016 CABANSAG v. FERNANDEZ enjoined.

October 18, 1957 | Bautista Angelo, J. | Freedom of Speech and Expression DOCTRINE: The Clear and Present Danger Rule, as interpreted in a number of
cases, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be
PETITIONER: Apolonio Cabansag "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high" before the
RESPONDENT: Geminiana Maria Fernandez, et al. utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the "substantive evil"
SUMMARY: Apolonio Cabansag filed in the CFI of Pangasinan a complaint sought to be prevented. And this evil is primarily the "disorderly and unfair
seeking the ejectment of Geminiana Fernandez, et al. from a parcel of land. 2 years administration of justice." Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot
thereafter, the court, Judge Villamor presiding, issued an order requiring the constitutionally be abridged unless there is a clear and present danger that such
stenographers who took down the notes to transcribe them within 15 days upon advocacy will harm the administration of justice. The Dangerous Tendency Rule,
payment of their corresponding fees. 3 years thereafter, the court, Judge Pasicolan on the other hand, has been adopted in cases where extreme difficulty is confronted
presiding, issued a similar order requiring the stenographers to transcribe their notes determining where the freedom of expression ends and the right of courts to protect
and decreeing that the case be set for hearing after said notes had been transcribed. their independence begins. If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which
From December 9, 1952 to August 12, 1954, no further step was taken either by the the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not necessary
court or any of the contending parties in the case. Apolonio Cabansag, apparently that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be
irked and disappointed by the delay in the disposition of his case, wrote the advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it
Presidential Complaints and Action Commission (PCAC) a letter where he claimed necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of
that “The undersigned has long since been deprived of his land thru the careful force, violence or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable
maneuvers of a tactical lawyer. The said case which had long been pending could effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil the utterance be to bring
not be decided due to the fact that the transcript of the records has not, as yet, been about the substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to prevent.
transcribed by the stenographers who took the stenographic notes.” Judge Morfe
ordered Cabansag to show cause in writing within 10 days why he should not be FACTS:
held liable for contempt for sending the letter to the PCAC which tended to degrade 1. Apolonio Cabansag filed in the CFI of Pangasinan a complaint seeking the
the court in the eyes of the President and the people. Judge Morfe issued another
ejectment of Geminiana Fernandez, et al. from a parcel of land. (TLDR: A
order requiring Cabansag’s attorneys to show cause why they should not likewise be
lot of postponements took place because the stenographers failed to
held for contempt for having committed acts which tend to impede, obstruct or
degrade the administration of justice.
transcribe their notes) The court set the case for hearing on October 27,
ISSUE: WoN the writing of the letter in question to the PCAC tended directly or 1948. Hearing was postponed to December 10, 1948. Only part of the
indirectly to put the lower court into disrepute or belittle, degrade or embarrass it in evidence was received and the next hearing was scheduled for January
its administration of justice. – NO. Analyzing said utterances, one would see that if 24,1949 when again only a part of the evidence was received and the case
they ever criticize, "the criticism refers, not to the court, but to opposing counsel was continued to October 4, 1949. The court ordered the stenographers who
whose tactical maneuvers" has allegedly caused the undue delay of the case. The took down the notes during the previous hearings to transcribe them within
grievance or complaint, if any, is addressed to the stenographers for their apparent 15 days upon payment of their fees, and the hearing was postponed until the
indifference in transcribing their notes. transcript of said notes had been submitted. Notwithstanding the failure of
We are therefore confronted with a clash of two fundamental rights which lie at the the stenographers to transcribe their notes, the hearing was set for March
bottom of our democratic institutions-the independence of the judiciary the right to 17, 1950. Two more postponements followed. On August 9, 1950, August
petition the government for redress of grievance. Two theoretical formulas had been 23, 1950, September 26, 1950 and November 29, 1950, hearings were had
devised in the determination of conflicting rights of similar import in an attempt to but the case was only partly tried to be postponed again. Three partial
draw the proper constitutional boundary between freedom of expression and hearings were held but these hearings were followed by three more
independence of the judiciary. These are the "clear and present danger" rule and the postponements and on August 15, 1951, the case was partially heard. After
"dangerous tendency" rule. (SEE DOCTRINE) Under such a state of affairs, this partial hearing, the trial was continued on March 6, 1952 only to be
appellant Cabansag cannot certainly be blamed for entertaining the belief that the postponed to May 27, 1952. No hearing took place on said date and the case
only way by which he could obtain redress of his grievance is to address his letter to was set for continuation on December 9, 1952 when the court issued an
the PCAC which after all is the office created by the late President to receive and
order suggesting to the parties to arrange with the stenographers who took
hear all complaints against officials and employees of the government to facilitate
down the notes to transcribe their respective notes and that the case would
which the assistance and cooperation of all the executive departments were
be set for hearing after the submission of the transcript. From December 9,
 1952 to August 12, 1954, no further step was taken either by the court or Morfe dismissed both charges but ordered Cabansag to show cause in
any of the contending parties in the case. writing within 10 days why he should not be held liable for contempt for
2. Apolonio Cabansag, apparently irked and disappointed by the delay in the sending the above letter to the PCAC which tended to degrade the court in
disposition of his case, wrote the Presidential Complaints and Action the eyes of the President and the people. Cabansag filed his answer stating
Commission (PCAC) a letter copy of which he furnished the Secretary of that he did not have the slightest idea to besmirch the dignity or belittle the
Justice and the Executive Judge of the CFI of Pangasinan, which reads: respect due the court nor was he actuated with malice when he addressed
"We, poor people of the Philippines are very grateful for the creation of your Office. the letter to the PCAC; that there is not a single contemptuous word in said
Unlike, in the old days, poor people are not heard, but now the PCAC is the sword letter nor was it intended to give the Chief Executive a wrong impression or
of Damocles ready to smite bureaucratic aristocracy. Poor people can now rely on opinion of the court; and that if there was any inefficiency in the disposal of
the PCAC to help them. his case, the same was committed by the judges who previously intervened
Undaunted, the undersigned begs to request the help of the PCAC in the interest of
public service, as President Magsaysay has in mind to create the said PCAC, to have
in the case.
his old case stated above be terminated once and for all. The undersigned has long 5. In connection with this answer, the lawyers of Cabansag, Roberto V.
since been deprived of his land thru the careful maneuvers of a tactical lawyer. The Merrera and Rufino V. Merrera, also submitted a written manifestation
said case which had long been pending could not be decided due to the fact that the stating that the sending of the letter of their client to the PCAC was through
transcript of the records has not, as yet, been transcribed by the stenographers who their knowledge and consent because they believed that there was nothing
took the stenographic notes. The new Judges could not proceed to hear the case wrong in doing so. Judge Morfe issued another order requiring also said
before the transcription of the said notes. The stenographers who took the notes are attorneys to show cause why they should not likewise be held for contempt
now assigned in another courts. It seems that the undersigned will be deprived for having committed acts which tend to impede, obstruct or degrade the
indefinitely of his right of possession over the land he owns. He has no other
administration of justice.
recourse than to ask the help of the ever willing PCAC to help him solve his
predicament at an early date. 6. The court rendered decision wherein Apolonio Cabansag and his lawyers
Now, then, Mr. Chief, the undersigned relies on you to do your utmost best to bring Roberto V. Merrera and Rufino V. Merrera were found guilty and sentenced
justice to its final destination. My confidence reposes in you. Thanks. the first to pay a fine of P20 and the last two P50 each with the warning that
Most confidently yours, a repetition of the offense will next time be heavily dealt with.
(Sgd.) APOLONIO CABANSAG
Plaintiff" ISSUE/s:
3. Upon receipt of the letter, the Secretary of Justice indorsed it to the Clerk of 1. WoN the writing of the letter in question to the PCAC tended directly or
Court, CFI of Pangasinan, instructing him to require the stenographers indirectly to put the lower court into disrepute or belittle, degrade or
concerned to transcribe their notes. The clerk of court referred the matter to embarrass it in its administration of justice. – NO. Analyzing said
Judge Morfe before whom the case was then pending informing him that utterances, one would see that if they ever criticize, "the criticism refers, not
the two stenographers concerned have already been assigned elsewhere. to the court, but to opposing counsel whose tactical maneuvers" has
Judge Morfe wrote the Secretary of Justice informing him that under the allegedly caused the undue delay of the case. The grievance or complaint, if
provisions of Act No. 2383 and the Rules of Court, said stenographers are any, is addressed to the stenographers for their apparent indifference in
not obliged to transcribe their notes except in cases of appeal and that since transcribing their notes.
the parties are not poor litigants, they are not entitled to transcription free of
charge, aside from the fact that said stenographers were no longer under his RULING: Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed, without
jurisdiction. pronouncement as to costs.
4. Meanwhile, Atty. Fernandez, counsel for defendants, filed a motion before
Judge Morfe praying that Apolonio Cabansag be declared in contempt of RATIO:
court for an alleged scurrilous remark he made in his letter to the PCAC to 1. We are therefore confronted with a clash of two fundamental rights
the effect that he, Cabansag, has long been deprived of his land "thru the which lie at the bottom of our democratic institutions-the independence
careful maneuvers of a tactical lawyer", to which counsel for Cabansag of the judiciary the right to petition the government for redress of
replied with a counter-charge praying that Atty. Fernandez be in turn grievance. Two theoretical formulas had been devised in the determination
declared in contempt because of certain contemptuous remarks made by of conflicting rights of similar import in an attempt to draw the proper
him in his pleading. Acting on these charges and counter-charges, Judge constitutional boundary between freedom of expression and independence
 of the judiciary. These are the "clear and present danger" rule and the a. If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state
"dangerous tendency" rule. has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not
2. The Clear and Present Danger Rule, as interpreted in a number of cases, necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence,
means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be
"extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high" before the advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language
utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force,
"substantive evil" sought to be prevented. And this evil is primarily the violence or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and
"disorderly and unfair administration of justice." Under this rule, the probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive
advocacy of ideas cannot constitutionally be abridged unless there is a clear evil the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the
and present danger that such advocacy will harm the administration of legislative body seeks to prevent.
justice. 4. Even if we make a careful analysis of the letter sent by appellant
a. Clear and present danger of substantive evils as a result of Cabansag to the PCAC, we would at once see that it was far from his
indiscriminate publications regarding judicial proceedings justifies mind to put the court in ridicule and much less to belittle or degrade it
an impairment of the constitutional right of freedom of speech and in the eyes of those to whom the letter was addressed for, undoubtedly,
press only if the evils are extremely serious and the degree of he was compelled to act the way he did simply because he saw no other
imminence extremely high. . . . A public utterance or publication is way of obtaining the early termination of his case. This is clearly
not to be denied the constitutional protection of freedom of speech inferable from its context wherein, in respectful and courteous language,
and press merely because it concerns a judicial proceeding still Cabansag gave vent to his feeling when he said that he "has long since been
pending in the courts, upon the theory that in such a case it must deprived of his land thru the careful maneuvers of a tactical lawyer"; that
necessarily tend to obstruct the orderly and fair administration of the case which had long been pending could not be decided due to the fact
justice. The possibility of engendering disrespect for the judiciary that the transcript of the records has not as yet, been transcribed by the
as a result of the published criticism of a judge is not such a stenographer who took the stenographic notes", and that the new Judges
substantive evil as will justify impairment of the constitutional could not proceed to hear the case before the transcription of the said
right of freedom of speech and press. notes." Analyzing said utterances, one would see that if they ever
b. In weighing the danger of possible interference with the courts by criticize, "the criticism refers, not to the court, but to opposing counsel
newspaper criticism against the right of free speech to determine whose tactical maneuvers" has allegedly caused the undue delay of the
whether such criticism may constitutionally be punished as case. The grievance or complaint, if any, is addressed to the
contempt, it was ruled that "freedom of public comment should in stenographers for their apparent indifference in transcribing their
borderline instances weigh heavily against a possible tendency to notes.
influence pending cases." 5. The only disturbing effect of the letter which perhaps has been the
c. The question in every case, according to Justice Holmes, is motivating factor of the lodging of the contempt charge by the trial
whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of judge is the fact that the letter was sent to the Office of the President
such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will asking for help because of the precarious predicament of Cabansag.
bring about the substantive evils that congress has a right to While the course of action he had taken may not be a wise one for it
prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree. would have been proper had he addressed his letter to the Secretary of
3. The Dangerous Tendency Rule, on the other hand, has been adopted in Justice or to the Supreme Court, such act alone would not be
cases where extreme difficulty is confronted determining where the freedom contemptuous. To be so the danger must cause a serious imminent
of expression ends and the right of courts to protect their independence threat to the administration of justice. Nor can we infer that such act
begins. There must be a remedy to borderline cases and the basic principle has "a dangerous tendency" to belittle the court or undermine the
of this rule lies in that the freedom of speech and of the press, as well as the administration of justice for the writer merely exercised his
right to petition for redress of grievance, while guaranteed by the constitutional right to petition the government for redress of a
constitution, are not absolute. They are subject to restrictions and legitimate grievance.
limitations, one of them being the protection of the courts against contempt. 6. The record shows that on January 13, 1947, or more than 8 years ago,
appellant Cabansag filed with the lower court a complaint against
 Geminiana Fernandez, et al. seeking to eject them from a portion of land proof showing improper motive on their part, much less bad faith in their
covered by a torrens title. On October 4, 1949, or two years thereafter, the actuation. But they should be warned, as we now do, that a commission of a
court, Judge Villamor presiding, issued an order requiring the stenographers similar misstep in the future would render them amenable to a more severe
who took down the notes to transcribe them within 15 days upon payment disciplinary action.
of their corresponding fees. On December 9, 1952, or almost 3 years
thereafter, the court, Judge Pasicolan presiding, issued a similar order
requiring the stenographers to transcribe their notes and decreeing that the
case be set for hearing after said notes had been transcribed. No further step
was taken from his last date either by the by the court or by the opposing
parties. Meanwhile, the stenographers were given assignment elsewhere,
and when this matter brought to the attention of the court by its own clerk of
court, said court in an indorsement sent to the Secretary of Justice expressed
its inability to take action in view of the fact that the stenographers were no
longer under its jurisdiction. And in said indorsement nothing was said
about its readiness to continue the trial even in the absence of the transcript
of the notes.
7. Under such a state of affairs, appellant Cabansag cannot certainly be
blamed for entertaining the belief that the only way by which he could
obtain redress of his grievance is to address his letter to the PCAC
which after all is the office created by the late President to receive and
hear all complaints against officials and employees of the government
to facilitate which the assistance and cooperation of all the executive
departments were enjoined. And one of the departments that come under
the control of the President is the Department of Justice which under the
law has administrative supervision over courts of first instance. The PCAC
is part of the Office of the President. It can, therefore, be said that the letter
of Cabansag though sent to the PCAC is intended for the Department of
Justice where it properly belongs. Consequently, the sending of that letter
may be considered as one sent to the Department of Justice and as such
cannot constitute undue publication that would place him beyond the mantle
of protection of our constitution.
8. We would only add one word in connection with the participation in the
incident of Cabansag's co-appellants, Attys. Roberto V. Merrera and Rufino
V. Merrera. While the conduct of Cabansag may be justified considering
that, being a layman, he is unaware of the technical rules of law and
procedure which may place him under the protective mantle of our
constitution, such does not obtain with regard to his co-appellants. Being
learned in the law and officers of the court, they should have acted with
more care and circumspection in advising their client to avoid undue
embarrassment to the court or unnecessary interference with the normal
course of its proceedings. Their duty as lawyers is always to observe utmost
respect to the court and defend it against unjust criticism and clamor. Had
they observed a more judicious behavior, they would have avoided the
unpleasant incident that had arisen. However, the record is bereft of any