the day of the rape. Their testimonies consisted of broad statements
based on general behavioral patterns of people afflicted with schizophrenia.
 235

People vs. Domingo G.R. No. 184343, March 2, 2009

Murder and Frustrated Murder, Exemption of Criminal Liability in View of
Insanity

Facts:

Appellant Jesus Domingo assails the Decision of the Court of

Appeals dated 30 April 2008 in CA-G.R. CR No. 30511, modifying the
Decision dated 13 November 2006 of Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan. The Court of Appeals found appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of murder in Criminal Cases No. 1496-M-2000
and No. 1497-M-2000, attempted murder in Criminal Cases No. 1498-M-
2000 and No. 1501-M-2000, frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 1500-
M-2000, and frustrated homicide in Criminal Case No. 1499-M-2000.

The testimony of the principal witness of the prosecution, Raquel Indon, is

assailed by appellant for not being credible due to an inconsistency in her
testimony and a lack of conformity with the experience of ordinary men.

Appellant also asserts that he was insane or completely deprived of

intelligence during the commission of the alleged crimes, and therefore
should be exempted from criminal liability in accordance with Article 12,
Chapter 2 of the Revised Penal Code.

Issue:
Are appellant’s contention meritorious?

Ruling:

No.

First contention. Appellant refers to Raquel’s testimony during cross-

examination wherein she narrated that after the appellant entered her
bedroom, she screamed. Her sister-in-law, who lived next door, responded
by asking Raquel who her assailant was, and the latter identified the
appellant. Appellant claims that the conversation between Raquel and her
sister-in-law was contrary to the ordinary course of things, and that the
 236

initial reaction of people in such a situation would be to ask for help from
other people in order to save those who are in danger. Secondly, Raquel also
testified during cross-examination that the appellant stabbed the front of
her legs when she fell down. It is also argued that the appellant could not
have stabbed the front of her legs, since she would be lying on front of her
legs when she fell down.

This Court finds no merit in these arguments. To begin with, there was
nothing out of the ordinary as regards Raquel’s testimony on these two
matters. First, there was nothing unusual about the sister-in-law’s query as
to who was attacking Raquel. Considering that the exchange merely
consisted of this question and the reply to it, it would not even be accurate
to refer to it as a "conversation." Secondly, it was not impossible for the
appellant to stab the front of Raquel’s legs, had her legs been positioned
sideways when she fell. But more importantly, these are peripheral details
that do not affect the substantial aspects of the incident. Raquel clearly and
positively testified that she was carrying her son Marvin when she rushed to
the gate and fell down, and the appellant stabbed her legs and thereafter
proceeded to stab Marvin who later died from the stab wounds. Her
testimony was supported by the Medico-Legal Reports marked as Exhibits
"E" and "F." Any inconsistencies in such peripheral details would not
exculpate the appellant.

Second contention. His claim is not supported by evidence.

Appellant offers his uncorroborated testimony as the only proof that he was
insane at the time he committed the crime. He testified that nine days before
he committed the crime, he suffered from lack of appetite, sleeplessness,
and anxiety. In addition, he allegedly heard voices ordering him to kill bad
people. He claims that he does not remember anything that happened on 29
March 2000, when the crimes were committed, and that he was already
detained when he became conscious of his surroundings.

The law presumes every man to be of sound mind. Otherwise stated, the law
presumes that all acts are voluntary, and that it is improper to presume that
acts are done unconsciously. Thus, a person accused of a crime who pleads
the exempting circumstance of insanity has the burden of proving beyond
reasonable doubt that he or she was insane immediately before or at the
moment the crime was committed.

Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence while

committing the act; i.e., when the accused is deprived of reason, he acts
without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of power
to discern, or there is total deprivation of freedom of the will. Mere
abnormality of the mental faculties is not enough, especially if the offender
has not lost consciousness of his acts. Insanity is evinced by a deranged and
perverted condition of the mental faculties and is manifested in language
and conduct. An insane person has no full and clear understanding of the
nature and consequences of his or her acts.
 237

Even assuming that appellant’s testimony is credible, his sleeplessness, lack

of appetite, nervousness and his hearing imaginary voices, while suggestive
of an abnormal mental condition, cannot be equated with a total deprivation
of will or an absence of the power to discern. Mere abnormality of mental
faculties will not exclude imputability. The popular conception of the word
"crazy" is used to describe a person or an act unnatural or out of ordinary.
Testimony that a person acted in a crazy or deranged manner days before
the commission of the crime does not conclusively prove that he is legally
insane and will not grant him or her absolution.

People v. Rafanan, Jr., G.R. No. 54135, November 21, 1991

Facts:
The prosecution’s evidence shows that on February 27, 1976, complainant
Estelita Ronaya who was then only fourteen years old was hired as a
househelper by the mother of the accused, Ines Rafanan alias ‘Baket Ines’
with a salary of P30.00 a month.

The accused Policarpio Rafanan and his family lived with his mother in the
same house at Barangay San Nicolas, Villasis, Pangasinan. Policarpio was
then married and had two children.

On March 16, 1976, in the evening, after dinner, Estelita Ronaya was sent
by the mother of the accused to help in their store which was located in
front of their house about six (6) meters away. Attending to the store at the
time was the accused.

At 11 ;00 o’clock in the evening, the accused called the complainant to help
him close the door of the store and as the latter complied and went near
him, he suddenly pulled the complainant inside the store and said, ‘Come.
let us have sexual intercourse,’ to which Estelita replied, ‘I do not like,’ and
struggled to free herself and cried.

The accused held a bolo measuring 1–1/2 feet including the handle which
he pointed to the throat of the complainant threatening her with said bolo
should she resist. Then, he forced her to lie down on a bamboo bed,
removed her pants and after unfastening the zipper of his own pants, went
on top of the complainant and succeeded having carnal knowledge of her
inspite of her resistance and struggle.

After the sexual intercourse, the accused cautioned the complainant not to
report the matter to her mother or to anybody in the house, otherwise he
would kill her.
 238

When Estelita’s mother confronted her and asked her why she went home
that evening, the complainant could not answer but cried and cried.
It was only the following morning on March 18, 1976 that the complainant
told her mother that she was raped by the accused. Upon knowing what
happened to her daughter, the mother Alejandra Ronaya, immediately
accompanied her to the house of Patrolman Bernardo Mairina of the Villasis
Police Force who lives in Barrio San Nicolas, Villasis, Pangasinan. Patrolman
Mairina is a cousin of the father of the complainant. He advised them to
proceed to the municipal building while he went to fetch the accused. The
accused was later brought to the police headquarter with the bolo, Exhibit
‘E', which the accused allegedly used in threatening the complainant.

At arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. The case then

proceeded to trial and in due course of time, the trial court, as already
noted, convicted the appellant.

Issue:

Whether the lower court erred in convicting appellant who at the time of the
alleged rape was suffering from insanity.

Ruling:

Appellant’s plea of insanity rests on Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code

which provides:

“Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability.— The

following are exempt from criminal liability: 1. An imbecile or an insane
person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.

Where the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law
defines as a felony (delito), the court shall order his confinement in one of
the hospitals or asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which he
shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the
same court.

Although the Court has ruled many times in the past on the insanity
defense, it was only in People vs. Formigones that the Court elaborated on
the required standards of legal insanity, quoting extensively from the
Commentaries of Judge Guillermo Guevara on the Revised Penal Code, thus:

“The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this exempting
circumstance may be taken into account, it is necessary that there be a
complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, that the
accused be deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his own
acts; that he acts without the least discernment; that there be a complete
absence of the power to discern, or that there be a total deprivation of
freedom of the will. For this reason, it was held that the imbecility or
insanity at the time of the commission of the act should absolutely deprive a
 239

person of intelligence or freedom of will, because mere abnormality of his

mental faculties does not exclude imputability.

The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Without

positive evidence that the defendant had previously lost his reason or was
demented, a few moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it
will be presumed that he was in a normal condition. Acts penalized by law
are always reputed to be voluntary, and it is improper to conclude that a
person acted unconsciously, in order to relieve him from liability, on the
basis of his mental condition, unless his insanity and absence of will are
proved.”

The standards set out in Formigones were commonly adopted in subsequent

cases. A linguistic or grammatical analysis of those standards suggests that
Formigones established two (2) distinguishable tests: (a) the test of cognition
—"complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the [criminal] act,” and
(b) the test of volition—"or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of the
will.” But our caselaw shows common reliance on the test of cognition,
rather than on a test relating to “freedom of the will;” examination of our
caselaw has failed to turn up any case where this Court has exempted an
accused on the sole ground that he was totally deprived of “freedom of the
will,” i.e., without an accompanying “complete deprivation of intelligence.”

Schizophrenia pleaded by appellant has been described as a chronic mental

disorder characterized by inability to distinguish between fantasy and
reality, and often accompanied by hallucinations and delusions.

The law presumes every man to be sane. A person accused of a crime has
the burden of proving his affirmative allegation of insanity.

Here, appellant failed to present clear and convincing evidence regarding his
state of mind immediately before and during the sexual assault on Estelita.
It has been held that inquiry into the mental state of the accused should
relate to the period immediately before or at the very moment the act is
committed. Appellant rested his case on the testimonies of the two (2)
physicians (Dr. Jovellano and Dr. Nerit) which, however, did not purport to
characterize his mental condition during that critical period of time. They
did not specifically relate to circumstances occurring on or immediately
before the day of the rape. Their testimonies consisted of broad statements
based on general behavioral patterns of people afflicted with schizophrenia.
 240

People v. Basa, Jr.

G.R. No. 237349
February 27, 2019

FACTS:

RTC and CA convicted Manuel Basa, Jr. of the crime of rape. AAA,
a minor, was raped by Basa twice inside the office of “Ka Eddie” INC pastor
in INC church in Paranaque City when she checked the taheta or their
attendance in participating in their worship. At the first rape, Basa kissed
and fingered her. Second rape, he kissed and her and inserted her penis.
According to him, he was not yet a member of the INC and still under
probation and contented that he was preparing the stage of the church for
afternoon program, and was with several other persons preparing for the
New Year’s celebration and afternoon prayer.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Basa should be held liable for Lascivious Conduct

HELD:

Yes. In Dimakuta v. People, the offender should liable for violation

of Sec 5(b) Art. III of RA 7610 if the offended party is a child victim. But if
the victim is at least eighteen years old, the offender should be liable under
Art. 244-A par. 2 of the RPC, unless the victim is at least 18 years old and
she is unable to fully take care of herself or protect herself from abuse,
neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or
mental disability or condition, in which case, the offender may still be held
liable for sexual abuse under RA 7610. RA 7610 is a special law which
should clearly prevail over RA 8353, which is a mere general law amending
the RPC. Before an accused can be held liable for lascivious conduct under
 241

Sec. 5 (b), Art. III of RA 7610, the Court held in Quimvel v. People that the
requisites are : 1.) The offender commits any act of lasciviousness or
lewdness; 2.) That it be done under any of the following circumstances: a.
Through force, threat, or intimidation; b. When the offended party is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; c. By means of fraudulent
machination or grave abuse of authority; or d. When the offended party is
under 12 years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present; 3.) That said act is performed
with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and
4.) That the offended party is a child, whether male or female, below 18
years of age. Basa committed the first act when he dragged AAA in the room
to insert his finger into her private part. The prosecution was able to prove
the element of intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of
the genitalia of any person, with intent to abuse or gratify sexual desire. The
second requisite, Basa grabbed her right arm and forcefully dragged her to
the office and threatened to kill her. Under Sec. 3 RA 7610 “children’ refers
to persons below eighteen years of age or those over but are unable to fully
take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or
condition.” With respect to the second case, he should be liable for rape as
all the elements were committed by basa. 1.) A man who shall have carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the ff. circumstances: a. Through force,
threat, or intimidation; b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave
abuse of authority; and d. When the offended party is under twelve years of
age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned
above be present. Indeed, no woman, much less a child, would willingly
submit herself to the rigors, the humiliation and the stigma attendant upon
the prosecution of rape, if she were not motivated by an earnest desire to
put the culprit behind bars. Hence, AAA’ testimony is entitled to full faith
and credence. Wherefore, appeal is dismissed and affirmed CA with
modification.
 242

People v Sto Tomas

FACTS: On the evening of May 23 1967, Salvacon Grulla, wife of herein

appellant Pacito Sto. Tomas and the appelant’s mother in law, Consolacion
Grulla were found dead inside the house of the Grulla’s. Pacito was
convicted with the crime of Parricide. In his defense, Pacito contends that
the trial court erred in considering the dwelling as an aggravating
circumstance because the victim’ s stay in the house of Consolacion Grulla
is only temporary hence, it may not be considered as her dwelling.

Issue: Whether or not the crime committed to a person’s dwelling may be

considered as aggravating even if the victim’s stay in the house is temporary

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that it may be considered as an

aggravating circumstance due to the fact that it is where Consolacion Grulla
was staying together with the other victim, Natividad Grulla and Salvacion
Grulla. The Court explained that victim Salvacion Grulla considered this
house as temporary sojourn in order to escape the brutalities of the
appellant brought by his jealousy. The Court further reiterated that the
aggravating circumstance of dwelling is present when the appellant killed
his wife in the house occupied by her other than the conjugal home. Hence,
in the case at bar the aggravating circumstance of dwelling should be
considered.
 243

People vs. Carillo

Facts: On June 4, 1947, between 8 and 9pm, Emma Foronda-Abaya and her
friend Marcelino Lontok Jr., while walking side by side on Pampanga Street,
manila on their way home from Far Eastern University, were held up by two
men, named Alejandro Carillo and Toribio Raquenio, and were robbed of
their personal belongings including a Bulova watch, bracelet, cash and other
articles.
After robbing Emma, one of the two robbers, Alejandro Carillo took her to a
secluded place and then and there hugged her and kissed her on the
lips,laid her down, pulled down her drawers and placed himself on top of
her with intent to satisfy his lust. In the meantime, the other robber, Toribio
raquenio was holding Marcelino Lontok Jr., at the point of a pistol at a
distance of about eight meters from the place where Emma cried for help,
saying, “Junior, pity me.” But Marcelino Lontok Junior was threatened by
his captor with bodily harm if he should move to help her. The satyr didn’t
succeed in raping his victim because she valiantly resisted and in the course
of the struggle both of them fell on the mire beside the log. At that precise
moment the other robber left Marcelino and approached his companion,
telling him to stop and inviting him to leave the place. Marcelino escaped to
seek help. At a distance of about 15 meters he heard two shots. When later
in the same evening he returned to the place with a police patrol, they found
Emma dead, her chest and abdomen pierced by two bullets. Two empty
shells were found at the scene of the crime.
Both robbers were apprehended and investigated regarding the crime of
robbery with homicide. After Alejandro Carillo and Toribio Raquenio had
confessed to the crime through interrogation by detectives, they were taken
by the detectives on June 29, 1947, together with Marcelino Lontok Jr., to
the scene of the crime, which was ascertained to be the corner of Pampanga
and Oroquieta Streets. Then and there they re-enacted the crime with a
 244

policewoman impersonating Emma. Photographs of the re-enactment were

taken and introduced in evidence during the trial. Both robbers were
sentenced for the crime of robbery with homicide with no mitigating and
aggravating circumstance.
In their joint appeal, Alejandrino Carillo and Toribio Raquenio, through their
counsel de ofico, challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to establish their
guilt and ask for their acquittal. The Solicitor General, on the other hand,
recommends the imposition of the death penalty on the appellant Alejandro
Carillo and the increase of the maximum penalty meted out to appellant
Toribio Raquenio.

Issue:

1. Whether or not there is any missing or defective link which might warrant
reversal of the decision of the lower court.
2. Whether or not the court erred in not considering the aggravating
circumstances which facilitated the commission of the offense.

Held:
No one can doubt the veracity of a statement that turns out to be in
conformity with the reality. If a person tells the police that he killed an
individual with a revolver after robbing him of his watch and that he buried
his victim at a certain place and hid the revolver inanother place and
delivered the watch to another person, and if the police finds the corpse in
the place indicated by the killer and identifies it as that of the victim, and
finds the revolver in the other place mentioned by the confessed killer and
also recovers the watch from the person to whom the killer said he had
delivered it, it would be impossible not to believe the statement of the killer
even if he should subsequently deny it. What could not be believed is such
denial.
Appellant Toribio Raquenio did not participate in the attempted rape and
killing of Emma Foronda-Abaya but tried to induce his companion
Alejandrino Carillo to desist therefrom. The trial court was right in finding
him guilty only of robbery with violence against and intimidation of person,
which is penalized in paragraph 5 of Article 294 of the RPC with prision
correccional in its maximum to prision mayor in its medium period.
Therefore, with only modification that the maximum of the indeterminate
penalty imposed should be increased to ten years of prision mayor, the
sentence as to the appellant Toribio Raquenio is affirmed.
The appellant Alejandro Carillo is guilty of robbery with homicide as well as
of attempted rape. Robbery with homicide is penalized in paragraph 1 of
article 294 with reclusion perpetua to death. The trial court erred in not
considering the aggravated circumstance of:

1. Recidivism, said appellant having been convicted twice of robbery

2. Nocturnity, which facilitated the commission of the crime and rendered
detection difficult.
3. Abuse of superior strength, considering his sex and the weapon used.
 245

The attempted rape in committed by this appellant on the same occasion

may be penalized separately, but was considered only as a further
aggravation of the offense. There is no mitigating circumstance.
Alejandro Carillo has proved himself to be a dangerous enemy of society.
The latter must protect itself from such enemy by taking his life in
retribution foe his offense and as an example and warning to others. In
these days of rampant criminality it should have a salutary effect upon the
criminally minded to know that the courts do not shirk their disagreeable
duty to impose the death penalty in cases where the law requires.

People vs. Amodia

GR No. 177356. November 20, 2008
Velasco, Jr., J.

Facts:

Richard Avila Roda the assistant manager of Nognog Videoke

Restaurant in QC went outside the restaurant to invite customers. There he
saw a person who was being mauled bu 7 people. Roda identified 3 of the
attackers who were Amodia, Marino and Lo-oc, who were regular customers.
Roda approached the victim and saw blood oozing out of the victims head,
whilst another mowler was about to give the victim another blow, Roda said
‘Hindi na kayo naawa’, which made them to stop and go back to the
restaurant. Roda wasnt able to report about the incident immediately
because he was threatened by the accused. The victim who was identified as
Jaime Bartina died as a result of the accident in QC General Hospital. The
crime of murder was charged against the 7 mowlers. During the trial, Lo-oc
made an alibi which was corroborated by Marino and Amodia, stating that
he saw Batino’s body lying on the ground with blood so he asked the help of
the two who were pedicab drivers to bring the victim to the hospital. But the
latter refused for the reason that pedicabs are not allowed to travel in the
National Highway. He left the victim in sitting position and went to Abdul
Videoke Bar and continued drinking but he never reported the incident. The
RTC rendered a decision which finds the three guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder an appeal was made to the CA.

Issue:
 246

Whether or not Amodia, Marino and Lo-oc are criminally liable for the
crime of murder.

Held:

The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC that the accused appellants
are criminally liable, but of the crime of homicide and not murder. The
abuse of strength was not considered as a qualifying circumstance that
would make the crime murder, although the victim was undoubtedly
outnumbered it was not shown that the accused-appellant deliberately
applied combined strength to weaken the defense of the victim and
guarantee the execution of the crime. As for Amodia who was a minor during
the commission of the crime was entitled to a mitigating circumstance of one
degree lower hence the penalty imposed upon him was prison mayor.

PEOPLE V DELPINO
G.R. NO. 171453
June 18, 2009

Facts:
On December 16, 1993, around 10:00 p.m., Mark Lorica (principal witness)
and his father Gabriel (victim) were watching TV inside their house, when
they heard a knock at the door. The victim asked who was knocking, but no
one answered. The victim opened the door, and while he was stooping down
to get his slippers, Manuel Delpino (appellant), armed with a short firearm,
shot him on his neck. When the victim fell down, appellant approached him
and verified whether he was already dead.

Issue:
Whether or not treachery employed by the appellant.

Ruling:
Yes. The essence of treachery is the sudden, unexpected attack by the
aggressor on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real chance
to defend himself, thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the
aggressor, and without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim.

Here, the victim had no chance to defend himself, what with the sudden
poking of the gun to his neck and without any warning that he will be shot.
 247

People vs. Tolentino

G.R. No. 176385, February 26, 2008

FACTS:
On 13 February 1998, three separate informations of Murder and two
counts of Frustrated Murder were filed before the RTC against appellants,
together with accused Jimmy Trinidad and Arnel Trinidad. The murder case
was docketed as Criminal Case No. 98-0258 while the two frustrated murder
cases were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 98-0260 and No. 98-0270. The
accusatory portions of the Informations read:

Criminal Case No. 98-0258

For: Murder

That on or about 11:10 o'clock in the evening, more or less, on the 29th day
of August, 1997, at Purok 7, Barangay San Vicente, Santa Elena, Camarines
Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously, with intent to kill, conspiring, confederating, and helping each
other to attain a common purpose, with treachery, evident premeditation
and abuse of superior strength, while armed with firearms, assault, attack,
and use personal violence upon one JOSITA FERNANDEZ-NOVELO, by then
and there shooting the said victim on her face causing upon the latter
serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and proximate cause of
the death of the victim to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said
victim.
 248

That the commission of the offense is attended by aggravating circumstance

of nighttime purposely sought to facilitate the same and dwelling.

Criminal Case No. 98-0260

For: Frustrated Murder

That on or about 11:10 in the evening of the 29th day of August, 1997, at
Purok 7, Barangay San Vicente, Santa Elena, Camarines Norte, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating, and mutually helping each other to
attain a common purpose, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously, with intent to kill, while armed with firearms and knife, and
with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength,
attack, assault, and use personal violence upon one ANTONIO BEA, by then
and there, poking a firearm at said private offended party, tying his hands
with a rope and thereafter, stabbing said victim on different parts of his
body, thus causing upon the latter serious and mortal wounds capable of
causing death, hence, performing all the acts of execution which could have
produced the crime of murder as a consequence, but nonetheless, did not
produce it by reason of causes independent of their (accused) will, that is, by
the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said victim which
prevented his death, to the damage and prejudice of herein private
complainant.

Criminal Case No. 98-0270

For: Frustrated Murder

That on or about 11:10 o'clock in the evening of August 29, 1997 at the
fishpond at Purok 7, Barangay San Vicente, municipality of Santa Elena,
province of Camarines Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another with intent to kill with treachery and evident
premeditation and while armed with long firearms and 12 gauge shot gun,
did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, kick
and strike one ANTONIO NOVELO with a shotgun, hitting him on the
different parts of his body and then shot one said Antonio Novelo but
missed, which ordinarily would cause the death of Antonio Novelo thus
performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime
of Murder as a consequence, but nonetheless, did not produce it by reason
of causes independent of their will, that is, by the timely and able medical
assistance rendered to said Antonio Novelo, which prevented his death, to
his damage and prejudice.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the qualifying circumstances of treachery, generic
aggravating circumstance of dwelling and nighttime should be appreciated
in the cases.
 249

HELD:
The RTC is correct in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery
in the killing of Josita Novelo and in the stabbing of Antonio Bea.

The essence of treachery is a deliberate and sudden attack, affording the

hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to escape.
Frontal attack can be treacherous when it is sudden and unexpected and
the victim is unarmed. What is decisive is that the execution of the attack
made it impossible for the victim to defend himself/herself or to retaliate.

In the killing of Josita Novelo, the victim was at her home when someone
called her. When the victim went outside, suddenly Jesus Trinidad held her.
Thereafter, Jesus Trinidad and Arnel Trinidad mauled Josita Novelo.
Without warning, Jesus Trinidad shot the helpless victim on the cheek. Said
attack was so sudden and unexpected that the victim had not been given
the opportunity to defend herself or repel the aggression. She was unarmed
when she was attacked. Indeed, all these circumstances indicate that the
assault on the victim was treacherous.

The stabbing of Antonio Bea was also attended with treachery. While Bea,
whose hands were tied behind his back, and the assailants were walking
along the dike, Emelio Tolentino unexpectedly stabbed the victim four times.
The victim could not put up a defense as the attack was swift and he was
not in the position to repel the same since his hands were tied.

Also affirmed is the ruling of the RTC appreciating the presence of the
generic aggravating circumstance of dwelling in Criminal Case No. 98-0258.
Evidence shows that Josita Novelo was killed in her own house. When the
crime is committed in the dwelling of the offended party and the latter has
not given provocation, dwelling may be appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance. Here, the crime was committed inside the house of the
deceased victim. Dwelling is considered aggravating primarily because of the
sanctity of privacy the law accords to human abode. He who goes to
another’s house to hurt him or do him wrong is more guilty than he who
offends him elsewhere.

Dwelling, however, cannot be appreciated in Criminal Case No. 98-0260

considering that the same was not alleged in the information. Under Section
9, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Court, aggravating circumstances must be
alleged in the information and proved otherwise; even if proved but not
alleged in the information, the same shall not be considered by the Court in
the imposition of the proper penalty on the accused.

The aggravating circumstance of nighttime in both cases should not be

appreciated. Nighttime is considered an aggravating circumstance only when
it is sought to prevent the accused from being recognized or to ensure their
escape. There must be proof that this was intentionally sought to ensure the
 250

commission of the crime and that the perpetrators took advantage of it.
Although the crime was committed at nighttime, there is no evidence that
the appellants and their companions took advantage of nighttime or that
nighttime facilitated the commission of the crime.

PEOPLE V BALINAS
G.R. NO. 181631
September 30, 2008

Facts:
Sayson and his companion ran into appellant in the store. Appellant
confronted Sayson about the latter's intervention inside the gambling place.
Sayson replied that he wanted to settle things for the sake of peace.
Thereafter, Sayson and his companion Gomez left the store but appellant
overtook the duo and stabbed Sayson twice on the chest. Appellant
immediately ran away while Sayson shouted for help.

Issue:
Whether or not treachery attendant in the case.

Ruling:
Yes. The courts below correctly appreciated the circumstance of treachery.
While the stabbing was preceded by a brief argument between appellant and
Sayson, it cannot be gainsaid that the attack was indeed sudden and
unexpected. Moreover, the fact that appellant went around the store in order
to catch up with Sayson showed his tenacity to execute the crime.
 251

People v Rodas

DOCTRINE Nighttime is considered aggravating only when it facilitated the

commission of the crime, or was especiallysought or taken advantage of by
the accused for the purpose of impunity. The essence of this aggravating
circumstance is the obscuridad afforded by, and not merely the
chronological onset of, nighttime.  Although the offense was committed at
night, nocturnity does not become a modifying factor when the place is
adequately lighted and, thus, could no longer insure the offender’s immunity
from identification or capture.

SUMMARY Accused-appellants Rodas are convicted with murder due to the

killing of Titing. The aggravating circumstance of nocturnity was not
considered because prosecution failed to show that nighttime facilitated the
commission of the crime, or was especially sought or taken advantage of by
the accused for the purpose of impunity and the place was properly lighted
even though the crime was committed at nighttime.

RELEVANT FACTS     



Titing Asenda, a resident of Boyos, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, was at

Milaub, Denoyan, Zamboanga del Norte, to help his brother, Danilo Asenda,
in the harvesting of the latter’s corn. August 9, 1996: at around 8:00 in the
 252

evening, a benefit dance at Milaub, which was sponsored by Boboy

Raquilme, was being held. Among those roaming in the vicinity of the dance
hall were Alberto Asonda and Ernie Anggot. o They stopped and hung out
near the fence to watch the affair. o Titing Asenda was standing near them.
They saw Charlito Rodas, Armando Rodas, Jose Rodas, Jr., and Jose Rodas,
Sr. surround Titin g Asenda. Suddenly, without a word, Charlito Rodas,
armed with a hunting knife, stabbed Titing at the back. o Armando Rodas
then clubbed Titing with a chako hitting him at the left side of the nape
causing him to fall. o Jose Rodas, Sr. handed to Jose Rodas, Jr. a bolo
which the latter used in hacking Titing, hitting him on the left elbow. Alberto
Asonda and Ernie Anggot tried to help Titing but Armando Rodas prevented
them by pointing a gun at them and firing it towards the sky. After the
assailants left, Alberto Asonda and Ernie Anggot approached Titing Asenda
who was already dead. They informed Danilo Asenda that his brother was
killed. The police arrived the following day after being informed of the
incident. Charlito Rodas8 and Jose Rodas, Jr. 9 withdrew their previous
pleas of “NOT GUILTY” and entered their respective pleas of “GUILTY” for the
lesser crime of Homicide RTC found accused-appellants Armando Rodas and
Jose Rodas, Sr. guilty of the crime of Murder

University of the Philippines College of Law 1-D (defense alibi were

contradictory so SC did not reverse RTC and CA’s findings) ISSUE AND
RATIO DECIDENDI Issue WON aggravating circumstance of nocturnity can
be considered

Ratio  

WON aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength can be

considered



 WON there is treachery



WON evident premeditation is appreciated



NO This circumstance is considered aggravating only when it facilitated the

commission of the crime, or was especially sought or taken advantage of by
the accused for the purpose of impunity. o The essence of this aggravating
circumstance is the obscuridad afforded by, and not merely the
chronological onset of, nighttime. Although the offense was committed at
 253

night, nocturnity does not become a modifying factor when the place is
adequately lighted and, thus, could no longer insure the offender’s immunity
from identification or capture. In the instant case, the prosecution failed to
show that nighttime facilitated the commission of the crime, or was
especially sought or taken advantage of by the accused for the purpose of
impunity. The crime scene was sufficiently lighted by a Petromax which led
to the identification of all the accused. YES There was glaring disparity of
strength between the victim and the four accused. The victim was unarmed
while the accused were armed with a hunting knife, chako and bolo. It is
evident that the accused took advantage of their combined strength to
consummate the offense. This aggravating circumstance, though, cannot be
separately appreciated because it is absorbed in treachery. YES The essence
of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on an
unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend
himself, thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor, and
without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim o In the case
under review, the victim was completely unaware that he was going to be
attacked. He was not forewarned of any danger to himself as there was no
altercation or disagreement between the accused and the victim. If treachery
may be appreciated even when the victim was forewarned, more so should it
be appreciated when the victim was not, as in the case at bar. The
suddenness of the attack, the number of the accused and their use of
weapons against the unarmed victim prevent the possibility of any defense
or retaliation by the victim. The fact that the victim was already sprawled on
the ground and still Jose Jr. hacked him with a bolo clearly constitutes
treachery NO For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the following
elements must be established: (1) the time when the accused decided to
commit the crime; (2) an overt act manifestly indicating that he has clung to
his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between decision and
execution to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of his act o
The essence of premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act was
preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the
criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment
In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to show any presence of the
elements

Disposition WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the decision of the

Court of Appeals in CA -G.R. CR-HC No. 00289 is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION. Appellants Armando Rodas and Jose Rodas, Sr. are found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of murder as defined in Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, qualified by
treachery. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance in the
commission of the crime, they are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. The appellants are ORDERED to pay, jointly and
severally, the heirs of Titing Asenda the amount of P25,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as temperate
damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. Costs against the
appellants.
 254

People of the Philippines vs. Juan Gonzales Escote, Jr., G.R. No.
140756, April 04, 2003,448 Phil. 749

Facts:
The accused, with force, violence and intimidation, robbed a passenger bus
routed to Pampanga. When the accused approached and about to rob the
deceased victim, the discovered that the said victim was a member of the
Philippine National Police. The accused then informed the victim that they
will kill him for being a police. The victim plead for his life. The accused
disregarded the plea and shoot the victim multiple times. After the robbery,
the accused were arrested a a criminal cae was filed against them for the
crime of Robbery with Homicide.

Issue:
Whether Treachery in a crime of Robbery with Homicide should be treated
as a qualified aggravating circumstance.

Held:
No, Treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance to robbery with
homicide although said crime is classified as a crime against property and a
single and indivisible crime. Treachery is not a qualifying circumstance
because “homicide” is used in its broadest and most generic sense.
 255

Treachery is not an element of robbery with homicide. Neither does it

constitute a crime specially punishable by law nor is it included by the law
in defining the crime of robbery with homicide and prescribing the penalty
therefor. Treachery is likewise not inherent in the crime of robbery with
homicide. Hence, treachery should be considered as a generic aggravating
circumstance in robbery with homicide for the imposition of the proper
penalty for the crime.

People vs. Lucas

G.R. No. 80102. January 22, 1990

FACTS:
Mauricia Lucas was then thirteen years old and working as a housemaid in
Sampaloc, Manila. Sometime in September 1985, she was fetched by her
father, herein accused Jovencio Lucas, from her place of work. They boarded
a jeepney and alighted in a place which Mauricia found unfamiliar. She was
thereafter brought to a dark room where the accused tied both her hands
and feet to a bed, undressed her, burnt her face with a lighted cigarette,
kissed her, fondled her private parts, pointed a knife at her neck, and
laughed while consummating the sexual act. The physical and genital
examination supported the fact of defloration and further testified that the
findings were consonant to that of a woman who had several experience with
sexual intercourse. Nonetheless, as the examinations were conducted about
six months after the alleged rape took place, evidence of violence can no
longer be established.

ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the trial court correctly appreciated the aggravating
circumstance of cruelty in the case.

HELD:
 256

1) Yes. The Court held that there is cruelty when the offender enjoys and
delights in making his victim suffer slowly and gradually, causing
unnecessary physical pain in the consummation of the offense. Moreover,
the absence of any evidence of force does not negate a finding that forcible
sexual intercourse actually took place. The trial court, having had the
opportunity of hearing the witnesses of both prosecution and defense, gave
weight to the sincerity and conviction of the victim. The appellant tied the
victim to a bed, burnt her face with a lighted cigarette, and laughed while
consummating the crime. Undeniably, cruelty is present in this case.

PEOPLE VS TIONGSON

FACTS:
Rudy Tiongson escaped from the Municipal Jail of Bulalacao, Oriental
Mindoro, together with George de la Cruz and Rolando Santiago, where they
were detained under the charge of Attempted Homicide. While in the act of
escaping, the said Rudy Tiongson killed Pat. Zosimo Gelera, a member of the
police force of Bulalacao, Oriental Mindoro, who was guarding the said
accused, and PC Constable Aurelio Canela of the PC Detachment stationed
in Bulalacao, Oriental Mindoro, who went in pursuit of them.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is an aggravating circumstance of insult to public
authority

HELD:
No aggravating circumstance of insult to public authority. The aggravating
circumstance that the crimes were committed in contempt of or with insult
to the public authorities cannot also be appreciated since Pat. Gelera and
PC Constable Canela were the very ones against whom the crime were
committed. Besides, Pat. Gelera and PC Constable Canela are not persons in
authority, but merely agents of a person in authority.
 257

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FLORO RODIL defendant-appellant.

FACTS:

Accused Floro Rodil was found guilty for the death of Lt. Guillermo Masana
of the Philippine Constabulary. The accused, armed with a double-bladed
dagger, with evident premeditation and treachery, and with intent to kill,
did, attack and stab PC Lt. Guillermo Masana while the latter was in the
performance of his official duties, which directly caused his death.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the crime of murder can be complexed with assault upon
agent of authority.

HELD:

Yes. The Solicitor General claims the crime committed was murder because
"it was established by the prosecution that during the stabbing incident,
appellant suddenly and without giving the victim a chance to defend
himself, stabbed the latter several times with a dagger, inflicting. The
 258

suddenness of the attack does not by itself suffice to support a finding of

treachery , the record failed to show that the accused made any preparation
to kill his victim so as to insure the commission of the crime. Clearly,
therefore, the impelling motive for the attack by appellant on his victim was
the latter's performance of official duty, which the former resented. This
kind of evidence does not clearly show the presence of treachery in the
commission of the crime.

The aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank should be appreciated

because it is obvious that the victim. Identified himself as a PC officer to the
accused who is merely a member of the Anti-Smuggling Unit and therefore
inferior both in rank and social status to the victim. If the accused herein
were charged with the complex crime of murder with assault against an
agent of a person in authority, and not merely murder, then the aggravating
circumstance of disregard of rank or contempt of or insult to public
authority cannot be appreciated as aggravating because either circumstance
is inherent in the charge of assault against a person in authority or an agent
of a person in authority.

But in the case at bar, the appellant is accused of murder only.

Consequently, either aggravating circumstance should be considered in the
imposition of the penalty. Appellant guilty of HOMICIDE AGGRAVATED BY
CONTEMPT FOR OR INSULT TO A PUBLIC AUTHORITY OR DISREGARD OF
THE RESPECT DUE THE OFFENDED PARTY ON ACCOUNT OF HIS RANK.

PEOPLE v. RENATO TAC-AN Y HIPOS, GR Nos. 76338-39, 1990-02-26

Facts:

violation of Section 1, paragraph (2), of Presidential Decree No. 1866...

accused, while acting under the influence of drugs and without any license
or permit from the proper authorities, did... then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control an
unlicensed firearm, a SMITH & WESSON Airweight caliber .38 revolver with
Serial Number 359323 with Five (5) spent shells and Five (5) live
ammunitions and without any... justifiable cause and with intent to kill,
used the said firearm and ammunitions to shoot one Francis Ernest
Escaño... amended information... accused, without any justifiable cause and
with intent to kill, evident premeditation, treachery, while acting under... the
influence of drugs, with cruelty and deliberately augmenting the suffering of
the victim, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and shoot one Francis Ernest Escaño

Appellant entered a plea of not guilty in both cases. The two (2) criminal
cases were consolidated upon motion of the prosecution and tried jointly.
On 31 July 1986, the trial court rendered a decision[3] convicting appellant
under both informations.
 259

accused Renato Tac-an y Hipos GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal

Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions qualified with Murder under
Section 1, paragraph

1 and 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1866... accused Renato Tac-an y Hipos

GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder under

Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Batas Pambansa Blg.
179 and P.D. 1866. Appreciating the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation (treachery used to qualify the crime to murder) and the
special aggravating circumstances of acting while under the... influence of
dangerous drugs and with the use of an unlicensed firearm and with insult
to a person in authority

The Mathematics class under Mr. Damaso Pasilbas scheduled for 3:00 p.m.
had just started in Room 15 when Renato suddenly burst into the room,
shut the door and with both hands raised, holding a revolver, shouted
"Where is Francis?" Upon sighting Francis seated behind and to... the right
of student Ruel Ungab. Renato fired at Francis, hitting a notebook, a
geometry book and the armrest of Ruel's chair.

Renato proceeded to the teacher's platform nearest the door and for the
fourth time fired at Francis as the latter was rushing towards the door. This
time, Francis was... hit on the head and he fell on the back of Ruel and both
fell to the floor.

Renato then went out of Room 15, and paced between Rooms 14 and 15. A
teacher, Mr. Pablo Baluma, apparently unaware that it was Renato who had
gunned down Francis, approached Renato and asked him to help Francis as
the latter was still alive inside the room. Renato thereupon... re-entered
Room 15, closed the door behind him, saying: "So, he is still alive. Where is
his chest?"... enato aimed at the chest of Francis and fired once more. The
bullet entered Francis' back below the right... shoulder, and exited on his
front chest just above the right nipple.

Renato then left with two (2) remaining students and locked Francis alone
inside Room 15. Renato proceeded to the ground floor and entered the
faculty room. There, he found some teachers and students and ordered
them to lock the door and close the windows, in effect holding... them as
hostages.

Renato's brother approached Capt. Lazo and volunteered to persuade his

brother to give up. Renato's father who, by this time had also arrived,
pleaded with Renato to surrender himself. Renato then turned over his gun
to his brother... through an opening in the balustrade of the faculty room.
Capt. Lazo took the gun from Renato's brother, went to the door of the
faculty room, entered and placed Renato under arrest.
 260

appellant was charged with unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm, a

Smith and Wesson Airweight .38 Caliber revolver with five (5) spent bullets
and five (5) live ones and with... having used such firearm and ammunition
to shoot to death Francis Ernest Escaño III

There is nothing in P.D. No. 1866 (which was promulgated on 29 June 1983)
which suggests that it was intended to remain in effect only for the duration
of the martial law imposed upon the country by former President Marcos.

Issues:

Whether or not the crime was committed in contempt of or with insult to the
public authorities.

Ruling:

we find no reason to disagree with the conclusion of the trial court that
Renato had indeed shot and killed Francis under the circumstances and in
the manner described by these witnesses.

There is no law which renders the use of an unlicensed firearm as an

aggravating circumstance in homicide or murder. Under an information
charging homicide or murder, the fact that the death weapon was an
unlicensed... firearm cannot be used to increase the penalty for the second
offense of homicide or murder to death (or reclusion perpetua under the
1987 Constitution).

We are compelled to agree with the trial court that treachery was here
present and that, therefore, the killing of Francis Ernest Escaño III was
murder... e must discard evident premeditation as an aggravating
circumstance.

No medical evidence had been submitted by the prosecution to show... that

Renato had smoked marijuana before gunning down Francis.

The above circumstances pointed to by the trial court may be indicative of

passionate anger on the part of Renato; we do not believe that they
necessarily show that Renato had smoked marijuana before entering his
English III class. In the absence of competent medical or other... direct
evidence of ingestion of a dangerous drug, courts must be wary and critical
of indirect evidence, considering the severe consequences for the accused of
a finding that he had acted while under the influence of a prohibited drug.
The Court considers that the evidence... presented on this point was simply
inadequate to support the ruling of the trial court that Renato had shot and
killed Francis while under the influence of a prohibited drug.

The trial court held that the shooting to death of Francis had been done "in
contempt of or with insult to the public authorities:
 261

"Under Republic Act 1978, as amended, a teacher of a public or private

school is considered a person in authority. The fact that Mr. Damaso
Pasilbas, the teacher in mathematics, was already checking the attendance
did not deter the accused from pursuing his evil act. The... accused ignored
his teacher's presence and pleas. Not yet satisfied with the crime and terror
he had done to Francis and the entire school, the accused entered the
faculty room and held hostage the teachers and students who were inside
that room. To the court, this act of the... accused was an insult to his
teachers and to the school, an act of callus disregard of others feelings and
safety and completely reprehensible."

We believe the trial court erred in so finding the presence of a generic

aggravating circumstance. Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 1978 and Presidential Decree No. 299,
provides as follows:

"Art. 152. Persons in authority and agents of persons in authority. Who

shall be deemed as such. In applying the provisions of the preceding and
other articles of this Code, any person directly vested with jurisdiction,
whether as an individual or as a member of some... court or government
corporation, board, or commission, shall be deemed a person in authority. A
barrio captain and a barangay chairman shall also be deemed a person in
authority.

A person who by direct provision of law or by election or by appointment by

competent authority, is charged with the maintenance of public order and
the protection and security of life and property, such as a barrio
councilman, barrio policeman and barangay leader... and any person who
comes to the aid of persons in authority, shall be deemed an agent of a
person in authority.

In applying the provisions of Articles 148 and 151 of this Code, teachers,
professors and persons charged with the supervision of public or duly
recognized private schools, colleges and universities, and lawyers in the
actual performance of their... professional duties or on the occasion of such
performance, shall be deemed persons in authority.

Careful reading of the last paragraph of Article 152 will show that while a
teacher or professor of a public or recognized private school is deemed to be
a "person in authority," such teacher or professor is so deemed only for
purposes of application of Articles 148 (direct... assault upon a person in
authority), and 151 (resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or
the agents of such person) of the Revised Penal Code. In marked contrast,
the first paragraph of Article 152 does not identify specific articles of the
Revised Penal Code for... the application of which any person "directly vested
with jurisdiction, etc." is deemed "a person in authority." Because a penal
statute is not to be given a longer reach and broader scope than is called for
by the ordinary meaning of the ordinary words used by such... statute, to
the disadvantage of an accused, we do not believe that a teacher or
 262

professor of a public or recognized private school may be regarded as a

"public authority" within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 14 of the
Revised Penal Code,... the provision the trial court applied in the case at bar.

(a) the aggravating circumstances of evident pre-meditation and of

having acted with contempt of or insult to the public authorities shall
be DELETED and not taken into account; and (b) the special
aggravating circumstances of... acting while under the influence of
dangerous drugs and with the use of an unlicensed firearm shall
similarly be DELETED and not taken into account. There being no
generic aggravating nor mitigating circumstances present, the
appellant shall suffer the penalty of... reclusion perpetua.

People v. Pagal et al, G.R. No. L-32040 (1977)

Topic. Disrespect of Age/Sex/Rank
Case. Petition to review lower court decision finding AC of disrespect of age
applicable

Facts. Guan had in his employ Pagal and Torcelino. Guan supposedly
maltreated Pagal and Torcelino during their employment. Pagal and
Torcelino sought to rob Guan, but Guan would not open the kaha de yero.
Because of Guan’s resistance, the two resorted to violence, stabbed Guan
with an icepick, and clubbed him with an iron pipe. The beating later
caused Guan’s death. The two got approximately P1,000 from the event.

Informations were filed against Pagal and Torcelino of Guan’s death. The
two, in their police statements confessed to the crime. Thereafter, a criminal
case was filed against them for the crime of robbery with homicide with the
aggravating circumstance of lack of respect for aged, among others.
 263

Upon arraignment, Pagal and Torcelino, through their counsel sought to

plead guilty provided that they be able to prove the existence of the
mitigating circumstances (MC) of sufficient provocation and acted on
impulse which produced passion obfuscation. The lower court allowed them.
They pleaded guilty and explained their case. But the court was not
convinced and later found Pagal and Torcelino guilty of robbery with
homicide and sentenced them to death penalty.

Pagal files a petition in the present court.

Issue. Was lower court correct in AC of disrespect of age? -No

Ratio. No because the said AC applies only when the crime committed is
against persons. The present court found that the lower court’s attaching of
AC on account of disrespect of age is mistaken. Said AC attaches only when
the crime is against persons. The crime at hand, robbery with homicide, is a
crime against property. Their being incongruent, the AC of disrespect of age
is not applicable to this case.

People vs. Lucas

G.R. No. 80102. January 22, 1990

FACTS:
Mauricia Lucas was then thirteen years old and working as a housemaid in
Sampaloc, Manila. Sometime in September 1985, she was fetched by her
father, herein accused Jovencio Lucas, from her place of work. They boarded
a jeepney and alighted in a place which Mauricia found unfamiliar. She was
thereafter brought to a dark room where the accused tied both her hands
and feet to a bed, undressed her, burnt her face with a lighted cigarette,
kissed her, fondled her private parts, pointed a knife at her neck, and
laughed while consummating the sexual act. The physical and genital
examination supported the fact of defloration and further testified that the
findings were consonant to that of a woman who had several experience with
sexual intercourse. Nonetheless, as the examinations were conducted about
six months after the alleged rape took place, evidence of violence can no
longer be established.
 264

ISSUE:
2) Whether or not the trial court correctly appreciated the aggravating
circumstance of relationship in the case.

HELD:

2) Yes. Article 15 of the Revised Penal code provides that, in the case of rape,
the alternative circumstance of relationship shall be taken into
consideration when the victim is the descendant of the offender. The Court
found that in order for the appellant to carry out the crime to his advantage,
the filial trust reposed in him by his daughter was undeniable abused. He
personally fetched his daughter, at her place of work, took her to the scene
of the crime, and forced himself sexually. The aggravating circumstance of
relationship in the case was correctly applied in the case.

PEOPLE VS TORREFIEL 45 OG 803

FACTS:

The Accused and his companion were guerillas of the USAFFE

On their way to the headquarters, they stopped at the house of the offended
party and asked her husband khaki clothes.
The offended party accused them of being looters. They then decided to
bring the spouses to their headquarters supposedly to investigate the
accusations.
The accused was initially assigned to accompany the husband and his
companion the wife. However, the accused was lost on their way, which led
to escape of the husband.
He eventually kept up with his companion, who, after realizing that the
husband escaped, left the wife with the accused to look for said husband.
The wife then testified that the accused, after winding cogon grass around
his genital organ, raped her.
 265

ISSUE: WON the aggravating circumstance of ignominy can be appreciated

HELD: YES.

The court appreciated the aggravating circumstance stating that the manner
of commission augmented the wrong done by increasing the pain and
adding ignominy thereto.

People v. Tampus

Facts:
The offended party, ABC, is the daughter of appellant Ida Montesclaros, and
was 13 years old at the time of the incident. Ida and ABC started to rent a
room in a house owned by Tampus, a barangay tanod. On April 1, 1995,
about 4:30 p.m., ABC testified that she was in the house with Ida and
Tampus who were both drinking beer at that time. They forced her to drink
beer and after consuming three and one-half (3 ½) glasses of beer, she
became intoxicated and very sleepy. While ABC was lying on the floor of
their room, she overheard Tampus requesting her mother, Ida, that he be
allowed to “remedyo” or have sexual intercourse with her. Appellant Ida
agreed and instructed Tampus to leave as soon as he finished having sexual
intercourse with ABC. Ida then went to work, leaving Tampus alone with
ABC. ABC fell asleep and when she woke up, she noticed that the garter of
her panties was loose and rolled down to her knees. She suffered pain in her
 266

head, thighs, buttocks, groin and vagina, and noticed that her panties and
short pants were stained with blood which was coming from her vagina.
When her mother arrived home from work the following morning, she kept
on crying but appellant Ida ignored her.

ABC testified that on April 4, 1995 around 1:00 a.m., she was left alone in
the room since her mother was at work at the beer house. Tampus went
inside their room and threatened to kill her if she would report the previous
sexual assault to anyone. He then forcibly removed her panties. ABC
shouted but Tampus covered her mouth and again threatened to kill her if
she shouted. He undressed himself, spread ABC’s legs, put saliva on his
right hand and he applied this to her vagina; he then inserted his penis into
ABC’s vagina and made a push and pull movement. After consummating the
sexual act, he left the house. When ABC told appellant Ida about the
incident, the latter again ignored her.

On May 4, 1995, after being maltreated by her mother, ABC sought the help
of her aunt, ABC filed two Complaints. She accused Tampus of taking
advantage of her by having carnal knowledge of her, against her will, while
she was intoxicated and sleeping on April 1, 1995 at 4:30 p.m. She declared
in her Complaint that this was done in conspiracy with accused Ida who
gave permission to Tampus to rape her. And again, she stated that on April
3, 1995, she was threatened with a wooden club by Tampus, who then
succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her, against her will.

The trial court convicted Tampus of two counts of rape, as principal and
Appellant Ida was found guilty as an accomplice.

Pending resolution of the appeal before the Court of Appeals, accused

Tampus. Thus, the appeal before the Court of Appeals dealt only with that of
appellant Ida. The appeal was dismissed by the CA. Hence, this case.

Issue:
Whether the Trial Court erred in convicting the appellant as accomplice of
his co-accused.

Held:
No, Accomplices are persons who, not being included in Article 17 of the
Revised Penal Code, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or
simultaneous acts. The following requisites must be proved in order that a
person can be considered an accomplice: (a) community of design, i.e.,
knowing that criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he
concurs with the latter in his purpose; (b) he cooperates in the execution of
the offense by previous or simultaneous acts; and, (c) there must be a
relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the
person charged as accomplice.
 267

All the requisites concur in order to find Ida guilty as an accomplice to

Tampus in the rape of ABC. The testimony of ABC shows that there was
community of design between Ida and Tampus to commit the rape of ABC.
Ida had knowledge of and assented to Tampus’ intention to have sexual
intercourse with her daughter. She forced ABC to drink beer, and when ABC
was already drunk, she left ABC alone with Tampus, with the knowledge
and even with her express consent to Tampus’ plan to have sexual
intercourse with her daughter.

It is settled jurisprudence that the previous acts of cooperation by the

accomplice should not be indispensable to the commission of the crime;
otherwise, she would be liable as a principal by indispensable cooperation.
The evidence shows that the acts of cooperation by Ida are not indispensable
to the commission of rape by Tampus. First, because it was both Ida and
Tampus who forced ABC to drink beer, and second because Tampus already
had the intention to have sexual intercourse with ABC and he could have
consummated the act even without Ida’s consent.

The acts of Ida are closely related to the eventual commission of rape by
Tampus. They both forced ABC to drink beer; when ABC was already drunk,
Tampus asked Ida if he could have sexual intercourse with ABC and Ida
gave her consent; and lastly, Ida left ABC alone with Tampus so that he
proceed with his plan to rape ABC.

PEOPLE v. ROLANDO CRUZ, GR No. 74048, 1990-11-14

Facts:

In the afternoon of November 25, 1983, Jesus Baang, married, 36 years old,
fisherman, succumbed to three gunshot wounds on the head, chest and
back. According to several eyewitnesses who were at the scene of the crime,
his alleged... assailant was Rading (Radito) Sason, but Rolando Cruz was
implicated as a co-conspirator and principal by inducement.

the... accused, conspiring,... and helping one another while armed with a...
gun, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation,... shot
JESUS BAANG y VALDEZ, hitting the latter on the different vital parts of his
body, thereby inflicting... upon him... gunshot wounds which directly
caused his death."[1]
 268

No bail was recommended.

Nonetheless, accused Rolando Cruz filed a motion for bail, contending that
the evidence against him was not strong. A hearing was conducted on said
motion,... and after the presentation of six (6) prosecution... witnesses, bail
was granted for his provisional liberty.

Thereafter, accused Rolando Cruz was arraigned and he pleaded "not guilty"
to the crime charged.

the Court finds accused Rolando Cruz guilty... of the crime of Murder... t

Hence the present appeal.

in the afternoon of November 25, 1983... he was at the store of Lola Ida in
Dampalit, Malabon,... Metro Manila. He saw the victim Jesus Baang
walking along M. Sioson Street, followed by Rading Sason. Suddenly, Sason
shot Baang from behind.

After the first gunshot, Baang turned around and faced his assailant who
then shot him for the second time. Baang tried to escape but he fell on the
ground. It was at this point when the gunman delivered the coup de... grace
and fatally shot Baang on the head. Sason then walked away from the
scene.[3]

Soriano stated that he did not see the accused Rolando Cruz during the
actual shooting.

Another eyewitness, Renato Ramirez, 23 years old, testified that at the time
of the incident, he was standing at the corner of Don Basilio Boulevard and
M. Sioson St. He was on his way home. He saw

Sason walking a few paces behind Baang. Then two shots rang out. He saw
Baang fall to the ground. Sason approached Baang and shot him... again.
Then Sason left

Ramirez corroborated the testimony of Soriano to the effect that the accused
Rolando Cruz was nowhere near the scene during the actual attack.[7]

The witnesses' narrations closely coincided with the findings... s of... the NBI

He sustained three (3) wounds, two of which were fatal

Issues:

appellant be held liable as an accomplice since he cooperated in the

execution of the offense by signalling the arrival of the deceased... appellant
 269

be held liable as an accomplice since he cooperated in the execution of the

offense by signalling the arrival of the deceased?[19]

Ruling:

appellant be held liable as an accomplice since he cooperated in the

execution of the offense by signalling the arrival of the deceased?[19]

In the case at bar, there is absence of conclusive proof indicating a prior

plan or agreement between appellant Cruz and Sason to kill the... victim.
That essential element cannot be automatically deduced from the fact that
the two accused had harbored a grudge against Baang.

All told, the criminal complicity of appellant Cruz, either as a principal by

inducement or as an accomplice, in the killing of Baang has not been
established beyond reasonable doubt. It follows that he must be acquitted.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Accused-appellant Rolando Cruz alias "Tikboy" is hereby ACQUITTED on
reasonable doubt.

People vs. Agapinay, 186 SCRA 812, June 27, 1990

Facts: This is an appeal to reverse RTC’s decision that sentenced Romeo

Agapinay, Delfin Agapinay, Cirilo Agapinay, Fortunato Agapinay, Alex
Agapinay, and Dante Agapinay, all principals by participation, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. Romeo admitted stabbing Virgilio
Paino. Thereafter, Delfin and Fortunato held him, where upon, Romeo
thrust another stab and as Virgilio ran away, Delfin, Alex, Fortunato, Dante,
and Cirilo threw rocks at him. The six’s defense stated that Virgilio was
being offensive (uttered offending words, “vulva of your mother, if you are
talking as if you have no debts, not like me, I have no debts”) and aggressive
thus, they only acted in self-defense.

Issue:
1. Whether all the six Agapinay’s should have same sentence
 270

2. Whether the accused should be entitled to mitigating circumstance of

provocation

Ruling:

1. No. It is our considered opinion that only Romeo, Delfin, and

Fortunato should be held as principals in the crime of murder. Romeo
is guilty, as he admitted in open court, by direct participation, while
Delfin and Fortunato are liable as principals by cooperation. In
holding the victim by his arms, both allowed Romeo to inflict upon
him a stab wound. Alex, Dante, and Cirilo, on the other hand, should
be held as simple accomplices for their acts of pelting the victim with
rocks. Since the deceased had already sustained two stab wounds, the
act of hurling rocks at him was not indispensable to justify holding
them legally liable as principals. Also, there was no “unlawful
aggression”. “Injurious words or threats” do not amount to unlawful
aggression. Thus, self-defense cannot be invoked. 2. Yes. The accused
should be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of provocation (or
vindication of a grave offense or passion or obfuscation) since clearly,
the deceased uttered offending words that made the Agapinays,
especially Romeo, react violently.

RAMON C. TAN v. PEOPLE, GR No. 134298, 1999-08-26

Facts:

Complainant Rosita Lim is the proprietor of Bueno Metal Industries, located

at 301 Jose Abad Santos St., Tondo, Manila, engaged in the business of
manufacturing propellers or spare parts for boats. Manuelito Mendez was
one of the employees working for her. Sometime in February

1991, Manuelito Mendez left the employ of the company. Complainant Lim
noticed that some of the welding rods, propellers and boat spare parts, such
as bronze and stainless propellers and brass screws were missing. She
conducted an inventory and discovered that propellers and... stocks valued
at P48,000.00, more or less, were missing. Complainant Rosita Lim
informed Victor Sy, uncle of Manuelito Mendez, of the loss. Subsequently,
 271

Manuelito Mendez was arrested in the Visayas and he admitted that he and
his companion Gaudencio Dayop stole from the... complainant's warehouse
some boat spare parts such as bronze and stainless propellers and brass
screws. Manuelito Mendez asked for complainant's forgiveness. He pointed
to petitioner Ramon C. Tan as the one who bought the stolen items and who
paid the amount of P13,000.00, in... cash to Mendez and Dayop, and they
split the amount with one another. Complainant did not file a case against
Manuelito Mendez and Gaudencio Dayop.

On relation of complainant Lim, an Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila filed

with the Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 19, an information against
petitioner charging him with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1612 (Anti-
Fencing Law) committed as follows:

"That on or about the last week of February 1991, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously knowingly receive, keep, acquire and possess several spare parts
and items for fishing boats all valued at

P48,130.00 belonging to Rosita Lim, which he knew or should have known

to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of theft.

Contrary to law."

On the other hand, the defense presented Rosita Lim and Manuelito Mendez
as hostile witnesses and petitioner himself. The testimonies of the witnesses
were summarized by the trial court in its decision, as follows:

"ROSITA LIM stated that she is the owner of Bueno Metal Industries,
engaged in the business of manufacturing propellers, bushings, welding
rods, among others (Exhibits A, A-1, and B). That sometime in February
1991, after one of her employees left the company, she... discovered that
some of the manufactured spare parts were missing, so that on February
19, 1991, an inventory was conducted and it was found that some welding
rods and propellers, among others, worth P48,000.00 were missing.
Thereafter, she went to Victor Sy, the person who... recommended Mr.
Mendez to her. Subsequently, Mr. Mendez was arrested in the Visayas, and
upon arrival in Manila, admitted to his having stolen the missing spare
parts sold then to Ramon Tan. She then talked to Mr. Tan, who denied
having bought the same.

On August 5, 1996, the trial court rendered decision, the dispositive portion
of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused RAMON C. TAN is hereby

found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating the Anti-Fencing Law of
1979, otherwise known as Presidential Decree No. 1612, and sentences him
to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of SIX (6)
 272

YEARS and ONE (1) DAY to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor and to
indemnify Rosita Lim the value of the stolen merchandise purchased by him
in the sum of P18,000.00.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.

After due proceedings, on January 29, 1998, the Court of Appeals rendered
decision finding no error in the judgment appealed from, and affirming the
same in toto.

In due time, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for
reconsideration; however, on June 16, 1998, the Court of Appeals

Issues:

The issue raised is whether or not the prosecution has successfully

established the elements of fencing as against petitioner.[2]

Ruling:

"The law on fencing does not require the accused to have participated in the
criminal design to commit, or to have been in any wise involved in the
commission of, the crime of robbery or theft."[6]

We resolve the issue in favor of petitioner.

"Fencing, as defined in Section 2 of P.D. No. 1612 is `the act of any person
who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive,
possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in
any manner deal in any article, item, object or... anything of value which he
knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds
of the crime of robbery or theft.'"[3]

"Robbery is the taking of personal property belonging to another, with intent

to gain, by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or using
force upon things."[4]

The crime of theft is committed if the taking is without violence against or

intimidation of persons nor force upon things.[5]

"The law on fencing does not require the accused to have participated in the
criminal design to commit, or to have been in any wise involved in the
commission of, the crime of robbery or theft."[6]

Before the enactment of P. D. No. 1612 in 1979, the fence could only be
prosecuted as an accessory after the fact of robbery or theft, as the term is
defined in Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code, but the penalty was light as
it was two (2) degrees lower than that prescribed... for the principal.[7]
 273

P. D. No. 1612 was enacted to "impose heavy penalties on persons who

profit by the effects of the crimes of robbery and theft." Evidently, the
accessory in the crimes of robbery and theft could be prosecuted as such
under the Revised Penal Code or under P.D. No. 1612. However,... in the
latter case, the accused ceases to be a mere accessory but becomes a
principal in the crime of fencing. Otherwise stated, the crimes of robbery
and theft, on the one hand, and fencing, on the other, are separate and
distinct offenses.[8] The State... may thus choose to prosecute him either
under the Revised Penal Code or P. D. No. 1612, although the preference for
the latter would seem inevitable considering that fencing is malum
prohibitum, and P. D. No. 1612 creates a presumption of fencing[9]... and
prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the property.[10]

Complainant Rosita Lim testified that she lost certain items and Manuelito
Mendez confessed that he stole those items and sold them to the accused.
However, Rosita Lim never reported the theft or even loss to the police. She
admitted that after Manuelito Mendez, her former... employee, confessed to
the unlawful taking of the items, she forgave him, and did not prosecute
him. Theft is a public crime. It can be prosecuted de oficio, or even without a
private complainant, but it cannot be without a victim. As complainant
Rosita Lim reported no... loss, we cannot hold for certain that there was
committed a crime of theft. Thus, the first element of the crime of fencing is
absent, that is, a crime of robbery or theft has been committed.

What is more, there was no showing at all that the accused knew or should
have known that the very stolen articles were the ones sold to him. "One is
deemed to know a particular fact if he has the cognizance, consciousness or
awareness thereof, or is aware of the existence of... something, or has the
acquaintance with facts, or if he has something within the mind's grasp with
certitude and clarity. When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is
an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware
of a high probability of... its existence unless he actually believes that it does
not exist. On the other hand, the words "should know" denote the fact that a
person of reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in
performance of his duty to another or would govern his conduct upon...
assumption that such fact exists. Knowledge refers to a mental state of
awareness about a fact. Since the court cannot penetrate the mind of an
accused and state with certainty what is contained therein, it must
determine such knowledge with care from the overt acts of that... person.
And given two equally plausible states of cognition or mental awareness, the
court should choose the one which sustains the constitutional presumption
of innocence."[23]

Without petitioner knowing that he acquired stolen articles, he can not be

guilty of "fencing".[24]

Consequently, the prosecution has failed to establish the essential elements

of fencing, and thus petitioner is entitled to an acquittal.
 274

Principles:

In Dizon-Pamintuan vs. People of the Philippines, we set out the essential

elements of the crime of fencing as follows:

"1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;

"2. The accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission of

the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires,
conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any
article, item, object or anything of value, which... has been derived from the
proceeds of the said crime;

"3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item,
object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime
of robbery or theft; and

"4. There is on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for
another."[11]

US v Mendoza
GR No. 7540, 23 Sept 1912
Torres, J.:

FACTS:

In the evening of 1 Aug 1910, Bernabe Mangunay approached the

house carrying a papaya firebrand of Mateo del Rosario in Apulid Panique,
Tarlac to ask for something to eat. He got too close to the house and the
eaves caught fire causing a large part of the house to be consumed. Mateo
was at the neighbor’s. Silveria Marcoleta, Mateo’s wife, called out for help
and managed to escape the house with their children.

The following day, Mateo reported to barrio lieutenant Vicente Mendoza

what happened. Mendoza ordered junior lieutenant Cadido Yabut to
 275

summon the accused. Upon appearance, Mendoza took no action nor did
he even report the facts to the proper higher authority.

On 5 Sept 1910 the provincial fiscal filed an information to the CFI

charging Vicente Mendoza as accessory in the crime of arson. Judgment
was rendered on 22 May 1911 finding Mendoza guilty as charged; from
which judgment he appealed.

ISSUE:

W/N the acquittal of the principal carries with it the acquittal fo the
accessory.

HELD:

Yes. First of all, the Court ruled that the charged should have been
prevaricacion under Art 355 for neglect of the duties of his office by
maliciously failing to move the prosecution and punishment of the
delinquent.

Since the Bernabe Mangunay was acquitted for lack of evidence, it also
necessary follows that Mendoza must also have been acquitted. The
responsibility of the accessory is subordinate to that of the principal
because the accessory’s participation therein is subsequent to its
commission and his guilt is very directly related to the principal delinquent
in the punishable act. If the facts alleged are not proven in the prosecution
institutes, or do not constitute a crime, no legal grounds exist for convicting
a defendant as an accessory after the fact of a crime not perpetrated or of
parties not guilty.

In the case at bar, since the acts charged against Mangunay do not
constitute a crime, it is neither proper nor possible to convict the defendant
as accessory.

LITO VINO v. PEOPLE, GR No. 84163, 1989-10-19

Facts:

At about 7:00 o'clock in the evening of March 21, 1985, Roberto Tejada left
their house at Burgos Street, Poblacion, Balingao, Pangasinan to go to the
house of Isidro Salazar to watch television. At around 11:00 P. M., while
Ernesto, the father of Roberto, was resting, he... heard two gunshots.
Thereafter, he heard Roberto cry out in a loud voice saying that he had been
shot. He saw Roberto ten (10) meters away so he switched on the lights of
their house. Aside from Ernesto and his wife, his children Ermalyn and
Julius were also in the house. They... went down to meet Roberto who was
crying and they called for help from the neighbors. The neighbors responded
 276

by turning on their lights and the street lights and coming down from their
houses. After meeting Roberto, Ernesto and Julius saw Lito Vino and Jessie
Salazar riding a... bicycle coming from the south. Vino was the one driving
the bicycle while Salazar was carrying an armalite. Upon reaching Ernesto's
house, they stopped to watch Roberto. Salazar pointed his armalite at
Ernesto and his companions. Thereafter, the two left.

Roberto was brought to the Sacred Heart Hospital of Urdaneta. PC/Col.

Bernardo Cacananta took his ante-mortem statement. In the said statement
which the victim signed with his own blood, Jessie Salazar was identified as
his assailant.

Lito Vino and Sgt. Jesus Salazar were charged with murder in a complaint
filed by PC Sgt. Ernesto N. Ordoño in the Municipal Trial Court of Balungao,
Pangasinan. However, on March 22, 1985, the municipal court indorsed the
case of Salazar to the Judge Advocate General's

Office (JAGO) inasmuch as he was a member of the military, while the case
against Vino was given due course by the issuance of a warrant for his
arrest. Ultimately, the case was indorsed to the fiscal's office who then filed
an information charging Vino of the crime of murder in... the Regional Trial
Court of Rosales, Pangasinan.

Upon arraignment, the accused Vino entered a plea of not guilty. Trial then
commenced with the presentation of evidence for the prosecution. Instead of
presenting evidence

Trial then commenced with the presentation of evidence for the prosecution.
Instead of presenting evidence in his own behalf, the accused filed a motion
to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence to which the... prosecutor filed an
answer. On January 21, 1986,[2] a decision was rendered by the trial court
finding Vino guilty as an accessory to the crime of murder and imposing on
him the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 4 years and

2 months of prision correccional as minimum to 8 years of prision mayor as

maximum. He was also ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the
sum of P10,000.00 being a mere accessory to the crime and to pay the costs.

Issues:

that inasmuch as the petitioner was charged in the information as a

principal for the crime of murder, can he thereafter be convicted as an
accessory?... whether or not the trial of an accessory can proceed without
awaiting the result of the separate charge against the principal... onsidering
that the alleged principal in this case was acquitted can the conviction of the
petitioner as an accessory be maintained?

Ruling:
 277

affirmative.

Petitioner was charged as a principal in the commission of the crime of

murder. Under Article 16 of the Revised Penal Code, the two other categories
of the persons responsible for the commission of the same offense are the
accomplice and the accessory. There is no doubt that... the crime of murder
had been committed and that the evidence tended to show that Jessie
Salazar was the assailant. That the petitioner was present during its
commission or must have known its commission is the only logical
conclusion considering that immediately thereafter, he... was seen driving a
bicycle with Salazar holding an armalite, and they were together when they
left shortly thereafter. At least two witnesses, Ernesto and Julius Tejada,
attested to these facts. It is thus clear that petitioner actively assisted
Salazar in his escape.

Petitioner's liability is that of an accessory.

This is not a case of a variance between the offense charged and the offense
proved or established by the evidence, and the offense as charged is
included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, in which case the
defendant shall be convicted of the offense proved... included in that which
is charged, or of the offense charged included in that which is proved.[5]

In the same light, this is not an instance where after trial has begun, it
appears that there was a mistake in charging the proper offense, and the
defendant cannot be convicted of the offense charged, or of any other offense
necessarily included therein, in which case the... defendant must not be
discharged if there appears to be a good cause to detain him in custody, so
that he can be charged and made to answer for the proper offense.[6]

In this case, the correct offense of murder was charged in the information.
The commission of the said crime was established by the evidence. There is
no variance as to the offense committed. The variance is in the participation
or complicity of the petitioner. While the... petitioner was being held
responsible as a principal in the information, the evidence adduced,
however, showed that his participation is merely that of an accessory. The
greater responsibility, necessarily includes the lesser. An accused can be
validly convicted as an accomplice... or accessory under an information
charging him as a principal.

he answer is also in the affirmative. The corresponding responsibilities of the

principal, accomplice and... accessory are distinct from each other. As long
as the commission of the offense can be duly established in evidence the
determination of the liability of the accomplice or accessory can proceed
independently of that of the principal.

In United States vs. Villaluz and Palermo,[7] a case involving the crime of
theft, this Court ruled that notwithstanding the acquittal of the principal
due to the exempting circumstance of minority or insanity (Article
 278

12, Revised Penal Code), the accessory may nevertheless be convicted if the
crime was in fact established.

Corollary to this is United States vs. Mendoza,[8] where this Court held in
an arson case that the acquittal of the principal must likewise result in the
acquittal of the accessory where it was shown that no crime was...
committed inasmuch as the fire was the result of an accident. Hence, there
was no basis for the conviction of the accessory.

In the present case, the commission of the crime of murder and the
responsibility of the petitioner as an accessory was established. By the same
token there is no doubt that the commission of the same offense had been
proven in the separate case against Salazar who was... charged as principal.
However, he was acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt by the same
judge who convicted Vino as an accessory. The trial court held that the
identity of the assailant was not clearly established. It observed that only
Julius Tejada identified Salazar... carrying a rifle while riding on the bicycle
driven by Vino, which testimony is uncorroborated, and that two other
witnesses, Ernesto Tejada and Renato Parvian, who were listed in the
information, who can corroborate the testimony of Julius Tejada, were not
presented by the... prosecution.

JORGE TAER, vs. CA and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 85204 June 18, 1990

FACTS:
Cirilo Saludes slept in the house of his compadre accused Jorge Taer,
whereat he was benighted. At about 2:00 o'clock dawn, accused Emilio
Namocatcat and Mario Cago arrived at Taer's house with two (2) male
carabaos owned by and which Namocatcat wanted Taer to tend. The said
carabaos were left at Taer's place. After searching in vain for the carabaos at
the vicinity, Dalde and Palaca reported the matter to the police. Reyes
informed Dalde that he saw the latter's lost carabao at Datag, Garcia-
Hernandez. Forthwith Dalde and Palaca went on that day to Datag and there
they found their missing carabaos tied to a bamboo thicket near the house
accused Taer. Upon query by Dalde and Palaca why their carabaos were
 279

found at his place, accused Taer, replied that the carabaos reached his place
tied together without any person in company. According to accused Taer,
what he told Dalde and Palaca was that
the carabaos were brought to his place by the accused Namocatcat who
asked him to tell anybody looking for them that they just strayed thereat.
Taer was
convicted for the crime of cattle rustling, later affirmed by the CA in toto,
finding the evidence of the prosecution that conspiracy indeed existed
between Emilio Namocatcat and Taer. Taer appealed arguing that the extent
of his participation did not go beyond the participation of the original
defendants Saludes and Cago. Therefore, he submits that the acquittal of
these two by the trial court should also lead to his acquittal and the only
evidence proving the alleged conspiracy between him and Namocatcat was
the confession of Namocatcat, however this should not be considered as
admissible because the same is hearsay under the rule of res inter alios
acta.

Issues:
Whether or not the conspiracy was proven beyond reasonable doubt to
convict the accused as principal for the crime of cattle rustling as defined
and punished by PD 533

Held:
No. Conspiracy must be established not by conjectures, but by positive and
conclusive evidence. The same degree of proof necessary to establish the
crime
is required to support a finding of the presence of criminal conspiracy,
which
is, proof beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, mere knowledge, acquiescence to,
or approval of the act, without cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not
enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy absent the intentional
participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the
common
design and purpose. At most the facts establish Taer's knowledge of the
crime. And yet without having participated either as principal or as an
accomplice, for he did not participate in the taking of the carabaos, he took
part subsequent to the commission of the act of taking by profiting himself
by its effects. Taer is thus only an accessory after the fact. The most cogent
proof that the prosecution could ever raise was the implication made by the
accused Namocatcat (he did not appeal his conviction to the Court of
Appeals) in his affidavit of confession. However, the settled rule is that the
rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of
another. The testimony, being res inter alios acta, cannot affect another
except as provided in the Rules of Court. This rule on res inter alios acta
specifically applies when the evidence consists of an admission in an
extrajudicial confession or declaration of another because the defendant has
no opportunity to cross-examine the co-conspirator testifying against him.
 280

WHEREFORE, the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court of

Tagbilaran and affirmed by the respondent Court of Appeals is hereby
MODIFIED in that the herein JORGE TAER is convicted as an accessory of
the crime of cattle-rustling as defined and penalized by PD No. 533
amending Arts. 308, 309, and 310 of the Revised Penal Code and he will
serve the minimum penalty within the range of arresto mayor medium,
which we shall fix at 4 months imprisonment and the maximum penalty of
prision correccional minimum which we shall fix at 2 years.

ROLANDO P. DELA TORRE v. COMELEC, GR No. 121592, 1996-07-05

Facts:

Petitioner Rolando P. Dela Torre via the instant petition for certiorari seeks
the nullification of two resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) allegedly with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
 281

jurisdiction in SPA No. 95-047,... a case for disqualification filed against

petitioner before the COMELEC.[1]

The first assailed resolution dated May 6,1995 declared the petitioner
disqualified from running for the position of Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna in the
last May 8,1995 elections, citing as the ground therefor, Section 40(a) of
Republic Act No. 7160 (the Local Government Code of

1991)[2] which provides as follows:

Issues:

The two (2) issues to be resolved are:

Whether or not the crime of fencing involves moral turpitude.

Ruling:

Fencing is defined in Section 2 of P.D.1612 (Anti-Fencing Law) as:

From the foregoing definition may be gleaned the elements of the crime of
fencing which are:

"1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;

"2. The accused who is not a principal or accomplice in the crime of robbery
or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or
disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item,
object or anything of value, which have been derived... from the proceeds of
the said crime;

"3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item,
object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime
of robbery or theft; and [Underscoring supplied.]

"4. There is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for
another."[13]

Moral turpitude is deducible from the third element. Actual knowledge by

the "fence" of the fact that property received is stolen displays the same
degree of malicious deprivation of one's rightful property as that which
animated the robbery or theft which, by their very nature,... are crimes of
moral turpitude

Petitioner's conviction of fencing which we have heretofore declared as a

crime of moral turpitude and thus falling squarely under the disqualification
found in Section 40 (a), subsists and remains totally unaffected
notwithstanding the grant of probation. In... fact, a judgment of conviction
in a criminal case ipso facto attains finality when the accused applies for
 282

probation, although it is not executory pending resolution of the application

for probation.[17] Clearly then, petitioner's theory has no... merit.

ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED and

the assailed resolutions of the COMELEC dated May 6,1995 and August
28,1995 are AFFIRMED in toto.

JUAN PONCE ENRILE v. OMAR U. AMIN, GR No. 93335, 1990-09-13

Facts:

Together with the filing of an information charging Senator Juan Ponce

Enrile as having committed rebellion complexed with murder[1] with the
 283

Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, government... prosecutors filed another

information charging him for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829 with
the Regional Trial Court of Makati

On March 2, 1990, the petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (a) to hold in

abeyance the issuance of a warrant of arrest pending personal
determination by the court of probable cause, and (b) to dismiss the case
and expunge the information from the record.

On March 16, 1990, respondent Judge Ignacio Capulong, as pairing judge of

respondent Judge Omar Amin, denied Senator Enrile's Omnibus motion on
the basis of a finding that "there (was) probable... cause to hold the accused
Juan Ponce Enrile liable for violation of PD No. 1829."

Issues:

whether or not the petitioner could be separately charged for violation of PD

No. 1829 notwithstanding the rebellion case earlier filed against him.

Ruling:

The resolution of the above issue brings us anew to the case of People v.
Hernandez (99 Phil. 515 [1956]) the rulings of which were recently repeated
in the petition for habeas corpus of Juan

Ponce Enrile v. Judge Salazar, (G.R. No. 92163 and 92164, June 5, 1990).
The Enrile case gave this Court the occasion to reiterate the long... standing
proscription against splitting the component offenses of rebellion and
subjecting them to separate prosecutions, a procedure reprobated in the
Hernandez case.

This doctrine is applicable in the case at bar. If a person can not be charged
with the complex crime of rebellion for the greater penalty to be applied,
neither can he be charged separately for two (2) different offenses where one
is a constitutive or... component element or committed in furtherance of
rebellion.

As can be readily seen, the factual allegations supporting the rebellion

charge constitute or include the very incident which gave rise to the charge
of the violation under Presidential Decree No. 1829. Under the Department
of Justice resolution (Annex A,... Rollo p. 49) there is only one crime of
rebellion complexed with murder and multiple frustrated murder but there
could be 101 separate and independent prosecutions for "harboring and
concealing" Honasan and 100 other armed rebels under

PD No. 1829. The splitting of component elements is readily apparent.

The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is described as a vast

movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots. (People v.
 284

Almasan [CA] O.G. 1932). Jurisprudence tells us that acts committed in

furtherance... of the rebellion though crimes in themselves are deemed
absorbed in the one single crime of rebellion. (People v. Geronimo, 100 Phil.
90 [1956]; People v. Santos, 104 Phil. 551 [1958]; People v. Rodriguez, 107
Phil. 659 [1960]; People v.

Lava, 28 SCRA 72 [1969]). In this case, the act of harboring or concealing

Col. Honasan is clearly a mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an
act done in furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot... therefore be made the
basis of a separate charge.

LITO CORPUZ v. PEOPLE, GR No. 180016, 2014-04-29

Facts:

petitioner Lito Corpuz (petitioner), seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision... finding the... petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
 285

crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of the
Revised Penal Code.

Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and petitioner met at the Admiral

Royale Casino in Olongapo City sometime in 1990

Private complainant was then engaged in the business of lending money to

casino players... upon hearing that the former had some pieces of jewelry
for... sale, petitioner approached him on May 2, 1991 at the same casino
and offered to sell the said pieces of jewelry on commission basis.

Private complainant agreed, and as a consequence, he turned over to

petitioner the following items: an 18k diamond ring for men; a... woman's
bracelet; one (1) men's necklace and another men's bracelet, with an
aggregate value of P98,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt of even date. They
both agreed that petitioner shall remit the proceeds of the sale, and/or, if
unsold, to return the same items, within a... period of 60 days.

The period expired without petitioner remitting the proceeds of the sale or
returning the pieces of jewelry. When private complainant was able to meet
petitioner, the latter promised the former that he will pay the value of the
said items entrusted... to him, but to no avail.

(5th) day of July 1991... accused, after having received from one Danilo
Tangcoy, one (1) men's diamond ring, 18k, worth P45,000.00;... one (1)
three-baht men's bracelet, 22k, worth P25,000.00; one (1) two-baht ladies'
bracelet, 22k, worth P12,000.00, or in the total amount of Ninety-Eight
Thousand Pesos (P98,000.00), Philippine currency, under expressed
obligation on the part of said accused to remit the... proceeds of the sale of
the said items or to return the same, if not sold, said accused, once in
possession of the said items, with intent to defraud, and with unfaithfulness
and abuse of confidence, and far from complying with his aforestated
obligation, did then and there... wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own personal use and benefit
the aforesaid jewelries (sic) or the proceeds of the sale thereof, and despite
repeated demands, the accused failed and refused to return the said items
or to remit the... amount of Ninety- Eight Thousand Pesos (P98,000.00),
Philippine currency, to the damage and prejudice of said Danilo Tangcoy in
the aforementioned amount.

January 28, 1992, petitioner, with the assistance of his counsel, entered a
plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution, to prove the above-stated facts, presented the lone

testimony of Danilo Tangcoy. On the other hand, the defense presented the
lone testimony of petitioner, which can be summarized, as follows:

Petitioner and private complainant were collecting agents of Antonio

Balajadia, who is engaged in the financing business of extending loans to
 286

Base employees. For every collection made, they earn a commission.

Petitioner denied having transacted any business with... private
complainant. However, he admitted obtaining a loan from Balajadia
sometime in 1989 for which he was made to sign a blank receipt. He
claimed that the same receipt was then dated May 2, 1991 and used as
evidence against him for the supposed agreement to sell... the subject pieces
of jewelry, which he did not even see.

WHEREFORE, finding accused LITO CORPUZ GUILTY beyond reasonable

doubt of the felony of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph one (1),
subparagraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code;

The case was elevated to the CA, however, the latter denied the appeal of
petitioner and affirmed the decision of the RTC, thus:

Issues:

B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE

LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT THE CRIMINAL INFORMATION FOR
ESTAFA WAS NOT FATALLY DEFECTIVE ALTHOUGH THE SAME DID NOT
CHARGE THE OFFENSE UNDER ARTICLE 315 (1) (B) OF THE REVISED
PENAL CODE IN THAT -

1. THE INFORMATION DID NOT FIX A PERIOD WITHIN WHICH THE

SUBJECT [PIECES OF] JEWELRY SHOULD BE RETURNED, IF UNSOLD,
OR THE MONEY TO BE REMITTED, IF SOLD;

2. THE DATE OF THE OCCURRENCE OF THE CRIME ALLEGED IN THE

INFORMATION AS OF 05 JULY 1991 WAS MATERIALLY DIFFERENT FROM
THE ONE TESTIFIED TO BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT WHICH WAS 02
MAY 1991;

Ruling:

This Court finds the present petition devoid of any merit.

The factual findings of the appellate court generally are conclusive, and
carry even more weight when said court affirms the findings of the trial
court, absent any showing that the findings are totally devoid of support in
the records, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as... to constitute grave
abuse of discretion.[4] Petitioner is of the opinion that the CA erred in
affirming the factual findings of the trial court. He now comes to this Court
raising both procedural and substantive issues.

According to petitioner, the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the trial

court, admitting in evidence a receipt dated May 2, 1991 marked as Exhibit
"A" and its submarkings, although the same was merely a photocopy, thus,
violating the best evidence rule. However, the... records show that petitioner
never objected to the admissibility of the said evidence at the time it was
 287

identified, marked and testified upon in court by private complainant. The

CA also correctly pointed out that petitioner also failed to raise an objection
in his

Comment to the prosecution's formal offer of evidence and even admitted

having signed the said receipt. The established doctrine is that when a
party failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they were
offered in evidence, such objection shall be... considered as waived.[5]

Another procedural issue raised is, as claimed by petitioner, the formally

defective Information filed against him. He contends that the Information
does not contain the period when the pieces of jewelry were supposed to be
returned and that the date when the crime... occurred was different from the
one testified to by private complainant. This argument is untenable. The
CA did not err in finding that the Information was substantially complete
and in reiterating that objections as to the matters of form and substance in
the

Information cannot be made for the first time on appeal.

It is true that the gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the appropriation or conversion
of money or property received to the prejudice of the... owner[6] and that
the time of occurrence is not a material ingredient of the crime, hence, the
exclusion of the period and the wrong date of the occurrence of the crime, as
reflected in the Information, do not make the latter fatally defective.

The CA ruled:

Finally, the opinion advanced by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno

echoes the view that the role of the Court is not merely to dispense justice,
but also the active duty to prevent injustice. Thus, in order to prevent
injustice in the present controversy, the Court... should not impose an
obsolete penalty pegged eighty three years ago, but consider the proposed
ratio of 1:100 as simply compensating for inflation. Furthermore, the Court
has in the past taken into consideration "changed conditions" or "significant
changes in... circumstances" in its decisions.

Similarly, the Chief Justice is of the view that the Court is not delving into
the validity of the substance of a statute. The issue is no different from the
Court's adjustment of indemnity in crimes against persons, which the Court
had previously adjusted in light of... current times, like in the case of People
v. Pantoja.[47] Besides, Article 10 of the Civil Code mandates a presumption
that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.

With due respect to the opinions and proposals advanced by the Chief
Justice and my Colleagues, all the proposals ultimately lead to prohibited
judicial legislation. Short of being repetitious and as extensively discussed
above, it is truly beyond the powers of the Court... to legislate laws, such
 288

immense power belongs to Congress and the Court should refrain from
crossing this clear-cut divide. With regard to civil indemnity, as elucidated
before, this refers to civil liability which is awarded to the offended party as
a kind of monetary... restitution. It is truly based on the value of money.
The same cannot be said on penalties because, as earlier stated, penalties
are not only based on the value of money, but on several other factors.
Further, since the law is silent as to the maximum amount... that can be
awarded and only pegged the minimum sum, increasing the amount granted
as civil indemnity is not proscribed. Thus, it can be adjusted in light of
current conditions.

Considering that the amount of P98,000.00 is P76,000.00 more than the

P22,000.00 ceiling set by law, then, adding one year for each additional
P10,000.00, the maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8
years of prision mayor minimum would be increased by 7... years. Taking
the maximum of the prescribed penalty, which is 8 years, plus an additional
7 years, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty is 15 years.

One final note, the Court should give Congress a chance to perform its
primordial duty of lawmaking. The Court should not pre-empt Congress
and usurp its inherent powers of making and enacting laws. While it may
be the most expeditious approach, a short cut by... judicial fiat is a
dangerous proposition, lest the Court dare trespass on prohibited judicial
legislation.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated November 5, 2007

of petitioner Lito Corpuz is hereby DENIED. Consequently, the Decision
dated March 22, 2007 and Resolution dated September 5, 2007 of the Court
of Appeals, which affirmed with... modification the Decision dated July 30,
2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, San Fernando City, finding
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under
Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code, are
hereby

AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed is the

indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from THREE (3) YEARS,
TWO (2) MONTHS and ELEVEN DAYS of prision correccional, as minimum,
to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS of reclusion temporal as... maximum.

Pursuant to Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, let a Copy of this Decision
be furnished the President of the Republic of the Philippines, through the
Department of Justice.

PEOPLE v. ALFREDO BON, GR NO. 166401, 2006-10-30

 289

Facts:

All these cases... were consolidated for trial. The rapes were alleged to have
been committed in several instances over a span of six (6) years.

AAA... six (6) years old... first molested in 1994 in the house appellant had
shared with her grandmother.

She recounted that the incident took place when she and appellant were
alone in the house. Appellant touched her... thighs and vagina, removed her
clothes and inserted his penis into her vagina.

three (3)... years after... gain she was sexually abused by appellant.

at age eleven (11) in 1999, she was raped by appellant for the third time,
again at the house of her grandmother.

twelve (12), she was abused for the fourth time by appellant.

she was raped... in an outdoor clearing

While at the clearing, appellant forced her to lie down on a grassy spot and
tried to insert his penis in her vagina. As she cried in pain, appellant
allegedly

stopped.

BBB... first raped by appellant in 1997 when she was ten (10) years old, also
at the house appellant shared with her grandmother.

n 1998 and 1999, she was raped... again by appellant on several occasions,
the rapes occurring under threat of a bladed weapon, and regardless of the
time of day.

last raped by appellant on 15 January 2000.

she was sleeping beside her sister AAA in the house of her grandmother
when she felt appellant touching her body. She pushed him away but
appellant pulled her three (3)... meters away from AAA towards the door. As
appellant was holding a knife, BBB could not make any noise to alert her
sister. Appellant ordered her to remove her clothes and forced her to lie
down. After he took off his clothes, appellant placed himself on top of BBB
and stayed... there for three (3) minutes "moving up and down." Thereafter,
she put on her clothes and returned to where her sister was. She added that
although it was dark, she knew it was appellant who had molested her as
she was familiar with his smell. Since then, she never slept in her...
grandmother's house again.
 290

RTC convicted appellant on all eight (8) counts of rape

It further considered the qualifying circumstances of minority of the victims

and the relationship of the victims and appellant, the latter being the
former's relative by consanguinity within... the third degree.

The Court of Appeals downgraded the convictions in Criminal Case Nos.

6906 and 6908 to attempted rape.

it could not find evidence... beyond reasonable doubt in those two (2) cases
that appellant had accomplished the slightest penetration of AAA's vagina to
make him liable for consummated rape. It stressed that there was not even
moral certainty that appellant's penis ever touched the labia of the
pudendum,... quoting portions of the transcript of the stenographic notes
where AAA was asked if appellant was then successful in inserting his penis
into her vagina and she answered in the negative.

Issues:

whether the Court should affirm the conviction of appellant Alfredo Bon
(appellant) for six counts of rape and two counts of attempted rape, the
victims being his then-minor nieces.

second issue arises as we are compelled to review the maximum term of

reclusion temporal in the sentence imposed on appellant by the Court of
Appeals for the two counts of attempted rape. The sentence was prescribed
by the appellate court prior to the enactment of

Republic Act No. 9346 which ended the imposition of the death penalty in
the Philippines. The proximate concern as to appellant is whether his
penalty for attempted qualified rape, which under the penal law should be
two degrees lower than that of consummated qualified rape,... should be
computed from death or reclusion perpetua.

what should be the appropriate penalty for the two (2) counts of attempted
rape

What is the penalty "lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law" for
attempted rape?

With the elimination of death as a penalty, does it follow that appellant

should now be sentenced to a penalty two degrees lower than reclusion
perpetua, the highest remaining penalty with the enactment of Rep. Act No.
9346? If it so... followed, appellant would be sentenced to prision mayor in
lieu of reclusion temporal.

Ruling:
 291

The Court thus affirms the conclusions of the Court of Appeals that it has
been established beyond reasonable doubt that appellant is guilty of six (6)
counts of rape and two (2) counts of attempted rape. However, in light of
Rep. Act No. 9346, the appropriate penalties for both... crimes should be
amended.

The sentence of death imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of
Appeals can no longer be affirmed in view of Rep. Act No. 9346, titled "An
Act Prohibiting the

Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines." Section 2 of the law

mandates that in lieu of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua
shall be imposed.

Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, which incorporates the

amendments introduced by Rep. Act No. 8353, prescribes:

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed
with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:

When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or the common law spouse of the parent
of the victim

The prescribed penalty for the consummated rape of a victim duly proven to
have been under eighteen years of age and to have been raped by her uncle,
is death under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. The determination
of the penalty two degrees lower than the death penalty... entails the
application of Articles 61 and 71 of the Revised Penal Code:

Art. 61. Rules of graduating penalties. For the purpose of graduating the
penalties which, according to the provisions of Articles 50 to 57, inclusive, of
this Code, are to be imposed upon persons guilty as principals of any
frustrated or attempted... felony, or as accomplices or accessories, the
following rules shall be observed:

When the penalty prescribed for the felony is single and indivisible, the
penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately following that
indivisible penalty in the respective graduated scale prescribed in Article 71
of this Code.

Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code (Article 71) warrants special attention,
crucial as it is to our disposition of this question. The provision reads:

Art. 71. Graduated scales. In the case in which the law prescribes a penalty
lower or higher by one or more degrees than another given penalty, the rules
prescribed in Article 61 shall be observed in graduating such penalty.
 292

SCALE NO. 1

Death

Reclusion perpetua

Reclusion temporal

Prision mayor

Prision correctional

Arresto mayor

Destierro

Arresto menor

Public censure

Fin

Following the scale prescribed in Article 71, the penalty two degrees lower
than death is reclusion temporal, which was the maximum penalty imposed
by the Court of Appeals on appellant for attempted rape. Reclusion
temporal is a penalty comprised of three divisible... periods, a minimum, a
medium and a maximum.

Indeterminate Sentence Law prescribes that "the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall be
that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the rules of the said Code,... and the minimum which shall
be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code
for the offense."

The Court also recognizes that the graduation of penalties reckoned from
"reclusion perpetua to death" differs from that based on the exclusive
penalty of death. For example, it has been held that the penalty two degrees
lower than "reclusion perpetua to death" is... prision mayor

In contrast, the Court has likewise held that for qualified rape in the
attempted stage, "the penalty x x x two (2) degrees lower than the imposable
penalty of death for the offense charged x x x is reclusion... temporal.

Under Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for an attempted
felony is the "penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for
the consummated felony." In this case, the penalty for the rape if it had been
consummated would have been death,... pursuant to Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659,... The death penalty
 293

shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:

When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent
of the victim.

The penalty in this case should have been reclusion temporal, which is the
penalty lower by two degrees than death. However, with the application of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, TOLENTINO may be sentenced to an
indeterminate imprisonment penalty whose... minimum shall be within the
range of prision mayor and whose maximum shall be within the range of
reclusion temporal in its medium period pursuant to Article 64 (1) of the
Revised Penal Code.

In contrast, if the penalty for the consummated crime is the single

indivisible penalty of death, as was... prescribed for several crimes under
Rep. Act No. 7659, Article 61(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that "the
penalty prescribed for the felony is single and indivisible, the penalty next
lower in degree shall be that immediately following that indivisible penalty in
the... respective graduated scale prescribed in Article 71". Thus, the proper
penalty two degrees lower than death is reclusion temporal.

Simply put, the negation of the word "death" as previously inscribed in

Article 71 will have the effect of appropriately downgrading the proper
penalties attaching to accomplices, accessories, frustrated and attempted
felonies to the level consistent with the rest of our penal... laws.

The harmonization that would result if Rep. Act No. 9346 were construed as
having eliminated the reference to

"death" in Article 71 would run across the board in our penal laws.
Consistent with Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, those convicted of
attempted qualified rape would receive the penalty two degrees lower than
that prescribed by law, now Rep. Act No. 9346, for qualified... rape.

"death," as utilized in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code, shall no longer

form part of the equation in the graduation of penalties.

For example, in the case of... appellant, the determination of his penalty for
attempted rape shall be reckoned not from two degrees lower than death,
but two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua. Hence, the maximum term
of his penalty shall no longer be reclusion temporal, as ruled by the

Court of Appeals, but instead, prision mayor.

We close by returning to the matter of appellant Alfredo Bon. By reason of

Rep. Act No. 9346, he is spared the death sentence, and entitled to the
 294

corresponding reduction of his penalty as a consequence of the downgrading

of his offense from two (2) counts consummated rape to... two (2) counts of
attempted rape. For the six (6) counts of rape, we downgrade the penalty of
death to reclusion perpetua with no eligibility for parole, pursuant to Rep.
Act No. 9346. For each of the two (2) counts of attempted rape, we
downgrade by one degree... lower the penalty imposed by the Court of
Appeals. We hold that there being no mitigating or aggravating
circumstances, the penalty of prision mayor should be imposed in it
medium period. Consequently, we impose the new penalty of two (2) years,
four (4) months and one

(1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as maximum.

Principles:

Indeterminate Sentence Law prescribes that "the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall be
that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the rules of the said Code,... and the minimum which shall
be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code
for the offense."... death penalty was provided for in two ways, namely: as
the maximum penalty for "reclusion perpetua to death," and death itself as
an automatic and exclusive penalty

Under Article 61 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, "[w]hen the penalty
prescribed for the crime is composed of two indivisible... penalties - the
penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately following the lesser of
the penalties prescribed in the respective graduated scale."

The maxim interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi

embodies the principle that a statute should be so construed not... only to
be consistent with itself, but also to harmonize with other laws on the same
subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent and intelligible system a
uniform system of jurisprudence.
 295

Cristobal v. Labrador

Facts:

Santos was convicted of estafa and was sentenced to six months of

imprisonment. Notwithstanding his conviction, he continued to be a
registered elector and was even seated as the municipal president of
Malabon. In 1938, the Election Code (Commonwealth Act No. 357) was
passed, sec. 94 (b) of which disqualifies Santos from voting for having been
declared by final judgment guilty of any crime against property. Because of
this, Santos applied for absolute pardon with the President. This was
granted and he was restored to his full and civil political rights, except that
with respect to the right to hold public office or employment, he will be
eligible for appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in
nature and involving no money or property responsibility.

Petitioner Cristobal filed a petition for the exclusion of Santos from the list of
voters on the ground that he was disqualified under the Election Code. The
trial court denied; hence, Cristobal filed a petition for certiorari. Cristobal
contends that the pardon granted by the President did not restore Santos to
the full enjoyment of his political rights because: a) the pardoning power
does not apply to legislative prohibitions; b) the pardoning power would
amount to an unlawful exercise by the President of a legislative function,
and c) Santos having served his sentence and all accessory penalties
imposed by law, there was nothing to pardon.

Issue:

Whether the presidential power of pardon applies to legislative prohibitions

Held:

There are two limitations upon the exercise of this constitutional prerogative
by the Chief Executive, namely: (a) that the power be exercised after
conviction; and (b) that such power does not extend cases of impeachment.
Subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power
cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action. It must remain where
the sovereign authority has placed it and must be exercised by the highest
authority to whom it is entrusted.

An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed, but removes all
disabilities resulting from the conviction. In the present case, the disability
is the result of conviction without which there would be no basis for
disqualification from voting. Imprisonment is not the only punishment
which the law imposes upon those who violate its command. There are
accessory and resultant disabilities, and the pardoning power likewise
 296

extends to such disabilities. When granted after the term of imprisonment

has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequences of
conviction.

In the present case, while the pardon extended to respondent Santos is

conditional in the sense that "he will be eligible for appointment only to
positions which are clerical or manual in nature involving no money or
property responsibility," it is absolute insofar as it "restores the respondent
to full civil and political rights."

The suggestion that the disqualification imposed in paragraph (b) of section

94 of Commonwealth Act No. 357, does not fall within the purview of the
pardoning power of the Chief Executive, would lead to the impairment of the
pardoning power of the Chief Executive, not contemplated in the
Constitution, and would lead furthermore to the result that there would be
no way of restoring the political privilege in a case of this nature except
through legislative action. (Labrador vs. Cristobal, G.R. No. 47941.
December 7, 1940)
 297

Pelobello v. Palatino (G.R. No. L-48100)

June 20, 1941 | G.R. No. L-48100

FACTS:

Gregorio Palatino was convicted of atendado contra la autoridad y sus

agentes in 1912 and was sentenced to imprisonment for two years, four
months, and one day of prision correccional. In 1915, he was granted
conditional pardon by the Governor-General.

Thereafter he exercised his right of suffrage, getting elected as councilor of

Torrijos, Marinduque from 1918 to 1921, municipal president of the same
municipality for three successive terms from 1922 to 1931, and finally as
mayor in December 1940.

After having been elected as mayor but before assuming such post, Pelobello
was granted absolute pardon by the President of the Philippines, restoring
the former's enjoyment of his full civil and
political rights.

Quo warranto proceedings were instituted by Florencio Pelobello, who

claimed that having been convicted of a prior offense, Palatino did not have
the right to vote and be voted upon, and that such disqualification had not
been removed by the plenary pardon. This contention was pursuant to
Section 167, in relation with Section 94 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code
(CA No. 357).

ISSUE:

Whether or not Palatino is disqualified from voting and being voted upon.

HELD:

No, the Court held that the President's pardoning power cannot be restricted
or controlled by legislative action. An absolute pardon not only blots out the
crime committed but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction.
The Court also held that when absolute pardon is granted after the term of
imprisonment has expired, it effectively removes all that is left of the
consequences of such conviction.
 298

Monsanto vs. Factoran

Facts:

In 1983, Monsanto (then assistant city treasurer of Calbayog City) was

convicted by the Sandiganbayan of estafa thru falsification of public
documents. She was sentenced to jail and to indemnify the government in
the sum of P4,892.50. The SC affirmed the decision. She then filed a motion
for reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she was extended by
President Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted (at that time,
clemency could be given even before conviction).

On the strength of such pardon, she wrote the City Treasurer of Calbayog
asking for automatic reinstatement to her position without need of a new
appointment since it was still vacant. The letter was referred to the Ministry
of Finance (MF) which at that time had control over the City Treasuries. The
Ministry of Finance ruled in favor of Monsanto but said that appointment
was only to retroact from the date of she was given pardon. Monsanto asked
for reconsideration saying that the full pardon wiped out the crime and thus
her service in the government should not be considered to have interrupted.
Thus, the date of her reinstatement should correspond to the date of her
preventive suspension; that she is entitled to backpay for the entire period of
her suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the
proportionate share of the amount of P4,892.50.

The motion for reconsideration was referred to the Office of the President.
Executive Secretary Factoran reversed the ruling of MF, ruling that acquittal
and not pardon is the only ground for reinstatement in the public service
and entitlement to payment of his salaries, benefits and emoluments due to
him during the period of his suspension pendente lite.

Monsanto thus filed a petition before the SC. She contends that since the
pardon was given when her case was still pending on appeal before the SC,
no final verdict has yet been handed and consequently the accessory penalty
attached to the crime which is forfeiture from public office did not attached.
Also she contends that the pardon given before the final verdict is
tantamount to acquittal.

Issues:

1. What is the effect of absolute pardon?

2. Is Monsanto entitled to backpay?

 299

3. Is a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief
Executive, entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a
new appointment?

4. May petitioner be exempt from the payment of the civil indemnity

imposed upon her by the sentence?

Held:

1. Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power

entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual, on
whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has
committed. It is the private, though official act of the executive magistrate,
delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not
communicated officially to the Court.

While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of
guilt so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as though he
never committed the offense, it does not operate for all purposes. The very
essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt. Pardon implies guilt.
It does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction
thereof. It does not wash out the moral stain. It involves forgiveness and not
forgetfulness.

2. No. A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no

amends for the past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the
offender. It does not impose upon the government any obligation to make
reparation for what has been suffered. “Since the offense has been
established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or suffered
while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly
suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required.”

3. No. Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the
penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. But
unless expressly grounded on the person's innocence (which is rare), it
cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing. A
pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power from
refusing appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad character, a poor moral
risk, or who is unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction.

The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her

disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond
that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-
apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.

4. No. Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the Revised Penal
Code. It subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the
sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence.
Petitioner's civil liability may only be extinguished by the same causes
 300

recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due,
remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor,
compensation and novation. (Monsanto vs. Factoran, G.R. No. 78239
February 9, 1989)

People v. Guillen (G.R. No. L-1477)

January 18, 1950 | G.R. No. L-1477

FACTS:

On March 10, 1947, in an event sponsored by the Liberal Party at Plaza

Miranda in Quiapo, Manila, Guillen planted a hand grenade near the stage
and threw another one toward then President Manuel Roxas in an apparent
assassination attempt born out of Guillen's spite for the President over the
latter's perceived failure to fulfill his promises and his call for the passage of
the so-called parity measure. General Castaneda managed to kick the
grenade off the stage. However, its explosion caused the death of Simeon
Varela (Barrela). It also caused the injuries of Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro
Carillo, and Emilio Maglalang.

Guillen pleaded not guilty to the consequent charges of murder and multiple
frustrated murder filed against him. At one point, he even tried to use the
insanity excuse, but he was found to have been mentally stable.

Later on, by his own admission, he confessed to his crimes. He was

subsequently found guilty of all the charges and was sentenced to death.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the conviction of the accused was proper.

HELD:

No, the SC ruled that Guillen's actions on March 10, 1947 and their
penalties were covered by Art. 48 of the RPC, not sub-section 1 of Art. 49.
The Court said that by a single act -- throwing a hand grenade at President
Roxas -- he committed two grave felonies:
(a) murder and (b) multiple attempted murder.

At the same time, the murder of Varela was attended by the qualifying
circumstance of treachery, given that the victim was not able to put up a
defense against the attack, even though he was not the principal target.

And lastly, the Court ruled that the injuries sustained by the other victims
constitute attempted and not frustrated murder. The Court reasoned that
Guillen's failed attempt to kill President Roxas was due to some reason or
accident (General kicking the grenade off the stage) other than his own
spontaneous desistance.
 301

In the end the Court affirmed the death sentence handed out by the lower
court.

___
Art. 48, RPC: "Penalty for complex crimes -- When a single act constitutes
two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary
means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall
be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period."
 302

People vs. Meliton Buyco

G.R. No. L-539 January 27, 1948

FACTS: Appellant was convicted by the CFI of Iloilo in Criminal Case No.
405, wherein the information alleged that on or about February 22, 1946, in
the municipality of Oton, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, said appellant, being
a first class private of the Military Police in said province, with deliberate
intent, treachery and abuse of authority, and with a decided purpose to kill,
did then and there fire several shots with a Thompson submachine gun
against Ireneo Gellangala, Apolonio Ikoy, and Napoleon Zambales, hitting
them on different parts of their bodies and as a result Irineo Gellangala and
Apolonio Ikoy died and as a result Irineo Gellangala and Apolonio Ikoy died
instantaneously and Napoleon Zambales died a few days later. The evidence
discloses, as found by the same judge, that Apolonio Ikoy and Irineo
Gellangala died from bullets discharged by the same shot which was aimed
at the former. It will be remembered that the shot was fired from a
submachine gun and, as already stated, it appears that the appellant to
fixed the mechanism of his submachine gun that a single pull at the trigger
would fire several bullets automatically in succession.

ISSUE: Whether or not the killing of the victims with an automatic

Thompson SMG considered a complex crime? YES

RULING: The evidence discloses, as found by the same judge, that Apolonio
Ikoy and Irineo Gellangala died from bullets discharged by the same shot
which was aimed at the former. It will be remembered that the shot was
fired from a submachine gun and, as already stated, it appears that the
appellant to fixed the mechanism of his submachine gun that a single pull
at the trigger would fire several bullets automatically in succession. Viada
(Vol. II, 5th ed., p. 529), commenting on article 90 of the Spanish Penal
Code, corresponding to article 48 of our Revised Penal Code, gives an
example of the first case mentioned therein of a single act constituting two
or more grave or less grave felonies as follows: A person fire a gun against
another with intention to kill the latter, and not only kills him but also a
third person who was beside the victim: here, he says we have a single act, a
single shot, which produces two homicides. As to the death of Napoleon
Zambales, the evidence reveals that it resulted from another and different
shot by the same defendant-appellant from the same gun. The Spanish SC
in its judgment of February 7, 1879, held that a person who, posting himself
in front of four individuals, fires four shots with a pistol saying: "toma tu
toma tu," wounding two of them, is guilty of four different crimes of
discharged of firearm against a determinate person, two complexed with that
of physical injuries, since the four shots were produced by four distinct acts.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby modified so that appellant
 303

Meliton Buyco, as he is hereby, convicted of the crime of murder complexed

with homicide for the deaths of Apolonio Ikoy and Irineo Gellangala.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,vs.

VICENTEDE LEON Y FLORA, defendant-appellant.
G.R. Nos. L-25375 and 25376 October 8, 1926

FACTS:
- Vicente de Leon y Flora was prosecuted in the municipal court for two
crimes of theft, on the theft of Magat's rooster and the other that of Nicolas'.
Upon being arraigned, the accused pleaded guilty and was sentenced by the
municipal court in each to suffer the penalty of three years, six months and
one day presidio correcional, to return the stolen roosters to their respective
owners and to pay the costs in both cases.- In view of the evidence, the trial
court found the accused guilty of one crime of theft, holding that the theft of
the two roosters constituted but one crime, and taking into consideration
the circumstance that the accused is an habitual delinquent sentenced him
in said two cases to the penalty of three years, six months and one day
presidio correccional and to pay the costs.- The Attorney-General urges that
the penalty for two crimes of theft be imposed upon the accused for each of
the stolen roosters.

ISSUE:
- Whether or not the penalty the penalty for two crimes of theft should be
imposed upon the accused for each of the stolen roosters.

RULING:
Doctrine laid down in United States vs. Balaba (37 Phil., 260), according to
which, where the accused made no objection to the information on the
ground that it charged more than one offense, the prosecution properly
submitted evidence as to the commission of each and all of the offenses
charged; and the trial court also properly entered judgment of conviction of
each and all of these offenses which were established by the introduction of
competent evidence at the trial and should, therefore, have imposed the
prescribed penalties for each and all of the offenses of which the accused
was convicted.
This doctrine, however, is not applicable to the present case as two separate
complaints have been filed herein against the accused, but the trial court
convicted the accused in the two cases, considering the facts alleged in the
said complaints as constituting but one crime. For the foregoing, the
judgment appealed from must be, as is hereby, modified and the accused
Vicente de Leon y Flora is sentenced to suffer the penalty of six years and
three months presidio mayor, with the accessories of the law, and to pay the
costs.
 304

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. JUSTICE FRANCIS GARCHITORENA, SANDIGANBAYAN (First
Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Facts:

Petitioner was charged in the Sandiganbayan with violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA

3019, Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, allegedly committed by her
favoring “unqualified” aliens with the benefits of the Alien Legalization
Program. Petitioner filed this case to enjoin Sandiganbayan from proceeding
with the case, on the ground that it was intended solely to harass her as she
was then a presidential candidate. After her petition was dismissed, she
then filed a motion for inhibition of Presiding Justice Garchitorena.

[A lot of procedural issues and controversies were discussed, but for the
purpose of limiting this digest to Criminal Law 1, the author did not include
it.]

Petitioner next claims that the Amended Informations did not charge any
offense punishable under Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 because the official
acts complained of therein were authorized under Executive Order No. 324
and that the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Investigation adopted
the policy of approving applications for legalization of spouses and
unmarried, minor children of “qualified aliens” even though they had arrived
in the Philippines after December 31, 1983. She concludes that the
Sandiganbayan erred in not granting her motion to quash the informations.

In a motion to quash, the accused admits hypothetically the allegations of

fact in the Information. Therefore, petitioner admitted hypothetically in her
motion that: 1) she was a public officer; 2) she approved the application for
legalization of the stay of aliens, who arrived in the Philippines after January
1, 1984; 3) those aliens were disqualified; 4) she was cognizant of such fact;
and 5) she acted in evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the execution
of her official functions; thereby constituting the elements of the offense
defined in Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019.

It bears noting that the public prosecutors filed a total of 32 Informations

against the petitioner for the violation of such law.

Issue:
How is the violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019 committed?
 305

Held:
There are two ways of violating Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. These are: (a)
by causing undue injury to any party, including the Government; and (b) by
giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference.

Issue #2:
Whether or not the filing of 32 Amended Informations against petitioner was
proper.

Held #2: NO.

Only one crime was committed in petitioner’s case, and hence, there should
only be one Information to be filed against her.

The 32 Amended Informations charge what is known as delito continuado or

“continued crime” and sometimes referred to as “continuous crime.” A delito
continuado consists of several crimes but in reality there is only one crime
in the mind of the perpetrator. See full text for the discussion and examples
of delito continuado as discussed by SC.

In the case at bench, the original information charged petitioner with

performing a single criminal act — that of her approving the application for
legalization of aliens not qualified under the law to enjoy such privilege. The
original information also averred that the criminal act : (i) committed by
petitioner was in violation of a law — Executive Order No. 324 dated April
13, 1988, (ii) caused an undue injury to one offended party, the
Government, and (iii) was done on a single day, i.e., on or about October 17,
1988. The 32 Amended Informations reproduced in verbatim the allegation
of the original information, except that instead of the word “aliens” in the
original information each amended information states the name of the
individual whose stay was legalized.

The 32 Amended Informations aver that the offenses were committed on the
same period of time, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988. The strong
probability even exists that the approval of the application or the legalization
of the stay of the 32 aliens was done by a single stroke of the pen, as when
the approval was embodied in the same document. Likewise, the public
prosecutors manifested at the hearing the motion for a bill of particulars
that the Government suffered a single harm or injury.

SC ordered the Ombudsman to consolidated the 32 Amended Informations

into one Information charging only one offense.
 306

People v. Jaime Jose, G.R. No. L-28232

Facts:
On June 26, 1967, four principal-accused Jaime Jose, Basilio Pineda Jr.,
Eduardo Aquino and Rogelio Cañal conspired together, confederated with
and mutually helped one another, then and there, to willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, with lewd design to forcibly abduct Magdalena “Maggie” dela
Riva, 25 years old and single, a movie actress by profession at the time of
the incident, where the four principal accused, by means of force and
intimidation using a deadly weapon, have carnal knowledge of the
complainant against her will, and brought her to the Swanky Hotel in Pasay
City, and hence committed the crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape.

Having established the element of conspiracy, the trial court finds the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of forcible abduction
with rape and sentences each of them to the death penalty.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court made a proper ruling of the case considering
the element of conspiracy.

Held:

No, the trial court’s ruling was not proper. The SC ruled that since the
element of conspiracy was present, where the act of one is the act of all,
each of the accused is also liable for the crime committed by each of the
other persons who conspired to commit the crime. The SC modified the
judgment as follows: appellants Jaime Jose, Basilio Pineda Jr., and Eduardo
Aquino are guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape and
each and every one of them is likewise convicted of three (3) other crimes of
rape. As a consequence thereof, each of them is likewise convicted with four
death penalties and to indemnify the victim of the sum of P10,000 in each of
the four crimes. The case against Rogelio Cañal was dismissed only in so far
as the criminal liability is concerned due to his death in prison prior to
promulgation of judgment.
 307

PEOPLE v. JAIME TOMOTORGO Y ALARCON, GR No. L-47941, 1985-04-

30

Facts:

Jaime Tomotorgo y Alarcon, the accused-appellant in this case, appeals

from the decision... finding him guilty of the crime of... parricide for having
killed his wife Magdalena de los Santos.

Several... months prior to the occurrence of the fatal incident

Magdalena de los Santos had been persistently asking her husband to sell
the conjugal home which was then located at Sitio Dinalungan, Barangay
Cabugao, Municipality of Siruma, Camarines Sur.

She wanted... their family to transfer to the house of her husband's in-laws
which is in the town of Tinambac, Camarines Sur.

He did not like to abandon the house wherein he and his... wife were then
living.

Furthermore, he had no inclination to leave because he has many plants

and improvements on the land which he was then farming... about seven
o'clock in the morning, the accused left his home to work on his farm. Upon
his return at about nine o'clock that same morning, he found his wife and
his three-month old baby already gone.

he finally saw his wife carrying his infant son and bringing a bundle of
clothes.

He asked and pleaded with his wife that she should return home with their
child but she adamantly refused to do... so. When appellant sought to take
the child from his wife, the latter threw the baby on the grassy portion of the
trail

Incensed with wrath and his anger beyond... control, appellant picked up a
piece of wood nearby and started hitting his wife with it... accused picked
his wife in his arms and brought her to their home. He then... returned to
the place where the child was thrown and he likewise took this infant home.
Soon thereafter, Magdalena de los Santos died de spite the efforts of her
husband to alleviate her pains.

he reported the tragic incident to the Barangay Captain

 308

He also brought with him the piece of wood... pleaded not guilty to the said
offense

However, when his case was called for trial... his counsel manifested to the...
court that after his conference with the accused, the latter expressed a
desire to change his previous plea of not guilty to that of guilty.

Upon being re-arraigned, the accused entered a plea of guilty. He confirmed

the manifestations made by his counsel to the court regarding his desire to
change his initial plea. He expressed his realization of... the gravity of the
offense charged against him and the consequences of his plea. His counsel
was then permitted by the court to establish the mitigating circumstances
which were then invoked in favor of the accused.

court below found him guilty of the crime of parricide, but with three
mitigating circumstances in his favor, namely: voluntary surrender, plea of
guilty, and that he acted upon an impulse so... powerful as naturally to have
produced passion and obfuscation.

With the imposition by the court below of the penalty of reclusion perpetua
on the herein accused and the subsequent denial of his motion for
reconsideration of the judgment rendered against him, the accused through
his counsel filed a notice of appeal to this

Court.

Issues:

In his appeal, accused argues and contends that the lower court erred:

"1. In disregarding its own findings of fact which showed manifest lack of
intent to kill;

"2. In disregarding the provisions of Article 49 of the Revised Penal Code

which prescribes the proper applicable penalty where the crime committed
is different from that intended;

"3. In not following the mandatory sequence of procedures for determining

the correct applicable penalty;

"4. In denying the appellant the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law."

Ruling:

We find no merit in the appeal of the accused herein which assails only the
correctness of the penalty imposed by the trial court on him.
 309

Appellant submits that the penalty for the felony committed by him which is
parricide being higher than that for the offense which he intended to
commit, and which he avers to be that of physical injuries only, the
provisions of Article 49 of the Revised Penal Code which relate... to the
application of penalties should have been observed and followed by the trial
court.

Art. 49. Penalty to be imposed upon the principals when the crime
committed is different from that intended. In cases in which the felony
committed is different from that which the offender intended to commit, the
following rules shall be observed;

"1. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be higher than that
corresponding to the offense which the accused intended to commit, the
penalty corresponding to the latter shall be imposed in its maximum period.

appellant argues in his appeal brief

The felony actually committed, parricide, has a higher penalty (reclusion

perpetua to death) than the felony intended, qualified physical injuries
(reclusion temporal medium and maximum).

Hence, since the penalty corresponding to the felony intended shall be...
imposed in its maximum period, the prescribed penalty is therefore
reclusion temporal maximum.

Under Article 64,... When there are two or more mitigating circumstances
and no aggravating circumstances are present, the court shall impose the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by law, in the period that it may deem
applicable, according to the number and nature of such circumstances.

Appellant maintains the belief that he should be punished only for the
offense he intended to commit which he avers to be serious physical
injuries, qualified by the fact that the offended party is his spouse.

Pursuant to the sub-paragraph of paragraph 4 of Art. 263 of... the Revised

Penal Code and as his wife is among the persons mentioned in Art. 246 of
the same code, appellant contends that the penalty imposable should then
be reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods.

On this mistaken premise, appellant therefore... claims that the penalty

prescribed by law for his offense is divisible and he should thus be entitled
to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

These contentions of the accused are manifestly untenable and incorrect.

Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code expressly states that criminal liability
shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the
 310

wrongful act be different from that... which he intended and that the
accused is liable for all the consequences of his felonious acts.

The reference made by the accused to Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code
which prescribes graduated penalties for the corresponding physical injuries
committed is entirely misplaced and irrelevant considering that in this case
the victim died very soon after she was... assaulted.

We are in complete accord with and we sustain the ruling made by the
courts below that the accused is not entitled to the benefits of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.

Article 49 of the Revised Penal Code does not apply to cases where more
serious consequences not intended by the offender result from his felonious
act because, under Article 4, par. 1 of the same Code, he is liable for all the
direct and natural consequences... of his unlawful act.

Article 49 applies only to cases where the crime committed is different from
that intended and where the felony committed befalls a different person

We hold that the fact that the appellant intended to maltreat the victim only
or inflict physical injuries does not exempt him from liability for the
resulting and more serious crime committed.

As held by this Court in that case, the appellant is only entitled to the
mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong.

The trial court in its consideration of this case had added a recommendation
that "executive clemency be extended to the accused-appellant after his
service of the minimum of the medium penalty of prision mayor."

Considering the circumstances which attended the commission of the

offense, the manifest repentant attitude of the accused and his remorse for
his act which even the trial court made particular mention of in its decision
and the recommendation made by the Office of the Solicitor

General as well as the number of years that the accused-appellant had been
imprisoned, this Court can do no less than recommend that executive
clemency be extended to the accused-appellant, Jaime Tomotorgo y Alarcon,
or that his sentence be commuted so that he can now qualify... and be
considered eligible for parole.
 311

People of the Philippines vs. Joseph Orilla, G.R. Nos. 148939-40,

February 13, 2004, 467 Phil. 253

Facts:
In September 12, 1996 at around 3:00 o’clock in the morning, 15-year-old
Remilyn Orilla was sound asleep inside one of the rooms of their house
when she was suddenly awakened by a heavy weight pressing on her body
and found her brother, Joseph Orilla on top of her. Remilyn Orilla noticed
that she was naked from waist down. Joseph Orilla continuously pinned
down Remilyn Orilla’s body with his own. She struggled to free herself from
appellant but her efforts proved futile. Appellant held both hands of Remilyn
Orilla with one hand holding a knife with his other hand. He then forced
Remilyn’s legs apart and inserted his penis into her vagina. Remilyn felt
pain. She also felt some warm matter enter her vagina. Appellant remained
on top of Remilyn Orilla and, after a few minutes, she again felt the same
substance enter her vagina. Joseph Orilla was charged with two (2) counts
of Rape, both Information is identical and reads:

xxx the above-accused, by means of force or intimidation, armed with a

knife, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with REMILYN R. ORILLA, younger sister of accused, against her
will and consent. xxx

The trial court found Joseph Orilla guilty of only one (1) crime of QUALIFIED
RAPE and imposed on him the death penalty because while appellant
ejaculated twice in Remilyn’s vagina, the first and second ejaculations
occurred during one single body connection. However, instead of dismissing
the second case, the trial court considered it as a qualifying circumstance
for the purpose of imposing the death penalty.

Issue:
Whether the Regional Trial Court gravely erred when it imposed the death
penalty based on the following grounds:
1) Relationship;
2) Minority;
3) Use of deadly weapon; and
4) Second ejaculation

Held:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative.
 312

Relationship – Article 14 does not include relationship as an aggravating

circumstance. Relationship is an alternative circumstance under Article 15
of the Revised Penal Code. The list of aggravating circumstances in Article
14 of the Revised Penal Code is thus exclusive. Based on a strict
interpretation, alternative circumstances are thus not aggravating
circumstances per se. The Revised Penal Code is silent as to when
relationship is mitigating and when it is aggravating. Jurisprudence
considers relationship as an aggravating circumstance in crimes against
chastity. However, rape is no longer a crime against chastity for it is now
classified as a crime against persons. The determination of whether an
alternative circumstance is aggravating or not to warrant the death penalty
cannot be left on a case-by-case basis. The law must declare unequivocally
an attendant circumstance as qualifying to warrant the imposition of the
death penalty. The Constitution expressly provides that the death penalty
may only be imposed for crimes defined as heinous by Congress. Any
attendant circumstance that qualifies a crime as heinous must be expressly
so prescribed by Congress.

Minority – Amended Information did not allege Remilyn’s minor age. The
prosecution’s failure to allege specifically Remilyn’s minor age prevents the
transformation of the crime to its qualified form. Since the Amended
Information failed to inform appellant that the prosecution was accusing
him of qualified rape, the court can convict appellant only for simple rape
and the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua and not death. The information
must allege every element of the offense to enable the accused to prepare
properly for his defense. The law assumes that the accused has no
independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense

Use of Deadly Weapon – When the accused commits rape with the use of a
deadly weapon, the penalty is not death but the range of two indivisible
penalties of reclusion perpetua to death.

Second Ejaculation – It is not the number of times that appellant ejaculated

but the penetration or touching that determines the consummation of the
sexual act. Thus, appellant committed only one count of rape. Second
ejaculation is not also of one of the qualifying circumstances of Rape.
Therefore, it has no basis in law.

Proper Penalty – To determine the proper penalty, we apply Article 63 of the

Revised Penal Code. Article 63 states that the greater penalty, which is
death, will be applied when in the commission of rape there is present one
aggravating circumstance. The Supreme Court held that the aggravating
circumstance that is sufficient to warrant the imposition of the graver
penalty of death must be that specifically enumerated in Article 14 of the
Revised Penal Code. Since it is only relationship that is alleged and proven
in this case, and it is not an aggravating circumstance per se, the proper
penalty is the lower penalty of reclusion perpetua.
 313

People of the Philippines vs. Luzviminda S. Valdez, G.R. Nos. 216007-

09, December 08, 2015, 774 Phil. 723

Facts:
Among the subjects of the cases were the reimbursements of expenses of
private respondent Luzviminda S. Valdez (Valdez), a former mayor of
Bacolod City, particularly: cash slips were altered/falsified to enable Valdez
to claim/receive reimbursement from the Government the total amount of
P279,150.00 instead of only P4,843.25; thus, an aggregate overclaim of
P274,306.75.

The Public Assistance and Corruption Prevention Office (PACPO), Office of

the Ombudsman – Visayas received the joint affidavit, which was thereafter
resolved adverse to Valdez. Consequently, Valdez was charged with eight
cases four of which (SB-14-CRM-0317 to 0320) were for Violation of Section
3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, while the remaining half (SB-14-CRM-0321 to
0324) were for the complex crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru
Falsification… of Official/Public Documents under Articles 217 and 171, in
relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). All the cases were
raffled before public respondent.

Since the Ombudsman recommended “no bail” in SB-14-CRM-0321, 0322,

and 0324, Valdez, who is still at-large, caused the filing of a Motion to Set
Aside No Bail Recommendation and to Fix the Amount of Bail. She argued
that the three cases are bailable as a matter of right because no aggravating
or modifying circumstance was alleged; the maximum of the indeterminate
sentence shall be taken from the medium period that ranged from 18 years,
8 months and 1 day to 20 years; and applying Article 48 of the RPC, the
imposable penalty is 20 years, which is the maximum of the medium period.

Petitioner countered in its Comment/Opposition that the Indeterminate

Sentence Law is inapplicable as the attending circumstances are immaterial
because the charge constituting the complex crime have the corresponding
penalty of reclusion perpetua. Since the offense is punishable by reclusion
perpetua, bail is discretionary. Instead of a motion to fix bail, a summary
hearing to determine if the evidence of guilt is strong is, therefore, necessary
conformably with Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution and Section
4, Rule 114 of the Rules. Without filing a motion for reconsideration,
petitioner elevated the matter before the SC.
 314

Issue:
Whether an accused indicted for the complex crime of Malversation of Public
Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents involving an amount
that exceeds P22,000.00 is entitled to bail as a matter of right

Held:
Yes. Mañalac, Jr. v. People already resolved that an accused charged with
Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents
where the amount involved exceeds P22,000.00 is not entitled to bail as a
matter of right because it has an actual imposable penalty of reclusion
perpetua. In Mañalac, Jr., the defendants argued that they should be
allowed to post bail since reclusion perpetua is not the prescribed penalty
for the offense but merely describes the penalty actually imposed on account
of the fraud involved. It was also posited that Article 48 of the RPC applies
“only after the accused has been convicted in a full-blown trial such that the
court is mandated to impose the penalty of the most serious crime,” and
that the reason for the imposition of the penalty of the most serious offense
is “only for the purpose of… determining the correct penalty upon the
application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.”

This Court, through the Third Division, however, denied the petition and
resolved in the affirmative the issue of whether the constitutional right to
bail of an accused is restricted in cases whose imposable penalty ranges
from reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua. To recall, the
amounts involved in Pantaleon, Jr. were manifestly in excess of P22,000.00.
We opined that the Sandiganbayan correctly imposed the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and that the ISL is inapplicable since it is an indivisible
penalty. The rulings in Pantaleon, Jr. and analogous cases are in keeping
with the provisions of the RPC. Specifically, Article 48 of which states that in
complex crimes, “the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed,
the same to be applied in its maximum period.” Thus, in Malversation of
Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents, the prescribed
penalties for malversation and falsification should be taken into account.
Under the RPC, the penalty for malversation of public funds or property if
the amount involved exceeds P22,000.00 shall be reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua, aside from perpetual special
disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or
equal to the total value of the property embezzled. On the other hand, the
penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P5,000.00 shall be
imposed for falsification committed by a public officer.

Considering that malversation is the more serious offense, the imposable

penalty for Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public
Documents if the amount involved exceeds P22,000.00 is reclusion
perpetua, it being the maximum period of the prescribed penalty of
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to… reclusion perpetua. For
purposes of bail application, however, the ruling in Mañalac, Jr. should be
revisited on the ground that Pantaleon, Jr. was disposed in the context of a
 315

judgment of conviction rendered by the lower court and affirmed on appeal

by this Court.

The appropriate rule is to grant bail as a matter of right to an accused who

is charged with a complex crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru
Falsification of Official/Public Documents involving an… amount that
exceeds P22,000.00.

The pivotal question is: How should We construe the term “punishable”
under the provisions above-quoted? In Our mind, the term “punishable”
should refer to prescribed, not imposable, penalty. The October 10, 2014
Resolution of public respondent is spot on had it not confused imposable
penalty with prescribed penalty. Nonetheless, reading through the text of the
assailed Resolution reveals that the anti-graft court actually meant
prescribed penalty whenever it referred to imposable penalty. Therefore, in
essence, the ruling is correct.

If the complex crime of Malversation thru Falsification shall be imposed in

its maximum period, there is no doubt that, in case of conviction, the
penalty to be imposed is reclusion perpetua. The cases, however, are still at
their inception. Criminal proceedings are yet to ensue. This is not the proper
time, therefore, to call for the application of the penalty contemplated under
Article 48 by imposing the same in its maximum period. For purposes of
determining whether a person can be admitted to bail as a matter of right, it
is the imposable penalty prescribed by law for the crime charged which
should be considered and, not the penalty to be actually imposed.
 316

PEOPLE v. ANTONIO COMADRE, GR No. 153559, 2004-06-08

Facts:

Appellants Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano were

charged with Murder with Multiple Frustrated Murder... at around 7:00 in
the evening of August 6, 1995, Robert Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe, Gerry
Bullanday,... Rey Camat and Lorenzo Eugenio were having a drinking spree
on the terrace of the house of Robert's father, Barangay Councilman

Jaime Agbanlog, situated in Barangay San Pedro, Lupao, Nueva Ecija.

As the drinking session went on, Robert and the others noticed appellants
Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano walking. The three
stopped in front of the house. While his companions looked on, Antonio
suddenly lobbed an object which fell on the roof of the terrace.

The object, which turned out to be a hand grenade, exploded ripping a hole
in the roof of the house. Robert Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe, Gerry Bullanday,
Rey Camat and Lorenzo Eugenio were hit by shrapnel and slumped
unconscious on the floor.

After trial, the court a quo gave credence to the prosecution's evidence and
convicted appellants of the complex crime of Murder with Multiple
Attempted Murder

Issues:

Whether or not the appellants are guilty of a complex (compound) crime...

when it imposed on the accused-appellants the supreme penalty of death
despite the evident lack of the quantum of evidence to convict them of the
crime charged beyond reasonable doubt

Ruling:

The single act by appellant of detonating a hand grenade may quantitatively

constitute a cluster of several separate and distinct offenses, yet these
component criminal offenses should be considered only as a single crime in
 317

law on which a single penalty is imposed because the... offender was

impelled by a "single criminal impulse" which shows his lesser degree of
perversity.

Under the aforecited article, when a single act constitutes two or more grave
or less grave felonies the penalty for the most serious crime shall be
imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period irrespective of the
presence of modifying circumstances, including the... generic aggravating
circumstance of treachery in this case.

Applying the aforesaid provision of law, the maximum penalty for the most
serious crime (murder) is death. The trial court, therefore, correctly imposed
the death penalty.

Principles:

Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. When a single act constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means
of committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be
imposed, the same to be applied in its... maximum period.
 318

PEOPLE v. MELECIO ROBIÑOS Y DOMINGO, GR No. 138453, 2002-05-

29

Facts:

finding Melecio Robiños[2] y Domingo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of...

the complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion and sentencing
him to death.

fifteen-year old Lorenzo Robiños was in his parents' house at Barangay San
Isidro in Camiling, Tarlac. While Lorenzo was cooking, he heard his parents,
appellant Melecio Robiños... and the victim Lorenza Robiños, who were at
the sala, quarrelling.

orenzo heard his mother tell appellant, 'Why did you come home, why don't
you just leave?' After hearing what his mother said, Lorenzo, at a distance
of about five meters, saw appellant, with a double-bladed knife, stab
Lorenza on the right... shoulder. Blood gushed from where Lorenza was hit
and she fell down on the floor.

Benjamin Bueno, the brother of the victim Lorenza Robiños... went to his
mother's house for the purpose of informing his relatives that on the evening
of March 24, 1995, appellant had killed his uncle, Alejandro Robiños, at
Barangay Mabilang. However while Benjamin was at his mother's house, he
received the more distressing... news that his own sister Lorenza had been
killed by appellant.

Benjamin saw appellant who shouted at... him, 'It's good you would see how
your sister died.'

The police, together with Benjamin Bueno and some barangay officials and
barangay folk, proceeded to the scene of the crime where they saw blood
dripping from the house of appellant and Lorenza. The police told appellant
to come out of the... house. When appellant failed to come out, the police,
with the help of barangay officials, detached the bamboo wall from the part
of the house where blood was dripping. The removal of the wall exposed
that section of the house where SPO1 Lugo saw appellant embracing

[his] wife.
 319

Appellant and Lorenza were lying on the floor. Appellant, who was lying on
his side and holding a bloodstained double-bladed knife with his right hand,
was embracing his wife. He was uttering the words, 'I will kill myself, I will
kill... myself.'

The victim Lorenza Robiños was six (6) months pregnant. She suffered 41
stab wounds on the different parts of her body.

'That suspect (Melecio Robiños) was under the influence of liquor/drunk

[who] came home and argued/quarreled with his wife, until the suspect got
irked, [drew] a double knife and delivered forty one (41) stab blows

Pleading exculpation, herein accused-appellant interposed insanity.

Issues:

RTC... erred in imposing the death penalty on appellant

Ruling:

it nonetheless erred in imposing the death penalty on appellant. It imposed

the maximum penalty without considering the presence or the absence of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The imposition of... the capital
penalty was not only baseless, but contrary to the rules on the application of
penalties as provided in the Revised Penal Code.

Since appellant was convicted of the complex crime of parricide with

unintentional abortion, the penalty to be imposed on him should be that for
the graver offense which is parricide. This is in accordance with the
mandate of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which... states: "When a
single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, x x x, the
penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed

In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty consisting of two

indivisible penalties, the court is mandated to impose one or the other,
depending on the presence or... the absence of mitigating and aggravating
circumstances.

The rules with respect to the application of a penalty consisting of two

indivisible penalties are prescribed by Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code,
the pertinent portion of which is quoted as... follows:

"In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two
indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the application
thereof:

When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the

commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied."
 320

Indeed, because the crime of parricide is not a capital crime per se, it is not
always punishable with death. The law provides for the flexible penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death -- two indivisible penalties, the application of
either one of which depends on the... presence or the absence of mitigating
and aggravating circumstances.

Considering that neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances were...

established in this case, the imposable penalty should only be reclusion
perpetua

Principles:

The law on parricide, as amended by RA 7659, is punishable with reclusion

perpetua to death.

when the penalty provided by law is either of two indivisible penalties and
there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the lower
penalty shall be imposed.
 321

PEOPLE v. ARTURO PUNZALAN, GR No. 199892, 2012-12-10

Facts:

crime of double murder with multiple attempted murder,... Seaman 1

Class

(SN1) Arnulfo Andal, SN1 Antonio Duclayna, SN1 Evelio Bacosa, SN1 Cesar
Domingo, SN1 Danilo Cuya, and SN1 Erlinger Bundang were among the
members of the Philippine Navy sent for schooling at the Naval Education
and Training

Command (NETC) at

Zambales.

at around 5:00 or 6:00 in the afternoon, they went to the "All-in-One"

Canteen to have some drink. Later, at around 10:00 in the evening, they
transferred to a nearby videoke bar, "Aquarius," where they... continued
their drinking session.

a heated argument between SN1 Bacosa and appellant ensued regarding a

flickering light bulb inside "Aquarius."

When SN1 Bacosa suggested that the light be turned off ("Patayin ang
ilaw"),... appellant who must have misunderstood and misinterpreted SN1
Bacosa's statement belligerently reacted asking, "Sinong papatayin?,"
thinking that SN1 Bacosa's statement was directed at him.

SN1 Cuya tried to pacify SN1 Bacosa and appellant, while

SN1 Bundang apologized to appellant in behalf of SN1 Bacosa. However,

appellant was still visibly angry, mumbling unintelligible words and
pounding his fist on the table.

To avoid further trouble, the navy personnel decided to leave... and return to
the NETC camp
 322

Along the way, they passed by the NETC sentry gate... to give the sentries
some barbecue before proceeding to follow their companions.

Soon after the navy personnel passed by the sentry gate,... flagged down a
rushing and zigzagging maroon Nissan van

The sentries approached the van and recognized appellant, who was reeking
of liquor, as the driver.

Appellant angrily uttered, "kasi chief, gago ang mga 'yan!," while pointing
toward the direction of the navy personnel's group. Even before he was given
the go signal to proceed, appellant shifted gears and sped away while
uttering, "papatayin ko ang mga

'yan!"... an sped away towards the camp and suddenly swerved to the right
hitting the group of the... walking navy personnel prompting him to exclaim

"chief, binangga ang tropa!"

When they were hit by the vehicle from behind, SN1 Cuya and SN1 Bacosa
were thrown away towards a grassy spot on the roadside. They momentarily
lost consciousness.

SN1 Duclayna lying motionless on the ground.

Members of the local police soon arrived at the scene of the crime.

found the bloodied lifeless body of SN1 Andal lying on the side of the road.

When they asked appellant why he ran over the navy personnel, he simply
answered that he was drunk.

directly caused the death of

Andal and

Duclayna

In his defense, appellant testified that in the evening... he was drinking... at

the "Aquarius" videoke bar. When he sang, the navy personnel who were
also inside the bar laughed at him as he was out of tune.

informed... that the navy personnel would like to make peace with him. He
went back inside the bar... and approached the navy personnel.

appellant offered his hand but

Bacosa suddenly punched appellant's right ear.

 323

To avoid further altercation, appellant left the bar... went home driving his
van... they... passed by the sentry, somebody threw stones at the van

When he alighted and inspected the vehicle, he saw that one of the
headlights was broken. Thereafter, he saw SN1 Bacosa and another man
approaching him so he went back inside the van but the duo boxed him
repeatedly on his... shoulder through the van's open window.

When he saw the four other navy personnel coming towards him, he
accelerated the van.

RTC... found appellant guilty... appellant claimed... he may not be held

criminally liable as he merely acted in avoidance of greater evil or injury,...
His act of increasing his vehicle's speed was reasonable and justified as he
was being attacked by two men whose four companions were also
approaching.

Court of Appeals

AFFIRME

Issues:

Is appellant guilty of the complex crime of murder with frustrated murder?

Ruling:

The felony committed by appellant as correctly found by the RTC and the
Court of Appeals, double murder with multiple attempted murder, is a
complex crime contemplated under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code:

Appellant was animated by a single purpose, to kill the navy personnel, and
committed a single act of stepping on the accelerator, swerving to the right
side of the road ramming through the navy personnel, causing the death of
SN1 Andal and SN1 Duclayna and, at the same time,... constituting an
attempt to kill SN1 Cuya, SN1 Bacosa, SN1 Bundang and SN1 Domingo.

The crimes of murder and attempted murder are both grave felonies... as the
law attaches an afflictive penalty to capital punishment

(reclusion perpetua to death) for murder while attempted murder is

punished by prision mayor,... an afflictive penalty.
 324

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ARNORLD GARCHITORENA Y CAMBA A.K.A “JUNIOR”, JOEY
PAMPLONA A.K.A “NATO” AND JESSIE GARCIA Y ADORINO, accused-
appellants.

G.R. No. 175605

August 28, 2009

FACTS:

On September 22, 1995, at around 9:00 in the evening, Dulce Borero along
with his brother Mauro Biay y Almarinez was selling “balut” at Sta. Inez
Almeda Subdivision, Brgy. Dela Paz, Biñan, Laguna.

Dulce Borero was about seven (7) arms length away from her brother Mauro
Biay.

Accused Jessie Garcia called Mauro Biay and as Mauro Biay approached
Jessie, the latter twisted the hand of Mauro and Jessie’s companions (co-
accused) Arnold Garchitorena and Joey Pamplona began stabbing Mauro
repeatedly with a shiny bladed instrument. Witness saw her brother Mauro
struggling to free himself while being stabbed by the (3) accused, until her
brother slumped face down on the ground.

Arnold instructed his two co-accused to run away. Borero claims she
wanted to shout but nothing came out from her mouth. Witness went home
to call for her elder brother Teodoro Biay, but when they return to the scene
the victim was no longer there as he had been brought to the Perpetual Help
Hospital.

Trial Court: Guilty, Court of appeals: Affirmed, Supreme Court: Affirmed and
Modifications.

ISSUE:
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Is there conspiracy shown in the case?

HELD:

Yes, accuse appellants were together in performing the concerted acts in

pursuit of their common objective. Jessie Garcia grabbed the victim’s hands
and twisted his arms; in turn, Joey Pamplona, together with Arnold
Garchitorena, strangled Mauro Biay and straddled the Mauro Biay on the
ground, then stabbed him.

Direct proof is not essential for conspiracy, for it may be inferred from the
acts of the accused prior to, during or subsequent to the incident. Accused-
appellant Garcia also argues that there was no conspiracy, as “there was no
evidence whatsoever that he aided the other two accused-appellants or that
he participated in their criminal designs.” We are not persuaded. In People
v. Maldo, 307 SCRA 436 (1999) we stated: “Conspiracy exists when two or
more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit it. Direct proof is not essential, for conspiracy may be
inferred from the acts of the accused prior to, during or subsequent to the
incident. Such acts must point to a joint purpose, concert of action or
community of interest. Hence, the victim need not be actually hit by each of
the conspirators for the act of one of them is deemed the act of all.”

All conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the intent and the
character of their participation, because the act of one is the act of all.
Where there is conspiracy, as here, evidence as to who among the accused
rendered the fatal blow is not necessary. All conspirators are liable as co-
principals regardless of the intent and the character of their participation,
because the act of one is the act of all.
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RICARDO A. LLAMADO v. CA, GR No. 84850, 1989-06-29

Facts:

Petitioner Ricardo A. Llamado was Treasurer of Pan Asia Finance

Corporation. Together with Jacinto N. Pascual, Sr., President of the same
corporation, petitioner Llamado was prosecuted for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 in Criminal Case No. 85-38653, Regional Trial Court... of
Manila, Branch 49. The two (2) had co-signed a postdated check payable to
private respondent Leon Gaw in the amount of P186,500.00, which check
was dishonored for lack of sufficient funds.

Petitioner Llamado, even while his Appellant's Brief was being finalized by
his then counsel of record, sought advice from another counselor. On 30
November 1987, petitioner, with the assistance of his new counsel, filed in
the Regional Trial Court a Petition for Probation... invoking Presidential
Decree No. 968, as amended. The Petition was not, however, accepted by the
lower court, since the records of the case had already been forwarded to the
Court of Appeals.

Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a "Manifestation and Petition
for Probation" dated 16 November 1987, enclosing a copy of the Petition for
Probation that he had submitted to the trial court. Petitioner asked the
Court of Appeals to grant his Petition for

Probation or, in the alternative, to remand the Petition back to the trial
court, together with the records of the criminal case, for consideration and
approval under P.D. No. 968, as amended.

Issues:

whether or not petitioner's application for probation which was filed after a
notice of appeal had been filed with the trial court, after the records of the
case had been forwarded to the Court of Appeals and the Court of Appeals
had issued... the notice to file Appellant's Brief, after several extensions of
time to file Appellant's Brief had been sought from and granted by the Court
of Appeals but before actual filing of such brief, is barred under P.D. No.
968, as amended.
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Ruling:

Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of

imprisonment or a fine only. An application for probation shall be filed with
the trial court, with notice to the appellate court if an appeal has been taken
from the sentence of conviction. The filing of the... application shall be
deemed a waiver of the right to appeal, or the automatic withdrawal of a
pending appeal.

It will be noted that under Section 4 of P.D. No. 968, the trial court could
grant an application for probation "at any time" "after it shall have convicted
and sentenced a defendant" and certainly after "an appeal has been taken
from the sentence of... conviction."Thus, the filing of the application for
probation was "deemed .

"Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the

court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant but
before he begins to serve his sentence and upon his application, suspend
the execution of said sentence and... place the defendant on probation for
such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best.

An application for probation shall be filed with the trial court, with notice to
the appellate court if an appeal has been taken from... the sentence of
conviction. The filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the right
to appeal, or the automatic withdrawal of a pending appeal.

no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant

has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction.
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People v. Evangelista
G.R. No. 110898 February 20, 1996
Petitioner: People of the Philippines
Respondents: Hon. Judge Antonio C. Evangelista
Ponente: Mendoza, J

Facts:

Grildo S. Tugonan was charged with frustrated homicide in the RTC. The
RTC appreciated in his favor the priveleged mitigating circumstances of
incomplete self-defense and the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender. On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction but modified his
sentence. Private respondent filed a petition for probation, alleging that (1)
he possessed all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for
probation under P.D. No. 968, as amended; (2) the Court of Appeals has in
fact reduced the penalty imposed on him by the trial court; (3) in its
resolution, the Court of Appeals took no action on a petition for probation
which he had earlier filed with it so that the petition could be filed with the
trial court; (4) in the trial court’s decision, two mitigating circumstances of
incomplete self-defense and voluntarily surrender were appreciated in his
favor; and (5) in Santos To v. Paño, the Supreme Court upheld the right of
the accused to probation notwithstanding the fact that he had appealed
from his conviction by the trial court. RTC ordered private respondent to
report for interview to the Provincial Probation Officer. Chief Probation and
Parole Officer Isias B. Valdehueza recommended denial of private
respondent’s application for probation on the ground that by appealing the
sentence of the trial court, when he could have then applied for probation,
private respondent waived the right to make his application. The Probation
Officer thought the original sentence imposed on private respondent by the
trial court (1 year of imprisonment) was probationable and there was no
reason for private respondent not to have filed his application for probation.
The RTC set aside the Probation Officer’s recommendation and granted
private respondent’s application for probation. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents is qualified for probation under

PD 968 despite the fact that he had appealed from judgement of the trial
court
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RULING: No. Having appealed from the judgement of the trial court and
having applied for probation only after the Court of Appeals had affirmed his
conviction, private respondent was clearly precluded from the benefits of
probation.

Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court
may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon
application by said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal,
suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation
for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best;
Provided, That no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if
the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgement of conviction.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of
imprisonment or a fine only. An application for probation shall be filed with
the trial court. The filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the
right to appeal. An order granting or denying probation shall not be
appealable.

When the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. If an
appeal is truly meritorious the accused would be set free and not only given
probation. This is precisely the evil that the amendment in P.D. No. 1990
sought to correct, since in the words of the preamble to the amendatory law,
“probation was not intended as an escape hatch and should not be used to
obstruct and delay the administration of justice, but should be availed of at
the first opportunity by offenders who are willing to be reformed and
rehabilitated.”

The petitioner who had appealed his sentence could not subsequently apply
for probation. Llamado v. CA, 174 SCRA 566 (1989).The perfection of the
appeal referred in the law refers to the appeal taken from a judgment of
conviction by the trial court and not that of the appellate court, since under
the law an application for probation is filed with the trial court which can
only grant the same “after it shall have convicted and sentenced [the]
defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the period for
perfecting an appeal.
 330

PABLO C. FRANCISCO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE

HONORABLE MAXIMO C. CONTRERAS, respondents.

TAKE AWAY: Probation is a special privilege granted by the state to a

penitent qualified offender. It essentially rejects appeals and encourages an
otherwise eligible convict to immediately admit his liability and save the
state of time, effort and expenses to jettison an appeal. The law expressly
requires that an accused must not have appealed his conviction before he
can avail of probation.

FACTS:

Petitioner Pablo Francisco was accused of multiple grave oral defamation in

five (5) separate Informations instituted by five (5) of his employees, each
Information charging him with gravely maligning them on four different
days.

Petitioner’s woes started when as President and General Manager of ASPAC

Trans. Company he failed to control his outburst and blurted —

“You employees in this office are all tanga, son of a bitches (sic), bullshit.
Puro kayo walang utak . . . . Mga anak ng puta . . . . Magkano ba kayo . . .
God damn you all.”

After nearly ten (10) years, Makati MeTC found petitioner guilty of grave oral
defamation in four (4) of the five (5) cases filed against him, and sentenced
him to a prison term of one (1) year and one (l) day to one (1) year and eight
(8) months of prision correccional “in each crime committed on each date of
each case, as alleqed in the information(s),” ordered him to indemnify each
of the offended parties, Victoria Gatchalian, Rowena Ruiz, Linda Marie Ayala
Pigar and Marie Solis, P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P5,000.00 for
attorney’s fees, plus costs of suit. He was acquitted in the other information
for persistent failure of the offended party, Edgar Colindres, to appear and
testify.

Not satisfied with the Decision of the MeTC, and insisting on his innocence,
petitioner elevated his case to the Regional Trial Court, which affirmed his
 331

conviction. Accordingly, petitioner was sentenced “in each case to a

STRAIGHT penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS imprisonment . . . . “

After he failed to interpose an appeal therefrom the decision of the RTC

became final.

The case was then set for execution of judgment by the MeTC which, as a
consequence, issued a warrant of arrest. But before he could be arrested
petitioner filed an application for probation which the MeTC denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is still qualified to avail of probation

even after appealing his conviction to the RTC which affirmed the MeTC
except with regard to the duration of the penalties imposed.

RULING: Petitioner is no longer eligible for probation.

Section 4 of the Probation Law, as amended, clearly mandates that “no

application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant
has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction,”

Thus, his appeal now precludes him from applying for probation.
 332

LOURDES A. SABLE v. PEOPLE, GR No. 177961, 2009-04-07

Facts:

Petitioner, together with Concepcion Abangan (Concepcion), Ildefonsa Anoba

(Ildefonsa) and Valentine Abellanosa (Valentine), is accused in Criminal Case
No. CBU-35455 of Falsification of Public Documents under Article 172(1) in
relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal

Code.

Petitioner and co-accused Ildefonsa were arraigned on 20 July 1994 while

co-accused Concepcion was never arrested. During the initial trial, Atty.
Gines Abellana, counsel for all the accused, manifested that co-accused
Valentine was already dead and requested that his name be... dropped from
the information.

Petitioner and co-accused Ildefonsa are the grand-daughters of Eleuteria

Abangan, who is one of the registered owners of Lot No. 3608, which is
registered under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO-2740 in the
names of Andrea Abangan, Fabian Abangan, Sergio Abangan,... Antonino
Abangan, Perfecta Abangan and Eleuteria Abangan. Private complainant
Gaspar Abangan (Gaspar) is the grandson of Lamberto Abangan, who is a
brother of the registered owners of the lot. Petitioner, together with her co-
accused Ildefonsa, allegedly falsified an

Extrajudicial Declaration of Heirs with Waiver of Rights and Partition

Agreement, as the signatures contained therein were not the signatures of
the true owners of the land. Petitioner and Ildefonsa also allegedly caused it
to appear that a certain Remedios Abangan, who was... already dead, signed
the document.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of
Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. CEB-CR No. 81981, raising the sole issue of
whether or not the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion in
denying the application for probation.
 333

Issues:

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER DENYING
PETITIONER'S APPLICATION FOR PROBATION

Ruling:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the court finds accused Ildefonsa

Anoba not guilty. However, the court finds Lourdes Abellanosa Sable guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and hereby sentences her to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of FOUR (4)

YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY to SIX (6) YEARS.

WHEREFORE, accused's motion for reconsideration of the Order dated July

22, 2003, motion to recall warrant of arrest and motion to allow accused to
avail of the benefits of the Probation Law, all are hereby denied.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari under

Rule 65 is hereby DISMISSED. The Decision dated 14 December 2006 and
Resolution dated 21 February 2007 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
No costs

Principles:

Sec. 4. Grant of Probation.--Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial

court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant and upon
application by said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal,
suspend the execution... of the sentence and place the defendant on
probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may
deem best; Provided, That no application for probation shall be entertained
or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of...
conviction.

One of the requisites... of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or

any plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Where an appeal is available,
certiorari will not prosper even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of
discretion.[27] Accordingly, when a party... adopts an improper remedy, as
in this case, his petition may be dismissed outright.
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