Empirical Models For The Monitoring of UK Corporations
Empirical Models For The Monitoring of UK Corporations
North-Holland
Richard J. TAFFLER
City University Business School, London, ECZY 8HB, UK
This paper has four main aims. Firstly it attempts a critical appraisal of extant UK Z-score
models and seeks to assess in each case their operational utility. Next two previously
unpublished models are described which address respectively (i) the need for separate models for
manufacturing and distribution companies, and (ii) the utility of the jackknife discriminant
approach in practice. Then developments of the technique to enhance considerably its utility to
the practitioner are described. Finally a brief review of how such approaches are currently being
used in the UK and by whom is provided.
1. Introduction
The UK provides a financial environment ideal for the successful
development of statistical models for the assessment of company solvency
and performance. The amount and quality of financial information about
corporate entities available to the analyst is similar to, and in the case of
privately owned companies considerably greater than, the US.l In addition
there is a well developed stockmarket with as many enterprises listed as on
the main US exchanges, a number of computer databases of standardised
company financial information and also a corporate failure rate among the
highest in the developed world. Not surprisingly then analysts have been
quick to adopt techniques successfully applied in the US to local conditions.
This paper has four main aims. Firstly in section 2 it provides a critical
review of the salient features of documented UK Z-score models, which are
discussed in chronologisal sequence. Then in the next section two new
models, unpublished heretofore, are described. Respectively these address
issues relating to the need in the UK for separate models for manufacturing
and distribution enterprises and, in the development of a private company
model, explore the utility of the jackknife discriminant technique. Next
section 4 describes developments of the Z-score approach to make it more
operational and finally a review of how such techniques are being used
currently in the UK, for what purposes and by whom is attempted. A
‘Because of the Companies’ Act requirement for all limited companies, whether listed or not,
to tile audited accounts, at Companies House, which are then made available to the public on
microfiche.
2. UK Z-score models
Work in the UK in this area has generally followed the methodology and
objectives of US studies particularly the seminal Altman (1968) paper and
has been largely restricted to the quoted corporate sector. The underlying 2-
group linear discriminant analysis (LDA) approach adopted in virtually all
the studies is well known and does not need to be described here.’
Comment. The Lis study demonstrated, possibly for the first time, that such
an approach is applicable in environments outside the US5 and served to
stimulate further work in this area in the UK. Although reportedly this
model was used subsequently, particularly in the investment community, no
analysis of its actual performance in practice has been published.
%x Eisenbeis and Avery (1972) or Altman et al. (1981) etc. for good reviews.
3The convention of appending the dates of completion of the different models to the authors’
names is used throughout the paper.
4Aknan (1983, ch. 3) interestingly develops a model with identical ratios for the analysis of
private companies in the US environment.
sAltman (1983, ch. 12) provides no earlier multivariate references.
R.J. TaJler, Empirical models for monitoring UK corporations 201
This, the next study chronologically, was completed in August 1974 and
received exposure in the financial press at that time [e.g., Taffler (1976)].
Taffler (1982) provides a full discussion including tests of its ex-ante
predictive ability. Where this study differs most from earlier US work is to
distinguish in the construction of the non-failed group between healthy live
companies and those with characteristics more similar to previous failures.
Tafller’s initial non-failed sample of 61 firms thus was culled of 16 firms
which conventional financial analysis suggested might be problematical.‘j The
23 bankrupt companies, predominantly manufacturers, were all those failing
between 1968 and 1973. No attempt was made to match the two groups by
industry, size or financial year.
Three classes of discriminant variable were developed: conventional ratios,
4-year trend measures and funds statement variables. However the latter
were too volatile for meaningful analysis and the trend measures added very
little to the power of the discriminant model. Analysis thus focused on a set
of 50 financial ratios which were transformed appropriately and windsorised
[Lev and Sunder (1979)] to improve univariate normality which is a
necessary condition for multivariate normality.7
Using principal component analysis (PCA) to help avoid multicollinearity
problemss a stepwise LDA produced a model consisting of the following five
variables:
The cut-off was set taking into account prior probability odds of 1: 10
(failed:solvent) for the population and on this basis the Lachenbruch U-test
[Lachenbruch (1967)] indicated 1 type I error and no type II errors.g The
first two variables contributed most to the model. A justification for the use
of ‘good’ as opposed to ‘continuing’ companies for the non-failed sample was
provided by substituting the full 61 firm set for the reduced size good
The motivation of this study was the concern that because of believed
differences in the financial characteristics between quoted companies with
access to the capital markets and the generally smaller unquoted concerns,
the development of a separate and distinct Z-model was necessary to analyse
privately owned manufacturing companies. Tisshaw’s failed sample consisted
of 31 of the larger privately owned manufacturing companies failing in the 18
month period to June 1976, and each of these was loosely matched by size,
industry and year end with two ‘healthy’ live companies on the Jordan
Dataquest database to provide the solvent group.13,14 Using a conventional
stepwise LDA approach and a carefully selected transformed financial ratio
set, a model consisting of the following 5 variables [with Mosteller-Wallace
(1963) percentage contribution of each variable to the power of the model
provided in brackets] was determined:
r3Tisshaw details the problems of definition of failure in the case of private companies and
points out ‘that many companies that do fail disguise the failure by either being taken over,
amalgamating, reconstructing or changing in some way, usually leaving the creditors partly paid
or deferred’. The unsatisfactory nature of UK insolvency law and the need for change has
recently been made explicit in the Cork Report (1982).
r4The mean delay in filing the last accounts of the failed sample (11.5 months) differed
significantly (at ~(=0.05) to the average time for the continuing company sample (9.0 months)
and the mean time from year end to failure was 23.3 months with standard deviation 9 months.
Interestingly these results may not be totally consistent with the hypothesis that private
company data lacks timeliness particularly in the case of companies experiencing problems.
204 R.J. Taffler, Empirical models for monitoring UK corporations
This UK model, which has received the most exposure and testing to date,
was first described in Taffler and Tisshaw (1977) in a study of auditor
behaviour in the going concern decision area.15 However discussions here
will draw primarily on Taffler (1983a and b) which are more concerned with
tests of the model’s true ex ante predictive ability and the results from its use
in practice in the several years subsequent to its development.
The failed sample consisted of the 46 manufacturing firms quoted on the
London Stock Exchange failing in the 8 year period to the end of 1976
which met certain criteria to ensure reliable source data. The solvent form set
was matched on a 1: 1 basis by industry and size but not by year with the
latest year available being used. Five of the original sample were screened
out as being financially problematical and replaced with firms financially
more sound, to ensure distinct groups. A list of 80 financial ratios was
developed and appropriately treated to improve normality. PCA was also
undertaken to aid formulation and interpretation of the resulting model.
Using a conventional stepwise linear discriminant package the following
model which was parsimonious with respect to its input requirements, could
be readily interpreted and performed well, finally resulted with Mosteller-
Wallace percentage contribution measures in brackets:
The constant term was adjusted for an odds ratio of 1:7 and such that in
practical application the cut-off was 0. The Lachenbruch U-test indicated one
type I errorl’ and no type II errors. Through reference to the principal
component analysis the ratios were interpreted as measuring respectively
profitability, working capital position, financial risk and liquidity.
Table I summarizes what happened in the 6 years subsequent to model
development to the 115 out of 825 (14%) listed manufacturing companies on
the EXSTAT database at risk (Z<O) as at the end of 1976.18 It will be
“They found inter alia only 22% of their 46 company sample of failed firms were qualified on
this basis in their last accounts prior to failure which compares with 44% in the case of 34 firms
in Altman and McGough (1974) and 48% for the 109 such firms between 1970 and 1982
discussed by Altman (1983, table 7-6 p. 220). Recent behaviour suggests the UK auditor is no
less reluctant to qualify despite the very changed economic environment and failure rate.
leThis measures the number of days the company can continue to trade if it can no longer
generate revenues. Fade1 and Parkinson (1978) discuss the ratio.
I’This was again Rolls Royce. See footnote 9 supra.
‘sThis is the UK equivalent of COMPUSTAT and is provided by Extel Statistical Services
Ltd. It now covers all quoted UK industrial and distribution corporations as well as many
unlisted and overseas enterprises and is updated weekly. Data series in most cases start in 1971.
At the beginning of 1977, however, coverage was more restricted.
R.J. Tafler, Empirical models for monitoring UK corporations 205
Table 1
Companies with at risk Z-scores at the end of 1976: A summary of
subsequent eventsa
No of % of
Event companies companies
Financial distress:
Receivership 17 15
Going concern, government, bank or other
emergency support 12 10
Acquisition etc as alternative to bankruptcy 13 11
Major closures and disposals 8 7
50 43
Still at risk (Z 5 0) 33 29
Recoveries (Z z 0) 32 28
115 100
observed no fewer than 43% had failed in some sense and a further 29% were
still at risk at the end of 1982 (many of these recovering temporarily then
collapsing again). Less than 3 out of 10 appeared to have effected a
permanent recovery. The results from this ‘proof is in the eating’ approach
[Altman (1978)] are encouraging. I9 That 41 of the 42 listed manufacturing
and construction companies on EXSTAT entering into receivership
subsequent to the model development were correctly classified as ‘at risk’ on
the basis of their last accounts prior to failure, provides an additional
validation test.”
Table 2 shows the distribution of percentage of negative Z-scores prior to
failure. The average time between the date of publication of the last accounts
and the appointment of a receiver was eight months and as such an average
Table 2
The percentage distribution of number of at risk Z-scores prior
to receivership (42 companies).
19A comparison may be made with Deakin’s (1977) results. See also Altman’s (1983, ch. 4, pp.
155-156) comment on the latter.
“These results may be compared with the similar performances of the ZETA model [Altman
(1983, ch. 4, pp. 144-147)] which interestingly enough are better than with the original sample
data!
206 R.J. Tafler, Empirical models for monitoring UK corporations
lead time of 3 l/4 years is provided by the Z-score first going negative.
However note such an analysis does not constitute a test of the predictive
ability of the model as is conveniently rather loosely argued but of its
classiJicatory ability. An at risk Z-score is not a prediction per se of failure
within a specified time frame but a description of a company as having a
financial profile more similar to a group of previous failures, which is a
necessary but not sufficient condition for financial distress, than to a group
of sound firms. In evaluating the operational utility of such a function the
percentage of the company population of interest labelled ‘failing’ is just as
important as ex ante tests of the model’s misclassification probabilitieszl
Taffler in fact shows that in 1980 the conditional probability of companies
with at risk Z-scores at the beginning of the year failing during the year was
no less than 0.33 compared with the conditional probability of companies
not failing given a solvent profile of effectively 1.0, both figures significantly
different to the null positions (5% and 95%) at better than a=O.OOl. He
concludes ‘the derived function would appear to exhibit true ex ante
predictive ability where the events predicted are the financial distress or
otherwise of a company within the next year’.
Taffler also describes a new development of the Z-score approach to
forecast the actual likelihood of a company failing in the next year given an
at risk profile, termed the ‘risk index’ or ‘Z-score of Z-scores’. This consists
of a linear additive weighted composite [Dawes and Corrigan (1974)] of
three factors: how low the company’s Z, the number of years at risk and the
trend in 2,” measured along a live point scale. Table 3 shows the risk index
distribution of negative Z-score firms as at the end of 1982 compared with
the risk index distribution of the 41 companies entering into receivership.
The third line shows the cumulative probabilities derived from these two
rows using Bayesian analysis.
Table 3
Risk index statistics.
‘iIn the case of this model the percentage of companies on EXSTAT at risk had doubled to
22% by the end of 1982 compared with 1977.
22An analogy with a Markov chain process with absorbing state or gambler’s ruin paradigm,
may be drawn [e.g., Scott (1981)].
R.J. TafJle Empirical models for monitoring UK corporations 207
Taffler (1983b) concludes his paper with a detailed discussion of why the
Z-score technique works so well and argues that because of the cognitive
difficulties confronting the financial statement user, only a formal model such
as the Z-score approach can provide efficient and unbiased processing of the
complex information set presented by a company’s accounts.23
Comment. Watts (1981) censures the preliminary Taffler and Tisshaw (1977)
paper on a number of grounds. Watt’s criticism of the paired sample
selection procedure is valid although his query regarding potential industry
heterogeneity affecting the power of the function, albeit theoretically
reasonable, has not been borne out in practical application of the model to
date.24 Watt’s argument about excluding differential misclassification costs
from the function deserves more detailed discussion. Taffler (1983b, footnote
29) argues that ‘only decisions taken can have a cost not the output from an
information model which is only one input to the decision process’. Since no
decision maker is ever likely to act on the basis of a Z-score alone he
believes the use of a loss ratio [Altman (1983, ch. 5)] relating to decision
error costs in the manner of Altman et al. (1977) is incorrect. If a Z-score
value only contributes say 20”/, to how a particular decision is reached, for
example whether or not to advance credit, then the appropriate differential
misclassification cost ratio used in the cut-off computation should be only
l/5 the actual decision error cost ratio.25
‘sA transformation of the model to measure company performance throughout the whole
performance spectrum, the PAS (performance analysis)-score, also described in the study, is
discussed in section 4.1 below.
24This model can however be criticised justifiably from a theoretical vantage point for having
construction companies excluded from the formulation samples whereas it is being applied
apparently successfully to analysing this sector in practice.
aSIn the case of this particular model it can be argued that because of its track record with an
‘inappropriate’ 1: 1 misclassification cost ratio, in practice incorporating a more realistic measure
would only serve to increase the number in the population apparently at risk with no reduction
in type I errors (which in any case are minimal to date).
261n the case of Beaver their ratio definition differed to his with cash flow calculated as profit
before tax and depreciation not net income and depreciation. The two multivariate models were
208 R.J. Taffler, Empirical models for monitoring UK corporations
‘approximated’ by fitting functions with ratios loosely based on those used in their name-sakes
to the Bank of England dataset with similar definitions for 4 out of the 5 ratios in the ‘Deakin
model’ and 2 out of the 4 measures in the ‘Taffler model’. No attempt was made to emulate the
quadratic formulation of the former.
“‘(Our model) appears to improve on earlier models in the UK context’ (E&M, p. 26).
Although papers describing the actual performance and validation results of both the Taffler,
1974 and 1977 models are referenced by Marais the authors preferred to use their own figures.
Criticism of such a nature apparently is not restricted to the UK. See for example Altman’s
(1978) reply to Moyer (1977).
*‘This database is described in section 2.7 below.
R.J. Tuffler, Empirical models fir monitoring UK corporations 209
Comment. The interest to the analyst in this study lies in four areas: (i) It
demonstrates how such techniques have now been tried by Central Banks,
(ii) it illustrates the vital importance of using validation samples in tests of
model efficiency and the misleading conclusions that can arise from the
resubstitution approach, (iii) the Bank of England model highlights the need
for the analyst always to consider the percentage of the population labelled
failing and to minimise this if his model is to have operational utility, and (iv)
it demonstrates how much care needs to be taken in developing such models
if they are to be used in practice. We may speculate the poor performance of
the model may have something to do with inter alia: (i) the use of continuing
firms as opposed to ‘healthy’ enterprises for the non-failed sample, which
would appear to be incorrect at least in the UK,29 (ii) the pooling of
manufacturing and distribution firms in one model which again is likely to
prove problematical in the UK environment as these have quite different
financial characteristics,30 and (iii) the selection of X,, the size measure, by
the stepwise procedures apparently reflecting the fact that the non-failed
firms were sampled from a large firm database31 whereas the failed set
appeared to be drawn from the whole population. The analyst should avoid
the implicit syllogism in the BEQB paper that because their particular model
does not work very well the Z-score technique itself is not very usefu1.32
Z9Lachenbruch (1974) demonstrates that although the true error rates may not be seriously
affected by initial misclassification of the samples in a non-random manner (in the Bank of
England model a number of firms with failing characteristics are included in the non-failed
sample), the apparent error rates will be biased and yield too favourable an outlook.
joThis issue is discussed in sections 3.1 below in the description of a model for the analysis of
distribution firms.
31At the time the study was undertaken Datastream covered approximately the top 1000
quoted UK industrial companies, around 60% of the total in terms of number.
32The Bank now actually uses the Datastream model (described in section 2.7 below) in
practice albeit this also has operational difficulties.
a3Another study in this sector has been undertaken by the City of Bradford Metropolitan
Borough Council to assist them in the selection of an approved list of contractors [Guy (1980)].
However inadequate detail about this preliminary work is published to justify discussion here
save to note the fitting of a 9-variable linear discriminant model to a group of 15 failed and 14
non-failed contractors.
210 R.J. TafJler, Empirical models for monitoring UK corporations
Z=25.4-51.2X1+87.8X,-4.8X3-14.5X,-9.1X,-4.5X6
where
X, =prolit before interest and tax/opening net assets,
X, =profit before interest and tax/opening net capital employed,
X, = debtors/creditors,
X, = current liabilities/current assets,
X, =log,, (days debtors), and
X, = creditors trend measurement.34
Comment.35 This model is of interest both to the potential user, who needs
to make solvency judgements in a particularly risk prone sector, and the
theorist. Although a number of methodological problems call into question
the authors claims for this particular model per se, their work would appear
to validate the utility of Z-score techniques in this disparate industry despite
the analyst’s concern about the heterogeneous nature of construction
companies. 36 The model itself, however, appears prone to sample bias37 and
the high misclassification rate of the small validation sample is worrying.
The cut-off would appear to have been set by inspection using similar
arguments to those of the Bank of England study and resubstitution
provided 1 type I error (2.3%) and 6 type II errors (10%) on this basis.38
Year t-l provided 8.7% subsequently failing firms with non-failed Z-scores
and 11.7% vice versa and year t-2 27.3% and 16.7% respectively. A secondary
sample of 10 failed companies were all correctly classified. No Lachenbruch
U-test was conducted nor is any information provided on the significance or
relative importance of any of the constituent ratios.
A particularly interesting feature of the Datastream service is the
classification of 15 types of Z-score trend and the ability to use the
Datastream computer to search for companies not just within particular Z-
score ranges but also with particular trend characteristics. A description of a
typical company analysis is provided in section 4.2 below.
38The type II errors were again not considered true misclassifications, it being argued
tautologically that ‘As the sample of non-failed firms was not restricted to healthy firms one
would expect to find a few weak firms in the sample, and it is these firms that have been
assigned low Z-scores’. [Datastream (1980, p. 13)].
JBF-- C
212 R.J. Tafler, Empvical models for monitoring UK corporations
Comment. The context of the first model is original and the ratios selected
intuitively reasonable. This author would certainly concur with the need to
adjust the cut-off appropriately. However, the second model is probably of
more interest to the analyst, particularly .the authors’ comment on the
important contribution to the function made by the decomposition index
which mirrors the results of Lev (1971) and Moyer (1977). We look forward
both to further validation tests of this model in an operational context and
also the results of further work using the decomposition variable. This
author, however, is fairly sceptical about the utility of a standard deviation
measure computed from 3 data items in practice.
214 R.J. Taf$er, Empirical models for monitoring UK corporations
The stated objectives of this recent and detailed study were to test whether
the ‘predictive ability’ of failure prediction models might be improved by
deriving them from data several years prior to failure and to include general
economic and industry indicators.
Data was drawn from the 1955-1974 Department of Trade computerized
data bank of company financial statements. 44 manufacturing, construction
and distribution businesses failing between 1960 and 1968 constituted the
failed sample from which models were developed and a similar number of
‘sound’ companies, defined as such largely in terms of continuing high
profitability, the other group. The variable set used in the discriminant runs
consisted of 40 financial ratios which met data availability requirements,
were normally distributed after transformation and had high loadings in a
PCA, a stock market index as a general economic indicator and dummy
variables to represent three broad industry categories: manufacturing,
quarrying and construction and distribution.44 A large number of different
discriminant analyses were undertaken with results for various models
derived from data both five years and one year before failure reported.
The first year function derived from 88 companies was given by
Z= -6.17+11.43X, + 14.07X, +0.55X, - 1.57X4+0.98X5,
where
XI= operating profit before depreciation/total assets,
X2= long-term debt/net capital employed,45
X,= current assets/total assets,
X4= quarrying and construction industry dummy, and
X,= distribution industry dummy.
The fifth year model, derived from 86 firms had the form
Z= -4.86+13.50X,+3.11X2+4.80X,-0.97X4+0.68X,,
where
X,=protit before interest and tax/total assets,
X2= acid test,46
X,= quick assets/total assets,
X,= quarrying and construction industry dummy, and
X,= distribution industry dummy.
44A cluster analytic approach was used to assign the 19 industries present in the data to three
3 ‘meta-industries’.
45Transformed as l/(3 +x), where x is the ratio value.
46Transformed as l/( 1 t-x), where x is the ratio value.
R.J. Taffler, Empirical models for monitoring UK corporations 215
‘IThe assistance of A.E. Jituboh and G.M.A. Joseph in the development of this model is
gratefully acknowledged.
“As apparently in the pooled sample Bank of England and Datastream models discussed in
sections 2.5 and 2.7 above. Altman et al. (1977) dealt with any such potential problems in their
US study by appropriate analytical adjustments of their data.
53After all as Napoleon pointed out the British are a ‘nation of shopkeepers’!
R.J. Taffler, Empirical models for monitoring UK corporations 217
(1 case) and forced divestment of most of the business for solvency reasons
(2 cases).54
The non-failed group was drawn from a random sample of 65 firms with
financial years ending in the 12 months to 30.4.78, and were reduced to 49 in
number, to provide a distinct healthy firm sample. A related set of 83 ratios
was used and similarly transformed etc. and reified via PCA. The final linear
discriminant model resulting consisted of the following variables with
Mosteller-Wallace percentage contributions given in brackets:
s4Altman (1983, ch. 11, p. 273) points out a minimum of 15-20 farlures arc required to make
modelling attempts feasible.
55This IS defined as: retained profit (wrth deferred taxation and exceptional and extraordinary
items added back) + depreciation.
56The misclassification cost ratio was set on the basis of likelv Z-score contnbution to a
dectsron x decision error cost ratio in the manner discussed in the reply to Watt’s critique of
Tamer, 1977 in section 2.4 above. For ooerational nurooses the function constant was adiusted
*
to incorporate this explicitly and also so a cut-off of0 resulted.
“A risk index approach similar to that of the Tamer, 1977 model is also used with this
model.
218 R.J. Taffler, Empirical models for monitoring UK corporations
companies were given a clean bill of health. We may conclude once again
separate models are necessary in the UK.
with the help of lists provided by Trade Indemnity plc., the leading UK
credit insurers, and failing predominantly between 1978 and 1981. Only firms
meeting the lower size bound constraint of turnover above &2m at 1981
prices and failing not much later than 2 years after the end of the last
financial year for which accounts were available were considered to ensure
reliable source data from which to build a model. The non-failed firms
were sampled randomly from the Extel Unquoted Companies Service and
culled of enterprises appearing less than healthy. 56 companies with 1978 or
1979 financial years were used. A related set of ratios to the earlier Taffler
studies was used and similar statistical treatments applied. The initial Fisher
model fitted using a conventional approach variables were:
X,=earnings before interest and tax/sales (EMT/S),
X,= debt/net worth (Debt/NW),
X3= average creditors/cost of sales (ACr/COS),
X,=liabilities/total assets (CL/TA).
This provided 2 type I (5.1%) and 2 type II errors (3.6%) using the
Lachenbruch U-test with a probability-cost ratio of l.‘j”
The jackknifed model was then fitted to the same variable set using 95
subsamples each with a different single case omitted, and the results
compared. The overall classification efficiency was identical and the
discriminant coefficients of similar magnitude to the Fisher function.61 The
apparent lack of bias in the original Fisher discriminant function may reflect
inter alia sufficient cases to reduce the risk of sample bias, the distinct and
well separated groups, and the small number of variables constituting the
function.
An examination of the recently established Performance Analysis Services
Ltd. computerised database of the top 1000 privately owned UK industrial
companies shows that of the 31 unlisted companies on it which could be
identified as bankrupt at the end of 1982 only 2 had solvent Z-scores. In one
case failure occurred 24 months after the end of the last financial year for
which published information was available and in the second, 30 months.’
Currently around 25% of unlisted companies on the database have at risk
profiles.
PAS-Score
1 industry Averqt!
‘60 2 War Croup
a Solvency Threshold
1 I I I I I 1
76 77 78 79 80 81
Year
63The partial correlation coefftcients between the PAS-score (p) and each of the constituent
model ratios for a random sample of 293 companies drawn from the EXSTAT tile as at 30.5.81,
based on their latest accounts are:
rPl ,3,=0.8884, rPz ,,,=0.6361, rp3.r2.,= -0.6876 and r,,.,,,=0.5609.
where the other subscripts denote the ratios. The negative sign for the relationship between the
PAS-score and the current liabilities/total assets ratio reflects the point that the greater the ratio
the weaker the balance sheet.
222 R.J. Taffler, Empirical models for monitoring UK corporations
Ind PAS-
Year Z-score PBT/CL CA/TL CLITA NCI PAS-score score av.
1981 2.0 5 2 3 7 39 44
1980 -4.6 2 1 1 2 3 44
1979 -2.6 1 1 1 2 4 46
1978 0.5 2 2 2 4 14 48
1977 1.1 3 2 2 4 16 47
1976 2.3 3 2 3 5 26 50
“Year ends are to 31.12. The ratios are described in section 2.4.
64A related approach is also taken by ZETA Services, Inc. [see Altman (1983, pp. 268-269)].
65The latter uses various of the Taffler models described in this paper.
66A commercial service using the Betts and Belhoul (1982) model has also recently been
established.
“This also provides facilities inter alia for Z-score financial modelling and a forecasting
routine for projecting next year’s Z-score and associated statistics.
R.J. Tafler, Empirical models for monitoring UK corporations 223
“Performance Analysis claims that their portfolios substantially outperform the market index
on a consistent basis. Altman (1983, chs. 9 and 10) describes a number of actual and potential
applications of Z-score type models by the equity investor and bond holder etc.
R.J. Taffler, Empirical models for monitormg UK corporations 225
‘ISuch fears arc not unique to the UK. For example Altman (1983, ch. 5) describes the lack of
use of such models by the field lending officer as ‘probably due to concern that the computerized
model might be a threat to the lending officer’s position and function and that nothing could
replace (his) ‘hands-on’ experience’.
“A notable exception is the application of Altman’s (1968) Z-score model to help manage a
company turnaround strategy [Altman (1983, ch. 6)].
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