Molina vs. CA (G.R. No. 125755, Feb.

24, 2003
(Rescissible Contract)

FACTS:

On April 23, 1984, petitioner, Molina a co-owner of a parcel of land executed a

Deed of Sale conveying his share in the said property to his sister Felisa. More
than four years after the sale, petitioner, upon the request of his sister, executed
another Deed of Absolute Sale in lieu of the first, covering the same share in favor
of Felisa's son, herein private respondent Margarito Flores and the latter's wife. On
September 5, 1990, petitioner alleged that the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
respondent spouses did not express the true will and intention of the parties making
the contract of sale not consummated. The trial court favorably ruled for the
petitioner. However, the CA reversed the RTC’s decision. Petitioner argued that
assuming that a contract of sale was entered into, it was not consummated as the
entire purchase price was not paid. Assuming that to be so albeit, by the Deed in
question petitioner acknowledged receipt of the P8,000 purchase price, it does not
by itself bar the transfer of the ownership or possession of the property, much less
dissolve the contract of sale. The contract remains but the payment of the price is a
resolutory condition, and the remedy of the seller is to exact fulfillment or, in case
of a substantial breach, to rescind the contract.

ISSUE:
WON petitioner can rescind the contract of sale under Art. 1191 of the Civil Code.

RULING:
No. The obligor in the present case complied with what is incumbent upon him by
paying the required installments. That petitioner, prior to the execution of the
impugned Deed, signed receipts identically denominated as "Kasunduan" under
which he acknowledged receiving sums of money as payment for his property,
which receipts were worded in the vernacular and could not have been mistaken or
misunderstood for anything else other than as evidence of the sale of his property,
seals the case against him.
Katipunan v Katipunan, G.R. 132415, January 30, 2003
(Voidable Contract)

FACTS:

Respondent Braulio Katipunan, Jr. is the owner of a 203 square meter lot and a
five-door apartment constructed thereon located at 385-F Matienza St., San
Miguel, Manila.
Petitioner Miguel Katipunan, entered into a Deed of Absolute Sale4 with brothers
Edgardo Balguma and Leopoldo Balguma, Jr. (co-petitioners), represented by their
father Atty. Leopoldo Balguma, Sr., involving the subject property for a
consideration of P187,000.00.
Respondent filed a complaint for annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale. He
contended that the said contract was obtained through insidious words and
machinations.
The TRC dismissed the complaint. The CA reversed the decision of RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether the consent of Braulio Katipunan, Jr., in the sale of his property was
vitiated rendering the Deed of Absolute sale voidable.

Ruling :
Yes. A contract of sale is born from the moment there is a meeting of minds upon
the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price. This meeting of the
minds speaks of the intent of the parties in entering into the contract respecting the
subject matter and the consideration thereof. Thus, the elements of a contract of
sale are consent, object, and price in money or its equivalent. Under Article 1330
of the Civil Code, consent may be vitiated by any of the following: (a) mistake,
(2) violence, (3) intimidation, (4) undue influence, and (5) fraud. The presence of
any of these vices renders the contract voidable.

The facts show that Braulio signed the deed without the remotest idea of what it
was (based on the transcript of the Court). The circumstances surrounding the
execution of the contract manifest a vitiated consent on the part of respondent.
Undue influence was exerted upon him by brother Miguel and Inocencio Valdez
(petitioners) and Atty. Balguma. However, they did not explain to him the nature
and contents of the document. Worse, they deprived him of a reasonable freedom
of choice.
Regal Films v Gabby Concepcion, G.R. 139532, August 9, 2001
(Unenforceable Contract)

FACTS:

In 1991, respondent Concepcion, a television artist and movie actor, through his
manager Lolita Solis, entered into a contract with petitioner for services to be
rendered by respondent in petitioner's motion pictures. Petitioner, in turn,
undertook to give two parcels of land to respondent, one located in Marikina and
the other in Cavite, on top of the talent fees it had agreed to pay. In 1993, the
parties renewed the contract, incorporating the same undertaking. Despite the
appearance of respondent in several films produced by petitioner, the latter failed
to comply with its promise. Thus, on May 1994, respondent and his manager filed
an action
against petitioner for rescission of contract with damages. In his complaint,
respondent contended that he was entitled to rescind the contract, plus damages,
and to be released from further commitment to work exclusively for petitioner
owing to the latter's failure to honor the agreement. Petitioner, on the other hand,
averred that both parties had executed an agreement which was to so operate as an
addendum to the 1991 and 1993 contracts between them. The agreement was
signed by a representative of petitioner and by Solis purportedly acting for and in
behalf of respondent Concepcion.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject addendum could be the basis of the compromise
judgment.

RULING:
No. The Courts agrees with the contention of the petitioner. Consent could be
given not only by the party himself, but by anyone duly authorized and acting for
and in his behalf. But by respondent's own admission, the addendum was entered
into without his knowledge and consent. A contract entered into in the name of
another by one who ostensibly might have but who, in reality, had no real authority
or legal representation, or who, having such authority, acted beyond his powers,
would be unenforceable. The adamant refusal of respondent to accept the terms of
the addendum constrained petitioner, during the preliminary conference to instead
express its willingness to release respondent from his contracts prayed for in his
complaint and to thereby forego the rejected addendum. Respondent's subsequent
attempt to ratify the addendum came much too late for, by then, the addendum had
already been deemed revoked
by petitioner.
Nazareno v CA , G.R. 138842, October 18, 2008
(Void/Inexistent Contract)

FACTS:

Maximino Nazareno, Sr. and Aurea Poblete were husband and wife. They had five
children, namely, Natividad, Romeo, Jose, Pacifico, and Maximino , Jr. Natividad
and Maximino, Jr. are the petitioners in this case, while the estate of Maximino,
Sr., Romeo, and his wife Eliza Nazareno are the respondents. During their
marriage, Maximino Nazareno, Sr. and Aurea Poblete acquired properties in
Quezon City and in the Province of Cavite. It is the ownership of some of these
properties that is in question in this case. Romeo was appointed administrator of
his father's estate. In the course of the intestate proceedings, Romeo discovered
that his parents had executed several deeds of sale conveying a number of real
properties in favor of his sister-PETITIONER, Natividad. These sales had no
consideration. One of the deeds involved six lots in Quezon City which were
allegedly sold by Maximino, Sr., with the consent of Aurea, to Natividad on
January 29, 1970 for the total amount of P47,800.00.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Deed of Absolute of Sale can be equated as a divisible
obligation.

HELD:

The Supreme court held that the Deed of Absolute Sale is an indivisible contract
founded on an indivisible obligation. As such, it being indivisible, it cannot be
annulled by only one of them. And since this suit was filed only by the estate of
Maximino A. Nazareno, Sr. without including the estate of Aurea Poblete, the
present suit must fail. The estate of Maximino A. Nazareno, Sr. cannot cause its
annulment while its validity is sustained by the estate of Aurea Poblete. An
obligation is indivisible when it cannot be validly performed in parts, whatever
may be the nature of the thing which is the object thereof. The indivisibility refers
to the prestation and not to the object. The Deed of Sale of January 29, 1970
supposedly conveyed the six lots to Natividad. The obligation is clearly indivisible
because the performance of the contract cannot be done in parts, otherwise the
value of what is transferred is diminished. Petitioners are mistaken in basing the
indivisibility of a contract on the number of obligors. In any case, if petitioners’
only point is that the estate of Maximino, Sr. alone cannot contest the validity of
the Deed of Sale because the estate of Aurea has not yet been settled, the argument
would nonetheless be without merit. The validity of the contract can be questioned
by anyone affected by it. A void contract is inexistent from the beginning. Hence,
even if the estate of Maximino, Sr. alone contests the validity of the sale, the
outcome of the suit will bind the estate of Aurea as if no sale took place at all.
Obligations and Contracts
(Case Digests)

Submitted to :

Judge Leoncio R. Bancoro

Submitted by :

Katrina Gay Visitacion-Piñero

College of Law and Jurisprudence,
Foundation University

Date Submitted:
May 29, 2023