BOYEFIO v NTHC PROPERTIES LTD

[1997-98] 1 GLR 768

Division: SUPREME COURT, ACCRA

Date: 9 JULY 1997
Before: BAMFORD-ADDO, AMPIAH, ACQUAH, ATUGUBA
AND AKUFFO JJSC

Courts—Jurisdiction—Land dispute—Land Title Registration District—Types of disputes that can arise

during registration process under PNDCL 152—Land title adjucation[sic](1) committee granted
exclusive jurisdiction for determination of any dispute relating to registration of land or interest in land
in registration district by section 12(1) of PNDCL 152—Committee internal tribunal not subject to
procedures and technicalities of court—Appeal from final decisions of committee going to High
Court—Whether dispute arising outside registration exercise in declared registration district cognizable
by courts—Whether section 12(1) of PNDCL 152 ousting jurisdiction of courts in land suits in
registration district—Land Title Registration Law, 1986 (PNDCL 152), ss 12(1), 13(2), 21(2), 22, 22(3)
and (4), 23(6), and 33(2).

Land title administration—Courts—Jurisdiction—Land Title Registration District—Ouster of jurisdiction

of court—Section 12(1) of PNDCL 152 granting exclusive jurisdiction at first instance over disputes
relating to registration of land or interest in land in registration district to land title adjudication
committee—Appeal from final decision of committee going to High Court and then to Court of Appeal
and Supreme Court—Whether jurisdiction of committee violating final judicial power of judiciary under
Constitution—Constitution, 1992, art 125(3)—PNDCL 152, s 139(2) and (3).

Statutes—Construction—Mandatory statutory provision—Ouster clause—Section 12(1) of PNDCL 152

granting exclusive jurisdiction at first instance over disputes relating to registration of or interest in land
to adjudicating committee—Circumstances in which committee can be side-stepped—Whether provision
in conflict with jurisdiction of judiciary—Constitution, 1992, arts 125(3) and 140(1)—PNDCL 152, s
12(1).

HEADNOTES
The plaintiff brought an action at the High Court, Accra against the defendant for damages for trespass,
ejectment and perpetual injunction in respect of a piece of land at Baatsonaa within the Nungua
Traditional Area. That area had been declared a registration district by the Land Title
Registration—Declaration of Registration District (Accra District 02) Instrument, 1992 (LI 1536) under
the Land Title Registration Law, 1986 (PNDCL 152). The defendant then applied to the High Court to
dismiss the action on the ground that since LI 1536 had declared the area a registration district, section
12(1) of PNDCL 152 operated to oust the jurisdiction of the court. The plaintiff however resisted the

[p.769] of [1997-98] 1 GLR 768

application[sic](2) the ground that under articles 125(3) and 140(1) of the Constitution, 1992 the High
Court had jurisdiction over the matter. The trial High Court judge then stayed the proceedings and in
accordance with article 130(2) of the Constitution, 1992 referred to the Supreme Court for determination
the question: “Whether having regard to the provisions of articles 125(3) and 140(1) of the Constitution,
1992, section 12(1) of PNDCL 152 can operate to oust the jurisdiction of the High Court in land matters
arising within areas which have been declared registration districts under the said Law.”
Held,
(1) the disputes which could arise relative to land or an interest in land under the Land Title
Registration Law, 1986 (PNDCL 152) and in respect of which section 12(1) provided that no action
should be commenced in any court until the procedures to settling such disputes under PNDCL 152
had been exhausted were disputes relating to (i) conflicting as provided under section 23(6) of
PNDCL 152; (ii) conflicting Land Registry Act, 1962 (Act 122) registered instrument as provided
under section 13(2); (iii) the registrar refusal to register an applicant as provided under section
21(2); and (iv) the accuracy and situation of land on the registry maps and plans as provided under
section 37(2). Under those provisions the specified disputes were in the first instance referred to the
adjudication committee set up under section 22 of PNDCL 152. However, under section 22(3) and
(4) of PNDCL 152, the jurisdiction of the adjudication committee was limited to the determination
of any dispute relating to the registration of land or interest in land in any registration district. The
adjudication committee was therefore a purely internal or domestic tribunal and not one with
general jurisdiction to handle any land suit in a registration district. It was not subject to the
procedures and technicalities of the court and it was only where there was an appeal to the High
Court from a final decision of the committee that section 33(2) of PNDCL 512 mandated the
registrar to enter the contents of the adjudicating record in the land register and other records of the
registry. It was therefore clear from the prescribed jurisdiction, procedure and effect of the decision
of the adjudication committee that it was not intended to assume the jurisdiction of the courts in
land suits in a registration district. Accordingly, the ban on taking actions in the courts imposed in
section 12(1) of PNDCL 152 was restricted solely to actions relating to disputes arising in the
courts of the Land Title Registry’s exercise of registering such titles to land and interest therein.
Accordingly, if a dispute arose outside the registration exercise of the registry then,
notwithstanding that the area had been declared a registration district, the court was the proper
forum for its determination. In the result, section 12(1) of PNDCL 152 did not oust the jurisdiction
of any court, let alone the High Court, in land suits in a registration district. Dictum of Aikins JSC
in Kasser v Raziel Construction Ltd [1993-94] 1 GLR 332 at 340, SC cited. Amar v Mireku, Court
of Appeal, 9 December 1993, unreported and Paul v IGIC Ltd, High Court, Accra, 14 July 1995
unreported overruled.

[p.770] of [1997-98] 1 GLR 768

(2) Since the land title adjudication committee was an internal administrative tribunal of the Land Title
Registry solely concerned with determining disputes arising in the course of the registry’s
functions, and section 13(2) and (3) of PNDCL 152 had provided for appeals from any decision of
the adjudication committee to the High Court, then thereafter a further right of appeal to the Court
of Appeal, and finally, to the Supreme Court, the power exercised by the adjudication committee
did not violate articles 124(3) and 140(1) of the Constitution, 1992 which had vested exclusive
final judicial power in the judiciary and granted the High Court jurisdiction in all cases.
(3) The law was clear that where an enactment had prescribed a special procedure by which something
was to be done, it was that procedure alone that was to be followed. Furthermore, section 12(1) of
PNDCL 152 was in consonance with the modern practice of setting up an internal tribunal in an
institution to determine at first instance disputes arising within that institution before recourse was
made to the courts if the matter did not end at the internal tribunal. In such situations, where a
person ignored the internal tribunal and came to court in respect of any such internal dispute, unless
that person had a substantial reason for side-stepping the internal tribunal, the courts would
invariably order him to go back to the internal tribunal. Accordingly, section 12(1) PNDCL 152
was consistent with articles 125(3) and 140(1) of the Constitution 1992. Tularley v Abaidoo [1962]
GLR 411, SC cited.

CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Takoradi Flour Mills v Parry, High Court, Sekondi, 30 March 1992, unreported.
(2) Vanderpuye v Obey, High Court, Accra, 21 October 1993, unreported.
(3) Amar v Mereku, Court of Appeal, Accra, 9 December 1993, unreported.
(4) Nicheren Shoshu, Sokagakkai of Ghana v Ghanatta [1993-94] 1 GLR 316, CA.
(5) Kasser v Raziel Construction Ltd [1993-94] 1 GLR 241, CA.
(6) Kasser v Raziel Construction Ltd [1993-94] 1 GLR 332, SC.
(7) Paul v IGIC, High Court, Accra, 14 July 1995, unreported.
(8) Canada Sugar Refinery Co v R [1898] AC 735.
(9) Akainyah v The Republic [1968] GLR 548, CA.
(10) Tularley v Abaidoo [1962] 1 GLR 411, SC.

[p.771] of [1997-98] 1 GLR 768

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
REFERENCE by the High Court, Accra to the Supreme Court for determination under article 130(2) of
the Constitution, 1992 of the question: “Whether or not having regard to the provisions of articles 125(3)
and 140(1) of the Constitution, 1992, section 12(1) of the Land Title Registration Law, 1986 (PNDCL
152) has ousted the jurisdiction of the High Court in land matters arising within areas which have been
declared as registration districts under PNDCL 152.” The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment of
Acquah JSC.

COUNSEL
E D Kom (with him Charles Hayibor and Ansah) for the plaintiff.
Zwennes for the defendant.

JUDGMENT OF ACQUAH JSC.

Section 12(1) of the Land Title Registration Law, 1986 (PNDCL 152) has received such varied and,
indeed, conflicting interpretations from the lower courts as to make one wonder whether this stems from
any flaw in the drafting of that section.
Now, the object of PNDCL 152 as the memorandum to it shows, is to provide a machinery for the
registration of title to land and interests in land. The starting point in the registration exercise is the
declaration by the Minister of Lands, in a legislative instrument, that a specified area is a registration
district. Thereafter the processes for registration are set in motion by the Land Title Registry. Now, when
an area is declared a registration district by a legislative instrument, section 12(1) of PNDCL 152 forbids
the institution of any court action concerning any land or interest therein in a registration district until the
procedures for settling disputes under the law are exhausted. The problem has been the determination of
the true import of this section 12(1) of PNDCL 152. Does it oust the court’s jurisdiction in land suits in a
registration district?
In the instant case, the plaintiff issued a writ accompanied by a statement of claim at the High Court,
Accra for damages for trespass, ejectment and perpetual injunction in respect of a land situate at
Baatsonaa within the Nungua Traditional Area. That area has indeed been declared a registration district
by the Land Title Registration—Declaration of Registration District (Accra District

[p.772] of [1997-98] 1 GLR 768

02) Instrument, 1992 (LI 1536) of 17 July 1992. The defendant entered appearance and moved the court
to dismiss the action on the grounds that with the declaration of the area as a registration district by LI
1536, section 12(1) of PNDCL 152 operates to oust the jurisdiction of the High Court. The plaintiff
relying on article 140(1) and 125(3) of the Constitution, 1992 resisted the application. The trial High
Court judge (Gbadegbe J) in accordance with article 130(2) of the Constitution, 1992 posed the following
question to this court:
“Whether having regard to the provisions of article 125(3) and 140(1) of the Constitution, 1992, section
12(1) of PNDCL 152 can operate to oust the jurisdiction of the High Court in land matters arising
within areas which have been declared registration districts under the said Law?”
Article 125(3) of the Constitution, 1992 vests the judicial power of the State in the judiciary, while article
140(1) grants jurisdiction in all civil and criminal matters, subject to the provisions of the Constitution,
1992, to the High Court. Thus if section 12(1) of PNDCL 152 is understood to oust the High Court’s
jurisdiction in land matters, then this will be inconsistent with the above provisions of the Constitution,
1992. What then is the import of section 12(1) of PNDCL 152?
In Takoradi Flour Mills Ltd v Parry, High Court, 30 March 1992, unreported, it was held that section
12(1) of PNDCL 152 is only applicable to disputes affecting unregistered lands. Then in Vanderpuye v
Obey, High Court, 21 October 1993, unreported, it was also held that section 12(1) is limited to the
registration of land title or interest in land, and not to the declaration of title to land. The Court of Appeal
in two cases held that the High Court, and for that matter any court, has no jurisdiction to deal with any
claim involving declaration of title to land or interest in land in a registration district having regard to
section 12(1) of PNDCL 152. The cases are: Amar v Mireku, Court of Appeal, Accra, 9 December 1993
and Boakye v Trustees of Nichiren Shoshu Sokaggakai of Ghana [1993-94] 1 GLR 316, CA. In the latter
case, the Court of Appeal held itself bound by its decision in the Amar case (supra) and thereby followed
it. The subject-matter of the Amar

[p.773] of [1997-98] 1 GLR 768

case (supra) was house No C345/4 of one Ruth Sackitey Sackey who died intestate on 5 August 1962.
The customary successor of Ruth Sackitey Sackey was alleged to have sold this house to the defendant
without the consent of the family. The action was therefore for a declaration that on the death intestate of
Ruth Sackitey Sackey, the house became a family property and that the sale by the successor without the
consent of the family, was null and void. The defendant pleaded that the sale was proper and
counterclaimed for title to the house and perpetual injunction to restrain the plaintiffs. The Court of
Appeal held that the defendant’s counterclaim for title to the house was ousted by section 12(1) of
PNDCL 152. Then in another case, Kasser v Raziel Construction Ltd [1993-94] 1 GLR 241, CA, in which
the lease in issue was registered under the Land Registration Act, 1962 (Act 122) before the area was
declared a registration district, the Court of Appeal held that a land dispute touching upon a
pre-declaration of registration area, is one over which the courts have jurisdiction. The holding seems to
imply that if it had fallen within the declaration period, the courts would have had no jurisdiction. An
appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision in the above case was dismissed by the Supreme Court by a
majority of four to one: see Kasser v Raziel Construction Ltd [1993-94] 1 GLR 332, SC. Aikins JSC who
wrote the leading majority opinion pointed out that it is misconception to hold that on a declaration of a
registration district, the adjudication committee of the Land Title Registry automatically assumes
jurisdiction in claims of proprietors of land or interests in land. Having regard to the issues raised in that
appeal, the scope of section 12(1) was of PNDCL 152 was not really examined. Indeed, Francois JSC
who dissented took the view that 12(1) of PNDCL 152 was irrelevant to the resolution of the appeal.
In 1995 Asare Korang J in Paul v IGTC Ltd, High Court, Accra, 14 July 1995, unreported, examined the
two Court of Appeal decisions mentioned earlier on, and noted that the Court of Appeal in those cases,
did not advert their minds to the provision of the Constitution, 1992 to determine whether section 12(1) of
PNDCL 152 could co-exist with the constitutional provisions. He held that article 140(1) of the
Constitution, 1992 and section 15(1)(a) of the Courts Act, 1993 (Act 459) impliedly repealed

[p.774] of [1997-98] 1 GLR 768

section 12(1) of PNDCL 152. He further held that in so far as the Court of Appeal failed to advert its
mind to the constitutional provisions, the said decisions of the Court of Appeal were given per incuriam.
He then concluded by holding that section 12(1) of PNDCL 152 is inconsistent with article 140(1) of the
Constitution, 1992 and consequently null and void.
It is evident from the line of reasoning of Asare Korang J in the Paul case (supra) that he took the view
that section 12(1) of PNDCL 152 does oust the jurisdiction of the courts in land suits. Is his lordship
right, and with what jurisdiction did he sit at the High Court to declare a provision of an enactment,
inconsistent with the Constitution, 1992?
Now, a safe and better approach to the interpretation of any provision of an enactment is to examine the
enactment as a whole so as to render that interpretation consistent with the remaining provisions of the
enactment. Thus Lord Davey in Canada Sugar Refining Co v R [1898] AC 735 at 741 said:
“Every clause of a statue should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses of the Act,
so as, as far as possible, to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute or series relating to the
subject-matter.”
Accordingly, a more fruitful approach to the discovery of the meaning and scope of section 12(1) of
PNDCL 152 must begin with a careful analysis of the section vis-á-vis the remaining provisions of the
Law. Section 12(1) of PNDCL 152 reads:
 “12. (1) No action concerning any land or interest therein in a registration district shall be commenced
in any court until the procedures for settling disputes under this Law have been exhausted.”

(The emphasis is mine.) The drafting of the above provision is certainly misleading as it does not bring
out the necessary emphasis and prominence of the key expressions therein. A recasting of it will therefore
read:
“Until the procedures for settling disputes under this Law have been exhausted, no action concerning
any land or

[p.775] of [1997-98] 1 GLR 768

interest therein in a registration district shall be commenced in any court.”

Such a recasting singles out the key elements in the section as “disputes under this Law” and the
“procedures” for settling such disputes. What then are disputes under this Law, and what are the
procedures for settling them?
(a) What are the disputes under PNDCL 152?
As stated earlier on, the first step in the process of registration under the Law is the declaration of a
registration district by the Minister of Lands. Within fourteen days of such a declaration, section 11 of
PNDCL 152 enjoins the Chief Lands Registrar by notice, to specify the extent of the registration district
and invite claimants for title to land or interest therein to put in their claims and demarcate the boundaries
of their land in the manner specified in the notice.
The Land Registry then checks the description of the land and investigates the title offered by each
claimant to ascertain whether the claimant has shown a prima facie right to have the land registered in his
name as proprietor. When satisfied, the notice of the application is then published and adverse claims if
any, to the applicant’s title are invited. Section 23(6) of PNDCL 152 provides:
“(6) Where there are two or more claimants of any interest in land situated in a registration district and the
Land Registrar is unable to effect agreement among the claimants—
(a) if the matter is within the jurisdiction of the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commission,
the Land Registrar shall refer it to the Commission and the matter shall be heard as if it had
been so referred by one of the parties; and,
(b) all other matters shall be referred by the Land Registrar to the Adjudicating Committee for
adjudication.”

Next, section 13 of PNDCL 152 provides for the registration of land or interest in land in respect of which
instruments have

[p.776] of [1997-98] 1 GLR 768

been registered under the Land Registry Act, 1962 (Act 122). The scheme of PNDCL 152 is that after the
declaration of a registration district, the Land Registrar is to prepare a list of all lands situated in that
district in respect of which an instrument had been registered under Act 122, and thereafter serve on any
person named as a proprietor of land or interest in land in the list so prepared, a notice of his intention to
register such person as proprietor of the land or interest. Where there are no conflicting instruments or
claims in respect of a land, the Land Registrar will, after the expiry of the notice of his intention to
register, register the uncontested candidate in the land register. But as provided in section 13(2) of
PNDCL 152:
 “(2) Where there are conflicting claims in respect of any land referred to in subsection (1) of this section
the matter shall be referred to the Adjudication Committee established under section 22 of this Law.”

Then section 20 of PNDCL 152 empowers the Land Registrar to reject an application for first registration
of any land or an interest in land on certain specified grounds. For example, he may reject an application
based on an instrument which is inconsistent with a prior instrument or if the instrument contains
interlineation, blank, erasure or alteration not verified by the signature or initials of the person executing
the instrument. There is, however, an obligation on the Land Registrar under section 21 of PNDCL 152 to
notify each applicant of his grounds for rejecting an application and if the objection is under section
20(1)(d) of PNDCL 152, to give the applicant 30 days within which to make further representations. In
respect of objections under section 20(1)(a) or (b), section 21(2) of PNDCL 152 provides:
“(2) Where the Land Registrar is of the opinion that an application should be rejected on the ground in
paragraph (a) or (b) of subsection (1) of section 20 of this Law, he shall notify the applicant of his
opinion and shall refer the matter to the Adjudication Committee.”

(The emphasis is mine.)

[p.777] of [1997-98] 1 GLR 768

Finally, section 34 to 52 of PNDCL 152 provide for the preparation of registry maps to be maintained at
the Land Title Registry. Section 37(1) of PNDCL 152 then presumes that these maps and plans filed in
the registry indicate the approximate boundaries and situations of any parcel of land shown thereon.
However, as provided in section 37(2) of PNDCL 152:
“(2) Where any uncertainty or dispute arises as to the position of any boundary, the Adjudication
Committee, on the application of any interested person, shall, on such evidence as it considers
relevant, determine and indicate the position of the boundary; except that in the case of a dispute
within the jurisdiction of the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commission, the Adjudication
Committee shall refer the matter to the Commission and the matter shall be heard as if it had been so
referred by any of the persons whose boundaries are in question.”

The above exposition, in brief, outlines the main disputes under PNDCL 152 envisaged to arise in the
course of registering title to land and interests therein at the Land Title Registry: disputes relating to
conflicting claims under section 23(6) of PNDCL 152; disputes relating to conflicting Act 122 registered
instruments under section 113(2) of PNDCL 152; disputes relating to the Land Registrar’s rejection to
register an applicant under section 21(2) of PNDCL 152; and finally disputes relating to the accuracy of
boundaries and situations of land on the registry maps and plans under section 37(2) of PNDCL 152. Of
course, each of the above four main disputes or a combination of them may give rise to further disputes in
the course of registration. However, whatever be the complex disputes which may arise from those
envisaged under the PNDCL 152, the important point is that the disputes set out above are the “disputes
under this Law” in respect of which, in the language of section 12(1) of PNDCL 152, no action shall be
commenced in any court until the procedures for settling them under PNDCL 152 have been exhausted.
For it goes without saying, that each of the four main disputes is related to land or an interest in land.
What then are the procedures to be exhausted?

[p.778] of [1997-98] 1 GLR 768

(b) Procedure under PNDCL 152

The procedure for settling each of the four main disputes outlined above is evidenced from the references
directed in sections 13(2), 21(2), 23(6), and 37(2) of PNDCL 152. In each of these sections, the dispute is
to be referred to the adjudication committee set up under section 22 of PNDCL 152 which reads:
“22. (1) There shall be established in a registration district a Land Title Adjudication Committee ( in
this Law referred to as ‘the Adjudication Committee’).
(2) Every Adjudication Committee shall consist of a chairman and two other persons all of whom
shall be appointed by the Secretary on the advice of the Board.
(3) There shall be referred to the Adjudication Committee either by the Land Registrar or any
interested person any dispute relating to the registration of land or interest in land.
(4) The Adjudication Committee shall determine any dispute referred to it under subsection (3) of
this section.”

Now, section 22(3) and (4) of PNDCL 152 clearly and unambiguously define the jurisdiction of the
adjudication committee as being the determination of any dispute relating to the registration of land or
interest in land in any registration district. And as already shown, these disputes are directed under section
13(2), 21(2) 23(6) and 37(2) of PNDCL 152 to be referred to the adjudication committee for
determination. The adjudication committee is, therefore, not a tribunal with general jurisdiction to handle
any land suit in a registration district but an internal or domestic tribunal of the Land Title Registry to
handle disputes likely to occur in the course of the registry’s exercise to register title to land and interests
therein. It is purely a domestic tribunal. Thus in the memorandum to the law, the rationale for enacting
section 12 of PNDCL 152 is stated, inter alia, as follows:
“The object of this provision is to discourage expensive litigation over land by compelling the parties to
make use of the Land Title Adjudication Committees under Sub-Part

[p.779] of [1997-98] 1 GLR 768

II of Part II of this Law, which will operate as domestic tribunals and free from technicalities.”
(The emphasis is mine.) Accordingly, as a domestic or internal tribunal not subject to the procedures and
technicalities of the courts, sections 27 to 33 of PNDCL 152 together with regulations 27 to 50 of the
Land Title Regulations, 1986 (LI 1341), set out the procedure and modus operandi of the adjudication
committee. Actions are initiated before the adjudication committee by filling a special form, set out in the
First Schedule to LI 1341, and the disputed land is described by reference to the Land Title Registry map.
If there is no appeal to the High Court against the final decision of the adjudication committee, the Land
Registrar is then mandated under section 33(2) of PNDCL 152 to “enter in the land register and other
records of Registry such of the contents of the adjudication record as may be prescribed.”
It is therefore abundantly clear from the prescribed jurisdiction, procedure and effect of the decision of
the adjudication committee that the said committee is not intended and could not have been intended to
assume the jurisdiction of the courts in land suits in a registration district. The adjudication committee has
been designed to be a domestic tribunal within the Land Title Registry to simplify and speed up the
determination of rival claims and other disputes arising in the course of the Land Registry’s registration
of title to land and interests therein.
(c) Scope of section 12(1) of PNDCL 152
From the above analysis of “the disputes under this Law” and the “procedures” mentioned in section
12(1) of PNDCL 152, it becomes apparent that the true import of section 12(1) of PNDCL 152 is that
whenever in a registration district, a dispute arises in the course of a registration of title to land or interest
therein in the Land Title Registry, no party to such a dispute shall commence any action in respect of this
dispute in any court, until the Land Title Adjudication Committee has had the opportunity of first
determining the said disputes. Accordingly, the ban on taking actions in the courts as imposed in section
12(1) of PNDCL 152, is restricted solely to actions relating to disputes arising in the

[p.780] of [1997-98] 1 GLR 768

course of the Land Title Registry’s exercise of registering such titles to land and interests therein.
Thus understood, it is clear, for example, that the Court of Appeal’s decision in Amar v Mireku (supra)
that the courts have no jurisdiction to determine the defendant’s counterclaim for title to house No C345/4
because of section 12(1) of PNDCL 152, is with respect erroneous. The suit was an estate matter and
there was no evidence that the house or the land thereof, was the subject of a registration exercise at the
Land Title Registry, notwithstanding the fact that the area had been declared a registration district. As
Aikins JSC. rightly pointed out in Kasser v Raziel Construction Ltd (supra) at 340:
“It is a misconception therefore to assert that the mere declaration of a registration district gives
automatic jurisdiction to the adjudication committee to entertain claims of proprietors of lands or of
interest in land within the registration district.”
The adjudication committee’s jurisdiction is in respect of only disputes arising in the course of registering
titles and interest in land at the Land Title Registry in a registration district. If the dispute arose outside
the registration exercise of the Land Title Registry, then notwithstanding that the area had been declared a
registration district, the courts are the proper forum for its determination.
It is proper at this stage to point out that section 12(2) of PNDCL 152 ousts the jurisdiction of the
adjudication committee in determining any claim under the Law if at the time of the publication of the
Chief Registrar’s notice under section 11 of PNDCL 152, there is pending an action concerning any land
or interest therein, in any court or before the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commission or the Stool
Lands Boundaries Appeal Tribunal. In such a situation, the Land Registrar is only to note any claim under
PNDCL 152 and wait for the determination of the suit by the court, commission or tribunal.
(d) The Constitution, 1992 and section 12(1) of PNDCL 152
As stated earlier on, article 125(3) of the Constitution, 1992

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vests the judicial power in the judiciary, while article 140(1) thereof vests in the High Court, jurisdiction
in all civil and criminal matters subject to the provisions of the Constitution, 1992. It is, however,
important to examine the provision of article 125(3) of the Constitution, 1992 to see whether it forbids
anybody outside the judiciary from exercising any judicial function. Especially, as section 31(2) of
PNDCL 152 provides that: “Any proceeding conducted under this Law by the Adjudication Committee
shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding.”
Now, article 125(3) of the Constitution, 1992 reads:
“(3) The judicial power of Ghana shall be vested in the Judiciary, accordingly, neither the President nor
Parliament nor any organ or agency of the President or Parliament shall have or be given final judicial
power.”

(The emphasis is mine.)

The above provision is in substance the same as article 102(1) of the Constitution, 1969 and 114(1) of the
Constitution, 1979 except that in the Constitutions, 1969 and 1979 there was no mention of Parliament.
But the essential point in all the three Constitutions is that final judicial power was vested in the judiciary
and not in any other organ or institution outside the judiciary. However, in none of the constitutions was
the expression “final judicial power” explained. The case of Akainyah v The Republic [1968] GLR 548,
CA made a brilliant exposition of what constitutes judicial power.
Now, as to the expression “final judicial power”, the 1968 Proposals of the Constitutional Commission
for a Constitution for Ghana, states at p 140, para 514 as follows:
“We have already made reference to the proposal for the vesting in the Judiciary of the judicial power
of the country. As a necessary corollary to this we also propose that no organ or agency of the
Executive shall have final judicial power. As already explained this means that the Judiciary is vested
with the exclusive right of final adjudication on all justiciable controversies.”
(The emphasis is mine.) The commission proceeds in para 515 at the same page to explain further thus:

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“We are aware of the modern development in administrations of setting up, as part of the administrative
machinery, of what are commonly known as Administrative Tribunals which mostly perform
quasi-judicial function. Our proposal does not presuppose the abolition of such tribunals. Indeed we
think they are a necessary adjunct of the administrative process. What our proposal does mean,
however, is that on matters that fall within the category of ‘justiceable controversies’ these
Administrative Tribunals shall not have the last word either on the interpretation of the law or on the
question of the limits of their own authority or on the reasonableness, or rather the correctness, of their
conclusions.”
(The emphasis is mine.)
The above passage is sufficiently clear not to need any further elucidation. The Land Title Adjudication
Committee is an internal administrative tribunal of the Land Title Registry solely concerned with
determining disputes arising in the course of the Land Registry’s functions. Section 13(2) and (3) of
PNDCL 152 provides for appeals from any decision of the adjudication committee to the High Court,
then thereafter, for a further right of appeal to the Court of Appeal and finally, to the Supreme Court.
Thus the power exercised by the adjudication committee does not violate article 125(3) of the
Constitution, 1992.
Section 12(1) of PNDCL 152, is, indeed, in consonance with the modern practice of setting up an internal
tribunal in an institution to have a first bite at disputes arising within that institution, before recourse is
made to the courts if the matter does not end at the internal tribunal. Where a person ignores the internal
tribunal and comes to court in respect of any such internal dispute, the courts would invariably order him
to go back to the internal tribunal if that person has no substantial reason for side-stepping the internal
tribunal. For the law is clear that, where an enactment has prescribed a special procedure by which
something is to be done, it is that procedure alone that is to be followed: see Tularley v Abaidoo [1962]
GLR 411, SC.
In conclusion, section 12(1) of PNDCL 152 does not oust the jurisdiction of any court, let alone the High
Court, in land suits in

[p.783] of [1997-98] 1 GLR 768

a registration district. Section 12(1) of PNDCL 152 only forbids the courts to handle at first instance,
disputes concerning titles to land and interests therein, arising in the course of registration of such titles
and interests in the Land Title Registry. And since such a procedure is consistent with article 125(3) of
the Constitution, 1992, section 12(1) of PNDCL 152 is, therefore, consistent with articles 125(3) and
140(1) of the Constitution, 1992.
There will therefore be a negative answer to the question posed for determination under article 130(2) of
the Constitution, 1992.

JUDGMENT OF BAMFORD-ADDO JSC.

I have been privileged to read in advance the ruling of my able brother Acquah JSC and I entirely, agree
with his reasons and conclusion. I would, however, like to add my own reasons. The High Court, Accra
presided over Gbadegbe J referred the following question to this court under article 130(2) of the
Constitution, 1992, namely:
“Whether having regard to the provisions of articles 125(3) and 140(1) of the Constitution, 1992 section
12(1) of PNDCL 152 can operate to oust the jurisdiction of the High Court in land matters arising
within areas which have been declared registration districts under the said Law?”
The plaintiff on 30 August 1995 issued out a writ at the High Court, Accra claiming: (a) damages for
trespass; (b) ejectment; and (c) perpetual injunction against the defendant in respect of land situated at
Baatsonaa within the Nungua Traditional Area, which has been declared a registration area under the
Land Title Registration Law, 1986 (PNDCL 152). The defendant applied to the court to have the action
struck out on the ground that in his view, by the provision of section 12(1) of PNDCL 152, the
jurisdiction of the High Court is ousted having regard to the fact that the area in which the disputed land
is located, falls within a registration district, having been so declared by the Land Title
Registration—Declaration of Registration District (Accra District 02) Instrument, 1992 (LI 1536) of 17
July 1992. According to the defendant the legislature had provided a procedure for settling disputes
relating to land falling within the registration area

[p.784] of [1997-98] 1 GLR 768

declared by LI 1536 and as such the court cannot entertain the land before the said court.
Section 12 of PNDCL 152 provides that:
“12 (1) No action concerning any land or interest therein in registration district shall be commenced in
any Court until the procedures for settling disputes under this Law have been exhausted.
(2) Where at the time of the publication of a notice under section 11 of this Law an action or
proceeding concerning any land or interest therein in a registration district referred to in the
notice is pending in any Court or before the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commission
or the Stool Lands Boundary Appeal Tribunal, any claim under this Law in respect of the same
land or interest shall be noted by the Land Registrar but no further action shall be taken by him
on such claim until the matter is determined by the Court, Commission or Tribunal.”

(The emphasis is mine.) The aim of PNDCL 152 was to provide “a machinery for the registration of title
to land and interests in land” according to the memorandum to the Law. In the registration exercise the
procedure to be followed, as stated in section 11 of PNDCL 152 is that upon the declaration of a
registration district, the Chief Registrar of Lands will issue a notice defining the limits of the registration
district and requiring any person who claims any land or interest in any land situated in the district to
make such a claim. Section 12(1) of PNDCL 152 provides that until the procedure for settling disputes
relating to registration of land in a registration district has been exhausted, no action should be taken in
any court concerning any land or interest in a registration district.
According to the same memorandum of PNDCL 152, the object of this provision is to discourage
expensive litigation over land by compelling the parties to make use of PNDCL 152, which in section 22
makes provision for the establishment of a land adjudication committee in each registration district which
would adjudicate on disputes relating only to title to land to be registered, subject to appeal to the High
Court. Section 12(1) of

[p.785] of [1997-98] 1 GLR 768

PNDCL 152 concerns only registration of “good title” to land in a declared registration district and does
not extend to include the general civil jurisdiction granted to the High Court in matters concerning land or
interest therein by article 140(1) of the Constitution, 1992 which is re-enacted in section 15(1) (a) of the
Courts Act, 1993 (Act 459).
The powers and jurisdiction given to the Chief Registrar of Lands and the land adjudication committee
under PNDCL 152 is circumscribed and limited to only matters relating to the registration of title in
accordance with documentary evidence, as clearly indicated in sections 22(3), 23(3) and 23(5) of PNDCL
152. Consequently, section 12(1) of PNDCL 152 cannot operate to oust the general land jurisdiction of
the High Court in the type of case or matter, concerning issues raised in the plaintiff’s writ as referred to
above. Such an interpretation would be wrong in view of the provisions of sections 12(1) and 23(5) of
PNDCL 152 limiting jurisdiction conferred on the adjudicating committee to matters concerning the
registration of “good title” to land in a registration district in accordance with the available land
instruments or documentary evidence. Section 12(1) of PNDCL 152 does not operate to oust or postpone
the exercise of the general civil jurisdiction, including the jurisdiction over all land matters given to the
High Court under the Constitution, 1992 but deals with the registration of “good title” to land as defined
in section 23(5) of PNDCL 152.
To interpret section 12(1) of PNDCL 152 so as to oust the jurisdiction of the High Court in the type of
case before the High Court, would be not only wrong but also inconsistent with the provisions of articles
125(3) and 140(1) of the Constitution, 1992 relating to the exercise of judicial power and the general
jurisdiction of the High Court.
For the above reasons section 12(1) of PNDCL 152 cannot operate to oust the jurisdiction of the High
Court, Accra in the land matter pending before it as indicated above.

JUDGMENT OF AMPIAH JSC.

I have read the opinion of my brother Acquah JSC and I agree entirely with his reasoning. I have nothing
useful to add.

[p.786] of [1997-98] 1 GLR 768

JUDGMENT OF ATUGUBA JSC.

I agree that the question posed be answered in the negative.
JUDGMENT OF AKUFFO JSC.
I also agree.

DECISION
Judgment accordingly.
 Endnotes
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[sic] same in document
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