Neopopulism and Neoliberalism

in LatinAmerica:
Unexpected Af nities

Kurt Weyland

Why have political populism and economic liberalism coexisted under Presidents Menem
in Argentina, Collor in Brazil, and Fujimori in Peru? In order to elucidate this surprising
convergence, which established conceptions of populism did not expect, this article
stresses some underlying affinities between neoliberalism and the new version of popu-
lism emerging in the 1980s. Both neopopulism and neoliberalism seek to win mass
support primarily from unorganized people in the informal sector, while marginalizing
autonomous organizations of better-off strata and attacking the "political class." They
both apply a top-down, state-centered strategy of wielding political power. Finally,
neoliberal efforts to combat Latin America's deep economic crisis yield some benefits
for poorer sectors, to which neopopulist leaders appeal, while imposing especially high
costs on many of the better-off opponents of neopopulism.

o the surprise of many observers, neopopulist politics and neoliberal econom-

T ics have converged in several new democracies of Latin America. Prime ex-
amples are the governments of Carlos Menem in Argentina (1989-present), Fernando
Collor de Mello in Brazil (1990-92) and Alberto Fujimori in Peru (1990-present).l
Contrary to the received wisdom, tough market-oriented adjustment and restructur-
ing have not necessarily undermined the popularity of these personal leaders; they
have even allowed Menem and Fujimori to strengthen their mass following, en-
hance their power, and win reelection. I argue that this combination of political
populism and economic liberalism is not simply a historical accident. Rather, it

Kurt Weyland is assistant professor of political science at Vanderbilt University. His work on Brazil
and on Comparative Politics/Latin America has appeared in Journal of Inter-American Studies and
World Affairs, Journal of Democracy, and International Studies Quarterly. Correspondence address: Box
1564-B, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN 37235. WEYLANK@CTRVAX.VANDERBILT.EDU

Studies in Comparative International Development, Fall 1996, Vol. 31, No. 3, 3-31.
4 Studies in ComparativeInternational Development / Fall 1996

reflects underlying affinities in their sources of political support and rejection, their
strategy of using state power, and their distribution of socioeconomic benefits.
Scholars did not expect populism and neoliberalism to coexist. Indeed, established
theories postulate a basic divergence between them. Drawing on dependency theory,
Cardoso and Faletto (1979, ch.5) and O'Donnell (1979, ch.2) associate the notion of
populism with the early stage of import-substitution industrialization, when steady
growth allowed personal leaders to attract a large following by enacting mass-
incorporating, moderately redistributive policies. According to this view, populism
would not be compatible with neoliberal restructuring, which includes tough auster-
ity measures, limits the distribution of benefits and is, therefore, expected to antago-
nize the mass of poorer people. The neoliberal policies on which many Latin
American countries have embarked in the last decade should thus preclude popu-
lism. 2 Liberal economists stress the same incompatibility. Thus, Sachs elaborated an
influential definition of populism as the pursuit of expansionary economic policies
that provide benefits to a wide gamut of social groups, yet avoid imposing costs on
elite sectors and, therefore, inevitably lead to economic crises. Neoliberalism, with
its insistence on fiscal discipline, calls for the complete opposite (Sachs 1989, 7-11;
Dornbusch and Edwards 1991).
How can these theories account for the recent convergence of populism and
neoliberalism under Presidents Menem, Collor, and Fujimori? Drake's "bait-and-
switch" interpretation of contemporary populism proposes an answer (Drake 1991,
36; similar Di Tella 1990, 92-97; Roxborough 1992, 425--6). In this view, politi-
cians in Latin America's new, weakly institutionalized democracies use populist
electoral tactics to gather support among the masses and win power; yet upon
assuming office, pressures from domestic elites and international economic forces
compel them to adopt tough market-oriented measures that diverge radically from
their campaign promises. The thesis of a drastic switch from leaders' populist stance
in the campaign to their neoliberal stance in government thus embodies the assump-
tion of the incompatibility of populism and neoliberalism.
This "bait-and-switch" interpretation certainly contains some truth. For instance,
it helps account for the striking turnabout of populist Fujimori, who rejected the
neoliberal campaign proposals of his adversary, Mario Vargas Llosa, but adopted
them himself upon becoming president of Peru. Nevertheless, this argument is
inadequate in empirical and theoretical terms. While it postulates a clear-cut se-
quence of populist electoral tactics and neoliberal governmental practice, leaders
like Menem, Collor, and Fujimori have, in fact, continued to use populist strategies
of winning mass support while enacting neoliberal economic policies. This simulta-
neity of political populism and economic liberalism contradicts the claim of a radi-
cal switch and the underlying incompatibility assumption.
The "bait-and-switch" interpretation is also theoretically unconvincing. In Latin
America's politicized democracies (Chalmers 1977, Power 1991), institutional struc-
tures are too weak to guarantee a president's power. Populist leaders would mn
great risks of facing widespread opposition if they betrayed their mass base after
taking office. In addition to securing their own position, presidents need to maintain
We,/land 5

minimal support among parliamentarians or state govemors, who are often (re-)elected
during the presidents' own terms. Furthermore, leaders try to perpetuate their power
by choosing their successor or preparing their own reelection. These political calcu-
lations create strong incentives for leaders to keep employing populist strategies
when in office--even when enacting neoliberal economic policies.
The incompatibility assumption underlying influential analyses of Latin American
populism thus seems to hinder--rather than to further--our understanding of crucial
experiences, such as Menem's and Fujimori's considerable success (despite enor-
mous cost) in turning around their crisis-ridden countries and winning reelection.
This article therefore proposes a reformulation of common conceptions of populism
in order to elucidate its continued viability in an age of neoliberal economics.

The Concept of Populism

Since the inadequate assumption of the incompatibility of populism and economic

liberalism is built into many definitions of populism, a conceptual clarification is
required. The relationship of populism and economic liberalism--their compatibil-
ity or incompatibility--should not be postulated by definitional fiat. In general, the
term populism should not imply an automatic association with certain economic
policies or socioeconomic structures. A purely political notion of populism there-
fore appears most appropriate and useful.
Drawing on the political aspects of multifaceted concepts of populism (Drake
1982, 218-26; Stein 1980, 10-3; Weffort 1986, 69-74), I define populism as a
political strategy with three characteristics: a personal leader appeals to a heteroge-
neous mass of followers, many of whom have been excluded from the mainstream
of development, yet are now available for mobilization; the leader reaches the
followers in a seemingly direct, quasi-personal manner that largely bypasses estab-
lished intermediary organizations, such as parties and interest associations; 3 if the
leader builds new organizations or revives earlier populist organizations, they re-
main personal vehicles with low levels of institutionalization.4 This definition fo-
cuses on the political core of populism.
Socioeconomic characteristics can be added to this political concept in order to
distinguish different types of populism. Populism varies, depending on its primary
mass constituency. While trying to attract a broad cross-section of "the people,"
populist leaders often focus their appeals on certain social strata that they find
especially available for populist mobilization. Thus, classical populists, such as Juan
Per6n in Argentina, had their primary following among urban workers and the
provincial lower middle class. By contrast, the neopopulists of the 1980s and 1990s,
such as Alan Garcfa in Peru and Fernando Collor in Brazil, sought support dispro-
portionately among the urban informal sector and the rural poor. Since workers
have a much higher capacity for collective organization than the informal sector,
they provide a more stable base of support for a personal leader, but also limit his
latitude with their own demands. In this way, classical populism and neopopulism
differ significantly. The strategic adaptation of personal leaders to different opportu-
nities and constraints thus creates different types of populism.
6 Studies in C~mparativr International Devdopmcm / Fall 1996

Economic liberalism, which insists on the predominance of the market as the

main mechanism of resource allocation, also assumes different forms. While the
classical liberalism of the 19th and early 20th century wanted to preserve existing
politico-economic structures, the neoliberalism of the 1970s to 1990s has promoted
profound reform. Classical liberalism defended the free-market system prevailing at
that time against demands for increasing governmental intervention. By contrast,
neoliberalism has tried to revert the enormous advance of state interventionism
since then. Yet it enlists the state as the main agent for recreating a free-market
system (Kahler 1990, 55). Also, while leaders invoke neoliberal ideas to justify
market-oriented change in Latin America, their reforms often include important
heterodox measures, and they do not aim at the complete elimination of state inter-
ventionism. This important dose of pragmatism facilitates the compatibility of
neoliberalism with neopopulism.

The Main Argument

A purely political concept of populism opens up the possibility of finding popu-

lism and economic liberalism compatible. Yet, it remains the task of empirical
investigation to assess whether and to what extent they are in fact compatible.
Descending on Sartori's "ladder of abstraction, ''5 I argue the following: At the most
abstract level, political populism and economic liberalism are compatible. More
specifically, neopopulism and neoliberalism have important affinities (in addition to
significant, widely noted tensions). At the most concrete level, neopopulism and
neoliberalism have formed an alliance in countries where expansionary, fiscally
irresponsible policies had produced byperinflationary crises. For instance, Menem
has needed Economy Minister Domingo Cavallo's capacity to guarantee economic
stability for winning reelection, and Cavallo has needed Menem's command over
political support for pushing through controversial market-oriented reforms.
The combination of neopopulism and neoliberalism under Menem, Collor, and
Fujimori draws strength from significant underlying affinities. While it is not an
historical necessity, it is more than an historical accident. Neoliberal neopopulism is
not just a marriage of convenience, but is reinforced by a seemingly odd, but mutual
attraction; only the perceived needs created by a deep crisis, however, have turned it
from a precarious love-hate affair into a fairly stable relationship.
In order to elucidate the complex neoliberal/neopopulist connection, this article
first explains the historical emergence of neoliberal neopopulism and then analyzes
their inherent affinities. In this way, the article seeks to counterbalance the common
emphasis in the literature on the divergences between neopopulism and neoliberalism,
which are undeniably important. For instance, neoliberals' insistence on universal
market rules diverges from neopopulists' interest in retaining political discretion,
and neoliberals' obsession with fiscal equilibrium conflicts with neopopulists' need
to buy support through spending programs. But since these differences are already
well known, this article concentrates on the equally important similarities.
WOand 7

Political Populism FIGURE 1 Economic Liberalism

The HistoricalEmergenceof NeoliberalNeopopulism

In the 1980s, populism reemerged in several of Latin America's new democracies

(Perruci and Sanderson 1989; Kaufman and Stallings 1991; Rea, Ducatenzeiler, and
Faucher 1992; Sanborn 1991). Socioeconomic modernization under the preceding
military regimes had weakened traditional mechanisms of elite control, such as
clientelism, and concentrated large numbers of people in urban centers. As democ-
racy returned, this mass of politically uncommitted people gained full rights of
participation. At the same time, political parties and interest associations in many
countries remained weak and unable to integrate most citizens into firm organiza-
tional networks. As a result, large numbers of people became available for populist
mobilization. The deprivations caused by the economic crisis of the 1980s made the
lavish promises of populist leaders particularly attractive. Populism therefore reap-
peared on the political scene, with special force in Brazil and Peru.
The prototypical case of this first wave of neopopulism was the presidency of
Alan Garcfa in Peru (1985-90). Garcfa rose to power by appealing especially to the
unorganized poor in Peru's huge informal sector, about half of the population. In
this way, he differed from classical populists like Per6n, who had drawn their
strongest support from industrial workers. Yet, since workers in Peru and other
Latin American countries had been incorporated into trade unions and parties and
had gained some capacity for autonomous demand-making over time, they were not
highly susceptible to renewed populist mobilization. By contrast, the informal sec-
tor remained excluded from most of the benefits of development and was politically
and organizationally largely uncommitted. With only limited capacity to advance
their interests successfully on their own, people from the informal sector were more
receptive to the promises of a populist benefactor (Sanborn 1991, 293-4, 340-54,
8 Studies in ComparativeInternational Development I Fall 1996

363-4; Crabtree 1992, 69-77; Cameron 1994, 42-8). Thus, the mass base of
neopopulism differed significantly from that of classical populism.
Garcfa's economic policies, however, bore a similarity to classical populism. He
w a n t e d to p e r p e t u a t e the e s t a b l i s h e d d e v e l o p m e n t m o d e l of state-led
import-substituting industrialization (ISI) and refused to combat Peru's economic
crisis through market-oriented stabilization measures. Instead, Garcfa's government
stimulated growth in order to overcome the bottlenecks that it held responsible for
the constant price rises. In this way, Garcfa managed to provide benefits to a vast
range of social groups, as classical populists had done. These heterodox policies
worked for about two years, but then led to a tremendous economic crisis, which
hurt especially the poor. Hyperinflation ravaged Peru from late 1988 on (Lago
1991, 270-316; Pastor and Wise 1992, 96-108).
In the mid- to late 1980s, Argentina and Brazil experienced a broadly similar
sequence of boom and bust, of temporary stabilization and resurgent inflation. Like
Garcfa, Presidents Ratil Alfonsfn (1983-89) and Jos6 Sarney (1985-90), who flirted
with neopopulism in 1985/86, tried to end economic crises without imposing costs
on important sectors. Poorer strata, especially in the informal sector, in fact, made
considerable gains in the early phases of these heterodox stabilization programs,
especially under the Brazilian Cruzado Plan of 1986. But the Alfonsfn and Sarney
governments failed to combat important causes of inflation, such as large fiscal
deficits, which were exacerbated by the drain on public resources caused by service
on the huge external debt. Prices soon started to explode, wrecking the economy
and undermining support for the government. In Argentina, runaway inflation trig-
gered social turmoil that forced Alfonsfn to leave office five months before sched-
ule (Baer and Beckerman 1989; Smith 1990).
These disasters suggested that the economic policies pursued by classical popu-
lists in the 1940s and 1950s and revived by the first wave of neopopulists in the
1980s were no longer viable. Resource constraints exacerbated by the debt crisis
made the distribution of benefits to a wide range of sectors unsustainable. Fiscal
profligacy was certain to boost inflation, which hurt the poor the most. There was
no easy, costless escape from the severe economic problems that had erupted in the
1980s. Austerity and other painful adjustment measures seemed to be in order.
Indeed, the failed efforts of Garcfa, Alfonsfn, and Sarney to shore up the estab-
lished development model, which used extensive governmental intervention and
protection from foreign competition to build up domestic industry, raised ever stronger
doubts about the model's continued viability. Could crisis-ridden countries afford to
sustain inefficient industries behind high trade barriers? Would these pampered
enterprises ever produce the foreign exchange required for reliably servicing the
external debt and for buying the inputs necessary for renewed development? How
beneficial to the economy was large-scale state intervention, which provided ample
opportunities for corruption and allowed special interests to obtain privileges at the
expense of the rest of society? Calls for profound economic restructuring grew ever
louder.
Thus, while populism made a comeback in several new democracies, it soon
We,/land 9

encountered seemingly insurmountable economic limits. Democratic politics stimu-

lated the revival of populism, yet economic constraints appeared to condemn it to
death. Indeed, while democracy opened the path for populism, the economic crises
exacerbated by populist leaders could threaten democracy itself. Peru, Argentina,
and Brazil thus appeared to face a stark dilemma: Either populists would continue to
win the presidency and keep mining the economy, or democracy would have to be
limited in order to prevent populism and impose economic stabilization.
Learning from the failure of their predecessors, Menem, Collor, and Fujimori
sought a way out of this dilemma: they used political populism to impose economic
liberalism, and in tum used economic liberalism to strengthen their populist leader-
ship. The three presidents thus adapted populism to the severe economic constraints
of the late 1980s. Confronting hyperinflationary crises, these second-wave
neopopulists made the best of the few political and economic opportunities that
were left; in fact, they turned adversity into advantage. They found broad-ranging,
though unorganized, support among the victims of the crisis, attacked economic
problems head-on through bold adjustment measures, and won acclaim as saviors of
their countries.
Collor, Fujimori, and Menem rose in neopopulist fashion. They appealed directly
(often via TV) to unorganized masses of people. 6 Collor and Fujimori, who lacked
any significant party organization, targeted especially the urban informal sector and
the rural poor. All three leaders won the presidency with disproportional support
from the less well-off sectors of society. 7 Yet upon taking office, all three presidents
imposed tough adjustment measures and initiated market-oriented restructuring. Thus,
they reversed the policies pursued by the classical populists of the 1940s and 1950s
and revived by the first wave of neopopulists in the 1980s.
The external constraints exacerbated by the debt crisis and the strong pressures
from international financial institutions bore much responsibility for this unexpected
adoption of neoliberal measures. Fujimori, Menem, and Collor learned the lesson of
Garcfa's, Alfonsfn's, and Sarney's failures and adjusted their policies to the inevi-
table. Yet, they also displayed a striking capacity to use economic challenges and
constraints to their own political advantage. Indeed, neoliberal policies did not
preclude continued populist politics. They even provided a number of new opportu-
nities for strengthening personal leadership. This synergistic effect rests on impor-
tant underlying affinities between neopopulism and neoliberalism.

InherentAffinities of Neopopulism and Neoliberalism

What are the affinities between neopopulism and neoliberalism? Contrary to plu-
ralism or corporatism, which stress the importance of intermediary organizations,
neopopulism and neoliberalism are antiorganizational in their majoritarian or indi-
vidualistic bent, respectively. In their conceptions of democracy, they stress count-
ing numbers ("one citizen, one vote") as the main decision criterion and, in principle,
refuse to recognize special weight, such as the economic clout of business groups. 8
Since in political practice, however, all democracies recognize special weight and
I0 Studies in Comparative International Devdopmcnt / Fall 1996

give small, yet influential groups political privileges, both neopopulism and
neoliberalism reject the established order, try to attract sectors it has left discontent,
and advance demands for change.
These shared principles give rise to three important affinities between neoliberalism
and neopopulism. First, there are some similarities in their sources of societal sup-
port. They both appeal to unorganized, largely poor people in the informal sector,
have an adversarial relation to many organized groups in civil society, and attack
the established "political class" as their main enemy. Second, their strategies of
applying power coincide in relying on a strongly top-down approach and in strength-
ening the apex of the state in order to effect profound economic reform and to boost
the position of the personal leader, respectively. Third, neoliberalism and neopopulism
have some similarities in their distribution of costs and benefits. Neoliberal adjust-
ment imposes particularly high costs on organized groups in civil society, which
neopopulist leaders seek to weaken. In contrast, by ending hyperinflation and enact-
ing targeted antipoverty programs, it benefits poorer sectors, which neopopulists
court. The following sections explain these affinities in greater depth.

Affinities in the Sources of Mass Support

SpecialAppeals to the Informal Sector

Both neopopulists and neoliberals (who also have powerful supporters among
well-off groups) try to gain a mass following by appealing to the main victims of
the established development model, import-substituting industrialization (ISI). ISI
provided considerable benefits to relatively better-off strata, including the industrial
working class. But, since job creation was limited, even in industry, large numbers
of people were confined to informal activities and often remained poor. Both
neopopulists and neoliberals center their efforts at finding mass support on these
strata, who are excluded from the formal economy and who lack strong organiza-
tions to assert their full rights of citizenship.
Like classical populists (Drake 1982, 236-7), neopopulists promise to incorporate
a heterogeneous mass of people who have remained excluded from the mainstream
of development. But they adapt the strategy of mass mobilization, which classical
populists used to attract, especially the working and lower middle classes (Kaufman
and Stallings 1991,16), to Latin America's current social and organizational struc-
ture. Neopopulists see the largely unorganized "marginal mass ''9 as the primary
reservoir of people who are nowadays available for populist mobilization. They,
therefore, center their appeals particularly on the urban underclass and the rural
poor. They often bypass established intermediary organizations (such as trade unions),
which have their strongest support among urban workers and lower middle sectors.
They use the unorganized mass to outflank organized civil society (Singer 1990;
Unger I990, 57-8, 380--4; Degregori and Grompone 1991, 23-36, 42-51).
Classical populism could not draw much support from these strata and left them
excluded. In its heyday, the rural poor were unavailable for mobilization because
Weylaad 11

landed elites kept them under tight clientelist control (Conniff 1982, 15; Drake
1982, 231; Cf. Mouzelis 1985, 332-9). Yet in recent decades, elite control in the
countryside has eroded with the capitalist modernization of agriculture and (usually
limited) land reforms. Therefore, many of the rural poor are now available for
political mobilization, especially in high-profile presidential campaigns.
Since the times of classical populism, the informal sector in the cities has also
grown enormously, swelled by a huge influx of poor people from the countryside
(Infante and Klein 1991). This marginal mass has benefited little from the state-led
ISI that classical populists helped establish. Due to limited job creation in industry,
many urban residents have had to survive on "income-earning activities unregulated
by the state" (Portes and Schauffler 1993,48), such as street vending, running small
unregistered repair shops, and performing services without legal rights. Most of this
burgeoning informal sector is quite poor; only small fractions are better-off than
formal workers.
Since most people in the informal sector have remained outside national-level
organizations, they are especially available for neopopulist mobilization. The het-
erogeneity of the marginal mass has hindered efforts to organize it, especially on a
supra-local level. Most social movements that mushroomed in Brazil and Peru
between 1975 and 1985 focused on local problems and formed only tenuous links--
often of a clientelist nature--to the national political system. Also, the military
regimes which held sway before the advent of democracy weakened political parties
and prevented them from sinking strong roots in the marginal mass.
The installation of democracy, however, enfranchised the urban informal sector
and the rural poor. The extension of suffrage to illiterates in Brazil and Peru opened
up an enormous reservoir of support for neopopulists (Pea, Ducatenzeiler, and
Faucher 1992, 137; Moisrs 1993, 580-1). For these reasons, neopopulists Menem,
Collor, and Fujimori have found large numbers of poorer people susceptible to their
appeals, l~
Interestingly, influential sectors among Latin American neoliberals have also tar-
geted poor marginals in their quest to attain electoral backing for their reform goals
(De Soto 1989; Pifiera 1993, ch.2; Espinal 1992, 36-7). In their view, the informal
sector, excluded from influence on the state, has not engaged in "rent seeking,"
which is rampant in the region's "politicized market econom[ies]" (Barzelay 1986).
Indeed, these neoliberals extol members of the informal sector as model entrepre-
neurs who demonstrate in their daily life that a market system can work in Latin
America and that it enjoys support among the population (De Soto 1989; Pifiera
1993, ch.2). Even dependently employed members of the informal sector could gain
from neoliberalism, especially a deregulation of the labor market, which would give
business people in the formal sector an incentive to hire more laborers (Portes and
Schauffler 1993, 55-6).
These neoliberals hope that the growing ilaformal sector can provide a popular
base and electoral support for their efforts to push back market-distorting state
interventionism. Those who have been excluded from and disadvantaged by the
special rights that public-private collusion confers upon small sectors should be
12 Studies in Comparative International Development/Fall 1996

interested in combating these unfair privileges. Neoliberals claim that the universal-
ist rules of the market will finally create a level playing field for the informals and
eliminate the protected niches of special interest groups. 11
Other neoliberals appeal to the poor mainly out of political expediency. Since the
marginal mass constitutes a substantial part of the voting population, sometimes
even a majority, it is a decisive reservoir of electoral support. Yet this tactic is also
based on a deeper affinity, namely, the priority that neoliberal social policy assigns
to anti-poverty measures targeted to the most destitute sectors. ~2 Many neoliberal
politicians, most prominently Fernando Collor, therefore, depict themselves as the
paternalistic benefactors of the poor.13 For all these reasons, neoliberals also target
the marginal mass as a crucial source of support.
Thus, neopopulists and neoliberals coincide in their special efforts to attract the
victims of the ISI model. Neoliberal neopopulists have indeed won disproportion-
ately strong backing from the informal sector and the rural poor. The candidate who
most clearly espoused the neoliberal/neopopulist combination, Fernando Collor,
won the presidential election of 1989 with the massive support of the unorganized
poor (Singer 1990, 137--41; Kinzo 1993, 322-5; Moisrs 1993, 582-8). His main
opponent, by contrast, Lufs In~icio Lula da Silva of the socialist Workers' Party
(PT), received disproportionate support from better-off, more educated, and more
highly organized sectors. While many of Brazil's strongest trade unions, profes-
sional associations, and social movements backed Lula, the most disadvantaged
groups tended to opt for Collor. For instance, in a poll held immediately before the
first round of the election, 35 percent of the poorest stratum announced its vote for
Coilor, compared to only 14 percent of the richest (Singer 1990, 138). Yet when
Collor's stabilization plans failed--due partly to resistance from organized groups--
his backing dwindled, although it continued to remain disproportionately strong
among the poor and less educated. 14
Fujimori and Menem, who openly embraced neoliberalism only after their vic-
tory, have often gained an especially high level of support in subsequent elections
and opinion polls from poorer strata. Due to his neopopulist appeals and to lasting
Peronist loyalties among the downtrodden, Menem has almost always found stron-
ger approval among the poorest Argentines than among better-off sectors. This was
the case even during the first two years of his term, when the government had great
difficulties in stabilizing the economy. Polls on vote intentions and electoral results
also confirm that the president and his party have consistently received dispropor-
tional backing from the less well-off (and the lower middle class) (Moray Araujo
1989a, 5; 1989c,19; 1990, 4, 39; 1991, 43, 45; 1994; De Riz 1994, 8). In the
Constituent Assembly elections of April 1994, for instance, poverty and vote for the
Peronist Party were correlated both in Greater Buenos Aires and at the national
level (Centro de Estudios 1991, 8-10, 27-9).
Opinion polls (conducted mainly in Lima) reveal that Fujimori had a higher
approval rating among poorer sectors than among the better-off for about a year
after his harsh adjustment program of August 1990.15 While persistent economic
hardship depressed his support among the poor after mid-1991, it turned dispropor-
Weyland 13

tionately strong again in 1992.16 In fact, the informal sector was clearly overrepre-
sented among Limefios voting for Fujimori's party in the Constituent Assembly
election of November 1992 (Cameron 1994, 157-8). After a temporary drop in late
1993 (Cameron 1994, 162), the president has almost always encountered his stron-
gest backing among the least well-off from February 1994 on. 17 In January 1995,
for instance, 79 percent of the poorest strata approved of his performance and 52.9
percent intended to vote for his reelection, but only 47.5 percent and 34 percent of
the better-off (IMASEN 1994, 29, 11, 15).
In conclusion, neoliberal neopopulists have often succeeded in winning dispropor-
tionately strong support from the poor, many of them in the informal sector.

Distancefrom Organized Civil Society

Neopopulists and neoliberals also converge in their adversarial relationship to
many organized groups of Latin America's limited working, middle, and business
classes, the main beneficiaries of the ISI model--and of classical populism. Estab-
lished organizations with considerable strength for autonomous action make these
sectors less susceptible to populist appeals and promises of benefits granted by a
personal leader. These better-off groups are often wary of neopopulists and support
them only as the lesser evil. Neoliberals, on the other hand, attack the same sectors
as market-distorting rent-seekers who limit competition and attain illicit privileges
through connections to the state. In turn, better-off groups offer the most powerful
resistance to neoliberal reforms.
Neopopulists find it more difficult to gain support among well-organized groups
than among the marginal mass. Long-standing organizations have created loyalties
among parts of the working, middle, and business classes and, thus, immunized
many of these sectors against future populist mobilization. 18 Since these organiza-
tions command substantial capacity for advancing their own interests, they do not
need to rely on paternalistic benefactors, and tend to distrust neopopulist mass
manipulation. Indeed, the neopopulist promise to extend the benefits of develop-
ment to the unorganized poor poses a threat to better-off sectors. Given precarious
economic growth and strict fiscal constraints in contemporary Latin America, carry-
ing out this promise would require a reduction in the special benefits that the
business, middle, and working classes presently enjoy (often due to classical popu-
lism). Finally, the leaders of interest organizations fear being bypassed by
neopopulists, who try to establish a direct, quasi-personal relationship with their
followers.
For these reasons, organized groups in civil society often oppose neopopulist
leaders. Many of them backed the candidates of established parties in the first round
of presidential elections. Most trade unions and popular social movements in Peru
supported the candidates of APRA, IU or the "Socialist Left," not Fujimori in 1990
(Degregori and Grompone 1991, 30-6). Similarly, large sections of organized civil
society, especially powerful trade unions and many middle class associations, op-
posed Collor in 1989 (Singer 1990; Mois6s 1993,583-5). Thus, in Brazil and Peru,
most interest associations were initially distant from neopopulist leaders.
14 Studies in Cempamtive International Development / Fall 1996

These leaders, however, often gain some support from organized groups in three
ways. First, they exploit rivalries and win the allegiance of weaker organizations
that hope to obtain access to governmental patronage in order to combat stronger
competing organizations. Thus, Collor attracted one faction of the union peak asso-
ciation Confederafao Geral dos Trabalhadores, which tried to block the advance of
the powerful Central Onica dos Trabalhadores (CUT). Similarly, in the internal
primary of the Peronist Party, Menem won support from the "15," a trade union
faction that had been weakened in the infighting inside the Confederacidn General
del Trabajo (CGT) (McGuire 1992, 48).
Second, neopopulists find backing in the second round of elections from interest
organizations that see them as the lesser evil than rightist or leftist opponents. In this
vein, Peruvian associations and parties mobilized votes for Fujimori in order to keep
Vargas Llosa and his conservative entourage out of power, and Brazilian business
organizations endorsed Collor in order to defeat socialist Lufs In~icio Lula da Silva
in 1989.
Third, neopopulist leaders obtain considerable support from sectors of organized
civil society if they can take over an established populist party. Thus, Menem has
controlled the Peronist Party and many party-affiliated trade unions. In Argentina,
where the informal sector is much smaller than in Brazil and Peru (Portes 1985, 22-
3), and where intermediary organizations have broader backing, neopopulists' main
support base is complemented by that of classical populism. The social and organi-
zational cleavages typical of neopopulism are muted in this case, which thus consti-
tutes a partial exception to my claims. But the leader still dominates the organization,
not vice versa. Menem has enjoyed much discretion and has deinstitutionalized his
party. 19
In sum, neopopulist leaders have had adversarial relations to many intermediary
organizations, at least in Brazil and Peru. This antagonism is congruent with neoliberal
attacks on pressure groups and their market-distorting, rent-seeking behavior.
Neoliberals depict these groups' influence on the state as the main obstacle to
economic efficiency and distributional fairness (De Soto 1989; Pifiera 1993; Castro
and Brito 1992). Therefore, Fernando Collor, for instance, refused in 1990 and early
1991 to consult with major business associations and publicly condemned cartels
that had emerged with state support. 2~ In this way, he entered into conflict with
much of organized civil society.
Many organized groups, in turn, oppose neoliberal candidates in elections and
resist governmental efforts to enact neoliberal programs. CUT-affiliated trade unions
in Brazil, unions and other popular sector organizations in Peru, and the Ubaldini-wing
of the Argentine CGT were in the forefront of protests against the neoliberal poli-
cies, such as wage cuts, dismissals of state employees, and privatization of public
enterprises. 21 Less openly, but more powerfully, the substantial sectors of business
that have profited from state subsidies and that depend on protection from competi-
tion often offer resistance to neoliberal trade reform, 22 even if they support other
parts of the market-oriented agenda, such as the flexibilization of labor laws and the
weakening of trade unions.
W~d 15

Thus, neopopulists and neoliberals converge in their adversarial relationship to

much of organized civil society. Both neoliberals in their deep-seated individualism
and neopopulist leaders with their quasi-direct links to their followers dislike au-
tonomous collective organization, which threatens to undermine universalist market
rules and to disturb the leaders' unmediated connection to the masses. Rejecting
negotiated agreements with established interest groups, neoliberal neopopulists try
to bypass many of these associations, appeal instead to masses of individuals, and
use their backing especially in the electoral arena (Ducatenzeiler, Faucher and Rea
1993, 189).

The Political Class as the New Enemy

Populists need a clear enemy in order to prove their own leadership credentials
and to unify their followers ("us vs. them"), But the sectors that were the prime
targets of classical populists' attacks and the main opponents of their protectionist,
redistributive policies have turned into the strongest allies of neoliberal neopopulists:
the international financial institutions (IFIs) and the small, powerful business sec-
tors that benefit most from economic restructuring, namely competitive,
export-oriented enterprises in agriculture, mining, manufacturing, and big banks,
openly back most neoliberal policies. They also give clear political support to
second-wave neopopulists, whom they regard as the only agents capable of enacting
market-oriented reform and thus reverting the deep economic crisis and the result-
ing threat to governability.23 Populism in contemporary Argentina, Brazil, and Peru
has thus lost its traditional adversaries.
Second-wave neopopulists have, however, found a new target for attack, namely
the "political class" heading the established parties (Roberts 1995, 97-9). President
Fujimori, in particular, has systematically denigrated and undermined traditional
politicians and fueled the widespread popular aversion to them, using it to justify
his coup of April 1992. Similarly, Menem and Collor have depicted themselves as
political outsiders and independents and have criticized old-time politicians as inef-
fective, elitist, and corrupt. These attacks have helped to delegitimate the opposition
and have thus enhanced the autonomy and power of personal leaders.
Neoliberals wholeheartedly share this enmity towards established politicians, whom
they accuse of avoiding urgently needed, though painful, economic reform in order
to protect narrow electoral and patronage interests. Indeed, in neoliberal eyes, tradi-
tional politicians--with their penchant for politically driven intervention in the
economy and their willingness to give in to pressures from rent-seeking interest
groups--are among the main obstacles to the establishment of a free-market system.
Neoliberals therefore hope that neopopulist attacks on the "political class" will clear
the path for market-oriented reform. The shared aversion to traditional politicians
thus reinforces the neoliberal/neopopulist combination.
16 Studies in ComparativeInternational Development/ Fall 1996

Similarities in Political Strategy

Neopopulists and neoliberals also display surprising similarities in their efforts to

centralize power and enact policy in an "autocratic" manner. Both apply a top-down,
state-centered approach that concentrates an enormous amount of influence in a
political leader and his close aides. Neopopulist politicians use their mass support to
occupy the government and enhance from this vantage point their personal influ-
ence and autonomy. Since their followers are not well organized and cannot serve
as a solid base for ruling the country, neopopulists strengthen and rely on the state's
institutional powers to bolster their own position. In this respect, there is consider-
able continuity with classical populism.
Neoliberals also use the commanding heights of the state as the decisive agent for
effecting change--a paradoxical strategy for outspoken detractors of the state (Kahler
1990, 55). In order to install a free-market system, neoliberals try to rein in
"rent-seeking" societal groups and dismantle the vast periphery of the burgeoning
state apparatus, especially public enterprises. Yet, while trying to reduce state in-
volvement in the economy, neoliberals apply the concentrated power of top state
agencies, above all the presidency and the finance ministry, to break the resistance
of groups that have benefited from state intervention and highly imperfect competi-
tion. Only a centralization of power at the top can dislodge public officials and
societal interest groups that have engaged in long-standing collusion. Ironically, the
state needs to make business itself more market-oriented by weaning it off its
parasitical relationship to the public sector.
In contemporary Latin America, the transition to full-fledged market economies
does not emerge through pressure from society, including business, but mainly via
imposition by a strong state (acting under external pressure). Contrary to classical
liberalism and to their own anti-statist rhetoric, Latin American neoliberals assign a
decisive, powerful role to the state, at least for a transition period of unspecified
length. As Mario Vargas Llosa, a protagonist of neoliberalism in Latin America,
states: "To establish a free e c o n o m y . . , doesn't weaken states, it strengthens them"
(1991, 26). For these reasons, neoliberals fortify the apex of the state, especially the
presidency and the finance ministry.
This top-down approach is congruent with the outstanding position of a personal
leader in neopopulism. In fact, charismatic politicians can use the neoliberal attack
on powerful organized groups and the effort to fortify the apex of the state to
enhance their own autonomy and power. They can invoke rational, modem argu-
ments and marshal extemal constraints and pressures to bolster their personal lead-
ership. For instance, in a dual effort to enhance his own political standing and
strengthen the central government financially, Collor invoked the need to make
Brazil's economy more competitive and to solve the debt crisis (Collor 1991, 11-3,
17-9, 25-9, 37-8, 63-4). Thus, neoliberalism provides a useful ideological justifica-
tion as well as external support for the political ambition of neopopulist politicians.
In this vein, Latin America's second-wave neopopulists have applied neoliberal
policies to remove obstacles to their power. Their measures to deregulate the labor
w~a 17

market have undermined the strength of trade unions; economic opening has weak-
ened important ISI-oriented sectors of private business; and dismissals of state
officials have disciplined the previously uncontrollable public sector and weakened
the opposition, which had packed state agencies with its supporters when it con-
trolled the government. Neoliberal neopopulists have even turned constraints into
advantages. Thus, pressure from IFIs has boosted their clout vis-a-vis domestic
actors, including powerful business groups. This has, for instance, allowed them to
enact important tax reforms that have increased the state's fiscal strength and its
control over society. 24 In sum, Presidents Collor, Menem, and Fujimori have sys-
tematically used the opportunities that neoliberal reform provided to enhance their
personal power (Bornhausen 1991, 5-16, 23; CUT 1991, 28-32; Weyland 1993,
11-12; Acufia 1994, 51-6; Waisman 1992, 235-41; Balbi 1993; Castillo 1992;
1993; Mauceri 1995; Panfichi and Francis 1993, 17-22).
Claiming to combat economic emergencies and trying to impose their tough eco-
nomic recipes against opposition, all neoliberal neopopulists have also bent and
weakened democratic checks and balances that could constrain their personal lead-
ership (O'Donnell 1994, 60-68). They have relied strongly on their decree powers
to enact market-oriented reforms, marginalized, attacked, and--in the Peruvian case--
dissolved parliament, and--in the Argentine case--packed the Supreme Court
(Ferreira and Goretti 1994; McClintock 1994; Power 1994; Schmidt 1994). Where
neoliberal policies have attained some success in stabilizing the economy, as in
Argentina and Peru, neopopulist presidents have exploited this accomplishment by
pressing for constitutional reforms that have permitted their immediate reelection.
In all these ways, neoliberal reforms have served the political ambitions of personal
leaders.
Thus, in their political strategy--the effort to take over the commanding heights
of the state and concentrate power at the top--neopopulism and neoliberalism in
Latin America have considerable overlap. Political factors, namely neopopulist lead-
ers' struggle for power and the neoliberal need for concentrated influence, underlie
this important affinity.

Affinities in the Distribution of Costs and Benefits

The Preventionof a Catastrophe

Neopopulism and neoliberalism even have some commonalities in how they dis-
tribute costs and benefits among different social strata. While neoliberal policies
impose initial losses on many sectors of society, these costs pale in light of the
imminent catastrophe of full-scale hyperinflation that market-oriented adjustment
helps avert. 25 Indeed, a majority supports the tough all-out attack on the crisis,
rather than insisting on a more gradual approach that eases the pain, but extends it
over a much longer time period. 26 Also, poorer strata seem to benefit the most from
the end of hyperinflation that painful shock programs bring about. By contrast,
formal workers and state employees suffer particularly from neoliberal policies,
18 Studies in ComparativeInternationalDevelopment/ Fall 1996

such as the ffexibilization of the labor market. Finally, where neoliberal policies are
successful in stabilizing the economy, they provide resources for anti-poverty pro-
grams that are targeted to the most needy sectors. The poor, who are more likely to
support neopopulism, thus receive some rewards, while many better-off groups in
organized civil society, who are skeptical towards neopopulism, pay the highest
costs. As a result, neopopulists who enact successful neoliberal plans can retain
their mass following and bolster their personal leadership.
Most of the marginals and the working and middle classes suffer immediate losses
from the tough adjustment programs that neoliberal neopopulists impose (Smith
1991, 67-8; Gonzales 1993, 66, 74-5; Sheahan 1994, 911-3). These costs stand in
stark contrast to the large-scale distribution of benefits that classical populists ef-
fected. Compared to the danger of deepening hyperinflation, however, many sectors
seem to see these initial losses as a lesser evil and to accept them as such. Claiming
to have no other choice, Presidents Menem, Collor, and Fujimori enacted harsh
measures in order to overcome hyperinflationary crises that threatened the vast
majority of the population with disaster and that created especially high costs for the
poorest sectors (Schneider 1989, 31-3; Lago 1991,292, 311-3; Morley and Alvarez
1992, 16-24). The imminent risk of further deterioration gave second-wave
neopopulists the latitude to impose neoliberal recipes on their countries. The im-
pending catastrophe made the bitter medicine of adjustment easier to swallow.
Indeed, many people accept draconian adjustment plans as long as they have
confidence in their success (Przeworski 1991, 164). Like surgery, market-oriented
reforms promise sustained benefits in the long run at the price of considerable pain
in the short run. Yet, given the uncertainties inherent in neoliberal efforts, anyone
betting on their success takes enormous risks. Interestingly, prospect theory, a psy-
chological theory of decision-making, has shown that people do tend towards risky
choices when they face prospects of losses (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Thaler
and Johnson 1990): they often prefer the uncertain promise to recoup losses at
considerable risk over more prudent options that can only limit the damage, but not
avert all losses. Similarly, many victims of hyperinflation, even among the poorest
sectors, accept the ambitious, risky shock programs imposed by neoliberal
neopopulists (on Latin America, Weyland 1996). To the surprise of observers (such
as Walton and Ragin 1989), these tough policies enjoyed striking levels of support,
at least initially .27
Therefore, neoliberal adjustment is acceptable and even attractive to neopopulist
leaders, who can turn adversity to their advantage and gain widespread popular
backing as saviors of their country. Charismatic leaders generally need crises to
demonstrate their "extraordinary" qualities and gain massive backing (Weber 1976,
654-61; O'Donnell 1994, 64-67). In this vein, the imposition of daring reforms in
the context of severe crises has often enhanced the image of neoliberal neopopulists
as bold leaders, boosting their popularity. Thus, the risks inherent in neoliberal
programs seem to make them more--not less---congruent with neopopulist strategies.
Also, in the distribution of costs and benefits, neoliberal policies seem to favor
poorer strata, which are more likely to support neopopulist leaders over better-off
Weylaad 19

sectors, which are more averse to neopopulism. The end of hyperinflation, produced
by drastic neoliberal adjustment, helps especially the least well-to-do, who suffered
the most from the preceding crisis (Schneider 1989, 31-3; Lago 1991, 292, 311-3;
Morley and Alvarez 1992, 16-24). In fact, the percentage of poor residents in
Greater Buenos Aires diminished greatly from 47.4 percent at the peak of the
hyperinflationary crisis in October 1989 to 28.8 percent in May 1991--before eco-
nomic growth resumed--and to 16.1 percent in May 1994. 28 Even in Peru, where
both the economic crisis and the neoliberal adjustment program were particularly
severe, poverty diminished from an astounding 53.6 percent of the population in
1991 to 45.8 percent in 1994. 29
In contrast to these improvements for poorer sectors, better-off state employees
and industrial workers have suffered the most from market-oriented reform. Salaries
in the public sector have fallen dramatically since the imposition of neoliberal shock
programs (Frediani 1993, 147). Thousands of (para-)state employees have lost their
jobs, 3~ The neoliberal flexibilization of the labor market, that is, the cut-back of
legal benefits and protection for workers, has hurt people who already had jobs in
the formal sector (but it may over time stimulate the hiring of new workers from the
informal sector). Thus, neoliberal policies seem to strengthen popular backing for
neopopulism by favoring those sectors that personal leaders tend to attract and by
hurting especially sectors that neopopulism seeks to marginalize.
Neoliberal neopopulists enhanced the popular acceptance of their tough policies
by imposing some costs on the middle and upper classes as well. Besides the
symbolic purpose of making all strata share in the sacrifices, the very depth of the
crises called for bold steps, such as President Menem's and Collor's confiscation of
a large share of the financial assets held by better-off groups(Crabtree 1991,120-1;
124--6; Welch 1991,12-18). Similarly, the effort to install full market systems led to
the reduction of generous subsidies for private enterprises (Smith 1991,54-5). Thus,
better-off strata visibly shouldered part of the burden of stabilization, and presidents
appeared brave by defying powerful groups that their predecessors had not dared to
antagonize. Both factors enhanced the popularity of neoliberal neopopulists. 31
While poorer sectors suffered initial losses from neoliberal adjustment, the avoid-
ance of an economic disaster, the daring effort to restore growth, and the costs
imposed on better-off strata made these temporary losses acceptable to many of
them. Where these policies succeeded in reducing inflation, as in Argentina and
Peru, neoliberal neopopulists have retained a vast mass following and bolstered
their personal leadership, as the reelection of Menem and Fujimori attests. Only in
Brazil, where Collor's stabilization efforts failed, did popular support evaporate.
Thus, even in the imposition of tough shock programs, neoliberalism and neopopulism
have proven more compatible than expected.

The Distributionof TargetedBenefits

The relief of being spared from a catastrophe fades with memory, however, over-
shadowed by the hardships that austerity programs impose. In order to maintain
20 Studies in ComparativeInternational Development / Fall 1996

support, neoliberal neopopulists need to distribute some tangible benefits. For this
purpose, they focus on their most likely backers, the poor in the informal sector,
who are easier to attract than the more skeptical sectors of organized civil society.
In fact, the very poverty of many people in the informal sector allows neopopulist
leaders to buy large numbers of supporters with limited resources. Organized inter-
est groups would be much more demanding. Satisfying them would endanger
neoliberal austerity policies.
For these reasons, neoliberal neopopulists have created special benefit programs
for the urban and rural poor to soften the social impact of economic adjustment.
Initially, these programs were limited severely by the constraints of fiscal discipline
(Kruse 1992,40-2; Graham 1994,106-12). They were particularly sporadic in Brazil
under Collor--one reason the unorganized poor failed to defend their erstwhile hero
when he faced corruption charges in 1992. 32 Yet, as the dire economic situation
improved and electoral needs intensified, neoliberal neopopulists announced more
substantial anti-poverty efforts.
In order to prepare his reelection, in 1993 President Menem started a range of
targeted spending programs and promised huge social investments for his second
term. Since 1991, the Argentine government has also transferred to the governor of
Buenos Aires province US$ 600 million per year for discretionary social spend-
ing. 33 In an even more politicized fashion, President Fujimori created an emergency
fund (FONCODES) that committed U S $ 1 7 0 million to social projects in 1994 and
that plans to spend up to US$ 320 million in 1995 (FONCODES 1995a; 1995b, 2,
5--6). Fujimori's most widely publicized social program, the construction of hun-
dreds of school buildings, had clear electoral purposes; indeed, he eagerly attended
numerous festive inaugurations in poor urban and rural areas. Since 1993, the min-
istries in charge of social policy have also increased their targeted expenditures
(Presidencia del Consejo de Ministros 1995; interview, Abugatt~is 1995).
Interestingly, these neopopulist spending programs correspond closely to the tar-
geted anti-poverty measures advocated by neoliberals, such as Milton Friedman
(1982, 190-4). Even the Chilean military regime--the protagonist of neoliberal
policies in Latin America---enacted some social programs for the poorest and most
vulnerable sectors, such as minimal employment schemes and extensive basic health
care (Graham 1994, ch.2). Similarly, Mexico's PRI-regime instituted a broad-ranging
anti-poverty program (PRONASOL) in order to alleviate the costs of its neoliberal
reforms and rebuild its support base after the electoral challenge of 1988 (Cornelius,
Craig and Fox 1994). In fact, international financial institutions have asked govern-
ments to adopt anti-poverty measures in order to cushion the social impact and
enhance the political viability of neoliberal policies at limited economic cost, that is,
without endangering fiscal discipline (Nelson 1992, 234-5; Glaessner et al. 1994,
xiv-xv; interview Durand 1995).
Thus, in their politically motivated distribution of benefits to poor sectors, Latin
American neopopulism and neoliberalism also have considerable affinities.
Neopopulist leaders use targeted spending programs to strengthen their mass fol-
lowing, and neoliberals advocate them in order to make harsh adjustment and
Weyland 2l

market-oriented restructuring politically sustainable. While the resources disbursed

are limited, these anti-poverty measures are politically important by demonstrating
the government's social concern and by giving the destitute hope of further im-
provement. 34
In sum, the costs and benefits of neoliberalism and neopopulism converge in
important ways. Harsh neoliberal reforms, therefore, do not necessarily undermine
popular support for neopopulist leaders, but may even enhance it.

Conclusion

Latin Americanists have had difficulty coming to grips with populism and
neoliberalism. The concept of populism has been defined so vaguely and applied so
broadly that scholars have questioned its usefulness (De la Torre 1992, 386-7;
Viguera 1993, 49). When authors have applied this notion to Latin America's new
democracies (Dornbusch and Edwards 1991; Rea, Ducatenzeiler, and Faucher 1992),
they have paid insufficient attention to the differences between neopopulism and
classical populism. Liberalism, in contrast, has appeared so alien to Latin America's
state-dominated economies and deeply unequal societies that its recent advance in
the region has created much puzzlement and consternation. The current coexistence
of neopopulism and neoliberalism is particularly confusing because it contradicts
established approaches that identify populism with non-liberal economic policies. 35
This article has tried to clarify both neopopulism and neoliberalism by explaining
their current coexistence and elucidating their affinities. For this purpose, I have
invoked the political incentives of gaining and maintaining power under democracy,
given the opportunities and constraints created by the legacies of state-led
import-substituting industrialization and its terminal crisis. This development model
benefited the middle and lower classes in the formal sector of the economy, which
commanded considerable organizational capacity and managed to extract many fa-
vors from the state. Yet a growing mass of poor people were excluded from the
mainstream of development and deprived of significant political influence. Both
neopopulists and some neoliberals have tried to gain the support of this disadvan-
taged mass. Low organizational capacity has made many marginals susceptible to
the appeals of neopopulist leaders, who depict themselves as benefactors of the
poor. Sectors of neoliberalism, in turn, have hoped that the informal sector, which
has lacked rent-seeking influence on the state, would support the creation of a level
playing field through the installation of universalist market principles. Conversely,
many better-off, organized groups are wary of the mass manipulation of neopopulism
and reject the market reforms promoted by neoliberalism, which endanger their
state-guaranteed well-being. For these reasons, neopopulism and neoliberalism have
had important points of commonality in their (targeted) sources of mass support.
Neopopulists and neoliberals have also coincided in their principal political strat-
egy to concentrate power at the apex of the state. In order to overcome deep
economic crises and to remove entrenched obstacles to a full-fledged market economy,
neoliberals have relied on top level leadership and have tried to strengthen presi-
22 Studiesin ComparativeInternationalDevelopment/ Fall 1996

dents and their close aides. This effort has played into the hands of neopopulist
leaders, who have used their positions as heads of state to enhance their personal
standing. In fact, these leaders have exploited neoliberal attacks on established
interests to increase their own autonomy and power.
Finally, neoliberal policies may provide benefits to the primary mass constituency
of neopopulists, the poor in the informal sector, and may hurt especially the lower
and middle class in the formal sector, which is less receptive to neopopulist mobili-
zation. Although tough adjustment measures impose initial costs on most strata,
they can prevent an economic catastrophe that would hit the poorest sectors hardest
and would completely destroy their livelihood. The most needy strata also benefit
from the targeted anti-poverty programs that neoliberal neopopulists tend to enact
sooner or later. Thus, the social distribution of the benefits and costs of neoliberal
reforms may help neopopulist leaders to maintain their fragile mass support, while
weakening the sectors of organized civil society that view them with skepticism.
These affinities contradict established theories that depict populism and liberalism
as polar opposites. Yet, while the received wisdom is incomplete and misleading, it
is not entirely unfounded. Despite the commonalities this article underscores,
neopopulism and neoliberalism diverge in significant ways. For instance, the ben-
efits that neoliberalism provides to internationally competitive enterprises do not
follow from the political logic of neopopulism. Conversely, the limits to the politi-
cal distribution of patronage that neoliberal adjustment imposes create constraints
on neopopulist leaders that only the severe economic crisis makes them accept.
Also, neoliberalism tries to consolidate the universalist rules of a full-fledged mar-
ket system, but neopopulist leaders want to retain discretion in order to build sup-
port by meting out particularistic favors or sanctions (see, in general, Waterbury
1993, 266--7). For these reasons, the current combination of neopopulism and
neoliberalism is fraught with tension.
Whether these tensions will undermine neoliberal neopopulism or whether the
affinities emphasized above will keep it a viable combination remains to be seen.
Much will depend on the long-term economic success and social impact of the
neoliberal model, which are uncertain at this point (Haggard and Kaufman 1992,
332-50; Acufia and Smith 1994, 41-9). Neoliberal neopopulists' risk of failure is
high, as indicated by President Collor's impeachment. 36 Yet, effecting a deep eco-
nomic transformation under democracy constitutes an enormous challenge. After
all, Chile's experience with the Pinochet regime seemed to suggest that neoliberal
restructuring "required" authoritarian rule. 37 In this light, even the limited, precari-
ous achievements of neopopulist neoliberalism are worthy of note.

Notes

An earlier version of this article was presented at the 90th Annual Meeting of the American Political
Science Association, New York, 1-4 September 1994.1 would like to thank David Bartlett, William
Canak, Paul Drake, Laura Golbert, Wendy Hunter, Robert Kaufman, Gerardo Munck, Aldo Panfichi,
Nancy Powers, Kenneth Roberts, Cynthia Sanborn and anonymous reviewers for many important sug-
gestions; Mema Montero Barr6 (Moray Araujo, Buenos Aires), Paula Vanin Cencaig (CESOP, UNICAMP,
WMand 23

Campinas), Guilliermo Loll (Apoyo, Lima) and Martin Siinchez (Imasen, Lima) for crucial opinion poll
data; and the University Research Council of Vanderbilt University for generous support for my field
research.
1. Neoliberal policies and important traces of political populism can also be found in the governments of
Fernando Belaunde in Peru (1980-85), Leon Febres Cordero in Ecuador (1984-88) and Victor Paz
Estenssoro in Bolivia (1985-89) (Conaghan and Malloy 1994, especially 136--7). By contrast, Carlos
Andr6s P6rez's government (1989-93) was not populist because Venezuela's political parties are very
strong (Coppedge 1994, ch. 2), set tight limits to leaders' latitude and thus restrict the chances for the
emergence of populism (see, in general, Kaufman and Stallings 1991, 24).
2. O'Donnell 1993,1356. In order to analyze neoliberal neopopulist governments, O'Donnell (1994) there-
fore elaborates the notion of "delegative democracy."
3. Nowadays, this quasi-direct connection is established especially via TV and opinion polls. On Fujimori's
skillful use of polls, see Conaghan 1995.
4. McGuire (1995: 20(O1,210--1,219, 231-2) emphasizes Peronism's low level of party institutionaliza-
tion.
5. Sartori 1970. Thus, I use "populism" as a classical, hierarchical category, whereas Roberts's innovative
reconceptualization (1995, 88-9) draws on Collier and Mahon's (1993,848-53) notion of "radial catego-
ries." In my view, classical categorization is preferable for clarifying contested concepts.
6. See chapters by Enrique Zuleta-Puceiro, Venicio A. de Lima, Joseph Straubhaar, Organ Olsen and Maria
Cavaliari Nunes, and Carlos Eduardo Lins da Silva in Skidmore (1993).
7. For Menem, see Catterberg and Braun 1989, 369-73; for Collor, Singer 1990, 137-41; Kinzo 1993, 322-
5; Mois6s 1993, 582-8; for Fujimori, Degregori and Grompone 1991, 37, 42-51, 102-3; Cameron 1994,
138-41, 158.
8. For this crucial distinction in democratic theory, see Dahl 1956, ch.4; Schmitter and Karl 1992, 55-8; on
Latin America, Weyland 1995, 127-30.
9. I use "marginal mass" as a synonym for "informal sector" mainly for stylistic reasons. Despite strong
criticism of its dualistic implications (Perlman 1976), "marginal" is widely applied in Latin American
social science (e.g., Tironi 1990; Weffort 1992, 22-6).
10. For Menem, see Catterberg and Braun 1989, 369-73; for Collor, Singer 1990, 137-41; Kinzo 1993, 322-
5; Mois6s 1993, 582-8; for Fujimori, Degregori and Grompone 1991, 37, 42-51, 102-3; Cameron
1994,138-41,158. The left has had much less success in attracting the poorest sectors, especially in rural
areas. Its strategy of collective empowerment and bottom-up pressure faces strong obstacles, such as the
dispersion of the population and fear of repression. Under these constraints, support for neopopulists,
who depict themselves as paternalistic benefactors, appears as a more realistic option for the destitute.
11. In this vein, Brazilian neoliberals use attacks on politically granted privileges and promises of equal
opportunity and full citizenship to appeal to the poor (Castro and Brito 1992: x, 39, 53-9).
12. See section on "The Distribution of Targeted Benefits" below.
13. Collor's campaign programs on TV, which I witnessed in late 1989, presented in a seemingly sincere
manner elaborate proposals for addressing long-standing social problems of Brazil's poorest strata. Parts
of Mario Vargas Llosa's Frente Democrdtico also tried to mobilize support among Peru's poorest strata
(Robles 1989, 52-6), though with limited success (Cameron 1994,110, 116, 136-8). Even sectors of
Argentina's neoliberal Union del Centro Democrftico pursued in the late 1980s a "popularization"
strategy targeting less well-off sectors (Gibson 1992, 255-67).
14. Datafolha 1991, 1992. As Weber (1976,656) observed, charisma is by nature fragile and depends on
verification via success ("probation").
15. APOYO (August 1990), 4, 8; (September 1990), 4, 12; (October 1990), 3; (November 1990), 3; (Decem-
ber 1990), 3; (January 1991), 3; (May 1991), 7; IMASEN 1990, I-A, 14-E.
16. In mid-1992, for instance, 75.8 percent of lower-class people who reported their intended vote in the
upcoming Constituent Assembly election leaned towards Fujimori, compared to 64.8 percent of better-off
strata (Rubio 1992, 7). See also IMASEN 1992, 2-A, 19-C, 21-C; APOYO (May 1992), 8; (December
1992), 9. On Fujimori's apt political use of these poll results, see Conaghan 1995.
17. IMASEN no.18 (February 1994), 13, 24-5; no.19 (March 1994),13, 23; no.20 (April 1994),10, 24, 28;
no.21 (May 1994), 13, 24-5; no.22 (June 1994), 12, 22; no.24 (August 1994), 21, 25; no.25 (September
1994), 11,18-19; no.26 (October 1994), 12,18-19; APOYO (August 1994),7,19; (September 1994), 7,13-
15; (December 1994), 7, 9,13, 26.
18. As explained below, this argument does not hold for populist organizations, such as Argentina's Peronist
Party.
24 Studies in ComparativeInternational Development / Fall 1996

19. McGuire 1995, 200-01,231-32. Menem won the Peronist Party's internal primary to select the candi-
date for the 1989 presidential election against a current that wanted to institutionalize the party.
20. Interview Temporal 1992; Bornhausen 1991, 5-16; "A FIESP n,~o 6 mais a mesma." Jornal do Brasil, 15
March 1990, 3.
21. Interviews Miguel 1995; Ubaldini 1995; "Execuq,~o Complicada." lstog Senhor, 6 June 1990,20-2;
"D'emissSes, Volver." Ibid., 20 June 1990,16-22; "Wave of Strikes Led by the State Sector." LAWR, 27
September 1990, 4; "Is Union Protest Starting to Wane?" LAWR, 4 July 1991, 8-9; Bolofia 1993, 130-
31.
22. For Argentina, see Smith 1991, 55-7, 69-70; Waisman 1992; for Brazil, IEDI 1990; Bornhausen 1991,
6-16; interviews Collor 1995, Moreira 1992; also Sola 1994, 156-57; for Peru, Bolofia 1993, vii, 94,
130-31,162-63, 201-02; SNI 1991, 6-7, 14-15; Castillo 1992, 1993; Kruse 1992, 39.
23. This backing became obvious in the alliance between President Menem and the Bunge y Born conglom-
erate in Argentina in 1989 (interview Ferreres 1995) and the decision of Peruvian business leader Jorge
Camet to join the Fujimori government in 1992 (interview Aguirre Roca 1995).
24. Ministerio de Economfa 1995, 4, 11; SRF 1994, 43-4; SUNAT 1994, gr~ifico 2. Stronger control of tax
evasion has figured prominently in tax reforms enacted under all three presidents. That these control
powers can be used for political purposes, for instance to silence business critics, is an open secret that a
top official of Brazil's Secretaria da Receita Federal confirmed in a confidential interview with the
author in Brasflia, 1989.
25. Przeworski 1991, 164; Drazen and Grilli 1993. In opinion polls conducted before the enactment of
neoliberal shock programs, Latin Americans pointed to inflation as their biggest concern: Moray Araujo
1989b, 8; IBOPE 1989, question 8; APOYO (June 1990), 35; (October 1990), 7; see Catterberg 1991,
26.
26. Mora y Araujo 1989a, 4-5; Datafolha 1990, questions 1, 9; IBOPE 1990, questions 6B, 7; APOYO
(August 1990), 9; (September 1990), 12; (October 1990), 15; (November 1990), 13-14. In Venezuela, by
contrast, where President P6rez imposed tough adjustment before the country's problems led to
hyperinflation, popular acceptance always remained low: "Changes Result in Confusion." FBISLAT, 16
June 1989, 67; Templeton 1995, 83-5.
27. See note 26.
28. INDEC data based on income surveys, reported in Ministerio de Economfa (1994, 53). Unpublished
calculations by the Secretarfa de Desarrollo Social (February 1995), which take unsatisfied basic needs
into account, show an improvement from 41.1 percent of households in poverty in 1989 to 30.9 percent
in 1991 and 25.1 percent in 1993.
29. FONCODES 1994, 13-20; similar Cu,4nto 1994: 12. Data for August 1990--the appropriate base line for
assessing the impact of neoliberal adjustment--is unavailable.
30. While substantial severance payments made these lay-offs more palatable in Argentina and Brazil, many
former public employees have found it difficult to establish a new livelihood, as growing unemployment
in Argentina seems to suggest (interview Ros 1995).
31. In a 1993 poll, 35.8 percent of Brazilians agreed to make a sacrifice in order to support stabilization "If
the sacrifice were equal for all" and another 21 percent "If the sacrifice were bigger for the rich;" only 25
percent accepted a sacrifice unconditionally ("O Brasil Quer Paulada." Isto E, 22 September 1993, 26).
32. Collor 1991, 80-90; "Collor dar~'i US$ 4 bilh6es para prote~ao ~ts crian~as." Jornal do Brasil, 11 August
1991, 19; "Adeus/~s Bases." Istog Senhor, 13 February 1991, 24-5; Weyland 1993, 23.
33. Comisi6n Nacional 1995, 13-30; Menem 1995, 22, 27-9; interview Amadeo 1995; Ciarfn, 29 December
1994, supplement. In early 1995, Governor Eduardo Duhalde and President Menem attended inaugura-
tions of social projects and other public works almost daily.
34. Thus, when asked about Fujimori's qualities, 38 percent of the poorest Peruvians mentioned his concern
for the poor (APOYO [September 1994], 9; multiple answers allowed). As the most important reason for
their support, 28.9 percent of his backers among the poorest Limefios mentioned his "public works" or
his "support for education," probably referring to his school building program (IMASEN no.25 [Septem-
ber 1994], lt).
35. The only systematic efforts to analyze neoliberal neopopulism are Ducatenzeiler, Faucher and Rea
(1993), Leaman (1994) and Roberts (1995).
36. While the impeachment was officially justified by presidential corruption, the economic problems caused
by neoliberal reforms and Collor's excessive strive for personal predominance fueled the widespread
animosity that forced his ouster (Weyland 1993).
37. Foxley 1983, 16,102. Fujimori's suspension of democracy was not required for pushing his neoliberal
economic agenda (McClintock 1994, 8-11).
Wo,land 25

References

ABUGATI',~S, JAVIER
1995 Author interview with Asesor, Presidencia del Consejo de Ministros, Lima, 14 February.
ACUIqA, CARLOS H.
1994 Politics and economics in the Argentina of the nineties. In Democracy, markets, and
structural reform in Latin America, edited by William C. Smith, Carlos H. Acufia, and
Eduardo A. Gamarra, 31-73. New Brunswick: Transaction.
ACUIq/A, CARLOS H., AND WILLIAM C. SMITH
1994 The political economy of structural adjustment. In Latin American political economy in
the age ofneoliberal reform, edited by William C. Smith, Carols H. Acufia, and Eduardo
A. Gamarra, 17-66. New Brunswick: Transaction.
AGUIRRE ROCA, JUAN ANTONIO
1995 Author interview with ex-President, Confederaci6n Nacional de Instituciones
Empresariales Privadas (1992-94), Lima, 14 February.
AMADEO, EDUARDO
1995 Author interview with Secretario de Desarrollo Social, Buenos Aires, 21 March.
APOYO, S.A.
1990094 lnforme de Opini6n. Lima Metropolitana. Various Issues. Lima: APOYO, S.A.
BAER, WERNER AND PAUL BECKERMAN
1989 The decline and fall of Brazil's Cruzado. Latin American Research Review 24, 1:35-64.
BALBI, CARMEN ROSA
1993 El desaparecido poder del sindicalismo. In El poder en el Perti, edited by Augusto
Alvarez Rodrich, 97-104. Lima: Apoyo.
BARZELAY, MICHAEL
1986 The politicized market economy. Berkeley: University of California Press.
BOLOIqA BEHR, CARLOS
1993 Cambio de rumbo. Lima: IELM
BORNHAUSEN, ROBERTO KONDER
1991 Reflex6es sobre o Brasil. Cademos do IRS # 18. Sao Paulo: FIESP.
BRESSER PEREIRA, LUIZ CARLOS
1991 Os tempos her6icos de Collor e Zdlia. S~o Paulo: Nobel.
CAMERON, MAXWELL A.
1994 Democracy and authoritarianism in Peru. New York: St. Martin's Press.
CARDOSO, FERNANDO HENRIQUE, AND ENZO FALETFO
1979 Dependency and development in Latin America. Berkeley: University of California Press.
CASTILLO OCHOA, MANUEL
1992 Empresarios: Promesas incumplidas QueHacer 70 (March-April):20-22.
1993 Los empresarios, la doble 16gica y las pugnas en el poder. QueHacer 85 (September-
October):38-41.
CASTRO, PAULO RABELLO DE, AND PAULO CARLOS DE BRITO
1992 Brasil, este pals tem jeito ? Rio de Janeiro: Rio Fundo.
CATFERBERG, EDGARDO
1991 Argentina confronts politics. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
CATFERBERG, EDGARDO, AND MARIA BRAUN
1989 Las elecciones presidenciales Argentinas del 14 de mayo de 1989. DesarroUo Econ6mico
29, 115 (October-December):361-374.
CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS UNION PARA LA NUEVA MAYORIA (CEUNM)
1994 An61isis de la elecci6n de constituyentes. Cuaderno # 78. Buenos Aires: CEUNM.
CHALMERS, DOUGLAS A.
1977 The politicized state in Latin America. In Authoritarianism in Latin America, edited by
James M. Malloy, 23-45. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
COLLIER, DAVID, AND JAMES E. MAHON, JR.
1993 Conceptual 'stretching' revisited. American Political Science Review 87, 4 (Decem-
ber):845-55.
26 Studies in ComparativeInternationalDevelopmentI Fall 1996

COLLOR, FERNANDO
1991 Brasil: um projeto de reconstru~ao nacional. Brasflia: Presid~ncia da Rept~blica.
1995 Author interview with former president (1990--92). Brasflia, 9 June.
CONAGHAN, CATHERINE M.
1995 Polls, political discourse, and the public sphere. In Latin America in comparative per-
spective, edited by Peter H. Smith, 227-255. Boulder: Westview.
CONAGHAN, CATHERINE M. AND JAMES M. MALLOY
1994 Unsettled statecraft. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
CONNIFF, MICHAEL L.
1982 Introduction. In Latin American populism in comparative perspective, edited by Michael
L. Conniff, 3-30. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.
COPPEDGE, MICHAEL
1994 Strong parties and lame ducks. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
CORNELIUS, WAYNE A., ANN L. CRAIG, AND JONATHAN FOX, EDS.
1994 Transforming state-society relations in Mexico. San Diego: Center for U.S. Mexican
Studies. University of California, San Diego.
CRABTREE, JOHN
1991 The Collor Plan. Bulletin of Latin American Research 10, 2:119-132.
1992 Peru under Garcfa. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
CUANTO, S.A.
1994 Perti 1994: El perfil de la pobreza. Cu6nto 6, 68 (December):5-14.
CUT (CENTRAL I~INICADOS TRABALHADORES)
1991 A crise Brasileira e os trabalhadores. Debate Sindical 5, 12 (September).
DAHL, ROBERT A.
1956 A preface to democratic theory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
DATAFOLHA
1990 Piano Collor 1--Avaliar IlL S~o Paulo: Datafolha (April).
1991 Pesquisa: avalia~ao de governadores I Avaliar do governo Collor. Ntimero: 1.002.
S~o Paulo: Datafolha (March).
1992 Relat6rio de pesguisa de opini&o No 1180. S~o Paulo: Datafolha (September).
DEGREGORI, CARLOS IVAN, AND ROMEO GROMPONE
1991 Elecciones 1990: demonios y redentores en el nuevo Per~. Lima: IEP.
DE LA TORRE, CARLOS
1992 The ambiguous meanings of Latin American populisms. Social Research 59, 2 (Sum-
mer):385-414.
DE RIZ, LILIANA
1994 Argentina. El enigma democr~ttico. Nueva Sociedad 129 (January-February):6-12.
DE SOTO, HERNANDO
1989 The otherpath. New York: Harper & Row.
DI TELLA, TORCUATO S.
1990 Menem's Argentina. Government and Opposition 25, 1 (Winter):85-97.
DORNBUSCH, RUDIGER, AND SEBASTIAN EDWARDS, eds.
1991 The macroeconomics of populism in Latin America. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
DRAKE, PAUL W.
1982 Conclusion. In Latin American populism in comparative perspective, edited by Michael
L. Conniff, 217-245. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.
1991 Comment. In Dornbusch and Edwards, eds., 35-40.
DRAZEN, ALLAN, AND VITTORIO GRILLI
1993 The benefit of crises for economic reforms. American Economic Review 83, 3 (June):598-
607.
DUCATENZEILER, GRACIELA, PHILIPPE FAUCHER, AND JULIAN CASTRO REA
1993 Am6rique Latine: Les 6checs du lib6ral-populisme. Revue Canadienne d'Etudes du
D3veloppement 14, 2:173-195.
DURAND, JOSI~ FRANCISCO
1995 Author interview with Director, Superintendencia Nacional de Administraci6n Tributaria.
Lima, 7 February.
w~a 27

ESPINAL, ROSARIO
1992 Development, neoliberalism and electoral politics in Latin America. Development and
Change 23, 4 (October):27-47.
FERREIRA RUBIO, DELIA, AND MATI'EO GORETH
1994 Government by decree in Argentina (1989-1993). Paper for XVIII LASA Congress,
Atlanta, March 10-12.
FERRERES, ORLANDO
1995 Author interview with former Vice-Minister of Economy (1989), Buenos Aires, 8 March.
FONCODES (FONDO NACIONAL DE COMPENSAClON Y DESARROLLO SOCIAL)
1994 FONCODES : Nota Mensual, no. 10 (November).
1995a El fondo nacional de compensacion y desarrollo social. Lima: FONCODES.
1995b Plan operativo instituciona11995. Resumen ejecutivo. Lima: FONCODES.
FOXLEY, ALEJANDRO
1983 Latin American experiments in neoconservative economics. Berkeley: University of Cati-
fornia Press.
FREDIANI, R A M r N OSVALDO
1993 Polfticas de estabilizaci6n y reforma estructural en Argentina. Buenos Aires: CIEDLA.
FRIEDMAN, MILTON
1982 Capitalism and freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
GIBSON, EDWARD L.
1992 Conservative parties and democratic politics: Argentina in comparative perspective. Ph.D.
Diss. Columbia University.
GLAESSNER, PHILIP J., ET AL.
1994 Poverty alleviation and social investment funds. Discussion Paper 261. Washington, DC:
World Bank.
GONZALES DE OLARTE, EFRA[N
1993 Economic stabilization and structural adjustment under Fujimori. Journal oflnteramerican
Studies and World Affairs 35, 2 (Summer):51-80.
GRAHAM, CAROL
1994 Safety nets, politics, and the poor. Washington, DC: Brookings.
HAGGARD, STEPHAN, AND ROBERT R. KAUFMAN
1992 Economic adjustment and the prospects for democracy. In The politics of economic
adjustment, edited by Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, 319-50. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
HOJMAN, DAVID E.
1994 The political economy of recent conversions to market economies in Latin America.
Journal of Latin American Studies 26, 1 (February): 191-219.
IBOPE
1989 National voter survey--wave 18. BRIBOPE89-OPP601. Rio de Janeiro: IBOPE (Novem-
ber).
1990 Questionfrio OPP 553. Rio de Janeiro: IBOPE (May).
IMASEN
1990 Investigaci6n sociolrgica y de mercado--octubre. Lima: IMASEN.
1992 Sondeo de opini6n p~blica--Gran Lima---agosto. Lima: IMASEN.
1994/95 IMASEN Confidencial. Various issues. Lima: IMASEN.
INFANTE, RICARDO, AND EMILIO KLEIN
1991 The Latin American labour market, 1950-1990. CEPAL Review 45 (December):121-135.
INSTITUTO DE ESTUDOS PARA O DESENVOLVIMENTO INDUSTRIAL (IEDI)
1990 A necessidade de um projeto de desenvolvimento. IEDI--Carta 1 (October): 1-3.
KAHLER, MILES
1990 Orthodoxy and its alternatives. In Economic crisis and policy choice, edited by Joan
Nelson, 33-61. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
KAHNEMAN, DANIEL, AND AMOS TVERSKY
1979 Prospect Theory. Econometrica 47, 2 (March):263-91.
KAUFMAN, ROBERT R., AND BARBARA STALLINGS
1991 The political economy of Latin American populism. In Dornbusch and Edwards, eds.,
15-34.
28 Studies in Comparative International Development / Fall 1996

KINZO, MARIA D'ALVA

1993 The 1989 presidential election. Journal of Latin American Studies 25, 2 (May):313-30.
KRUSE, SABINE
1992 PERU: Anpassungspolitik und 'autogolpe'. Lateinamerika Supplement no. 11 (August): 1-
70.
LAGO, RICARDO
1991 The illusion of pursuing redistribution through macropolicy. In Dornbusch and Edwards,
eds., 263-323.
LEAMAN, DAVID E.
1994 Populist liberalism in post-authoritarian Argentina. Paper for XVIII LASA Congress,
Atlanta, March I 0-12.
MAUCERI, PHILIP
1995 State reform, coalitions, and the neoliberal autogolpe in Peru. Latin American Research
Review 30, 1:7-37.
MCCLINTOCK, CYNTHIA
1994 The breakdown of constitutional democracy in Peru. Paper for XVIII LASA Congress,
Atlanta, March 10-12.
MCGUIRE, JAMES W.
1992 Union political tactics and democratic consolidation in Alfonsfn's Argentina, 1983-1989.
Latin American Research Review 27, 1:37-74.
1995 Political parties and democracy in Argentina. In Building democratic institutions, edited
by Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully, 200-246. Stanford: Stanford University
Press.
MENEM, CARLOS SAIJL
1995 Mensaje presidencial. Buenos Aires: Presidencia.
MIGUEL, LORENZO
1995 Author interview with president of Uni6n de Obreros Metah~rgicos, Buenos Aires, 27
March.
MINISTERIO DE ECONOMIA. SECRETARIA DE INGRESOS PUBLICOS
1995 La recaudaci6n tributaria en el cuarto trimestre de 1994. Buenos Aires: Ministerio de
Economfa.
MINISTERIO DE ECONOMIA. SECRETARIA DE PROGRAMACION ECONOMICA
1994 Informe Econ6mico 3, 10 (October).
MOISI~S, JOSI~ ALVARO
1993 Elections, political parties and political culture in Brazil. Journal of Latin American
Studies 25, 3 (October):575-611.
MORA Y ARAUJO/SOCMERC
1989a Anticipo de lnformaci6n 89/5 (November). Buenos Aires: SOCMERC.
1989b lnforme General 89/2 (March). Buenos Aires: SOCMERC.
1989c Informe lnstituciona189/5 (October). Buenos Aires: SOCMERC.
1990 Informe de Opini6n P~blica 1990/6 (October). Buenos Aires: SOCMERC.
1991 lnforme de Opini6n Ptlblica 1991/4 (June). Buenos Aires: SOCMERC.
1994 An6lisis Sociopolltico de la Coyuntura Argentina (October). Buenos Aires: SOCMERC.
MOREIRA, MARCILIO MARQUES
1992 Author interview with Economy Minister, Brasflia, 19 July.
MORLEY, SAMUEL A., AND CAROLA ALVAREZ
1992 Recession and the growth of poverty in Argentina. Washington, DC: Inter-American
Development Bank.
MOUZELIS, NICOS
1985 On the concept of populism. Politics and Society 14, 3:329-348.
NELSON, JOAN M.
1992 Poverty, equity, and the politics of adjustment. In The politics of economic adjusonent,
edited by Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, 221-269. Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press.
O'DONNELL, GUILLERMO A.
1979 Modernization and bureaucratic authoritarianism, 2d ed. Berkeley: Institute for Interna-
tional Studies. University of California, Berkeley.
We,/land 29

1993 On the state, democratization and some conceptual problems. World Development 21, 8
(August): 1355-69.
1994 Delegative democracy. Journal of Democracy 5, 1 (January):55-69.
PANFICHI, ALDO, AND CESAR FRANCIS
1993 The war of the gods: Authoritarian political leadership in Peru. Lima: Departamento de
Ciencias Sociales, Pontificia Universidad Cat61ica del Perti.
P/~SARA, LUIS
1993 E1 ocaso de los partidos. In El poder en el Per~, edited by Augusto .~ellvarez Rodrich,
33--49. Lima: Apoyo.
PASTOR, JR., MANUEL AND CAROL WISE
1992 Peruvian economic policy in the 1980s. Latin American Research Review 27, 2:83-117.
PE~IAFLOR G., GIOVANNA
1992 Y el ganador e s . . . QueHacer 80 (November-December):30-37.
PERLMAN, JANICE E.
1976 The myth ofmarginality. Berkeley: University of California Press.
PERRUCI JR., GAMALIEL, AND STEVEN E. SANDERSON
1989 Presidential succession, economic crisis, and populist resurgence in Brazil. Studies in
Comparative International Development 24, 3 (Fall): 30-50.
PHILIP, GEORGE
1993 The new economic liberalism and democracy in Latin America. Third World Quarterly
14, 3:555-571.
PI/qERA, JOSI~
1993 Camino nuevo. Santiago: Economfa y Sociedad.
PORTES, ALEJANDRO
1985 Latin American class structures. Latin American Research Review 20, 3:7-39.
PORTES, ALEJANDRO, AND RICHARD SCHAUFFLER
1993 Competing perspectives on the Latin American informal sector. Population and Develop-
ment Review 19, 1 (March):33-60.
POWER, TIMOTHY J.
1991 Politicized Democracy. Journal oflnteramerican Studies and World Affairs 33, 3 (Fa11):75-
112.
1994 The pen is mightier than the congress. Paper for XVIII LASA Congress, Atlanta, March
10-12.
PRES1DENCIA DEL CONSEJO DE MINISTROS
1995 Ejecuci6n del programa de focalizacirn del gasto social a diciembre de 1994 por
departamentos. Lima: n.p.
PRZEWORSKI, ADAM
1991 Democracy and the market. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
REA, JULIAN CASTRO, GRACIELA DUCATENZEILER, AND PHILIPPE FAUCHER
1992 Back to populism. In Latin America to the Year 2000, edited by Archibald Ritter,
Maxwell A. Cameron, and David H. Pollock, 125-146. New York: Praeger.
REMMER, KAREN L.
1991 The political impact of economic crisis in Latin America in the 1980s. American Political
Science Review 85, 3 (September): 777-800.
ROBERTS, KENNETH
1995 Neoliberalism and the transformation of populism in Latin America: The Peruvian case.
World Politics 48, 1 (October):82-116.
ROBLES, VICTOR
1989 Los jovenes del FREDEMO. QueHacer 60 (August-September):49-56.
ROS, ROBERTO CARLOS
1995 Author interview with Asesor, Confederacirn General del Trabajo, Buenos Aires, 27
March.
ROXBOROUGH, IAN
1992 Neoliberalism in Latin America. Third Worm Quarterly 13, 3:421--440.
RUBIO CORREA, MARCIAL
1992 E1 espejismo de la fuerza, QueHacer 77 (May-June):4-13.
30 Studiesin ComparativeInternationalDevelopment/Fall 1996

SACHS, JEFFREY D.
1989 Social conflict and populist policies in Latin America. Working Paper no.2897. Cam-
bridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
SANBORN, CYNTHIA ANN
1991 The democratic left and the persistence of populism in Peru: 1975-1990. Ph.D. Diss.
Harvard University.
SARTORI, GIOVANNI
1970 Concept misformation in comparative politics. American Political Science Review 64:1033-
53.
SCHMIDT, GREGORY D.
1994 Presidential decree authority in Peru, 1980-1993. Paper for XVIII LASA Congress,
Atlanta, March 10-12.
SCHMI'ITER, PHILIPPE C., AND TERRY KARL
1992 The types of democracy emerging in Southern and Eastern Europe and South and Central
America. Bound to change, edited by Peter M.E. Volten, 43-68. New York: East-West
Institute.
SCHNEIDER, BEN ROSS
1991 Brazil under Collor. World Policy Journal (Spring): 321-347.
SCHNEIDER, INGR1D
1989 Soziale Auswirkungen von Wirtschaftskrise und Strukturanpassung in Lateinamerika.
Lateinamerika Supplement no. 7 (September): 1-72.
SECRETARIA DA RECEITA FEDERAL (SRF)
1994 Sistema tribut6rio. Brasflia: SRF.
SHEAHAN, JOHN
1994 Peru's return toward an open economy. World Development 22, 6 (June):911-923.
SINGER, ANDRI~
1990 Collor na Periferia. In De Geisel a Collor, edited by Bolfvar Lamounier,135-152. Silo
Paulo: Sumar~ & IDESP.
SKIDMORE, THOMAS E., Ed.
1993 Television,politics, and the transition to democracy in Latin America. Washington, DC:
Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
SMITH, WILLIAM C.
1990 Democracy, distributional conflicts and macroeconomic policymaking in Argentina, 1983-
89. Journal of lnteramerican Studies and World Affairs 32, 2 (Summer): 1--42.
1991 State, market and neoliberalism in post-transition Argentina. Journal of Interamerican
Studies and World Affairs 33, 4 (Winter):45-82.
SOCIEDAD NACIONAL DE INDUSTRIAS (SNI)
1991 Memoria 1989-1990. Lima: SNI.
SOLA, LOURDES
1994 The state, structural reform, and democratization in Brazil. In Democracy, markets, and
structural reform in Latin America, edited by William C. Smith, Carlos H. Acufia, and
Eduardo A. Gamarra, 151-181. New Brunswick: Transaction.
STEIN, STEVE
1980 Populism in Peru. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.
SUPERINTENDENCIA NACIONAL DE ADMINISTRACION TRIBUTARIA (SUNAT)
1994 Nota Tributaria 3, 9 (September).
TEMPLETON, ANDREW
1995 The evolution of popular opinion. In Lessons of the Venezuelan experience, edited by
Louis Goodman et al., 79-114. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
TEMPORAL, AMAURY
1992 Author interview with ex-President of Confedera~ao das Associa~es Comerciais do
Brasil, Rio de Janeiro, 20 July.
THALER, RICHARD AND ERIC JOHNSON
1990 Gambling with the house money and trying to break even. Management Science 36:643-
60.
TIRONI, EUGENIO
1990 Autoritarismo,modernizaci6n y marginalidad. Santiago: Sur.
Weyt~d 31

UBALDINI, SAOL
1995 Author interview with former Secretary-General of Confederaci6n General del Trabajo
(1985-92), Buenos Aires, 15 March.
UNGER, ROBERTO MANGABEIRA
1990 A alternativa transformadora. Rio de Janeiro: Guanabara Koogan.
VARGAS LLOSA, MARIO
1991 The country to come. Partisan Review 58, 1 (Winter):20-8.
VIGUERA, ANfBAL
1993 'Populismo' y 'Neopopulismo' en Am6rica Latina. Revista Mexicana de Sociologfa 55, 3
(July-September):49-66.
WAISMAN, CARLOS A.
1992 Argentina's revolution from above. In The new Argentine democracy, edited by Edward
C. Epstein, 228-243. New York: Praeger.
WALTON, JOHN, AND CHARLES RAGIN
1989 Austerity and dissent. In Lost promises, edited by William L. Canak, 216-232. Boulder,
CO: Westview.
WATERBURY, JOHN
1993 Exposed to innumerable delusions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
WEBER, MAX
1976 Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 5th edition. Tilbingen: J.C.B. Mohr/Paul Siebeck.
WEFFORT, FRANCISCO CORRI~A
1986 0 populismo na polltica brasileira, 3d edition. Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra.
1992 Qual democracia? S~o Paulo: Companhia das Letras.
WELCH, JOHN H.
1991 Monetary policy, hyperinflation, and internal debt repudiation in Argentina and Brazil.
Paper for XVI LASA Congress, Washington, DC, April 4-6.
WEYLAND, KURT
1993 The rise and fall of president Collor and its impact on Brazilian democracy. Journal of
lnteramerican Studies and World Affairs 35, 1:1-37.
1995 Latin America's four political models. Journal of Democracy 6, 4 (October): 125-39.
1996 Risk-taking in Latin American economic restructuring: Lessons from prospect theory.
International Studies Quarterly 40, 2 (June):185-207.
WISE, CAROL
1994 The politics of Peruvian economic reform. Journal oflnteramerican Studies and World
Affairs 36, 1 (Spring):75-125.
WORLD BANK
1993 Argentina. From insolvency to growth. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Acronyms
FBIS-LAT Foreign Broadcast Information Service--Latin America
LARR Latin American Regional Reports
LAWR Latin American Weekly Reports