1 

Introduction to Philosophy and Arguments

Argument 2

In philosophy and logic, an argument is a series of statements typically used to persuade someone of
something or to present reasons for accepting a conclusion. The general form of an argument in a
natural language is that of premises (typically in the form of propositions, statements or sentences)
in support of a claim: the conclusion. The structure of some arguments can also be set out in a
formal language, and formally defined "arguments" can be made independently of natural language
arguments, as in math, logic, and computer science.

In a typical deductive argument, the premises guarantee the truth of the conclusion, while in an

inductive argument, they are thought to provide reasons supporting the conclusion's probable truth.
The standards for evaluating non-deductive arguments may rest on different or additional criteria
than truth, for example, the persuasiveness of so-called "indispensability claims" in transcendental
arguments, the quality of hypotheses in retroduction, or even the disclosure of new possibilities for
thinking and acting.

The standards and criteria used in evaluating arguments and their forms of reasoning are studied in
logic. Ways of formulating arguments effectively are studied in rhetoric (see also: argumentation
theory). An argument in a formal language shows the logical form of the symbolically represented or
natural language arguments obtained by its interpretations.

Formal and informal

Informal arguments as studied in informal logic, are presented in ordinary language and are intended
for everyday discourse. Conversely, formal arguments are studied in formal logic (historically
called symbolic logic, more commonly referred to as mathematical logic today) and are expressed in
a formal language. Informal logic may be said to emphasize the study of argumentation, whereas
formal logic emphasizes implication and inference. Informal arguments are sometimes implicit. That
is, the rational structure – the relationship of claims, premises, warrants, relations of implication, and
conclusion – is not always spelled out and immediately visible and must sometimes be made explicit
by analysis.

Standard types

There are several kinds of arguments in logic, the best-known of which are "deductive" and
"inductive." An argument has one or more premises but only one conclusion. Each premise and the
conclusion are truth bearers or "truth-candidates", each capable of being either true or false (but not
both). These truth values bear on the terminology used with arguments.

Deductive arguments

 A deductive argument asserts that the truth of the conclusion is a logical consequence of the
premises. Based on the premises, the conclusion follows necessarily (with certainty). For
example, given premises that A=B and B=C, then the conclusion follows necessarily that A=C.
Deductive arguments are sometimes referred to as "truth-preserving" arguments.
 A deductive argument is said to be valid or invalid. If one assumes the premises to be true
(ignoring their actual truth values), would the conclusion follow with certainty? If yes, the
argument is valid. Otherwise, it is invalid. In determining validity, the structure of the
argument is essential to the determination, not the actual truth values. For example, consider
the argument that because bats can fly (premise=true), and all flying creatures are birds
(premise=false), therefore bats are birds (conclusion=false). If we assume the premises are
true, the conclusion follows necessarily, and thus it is a valid argument.
 If a deductive argument is valid and its premises are all true, then it is also referred to as
sound. Otherwise, it is unsound, as in the "bats are birds" example.

1
Inductive arguments

 An inductive argument, on the other hand, asserts that the truth of the conclusion is
supported to some degree of probability by the premises. For example, given that the U.S.
military budget is the largest in the world (premise=true), then it is probable that it will remain
so for the next 10 years (conclusion=true). Arguments that involve predictions are inductive,
as the future is uncertain.
 An inductive argument is said to be strong or weak. If the premises of an inductive argument
are assumed true, is it probable the conclusion is also true? If so, the argument is strong.
Otherwise, it is weak.
 A strong argument is said to be cogent if it has all true premises. Otherwise, the argument is
uncogent. The military budget argument example above is a strong, cogent argument.

Deductive

A deductive argument is one that, if valid, has a conclusion that is entailed by its premises. In other
words, the truth of the conclusion is a logical consequence of the premises—if the premises are true,
then the conclusion must be true. It would be self-contradictory to assert the premises and deny the
conclusion, because the negation of the conclusion is contradictory to the truth of the premises.

Validity

Deductive arguments may be either valid or invalid. If an argument is valid, it is a valid deduction,
and if its premises are true, the conclusion must be true: a valid argument cannot have true premises
and a false conclusion.

An argument is formally valid if and only if the denial of the conclusion is incompatible with accepting
all the premises.

The validity of an argument depends, however, not on the actual truth or falsity of its premises and
conclusion, but solely on whether or not the argument has a valid logical form. The validity of an
argument is not a guarantee of the truth of its conclusion. Under a given interpretation, a valid
argument may have false premises that render it inconclusive: the conclusion of a valid argument
with one or more false premises may be either true or false.

Logic seeks to discover the valid forms, the forms that make arguments valid. A form of argument is
valid if and only if the conclusion is true under all interpretations of that argument in which the
premises are true. Since the validity of an argument depends solely on its form, an argument can be
shown to be invalid by showing that its form is invalid. This can be done by giving a counter example
of the same form of argument with premises that are true under a given interpretation, but a
conclusion that is false under that interpretation. In informal logic this is called a counter argument.

The form of argument can be shown by the use of symbols. For each argument form, there is a
corresponding statement form, called a corresponding conditional, and an argument form is valid if
and only if its corresponding conditional is a logical truth. A statement form which is logically true is
also said to be a valid statement form. A statement form is a logical truth if it is true under all
interpretations. A statement form can be shown to be a logical truth by either (a) showing that it is a
tautology or (b) by means of a proof procedure.

The corresponding conditional of a valid argument is a necessary truth (true in all possible worlds)
and so the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises, or follows of logical necessity. The
conclusion of a valid argument is not necessarily true, it depends on whether the premises are true.
If the conclusion, itself, just so happens to be a necessary truth, it is so without regard to the
premises.

Some examples:

2
  All Greeks are human and all humans are mortal; therefore, all Greeks are mortal.  : Valid
argument; if the premises are true the conclusion must be true.
 Some Greeks are logicians and some logicians are tiresome; therefore, some Greeks are
tiresome. Invalid argument: the tiresome logicians might all be Romans (for example).
 Either we are all doomed or we are all saved; we are not all saved; therefore, we are all
doomed. Valid argument; the premises entail the conclusion. (Remember that this does not
mean the conclusion has to be true; it is only true if the premises are true, which they may
not be!)
 Some men are hawkers. Some hawkers are rich. Therefore, some men are rich.  Invalid
argument. This can be easier seen by giving a counter-example with the same argument form:
 Some people are herbivores. Some herbivores are zebras. Therefore, some people are
zebras. Invalid argument, as it is possible that the premises be true and the conclusion false.

In the above second to last case (Some men are hawkers...), the counter-example follows the same
logical form as the previous argument, (Premise 1: "Some X are Y." Premise 2: "Some Y are Z."
Conclusion: "Some X are Z.") in order to demonstrate that whatever hawkers may be, they may or
may not be rich, in consideration of the premises as such. (See also, existential import).

The forms of argument that render deductions valid are well-established, however some invalid
arguments can also be persuasive depending on their construction (inductive arguments, for
example). (See also, formal fallacy and informal fallacy).

Soundness

A sound argument is a valid argument whose conclusion follows from its premise(s), and the
premise(s) of which is/are true.

Inductive

Non-deductive logic is reasoning using arguments in which the premises support the conclusion but
do not entail it. Forms of non-deductive logic include the statistical syllogism, which argues from
generalizations true for the most part, and induction, a form of reasoning that makes generalizations
based on individual instances. An inductive argument is said to be cogent if and only if the truth of
the argument's premises would render the truth of the conclusion probable (i.e., the argument
is strong), and the argument's premises are, in fact, true. Cogency can be considered inductive logic's
analogue to deductive logic's "soundness." Despite its name, mathematical induction is not a form of
inductive reasoning. The lack of deductive validity is known as the problem of induction.

Defeasible arguments and argumentation schemes

In modern argumentation theories, arguments are regarded as defeasible passages from premises to
a conclusion. Defeasibility means that when additional information (new evidence or contrary
arguments) is provided, the premises may be no longer lead to the conclusion (non-monotonic
reasoning). This type of reasoning is referred to as defeasible reasoning. For instance we consider
the famous Tweedy example:

Tweedy is a bird.

Birds generally fly.

Therefore, Tweedy (probably) flies.

This argument is reasonable and the premises support the conclusion unless additional information
indicating that the case is an exception comes in. If Tweedy is a penguin, the inference is no longer
justified by the premise. Defeasible arguments are based on generalizations that hold only in the
majority of cases, but are subject to exceptions and defaults. In order to represent and assess
defeasible reasoning, it is necessary to combine the logical rules (governing the acceptance of a
3
conclusion based on the acceptance of its premises) with rules of material inference, governing how
a premise can support a given conclusion (whether it is reasonable or not to draw a specific
conclusion from a specific description of a state of affairs). Argumentation schemes have been
developed to describe and assess the acceptability or the fallaciousness of defeasible arguments.
Argumentation schemes are stereotypical patterns of inference, combining semantic-ontological
relations with types of reasoning and logical axioms and representing the abstract structure of the
most common types of natural arguments. The argumentation schemes provided in (Walton, Reed &
Macagno, 2008) describe tentatively the patterns of the most typical arguments. However, the two
levels of abstraction are not distinguished. For this reason, under the label of “argumentation
schemes” fall indistinctly patterns of reasoning such as the abductive, analogical, or inductive ones,
and types of argument such as the ones from classification or cause to effect. A typical example is
the argument from expert opinion, which has two premises and a conclusion.

Major Premise: Source E is an expert in subject domain S containing proposition A.

Minor Premise: E asserts that proposition A is true (false).

Conclusion: A is true (false).

Each scheme is associated to a set of critical questions, namely criteria for assessing dialectically the
reasonableness and acceptability of an argument. The matching critical questions are the standard
ways of casting the argument into doubt.

CQ1: Expertise Question. How credible is E as an expert source?

CQ2: Field Question. Is E an expert in the field that A is in?

CQ3: Opinion Question. What did E assert that implies A?

CQ4: Trustworthiness Question. Is E personally reliable as a source?

CQ5: Consistency Question. Is A consistent with what other experts assert?

CQ6: Backup Evidence Question. Is E's assertion based on evidence?

If an expert says that a proposition is true, this provides a reason for tentatively accepting it, in the
absence of stronger reasons to doubt it. But suppose that evidence of financial gain suggests that the
expert is biased, for example by evidence showing that he will gain financially from his claim.

By analogy

Argument by analogy may be thought of as argument from the particular to particular. An argument
by analogy may use a particular truth in a premise to argue towards a similar particular truth in the
conclusion. For example, if A. Plato was mortal, and B. Socrates was like Plato in other respects, then
asserting that C. Socrates was mortal is an example of argument by analogy because the reasoning
employed in it proceeds from a particular truth in a premise (Plato was mortal) to a similar particular
truth in the conclusion, namely that Socrates was mortal.

Other kinds

Other kinds of arguments may have different or additional standards of validity or justification. For
example, Charles Taylor writes that so-called transcendental arguments are made up of a "chain of
indispensability claims" that attempt to show why something is necessarily true based on its
connection to our experience, while Nikolas Kompridis has suggested that there are two types of
"fallible" arguments: one based on truth claims, and the other based on the time-responsive
disclosure of possibility (see world disclosure). The late French philosopher Michel Foucault is said to
have been a prominent advocate of this latter form of philosophical argument.

4
In informal logic

Argument is an informal calculus, relating an effort to be performed or sum to be spent, to possible

future gain, either economic or moral. In informal logic, an argument is a connexion between

1. an individual action
2. through which a generally accepted good is obtained.

Ex :

1. You should marry Jane (individual action, individual decision)

2. because she has the same temper as you. (generally accepted wisdom that marriage is good
in itself, and it is generally accepted that people with the same character get along well).
1. You should not smoke (individual action, individual decision)
2. because smoking is harmful (generally accepted wisdom that health is good).

The argument is neither a) advice nor b) moral or economical judgement, but the connection
between the two. An argument always uses the connective because. An argument is not an
explanation. It does not connect two events, cause and effect, which already took place, but a
possible individual action and its beneficial outcome. An argument is not a proof. A proof is a logical
and cognitive concept; an argument is a praxeologic concept. A proof changes our knowledge; an
argument compels us to act.[]

Logical status

Argument does not belong to logic, because it is connected to a real person, a real event, and a real
effort to be made.

1. If you, John, will buy this stock, it will become twice as valuable in a year.
2. If you, Mary, study dance, you will become a famous ballet dancer.

The value of the argument is connected to the immediate circumstances of the person spoken to. If,
in the first case,(1) John has no money, or will die the next year, he will not be interested in buying
the stock. If, in the second case (2) she is too heavy, or too old, she will not be interested in studying
and becoming a dancer. The argument is not logical, but profitable.

World-disclosing

World-disclosing arguments are a group of philosophical arguments that are said to employ a
disclosive approach, to reveal features of a wider ontological or cultural-linguistic understanding – a
"world," in a specifically ontological sense – in order to clarify or transform the background of
meaning and "logical space" on which an argument implicitly depends.

Explanations

While arguments attempt to show that something was, is, will be, or should be the case, explanations
try to show why or how something is or will be. If Fred and Joe address the issue of whether or not
Fred's cat has fleas, Joe may state: "Fred, your cat has fleas. Observe, the cat is scratching right
now." Joe has made an argument that the cat has fleas. However, if Joe asks Fred, "Why is your cat
scratching itself?" the explanation, "...because it has fleas." provides understanding.

Both the above argument and explanation require knowing the generalities that a) fleas often cause
itching, and b) that one often scratches to relieve itching. The difference is in the intent: an
argument attempts to settle whether or not some claim is true, and an explanation attempts to
provide understanding of the event. Note, that by subsuming the specific event (of Fred's cat
scratching) as an instance of the general rule that "animals scratch themselves when they have
fleas", Joe will no longer wonder why Fred's cat is scratching itself. Arguments address problems of
5
belief, explanations address problems of understanding. Also note that in the argument above, the
statement, "Fred's cat has fleas" is up for debate (i.e. is a claim), but in the explanation, the
statement, "Fred's cat has fleas" is assumed to be true (unquestioned at this time) and just
needs explaining.

Arguments and explanations largely resemble each other in rhetorical use. This is the cause of much
difficulty in thinking critically about claims. There are several reasons for this difficulty.

 People often are not themselves clear on whether they are arguing for or explaining
something.
 The same types of words and phrases are used in presenting explanations and arguments.
 The terms 'explain' or 'explanation,' et cetera are frequently used in arguments.
 Explanations are often used within arguments and presented so as to serve as arguments.
 Likewise, "...arguments are essential to the process of justifying the validity of any explanation
as there are often multiple explanations for any given phenomenon."

Explanations and arguments are often studied in the field of Information Systems to help explain user
acceptance of knowledge-based systems. Certain argument types may fit better with personality
traits to enhance acceptance by individuals.

Fallacies and nonarguments

Fallacies are types of argument or expressions which are held to be of an invalid form or contain
errors in reasoning. There is not as yet any general theory of fallacy or strong agreement among
researchers of their definition or potential for application but the term is broadly applicable as a label
to certain examples of error, and also variously applied to ambiguous candidates.

In Logic types of fallacy are firmly described thus: First the premises and the conclusion must be
statements, capable of being true or false. Secondly it must be asserted that the conclusion follows
from the premises. In English the words therefore, so, because and hence typically separate the
premises from the conclusion of an argument, but this is not necessarily so. Thus: Socrates is a man,
all men are mortal therefore Socrates is mortal is clearly an argument (a valid one at that), because it
is clear it is asserted that Socrates is mortal follows from the preceding statements. However I was
thirsty and therefore I drank is NOT an argument, despite its appearance. It is not being claimed
that I drank is logically entailed by I was thirsty. The therefore in this sentence indicates for that
reason not it follows that.

Elliptical arguments

Often an argument is invalid because there is a missing premise—the supply of which would render it
valid. Speakers and writers will often leave out a strictly necessary premise in their reasonings if it is
widely accepted and the writer does not wish to state the blindingly obvious. Example: All metals
expand when heated, therefore iron will expand when heated.  (Missing premise: iron is a metal). On
the other hand, a seemingly valid argument may be found to lack a premise – a 'hidden assumption'
– which if highlighted can show a fault in reasoning. Example: A witness reasoned: Nobody came out
the front door except the milkman; therefore the murderer must have left by the back door.  (Hidden
assumptions- the milkman was not the murderer, and the murderer has left by the front or back
door).

6
Argument
The word “argument” can be used to designate a dispute or a fight, or it can be used more
technically. The focus of this article is on understanding an argument as a collection of  truth-
bearers (that is, the things that bear truth and falsity, or are true and false) some of which are offered
as reasons for one of them, the conclusion. This article takes propositions rather than sentences or
statements or utterances to be the primary truth bearers. The reasons offered within the argument are
called “premises”, and the proposition that the premises are offered for is called the “conclusion”. This
sense of “argument” diverges not only from the above sense of a dispute or fight but also from the
formal logician’s sense according to which an argument is merely a list of statements, one of which is
designated as the conclusion and the rest of which are designated as premises regardless of whether
the premises are offered as reasons for believing the conclusion. Arguments, as understood in this
article, are the subject of study in critical thinking and informal logic courses in which students usually
learn, among other things, how to identify, reconstruct, and evaluate arguments given outside the
classroom.
Arguments, in this sense, are typically distinguished from both implications and inferences. In
asserting that a proposition P implies proposition Q, one does not thereby offer P as a reason for Q.
The proposition frogs are mammals implies that frogs are not reptiles, but it is problematic to offer the
former as a reason for believing the latter. If an arguer offers an argument in order to persuade an
audience that the conclusion is true, then it is plausible to think that the arguer is inviting the audience
to make an inference from the argument’s premises to its conclusion. However, an inference is a form
of reasoning, and as such it is distinct from an argument in the sense of a collection of propositions
(some of which are offered as reasons for the conclusion). One might plausibly think that a person S
infers Q from P just in case S comes to believe Q because S believes that P is true and because S
believes that the truth of P justifies belief that Q. But this movement of mind from P to Q is something
different from the argument composed of just P and Q.

The characterization of argument in the first paragraph requires development since there are forms of
reasoning such as explanations which are not typically regarded as arguments even though
(explanatory) reasons are offered for a proposition. Two principal approaches to fine-tuning this first-
step characterization of arguments are what may be called the structural and pragmatic approaches.
The pragmatic approach is motivated by the view that the nature of an argument cannot be
completely captured in terms of its structure. In what follows, each approach is described, and
criticism is briefly entertained.  Along the way, distinctive features of arguments are highlighted that
seemingly must be accounted for by any plausible characterization. The classification of arguments
as deductive, inductive, and conductive is discussed in section 3.

Table of Contents
1. The Structural Approach to Characterizing Arguments
2. The Pragmatic Approach to Characterizing Arguments
3. Deductive, Inductive, and Conductive Arguments
4. Conclusion
5. References and Further Reading
1. The Structural Approach to Characterizing Arguments
Not any group of propositions qualifies as an argument. The starting point for structural approaches is
the thesis that the premises of an argument are reasons offered in support of its conclusion (for
example, Govier 2010, p.1, Bassham, G., W. Irwin, H. Nardone, J. Wallace 2005, p.30, Copi and
Cohen 2005, p.7; for discussion, see Johnson 2000, p.146ff ). Accordingly, a collection of
propositions lacks the structure of an argument unless there is a reasoner who puts forward some as
reasons in support of one of them. Letting P 1, P2, P3, …, and C range over propositions and R over
reasoners, a structural characterization of argument takes the following form.
 A collection of propositions, P 1, …, Pn, C, is an argument if and only if there is a reasoner R who puts
forward the Pi as reasons in support of C.
The structure of an argument is not a function of the syntactic and semantic features of the
propositions that compose it. Rather, it is imposed on these propositions by the intentions of a
reasoner to use some as support for one of them. Typically in presenting an argument, a reasoner will
use expressions to flag the intended structural components of her argument. Typical premise
7
indicators include: “because”, “since”, “for”, and “as”; typical conclusion indicators include “therefore”,
“thus”, “hence”, and “so”. Note well: these expressions do not always function in these ways, and so
their mere use does not necessitate the presence of an argument.

Different accounts of the nature of the intended support offered by the premises for the conclusion in
an argument generate different structural characterizations of arguments (for discussion see
Hitchcock 2007). Plausibly, if a reasoner R puts forward premises in support of a conclusion C, then
(i)-(iii) obtain. (i) The premises represent R’s reasons for believing that the conclusion is true and R
thinks that her belief in the truth of the premises is justified. (ii) R believes that the premises make C
more probable than not. (iii) (a) R believes that the premises are independent of C ( that is, R thinks
that her reasons for the premises do not include belief that C is true), and (b) R believes that the
premises are relevant to establishing that C is true. If we judge that a reasoner R presents an
argument as defined above, then by the lights of (i)-(iii) we believe that R believes that the premises
justify belief in the truth of the conclusion.  In what immediately follows, examples are given to
explicate (i)-(iii).

A: John is an only child.

B: John is not an only child; he said that Mary is his sister.

If B presents an argument, then the following obtain. (i) B believes that the premise ( that is,  Mary is
John’s sister) is true, B thinks this belief is justified, and the premise is B’s reason for maintaining the
conclusion. (ii) B believes that John said that Mary is his sister makes it more likely than not that John
is not an only child, and (iii) B thinks that that John said that Mary is his sister is both independent of
the proposition that Mary is John’s sister and relevant to confirming it.

A: The Democrats and Republicans don’t seem willing to compromise.

B: If the Democrats and Republicans are not willing to compromise, then the U.S. will go over the
fiscal cliff.

B’s assertion of a conditional does not require that B believe either the antecedent or consequent.
Therefore, it is unlikely that B puts forward the Democrats and Republicans are not willing to
compromise as a reason in support of the U.S. will go over the fiscal cliff, because it is unlikely that B
believes either proposition. Hence, it is unlikely that B’s response to A has the structure of an
argument, because (i) is not satisfied.

A: Doctor B, what is the reason for my uncle’s muscular weakness?

B: The results of the test are in. Even though few syphilis patients get paresis, we suspect that the
reason for your uncle’s paresis is the syphilis he suffered from 10 years ago.

Dr. B offers reasons that explain why A’s uncle has paresis. It is unreasonable to think that B believes
that the uncle’s being a syphilis victim makes it more likely than not that he has paresis, since B
admits that having syphilis does not make it more likely than not that someone has (or will have)
paresis. So, B’s response does not contain an argument, because (ii) is not satisfied.

A: I don’t think that Bill will be at the party tonight.

B: Bill will be at the party, because Bill will be at the party.

Suppose that B believes that Bill will be at the party. Trivially, the truth of this proposition makes it
more likely than not that he will be at the party. Nevertheless, B is not presenting an argument.  B’s
response does not have the structure of an argument, because (iiia) is not satisfied. Clearly, B does
not offer a reason for Bill will be at the party that is independent of this. Perhaps, B’s response is
intended to communicate her confidence that Bill will be at the party. By (iiia), a reasoner R puts
8
forward [1] Sasha Obama has a sibling in support of [2] Sasha is not an only child only if R’s reasons
for believing [1] do not include R’s belief that [2] is true. If R puts forward [1] in support of [2] and, say,
erroneously believes that the former is independent of the latter, then R’s argument would be
defective by virtue of being circular. Regarding (iiib), that Obama is U.S. President entails that the
earth is the third planet from the sun or it isn’t, but it is plausible to suppose that the former does not
support the latter because it is irrelevant to showing that the earth is the third planet from the sun or it
isn’t is true.

Premises offered in support of a conclusion are either linked or convergent. This difference marks a
structural distinction between arguments.

[1] Tom is happy only if he is playing guitar.

[2] Tom is not playing guitar.
———————————————————————
∴ [3] Tom is not happy.
Suppose that a reasoner R offers [1] and [2] as reasons in support of [3]. The argument is presented
in what is called standard form; the premises are listed first and a solid line separates them from the
conclusion, which is prefaced by “∴”. This symbol means “therefore”. Premises [1] and [2] are
linked because they do not support the conclusion independently of one another,  that is, they support
the conclusion jointly. It is unreasonable to think that R offers [1] and [2] individually, as opposed to
collectively, as reasons for [3]. The following representation of the argument depicts the linkage of the
premises.

Combining [1] and [2] with the plus sign and underscoring them indicates that they are linked. The
arrow indicates that they are offered in support of [3]. To see a display of convergent premises,
consider the following.
[1] Tom said that he didn’t go to Samantha’s party.
[2] No one at Samantha’s party saw Tom there.
——————————————————————————
∴ [3] Tom did not attend Samantha’s party.
These premises are convergent, because each is a reason that supports [3] independently of the
other. The below diagram represents this.

An extended argument is an argument with at least one premise that a reasoner attempts to support
explicitly. Extended arguments are more structurally complex than ones that are not extended.
Consider the following.

The keys are either in the kitchen or the bedroom. The keys are not in the kitchen. I did not find the
keys in the kitchen. So, the keys must be in the bedroom. Let’s look there!

The argument in standard form may be portrayed as follows:

[1] I just searched the kitchen and I did not find the keys.
—————————————————————————————
∴ [2] The keys are not in the kitchen.
9
[3] The keys are either in the kitchen or the bedroom.
————————————————————————————
∴ [4] The keys are in the bedroom.

Note that although the keys being in the bedroom is a reason for the imperative, “Let’s look there!” (given the
desirability of finding the keys), this proposition is not “truth apt” and so is not a component of the argument.

An enthymeme is an argument which is presented with at least one component that is suppressed.

A: I don’t know what to believe regarding the morality of abortion.

B: You should believe that abortion is immoral. You’re a Catholic.

That B puts forward [1] A is a Catholic in support of [2] A should believe that abortion is
immoral suggests that B implicitly puts forward [3] all Catholics should believe that abortion is
immoral in support of [2]. Proposition [3] may plausibly be regarded as a suppressed premise of B’s
argument. Note that [2] and [3] are linked. A premise that is suppressed is never a reason for a
conclusion independent of another explicitly offered for that conclusion.

There are two main criticisms of structural characterizations of arguments. One criticism is that they
are too weak because they turn non-arguments such as explanations into arguments.

A: Why did this metal expand?

B: It was heated and all metals expand when heated.

B offers explanatory reasons for the explanandum (what is explained): this metal expanded. It is
plausible to see B offering these explanatory reasons in support of the explanandum. The reasons B
offers jointly support the truth of the explanandum, and thereby show that the expansion of the metal
was to be expected. It is in this way that B’s reasons enable A to understand why the metal
expanded.

The second criticism is that structural characterizations are too strong. They rule out as arguments
what intuitively seem to be arguments.

A: Kelly maintains that no explanation is an argument. I don’t know what to believe.

B: Neither do I. One reason for her view may be that the primary function of arguments, unlike
explanations, is persuasion. But I am not sure that this is the primary function of arguments. We
should investigate this further.

B offers a reason, [1] the primary function of arguments, unlike explanations, is persuasion, for the
thesis [2] no explanation is an argument. Since B asserts neither [1] nor [2], B does not put forward
[1] in support of [2]. Hence, by the above account, B’s reasoning does not qualify as an argument. A
contrary view is that arguments can be used in ways other than showing that their conclusions are
true. For example, arguments can be constructed for purposes of inquiry and as such can be used to
investigate a hypothesis by seeing what reasons might be given to support a given proposition (see
Meiland 1989 and Johnson and Blair 2006, p.10). Such arguments are sometimes referred to as

10
exploratory arguments.  On this approach, it is plausible to think that B constructs an exploratory
argument [exercise for the reader: identify B’s suppressed premise].

Briefly, in defense of the structuralist account of arguments one response to the first criticism is to bite
the bullet and follow those who think that at least some explanations qualify as arguments (see
Thomas 1986 who argues that all explanations are arguments). Given that there are exploratory
arguments, the second criticism motivates either liberalizing the concept of support that premises
may provide for a conclusion (so that, for example, B may be understood as offering [1] in support of
[2]) or dropping the notion of support all together in the structural characterization of arguments (for
example, a collection of propositions is an argument if and only if a reasoner offers some as reasons
for one of them. See Sinnott-Armstrong and Fogelin 2010, p.3).

2. The Pragmatic Approach to Characterizing Arguments

The pragmatic approach is motivated by the view that the nature of an argument cannot be
completely captured in terms of its structure. In contrast to structural definitions of arguments,
pragmatic definitions appeal to the function of arguments. Different accounts of the purposes
arguments serve generate different pragmatic definitions of arguments. The following pragmatic
definition appeals to the use of arguments as tools of rational persuasion (for definitions of argument
that make such an appeal, see Johnson 2000, p. 168; Walton 1996, p. 18ff; Hitchcock 2007, p.105ff)

A collection of propositions is an argument if and only if there is a reasoner R who puts forward some
of them (the premises) as reasons in support of one of them (the conclusion) in order to rationally
persuade an audience of the truth of the conclusion.

One advantage of this definition over the previously given structural one is that it offers an
explanation why arguments have the structure they do. In order to rationally persuade an audience of
the truth of a proposition, one must offer reasons in support of that proposition. The appeal
to rational persuasion is necessary to distinguish arguments from other forms of persuasion such as
threats. One question that arises is: What obligations does a reasoner incur by virtue of offering
supporting reasons for a conclusion in order to rationally persuade an audience of the conclusion?
One might think that such a reasoner should be open to criticisms and obligated to respond to them
persuasively (See Johnson 2000 p.144 et al, for development of this idea). By appealing to the aims
that arguments serve, pragmatic definitions highlight the acts of presenting an argument in addition to
the arguments themselves. The field of argumentation, an interdisciplinary field that includes rhetoric,
informal logic, psychology, and cognitive science, highlights acts of presenting arguments and their
contexts as topics for investigation that inform our understanding of arguments (see Houtlosser 2001
for discussion of the different perspectives of argument offered by different fields).

For example, the acts of explaining and arguing—in sense highlighted here—have different aims.
Whereas the act of explaining is designed to increase the audience’s comprehension, the act of
arguing is aimed at enhancing the acceptability of a standpoint. This difference in aim makes sense of
the fact that in presenting an argument the reasoner believes that her standpoint is not yet acceptable
to her audience, but in presenting an explanation the reasoner knows or believes that the
explanandum is already accepted by her audience (See van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992, p.29,
and Snoeck Henkemans 2001, p.232). These observations about the acts of explaining and arguing
motivate the above pragmatic definition of an argument and suggest that arguments and explanations
are distinct things. It is generally accepted that the same line of reasoning can function as an
explanation in one dialogical context and as an argument in another (see Groarke and Tindale 2004,
p. 23ff for an example and discussion). Eemeren van, Grootendorst, and Snoeck Henkemans 2002
delivers a substantive account of how the evaluation of various types of arguments turns on
considerations pertaining to the dialogical contexts within which they are presented and discussed.

Note that, since the pragmatic definition appeals to the structure of propositions in characterizing
arguments, it inherits the criticisms of structural definitions. In addition, the question arises whether it
captures the variety of purposes arguments may serve. It has been urged that arguments can aim at
engendering any one of a full range of attitudes towards their conclusions (for example, Pinto 1991).
For example, a reasoner can offer premises for a conclusion C in order to get her audience to

11
withhold assent from C, suspect that C is true, believe that is merely possible that C is true, or to be
afraid that C is true.

The thought here is that these are alternatives to convincing an audience of the truth of C. A
proponent of a pragmatic definition of argument may grant that there are uses of arguments not
accounted for by her definition, and propose that the definition is stipulative. But then a case needs to
be made why theorizing about arguments from a pragmatic approach should be anchored to such a
definition when it does not reflect all legitimate uses of arguments. Another line of criticism of the
pragmatic approach is its rejecting that arguments themselves have a function (Goodwin 2007) and
arguing that the function of persuasion should be assigned to the dialogical contexts in which
arguments take place (Doury 2011).

3. Deductive, Inductive, and Conductive Arguments

Arguments are commonly classified as deductive or inductive (for example, Copi, I. and C. Cohen
2005, Sinnott-Armstrong and Fogelin 2010). A deductive argument is an argument that an arguer
puts forward as valid. For a valid argument, it is not possible for the premises to be true with the
conclusion false. That is, necessarily if the premises are true, then the conclusion is true. Thus we
may say that the truth of the premises in a valid argument guarantees that the conclusion is also true.
The following is an example of a valid argument: Tom is happy only if the Tigers win, the Tigers lost;
therefore, Tom is definitely not happy.
A step-by-step derivation of the conclusion of a valid argument from its premises is called a proof. In
the context of a proof, the given premises of an argument may be viewed as initial premises. The
propositions produced at the steps leading to the conclusion are called derived premises. Each step
in the derivation is justified by a principle of inference. Whether the derived premises are components
of a valid argument is a difficult question that is beyond the scope of this article.   

An inductive argument is an argument that an arguer puts forward as inductively strong. In an

inductive argument, the premises are intended only to be so strong that, if they were true, then it
would be unlikely, although possible, that the conclusion is false. If the truth of the premises makes it
unlikely (but not impossible) that the conclusion is false, then we may say that the argument is
inductively strong. The following is an example of an inductively strong argument: 97% of the
Republicans in town Z voted for McX, Jones is a Republican in town Z; therefore, Jones voted for
McX.
In an argument like this, an arguer often will conclude “Jones probably voted for McX” instead of
“Jones voted for McX,” because they are signaling with the word “probably” that they intend to
present an argument that is inductively strong but not valid.

In order to evaluate an argument it is important to determine whether or not it is deductive or

inductive. It is inappropriate to criticize an inductively strong argument for being invalid. Based on the
above characterizations, whether an argument is deductive or inductive turns on whether the arguer
intends the argument to be valid or merely inductively strong, respectively. Sometimes the presence
of certain expressions such as ‘definitely’ and ‘probably’ in the above two arguments indicate the
relevant intensions of the arguer. Charity dictates that an invalid argument which is inductively strong
be evaluated as an inductive argument unless there is clear evidence to the contrary.

Conductive arguments have been put forward as a third category of arguments (for example, Govier
2010). A conductive argument is an argument whose premises are convergent; the premises count
separately in support of the conclusion. If one or more premises were removed from the argument,
the degree of support offered by the remaining premises would stay the same. The previously given
example of an argument with convergent premises is a conductive argument. The following is another
example of a conductive argument. It most likely won’t rain tomorrow. The sky is red tonight. Also, the
weather channel reported a 30% chance of rain for tomorrow.

The primary rationale for distinguishing conductive arguments from deductive and inductive ones is
as follows. First, the premises of conductive arguments are always convergent, but the premises of
deductive and inductive arguments are never convergent. Second, the evaluation of arguments with
convergent premises requires not only that each premise be evaluated individually as support for the
conclusion, but also the degree to which the premises support the conclusion collectively must be
12
determined. This second consideration mitigates against treating conductive arguments merely as a
collection of subarguments, each of which is deductive or inductive. The basic idea is that the support
that the convergent premises taken together provide the conclusion must be considered in the
evaluation of a conductive argument. With respect to the above conductive argument, the sky is red
tonight and the weather channel reported a 30% chance of rain for tomorrow are offered together as
(convergent) reasons for It most likely won’t rain tomorrow. Perhaps, collectively, but not individually,
these reasons would persuade an addressee that it most likely won’t rain tomorrow.

4. Conclusion
A group of propositions constitutes an argument only if some are offered as reasons for one of them.
Two approaches to identifying the definitive characteristics of arguments are the structural and
pragmatic approaches. On both approaches, whether an act of offering reasons for a proposition P
yields an argument depends on what the reasoner believes regarding both the truth of the reasons
and the relationship between the reasons and P. A typical use of an argument is to rationally
persuade its audience of the truth of the conclusion. To be effective in realizing this aim, the reasoner
must think that there is real potential in the relevant context for her audience to be rationally
persuaded of the conclusion by means of the offered premises. What, exactly, this presupposes
about the audience depends on what the argument is and the context in which it is given. An
argument may be classified as deductive, inductive, or conductive. Its classification into one of these
categories is a prerequisite for its proper evaluation.

13