ISSN 1019-3316, Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2022, Vol. 92, Suppl. 6, pp. S534–S542.

© The Author(s), 2022. This article is an open access publication.

Russian Text © The Author(s), 2022, published in Obshchestvennye Nauki i Sovremennost’, 2022, No. 4.

Security Challenges

Development of the Chinese A2/AD System

in the Context of US–China Relations
M. G. Yevtodyeva#
Primakov National Research Institute of the World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO),
Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia
e-mail: mariannaevt@imemo.ru

Abstract—In recent years, the growing arms race between the United States and China has begun to affect
almost all areas of the offensive and defensive military potential of the two countries. One of its key directions
is the development of the Chinese anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) system, aimed at blocking enemy’s mil-
itary actions, information tools, and capabilities in various zones of the theater of operations, as well as the
US response to counter this strategy. The Chinese A2/AD concept and its correlation with the doctrine of
development of the Chinese Armed Forces are analyzed. Additionally, based on systematic analysis and anal-
ysis of sources and statistical data, the dynamics of strengthening the main elements of China’s A2/AD system
over the past decade is discussed, including high-precision missiles, ground and air defense systems, fourth-
generation tactical aircraft, electronic warfare, antisatellite weapons, and cyberwarfare. Several conclusions
are made as to the effect of these processes on the US doctrines and principles of deploying forces in the
Asia–Pacific region.

Keywords: United States, China, anti-access/area denial, missiles, air defense, tactical aviation, cyberopera-
tions, electronic warfare
DOI: 10.1134/S1019331622120048

The growing contradictions between China and the of military technologies in China.1 At the same time,
United States over the past few decades have increas- the doctrines of the use of relevant weapons are being
ingly manifested themselves in their policies regarding reviewed in the same direction, including the concepts
the development of modern weapons and in the doc- of nuclear and conventional deterrence, force projec-
trines of the use of armed forces. The growing arms tion, network-centric warfare, and information war-
race in recent years has affected almost all the areas of fare [Kashin and Lukin, 2021; Kamennov, 2019; Mili-
development of the offensive and defensive military tary and Security Developments…, 2021; Montgomery,
potential of the two countries, including their strategic 2014].
nuclear forces and conventional forces. It can be This paper examines the development in the PRC
traced in the race of high-precision weapons, land and in the last decade of the systems of anti-access/area
sea-based air defense an missile defense systems, denial (A2/AD systems), which are important for
space warfare, and hypersonic weapon systems. These strengthening the conventional forces and means of
processes have especially escalated in the past few the armed forces, as well as for combat operations in
years, when the period of confrontation between order to block the actions of the enemy from the point
Washington and Beijing in the military–political of view of its offensive opportunities and information
sphere, along with the development of cooperation in means of their provision. The corresponding Chinese
other areas (primarily in bilateral trade), gave way to Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy was devel-
the large-scale aggravation of bilateral relations oped just over a decade ago as an answer to the ques-
against the backdrop of a tougher, in the opinion of the tion of how China could counteract the likely military
United States, course by China in the Asia–Pacific scenarios of US actions (including interservice opera-
region (APR) and adjacent seas, strengthening Chi- tion) in the event of interference by US forces or their
nese strategic forces and capabilities of intelligence allies in possible conflicts involving the PRC, and with
and surveillance systems, and developing a wide range
1 Since
2017, the US National Security Strategy, the National
# Marianna
Georgievna Yevtodyeva, Cand. Sci. (Polit.) is a Defense Strategy, and other US strategic documents have begun
Senior Researcher at the Center for International Security of the to note the growing trend of military confrontation between the
Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and leading powers. The most likely opponents of the United States
International Relations, RAS (IMEMO RAS). are named Russia and China.

S534
 DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHINESE A2/AD SYSTEM S535

the help of which military means the PRC can control A2/AD tools allow solving a wide range of operational
strategically important maritime zones in case of a tasks. First of all, we are talking about strengthening
military escalation. At the same time, this strategy (its the interaction between the branches of the armed
other common name is the “counterintervention” forces within the framework of the operation; increas-
strategy) took into account that the United States has ing the combat stability and survivability of inter-
superiority over China in aviation; warships and naval branch forces and assets, including through their
weapon systems; command, control, communica- distributed formation; development of combat infor-
tions, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and mation networks (including interbranch ones), inte-
reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems; and other combat grating reconnaissance and strike capabilities in the
and information assets in these zones. theater of operation; increasing the effectiveness of the
Various aspects of the A2/AD concept have been use of high-precision weapons as the main combat
widely studied in recent years by foreign (primarily means; etc. Combined within a specific operation, all
Chinese and American) and Russian experts. The these assets—from guided missiles to submarines and
problems of the US response to the formation in cyberweapons—serve the chief goal: blocking enemy
China of a system of anti-access/area denial and other access and actions in certain areas of the battlefield
related programs of the PRC’s military development [LaGron, 2015].
were considered by M. Kofman, E. Montgomery, The Chinese concept of A2/AD was developed in
D. Ochmanek, L. Jinghua, and other authors the 2000s; moreover, in the same period, the People’s
[Kofman, 2019; Montgomery, 2014; Ochmanek, 2014; Liberation Army of China (PLA) abandoned the doc-
Jinghua, 2019]. There were also discussions on the trine of “people’s war,” aimed at a massive build-up of
possible consequences of the US–China conflict in conventional forces, and switched to the doctrine of
the Western Pacific with the use of A2/AD systems on information (or informatized) war aimed at strength-
both sides [Gompert, et al., 2016]. A number of studies ening high-tech combat forces while relying on
compared the Russian and Chinese approaches to the A2/AD means. In response to the PRC’s efforts to
development of A2/AD assets and also analyzed the increase anti-access/area denial capabilities against
American concept of an AirSea Battle, which became the US Air Force and Navy, the United States intro-
one of the responses to strengthening China’s coun- duced the AirSea Battle concept in 2010, an opera-
terintervention capabilities [Kofman, 2020; Kazianis, tional concept that gives the US forces opportunities
2014]. Many Russian researchers have also paid atten- to counter an adversary in a nonpermissive strategic
tion to this issue, including in the context of the devel- environment. In the context of countering China, it,
opment of the PRC’s strategic and nonstrategic forces along with an appropriate set of military tools, aims to
[Arbatov, 2022; Bogdanov and Yevtodyeva, 2021; “open access” to a potential battlefield through a
Kamennov, 2019; Kashin, 2016]. blinding campaign against PLA networks using attacks
The main objective of this paper is to analyze the on China’s command, control, computer, communi-
course and pace of the formation of the A2/AD system cations, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
in the PRC over the past decade and to assess the con- (C4ISR ) systems and its strike systems (including
sequences that these processes may have for the mili- missile launchers), as well as to seize and sustain the
tary and military–political strategy of the United initiative in the air, sea, space, and cyber domains
States in the Asia–Pacific region. [SIPRI Yearbook, 2015, pp. 272, 273; Cavas, 2013].
Since the development of the Chinese A2/AD doc-
trine and the American concept of AirSea Battle, both
FORMATION OF THE CHINESE A2/AD the United States and China have significantly
CONCEPT strengthened their air and naval forces in the APR—
According to an approach shared by many military along with their capabilities in the field of missile,
experts, the core elements of an effective A2/AD sys- cyber, and electronic weapons and antisatellite sys-
tem or specific weapons that provide a “counterinter- tems. Until the early 2010s, the PRC had at its disposal
vention strategy” include accurate ballistic and cruise only some components of the A2/AD system. How-
missiles; integrated multilayer surface-to-air defenses; ever, from the time the relevant doctrine was put for-
large numbers of fourth generation fighter aircraft and ward until the current stage, China’s potential in the
high-yield air-to-air missiles; near real time distrib- A2/AD area has been developing so actively that West-
uted surveilance and reconnaisance systems, and ern analysts are increasingly expressing concerns
command and control networks; electronic warfare about the consequences of these processes in the APR
systems (jamming); antisatellite weapons; and cyber [Montgomery, 2014; Ochmanek, 2014].
weapons [Ochmanek, 2014]. Taken together and con-
sidering the relatively recently developed modern con-
cepts of combat operations (the American concept of BUILDING UP A2/AD IN THE PRC
a multidomain operation and an interbranch AirSea In determining which specific means belong to the
Battle or the concept of joint information operations A2/AD potential, it is necessary, first, to emphasize
in the PRC) [Bogdanov and Yevtodyeva, 2021], the difference between the A2/AD and C4ISR systems

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S536 YEVTODYEVA

of modern armies. The C4ISR systems include all the are equipped: P-27, X-29, X-31, PL-15, PL-21, YJ-83,
means of collecting information (including intelli- and others.
gence), command, control, and communications Intermediate-range missiles Dongfeng-21 (with a
through a constellation of satellites and ground infra- range up to 4000 km) and Dongfeng-26 (3000–
structure. In addition to the radar and data transmis- 5500 km), which have been in service since the late
sion systems of fighter aircraft and warships, they also 1990s, can be equipped with both nuclear and conven-
include reconnaissance drones, early warning aircraft
(AEW), and several other systems. Accordingly, we are tional warheads3 and have maneuvering reentry vehi-
cles with improved performance in terms of range,
talking about a complex of information support for
payload, and speed, making them the most modern
own armed forces. A2/AD is an information and strike types of missiles of this class [Ukhov, 2019]. Dong-
potential configured to defend against enemy intru- feng-26 (the so-called “Guam killer”) can hit Guam,
sions and disrupt enemy’s information systems, as well where the largest US strategic military base in the
as provide subsequent target designation for own Pacific Ocean is located, from a distance of 4000 km.
forces based on the data received. Based on this logic, The Dongfeng-21D with a terminal radar-guidance
A2/AD does not include nuclear-armed systems system, or, as American sources describe it, the “air-
because they cannot be used for counterintervention craft carrier killer,” is today considered the only anti-
purposes. In other words, the A2/AD concept itself ship ballistic missile in the world. According to some
provides for the development of countermeasures, in estimates, it may pose a significant threat to US air-
fact, only against an attack using conventional weap- craft carrier groups in the Pacific.4 The new Dong-
ons, while the capabilities of nuclear forces and the feng-17 IRBMs, which have recently entered service,
concept of nuclear deterrence should be considered will also be dual-use systems and can be equipped with
as a separate part of the armed forces and military a hypersonic glide vehicle, capable of overcoming any
strategy. missile defense.
If we talk about China’s missile potential, i.e., If in terms of the total ammunition of the PRC
development and adoption of high-precision ballistic Rocket Force, which includes nuclear-armed ICBMs
and cruise missiles, it has been rapidly strengthening and IRBMs, expert estimates differ little [Yesin, 2020;
in the last decade in both nuclear and nonnuclear Military Balance, 2021, p. 230],5 it is rather difficult to
equipment. In the field of ballistic missiles, it consists estimate the total number of deployed Chinese missile
of the Dongfeng-5/5A/5B and Dongfeng- systems related to A2/AD. One can only assume that,
31/31A/31AG ICBMs, and the Dongfeng-41, which is considering the very wide list of types of correspond-
only just being introduced into the combat structure of ing missiles, it is at least several times greater than the
the PRC Rocket Force,2 as well as intermediate-range number of nuclear-tipped systems.
ballistic missiles (IRBMs) Dongfeng-21, Dongfeng- Tactical aviation of the PRC is actively developing,
26, Dongfeng-15, Dongfeng-16, and Dongfeng-17. In and in the last 10–20 years, an advantage has arisen
the context of A2/AD, one should not consider only due to entering into service of fourth-generation and
nuclear ICBMs and IRBMs that cannot be equipped 4+-generation aircraft, including Su-35 fighters. The
with conventional warheads (Dongfeng-5, Dongfeng- fleet of f ighter aircraft includes the Su-27SK,
31, and Dongfeng-41 ICBMs, as well as Dongfeng- Su-30MKK, Su-30MK2, and Su-35 delivered from
21A/B IRMs). Nevertheless, China has a lot of non- Russia, as well as their Chinese-made “analogues”
nuclear missile weapons “on the balance sheet.” J-10A/B/C/S, J-11B/BS, J-15, J-16, and J-20A.
Among intermediate-range ballistic missiles, there are According to Military Balance 2021, as of the end of
five types of missiles (Dongfeng-21C/D, Dongfeng-26, 2020, there were 886 aircraft of these types in the PRC
Dongfeng-15, Dongfeng-16, and Dongfeng-17); Air Force, and 153 aircraft in naval aviation. In addi-
among cruise missiles, missiles of two types: Dong- tion, the PRC Air Force and Naval Aviation have
hai-10A (CJ-10) and Donghai-20 (CJ-20). The
3 Dongfeng-21
A2/AD potential also includes a number of anti-ship in a conventional capable variants are represented
by Dongfeng-21C and Dongfeng-21D.
missiles that are in service in the Chinese Navy, 4 Since the beginning of its deployment, the Chinese leadership
including the S-802, KD-88 (cruise anti-ship mis- has stated that the Dongfeng-21D can hit large moving surface
sile), and some others. This should also include air-to- ships, including aircraft carriers. Several experts, having ana-
air and air-to-surface missiles of relatively long range lyzed the capabilities of the Chinese intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance system, doubt that the Dongfeng-21D and
and power, with which modern Chinese fighters, such Dongfeng-26B high-precision anti-ship ballistic missiles are
as the Su-27, Su-30, Su-35, J-15, J-16, J- 17, and J-20, currently capable of striking moving warships from a distance of
several hundred kilometers [Watanabe, 2021].
2 Dongfeng-5B, 5 The total ammunition of the PRC Rocket Force could be about
Dongfeng-31AG, and Dongfeng-41, the latest
most advanced missiles in their lineup, have a range of 11000– 340–350 missiles and 400–410 nuclear warheads. The number
14000 km and are equipped with means to overcome missile of ICBM launchers, according to the estimates of the US
defense and with several multiple independently targetable reen- Department of Defense, reaches approximately 200, and the
try vehicles (MIRVs) [Yesin, 2020]. number of IRBMs in service is slightly less.

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 DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHINESE A2/AD SYSTEM S537

260 JH-7 and JH-7A fighter-bombers. The latter are tional awareness without using (i.e., turning on) their
equipped with Russian Kh-29L and Kh-29T air-to- own radar systems.9 The PRC also provides early
surface guided missiles, as well as KAB-500kr guided warning capabilities through the supply of long-range
aerial bombs and their analogues. Since 2002, new S- and medium-range high-altitude unmanned aerial
803K anti-ship cruise missiles have been put into ser- vehicles (UAVs), which are used primarily in maritime
vice to equip JH-7A aircraft. surveillance. There are currently more than ten types
The latest Chinese fighter variants, such as the J- of UAVs in service with the PLA ground forces, naval
16, have improved performance and combat capabili- aviation, and the Air Force, including the heavy
ties. In particular, the J-16 is equipped with an active Pterodactyl I, Wing Loong, BZK-005, and ASN-
phased array radar (AFAR), while the Chinese Su-35s 229A, as well as medium UAVs BZK-006, BZK-007,
are equipped with less powerful radars with a passive and BZK-008 [Military Balance, 2021, pp. 250–255].
electronic scanning array. The development of the J- As for air and missile defense, today the PRC has a
16D aircraft, designed for electronic warfare, is under- fairly reliable multilayer air and missile defense system
way; it is currently undergoing flight tests [Military that covers the entire land territory of China and terri-
Balance, 2021, p. 232]. In addition, China, during spe- tory up to 550 km from its coast. It relies on a network
cial exercises, is exploring the possibilities of strength- of early warning radars, advanced fighter aircraft,
ening coordination between units of the Air Force, and various antiaircraft missile systems (SAMs).
naval aviation, special units of antisubmarine warfare, An important part of it is Russian S-300PMU and
etc. A significant number of such exercises are being S-300PMU1/PMU2 systems, purchased in the late
conducted in the region around Taiwan. 1990s–2000s, capable of tracking and hitting various
It should be noted that, within the framework of types of targets, including tactical aircraft, as well as
the PLA, in parallel with the development of A2/AD, cruise and ballistic missiles, at ranges up to 200–
the potential of aviation and naval systems related to 250 km.10 China has placed air defense system radars
C4ISR is increasing significantly. Thus, in 2020, the at key outposts in the South China Sea and on several
PLA Air Force was armed with about two dozen or types of destroyers, greatly increasing the range of
more AEW aircraft created on the basis of the Y-8 air- integrated air defense. The capabilities of AEW air-
craft,6 including 13–19 KJ-500s and 5 KJ-200s (Y-8Ws). craft also have the effect of expanding the coverage
In addition, four platforms were purchased from Rus- area of radars beyond the range of ground-based
sia for the most modern Chinese KJ-2000 AEW&C radars and SAMs. China also uses point defense, i.e.,
aircraft, developed in the 2000s on the basis of the the same air defense systems to protect strategic facil-
Russian A-50 with Chinese radars, which replaced the ities from long-range cruise missiles and enemy air-
Israeli radio-technical complex with an EL/M-205 craft. At the same time, air defense systems that
radar with three AFARs (Israel’s sale of such systems increase operational mobility are being strengthened,
to China in 2000 was blocked under US pressure) for example, the wheeled version of the HQ-17
[Linnik, 2017]. Electronic warfare (EW) aircraft were HQ-17A SAM adopted for service [Military Balance,
created by China also on the basis of the Y-8; in total 2021, pp. 230, 251].
there are up to ten aircraft of the Y-8CB/XZ type and For comparison, it can be noted that at the end of
four Y-9G. Up to 20 electronic reconnaissance aircraft 2010, according to the Military Balance, the basis of
are also in service, including Y-9 JZ/X/XZ, Y-8G, and China’s air defense system was just over 300 antiair-
the Soviet Tu-154. More than 40 special aircraft, craft missile systems, including HQ-7, HQ-9, HQ-12,
including AEW and electronic reconnaissance air- S-300, and S-300PMU1/PMU2. At the end of 2020,
craft, are in the PLA naval aviation [Khramchikhin, the PLA had already more than 850 antiaircraft mis-
2022].7 sile systems, including about 550 long-range systems
[Military Balance, 2011, p. 234; Military Balance,
EW and AEW aircraft, including the KJ-2000, 2021, pp. 254, 255]. Basically, the buildup is due to the
greatly facilitate the tasks of the Chinese Air Force and increase in the equipment of troops with Chinese air
Navy in collecting real-time intelligence and border’s defense systems: long-range HQ-9 and HQ-9B sys-
surveilance.8 They also allow PLA fighters to be less tems, medium-range HQ-2 and HQ-12 systems,
vulnerable to detection by providing them with situa- HQ-17/HQ-17А complexes, and HHQ-9 naval systems.
6 An improved version of the Y-8 is the Y-9, which is considered a
To improve the capabilities of its air defense in
2014–2015, China purchased from Russia 32 S-400
completely Chinese aircraft and is produced only in special ver-
sions. Triumph antiaircraft missile systems (several divi-
7 Military Balance 2021 data indicates a slightly smaller number of sions), which made it possible to expand the range of
AEW aircraft in service in the PLA Air Force: 19 AEW and
9 Previously,
19 EW aircraft. In naval aviation, according to the publication, this kind of capability provided the US Air Force
there are 24 AEW aircraft. with significant advantages in battles beyond the visual range.
8 In particular, the Y-8J is reportedly capable of detecting such Now the United States actually has lost these advantages in the
small objects as a submarine periscope within a range of up to event of a potential conflict with China [Bilsborough, 2013].
10The maximum range of fire of the S-300PMU2 is indicated.
185 km.

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S538 YEVTODYEVA

ground-based air defense up to the entire territory of the United States has 1300, and Russia has 170 [Arba-
Taiwan, as well as airspace over a significant part of the tov, 2022].
South China and East China Seas [Yevtodyeva,
In 2007, China successfully tested its ground-based
2018].11 An even more significant breakthrough for the anti-satellite weapons by destroying an orbital target,
PRC was coming to an argeement with Russia on the Fengyun meteorological satellite, with a medium-
assistance in the creation of a missile attack warning range ballistic missile. Since then, the PRC has con-
system [Valdai Discussion Club Meeting, 2019], tinued to conduct other anti-satellite weapons tests
which, apparently, provides for the construction in the [Weeden, 2020], as well as to develop anti-satellite sys-
PRC of over-horizon early warning radars modeled on tems and related technologies, including kinetic mis-
Russian ground-based early warning radar stations of siles, ground-based lasers, and orbital space robots.
the Voronezh type. Previously, China did not have the The capabilities for anti-satellite operations are also
appropriate technologies and capabilities in the field being worked out [Military and Security Develop-
of early warning of a missile attack (covering the terri- ments…, 2019, p. 56].
tory of the United States, Japan, and South Korea,
from where missile strikes could potentially be Thanks to the growth in the capabilities of deployed
launched). space systems, including communications satellites
In the past decade and a half, the PRC has and reconnaissance and surveillance satellites, the
achieved a number of significant successes in its space PRC was able to increase the role of command and
program, as well as in the development of anti-satellite control systems in joint operations. The PLA was also
systems. Thus, after a landmark test of anti-satellite able to improve significantly the geolocation and pre-
weapons in 2007, while simultaneously strengthening cision strike capabilities, continuous global satellite
the civilian component of the space program, China surveillance, military communications and data trans-
has demonstrated significant success in space pro- mission architecture. China’s active improvement of
grams related to C4ISR. The Beidou series of global C4ISR capabilities, as well as space and anti-satellite
positioning satellites (Beidou-2 and Beidou-3), a Chi- programs, could threaten the space assets deployed in
nese alternative to the GPS satellite system, achieved this region, as well as the potential of the Air Force and
full regional coverage several years ago, and global Navy of the US and its allies. This trend is also
coverage by 2020 [China to Complete…, 2019; Qian reflected by the assessments of American experts, who
and Xiaotong, 2020]. China has been successful in show that by the mid-2010s China actually overtook
modernizing and expanding its space launch infra- Russia in the deployment of A2/AD systems, becom-
structure under the leadership of the PLA General ing the second power after the United States in terms
Armaments Department. In general, the launch pro- of development of anti-access systems [Ochmanek,
grams of the Yaogan and Shijian series of satellites, 2014, p. 2].
which are used in the target designation system for
launching high-precision missiles and electronic In addition to the development of the A2/AD com-
intelligence satellites, are going well. ponents listed above, military analysts also see signifi-
cant cyber and electronic warfare capabilities as key to
According to Military Balance, in 2020 China had an effective PRC “counterintervention strategy” that
45 navigation and positioning satellites (15 Beidou-2 can effectively disrupt enemy’s command and control
and 30 Beidou-3 of various modifications), about systems and communications [Military and Security
30 military tactical reconnaissance satellites (designed Developments…, 2021, pp. 77–79; Kashin, 2016].
to track moving targets in a mode close to real time),
and 40 signal and electronic intelligence satellites As the advantages of cybermeans, it is indicated
(ELINT/SIGINT), including Yaogan-30/32, Shi- that offensive cyber operations will ensure the deter-
jian-6, and Shijian-11. It should be noted that, at the rence of the enemy or reduce its ability to conduct mil-
end of 2010, China had at its disposal only eight navi- itary operations against the PRC. In addition, with the
gation and positioning satellites (Beidou-1 and Bei- help of cyber operations, the PRC can manage an
dou-2), about 15 reconnaissance satellites, and eight escalation of the conflict, in the early stages of the
satellites with ELINT/SIGINT functions [Military conflict, by attacking and blocking information sup-
Balance, 2011, p. 480]. Thus, at that time, the total port and communications and control systems
number of Chinese military satellites launched into (C4ISR) in the enemy forces or by attacking critical
orbit was not about 130–140 (as at the end of 2020) civilian and military infrastructure to deter or disrupt
[Kamennov, 2019, p. 43; Military Balance, 2021, pp. intervention. The development of defensive cyber
250–255] but only 31. Several satellite programs—Bei- capabilities in the PRC is also of great importance due
dou, Yaogan, and others—were only at the initial to the specifics of counteraction in the information
stage. In total, according to available estimates, China sphere [Jinghua, 2019].12
currently has more than 350 satellites in orbit, while
12In
the cyber domain, after the first round of a cyber attack, the
11The
range of fire of the S-400 air defense system reaches 400 attacked side can respond with an accurate counterattack only if
km, and the target detection range is 600 km. it has a strong defense.

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 DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHINESE A2/AD SYSTEM S539

The PRC plans in the coming years to develop managed to improve its capabilities in the field of
capabilities commensurate with its status as a major cyber defense/cyber attacks and electronic warfare sig-
cyber country [Military and Security Developments…, nificantly compared to 2015. According to forecasts,
2021, pp. 77–79]; that is why it integrates offensive this capability will only be strengthened [Costello and
and defensive cyber operations and increases the num- McReynolds, 2018; Desai, 2019].
ber of joint military exercises that allow personnel to
test capabilities.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REGION
Actions in the field of electronic warfare (EW) dif-
fer from cyber operations in that they are carried out The capacity growth estimates also apply to the
not in the information (cyber) domain but in the elec- Chinese A2/AD system as a whole. The PLA certainly
tromagnetic spectrum. The electronic warfare strategy faces a number of obstacles that make it difficult to
focuses on the suppression, destruction, and interrup- take full advantage of the current systems and capabil-
tion of the operation of enemy electronic equipment: ities of C4ISR and A2/AD. These obstacles compli-
radars and sensors of data transmission systems that cate the functioning of a unified system of “network
operate at the radio, radar, microwave, infrared, and management” and information operations. For exam-
optical frequency bands. These types of operations are ple, despite the adoption of the latest communica-
also actively being developed by China. In particular, tions, intelligence, and surveillance systems, as well as
it was reported that the PRC fielded several types of the development of the EW, cyber and space warfare
UAVs with EW payloads, and that PLA EW units rou- potential interoperability problems remain. Further-
tinely train to conduct jamming and anti-jamming more, the troops lack experience in the use of the
operations against communication and radar systems appropriate technologies and systems. There is also a
or satellite systems [Military and Security Develop- kind of “technological gap” between PLA units that
ments…, 2019, pp. 63, 64]. have the latest high-tech A2/AD systems and equip-
ment and those that do not [Bilsborough, 2013]. But it
An important element in strengthening the poten- should be recognized that the overall capacity of
tial of the PRC in electronic warfare and cyber opera- China’s A2/AD assets has developed rapidly over the
tions was the formation, within the framework of the past ten years and will continue to strengthen in the
military reform of 2015, of a separate branch of the coming years [Gompert, Cevallos, and Garafola,
armed forces, which combined the entire potential of 2016]. At the same time, the PLA has goals to be ready
information confrontation and “intellectual war- to “win in informatized (network) local wars” with an
fare”—the Strategic Support Force (SSF) of the PRC. emphasis on confrontation at sea (as they are formu-
All forces, missions, and capabilities of technical lated in the 2015 PRC Defense White Paper) and to
reconnaissance, space, cyber and electronic warfare, win in “intellectual war” of a new type (China out-
as well as information and psychological warfare, lined such goals for the modernization of the PLA in
which were previously subordinate to two different 2020).
departments of the PLA General Staff, were brought An integral part of China’s approach to informa-
together in the SSF [Military and Security Develop- tized war will be the information and technological
ments…, 2021, pp. VII, 77–79; Kashin, 2016]. In fact, support (in the field of space and cyber operations and
the potential for “integrated network and electronic electronic warfare) that the strengthening of SSF will
warfare” was created, whereas previously in the PLA, provide, as well as the integration into a single system
the cyber defence and cyber operations units were not of offensive and defensive operations of other compo-
subordinated to the same structure, as well as EW and nents of the C4ISR and A2/AD systems. These
cyber warfare forces [Costello and McReynolds, changes will allow the PLA to increase significantly its
2018]. In addition, SSF,13 as a separate branch of the offensive capabilities against technologically powerful
armed forces, along with the PLA Rocket Force, adversaries, including the United States. Through
obtained powers not only for the construction of their “cross-domain integration,” the threat of Chinese
own forces but also for strategic operations. Thus, their attacks using conventional weapons and cyber warfare
status and opportunities for the development of appro- against various significant civilian targets and critical
priate capabilities increased. Several issues related to infrastructure will become a deterrent to possible mil-
SSF development are still not clear (for example, the itary operations [Desai, 2019].
peculiarities of the PRC doctrine on the use of force in For the United States, China’s progress in the
cyber domain, the level of professionalism of the per- development of the A2/AD system has already led to
sonnel of the units included in the SSF, the effective- consequences in military-political and military-stra-
ness of ongoing exercises, etc.). However, Western tegic sphere; this is reflected both in doctrines of the
experts generally share the opinion that the PRC has use of force and concepts of combat operations, and in
13They principles of deploying US forces in the APR. Gener-
consist of the Space Systems Department, which is
responsible for military space operations, and the Network Sys- ally speaking, the zone of free maneuvering of the
tems Department, which is responsible for technical reconnais- combat forces of the US fleet stationed in the APR is
sance, EW, cyber warfare, and psychological operations. being reduced (especially in the seas adjacent to the

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S540 YEVTODYEVA

PRC), and the operations of military aviation are also It is noteworthy that the Pentagon plans to solve
being complicated or prohibited. Accordingly, the the corresponding tasks, including blocking Chinese
United States is forced to adjust the principles for C4ISR and A2/AD assets, not solely at the expense of
deploying its warships, aircraft (strike and reconnais- its own combat forces deployed in the region. A num-
sance), and military and naval bases in the region. The ber of them, apparently, could be shifted “to the
United States recently redeployed the B-52 strategic shoulders” of the US allied countries, first of all, on
bombers from the island of Guam in the Pacific partners in the APR [Gompert, Cevallos, and Gara-
Ocean to North Dakota, thereby removing them from fola, 2016, pp. 56, 57]. This approach explains such
a potential strike from Chinese medium-range mis- regional military-strategic processes as the strength-
siles. In 2020, plans were unveiled to increase funding ening of the air/missile defense of South Korea and
to the US Indo–Pacific Command to equip joint Japan with the THAAD and Aegis missile defense sys-
forces, including those of US allies, with precision- tems purchased from the United States, the re-equip-
guided (anti ship and anti aircraft) weapons. It is also ment by the countries of Southeast Asia of warships
planned to create, primarily in Guam itself, an inte- and aircraft with modern radars and surveillance and
grated air and missile defense and strengthen the combat control systems, growing gratuitous transfers
groupings of troops in the region [Khodarenok, 2020]. or preferential purchases of American UAVs by South-
The Joint Pacific Command forces are tasked with east Asian countries, etc. All these processes, there-
preparing for one war between the great powers, in fore, not only indicate the growing nature of threats
addition to dealing with several smaller conflicts. The and the intensification of the arms race between the
change in US views on the principles of conducting United States, China, and between the APR countries
operations in the APR is obvious: the country is plac- in general, but also become a reaction to the active
ing more emphasis on the development of its own development of China’s reconnaissance and anti-
C4ISR and A2/AD assets deployed in the region, access/area denial systems.
including electronic warfare, air/missile defense sys-
tems, stealth aircraft, cruise missiles, etc. CONFLICT OF INTEREST
Many US military analysts share the view that, as The author declares that she has no conflicts of interest.
Chinese A2/AD capabilities strengthen further, the
cost of US losses in conventional forces against China
OPEN ACCESS
will only increase over time,14 especially in a scenario
of short-term but intense conflict. It is concluded that This article is licensed under a Creative Commons
the United States should rely not on “plans to destroy Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use,
China’s A2/AD capabilities in the first phase of the sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any
conflict” but on containment and de-escalation mea- medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit
sures, and at the same time on increasing investment to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
in combat platforms with increased survivability and the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes
“in the development of its own A2/AD assets” were made. The images or other third party material in this
[Gompert, et al., 2016, pp. XV, XVI, 19–21]. article are included in the article’s Creative Commons
license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the
The need to counter China as a powerful adversary material. If material is not included in the article’s Cre-
at sea, that in the past decade has significantly ative Commons license and your intended use is not per-
increased the number of ships of the main classes and mitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted
developed the “sea component” of the A2/AD poten- use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the
tial, is reflected in the new US Naval strategy Battle copyright holder. To view a copy of this license, visit
Force 2045, which the US Navy presented in the fall http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
of 2020. Its key aspects were shifting priorities in the
development and deployment of the fleet to light
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