INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL BOARD

Precursors
and chemicals frequently used in the illicit manufacture
of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances

2022

EMBARGO
Observe release date:
Not to be published or broadcast before
Thursday, 9 March 2023, at 1100 hours (CET)

CAUTION
UNITED NATIONS
 Reports published by the International Narcotics Control Board for 2022

The Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2022 (E/INCB/2022/1) is
supplemented by the following reports:

No Patient Left Behind: Progress in Ensuring Adequate Access to Internationally Controlled Sub-
stances for Medical and Scientific Purposes (E/INCB/2022/1/Supp.1)

Narcotic Drugs: Estimated World Requirements for 2023—Statistics for 2021 (E/INCB/2022/2)

Psychotropic Substances: Statistics for 2021—Assessments of Annual Medical and Scientific

Requirements for Substances in Schedules II, III and IV of the Convention on Psychotropic
­Substances of 1971 (E/INCB/2022/3)

Precursors and Chemicals Frequently Used in the Illicit Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs and
­Psychotropic Substances: Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2022 on the
Implementation of Article 12 of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 (E/INCB/2022/4)

The updated lists of substances under international control, comprising narcotic drugs,
­psychotropic substances and substances frequently used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs
and psychotropic substances, are contained in the latest editions of the annexes to the statistical
forms (“Yellow List”, “Green List” and “Red List”), which are also issued by the Board.

Contacting the International Narcotics Control Board

The secretariat of the Board may be reached at the following address:

Vienna International Centre
Room E-1339
P.O. Box 500
1400 Vienna
Austria

In addition, the following may be used to contact the secretariat:

Telephone: (+43-1) 26060
Fax: (+43-1) 26060-5867 or 26060-5868
Email: incb.secretariat@un.org

The text of the present report is also available on the website of the Board (www.incb.org).
 INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL BOARD

Precursors
and chemicals frequently used in the illicit
manufacture of narcotic drugs and
psychotropic substances
Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2022 on the
implementation of article 12 of the United Nations Convention against
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988

UNITED NATIONS
Vienna, 2023
 E/INCB/2022/4

UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATION

Sales No. E.23.XI.4
ISBN: 978-92-1-148378-9
eISBN: 978-92-1-002499-0
ISSN 2411-8664
eISSN 2411-8672

©  United Nations: International Narcotics Control Board, January 2023. All rights reserved worldwide.
Publishing production: English, Publishing and Library Section, United Nations Office at Vienna.
Foreword
It is my pleasure to present the analysis of the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) regard-
ing the world precursor situation in 2022. The situation has never been more complex, as reflected in
the current report, which highlights the issues relating to chemicals not under international control.
Governments have nevertheless identified these chemicals as having been used in illicit drug manu-
facture and have brought them to the attention of the Board pursuant to article 12, paragraph 12 (b),
of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances
of 1988.

The Board commends those Governments that share information about emerging chemicals and
methods of diversion and acknowledges the increasing volume of data provided on form D. The Board
urges Governments to submit complete information, including information on methods of diversion
and illicit manufacture. Such information will enable meaningful analysis and the identification of
emerging trends.

The Board reiterates its support for providing, through its secretariat, the needed technical assistance
to Governments to bridge this gap and ensure an effective international response to address the diver-
sion and misuse of both scheduled and non-scheduled chemicals for the illicit manufacture of drugs.

In March 2022, following the Board’s recommendation, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs decided
to place three precursors of fentanyl and of a number of fentanyl analogues under international con-
trol. Two of those substances are close chemical relatives, an issue that the Commission has also
addressed for the first time in its resolution 65/3. The resolution encourages Governments to place
domestic controls not only on individual substances but also on groups of related chemicals. The
Board welcomes this approach as a means to disrupt the emergence of the use of a series of closely
related substitute chemicals in response to scheduling action at the international level. This develop-
ment of substitution with non-scheduled chemicals has been noted with concern over the past years.

To support Governments in their efforts in an increasingly complex and dynamic global context, the
Board has consolidated its work under articles 12 and 13 of the 1988 Convention in a new strategy
that covers precursors and illicit drug manufacturing equipment. The strategy builds on the successes
in international precursor control and extends proven concepts to address non-scheduled chemicals,
as well as essential drug manufacturing equipment. In addition, the strategy highlights the impor-
tance of engagement with a wide range of industries along the supply chain and the need to support
Governments in their efforts to enhance public-private partnerships in different national contexts.

The importance of industry cooperation is also reflected in the thematic chapter of this year’s report,
which examines the crucial role played by the Internet-related industry, including Internet and email
service providers, social media and business-to-business platforms, in facilitating precursor
trafficking.

Finally, I wish to thank those Governments that have worked with the Board in developing and main-
taining the international precursor control system since its establishment in 1992.

The Board looks to Member States to continue to support INCB in implementing the new strategy,
which is required to help shape our collective response to the emerging challenges that we are facing.

Jagjit Pavadia
President of the International
Narcotics Control Board
iii
Preface
The United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances
of 1988 requires the International Narcotics Control Board to report annually to the Commission on
Narcotic Drugs on the implementation of article 12 of the Convention and requires the Commission
to periodically review the adequacy and propriety of Tables I and II of the Convention.

In addition to its annual report and other technical publications on narcotic drugs and psychotropic
substances, the Board has prepared its report on the implementation of article 12 of the 1988
Convention in accordance with the following provisions, contained in article 23 of the Convention:

1. The Board shall prepare an annual report on its work containing an analysis of the information at
its disposal and, in appropriate cases, an account of the explanations, if any, given by or required of
parties, together with any observations and recommendations which the Board desires to make. The
Board may make such additional reports as it considers necessary. The reports shall be submitted to
the Economic and Social Council through the Commission, which may make such comments as it
sees fit.

2. The reports of the Board shall be communicated to the parties and subsequently published by the
Secretary-General. The parties shall permit their unrestricted distribution.

v
Contents
Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
Explanatory notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii
Chapter
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

II. Action taken by Governments and the International Narcotics Control Board . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

A. Scope of control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

B. Adherence to the 1988 Convention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

C. Reporting to the Board pursuant to article 12 of the 1988 Convention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

D. Legislation and control measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

E. Submission of data on licit trade in, uses of and requirements for precursors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

F. Annual legitimate requirements for imports of precursors of amphetamine-type stimulants . . . . 6

G. Pre-export notifications and utilization of the Pre-Export Notification Online system . . . . . . . . . 7

H. Other activities and achievements in international precursor control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

III. Extent of licit trade and latest trends in trafficking in precursors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

A. Substances used in the illicit manufacture of amphetamine-type stimulants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

B. Substances used in the illicit manufacture of cocaine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

C. Substances used in the illicit manufacture of heroin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

D. Substances used in the illicit manufacture of other narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances . . . 32

E. Substances not listed in Table I or Table II of the 1988 Convention that are used in the illicit
manufacture of other narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances or substances of abuse not
under international control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

IV. Facilitation of precursor trafficking through the Internet: a thematic study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

V. Conclusions and recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Annexes*

I  arties and non-parties to the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs
P
and Psychotropic Substances of 1988, by region, as at 1 November 2022 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

II S ubmission of information by Governments, pursuant to article 12 of the United Nations

Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988,
on form D for the years 2017–2021 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

III S eizures of substances in Tables I and II of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988, as reported to the International Narcotics
Control Board, 2017–2021 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

* The annexes are not included in the printed version of the present report but are available on the website of the International Narcotics Control
Board (www.incb.org).

vii
 IV S ubmission of information by Governments on licit trade in, legitimate uses of and requirements for
substances in Tables I and II of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 for the years 2017–2021 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

V  nnual legitimate requirements for ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, 3,4-methylenedioxyphenyl-2-

A
propanone and 1-phenyl-2-propanone; substances frequently used in the manufacture of
amphetamine-type stimulants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

VI  overnments that have requested pre-export notifications pursuant to article 12, paragraph 10 (a),
G
of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances of 1988 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

VII S ubstances in Tables I and II of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

VIII Use of scheduled substances in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances . . . 69

IX  icit uses of the substances in Tables I and II of the United Nations Convention against Illicit
L
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

X  reaty provisions for the control of substances frequently used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic
T
drugs and psychotropic substances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

XI Regional groupings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

Figures

1. Number of Governments providing estimates of annual legitimate requirements, 2011–2022 . . . . . . . 6

2. Level of utilization of the PEN Online system, by region, 2021 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

3. Main differences between the PEN Online system and the PEN Online Light system . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

4. Categories of industries that might be involved in the manufacture, trade or distribution of

chemicals used for illicit drug manufacture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

5. Seizures of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine, as reported by Governments on form D, and of

methamphetamine, as reported on the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime annual report
questionnaire, 2012–2021 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

6. Seizures of pseudoephedrine preparations, as reported by Governments on form D, 2017–2021 . . . . 15

7. Seizures of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine, as reported by Governments in Europe on form D,

2017–2021 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

8. Alternative chemicals used in the illicit manufacture of amphetamine or methamphetamine . . . . . . 20

9. Alternative chemicals used in the illicit manufacture of MDMA and related “ecstasy”-type substances . . . . 23

10. Incidents communicated through PICS involving 3,4-MDP-2-P methyl glycidic acid derivatives
under international control and non-scheduled alternatives, 2013–2022 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

11. Thefts of hydrogen gas, as reported on form D by Germany, 2015–2021 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

12. Seizures of potassium permanganate, as reported by Governments on form D, 2012–2021 . . . . . . . . 27

13. Seizures of sodium metabisulfite, as reported by Governments in South America on form D,

2012–2021 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

viii
 14. Proportion of seizures of acetate solvents, expressed in kilograms and litres, as reported by
Governments on form D, 2017–2021 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

15. Seizures of acetic anhydride, as reported by Governments on form D, 2001–2021 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

16. Seizures of acetic anhydride, as reported by the Government of Afghanistan on form D,

2008–2020 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

17. Proposed exports of two fentanyl precursors, pre-notified by exporting Governments through the
PEN Online system, 2018–2021 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

18. Seizures of fentanyl precursors (expressed in fentanyl equivalents), as reported by Governments

on form D, 2016–2021 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

19. Schematic overview of the evolution of fentanyl precursors, 2017–2022 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

20. Seizures of GBL, as reported by Governments on form D for 2021 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

21. Seizures of ketamine precursors, as reported by Governments on form D, 2010–2021 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

22. Examples of Internet postings advertising the intent to purchase precursors in the period 2008–2009 . . . 36

23. Number of Internet search records for 3,4-MDP-2-P methyl glycidate and 3,4-MDP-2-P ethyl
glycidate per year since 2017 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

24. Incidents involving 3,4-MDP-2-P methyl glycidate and 3,4-MDP-2-P ethyl glycidate communicated
through PICS, 2017–2022 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Boxes

1. Commission on Narcotic Drugs resolution 65/3 and groups of chemically related precursors . . . . . . 5

2. Responsibility of transit countries to prevent the diversion of internationally controlled

precursor chemicals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

3. Precursors Incident Communication System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

4. Acetyl chloride and the international precursor control system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

5. Approaches to addressing suspicious Internet postings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Maps

1. Status of submissions by Governments of form D for 2021 containing information concerning

seizures of substances listed in Table I or Table II of the 1988 Convention and seizures of
substances not listed in Table I or Table II, as at 1 November 2022 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

2. Governments reporting seizures of substances not listed in Table I or Table II of the

1988 Convention on form D and through PICS, 2018–2022 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Tables

1. States parties failing to report as required under article 12, paragraph 12, of the 1988 Convention, 2021 . 2

2. The 10 countries with the largest proposed imports of ephedrine and pseudo­ephedrine, by volume,
1 November 2021–1 November 2022 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

ix
Explanatory notes
The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on the maps in the present publication
do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

The designations employed and the presentation of the material in the present publication do not
imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations
concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the
delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

Countries and areas are referred to by the names that were in official use at the time the relevant data
were collected.

Multiple government sources of data were used to generate the present report, including form D
(“Annual information on substances frequently used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and
psychotropic substances”); the Pre-Export Notification Online (PEN Online) system; the Precursors
Incident Communication System (PICS); results achieved under Project Prism and Project Cohesion,
which are the international operational initiatives regarding chemicals used in the illicit manufacture
of, respectively, synthetic drugs, and cocaine and heroin; and official communications with competent
national authorities and official national reports on the drug and precursor control situation.

Unless otherwise specified, data provided on form D are referred to by the calendar year to which they
apply. The reporting period for data from the PEN Online system and PICS is from 1 November 2021
to 1 November 2022, unless otherwise specified. Where PEN Online system data are used for multiple
years, calendar years are used. Additional information was provided through regional and inter­
national partner organizations, as indicated in the report.

With regard to data on seizures, readers should bear in mind that reported seizures generally reflect
the corresponding level of regulatory and law enforcement activity at that specific time. In addition, as
seizures are often the result of law enforcement cooperation among several countries (e.g. through
controlled deliveries), the occurrence of seizures and the volumes seized in a given country should not
be misinterpreted or used as an overestimation in assessing that country’s role in the overall situation
of trafficking in precursors.

Reference to “tons” is to metric tons, unless otherwise stated.

The following abbreviations have been used in the present report:

ANPP 4-anilino-N-phenethylpiperidine
4-AP 4-anilinopiperidine (N-phenyl-4-piperidinamine)
APAA alpha-phenylacetoacetamide (2-phenylacetoacetamide)
APAAN alpha-phenylacetoacetonitrile
1-boc-4-AP 1-boc-4-anilinopiperidine (tert-butyl 4-(phenylamino)
piperidine-1-carboxylate)
CICAD Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission of the
Organization of American States
DEPAPD diethyl (phenylacetyl)propanedioate
EAPA ethyl alpha-phenylacetoacetate (ethyl 3-oxo-2-phenylbutanoate)
Europol European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation
GBL gamma-butyrolactone

xi
 GHB gamma-hydroxybutyric acid
INCB International Narcotics Control Board
INTERPOL International Criminal Police Organization
IONICS Project Ion Incident Communication System
LSD lysergic acid diethylamide
MAMDPA methyl 3-oxo-2-(3,4-methylenedioxyphenyl)butanoate
MAPA methyl alpha-phenylacetoacetate (methyl 3-oxo-2-phenylbutanoate)
MDMA 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine (commonly known as “ecstasy”)
3,4-MDP-2-P 3,4-methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone
3,4-MDP-2-P methyl glycidate methyl ester of 3,4-MDP-2-P methyl glycidic acid
NPP N-phenethyl-4-piperidone
P2NP 1-phenyl-2-nitropropene
P-2-P 1-phenyl-2-propanone
PEN Online system Pre-Export Notification Online system
PEN Online Light system Pre-Export Notification Online Light system
PICS Precursors Incident Communication System
t-boc-MDMA N-tert-butoxycarbonyl-MDMA
UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
WCO World Customs Organization

xii
Summary
Article 12 of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances of 1988 forms the basis of international precursor control. The fact that there
are 190 States parties to the 1988 Convention indicates a firm global commitment to the international
system designed to prevent the diversion of chemical precursors to the illicit manufacture of drugs.

In March 2022, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, at its sixty-fifth session, decided to include three
precursors of fentanyl and of some related substances, namely, 4-AP, 1-boc-4-AP and norfentanyl, in
Table I of the 1988 Convention. That decision, which came into effect on 23 November 2022, brought
the total number of substances scheduled under Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention to 33. Ten of
those substances, some of them designer precursors with no known legitimate uses, were added to
Table I in the last eight years, indicating the increased sophistication of trafficking entrepreneurs in
quickly replacing controlled substances with alternative chemicals that are not subject to international
control, for purposes of illicit drug manufacture.

With 126 States parties having submitted form D as at 1 November 2022, the level of reporting of
annual information on substances frequently used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and
psychotropic substances remained at the previous level. Since such reporting forms a critical basis for
the reports of the Board on the implementation of article 12 of the 1988 Convention, there remains an
immediate need to improve the comprehensiveness, quality and timeliness of such reporting.

The issue of the use of non-scheduled chemicals for illicit drug manufacture continued to occupy a
pre-eminent position globally. A total of 67 countries across all continents have now reported seizures
of substances not included in the two tables of the 1988 Convention, indicating the global spread of
the problem. With the exception of cannabis, no drug or class of drugs remains untouched by the use
of non-scheduled chemicals. With a view to advancing knowledge and generating action at the
national and international levels, the Board has developed guidance material and information
resources on this subject. The guidance document entitled “Proliferation of non-scheduled chemicals
and designer precursors: options for global action” is one such resource. In addition, in order to facili-
tate the understanding of the subject, INCB created an interactive compendium to serve as a single
reference point for INCB tools and resources on the subject of non-scheduled chemicals and designer
precursors. Furthermore, at its sixty-fifth session, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs adopted resolu-
tion 65/3, entitled “Intensifying efforts to address the diversion of non-scheduled chemicals frequently
used in the illicit manufacture of drugs and the proliferation of designer precursors”. The resolution
provides a concrete basis for action to address chemicals not under international control, which
remains one of the most critical challenges in international precursor control.

The monitoring of international trade in controlled precursors is at the core of international precursor
control efforts. The number of Governments formally requesting to receive pre-export notifications
for some or all of the substances in Tables I and II had risen to 117 as at 1 November 2022, with the
addition of Zambia since the previous year. The data for the reporting year provided more evidence of
the effectiveness of the Board’s online platform for facilitating such pre-notification, the PEN Online
system. For example, timely action by Jordan on pre-export notifications submitted by Egypt pre-
vented the possible diversion of nearly 1 ton of pseudoephedrine preparations.

As regards trafficking in key drug precursors, the decline in reported seizures of ephedrine and pseudo­
ephedrine, substances used in the illicit manufacture of methamphetamine, continued. However, in
contrast to the overall decline in seizures of ephedrines, seizures of pseudoephedrine in the form of
pharmaceutical preparations more than doubled in 2021 compared with 2020, and more than trebled
compared with 2018, indicating a clear trend of resurgence in the use of such preparations for illicit
purposes. Furthermore, the location of reported seizures indicates a likely expansion of the illicit

xiii
 manufacture of methamphetamine to hitherto unaffected territories. This scenario underscores the
need for exporting Governments to be mindful of the estimated annual legitimate requirements of the
importing countries for imports of precursors of amphetamine-type stimulants when allowing such
exports. The reporting year provided more than one instance of exports in excess of annual legitimate
requirements, one of which was later objected to by the importing country, indicating a possible diver-
sion attempt.

Insofar as other precursors of amphetamine-type stimulants are concerned, in the reporting year, the
global quantity seized of MAPA, included in Table I of the 1988 Convention in 2020, amounted to
only about a third of the quantity reported seized in 2020, confirming the previously observed trend
of declining quantities seized of substances after their international scheduling, and their replacement
by non-scheduled alternatives. Among the newly reported alternative precursors were DEPAPD for
amphetamine and methamphetamine, and 3,4-MDP-2-P ethyl glycidate for MDMA and related sub-
stances. In addition, seizures of the previously reported substance MAMDPA continued to be
reported.

The global quantity reported seized of the key cocaine precursor, potassium permanganate, nearly
doubled in comparison with the quantity reported seized in 2020, with the largest quantities being
reported by countries in South America and China. Of the 16 countries reporting such seizures, six
were in Europe, indicating the existence in Europe of cocaine laboratories for both the recovery of
cocaine base from carrier materials used for smuggling, and the conversion of cocaine base into
hydrochloride salt. Seizures of non-scheduled chemicals associated with cocaine manufacture
included chemicals used to illicitly manufacture controlled cocaine precursors, as well as chemicals
associated with efficiency gains.

As regards heroin precursors, global seizures of acetic anhydride continued the declining trend wit-
nessed since 2018, in particular in countries that had previously reported seizures of sizeable amounts
of the substance. In 2021, the amount of acetic anhydride seized in Türkiye accounted for more than
60 per cent of the amount of the substance seized globally, thereby corroborating the country’s signifi-
cance as a transit country between Europe and the likely heroin manufacturing sites in Afghanistan.
At the same time, trafficking in acetyl chloride, a possible replacement for acetic anhydride that
emerged around 2018, continued to be reported in West Asia.

Precursors of other synthetic drugs also continued to be reported seized or diverted from domestic
distribution channels. Such incidents indicated the illicit manufacture of fentanyl, LSD, and phency-
clidine and related drugs, as well as of ketamine and new psychoactive substances, including sub-
stances recently scheduled under the drug treaties.

As already highlighted by the Board in the past, the use of the Internet (the surface web) to facilitate
trafficking in precursors continued to be relevant. India reported seizures of controlled substances in
2022, following investigations using the intelligence packages developed as an outcome of the INCB
Operation Acronym, conducted in 2021. A drug trafficking network was also identified, indicating the
importance of investigating suspicious Internet postings related to precursors.

xiv
I. Introduction the way forward for effective international and domestic
precursor control.

5. Annexes I to XI contain updated statistics and practi-

1. The present report has been prepared by INCB pursu- cal information intended to assist competent national
ant to article 23 of the United Nations Convention against authorities in carrying out their functions. The annexes are
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic not included in the printed copies of the present report but
Substances of 1988. It provides an overview of action taken are included in the digital version of the report, available
by Governments and by INCB since the publication of the on the INCB website.
Board’s report on precursors for 20211 to prevent the
diversion of chemicals and to implement the provisions of
the 1988 Convention.

2. Following the summary and the present introduction,

II. Action taken by
substantive reporting begins in chapter II, which provides Governments and
statistics and information on action taken by Governments
and the Board in accordance with the provisions of article 12 the International
of the 1988 Convention. This includes information on the
utilization of the PEN Online system and a summary of Narcotics Control
the operational activities under Project Cohesion and
Project Prism. The chapter also contains an overview of Board
international cooperation and other initiatives related to
precursor control.
A.  Scope of control
3. Chapter III provides an overview of the licit trade in 6. On 16 March 2022, the Commission on Narcotic
precursors and the latest major trends in the trafficking Drugs decided, in accordance with the Board’s recommen-
and illicit use of chemicals, highlighting the most relevant dation, to add 4-AP, 1-boc-4-AP and norfentanyl, three
cases of suspicious and stopped shipments, diversion and precursors of fentanyl and of a few related substances, to
attempted diversion, and seizures, as well as activities Table I of the 1988 Convention. The decision became
associated with illicit drug manufacture. effective on 23 November 2022, 180 days after it was com-
municated by the Secretary-General to Governments.
4. Chapter IV provides a thematic examination of the
facilitation of precursor trafficking through the Internet 7. As has been common practice in the past, and pursu-
(the surface web), including activities ranging from the ant to Economic and Social Council resolution 1992/29,
advertising for the sale or purchase of precursor chemicals INCB has requested WCO to establish unique Harmonized
through websites, or social media or business-to-business System codes3 for the newly scheduled chemicals. Until
platforms, to the mediating of such activities. Throughout such time as each substance is assigned a unique
this report, specific recommendations and conclusions are Harmonized System code, INCB encourages
highlighted as a basis for Governments to take the neces- Governments to adopt, on a voluntary basis, interim,
sary action to prevent the diversion of and trafficking in discrete codes based on the applicable Harmonized
precursor chemicals and their use in illicit manufacture.2 System group code.4
Chapter V provides recommendations to Governments on

1 
Precursors and Chemicals Frequently Used in the Illicit
Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances: Report of
the International Narcotics Control Board for 2021 on the Implementation
of Article 12 of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in 3 
See WCO, Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 (E/INCB/2021/4). System, 7th ed. (Brussels, 2022).
2 
A compilation of the recommendations relating to international 4 
Harmonized System classifications of non-scheduled chemicals
precursor control made by INCB in previous years is available on the used in the illicit manufacture of drugs are available to competent
Board’s website (www.incb.org ). national authorities on a secure page of the INCB website.

1
2   INCB REPORT ON PRECURSORS 2022

B.  Adherence to the Comprehensive information about the status of the sub-
mission of form D by individual Governments is included
1988 Convention in annex II.
8. As at 1 November 2022, the 1988 Convention had
been ratified, acceded to or approved by 190 States and Table 1. States parties failing to report as required
formally confirmed by the European Union (extent of under article 12, paragraph 12, of the 1988
competence: art. 12). There have been no changes in that Convention, 2021
regard since the publication of the INCB report on precur- Africa
sors for 2021, thus leaving seven States – four in Oceania
Algeria Eritreaa Mauritania
and three in Africa (see annex I)5 – that have yet to become
parties to the Convention. To reduce their vulnerability to Angola Eswatini b
Namibiaa
precursor trafficking, INCB urges the seven States that Burkina Fasob Ethiopiaa Niger
have yet to become parties to the 1988 Convention to Burundi Gambia a
Rwanda
implement the provisions of article 12 and accede to
Sao Tome and
the Convention without further delay. Cabo Verde Guineab
Principea
Central African
Guinea-Bissaua Senegal
C.  Reporting to the Board Republicb
Chad Lesothob Seychellesa
pursuant to article 12 of the
Comorosb Liberiab Tunisia
1988 Convention
Congo b
Libya b
Zambiaa
9. Under article 12, paragraph 12, of the 1988 Côte d’Ivoirea Malawib
Convention, Governments are required to report annually
Djiboutib Malia
to INCB information on substances frequently used in the
illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic Americas
substances (for which form D is used).6 Specifically, the Antigua and Barbudab Brazil Saint Kitts and Nevisb
information to be submitted includes: (a) the amounts Saint Vincent and the
Bahamasb Cubab
seized of substances included in Tables I and II of the 1988 Grenadines
Convention and, when known, their origin; (b) any sub- Barbadosa Dominica Suriname
stance not included in Table I or Table II that is identified Belize Grenada b

as having been used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic

Asia
drugs or psychotropic substances; and (c) methods of
diversion and illicit manufacture. That information is sub- Afghanistan Maldives Timor-Leste
sequently used to identify regional and global patterns and Bangladesh Nepal Viet Nam
trends (see chap. III).
Cambodia a
Oman Yemen
10. As at 1 November 2022, a total of 127 States parties Indonesia
to the 1988 Convention had submitted form D for 2021.
Oceania
Less than 50 per cent of States parties submitted their form
by the deadline of 30 June 2022, and a number of States Cook Islands b
Naurub Samoaa
parties failed to report data for 2021 altogether. Several Fijia Niueb Tongab
parties have not submitted form D for the past 5 or even 10 Marshall Islandsb Palau Vanuatub
years, including 21 countries in Africa and 8 in Oceania
Micronesia (Federated
(see table 1).7 Kuwait resumed submission of form D after States of)
more than 5 years, and Togo after more than 8 years.
Note: See also annex II.
a
Government that failed to submit form D for any year during the
5 
Equatorial Guinea, Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, past five years (2017–2021).
Somalia, South Sudan and Tuvalu.
b
Government that failed to submit form D for any year during the
past 10 years (2012–2021).
6 
The latest version of form D is available on the INCB website in the
six official languages of the United Nations. In an effort to streamline and
expedite the reporting process and to minimize the potential for data
entry errors, INCB requests the utilization of a spreadsheet form. Fifty-
three States have used the spreadsheet version of form D for 2021.
7 
The Holy See and Liechtenstein did not furnish form D separately,
as their data are included in the reports of Italy and Switzerland,
respectively.
 II.  Action taken by Governments and the International Narcotics Control Board   3

11. As at 1 November 2022, 71 Governments had control in different countries. Both resources are available
reported seizures of substances listed in Table I or Table II as part of the Board’s information package on the control
of the 1988 Convention on form D for 2021. Fifty-seven of precursors and can be accessed by competent national
Governments had reported seizures of substances not authorities on the Board’s secure website. To ensure that
included in Table I or Table II, and 38 had supplied infor- the information is up to date at all times, INCB encour-
mation concerning methods of diversion and illicit manu- ages all Governments to inform it regularly of relevant
facture. However, a number of Governments submitted changes to their national precursor legislation and
incomplete information or submitted aggregated figures requirements related to the legitimate trade in these
lacking details sufficient to allow the Board to analyse and substances.
identify emerging trends in trafficking in precursors and
13. Since 1 November 2021, the changes in control mea­
the illicit manufacture of drugs (see map 1). The Board
sures set out below have come to the attention of INCB.
therefore once again urges all Governments to provide
comprehensive, mandatory information on seizures 14. In December 2021, the de facto authorities of
and on methods of diversion and illicit manufacture on Afghanistan banned the harvesting of Ephedra plant in
time and in one form that consolidates the information the Afghan provinces of Ghor, Farah, Nimroz and
from all relevant agencies. Bamyan.8 This ban in specific provinces preceded a decree
issued on 3 April 2022 announcing a ban on poppy culti-
vation and the manufacture of illicit drugs across
Afghanistan.9
D.  Legislation and control measures
15. In the Netherlands, a new law that entered into force
12. Establishing and strengthening appropriate national on 1 January 2022 gave the Ministry of Health, Welfare
control measures constitutes the basis for effective moni- and Sport and the Ministry of Justice and Security the
toring of the movement of precursors both in international authority to schedule chemicals that can be used to manu-
trade and domestic distribution. In accordance with facture illicit drugs and that have no known legal use. A
Economic and Social Council resolution 1992/29, the multi-stakeholder expert group was set up to inform this
Board collects information on the specific controls applied
to the substances in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention
8 
David Mansfield, “Banning ephedra and bolstering the rural econ-
and maintains a directory of those requirements to assist
omy of Afghanistan”, Alcis, 13 January 2022.
Governments in monitoring trade in controlled chemicals. 9 
“Islamic Emirate announces ban on poppy cultivation”, TOLO
The Board also maintains a list of chemicals under national News, 3 April 2022.

Map 1. Status of submissions by Governments of form D for 2021 containing information concerning
seizures of substances listed in Table I or Table II of the 1988 Convention and seizures of
substances not listed in Table I or Table II, as at 1 November 2022

Not submitted

Blank (both mandatory parts

left blank)
Partially filled in (one out of the The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
two mandatory parts filled in) Final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. Dotted line represents approximately
the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon
Substantially filled in (both by the parties. A dispute exists between the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning
mandatory parts filled in) sovereignty over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas).
4   INCB REPORT ON PRECURSORS 2022

scheduling process, which includes representatives of the 18. On 31 October 2022, the Government of Thailand
Netherlands Forensic Institute and the chemical industry, decided to introduce a registration requirement for
as well as law enforcement agencies, customs authorities importers, exporters and end users of sodium cyanide,
and the Netherlands Public Prosecution Service. An initial benzyl cyanide and benzyl chloride. As an immediate
list of chemicals to be scheduled was to be finalized before measure and while the issuance of import and export per-
the end of 2022. mits was under consideration, the Government suspended
exports and was to reduce imports of two of the three
16. On 8 March 2022, the Secretary-General of the
chemicals, sodium cyanide and benzyl cyanide. The meas-
United Nations, in his capacity as depositary of the 1988
ures were in response to the chemicals alleged to have
Convention, communicated that, as of 4 March 2022,
been used in illicit methamphetamine manufacture.
Ukraine was unable to guarantee the full implementation
of its obligations under the Convention. 19. Pursuant to European Commission Delegated
Regulation (EU) 2022/1518, and effective 3 October 2022,
17. In August 2022, a ministerial order by the
EAPA and MAMDPA, precursors of P-2-P and 3,4-MDP-
Government of Canada extended the scope of control over
2-P, respectively, were added as category 1 substances in
4-AP to include its derivatives and analogues, for a period
the annexes of Regulation (EC) No. 273/2004 of the
of one year. As a result of the order, the import, export,
European Parliament and the European Council and
production, trafficking, and possession for the purposes of
Council Regulation (EC) No. 111/2005. Category 1 entails
trafficking of analogues and derivatives of 4-AP became
the strictest control and monitoring measures under the
subject to criminal prohibitions under the Controlled
European Union precursor legislation.
Drugs and Substances Act. The order responded to the
decision of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs to add
1-boc-4-AP to Table I of the 1988 Convention. It was also
in line with one of the recommendations made by the
Measures to address the proliferation of
Commission on Narcotic Drugs in its resolution 65/3,
whereby the Commission encouraged Member States to non-scheduled chemicals, including
consider taking domestic measures on chemicals related to designer precursors
substances included in Table I and Table II that may read-
20. Chemicals not listed in Table I or Table II of the 1988
ily be converted to or substituted for those substances. In
Convention that can be used to illicitly manufacture, or
addition, the order by Canada also extended that recom-
substitute for, controlled precursors, have been encoun-
mendation to analogues, that is, to precursors of certain
tered in all regions of the world (see map 2). Since the
fentanyl analogues, such as para-fluorofentanyl and
publication of Board’s previous report on precursors, the
bromofentanyl.

Map 2. Governments reporting seizures of substances not listed in Table I or Table II of the 1988
Convention on form D and through PICS, 2018–2022

No reported seizures of non- The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
scheduled substances Final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. Dotted line represents approximately
the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon
Reported seizures of by the parties. A dispute exists between the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning
non-scheduled substances sovereignty over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas).
 II.  Action taken by Governments and the International Narcotics Control Board   5

number of Governments reporting such substances has a single reference point, providing an overview of the bene­
increased from 66 to 67. fits, uses and application of various tools and resources
that can aid Governments in identifying the ever-growing
21. Given the global spread of non-scheduled chemicals,
number of non-scheduled chemicals, assessing the risks of
the Board remains convinced of the need to further
their potential use in illicit drug manufacture and commu-
advance measures to address the proliferation of chemicals
nicating incidents related to them. The interactive com-
not included in Table I or Table II of the 1988 Convention,
pendium is accessible on the INCB website and includes
and to facilitate global cooperation on this matter. To that
descriptions and visual representations of the INCB guid-
end, and in continuation of its long-standing work in the
ance document on non-scheduled chemicals, the recently
area, INCB developed materials and facilitated a number
launched PEN Online Light system (see para. 40 below),
of initiatives, including the guidance document entitled
PICS, the limited international special surveillance list of
“Proliferation of non-scheduled chemicals and designer
non-scheduled substances frequently used in illicit drug
precursors: options for global action”, which consists of a
manufacture, the list of chemicals under national control
collated list of policy options and approaches. The docu-
in different countries (known as Table 4), a set of resources
ment, which is the result of a series of targeted inter­
on enhancing industry cooperation, a compilation of pre-
national consultations with technical experts and
cursor chemical monographs, and the precursors module
Governments organized by the Board throughout 2021,
of the United Nations Toolkit on Synthetic Drugs.
was made available on the INCB website, in all six official
languages of the United Nations.

22. In March 2022, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs E.  Submission of data on licit trade
adopted resolution 65/3, entitled “Intensifying efforts to in, uses of and requirements for
address the diversion of non-scheduled chemicals fre- precursors
quently used in the illicit manufacture of drugs and the
proliferation of designer precursors”. In the resolution, the 24. In accordance with Economic and Social Council
Commission called upon Member States to intensify their resolution 1995/20, Governments provide data on their
efforts to address the diversion of non-scheduled chemi- licit trade in, uses of and requirements for substances listed
cals, provided policy recommendations, encouraged com- in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention. Together with
pliance with the 180-day period following the information about pre-export notifications exchanged
communication by the Secretary-General within which through the PEN Online system, those data enable INCB
parties to the 1988 Convention should place newly sched- to identify unusual trade patterns and suspicious activity,
uled substances under national control, and called for thereby preventing diversion.
improved measures for data collection, international and
25. As at 1 November 2022, 117 Governments had
regional cooperation and training. In the resolution, the
submitted data on licit trade in substances in Table I or
Commission also referenced various INCB tools and
Table II of the 1988 Convention, and 106 Governments
resources and encouraged Member States to make active
had furnished data on the licit uses of and/or requirements
use of them.
for one or more of those substances (see annex  IV). As in
23. To complement the strengthened efforts in the area the past, those data, although submitted on a voluntary
of non-scheduled chemicals and designer precursors, the basis, were submitted by more Governments, and were
Board has developed an interactive compendium of rele- more comprehensive, than the mandatory data on seizures
vant INCB tools and resources. The compendium serves as of precursors (see para. 11 above).

Box 1.  Commission on Narcotic Drugs resolution 65/3 and groups of chemically related precursors

For several years, INCB has highlighted the need to more proactively address traffickers’ exploitation of groups of sub-
stances that are chemically related to controlled precursors, including derivatives and analogues of such precursors.

In paragraph 7 of its resolution 65/3, the Commission on Narcotics Drugs encouraged Member States, when placing
domestic controls on a substance pursuant to a decision by the Commission to add that substance to Table I or Table II
of the 1988 Convention, to consider also taking domestic measures on related chemicals that may readily be converted
to or substituted for that substance, in accordance with national legislation.

In August 2022, Canada applied this approach at the national level (see para. 17 above).
6   INCB REPORT ON PRECURSORS 2022

F.  Annual legitimate requirements party to the 1988 Convention. At the same time, a total of
22 States parties to the 1988 Convention had not yet pro-
for imports of precursors of vided any estimates to the Board; the majority of those are
amphetamine-type stimulants in Africa and Oceania.
26. With a view to providing exporting countries with 28. The main objective of estimating such requirements
an additional tool to monitor the amounts of selected is to provide the competent authorities of exporting coun-
amphetamine-type stimulant precursors involved in pro- tries with an indication of the amounts legitimately
posed shipments to importing countries, the Commission required by importing countries, with a view to putting
on Narcotic Drugs, in its resolution 49/3, requested individual shipments, as well as more established patterns
Member States to provide to INCB estimates of their of trade, in perspective and enabling better monitoring
annual legitimate requirements for 3,4-MDP-2-P, pseu- and control. Since the publication of the Board’s report on
doephedrine, ephedrine and P-2-P, and, to the extent pos- precursors for 2021, 96 countries and territories have
sible, estimated requirements for preparations containing reconfirmed or updated their estimates for at least one of
those substances that could be easily used or recovered by the substances, a significantly lower number than in the
readily applicable means. Annual legitimate requirements previous year. However, some estimates provided to INCB
for imports of precursors of amphetamine-type stimulants date back several years and have not been updated recently.
as reported by Governments are presented in annex V to Ninety States parties to the 1988 Convention are in this
the present report and are updated regularly on a dedi- category, some having missed the opportunity to update
cated page of the INCB website.10 their submission for one year and others for several years.
27. Governments have continued to report their annual 29. In several countries, planned shipments of precur-
legitimate requirements for imports of precursors of sors of amphetamine-type stimulants pre-notified through
amphetamine-type stimulants and their preparations to the PEN Online system exceeded or were close to reaching
INCB, mostly on form D and, to a lesser extent, by means the estimated annual requirements for the concerned
of individual communications during the year. As at period at the time of the pre-notification, prompting
1 November 2022, 183 countries and territories had pro- follow-up requests from INCB for clarification by the
vided at least one estimate (see figure 1). The figure respective competent authorities (see also paras. 77 and 78
includes a number of territories and States that are not yet below). On the other hand, several countries had indicated
annual legitimate requirements that by far exceeded the
10 
www.incb.org/incb/en/precursors/alrs.html. amounts imported or pre-notified to them for import,

Figure 1. Number of Governments providing estimates of annual legitimate requirements, 2011–2022

200

180
Number of Governments providing annual

183
160 178
168 173
162 166 166
legitimate requirements

140 153 157 157

150
120 137

100

80

60

40

20

0
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 As of 1
Nov
Number of Governments providing at least one estimate 2022
 II.  Action taken by Governments and the International Narcotics Control Board   7

suggesting unrealistically high estimated requirements. In system for the exchange of pre-export notifications, PEN
some other cases, Governments indicated on form D the Online, to ensure that they receive information about all
use of a substance or a number of substances for specific relevant planned shipments of chemicals destined for their
purposes; however, they did not provide any indication territory in real time, thus enabling them to verify the
regarding the estimated amounts required. INCB invites legitimacy of a transaction and suspend or stop it, as
Governments to review the methodology used to esti- required, before the shipment leaves the exporting
mate their annual legitimate requirements for imports country.
of individual precursors of amphetamine-type stimu-
lants to reflect changing import needs, and to provide 1. Pre-export notifications
updates to the Board, at any time throughout the year,
on any necessary changes. 33. As at 1 November 2022, 117 countries and territories
had formally requested to receive pre-export notifications
30. In order to establish their estimates more accurately, for some or all of the substances in Table I and Table II of
Governments may refer to the Guide on Estimating the 1988 Convention (see annex VI). This figure includes
Requirements for Substances under International Control, the Government of Zambia, which in June 2022 invoked
developed by INCB and the World Health Organization, article 12, paragraph 10 (a), for all substances in Tables I
as well as the recently updated document entitled “Issues and II. As traffickers are continuously looking for vulner-
that Governments may consider when determining annual able territories to carry out their illicit drug manufacturing
legitimate requirements for ephedrine and pseudoephed- activities, it is essential that all Governments are officially
rine”. Both documents are available on the Board’s pre-notified of shipments of controlled precursor chemi-
website. cals destined to their territory or territories; it is equally
31. During the reporting period, some countries, includ- important that all shipments are monitored, and not just
ing India, Jordan and Nigeria, revised their estimates sig- those destined for territories where illicit manufacture is
nificantly downwards. India, which previously had the known to take place, so that suspicious consignments can
largest estimated annual legitimate requirements for be identified, regardless of their destinations. In order for
ephedrines and pseudoephedrines worldwide, revised its the pre-export notification system to be effective, the
annual legitimate requirements down to almost zero to Board calls upon all remaining Governments that have
reflect import requirements, following the updated guid- not yet invoked the provisions of article 12, paragraph
ance of the Board. Jordan has further reduced its annual 10 (a), of the 1988 Convention, notably those in Africa
legitimate requirements following a similar step last year. and Oceania, to do so without further delay.
This follows an unprecedented pattern of imports of pseudo­ 34. The Board furthermore strongly encourages
ephedrine and subsequent exports of preparations con- interested Governments and organizations to use bilat-
taining that substance to the Kurdistan region of Iraq, eral, regional and multilateral initiatives to draw
which the Board had noted in the past.11 attention to, and help other Governments to take
advantage of, the provisions of article 12, paragraph
10 (a), of the 1988 Convention with regard to all sub-
G.  Pre-export notifications and stances in Table I and Table II of the Convention.
utilization of the Pre-Export
Notification Online system 2. Pre-Export Notification Online
32. Knowledge about incoming shipments in inter­
system
national trade and the possibility to verify the legitimacy 35. Since the Board published its report on precursors
of a planned import are key in preventing the diversion of for 2021, the Governments of Fiji, Malawi and Mongolia
precursors. The international precursor control system have been registered as users of the PEN Online system,
offers Governments two complementary tools. First, by thus increasing the number of Governments with author-
invoking article 12, paragraph 10 (a), of the 1988 ized access to that electronic tool to 168 countries and ter-
Convention, Governments of importing countries can ritories. The number of pre-export notifications
make it mandatory for exporting countries to inform them communicated through the PEN Online system has
of planned shipments of precursors prior to shipping. remained stable, with an average of 2,900 notifications sent
Second, although not a treaty requirement, Governments per month during the reporting year. Since 1 November
should also register with the Board’s automated online 2021, about 35,000 pre-export notifications have been sub-
mitted by 69 exporting countries and territories through
11 
See, for example, the INCB report on precursors for 2019 (E/ the PEN Online system. Although the Board is pleased to
INCB/2019/4), para. 79. note that 85 per cent of all countries and territories using
8   INCB REPORT ON PRECURSORS 2022

the system view more than 90 per cent of their incoming instances where timely action had prevented possible traf-
pre-export notifications, the number of Governments not ficking attempts from proceeding and others where lack of
viewing them, notably in Africa and Oceania, still raises a timely response to the pre-export notification had
some concern (see figure 2). INCB therefore reiterates resulted in dubious exports requiring subsequent investi-
its recommendation to importing Governments that gations (see para. 77 below). The Board encourages
are registered as users of the PEN Online system to Governments to make effective use of the PEN online
make active use of the system for all transactions system to identify suspicious shipments and possible
involving precursors and to respond to exporting diversion attempts. Close monitoring of the submitted
authorities in a timely manner where necessary. pre-export notifications and prompt responses by the
importing countries are the most effective remedies to
36. Less than 5 per cent of pre-export notifications were
prevent chemicals intended for licit purposes from
objected to during the reporting year. Similar to previous
entering illicit channels. The Board also encourages
years, many of those objections were raised for adminis-
exporting and importing Governments to treat
trative reasons. To avoid unnecessary administrative
objected shipments as the starting point for investiga-
objections and delays in shipments, the Board reminds
tions to identify traffickers and modi operandi.
exporting authorities to include all relevant details,
especially authorization numbers, where available, 38. Another trend noted was the pre-notification of
when submitting a pre-export notification in the PEN planned shipments in excess of the quantities indicated by
Online system. Preferably and where available, export- the importing countries as their estimated annual legiti-
ing Governments should consider attaching a copy of mate requirements (see paras. 77 and 78 below). The
the import authorization to the pre-export notification Board encourages the Governments of exporting coun-
in the PEN Online system to facilitate verification by tries to consider the annual legitimate requirements of
the authorities of importing countries. the importing countries before authorizing exports of
selected precursors of amphetamine-type stimulants
37. The Board has repeatedly highlighted the need to and preparations containing such substances, pursu-
take prompt action upon receipt of a pre-export notifica- ant to Commission on Narcotic Drugs resolution 49/3.12
tion. Specifically, this implies that the importing Shipments in excess of quantities indicated by import-
Government should verify the legitimacy of the shipment ing countries as their legitimate needs could possibly
in question, namely, the importing company and the be trafficking attempts.
amount pre-notified, and provide feedback to the export-
ing authority. Undertaking these activities within a period
of 7 to 15 working days has become established practice. 12 
An updated list of annual legitimate requirements is available on
During the reporting period, the Board noted a few the Board’s website.

Figure 2. Level of utilization of the PEN Online system, by region, 2021

60
Number of Governments

50
13 2
4
40
14 8
30 7
23

20
31 33
28
10 10
18
3
0 3
Africa Americas Asia Europe Oceania

Not registered
Registered and viewing less than 90 per cent of notifications
Registered and viewing 90 per cent or more of notifications
 II.  Action taken by Governments and the International Narcotics Control Board   9

Box 2.  Responsibility of transit countries to prevent the diversion of internationally controlled precursor chemicalsa

Normal commercial practice may involve shipping a chemical through one or more countries. Therefore, in addition to
exporting and importing countries, transit countries have an important role to play in preventing diversion, pursuant to
article 12, paragraph 9 (c), of the 1988 Convention. However, the Board has noted that, whereas some transit countries
are informed of shipments entering their country en route to another country, in many cases, owing to a lack of full
documentation, transit countries may not be aware that a specific transit is to occur.

It is therefore essential that the authorities of transit countries are informed fully and in advance by the authorities of
the exporting country of the transit that is to occur. In practice, this can be accomplished by copying a pre-export noti-
fication to the authorities of transit countries. While not mandatory under the 1988 Convention, some Governments also
require transit authorizations to be issued.

In the process of determining the legitimacy of transit shipments of internationally controlled precursors, it is important
that exporting, importing and transit countries establish good working relationships with each other to avoid delaying
legitimate trade. Where information is provided about suspicious shipments in transit, national authorities should
cooperate by sharing pertinent information and providing assistance in law enforcement operations. Specifically, the
authorities of transit countries should:

• Invoke article 12, paragraph 10 (a), of the 1988 Convention and review all incoming pre-export notifications
when copied in as a transit country.

• Put in place a monitoring mechanism to identify suspicious shipments and ensure legislative power to seize
shipments of controlled chemicals, when necessary, or to delay onward shipment, in accordance with national
law, until such time as the authorities are satisfied that the shipment is intended for licit purposes.

• Ensure close coordination of the activities of the different authorities and actors, in particular those of customs
authorities and industry, all of which may be in a position to confirm the legitimacy of shipments involving
controlled chemicals.

• Check shipping documents to ensure that:

-  They are fully completed and that there are no inaccuracies;

- The shipment of a controlled chemical is indeed considered a transit shipment or a shipment that has
entered the country under conditions of customs surveillance and that its exportation has been authorized
by the exporting country;

-  There are sound grounds for routing the consignment through the particular transit country;

-  The regulations and legal requirements of the importing country, or next transit country, are fully met;

- The operator, individuals, companies or other parties involved in the transaction have been suitably vetted
and are authorized to handle the chemical or chemicals involved.

• In case of concern about the legitimacy of a shipment, consider authorizing the shipment only upon receiving
an explicit response from the authorities of the subsequent importing country or arranging for a controlled
delivery.

___________
a
A discussion on the global issue “Responsibilities of transit countries in the licit trade in internationally controlled substances” can be found in the
annual report of the Board for 2022 (E/INCB/2022/1).
10   INCB REPORT ON PRECURSORS 2022

3. Pre-Export Notification Online Light H. Other activities and

system: sending pre-export achievements in international
notifications for non-scheduled precursor control
chemicals on a voluntary basis
39. Since early 2021, the authorities of some exporting 1. Project Prism and Project Cohesion
countries have started to systematically send advance noti- 41. The INCB Precursors Task Force, which steers the
fications for shipments of chemicals not in Table I or activities of the two operational projects of INCB, Project
Table  II of the 1988 Convention to importing countries by Prism and Project Cohesion,13 decided to conduct, jointly
email, often sending a copy to INCB. This practice has with WCO and the UNODC-WCO Container Control
emerged in response to changes in national legislation and Programme, a multilateral activity related to free zones in
domestic controls requiring the sending of such pre- selected countries. In addition, Operation Knockout was
export notifications. conducted jointly under Project Prism, Project Ion and the
40. To respond to the emergence of non-scheduled INCB Global Rapid Interdiction of Dangerous Substances
chemicals and designer precursors and assist Governments (GRIDS) Programme at the end of 2022. The results of the
in addressing the issue of chemicals that are not under operation, which was aimed at identifying and disman-
international control but that may be controlled nationally tling illicit manufacturing operations, suspicious online
in one or more countries, the Board launched the PEN marketing activities, and distribution and redistribution
Online Light system in October 2022. Analogous to the points involving GBL and 1,4-butanediol, among other
PEN Online system, The PEN Online Light system is a substances, are to be evaluated by the Task Force in 2023.
tool that exporting Governments can use to notify import- 42. Operation Acronym, aimed at addressing the diver-
ing countries about planned shipments of internationally sion of precursors by means of the Internet (specifically,
non-scheduled chemicals on a voluntary basis. It uses the the surface web), was conducted in February 2021.
same technology as the PEN Online system, but given its Following the conclusion of the operation, “intelligence
voluntary nature, some features in the PEN Online system packages” were developed and shared with the countries
have been deactivated in the PEN Online Light system concerned to facilitate appropriate follow-up investiga-
(see figure 3). The Board recommends that the authori- tions. One such package was shared with the authorities of
ties of exporting countries actively use the PEN Online India in September 2021. Subsequent investigations were
Light system when notifying importing Governments successful in unearthing a major drug trafficking network
of shipments involving non-scheduled chemicals. that was involved in the diversion and supply of several
Importing authorities, likewise, are encouraged to nationally and internationally controlled substances,
make use of this free tool to receive advance notifica- including ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, tramadol, oxyco-
tions of proposed shipments of non-scheduled chemi- done, alprazolam, diazepam, codeine and ketamine. The
cals destined for their territories. investigations also led to seizures of ketamine and ephed-
Figure 3. Main differences between the PEN Online rine, the arrest of four persons and the obtaining of intel-
system and the PEN Online Light system ligence about a shipment originating in Mexico and
destined for Australia, details of which were shared with
MAIN DIFFERENCES Australia. In addition, one large-scale drug trafficker was
Table I Substances identified in Mexico and authorities in Australia seized
and Table II
substances only
not in Table I
or Table II 1 kg of methamphetamine. The investigations were
ongoing.

Some 43. During the reporting period, INCB also continued

Mandatory
fields
mandatory
fields to serve as a focal point for the exchange of information on
deactivated
suspicious transactions in legitimate trade, trafficking
PEN ONLINE PEN ONLINE trends, identified modi operandi and emerging
LIGHT

Automated No automated
13 
The two projects, which currently bring together operational focal
notifications notifications
of receipt of receipt
points from law and regulatory enforcement authorities of more than 140
Governments worldwide, serve as platforms for international coopera-
tion to address the diversion of and trafficking in chemicals used in the
Reply No reply illicit manufacture of synthetic drugs (Project Prism), and heroin and
deadline and deadline and
automated no automated
cocaine (Project Cohesion). A summary of the minimum action needed
reminders reminders for international multilateral cooperation under the two projects is avail-
able in the INCB report on precursors for 2015 (E/INCB/2015/4), box 2.
 II.  Action taken by Governments and the International Narcotics Control Board   11

non-scheduled chemicals, including through PICS (see the past, the newly reported incidents had occurred in all
sect. 2 below). Six special alerts were issued and shared regions of the world and involved 16 substances in Table I
with focal points, including information on interim out- of the 1988 Convention, 6 substances in Table II and 40
comes of the above-mentioned investigation in India; the substances included in the international special surveil-
emergence of 3,4-MDP-2-P ethyl glycidate, a new designer lance list. Incidents involving more than 60 additional
precursor of MDMA; and common features of shipments non-scheduled substances that are not included in Table I
involving a variety of designer precursors (see also para. or Table II or in the international special surveillance list
126 below). All past alerts are available to registered users were also communicated. Some of the incidents involved
of PICS. multiple substances, in particular the incidents involving
clandestine laboratories. During the reporting period,
2. Precursors Incident Communication there were also nine incidents involving different types of
System laboratory equipment. The Board would once again like to
commend PICS users for sharing incidents involving pre-
44. PICS continued to play a central role in alerting reg- cursors and/or equipment through the system. The Board
istered users worldwide to the further evolution of the encourages PICS users to increase the level of action-
landscape of non-scheduled chemicals in terms of new able details shared through PICS and to also include
substances, the complexity of trafficking routes and the leads about essential equipment used in illicit drug
geographical spread of designer precursors. PICS also con- manufacture, to assist Governments in analysing the
tinued to provide leads to national authorities to assist latest modi operandi used by traffickers and updating
them in identifying links between seizures, initiating back- risk profiles used to identify trafficking in precursors
tracking investigations, conducting further seizures and and equipment across borders.
preventing diversion attempts.
45. As at 1 November 2022, PICS had about 600 regis- 3. Cooperation with industry
tered users from 124 countries and territories, represent- 46. Cooperation with industry is an essential and effec-
ing more than 300 agencies in all regions.14 Between tive component of any regulatory framework. INCB has
1 November 2021 and 1 November 2022, more than 250 repeatedly reiterated that such cooperation should not be
new precursor-related incidents involving over 740 indi- limited only to the chemical and pharmaceutical manufac-
vidual substance-related communications were communi- turing industry but should extend to industries concerned
cated through the system. This brings the total number of in any way with the supply of the substances. Overall, the
incidents that have been communicated through PICS cooperation should involve all industries whose products
since its establishment in 2012 to more than 3,700. As in or services may be misused in connection with illicit drug
manufacture, including those that manufacture or distrib-
14 
Governments that have not yet registered PICS focal points for ute equipment.
their national authorities involved in precursor control may request an
account by writing to incb.pics@un.org.

Box 3.  Precursors Incident Communication System

In October 2021, in its tenth year of operation, PICS was upgraded with new features, including the following:

• A function for extensive web browser-type searches, with several fixed filtering options to refine the search
and the possibility to add additional filtering options by means of dynamic filtering

• Enhanced report generation functionalities to support analysis and backtracking investigations

• 
Features aimed at facilitating the more meaningful exchange of information regarding cases involving
equipment

• In addition to information on actual seizures of precursors and equipment, PICS now provides for the sharing
of details of suspicious shipments
12   INCB REPORT ON PRECURSORS 2022

47. Specifically, the Board considers it important that cooperation between Governments and the private sector
the cooperation involve not only known industries that are vary significantly among countries and regions depending
licensed or otherwise regulated under national precursor on the respective national context. To illustrate how coop-
legislation to deal with controlled precursors but also eration with the chemical industry has been established
other categories of industries that might, often unknow- and implemented in different national contexts, several
ingly, be targeted by traffickers in order to obtain chemi- Governments provided their practices and case studies to
cals for illicit drug manufacture (see figure 4 below). To the Board.
assist Governments in their efforts, the Board has prepared
49. For a number of years, the Board has encouraged
a global review and guidance document on those catego-
and facilitated the practice of twinning. This practice links
ries that is available to competent national authorities on
counterparts from the public and private sectors in coun-
its secure website.15 The Board encourages Governments
tries that already have in place well-established coopera-
to peruse the document and to map their national
tion arrangements with industry and thus assists
industry landscape with the aim of understanding
Governments wanting to establish or further enhance
which categories are available in their territories and
such cooperation. Since 2016, practical guidance in the
sensitizing the industries concerned.
context of twinning arrangements has been provided by
48. In September 2022, the Board made an additional authorities of France and Switzerland to authorities in the
resource available to Governments, a document entitled United Republic of Tanzania. The cooperation resulted in
“National practices related to public-private partnerships the signing of a memorandum of understanding with two
in the area of drug precursors and non-scheduled chemi- pharmaceutical associations and a number of chemical
cals used in illicit drug manufacture”.16 The document pro- companies in 2021, and in the finalization of a voluntary
vides a summary of the key findings of an INCB survey code of practice in 2022.
conducted in 2021 that took stock of existing national
50. The Board encourages Governments to take
public-private cooperation mechanisms worldwide. The
advantage of available reference and guidance materi-
survey confirmed that the nature, format and scope of the
als, including the compilation of national practices and
case studies, as well as opportunities for twinning
15 
The document is available at www.incb.org/incb/secured/precur- arrangements. The Board stands ready to facilitate
sors/Global_review_of_Categories_of_Industries.pdf.
twinning arrangements between countries.
16 
Available to Governments on the Board’s secure website at www.
incb.org/incb/secured/precursors/National_Practices_Related_to_
Public-Private_Partnerships.pdf.

Figure 4. Categories of industries that might be involved in the manufacture, trade or distribution of
chemicals used for illicit drug manufacture

INDUSTRIES COVERED IN THE GLOBAL REVIEW

Petrochemical Large-scale producers of Pharmaceutical Producers of active Producers of fine Research and develop-
industry commodity chemicals industry pharmaceutical and specialty ment service providers
ingredients chemicalsa

Toll manufacturers Suppliers of laboratory Chemical distributors Exporters and Industrial parks and
and contract chemicals importers industrial estates
manufacturers

a
The term “producers of fine and specialty chemicals” covers many subcategories of industries, such as those related to flavours and fragrances, mining and paper.
 III.  Extent of licit trade and latest trends in trafficking in precursors   13

51. An interactive compendium describing and visual- control, pursuant to Economic and Social Council resolu-
izing INCB tools and resources on public-private partner- tion 1992/29 (see para. 7 above). WCO, through the
ship and voluntary cooperation with industry has been UNODC-WCO Container Control Programme, also
published and made available to Governments on the remained an important operational partner during the
INCB website. The compendium includes a discussion of reporting period, namely, in connection with devising and
the benefits, use and application of the various INCB bro- implementing a multilateral activity related to free zones
chures, guidelines, practical notes, publications and other (see para. 41 above).
resources that can help Governments to understand the
56. The specific activities of regional partners such as
different elements of public-private partnerships, includ-
CICAD and the European Commission complement
ing ways to set up, encourage or enhance such partner-
and reinforce the Board’s global approach and help to
ships, learn from practical national case studies and better
advance precursor control at the regional level.
understand the complex landscape of different industries.
52. A discussion on the global issue “Public-private
partnerships in the area of drug precursors, non-scheduled
chemicals and dangerous substances” can be found in the
annual report of the Board for 2022.17 III. Extent of licit
4. International cooperation in, and
trade and latest
other international initiatives trends in
focusing on, precursor control
trafficking in
53. Various forms of cooperation with international and
regional partners, including joint operational activities, ad precursors
hoc partnerships, collaboration in meetings and training
initiatives and regular exchanges of expertise and know-
57. The present chapter provides an overview of the
how in areas of common interest, continued to play an
major trends and developments in both licit trade and traf-
important role during the reporting period. INTERPOL,
ficking in precursor chemicals, by substance group, with a
UNODC and WCO, as well as the regional entities CICAD
view to addressing gaps and weaknesses in precursor con-
and the European Commission, are members of the INCB
trol mechanisms. It summarizes information on seizures
Precursors Task Force and cooperate on operational
and cases of diversion or attempted diversion from inter-
aspects of international precursor control. INCB would
national trade, as well as activities associated with illicit
like to acknowledge the contributions of all partners in
drug manufacture. The chapter is based on information
advancing precursor control efforts worldwide.
provided to the Board through various mechanisms, such
54. The partnership between INCB and UNODC con- as form D, the PEN Online system, PICS, Project Prism
tinued to bring together the Board’s expertise in precursor and Project Cohesion, and through national reports and
control and closer access to some regions and countries other official information from Governments. The analysis
through UNODC country and regional offices. It also covers the period up to 1 November 2022.
brought together elements of precursor control and some
58. The present chapter also provides information about
of the broader law enforcement initiatives of UNODC,
substances not included in Table I or Table II of the
such as the UNODC-WCO Container Control
1988 Convention, which is reported to INCB pursuant to
Programme. In addition, INCB continued to support the
article 12, paragraph 12 (b), of the Convention.
Paris Pact18 expert group on precursors, including in rela-
Governments also share such information through PICS.
tion to formulating related recommendations for national
Data on non-scheduled chemicals are generally presented
regulatory and law enforcement authorities and inter­
in dedicated subsections but may also be found in the
national agencies and to their implementation.
sections providing details on trends with regard to sub-
55. INCB and WCO continued to work together to stances in Table I and Table II of the 1988 Convention,
ensure that a unique Harmonized System code is estab- especially in cases where the non-scheduled chemicals
lished for each precursor chemical under international being discussed are part of a more complex development.

E/INCB/2022/1.
17 

The Paris Pact initiative, led by the UNODC Paris Pact

18 

Coordination Unit, provides a multilateral framework for the fight

against opiates originating in Afghanistan.
14   INCB REPORT ON PRECURSORS 2022

A. Substances used in the illicit 61. Table 2 presents the 10 countries with the largest
volume of proposed imports of ephedrine and pseudo­
manufacture of amphetamine- ephedrine, ranked in terms of the volume notified through
type stimulants the PEN Online system, in the reporting period.

1. Substances used in the illicit 62. India stopped one shipment of 2,500 kg of ephedrine
hydrochloride to Uganda. While the reasons for stopping
manufacture of amphetamines the shipment were not available, it is noted that the annual
(a) Ephedrine and pseudoephedrine legitimate requirements of Uganda for ephedrine
amounted to only 1,000 kg.
59. Ephedrine and pseudoephedrine, both of which
have legitimate medical applications, can also be used in Trafficking
the illicit manufacture of methamphetamine. However, 63. Seizures of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine, either
methamphetamine can alternatively be manufactured in the form of raw material or in the form of preparations,
from P-2-P, phenylacetic acid, APAAN, APAA, MAPA or a were reported on form D by 33 countries, about the same
number of non-scheduled chemicals (see subsects. (c) and number as in 2020. That was among the lowest numbers of
(d) below, and annex VIII). Because of their licit uses, both countries reporting such seizures in the last 10 years and
ephedrine and pseudoephedrine are traded widely. barely three quarters of the number of countries that
reported such seizures in 2019. Correspondingly, the
Licit trade quantity of ephedrines seized globally totalled 6.1 tons, the
60. Between 1 November 2021 and 1 November 2022, lowest quantity seized in the last 10 years, and was almost
exporting countries sent 5,426 pre-export notifications half of the quantity seized in 2020 (see figure 5). The over-
through the PEN Online system for planned shipments of all declining trend in quantities of ephedrines seized con-
ephedrine and pseudoephedrine in bulk and in the form trasts remarkably with the increasing trend in quantities of
of pharmaceutical preparations. The notifications were for methamphetamine seized19 and is partly explained by the
a total of approximately 1,290 tons of pseudoephedrine, greater use by traffickers of alternative precursors, some of
which represents a slight increase in trade compared with them designer precursors. This trend is now well estab-
the reporting years 2021 and 2020, and almost 73 tons of lished in Europe and is becoming increasingly significant
ephedrine. The shipments originated in 42 exporting in other parts of the world (see also paras. 104–116).
countries and territories and were destined for 169 import-
64. Of the total of more than 6.1 tons of ephedrines
ing countries and territories.
seized in 2021, seizures of ephedrine in the form of raw
material accounted for more than 4 tons, a trend consist-
Table 2. The 10 countries with the largest proposed ent with past years. China alone accounted for nearly 95
imports of ephedrine and pseudo­ per cent of the quantity seized globally in 2021, having
ephedrine, by volume, seized 3.8 tons. However, contrary to the overall declining
1 November 2021–1 November 2022 trend in seizures of ephedrines, the quantity seized of
Ranking Ephedrine Pseudoephedrine
pseudoephedrine in the form of preparations increased to
United States of
more than 1.4 tons, which was more than twice the quan-
1 Republic of Korea tity seized in 2020. In fact, following a sharp decline after
America
2 Nigeria Egypt 2017, quantities seized of pseudoephedrine in the form of
3 Egypt Türkiyea
preparations have been growing consistently, and in 2021
more than tripled in comparison with the quantity seized
4 Indonesia Indonesia
in 2018 (see figure 6). While medical preparations con-
5 United States Switzerland
taining ephedrine and pseudoephedrine are not under
United Kingdom of
international control, the Board encourages
6 Great Britain and Pakistan
Northern Ireland Governments to put in place adequate mechanisms to
7 South Africa Japan
prevent the diversion of preparations containing chem-
icals listed in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention, in
8 Ghana Republic of Korea
particular those containing ephedrine and pseudo-
9 Switzerland Italy
ephedrine, as envisaged by the General Assembly in its
10 Singapore, Denmark Singapore
resolution 59/162.
Since 31 May 2022, “Türkiye” has replaced “Turkey” as the short
a 

name used in the United Nations. 19 

World Drug Report 2021, booklet 4, Drug Market Trends: Cocaine,
Amphetamine-type Stimulants (United Nations publication, 2021).
 III.  Extent of licit trade and latest trends in trafficking in precursors   15

Figure 5. Seizures of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine, as reported by Governments on form D, and of

methamphetamine, as reported on the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime annual report
questionnaire, 2012–2021
pseudoephedrine seized (kilograms)

50 000 400

Amount of methamphetamine
350
Amount of ephedrine and

40 000
300

seized (tons)
30 000 250
200
20 000 150
100
10 000
50
0 0
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

Pseudoephedrine and preparations containing pseudoephedrine

Ephedrine and preparations containing ephedrine
Methamphetamine (data for 2021 not available)

Figure 6.  Seizures of pseudoephedrine preparations, as reported by Governments on form D, 2017–2021

3 500 14
Amount seized (kilograms)

3 000 12

Number of Governments
2 500 10

2 000 8

1 500 6

1 000 4

500 2

0 0
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

Pseudoephedrine preparations seized

Number of Governments reporting seizures of pseudoephedrine in preparation form

65. There are wide regional variations in the quantities of preparations seized in 295 cases, and an additional 8.5 kg
ephedrine and pseudoephedrine seized globally. A regional of ephedrine preparations seized in 40 cases. India was
analysis, beginning with Oceania and proceeding from east reported as the country of origin of 355 kg of pseudo­
to west, is presented in the following paragraphs. ephedrine preparations seized in 48 cases and 2.6 kg of
ephedrine preparations seized in 4 cases. Whereas in the
Oceania past, India has been reported as the country of origin of
ephedrine and pseudoephedrine trafficked to Australia, in
66. Australia and New Zealand were the only countries
the reporting period, Australia shared three cases through
in the Oceania region that reported seizures of ephedrines.
PICS involving shipments of over 10 kg each of pseudo­
Mirroring the global trend, the total of 578 kg of ephed-
ephedrine in December 2021, January 2022 and February
rines reported seized in 2021 was only a fraction of the
2022; the first two shipments were reported as having
quantity of over 6.5 tons reported seized in 2017.
originated in Nepal and the last in Brunei Darussalam.
67. The bulk of the seizures occurred in Australia, which
reported a total of more than 420 kg of pseudoephedrine
16   INCB REPORT ON PRECURSORS 2022

68. New Zealand showed a consistently declining trend 2021.20 Furthermore, from media reports, the Board is
in seizures of ephedrines, which is believed to be the pri- aware of the purported seizure of 1.3 million pseudo­
mary class of precursor chemicals used in the manufacture ephedrine tablets from a car and a truck in Sagaing,
of methamphetamine in that country. On form D for 2021, Myanmar, in August 2022. The country of origin in that
New Zealand reported seizures totalling 114 kg of ephed- case is believed to be India.
rine and 35 kg of pseudoephedrine in 76 and 68 cases,
73. The decline in seizures of ephedrine and pseudo­
respectively, indicating the small size of individual ship-
ephedrine in the South-East Asian region corresponds
ments. In one case shared by India through PICS in March
with the decline in the number of methamphetamine labo-
2022 involving 1.9 kg of pseudoephedrine, the substance
ratories reported dismantled in the region in recent years.
had been hidden in 50 rolls of metallic yarn destined for
These indicators are, however, contradicted by the overall
New Zealand and intercepted in India.
increase in the quantity of methamphetamine seized in the
69. The data on seizures seem to indicate a clear trend of region,21 possibly pointing to a geographical shift in meth-
trafficking in ephedrine and pseudoephedrine in the form amphetamine manufacture.
of raw material from India to Australia, and more recently
to New Zealand, via postal or air cargo routes by conceal- South Asia
ing the substances in other goods or packing materials.
74. India remained the only country in South Asia
The Board encourages the Governments of Australia
reporting seizures of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine. On
and India to jointly investigate such cases with a view
form D for 2021, India reported five cases involving sei-
to dismantling criminal networks in both countries.
zures totalling 79 kg (and 4 litres) of ephedrine in the form
of raw material, representing less than a fifth of the quan-
East and South-East Asia
tity reported seized in 2020. The entire quantity seized had
70. China was the only country in East and South-East been sourced domestically. India also reported 19 cases
Asia to report seizures of ephedrines on form D for 2021. involving seizures totalling 246 kg of pseudoephedrine.
Totalling 3.8 tons, the quantity of ephedrines seized by The majority of those cases were also shared by the
China accounted for nearly two thirds of the total quantity Government through PICS. Analysis of PICS data for 2021
of ephedrines seized globally. indicates that there were 27 cases involving a total of nearly
300 kg of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine. Of those cases,
71. While China remained the country reporting the
13 involved attempted trafficking through postal, express
largest quantity of ephedrine seized in the world, the quan-
courier or air cargo routes, and 3 involved quantities seized
tity of 3.8 tons reported seized by China was barely half the
in illicit laboratories. Where the destination was known,
quantity reported seized by that country in 2020 and a
14 of the cases involved a total of 106 kg of pseudoephed-
quarter of the quantity reported seized in 2018. In addi-
rine destined for Australia (10 of which involved ship-
tion, China reported the seizure of 74 kg of pseudoephed-
ments on postal or air cargo routes and 4 of which involved
rine in the form of raw material. The information about
seizures from commercial or industrial buildings) and 1
the number of incidents to which these seizures pertained,
case involved a shipment of 24 kg of pseudoephedrine des-
or whether the seized quantities were a result of illicit
tined for Malaysia. In 2022, information was also shared
manufacture or of diversion from licit channels, was not
through PICS about 14 incidents in India involving ship-
available. However, the seizure of non-scheduled chemi-
ments of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine totalling 759 kg
cals known to have been used as starting materials in the
of the two substances; eight of the shipments were des-
illicit manufacture of ephedrine in China (see para. 114
tined for Australia, four for New Zealand (see also para. 69
below) indicates that the ephedrine seized was likely a
above) and one for the United Arab Emirates, the latter
result of illicit manufacture. There were no reported sei-
two countries being reported as destinations for the first
zures of preparations containing either ephedrine or pseudo­
time. Eight of the incidents involved postal or air cargo
ephedrine. That contrasts with the period 2012–2019,
routes.
when China reported seizures of ephedrine preparations
in amounts ranging between 2 tons and more than 5.7 tons 75. Information about the origin of ephedrine and pseudo­­
each year. ephedrine seized in India, in particular whether it was
diverted from licit manufacture or illicitly manufactured,
72. No other country in the region reported any seizure
is seldom available. In one case, official reports of a seizure
of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine in 2021. However, in its
annual report for 2021, the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency recorded seizures totalling 6.2 kg of ephedrine in 20 
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, 2021 Annual Report
(Quezon City, 2021), p. 32.
21 
World Drug Report 2021, booklet 4, Drug Market Trends: Cocaine,
Amphetamine-type Stimulants, p. 53.
 III.  Extent of licit trade and latest trends in trafficking in precursors   17

of nearly 662 kg of ephedrine in liquid form in India in during the period September–December 2021. The three
July 2022 indicated that the substance had been illicitly shipments of 324 kg each contained the same pharmaceu-
manufactured in a closed pharmaceutical unit in the north tical preparations that had been objected to by Jordan (see
of India that had been rented by traffickers (see also para. para. 77 above).
115 below).
Europe
West Asia
79. Twenty Governments in Europe reported seizures of
76. In West Asia, the only reported seizures of ephed- ephedrine and pseudoephedrine on form D, up from 14
rines in 2021 were reported by Türkiye. The seizures were that did so in 2020. Nearly 1 ton of ephedrines was
effected in 46 cases and amounted to a total of 2.13 kg of reported seized, slightly less than the quantity of 1.1 tons
ephedrine raw material, indicating the small size of the seized in 2020 but far in excess of the quantities seized in
individual amounts seized. In all of the cases, the country the previous three years (see figure 7). The majority of the
of origin was not known. In the last five years, among the seizures, amounting to 894 kg of the total of 967 kg, were
countries in the region, only Afghanistan and Pakistan of pseudoephedrine and preparations containing pseudo­
have reported seizures of ephedrines in excess of 1 kg; ephedrine. This contrasts with 2020, when ephedrine
Afghanistan reported the seizure of 50 kg of pseudoephed- accounted for the majority of seizures (860 kg of the total
rine in 2018 and of 440 kg of pseudoephedrine prepara- of 1,108 kg). However, given that two cases in Poland
tions in 2019, and Pakistan reported the seizure of 80 kg of together accounted for 808 kg out of the 860 kg of ephedrine
ephedrine in 2019. seized in Europe in 2020, the trend in Europe in the last
five years is predominantly of pseudoephedrine, more
77. Jordan, which reported no seizures of pseudoephed-
specifically, preparations of pseudoephedrine, which
rine hydrochloride, objected to three shipments contain-
accounted for 869 kg out of the 894 kg of pseudoephedrine
ing a total of 972 kg (324 kg each) of the substance in
seized in Europe in 2021.
preparation form, which was intended to be imported
from Egypt, in October 2021. In each case, the importing Figure 7. Seizures of ephedrine and
company had not requested the shipment. That was the pseudoephedrine, as reported by
first time that any proposed export of pseudoephedrine Governments in Europe on form D,
from Egypt destined for Jordan had been pre-notified. 2017–2021
Given the large quantities involved, the fact that the
importing company had never requested the shipment 1 000 22
900 20
made the attempted transaction suspicious and worthy of
Amounts seized (kilograms)

800 18

Number of Governments
16
investigation by both the exporting country and the 700
14
600
importing country. Another case involved a proposed 500
12
10
shipment of 120 kg of pseudoephedrine in the form of a 400
8
300 6
pharmaceutical preparation (1 million tablets), from Egypt 200 4
to Georgia. Following the Board’s inquiry, undertaken on 100
0
2
0
the basis that that single proposed shipment had exceeded 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

the annual legitimate requirements of Georgia, the author- Ephedrine and preparations containing ephedrine
Pseudoephedrine and preparations containig pseudoephedrine
ities of Georgia confirmed that the importing company Number of Governments reporting seizures
was not licensed to import the substance. However, since
the objection had been conveyed after the time period
80. Bulgaria reported the largest quantity of pseudo­
mentioned in the pre-export notification, the shipment
ephedrine preparations seized in Europe (317 kg), fol-
was allowed to proceed. The matter was still under investi-
lowed by Austria (259 kg), Ukraine (212 kg), Czechia (42 kg)
gation. The aforementioned instances provide continued
and Poland (11 kg). The quantity seized in Bulgaria
evidence of the effectiveness of the PEN Online system in
involved over 2.6 million tablets related to three cases, in
preventing the diversion of precursors from licit inter­
all of which the country of origin was reported as Türkiye.
national trade.
The Board encourages Governments to share details of
78. Pre-notifications of planned shipments in excess of the seizures reported, including the brand names of
annual legitimate requirements indicated by importing the seized preparations, as such details are helpful in
countries also involved the United Arab Emirates. While follow-up investigations and in establishing possible
having an annual legitimate requirement of 2,418 kg for linkages with other cases. Such information, if shared
pseudoephedrine preparations, the country was pre- in a timely manner through PICS, can enable the
notified of shipments totalling more than 3 tons by Egypt detection of similar cases.
18   INCB REPORT ON PRECURSORS 2022

81. For the first time in more than a decade, Austria seizure was effected at the international airport in Lagos,
reported the seizure of preparations containing pseudo­ Nigeria, and the substance was concealed in the false
ephedrine, specifically, 2.16 million tablets under the trade bottom of a suitcase. The destination was Johannesburg,
name Decancit SR containing 120 mg of pseudo­ephedrine South Africa. In 2018 and 2019, Nigeria reported seizures
per tablet, corresponding to a total quantity of 259 kg of of ephedrine in excess of 300 kg, but since then seizures of
the substance. The shipment, whose last point of departure the substance in the country have declined significantly.
was Dubai, United Arab Emirates, was destined for a Furthermore, Ghana reported two instances of theft, one
country in South-Eastern Europe. Investigations revealed of 50 kg of ephedrine and the other of 25 kg of pseudo­
that the stated recipient was a fake company and that its ephedrine, both from a warehouse in a manufacturing
stated address did not exist. No documents or permits facility. Investigations into both cases were ongoing.
were provided. The Board became aware of seizures or
86. In addition, the Board is following up on media
stopped shipments of a pharmaceutical preparation con-
reports of a seizure of 180 kg of ephedrine concealed in
taining pseudoephedrine under the same trade name in
cornmeal bags in a warehouse in Mozambique.
several countries in Eastern Europe, South-Eastern
Europe, West and Central Europe and West Asia in the 87. Notwithstanding the negligible seizures of ephed-
period 2021–2022. Investigations were ongoing. rines reported by countries in Africa, the region is a major
destination for imports of ephedrines, with four countries,
82. Ukraine reported 367 cases involving the seizure of a
namely, Nigeria, Egypt, South Africa and Ghana, in rank-
total of 212 kg of pseudoephedrine preparations. The
ing order, appearing among the 10 countries receiving the
country of origin in 28 of those cases, involving a total of
most pre-export notifications for ephedrine worldwide in
71 kg of pseudoephedrine, was Israel, and in 29 of the
2021 (see table 2 above). Egypt was also the second largest
cases, involving a total of 17 kg of the substance, was
importer of pseudoephedrine in the world in 2021 and is
Egypt. Of those 17 kg, nearly 12 kg were seized in three
also a major exporter of both substances in the form of
incidents involving the seizure of tablets from passengers’
pharmaceutical preparations.
luggage at an airport. The tablets had been removed from
their original packaging and were suspected to have been 88. Monitoring of the PEN Online system conducted by
diverted from legitimate channels in Egypt. In one case the Board with regard to pharmaceutical preparations
shared through PICS, over 100,000 tablets under the trade containing pseudoephedrine resulted in the identification
name Decancit SR were seized from a passenger’s baggage. of suspicious shipments of preparations containing pseudo­
The Ukrainian nationals arrested in the case had flown to ephedrine originating in a country in Africa and destined
Egypt specifically for the purpose of purchasing pseudo­ for countries in West Asia and East Africa. In one case
ephedrine. In addition, seizures of Decancit SR tablets at involving six shipments totalling nearly 1 ton of pseudo­
airports in Ukraine, from passengers arriving from Egypt, ephedrine preparations, the import certificate provided to
continued to be shared through PICS in 2022. the exporting country was later confirmed as having been
forged. Following the case, the importing country
83. Czechia reported seizures totalling more than 42 kg
requested that, as a matter of general practice, a copy of the
of pseudoephedrine preparations in 59 cases. In seven of
import permit be attached with any pre-export notifica-
the cases, involving a total of about 4 kg of the substance,
tion in order to enable the importing country to verify the
the country of origin was reported as Poland.
permit’s authenticity. Further investigation was in progress
84. While seizures of non-scheduled chemicals are more in both the exporting and importing countries. The case
frequently reported in relation to the illicit manufacture of points to the need for Governments to exercise due dili-
amphetamine and methamphetamine in Europe, the gence before authorizing exports of scheduled precursors
increase in both the quantity of pseudoephedrine prepara- and to provide detailed information in the pre-export
tions seized and the number of countries reporting such notifications. The Board therefore encourages
seizures in 2021 may indicate that the interest among traf- Governments in the region to remain vigilant about
fickers in the large-scale trafficking of pseudoephedrine monitoring international trade in these substances in
preparations, a trend noted some 15 years ago, may have order to prevent their diversion for illicit purposes.
been renewed, including in countries not previously asso-
ciated with such manufacture. Americas
89. The United States reported seizures amounting to
Africa
less than half a kilogram of ephedrine and 23 kg of pseudo­
85. Nigeria was the only country in the African region ephedrine in 2021. In the years since 2019, when 195 kg of
that reported seizures of ephedrines, reporting a single sei- pseudoephedrine and 6 kg of ephedrine were seized, the
zure of 25.6 kg of ephedrine raw material on form D. The quantities seized of these substances have not exceeded 30 kg.
 III.  Extent of licit trade and latest trends in trafficking in precursors   19

This supports the belief that the methamphetamine market addition, one seizure of 10 kg of ephedra was shared by
in the United States is supplied from large-scale laborato- Czechia through PICS in December 2021. The seizure was
ries that use P-2-P-based methods. Mexico too follows a effected at an airport, and the consignment, which had
similar pattern, having reported practically no seizures of originated in China, had been misdeclared as green tea.
ephedrine or pseudoephedrine for the last five years. In
95. In recent years, there has been increasing concern
the years since 2019, when Canada reported the seizure of
about the use of ephedra as a starting material for illicit
750 kg of ephedrine, the country has reported no signifi-
methamphetamine manufacture in Afghanistan. While no
cant seizures of ephedrines.
reliable data are available regarding the extent of such use,
90. Of the countries in Central America and the research and field studies suggest that enough ephedra to
Caribbean, Guatemala reported one case involving the sei- manufacture 220 tons of methamphetamine was traded at
zure of 155 kg of ephedrine in the form of preparations one of the major bazaars in south-western Afghanistan.22
and two cases involving the seizure of 162 kg of pseudo­
ephedrine, also in the form of preparations.
(c) P-2-P, phenylacetic acid, APAAN,
91. Of the countries in South America, only Chile APAA and MAPA
reported a small seizure of less than half a kilogram of
96. As P-2-P and phenylacetic acid are traded legiti-
ephedrine. No seizures, either of ephedrine or pseudo­
mately, albeit with differences in the extent of their trade,
ephedrine, were reported by any other country in the
instances of their diversion from legitimate trade have
region, which follows the trend noted in 2020.
been rare in recent years. Seizures of the two substances
often involve material that has been illicitly manufactured
(b) Norephedrine and ephedra from one of their precursors. By contrast, APAAN, APAA
and MAPA are considered to be designer precursors that
Licit trade are traded in very limited quantities or not at all. The avail-
92. Between 1 November 2021 and 1 November 2022, ability of APAAN, APAA and MAPA on illicit markets is
pre-notifications were processed through the PEN Online therefore typically the result of illicit demand and availa-
system by 13 exporting countries for 202 shipments of bility from dubious sources, including companies that may
norephedrine to 33 importing countries, involving more have been unknowingly targeted by traffickers as providers
than 37 tons of raw material and slightly more than 1.3 tons of customized synthesis.
in the form of pharmaceutical preparations. Shipments
97. There are a number of as yet non-scheduled alterna-
amounting to 1 ton or more were pre-notified to the fol-
tives to P-2-P and other controlled precursors that are
lowing importing countries, in descending order of the
used in the illicit manufacture of amphetamine and meth-
amounts shipped: United States, Myanmar, Philippines,
amphetamine (see figure 8 and subsect. (d) below).
Denmark and Japan. Overall, international trade in nor­
ephedrine, a substance that can be used in the illicit manu- Licit trade
facture of amphetamine, continued to remain at a low level
98. Between 1 November 2021 and 1 November 2022,
compared with trade in other precursors of amphetamine-
proposed international trade in P-2-P and phenylacetic
type stimulants.
acid remained at a level similar to that of previous years.
Trafficking Twenty-two proposed shipments of P-2-P, from three
exporting countries to seven importing countries, and
93. Only Australia and Belarus reported seizures of
about 776 proposed shipments of phenylacetic acid, from
norephedrine on form D for 2021. Australia reported eight
18 exporting countries to 45 importing countries and ter-
cases involving a total of less than 150 grams of the sub-
ritories, were pre-notified through the PEN Online system.
stance and Belarus reported three cases involving a total of
about 50 grams. The total quantity reported seized globally 99. By contrast, there have been no pre-export notifica-
in 2021 was less than the total quantities reported seized in tions for APAAN or APAA and three pre-export notifica-
the last five years and the second lowest in the last 10 years, tions for MAPA since November 2021. All of the transactions
indicating the decreasing use of the substance for the illicit notified through the PEN Online system involved small
manufacture of amphetamine. amounts for reference and laboratory purposes.
94. Only China reported seizures of Ephedra plant on
form D for 2021. After having reported seizures of Ephedra
plant in excess of 100 tons in 2019 and 2020, China 22 
The conclusion is based on high-resolution satellite imagery of the
Abdul Wadood Bazaar collected on 26 November 2021 (see David
reported seizures totalling about 30 tons of the plant in
Mansfield, “Banning ephedra and bolstering the rural economy of
2021. No further details of the seizures were provided. In Afghanistan”, Alcis, 13 January 2022).
20   INCB REPORT ON PRECURSORS 2022

Figure 8.  Alternative chemicals used in the illicit manufacture of amphetamine or methamphetamine

Benzyl Benzyl
chloridea cyanidea

Phenylacetic
acidb APAANb APAAb MAPAb EAPAa DEPAPDa

P-2-P methyl
glycidic acid P-2-Pb
derivativesa
Amphetaminec or
methamphetaminec
Benz-
aldehydea P2NPa

a 
Not under international control but included in the limited international special surveillance list.
b 
Included in Table I of the 1988 Convention.
c 
Included in Schedule II of the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971.

Trafficking to cease after the substance is placed under international

100. In 2021, 14 countries reported seizures of P-2-P control. In 2021, the largest quantity seized of MAPA was
amounting to a total of more than 11,800 litres on form D. reported by the Netherlands (more than 6 tons), followed
Both the number of countries reporting seizures and the by Belgium (more than 2.2 tons) and Germany (more than
amounts reported were smaller than those in 2020. The 1.3 tons). Where information was available, the country of
largest total amount of the substance seized was reported origin was reported to be China, including Hong Kong, as
by Türkiye (more than 4,200 litres), followed by the in the past. The Republic of Korea and countries in Europe
Netherlands (almost 4,000 litres), Mexico (more than were used as transit countries. While shipments from Asia
2,500 litres), Belgium (665 litres) and Germany (almost to Europe were dispatched by air, shipments within
300 litres). With regard to phenylacetic acid, China Europe, typically with the Netherlands as the final destina-
reported seizures on form D for 2021 amounting to tion, were often dispatched by road. Most consignments of
12 tons. That was the largest amount reported seized by MAPA had been misdeclared. Some seizures were made
any country since 2017, when Mexico alone reported the after controlled deliveries had been conducted between
seizure of almost 19.5 tons of the substance in illicit meth- the countries concerned.
amphetamine laboratories. Unfortunately, neither country 102. The Netherlands was also the only country to report
provided any information about the origin of the chemi- a seizure of APAA (50 kg) in 2021. There were no reported
cal, including whether it had been illicitly manufactured seizures of APAAN.
(see para. 110 below) or diverted from legitimate channels.
103. In 2022, additional seizures of these chemicals were
The Board encourages Governments to distinguish
communicated through PICS. The amounts were consid-
between the two scenarios and to investigate the source
erably smaller than in previous years, with seizures of
of seized precursors and share the relevant details
MAPA in the first 10 months of 2022 involving about 350 kg,
through PICS and report them on form D, as this will
less than 3 per cent of the amount seized in the corre-
enable the most appropriate follow-up to address the
sponding period in 2021. At the same time, seizures com-
underlying weaknesses.
municated through PICS in 2022 also indicated a
101. On form D for 2021, six countries in Europe and significant increase in the number of incidents and the
Australia reported seizures of MAPA. The total amount of amounts involving non-scheduled alternative precursors
about 9.7 tons reported seized was only about 30 per cent (see subsect. (d) below).
of the amount reported seized in 2020. The decline con-
firmed the trend observed in relation to other designer
chemicals, namely, the tendency for seizures of a substance
 III.  Extent of licit trade and latest trends in trafficking in precursors   21

(d) Use of non-scheduled chemicals limited international special surveillance list, under the
extended definitions, as a derivative of P-2-P. In the first 10
and other trends in the illicit
months of 2022, there were two occurrences in the
manufacture of amphetamine Netherlands, one in a express courier shipment with no
and methamphetamine labelling, and the second in an illicit laboratory where
12 litres of the substance were seized. Later in 2022, a deriv-
104. As in previous years, in terms of volume, a signifi-
ative of DEPAPD was also encountered. The emergence of
cant amount of the non-scheduled chemicals encountered
DEPAPD and its derivative provides further evidence sup-
in connection with the illicit manufacture of amphetamine
porting the Board’s call to address groups of substances that
and methamphetamine consisted of purpose-made
are closely related chemically. The Board wishes to call
designer precursors, closely related in chemical structure
the attention of Member States to the efficiency of
to chemicals in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention that
extending control to entire groups of chemicals wher-
can be converted into the related controlled chemical by
ever possible, rather than controlling individual sub-
readily applicable means. In addition, countries continued
stances, which are often easily replaced by traffickers.
to report various common chemicals that were available
off the shelf. The majority of chemicals in both categories
Benzaldehyde, nitroethane and
have long been included in the limited international spe-
cial surveillance list of non-scheduled substances, either 1-phenyl-2-nitropropene
listed by name or covered by the extended definitions, as 108. Seizures of chemicals involved in the so-called
well as in other regional or national watch lists, as substi- nitrostyrene method for the manufacture of P-2-P and,
tutes for controlled precursors. subsequently, methamphetamine or amphetamine, con-
tinued to be reported on form D. In 2021, four countries
Derivatives of P-2-P methyl glycidic acid reported seizures of benzaldehyde, nitroethane and/or
and alpha-phenylacetoacetic acid P2NP, the chemical intermediate derived from the reac-
tion between benzaldehyde and nitroethane. The seizures
105. On form D, the Netherlands was the only country
often occurred in illicit laboratories, which were typically
to report notable seizures of non-scheduled designer pre-
of small scale. In 2021, the largest seizures were reported
cursors of amphetamine and methamphetamine, namely,
by the Russian Federation, amounting to more than 1 ton
P-2-P methyl glycidic acid derivatives (more than 730 kg)
of benzaldehyde. The lack of notable seizures of these
and EAPA, the ethyl ester analogue of MAPA (85 litres).
chemicals in Mexico confirms the continued decline in the
Those amounts were a fraction of the amounts seized
use of the nitrostyrene method in the country since 2017.
between 2017 and 2019.
This is likely the result of the rising cost of the related
106. In the first 10 months of 2022, 37 incidents involv- chemicals and the availability of alternative chemicals for
ing P-2-P methyl glycidic acid derivatives were communi- other methods of illicit methamphetamine manufacture,
cated through PICS, amounting to more than 10 tons. All especially phenylacetic acid-based methods (see para. 109
of the incidents were communicated by countries in below).
Europe. Fifteen incidents occurred in illicit laboratories or
warehouses in the Netherlands and 21 incidents involved Benzyl chloride, sodium cyanide and
border seizures at airports or postal or parcel facilities in benzyl cyanide
Czechia, Germany and the United Kingdom, of which
seven were linked by a common modus operandi. Another 109. Benzyl cyanide is the chemical intermediate
six were linked by a common misdeclaration. In the major- derived from the reaction between benzyl chloride and
ity of instances, China, including Hong Kong, was identi- sodium cyanide and may also be encountered as a starting
fied as the country of origin. Investigations in the countries material in illicit laboratories. The reaction may then pro-
concerned were ongoing. The resurgence of P-2-P methyl ceed by way of APAAN or phenylacetic acid to P-2-P and,
glycidic acid derivatives, which have been controlled in all subsequently, methamphetamine or amphetamine (see
States of the European Union since December 2020, is figure 8 above).
believed to be the result of enhanced law enforcement
110. On form D, six countries in the Americas, Asia and
focus and risk profiling by customs authorities.
Europe reported seizures of benzyl chloride, sodium cya-
107. In early 2022, a new alternative precursor of nide and/or benzyl cyanide. The largest amounts of benzyl
amphetamine and methamphetamine emerged in the cyanide were seized in China (about 3,800 litres) and the
Netherlands. The substance is known as DEPAPD, or Netherlands (about 2,000 litres), followed by Mexico
diethyl (phenylacetyl)propanedioate. While not under (585 litres). Serbia reported a seizure of more than 16,500
international control, it has been included in the Board’s litres of benzyl chloride – the third largest amount of the
22   INCB REPORT ON PRECURSORS 2022

substance ever reported seized – from a private property On form D, China reported seizures amounting to more
in a town in eastern Serbia. Mexico was the only other than 1.9 tons of propiophenone.
country to report seizures of benzyl chloride, however, the
115. INCB is also aware of an incident involving the
amount (more than 350 litres) was significantly smaller
illicit manufacture of ephedrine from propiophenone in
than the amounts reported by the country in the period
India in July 2022. In addition to seizures of other chemi-
2017–2020. There were no reported seizures of pheny-
cals required to convert propiophenone into ephedrine,
lacetic acid or APAAN in Mexico (see paras. 100–103
the seizure of tartaric acid indicates that illicit operators
above). However, forensic profiling analysis of metham-
had manufactured the form of ephedrine that would sub-
phetamine samples seized at points of entry into the
sequently yield the more potent “d” form of methamphet-
United States from Mexico continues to provide evidence
amine. The level of sophistication of the manufacturing
of the use of P-2-P-based synthesis methods and of pheny-
operation is also reflected by the fact that it took place in
lacetic acid as the primary precursor of P-2-P.
the premises of a closed pharmaceutical company that had
been rented by traffickers. All chemicals and equipment
Other chemicals not under international
needed for the operation appeared to have been procured
control that were seized in relation to the domestically.
clandestine manufacture of amphetamine
116. Seizures of chemicals involved in ephedrines-based
or methamphetamine23 methods of illicit methamphetamine manufacture, namely,
111. Seizures of tartaric acid in regions known for illicit the so-called Nagai method, were reported on form D by a
methamphetamine manufacture are a strong indicator of number of countries in all regions but Africa. However,
the use of P-2-P-based methods. As a separating agent, the seizures were usually indicative of smaller-scale manu-
tartaric acid is used to increase the yield of the desired “d” facturing operations. Notable seizures of one or more of
form of the drug.24 Tartaric acid is also used for similar the chemicals, in particular phosphoric acid, were
purposes in the illicit manufacture of ephedrine from reported by Belgium and the Netherlands. In terms of the
2-bromopropiophenone or its precursor propiophenone number of seizures, Czechia continued to be one of the
(see para. 115 below). countries reporting frequent seizures of iodine, red phos-
phorous and phosphoric acid. There were no seizures of
112. Seizures of tartaric acid have been reported by thionyl chloride, a substance indicative of the so-called
Mexico regularly since 2009, when manufacturing meth- Emde method, which involves the use of chloropseu-
ods in the country shifted from ephedrines-based to P-2- doephedrine as an intermediate and which used to be
P-based methods. Recently, the quantities of tartaric acid widely employed in East and South-East Asia. Since many
seized in Europe have surpassed the quantities seized in of these chemicals are traded and distributed widely for
North America, although they remain at levels lower than legitimate purposes, the Board encourages Governments
those previously reported in Mexico. The seizures of tar- of countries in which the illicit manufacture of meth-
taric acid in Europe coincide with the increase in illicit amphetamine or ephedrine has been encountered to
methamphetamine manufacture in that region. consider determining whether trade in and distribu-
113. On form D, the only notable seizures of tartaric acid tion of the chemicals are commensurate with legiti-
were reported by the Netherlands (almost 4 tons) and mate needs and/or whether there have been any recent
Belgium (about 580 kg). Through PICS, the focal point in suspicious increases in that regard. Also, the authori-
the Netherlands communicated seizures of tartaric acid ties of countries exporting any of the above-mentioned
amounting to almost 1.2 tons in the first 10 months of chemicals are invited to use, on a voluntary basis, the
2022. Board’s recently launched PEN Online Light system to
notify the authorities of importing countries of any
114. Seizures of tartaric acid in countries in East and
planned shipments of the chemicals.
South-East Asia may provide supporting evidence for the
spread of P-2-P-based methods for illicit methampheta-
mine manufacture in that region. However, tartaric acid
2. Substances used in the illicit
has also been associated with illicit ephedrine manufac- manufacture of MDMA and its
ture, specifically with a manufacturing method that uses analogues
2-bromopropiophenone or its precursor propiophenone.
117. The relevance of the traditional precursors of
MDMA (commonly known as “ecstasy”) included in Table I
See also paras. 128–130, on methylamine.
23  of the 1988 Convention (3,4-MDP-2-P, piperonal, safrole
For details, see the INCB report on precursors for 2020 (E/
24  and isosafrole) for the illicit manufacture of MDMA has
INCB/2020/4), figure IX. decreased significantly, in parallel with an increase in
 III.  Extent of licit trade and latest trends in trafficking in precursors   23

seizures of non-scheduled chemicals. Some of those chem- largest among all the precursors of MDMA under inter­
icals, namely, 3,4-MDP-2-P methyl glycidic acid deriva- national control. However, comprising a total of about
tives, have since been placed under international control. 1.2 tons, they were significantly smaller than the amounts
A schematic overview of the alternative chemicals used in seized during the period 2014–2019, that is, prior to the
the illicit manufacture of MDMA and related “ecstasy”- placing of those substances under international control.
type substances is shown in figure 9. Seizures of 3,4-MDP-2-P amounted to almost 900 litres.
As in the past, the bulk was in the form of a chemical inter-
(a) 3,4-MDP-2-P, 3,4-MDP-2-P methyl mediate seized from illicit laboratory settings in which it
glycidate, 3,4-MDP-2-P methyl had been manufactured illicitly from one of its precursors,
and had not been diverted from legitimate channels. Most
glycidic acid and piperonal of the seizures occurred in the Netherlands.
Licit trade 120. On form D, Ukraine reported seizures of 150 kg of
118. Between 1 November 2021 and 1 November 2022, piperonal, the largest amount of the substance reported
16 exporting countries and territories notified the authori- seized worldwide since 2016. No further details were
ties of 54 importing countries and territories of approxi- provided.
mately 800 proposed exports of piperonal. The number of 121. Incidents involving 3,4-MDP-2-P methyl glycidic
both exporting countries and importing countries in that acid derivatives continued to be reported through PICS in
period remained about the same as in previous years. No 2022. INCB is aware of seizures of such derivatives total-
trade in 3,4-MDP-2-P, 3,4-MDP-2-P methyl glycidate or ling more than 1.4 tons in the first 10 months of 2022. In
3,4-MDP-2-P methyl glycidic acid was reported. On form addition, new non-scheduled alternatives started to
D, China reported having stopped three shipments of emerge and were seized in amounts exceeding those of the
piperonal to three different countries, amounting to a total above-mentioned chemicals. All of the incidents occurred
of more than 1,600 tons. Unfortunately, no further details in Europe and often involved similar modi operandi that
were provided. triggered bilateral and multilateral investigations among
the countries concerned (see subsect. (c) below).
Trafficking
119. In 2021, the amounts seized of 3,4-MDP-2-P
methyl glycidic acid derivatives continued to be the

Figure 9. Alternative chemicals used in the illicit manufacture of MDMA and related “ecstasy”-type
substances

Safrole-rich
oilsb

Piperonalb Safroleb Isosafroleb MAMDPAa

3,4-MDP-2-P methyl
glycidic acid (and salts)b
3,4-MDP-2-Pb
3,4-MDP-2-P methyl
glycidateb MDMAc or related
“ecstasy”-type
3,4-MDP-2-P ethyl substances
glycidatea

a 
Not under international control but included in the limited international special surveillance list.
b 
Included in Table I of the 1988 Convention.
c 
Included in Schedule I of the 1971 Convention.
24   INCB REPORT ON PRECURSORS 2022

(b) Safrole, safrole-rich oils and MAMDPA and MAPA is another reminder to proactively
consider substance groups rather than individual sub-
isosafrole
stances in order to ensure an effective precursor control
Licit trade regime, as recommended in Commission on Narcotic
Drugs resolution 65/3.
122. Between 1 November 2021 and 1 November 2022,
six exporting countries sent 27 pre-export notifications 126. In late 2021, authorities in the Netherlands also
regarding safrole to the authorities of 12 importing coun- started to encounter another alternative chemical, namely,
tries and territories through the PEN Online system. The 3,4-MDP-2-P ethyl glycidate, which is closely related to
notifications concerned a total volume of approximately 3,4-MDP-2-P methyl glycidate and the corresponding
17 litres, while pre-export notifications for safrole-rich oils acid, which were both placed in Table I of the 1988
concerned a total of approximately 192 litres. There were Convention in November 2019. Seizures of the substance
two pre-export notifications for isosafrole during that occurred in several series of shipments, with each series
period, involving a total of about 280 litres, all destined for having been characterized by a number of common fea-
countries in South America. tures, such as the name under which the shipments were
misdeclared, their routing, and/or details regarding the
Trafficking shipper or consignee. The Board issued a number of alerts
123. The trafficking situation regarding safrole, safrole- related to the incidents, all but two of which had occurred
rich oils and isosafrole remained unchanged, with only in the Netherlands. Where such information was available,
three Governments reporting seizures of the substances the country of origin was China. The Board would like to
on form D for 2021. All of the reported seizures involved reiterate its request formulated in the alerts, for
safrole and totalled less than 50 litres. In the first 10 Governments to be vigilant and to consider carrying
months of 2022, four incidents involving the substance out the risk profiling of shipments of non-scheduled
were communicated through PICS. They amounted to a chemicals using the information provided in the alerts.
total volume of 480 litres, of which 375 litres were seized in This practice would allow the identification of addi-
a single incident in a warehouse in the Netherlands. Two tional consignments with similar characteristics that
of the other incidents also occurred in the Netherlands, may be on their way and would help to generate suffi-
and one in Cambodia, and did not involve any border sei- cient evidence of the illicit use of the substances,
zures that produced actionable information. enabling countries of origin, transit and destination to
act, seize relevant consignments and build cases to
(c) Use of non-scheduled chemicals prosecute those behind such illicit use.
and other trends in the illicit
manufacture of MDMA and its Figure 10. Incidents communicated through PICS
analogues involving 3,4-MDP-2-P methyl glycidic
acid derivatives under international
124. The evolution of precursors of MDMA and of related
control and non-scheduled alternatives,
“ecstasy”-type substances is a reflection of the evolution of
2013–2022
precursors of other synthetic drugs: soon after their inter-
national scheduling, or even around the time at which the
Amount seized (kilograms and litres)

12 000 30
scheduling process is initiated, there is a decrease in the November 2019: International control of
3,4-MDP-2-P methyl glycidic acid, its methyl ester and salts
10 000 25
Number of incidents

amounts seized and the number of incidents involving the

chemicals, accompanied by the emergence of alternative 8 000 20
precursors that are often very closely related chemically 6 000 15
(see figure 10).
4 000 10
125. On form D for 2021, authorities in the Netherlands
2 000 5
reported seizures of almost 4.5 tons of MAMDPA, a sub-
stance that had emerged as an alternative to controlled 0 0
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022a
precursors of MDMA in mid-2021 and was the subject of
3,4-MDP-2-P methyl glycidic acid, its methyl ester and salts
communications through PICS at that time. Chemically, Number of incidents
MAMDPA is the “ecstasy”-type analogue of MAPA, a 3,4-MDP-2-P ethyl glycidate and MAMDPA
designer precursor of amphetamine and methampheta- Number of incidents

mine that was added to Table I of the 1988 Convention in a

The data only cover the first 10 months of 2022.
November 2020. The close chemical relationship between
 III.  Extent of licit trade and latest trends in trafficking in precursors   25

3. Other trends in the illicit notable seizures of precursors of methylamine in 2021 (see
also para. 174 below). On form D, Panama referred to a
manufacture of amphetamine-type
seizure of 891 bags of methylamine hydrochloride in 2018.
stimulants The Government was still in the process of ensuring the
127. A number of chemicals not included in the tables of lawful disposal of the chemical.
the 1988 Convention but frequently reported on form D 130. During the first 10 months of 2022, seizures totalling
can be used in the illicit manufacture of different amphet- more than 4,800 litres of methylamine and more than
amine-type stimulants, synthetic cathinones and other 2 tons of methylamine hydrochloride were communicated
new psychoactive substances, and/or certain precursors, through PICS. With the exception of one incident in
such as ephedrine and pseudoephedrine. They typically Australia, all of the seizures occurred in the Netherlands,
include a number of versatile chemicals, solvents and rea- mostly in illicit laboratories or warehouses. The Board
gents that are often diverted from domestic channels. encourages Governments to be vigilant as to the possi-
ble diversion of methylamine, including from domestic
Methylamine distribution channels.
128. Methylamine is used widely for various legitimate
purposes, including in fine chemical synthesis and in the Hydrogen gas
pharmaceutical industry. It is required in the illicit manu- 131. Since 2015, Germany has regularly reported thefts
facture of several amphetamine-type stimulants (e.g. meth- of hydrogen gas from company premises (see figure 11).
amphetamine and MDMA) and synthetic cathinones, as Hydrogen gas can be used as a reducing agent in the illicit
well as ketamine, and ephedrine and pseudoephedrine. manufacture of several synthetic drugs. The gas stolen in
129. In 2021, the largest quantity of methylamine seized Germany is believed to be for use in the illicit manufacture
was reported by the United States (approximately 24.5 tons of MDMA, mainly in the Netherlands but also in Belgium,
of methylamine hydrochloride in a single incident), fol- as evidenced by empty gas cylinders found in illicit labora-
lowed by the Netherlands (almost 12 tons in 18 incidents tories and warehouses in those countries.
involving illicit laboratories or warehouses) and Mexico 132. Thefts in Germany and seizures in the Netherlands
(more than 1,400 litres in 4 incidents). Poland reported of hydrogen gas also continued to be communicated
seizures totalling more than 530 litres in 7 incidents, asso- through PICS in 2022. The total amount of hydrogen gas
ciated with the illicit manufacture of mephedrone and reported stolen in the first 10 months of 2022 exceeded the
4-CMC (clephedrone). The bulk of methylamine seized in total amount reported stolen on form D for 2021 by almost
Austria (125 kg) was also reported to have been encoun- 50 per cent.
tered in an illicit mephedrone laboratory. There were no

Figure 11.  Thefts of hydrogen gas, as reported on form D by Germany, 2015–2021

20 000 18

18 000 16
Amount stolen (litres)

Number of cases of theft

16 000 14
14 000
12
12 000
10
10 000
8
8 000
6
6 000
4 000 4

2 000 2

0 0
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

Amount stolen Cases of theft

26   INCB REPORT ON PRECURSORS 2022

Other chemicals not under international 137. There was a small increase in the share of imports of
control potassium permanganate reported by the three coca-
producing countries in South America (Bolivia
133. On form D for 2021, five countries reported sei- (Plurinational State of), Colombia and Peru), which
zures of formamide, formic acid and/or ammonium for- together accounted for 1.3 per cent, compared with less
mate, chemicals associated with the so-called Leuckart than 1 per cent reported in the previous year. Imports of
method of illicit manufacture. The Leuckart method can the substance by other countries in South America
be used to manufacture amphetamine and methamphet- amounted to about 5 per cent, or about 1,400 tons. Of
amine from P-2-P or related designer precursors, or to those countries, and similar to previous years, only
manufacture MDMA and its analogues from 3,4-MDP- Argentina, Brazil and Chile had pre-notified exports of
2-P or related designer precursors. As in previous years, potassium permanganate, in small amounts.
the largest amounts of such chemicals were seized in illicit
138. On form D for 2021, China reported having stopped
laboratories and warehouses in Europe. The Netherlands,
14 exports involving a total of almost 2,400 tons of potas-
Belgium, Spain and Germany, in descending order of
sium permanganate destined for 12 countries. The United
amounts seized, reported the largest seizures of those sub-
Republic of Tanzania objected to four imports of a total of
stances. Overall seizures amounting to 26,000 litres and
5.6 tons of the substance, and Jordan to a total of about 95 kg,
kilograms combined in 2021 continued a declining trend
because no import authorization had been issued.
from a peak in 2019 (86,000 litres and kg combined).
134. During the reporting period, INCB also became Trafficking
aware of additional seizures of “masked”, or chemically 139. On form D for 2021, 16 countries reported seizures
protected, derivatives of synthetic drug end products, of potassium permanganate, including 6 countries in
namely, amphetamine-type stimulants. While seizures of Europe. With the exception of an outlier in 2016, the
those derivatives had initially occurred in Australia around amounts reported have remained at an average of approxi-
2015, the substances were later also encountered in China, mately 100 tons per year for the past 10 years (see figure 12).
the Netherlands, New Zealand and the United States. The For many years, Colombia has reported the largest amounts
amounts seized were indicative of distribution at both the seized. In 2021, seizures in Colombia totalled more than
wholesale and retail levels. In 2022, Chile communicated 135 tons, more than twice the amount seized in the country
an incident involving t-boc-MDMA through PICS. in 2020. Seizures amounting to more than 1 ton were also
reported by China (almost 18.6 tons, an amount more than
10 times the amount seized in the country in 2020), Chile
B. Substances used in the illicit
(more than 5.8 tons) and Peru (almost 1.5 tons, which was
manufacture of cocaine almost twice the amount seized in the country in 2020).
Seizures of potassium permanganate in Europe were also
1. Potassium permanganate on the rise, albeit in smaller amounts, mirroring an
135. Potassium permanganate is the principal oxidizing increase in illicit cocaine laboratories and chemical ware-
agent used in the illicit manufacture of cocaine. Most of houses in that region.26 By contrast, the amounts seized in
the cocaine that is seized continues to be highly Bolivia (Plurinational State of) and Venezuela (Bolivarian
oxidized.25 Republic of) were significantly smaller than the amounts
seized in 2020.
Licit trade
136. Between 1 November 2021 and 1 November 2022,
the authorities of 35 exporting countries and territories
sent 1,823 pre-export notifications to 115 importing coun-
tries and territories relating to a total of more than 28,300
tons of potassium permanganate, which represents about
20 per cent less trade in the substance compared with the
previous reporting year. The main exporter was China,
26 
These laboratories are known as secondary extraction laboratories,
or cocaine “washing” laboratories, where cocaine is recovered after being
followed by India and the United States. mixed with, or incorporated into, other substances for the purpose of
smuggling. In addition, there are laboratories for the conversion of
cocaine base into hydrochloride salt. On the basis of the chemicals seized,
25 
Continuing the trend identified in previous years, results from the cocaine laboratories have to date been identified in Belgium, Italy, the
Cocaine Signature Program of the United States Drug Enforcement Netherlands and Spain. The required chemicals include acids and
Administration Special Testing and Research Laboratory indicate that solvents listed in Table II of the 1988 Convention, non-scheduled sub-
less than 1 per cent of the cocaine samples examined, from seizures in stitutes, such as acetate solvents, and bases. Most of the chemicals are
2021 in the United States, were moderately or not oxidized. sourced from within the European common market.
 III.  Extent of licit trade and latest trends in trafficking in precursors   27

Figure 12. Seizures of potassium permanganate, illicit manufacture of potassium permanganate in that

as reported by Governments on form D, country. According to the Colombian Drug Observatory,27
2012–2021 in the period 2017–2021, between 7 and 10 such sites were
700 000 20 dismantled in Colombia every year. In the first 10 months

Number of countries reporting seizures

600 000
18
of 2022, eight potassium permanganate laboratories were
Amount seized (kilograms)

16
500 000 14 dismantled.
12
400 000
10 144. Sodium hypochlorite is another chemical associ-
300 000
8 ated with the illicit manufacture of potassium permanga-
6
200 000
4
nate. Several countries, in particular in South America,
100 000
2 have placed some kind of control over sodium hypochlo-
0
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
0
rite and therefore regularly report seizures of the substance
Amount seized Number of countries reporting seizures on form D. In 2021, notable seizures were reported by
Argentina, in the form of a solution amounting to almost
140. As in the past, countries in South America typically 10,000 litres, in relation to 25 incidents, and Peru (about
indicated diversion from domestic distribution channels 5 tons, up from around 3 tons in 2020 but not anywhere
as the source of potassium permanganate. In Colombia, close to the amount of almost 14 tons seized in 2018).
illicit manufacture continued to be another notable source
145. In terms of efficiency gains, a relatively new trend
of the substance, as evidenced by seizures of precursors and
that has come to the Board’s attention is the use of acetyl
substitutes of potassium permanganate (see para. 142 below).
chloride in the last step of the conversion of cocaine base
2. Use of non-scheduled chemicals to cocaine hydrochloride. Use of the chemical, which has
long been associated with illicit heroin manufacture (see
and other trends in the illicit
sect. C.2 below), appears to increase both the yield and
manufacture of cocaine purity of cocaine hydrochloride. The Board encourages
141. Each year, chemicals not under international con- further research into the use of acetyl chloride in illicit
trol represent a significant portion of the cocaine chemi- cocaine manufacture and invites the countries con-
cals reported seized on form D. They can be classified in cerned to also determine the sources of the chemical.
the following groups: (a) precursors of and substitutes for 146. Sodium metabisulfite is another chemical associ-
potassium permanganate; (b) chemicals that help to ated with efficiency gains in illicit cocaine manufacture,
improve the efficiency of the manufacturing process, such which are realized by using the substance to standardize
as sodium metabisulfite and calcium chloride; (c) a variety the oxidation level of cocaine base sourced from multiple
of common acids, bases and solvents used in the extrac- extraction laboratories prior to further processing. In the
tion of cocaine base from coca leaves and for the conver- last 10 years, the largest seizures of sodium metabisulfite
sion of cocaine base into hydrochloride; and (d) chemicals were reported by countries in South America, with
used to illicitly manufacture controlled precursors used in Colombia accounting for almost 75 per cent of total
cocaine processing. Most of these chemicals are sourced amount seized in that region (see figure 13). In 2016,
domestically. notable seizures started to be reported by countries in
142. Countries in South America in particular have a Europe and have been associated with an increase in
number of additional substances under national control. cocaine laboratories, including the so-called secondary
For example, Colombia controls 25 substances in addition extraction, or cocaine “washing”, laboratories in the region.
to those under international control, many of which are On form D for 2021, Belgium reported seizures totalling
related to cocaine processing. Seizures involving 24 of more than 1.4 tons of sodium metabisulfite. As in previous
them were effected in 2021. On form D, Colombia contin- years, the largest amounts seized in 2021 were reported by
ued to be the only country reporting seizures of precursors Colombia (almost 45 tons) and Peru (almost 8.5 tons).
of potassium permanganate. Specifically, there was one Peru also reported five seizures totalling almost 5.6 tons of
incident involving 250 kg of manganese dioxide (pyro- potassium metabisulfite, a possible substitute for sodium
lusite) and three incidents involving a total of more than metabisulfite.
18.5 tons of potassium manganate. Since the latter is an
intermediate in the manufacture of potassium permanga-
nate from manganese dioxide, a proportion of the amount
seized may have been manufactured illicitly.
143. Seizures of these chemicals in Colombia also cor- 27 
Colombian Drug Observatory (www.odc.gov.co/sidco/oferta/
roborate information about the dismantling of sites for the infraestructura-sustancias-quimicas) (in Spanish).
28   INCB REPORT ON PRECURSORS 2022

Figure 13. Seizures of sodium metabisulfite, as environment and neighbourhoods posed by stored

reported by Governments in South chemicals.
America on form D, 2012–2021
149. While historically, acetone, ethyl ether, methyl ethyl
140 000
ketone or toluene (all solvents included in Table II of the
120 000
1988 Convention) have been used for the conversion of
Amount seized (kilograms)

cocaine base into hydrochloride, a variety of other

100 000
common solvents can and are also being used. Most of
80 000
them can be replaced by yet others with similar properties,
60 000
and the preference for a particular solvent is often a result
40 000
of its accessibility and the illicit operators’ experience with
20 000
it. Most solvents are obtained from domestic sources.
0
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Seizures effected in South America Seizures effected in Colombia
150. With regard to solvents required for the final con-
version of cocaine base into cocaine hydrochloride, sei-
zures of so-called acetate solvents (methyl, ethyl,
147. Calcium chloride is another chemical associated
n-propyl, isopropyl, butyl and isobutyl acetate and mix-
with efficiency gains in illicit cocaine manufacture.
tures of them) have regularly been reported on form D. In
Specifically, it is used as a drying agent for solvents, thus
the period 2017–2021, ethyl acetate accounted for almost
enabling them to be recycled and reducing the need for
75 per cent of the total volume of acetate solvents seized
fresh solvents. Whereas Bolivia (Plurinational State of)
worldwide (see figure 14). Seizures of methyl acetate,
and Colombia have regularly reported significant, multi-
amounting to almost 4.3 tons, were reported for the first
ton seizures of calcium chloride since 2013, trafficking of
time, by Peru, in 2021.
the substance through Ecuador appears to have started in
2016, and peaked in 2018 at more than 143 tons.28 Since Figure 14. Proportion of seizures of acetate
then, quantities of calcium chloride seized in Ecuador solvents, expressed in kilograms and
have decreased; in 2021, they decreased to about 12 tons litres, as reported by Governments on
(in four incidents). In Peru, notable seizures of the sub- form D, 2017–2021
stance have been reported since 2018, and following its
96,733 (5%) 17,869 (1%) 4,275 (0.2%)
placement under control in the country in January 2020,
161,049 (8%)
amounts totalling almost 46 tons in 2020 and 34 tons in
2021 were reported. On form D, Peru also reported first-
time seizures of more than 13 tons of a substitute chemi-
cal, magnesium chloride, in illicit cocaine laboratories. 251,819 (13%)
Both chemicals were reported to be used in the recycling
of acetone used in the conversion of cocaine base into 1,447,980 (73%)

hydrochloride salt.
148. In July 2022, the Government of Ecuador, with
technical support from UNODC, disposed of 27 tons of Ethyl acetate Butyl acetate Isopropyl acetate
calcium chloride and sodium bicarbonate by burying the n-Propyl acetate Isobutyl acetate Methyl acetate
chemicals in an engineered landfill near the port of
Guayaquil. The Board recognizes the importance of the 151. On form D for 2021, 10 countries, 6 in South
lawful and environmentally safe disposal of seized chemi- America, 3 in Europe and 1 in Asia, reported seizures of
cals. Given the significant quantities of some chemicals acetate solvents. As in previous years, the largest amounts
seized, the Board also recognizes the challenges that such were reported by countries in South America; seizures
disposal may present and commends all Governments for reported by countries in Europe may be another reflection
their efforts in this regard. The Board welcomes technical of the cocaine “washing” laboratories that have emerged in
support from UNODC and encourages other international that region. However, acetate solvents can also be used in
and regional organizations to continue to provide techni- the illicit manufacture of other synthetic drugs.
cal support to such efforts to prevent the re-entry of seized 152. Methyl isobutyl ketone is another solvent that can
chemicals into illicit channels and reduce the risks to the be used in the final hydrochloride crystallization step in
the manufacture of cocaine. Seizures of the substance,
amounting to more than 23,500 litres, were only reported
28 
INCB report on precursors for 2021(E/INCB/2021/4), figure X by Colombia in 2021.
and para. 160.
 III.  Extent of licit trade and latest trends in trafficking in precursors   29

153. Forensic profiling analysis can provide an indica- Licit trade

tion of the solvent, or solvent mixture, used in the cocaine 156. From 1 November 2021 to 1 November 2022, the
hydrochloride crystallization step. Together with profiling authorities of 24 exporting countries and territories used
methods that target the geographical origin of the coca the PEN Online system to submit almost 2,300 pre-export
from which the cocaine was extracted, forensic solvent notifications for shipments of acetic anhydride. The ship-
analysis can thus provide valuable strategic information ments were destined for 91 importing countries and terri-
for law enforcement and regulatory authorities. The most tories and involved a total of almost 1.1 billion litres of
recent forensic profiling results identified ethyl acetate as a acetic anhydride, an increase of 47 per cent compared with
prominent solvent in cocaine seized in Europe, while ace- the previous reporting year.
tate mixtures were common in cocaine seized in the
United States, and acetone was the most prominent sol- 157. In 2021, the competent national authorities of
vent utilized in the crystallization step in the manufacture importing countries objected to approximately 2.8 per
of cocaine seized in Peru. Since acetate solvents are availa- cent of pre-export notifications related to proposed
ble and widely used for a range of legitimate purposes, the exports of acetic anhydride, mostly for administrative rea-
Board encourages Governments to monitor inter­ sons. The objection rate was considerably lower than it was
national trade in and domestic distribution of acetate in the period 2018–2020, when approximately 7.6 per cent
solvents, as appropriate, with a view to identifying any of proposed shipments of acetic anhydride were objected to.
changes in such trade or distribution, which may indi- 158. In 2021, authorities in the United States objected,
cate their diversion into illicit channels. The Board’s for administrative reasons, to about 50 per cent of pre-
recently launched PEN Online Light system may pro- export notifications of acetic anhydride submitted by the
vide a useful, voluntary tool for authorities in this authorities of Mexico. That objection rate was lower than
regard. the average objection rate in the period 2018–2020 (about
154. Some countries in South America also report the 75 per cent). Nevertheless, in view of the continued high
illicit manufacture of chemicals needed for cocaine pro- proportion of objections to shipments of acetic anhydride
cessing, including ammonia, hydrochloric acid and sul- involving the two countries, the Board reiterates its ear-
phuric acid. On form D for 2021, Argentina, Honduras, lier call to the Governments of Mexico and the United
Peru and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) reported sei- States, as well as other Governments with high rates of
zures of chemicals that can be used as precursors, includ- objections, to analyse and address the root causes, and
ing urea, sulphur and sodium chloride. Some of the to take mutually acceptable remedial measures, as
seizures were made in illicit laboratories, indicating actual deemed appropriate, to increase the efficiency of
manufacture. Colombia did not report any such seizures administrative control over the trade in acetic anhy-
but dismantled 15 sites used for the illicit manufacture of dride, without compromising the capacity of the coun-
sulphuric acid in the period 2017–2019, according to the tries concerned to identify and address actual
Colombian Drug Observatory.29 diversions of the substance from either domestic or
international trade.

C. Substances used in the illicit 159. In recent years, the number of suspected or actual
diversions of acetic anhydride from international trade has
manufacture of heroin declined considerably, with most of the reported cases
now involving diversions from domestic distribution
1. Acetic anhydride
channels prior to smuggling. During the reporting period,
155. Acetic anhydride is one of the most widely traded about 80 per cent of the total amount of acetic anhydride
substances in Table I of the 1988 Convention, with hun- traded internationally was destined for a very limited
dreds of millions of litres of the substance traded annually. number of companies (so-called “tank farms”) in Belgium
It is used in the illicit manufacture of heroin, as well as in and the Netherlands. The ongoing domestic sale and dis-
the illicit manufacture of methamphetamine or ampheta- tribution of large amounts of the substance has led traf-
mine in instances where the immediate precursor P-2-P is fickers to target the region for a number of years, as
illicitly derived from phenylacetic acid or phenylacetic corroborated by continued reports of countries of the
acid derivatives (see annex VIII). European Union being a source of the substance seized
within the region and elsewhere.
160. Although none of the countries that objected
through the PEN Online system to proposed shipments of
29 
Colombian Drug Observatory (www.odc.gov.co/sidco/oferta/ acetic anhydride during the reporting period identified
infraestructura-sustancias-quimicas) (in Spanish). any shipment as being a suspected diversion attempt, some
30   INCB REPORT ON PRECURSORS 2022

of the shipments that were objected to may have warranted 48,900 litres in 2020 to only 12,200 litres in 2021, repre-
follow-up law enforcement investigations into their legiti- senting a 75 per cent decrease. Iran (Islamic Republic of),
macy, in particular in cases where the proposed importer the United Arab Emirates and Myanmar, which seized
denied having ordered the shipment. To initiate such 15,000 litres, 13,300 litres and 12,200 litres of acetic anhy-
investigations, the national authorities may wish to use the dride, respectively, in 2020, did not report any seizures of
dedicated INCB guide comprising practical tips for follow- the substance in 2021.
up investigations into shipments of precursor chemicals
164. With a total amount of 36,300 litres, Türkiye
that have been objected to through the PEN Online system
reported the largest seizures of acetic anhydride in 2021,
and providing examples of best practices from a number of
almost triple the amount reported seized in 2020 (see para.
investigations into suspected diversion attempts. The
168 below) and more than 60 per cent of the amount
guide was shared with Governments in 2019.30
seized globally in 2021. Notable seizures of acetic anhy-
Trafficking dride were also reported by the Netherlands (5,600 litres)
and Guatemala (4,400 litres). With regard to 2022, infor-
161. Since 2001, the amount of acetic anhydride seized
mation communicated by Governments through PICS in
globally each year has fluctuated significantly, ranging
the first 10 months of the year suggests a likely continued
from 22,000 to 214,000 litres, with a peak in the period
decline in the quantity of acetic anhydride seized
2016–2018, when the amount seized globally averaged
worldwide.
152,000 litres per year. That period was also characterized
by a significant number of suspicious orders and inquiries 165. Afghanistan remains the world’s largest illicit pro-
involving legitimate suppliers. The reason for the high ducer of opium and heroin and is the main source of the
demand for the substance in the period 2016–2018 has heroin available in Europe. According to UNODC, in
never been unambiguously clarified in the countries July 2021, opium poppy cultivation in the country was esti-
concerned.31 mated at 177,000 hectares, representing 85 per cent of global
illicit opium production. The opium harvest in 2021 poten-
162. In the period 2019–2020, global seizures of acetic
tially yielded between 270 and 320 tons of pure heroin, the
anhydride declined to an average of 106,000 litres per year.
illicit manufacture of which would potentially require
In the same period, trafficking in acetyl chloride, a possi-
between 270,000 and 800,000 litres of acetic anhydride,
ble replacement for acetic anhydride as an acetylating
based on the Board’s conversion figures (see annex VIII).
agent, which emerged around 2018, gained further impor-
tance (see figure 15 and para. 171 below). 166. Despite the continued cultivation of opium poppy
in Afghanistan, seizures of acetic anhydride in the country
Figure 15. Seizures of acetic anhydride, as
peaked in 2017 at 37,715 litres and have been in decline
reported by Governments on form D,
since then. In 2018, the quantity seized of the substance
2001–2021
dropped by 80 per cent, to 7,364 litres, then to 786 litres in
250 000 2019 and further to 656 litres in 2020 (see figure 16
below).32 In the same period, seizures of an alternative
Amount seized (litres)

200 000
acetylation agent, namely, acetyl chloride, started to
150 000 emerge in Afghanistan and other countries in West Asia.
100 000 Figure 16. Seizures of acetic anhydride, as
50 000 reported by the Government of
Afghanistan on form D, 2008–2020
0
20 01
2002
2003
2004
20 05
2006
20 07
2008
20 9
20 0
20 11
2012
2013
2014
20 15
2016
20 17
2018
20 19
20 0
21
0
1

70 000
20

60 000
163. According to information provided by Governments
Amount seized (litres)

on form D, the quantity of acetic anhydride seized globally 50 000

declined even further in 2021, including in some countries 40 000

that had previously reported seizures of sizeable amounts 30 000
of the substance. In total, almost 58,600 litres of acetic 20 000
anhydride were seized worldwide in 2021. In China, the
10 000
total quantity seized of the substance dropped from
0
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

INCB report on precursors for 2019 (E/INCB/2019/4), para. 189.

30  32 
At the time of writing, Afghanistan had not submitted form D and
INCB report on precursors for 2017 (E/INCB/2017/4), paras.
31 
hence did not provide information on amounts of acetic anhydride and/
167–168. or acetyl chloride seized in the country in 2021.
 III.  Extent of licit trade and latest trends in trafficking in precursors   31

167. In April 2022, the de facto authorities of Afghanistan 2. Use of non-scheduled chemicals
issued a decree banning the cultivation of opium poppy
and other trends in the illicit
and the manufacture of illicit drugs (see also para. 14 above).
Nonetheless, according to UNODC, the opium harvested in manufacture of heroin
2022 could be converted into some 240–290 tons of pure 170. Acetyl chloride is a chemical substance known to
heroin, the illicit manufacture of which would potentially be a possible substitute for acetic anhydride as an acetylat-
require between 240,000 and 725,000 litres of acetic ing agent in the conversion of morphine to heroin. Acetyl
anhydride. chloride is therefore included in the INCB limited inter­
168. In 2021, Türkiye reported 13 seizures of acetic national special surveillance list of non-scheduled sub-
anhydride amounting to a total of 36,300 litres of the sub- stances and is also controlled in several countries,
stance, an increase of 24,200 litres compared with the including Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran and
12,100 litres reported seized in 2020. In two particular Pakistan.
seizures, involving a total of 25,000 litres, the seized sub- 171. In the past, seizures of acetyl chloride were only
stance had purportedly originated in European Union rarely reported. However, from 2017 to 2021, Afghanistan,
member States. To facilitate backtracking investigations India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), the Netherlands,
into the seized substance, the Board convened an intelligence- Pakistan, Türkiye and the United Arab Emirates shared
sharing meeting in 2022 that was attended by representa- through PICS information on a total of 12 seizures of acetyl
tives of the countries associated with its trafficking. chloride, amounting to a total of more than 100,000 litres.
169. In the Netherlands, the total quantity seized of acetic Where such information was available, China was identi-
anhydride increased more than sixfold, from 910 litres fied as the source country. In 2022, one seizure, amounting
seized in 2020 to 5,610 litres seized (in two seizures) in to less than 1 litre of acetyl chloride, was communicated
2021. In one case, in addition to 2,010 litres of acetic anhy- through PICS, by Hong Kong, China.
dride seized in a warehouse, police also seized 180 litres of 172. Communications shared through PICS on traffick-
glacial acetic acid, 60 kg of sodium carbonate and a large ing in acetyl chloride present an opportunity for the com-
quantity of heroin. The circumstances of the case indicated petent national authorities of the countries concerned,
the possible use of the seized chemicals in the illicit manu- including of the reported country or countries of origin, to
facture of heroin in the country. Since 2017, more than initiate backtracking investigations with a view to identify-
10 sites believed to be associated with illicit heroin ing modi operandi used by traffickers and preventing
manufacture have been identified in the Netherlands. In future trafficking attempts involving the same modi oper-
recent years, illicit heroin laboratories have also been andi and/or involving the same trafficking groups. INCB
identified in other European Union member States, reminds the Governments concerned of the value of
including Belgium, Czechia and Spain.33,34 investigating the circumstances of seizures of key
non-scheduled chemicals, such as acetyl chloride, and
encourages them to consider taking action against the
diversion of and trafficking in such chemicals, in
accordance with article 13 of the 1988 Convention.

NCB report on precursors for 2018 (E/INCB/2018/4), para. 190.

33  173. Glacial acetic acid is a chemical that is included in
34 
EMCDDA, European Drug Report 2022: Trends and Developments the INCB limited international special surveillance list. It
(Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, 2022), p. 24. has been repeatedly reported as being used as a cover load

Box 4.  Acetyl chloride and the international precursor control system

At the international level, concerns about use of acetyl chloride in illicit drug manufacture were articulated long before
the adoption of the 1988 Convention, in Commission on Narcotic Drugs resolution 2 (S-V) of 1978, which focused on
measures against the use of acetic anhydride or acetyl chloride in the illicit manufacture of heroin. In the resolution,
reflecting the belief current at that time, the Commission recognized that there were practical considerations that made
it difficult to place acetic anhydride or acetyl chloride under strict national control, particularly in countries where acetic
anhydride or acetyl chloride was used in large quantities industrially. Nonetheless, acetic anhydride was eventually
added to the list of internationally controlled precursor chemicals, whereas acetyl chloride is not yet internationally
controlled.
32   INCB REPORT ON PRECURSORS 2022

or to otherwise conceal acetic anhydride. However, it may PEN Online system. While no further information about
also be associated with the illicit manufacture of other the case was available to INCB, it does not appear that it was
drugs and precursors, including P-2-P and 3,4-MDP-2-P. a diversion attempt but rather a shipment stopped for
In the past five years, significant seizures of the substance administrative reasons. Although there continue to be spo-
have been reported by countries in Latin America, where radic reports of the illicit manufacture of methaqualone, the
the chemical is under national control in a number of reports rarely include any information about the specific
countries. On form D for 2021, the amounts of glacial chemicals involved or their sources. There were no notable
acetic acid reported seized worldwide totalled 8,500 litres, seizures of any internationally controlled precursor of
including 7,600 litres of the substance seized in Peru. methaqualone reported on form D for 2021.
174. Ammonium chloride is another non-scheduled 178. In terms of alternative precursors of methaqualone
chemical frequently associated with the illicit manufacture not under international control, South Africa reported a
of heroin, in which it is used in the process of extracting seizure of 200 litres of ortho-toluidine at O.R. Tambo
morphine from opium. It is also required for the illicit International Airport in Johannesburg, South Africa. The
manufacture of methylamine (see paras. 128–130 above). consignment had been mislabelled and had allegedly
In 2021, only three countries reported seizures of ammo- originated in China.
nium chloride. The total amount reported seized was neg-
179. In addition, through PICS, INCB is aware of the sei-
ligible compared with the 16,600 kg reported seized in
zure in 2021 of a shipment of 1.7 tons of acetanthranil
2020, most of which was reported by Afghanistan and
that had arrived at the international airport in
Mexico.
Johannesburg from Kenya. That was the fourth incident
involving the substance in South Africa since 2018 and the
D. Substances used in the illicit first with a link to Kenya. The Board has inquired with the
manufacture of other narcotic authorities concerned and is awaiting feedback on the
status of follow-up investigations.
drugs and psychotropic
180. The seizures of acetanthranil are important because
substances
they illustrate that, as in the case of other synthetic drugs,
1. Ergot alkaloids and lysergic acid traffickers are seeking alternative precursors not under
international control also for the illicit manufacture of
175. On form D for 2021, three countries reported sei- methaqualone. The seizures of the substance might thus
zures of ergotamine and five reported seizures of lysergic explain the absence of seizures of the traditional, con-
acid; there were no seizures of ergometrine. As in the past trolled precursors of methaqualone and also the need for a
and reflecting the potency of the end product, LSD, the shift in the focus of law enforcement in the African region.
amounts reported seized by each country were usually
very small, in the range of a gram or less. Australia, which 3. Precursors of fentanyl, fentanyl
has regularly reported seizures of the two substances in
analogues and other synthetic
notable quantities, seized about 360 grams of ergotamine
and 240 grams of lysergic acid in 2021. opioids, and alternative chemicals
176. In July 2022, the Board became aware of an ergot-
Licit trade
amine diversion scheme in Paraguay. Investigations deter-
mined that between 2020 and 2022 at least 4.5 kg of the 181. With the addition of 4-AP, 1-boc-4-AP and norfen-
substance had been diverted through domestic purchases tanyl to Table I of the 1988 Convention, effective 23
using two front companies. It is presumed that the scheme November 2022, there are now five precursors of fentanyl
was dedicated to the diversion and that the ergotamine and related substances under international control. While
was sold onwards to organized criminal groups in the the extent of trade in the three chemicals remains to be
border area between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay. seen, it is assumed that most shipments relate to trade in
small amounts for limited research and laboratory ana-
2. N-Acetylanthranilic acid, anthranilic lytical purposes.

acid and alternative precursors of 182. International trade in NPP and ANPP, the other
methaqualone two precursors of fentanyl under international control,
continued to be limited to a few exporting and importing
177. On form D for 2021, China reported having stopped countries. Between 1 November 2021 and 1 November
a shipment of anthranilic acid to Pakistan in response to a 2022, 14 proposed shipments of NPP were pre-notified by
request made by the authorities in that country through the the authorities of three exporting countries to five
 III.  Extent of licit trade and latest trends in trafficking in precursors   33

importing countries. All of the importing countries are seizures in the United States involved 390 kg of ANPP, an
known to manufacture fentanyl legitimately. The total amount reported to have been of domestic origin. The
quantity involved significantly exceeded the quantities United States also reported 28 incidents involving fentanyl
observed in the period 2019–2020 (see figure 17). The laboratories in 2021. Canada did not report any seizures of
largest exporter of NPP was India, followed by France. fentanyl precursors on form D, however, through PICS, the
International trade in ANPP continued to be negligible, Board is aware of illicit fentanyl laboratories in the country,
involving less than 5 grams of the substance, in 14 pro- and of a seizure of about 12 kg of ANPP.
posed shipments, during the reporting period.
184. The United States was the only country to report
Figure 17. Proposed exports of two fentanyl seizures of other fentanyl precursors on form D. That
precursors, pre-notified by exporting included 4 kg of 1-boc-4-AP, one of the three chemicals
Governments through the PEN Online added to Table I of the 1988 Convention in November
system, 2018–2021a 2022, 180 kg of 4-piperidone and 170 kg of 2-bromoethyl
benzene. The latter two chemicals were seized from a mis-
Amount pre-notified (kilograms)

labelled shipment that had originated in China and was

Number of pre-export
6 000 25
destined for an address in Texas, United States. The two
notifications sent
5 000 20
4 000 chemicals are associated with different methods of illicit
15
3 000 fentanyl manufacture; they also have numerous legitimate
10
2 000 applications.
1 000 5
0 0 Figure 18. Seizures of fentanyl precursors
2017/18 2018/19 2019/20 2020/21 2021/22
(expressed in fentanyl equivalents), as
Amount of ANPP pre-notified reported by Governments on form D,
Amount of NPP pre-notified 2016–2021
Number of of pre-export notifications involving ANPP
Number of of pre-export notifications involving NPP October 2017: international
Amount seized, expressed in fentanyl

700
control of NPP and ANPP
Reporting periods are from 1 November of the first year to 1
a 
600
equivalents (kilograms)

November of the following year.

500
400
Trafficking
300
183. Incidents involving fentanyl precursors were 200
reported on form D for the first time in 2016 (see figure 18).
100
On form D for 2021, only Mexico and the United States
0
reported notable seizures of NPP and/or ANPP. While the 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
seizures in Mexico predominantly involved NPP (about NPP ANPP 4-AP 1-boc-4-AP
45 kg) and were alleged to have originated in China, the

Figure 19. Schematic overview of the evolution of fentanyl precursors, 2017–2022

2017

From mid-2018 • Seizures of 4-AP in Mexico, initially in small amounts (0.6–1.8 kg);
Traffickers seeking originating in China (incl. Hong Kong), the Netherlands or Singapore
alternatives to NPP • Seizures of chemically masked fentanyl precursors (e.g. 1-boc-4-AP)
and ANPP • Shift also evidenced by forensic impurity profiling results

September 2018 December 2018

100 kg of NPP seized in India, bound for Mexico 2022
First illicit fentanyl lab in India:
11 kg of fentanyl, from non-sched. August 2020
precursors via NPP and ANPP Masked precursor of
fentanyl analogue May 2021:
From mid-2019
• Increase in amounts of 4-AP seized New masked (alternative)
October 2020 fentanyl precursors
• Seizures of 4-piperidone
Warehouse with (United States)
• Experimental precursor laboratory in Mexico
fentanyl chemicals in
the Netherlands
34   INCB REPORT ON PRECURSORS 2022

185. Soon after the international scheduling of NPP and E.  Substances not listed in Table I
ANPP, traffickers started to seek alternatives to those
chemicals. The alternatives included stable chemical inter-
or Table II of the 1988
mediates used in one or more of the several fentanyl manu- Convention that are used in the
facturing methods, as well as their chemically masked illicit manufacture of other
derivatives. Alternatives identified later also included pre-
precursors and their masked derivatives (see figure 19).
narcotic drugs and psychotropic
While much of the innovation with regard to these alter- substances or substances of
natives has been observed in North America, where most abuse not under international
of the related seizures have been effected, there has also
control
been some geographical diversification, as illustrated by
incidents related to illicit fentanyl manufacture, namely, 1. Precursors of GHB
the seizure of an illicit laboratory in India in 2018 and of a
warehouse containing several hundreds of litres of fenta- 188. On form D for 2021, 14 countries reported seizures
nyl chemicals in the Netherlands in 2020. of GBL, a chemical precursor of GHB that may also be
directly ingested, as it is metabolized into GHB in the
186. There were no seizures of precursors of fentanyl
body. Because of this “dual use”, some countries control
analogues reported on form D for 2021. However, in 2022,
GBL as a precursor while others control it as a psycho-
the United States communicated an incident involving the
tropic substance. As a result, not all countries where GBL
masked derivative of a precursor of para-fluorofentanyl
is encountered report seizures of the substance on form D.
through PICS. The misdeclared shipment was seized at the
In 2021, the largest quantities seized of GBL were reported
international airport in Indianapolis, United States. In that
by Australia, totalling more than 3 tons of the substance
connection, the Board welcomes the scheduling approach
seized in 429 incidents. Seizures were also reported by
taken by Canada (see para. 17 above) and reiterates its
countries in Europe and North and South America. While
call to Governments to consider taking measures, in
the majority of incidents and the largest amounts of GBL
accordance with national legislation, on groups of
seized in Australia could be traced to countries in East and
chemically related substances, that is, chemicals that
South-East Asia, the GBL seized in Europe had originated
are closely related to controlled precursors and that
from within Europe.
may be readily converted to or substituted for those
precursors. Alternatively, or in addition, Governments 189. The total amount of GBL reported seized in 2021
may wish to consider taking specific measures with was significantly smaller than that reported in 2020, when
regard to chemicals that do not have any currently the Netherlands and Slovenia reported single seizures of
recognized legitimate uses. more than 20,000 litres and more than 12,000 litres,
respectively, and several other countries reported amounts
4. 
Precursors of phencyclidine and between 100 and 300 litres. By contrast, the amounts
other phencyclidine-type drugs reported seized in 2021 were much smaller and reflected a
larger number of incidents, and were therefore indicative of
187. Seizures of precursors of phencyclidine, a dissocia-
retail-level seizures of GBL for direct consumption, with the
tive anaesthetic that is often misused for its hallucinogenic
likely exception of the seizures in the Netherlands (see
properties, are infrequently reported on form D. The
figure 20).
amounts reported seized are typically very small, rarely
exceeding 2 litres per country and year. The United States
has been an exception, both in terms of the frequency of
reported seizures and the amounts involved. While the
total amount of precursors of phencyclidine seized glob-
ally has rarely exceeded 100 litres per year, in 2021, the
United States reported a single seizure of more than
1,800 litres of piperidine. The shipment originated in India
and was destined for a consignee in Nevada, United States;
an investigation revealed that the location of the consignee
was a residential apartment complex.
 III.  Extent of licit trade and latest trends in trafficking in precursors   35

Figure 20. Seizures of GBL, as reported by readily converted into the substance; both can be consid-
Governments on form D for 2021 ered designer precursors. On form D for 2021, China
reported seizures totalling more than 4.7 tons of 2-chloro-
Amount seized (kilograms of litres)

300 50
45
phenyl cyclopentyl ketone. No further details were pro-
250
vided. In the past, China has regularly reported seizures of

Number of incidents
40
35
200
30 “hydroxylimine”.37 Seizures of both substances peaked in
150 25 2014 (see figure 21). INCB is also aware of illicit ketamine
20
100 15 laboratories having been dismantled in Cambodia,
50 10 Canada, China, India, Malaysia and the Netherlands in the
5
0 0 past 10 years; some of the laboratories, in particular those
in East and South-East Asia, were of industrial scale.
ile

Hu y
y

ly

ds

Sw ia
en
ia a

aa

sa
an

ar
nc

Ne atvi
lan

Ita

rb
Ch

lan

ed

te
ni

ng
str

Fra

rm

Se

ta
Fin
to

L
er
Au

Ge

dS
Es

th

Un
ite Figure 21. Seizures of ketamine precursors, as
Amount seized Number of incidents reported by Governments on form D,
2010–2021
Note: The figure excludes Australia, which reported seizures
80 000
amounting to 3,145 kg in 2021.

Amount seized (kilogram)

70 000
Austria, Estonia and the United States did not provide information
a 

on the number of incidents. 60 000

50 000
190. Seizures of GBL communicated through PICS in 40 000

the first 10 months of 2022 amounted to a total of about 30 000

2,900 litres, in 93 incidents. In addition, 268 incidents 20 000

10 000
involving a total of about 450 litres and kilograms were
0
communicated through IONICS during the same period, 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

again indicating retail-level incidents. Hydroxylimine 2-Chlorophenyl cyclopentyl ketone 2-Chlorobenzonitrile

191. Seizures of 1,4-butanediol, a precursor of GBL and

a pre-precursor of GHB that is also readily converted to 3. Precursors of new psychoactive
GHB upon ingestion, were negligible in 2021. In the past
substances, including substances
five years, only seven countries reported seizures of the
substance; the largest amounts – five litres – were reported recently scheduled under the
by two countries, Germany, in 2021, and Norway, in 2019. Single Convention on Narcotic
In the first 10 months of 2022, almost 170 incidents involv- Drugs of 1961 as amended by the
ing a total of more than 750 kilograms and litres were
1972 Protocol or the Convention on
communicated through IONICS. Both GBL and 1,4-butan-
ediol were target substances for Operation Knockout (see Psychotropic Substances of 1971
para. 41 above). 194. While the reporting of seizures of precursors of new
192. From other sources, INCB is aware of new methods psychoactive substances and substances recently placed
for the illicit manufacture of GBL and/or GHB, possibly in under international control continues to be unsystematic,
response to controls placed on GBL in China in September several countries, especially countries in Europe, report
2021.35 such seizures on form D. As in the past, most of the sei-
zures made in the reporting period involved precursors of
2. Precursors of ketamine synthetic cathinones. On form D for 2021, Austria and
France reported seizures of mephedrone precursors, spe-
193. Although there is no systematic reporting of infor-
cifically 139 kg of 2-bromo-4’-methylpropiophenone in
mation about precursors of ketamine and the illicit manu-
Austria, and 105 kg of 4-methylpropiophenone in France.
facture of the substance, some countries submit such data
The seizure in France concerned a transit shipment from
to INCB. Reported seizures of ketamine have predomi-
China to Ukraine. Poland reported seizures of 20 kg of
nantly involved two substances, “hydroxylimine”36 and
2-bromo-4’-chloropropiophenone (a precursor of 4-CMC
2-chlorophenyl cyclopentyl ketone. Both substances are
(clephedrone) and other 4-chloro-substituted cathinone
intermediates in the synthesis of ketamine and can be
derivatives) and more than 290 kg (in 11 incidents) of
2-bromo-4’-methoxypropiophenone (a methedrone
See INCB report on precursors for 2021 (E/INCB/2021/4), para. 28.
35 

“Hydroxylimine” is an informal term used to refer to the substance

36 

known chemically as 1-hydroxycyclopentyl (2-chlorophenyl)- 37 

“Hydroxylimine” has been under control in China since mid-2008
ketone-N-methylimine. and 2-chlorophenyl cyclopentyl ketone since September 2012.
36   INCB REPORT ON PRECURSORS 2022

precursor). In addition, the Republic of Moldova referred used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psy-
to a seizure of hydrochloric acid made in connection with chotropic substances, including with respect to the use of
the illicit manufacture of alpha-pyrrolidinopentiophenone the Internet for illicit purposes, and to continue to notify
(alpha-PVP). INCB of such information.
195. In the first 10 months of 2022, seven incidents 198. In 2017, in its resolution 60/5, the Commission
involving precursors of new psychoactive substances were encouraged Member States, INCB and UNODC to collect
communicated through PICS. They included two inci- data, analyse evidence and share information with respect
dents related to illicit laboratories in the Netherlands, to criminal activities conducted via the Internet relating to
involving 23 kg of a mephedrone precursor and 88 kg of a precursors, and to continue to strengthen legal, law
clephedrone precursor. In addition, seizures in the Russian enforcement and criminal justice responses, based on
Federation involving more than 8 tons of precursors of national legislation, as well as international cooperation,
mephedrone and alpha-PVP were communicated during to curb such illicit activities.
the same period. The internationally non-scheduled
chemicals had allegedly originated in China and transited Drivers of precursor trafficking over the
Kazakhstan before being seized in the Russian Federation. Internet
199. Past monitoring of the Internet by the Board’s sec-
retariat indicated that, from the early 2000s to the early
2010s, Internet-facilitated precursor trafficking appeared
IV. Facilitation of to be primarily driven by potential buyers of precursors

precursor seeking chemicals needed in illicit drug laboratories (see

figure 22). At that time, such buyers did not make much

trafficking through effort to hide their identity or activities. Their contact

details, and even those of vendors, were relatively easy to
the Internet: identify. Despite information being available that enabled
the identification of those involved, regulatory and law
a thematic study enforcement authorities often did not make use of that
information for follow-up inquiries or investigations, per-
haps owing to a lack of awareness and expertise.
196. As the use of the Internet and other computer net- Figure 22. Examples of Internet postings
works has grown rapidly in recent years, so have the advertising the intent to purchase
opportunities for Internet-facilitated drug trafficking. This precursors in the period 2008–2009
is also the case with regard to trafficking in precursor
chemicals. The misuse of the Internet (the surface web) for
the diversion of and trafficking in precursor chemicals was
first reported by the Board in its report on precursors for
2000, in relation to fatal accidents at illicit MDMA labora-
tories in Europe and North America. The laboratories
were operated by people with no background in chemistry
who had obtained the required recipes, chemicals and
equipment on the Internet.38 In the same year, the
Commission on Narcotic Drugs, in its resolution 43/8,
expressed its resolve to curtail the availability of controlled 200. Since the late 2010s, the situation has changed, with
pharmaceuticals and precursor chemicals for illicit pur- Internet posts related to precursors being dominated by
poses through the misuse of the World Wide Web. vendors or private sellers, as compared with the earlier
197. In 2011, the Commission, in its resolution 54/8, attempts, which were dominated by buyers. The advertise-
invited Member States to take appropriate measures to ments have also become more sophisticated compared
strengthen international cooperation and the exchange of with the relatively transparent methods noted earlier, with
information regarding the identification of new routes and the latest postings by vendors increasingly using Chemical
modi operandi of criminal organizations dedicated to the Abstracts Service (CAS) registry numbers in addition to,
diversion or smuggling of precursor chemicals frequently or instead of, chemical names and/or street names of con-
trolled precursors and non-scheduled chemicals. In addi-
tion, vendors have also resorted to the use of anonymizing
INCB report on precursors for 2000 (E/INCB/2000/4), para. 76.
38 
 IV.  Facilitation of precursor trafficking through the Internet: a thematic study   37

technologies such as virtual private network and proxy 203. As regards seizure, the Board has previously noted a
services39 to hide Internet protocol addresses and loca- phenomenon whereby incidents involving a particular
tions. Furthermore, while the initial contact between chemical decline significantly following its international
potential buyers and vendors of precursors and non- scheduling.41 Figure 24 illustrates this with regard to the
scheduled chemicals continues to be made on legitimate number of incidents and amounts of 3,4-MDP-2-P methyl
online platforms, including business-to-business and glycidate. Seizures of the substance have continued to
social media platforms, subsequent communications are decline following its scheduling in China in 2021.42 In
often carried out by means of encrypted systems that contrast to the decline in seizures of 3,4-MDP-2-P methyl
remain beyond the reach of law enforcement authorities.40 glycidate, seizures of 3,4-MDP-2-P ethyl glycidate emerged
in 2021 and increased significantly in 2022, both in terms
201. Regardless of whether it is driven by buyers or sell-
of the number of incidents and the amounts involved (see
ers, Internet-facilitated trafficking in precursors is always
figure 24). This trend corresponds to the large number of
influenced by the regulatory environment, at both the
Internet search records for the substance in that period.
international and national levels. Information derived
It is worth mentioning that neither 3,4-MDP-2-P methyl
from the monitoring of Internet activity may indicate
glycidate nor 3,4-MDP-2-P ethyl glycidate have any known
either the continued or discontinued interest of traffickers
legitimate use.
in chemicals after their scheduling.
Figure 24. Incidents involving 3,4-MDP-2-P methyl
202. The following figures provide an illustration of
glycidate and 3,4-MDP-2-P ethyl
changed patterns in relation to traffickers’ interest in two
glycidate communicated through PICS,
precursors of MDMA and related substances: 3,4-MDP-
2017–2022
2-P methyl glycidate (“PMK glycidate”), which was placed
in Table I of the 1988 Convention in November 2019, and 25 12 000

Amount seized (kilograms)

10 000
3,4-MDP-2-P ethyl glycidate (“PMK ethyl glycidate”), its
Number of incidents

20
8 000
internationally non-scheduled substitute. Prior to the 15
6 000
international scheduling of 3,4-MDP-2-P methyl glycidate 10
4 000
in 2019, the number of Internet search records for both 5 2 000
substances was relatively stable, however, once the sched-
0 0
uling was effected, searches for the non-scheduled 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022a

3,4-MDP-2-P ethyl glycidate grew at a much faster rate 3,4-MDP-2-P methyl glycidate (amount seized)
3,4-MDP-2-P ethyl glycidate (amount seized)
than those for the internationally controlled 3,4-MDP-2-P 3,4-MDP-2-P methyl glycidate (number of incidents)
methyl glycidate. The number of search records for 3,4-MDP-2-P ethyl glycidate (number of incidents)

3,4-MDP-2-P ethyl glycidate increased even further after The data only cover the first 10 months of 2022.
a 

China introduced national controls over 3,4-MDP-2-P

methyl glycidate in the second half of 2021 (see figure 23).
Addressing Internet-facilitated trafficking in
precursors
Figure 23. Number of Internet search records for
3,4-MDP-2-P methyl glycidate and 204. Although the awareness of Internet-facilitated traf-
3,4-MDP-2-P ethyl glycidate per year ficking in precursors has increased among competent
since 2017 national authorities, the actual magnitude of the problem,
in particular in terms of the number of suspicious websites
Number of search records

25 000 and listings on e-commerce and social media platforms

20 000 advertising the sale of precursor chemicals, including
those with no legitimate use, has also further increased.43
15 000
Nonetheless, the number of regulatory and/or law enforce-
10 000
ment investigations launched by competent national
5 000
41 
INCB report on precursors for 2021 (E/INCB/2021/4), para. 30
0
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 and figure I.
3,4-MDP-2-P methyl glycidate (CAS number: 13605-48-6)a
42 
Of the 57 cases involving the substances shared through PICS in
3,4-MDP-2-P ethyl glycidate (CAS number: 28578-16-7)a the period from 1 January 2017 to 15 September 2022, China, including
Hong Kong, was mentioned as the country of origin in 35 out of the 37
cases in which the country of origin was indicated.
Searches were done on the basis of CAS numbers.
a 
43 
Observations from Internet monitoring also indicate likely links
between multiple suspicious postings regarding precursors and non-
39 
Europol, The Internet Organized Crime Threat Assessment 2014 scheduled chemicals found on the surface web that contained the same
(The Hague, 2014), p. 21. contact details, suggesting that they had been posted by the same traf-
40 
Such as Telegram or Wickr. ficker or traffickers.
38   INCB REPORT ON PRECURSORS 2022

authorities worldwide in order to verify the legitimacy of  (b)  Hesitation to initiate investigations into suspicious
suspicious postings has remained very low. That is perhaps postings because they might represent scams rather than
attributable to the fact that many law enforcement officials legitimate trade in precursors;
may believe that suspicious postings on online trading
 (c)  Lack of sufficient proof of the buyer’s or vendor’s
platforms or suspicious websites are online scams rather
knowledge that a precursor proposed to be sold or bought
than advertisements by legitimate vendors with the capac-
online was intended to be used for the illicit manufacture
ity to supply the advertised precursor chemicals (see also
of drugs, leading to a perceived lack of legal grounds to
para. 207 below).
support the initiation of criminal investigations.
205. While limited, investigations into Internet-facilitated
208. In most countries, national precursor control meas-
precursor trafficking conducted since 2017 have produced
ures require the registration of precursor operators (i.e.
significant results, such as a seizure of nearly 10 tons of
manufacturers, importers, exporters, distributors or end
acetic anhydride in India in 2018, the largest seizure of the
users) with the competent national authorities, as well as a
substance in the country in the last two decades, and a sei-
general or individual authorization for the import and
zure of ephedrine and ketamine in India in 2022. Follow-up
export of controlled substances. The mandatory reporting
investigations into the latter case led to the identification
of domestic trade and distribution is also required in some
of a shipment of methamphetamine destined for Australia.
jurisdictions. As such measures are in place in a number of
The case also involved the use of cryptocurrencies for pay-
countries, the Board believes that the administrative veri-
ment and led to the arrest of the persons involved. A
fication of the postings and the authenticity of the infor-
common feature in both cases was the cooperation
mation contained in them, at least in respect of substances
between the authorities and the private business-to-
under national control, should not present a major chal-
business Internet platforms on which the suspicious post-
lenge for competent national authorities. Furthermore, the
ings were placed, which ultimately led to the seizures and
Board recommends that relevant Government agencies
arrests. In another case, backtracking investigations into
engage with the operators of legitimate online platforms to
seizures of acetic anhydride in Pakistan were supported by
obtain additional information that could assist in identify-
several other countries, including in the form of cyber-
ing persons or companies behind suspicious postings.
crime investigations in India, which resulted in the arrest
Operators of legitimate online platforms have repeatedly
of an individual who had been involved in the trafficking
confirmed their readiness to voluntarily provide such
of large amounts of the substance to Pakistan through the
information, upon request.
United Republic of Tanzania in 2016.44,45
209. Where information from the concerned Internet
206. These examples prove that investigations into
platforms about suspected illicit activities involving pre-
Internet-facilitated precursor trafficking contribute to the
cursors is difficult to obtain on a voluntary basis, specific
disruption of trafficking networks. Similar investigations
regulations covering precursor-related Internet postings
would also be required in other countries, in particular in
may strengthen the powers of competent national authori-
countries identified as main sources and end users of the
ties to obtain such information. Some Governments that
drug precursors.
already had successful voluntary cooperation arrange-
207. In 2021, the targeted, time-bound Operation ments with business-to-business platforms nevertheless
Acronym, which focused on precursor trafficking over the put in place specific regulations to include activities
Internet (the surface web), further assisted the Board in involving the offering for sale or distribution, or the medi-
identifying practical obstacles and legal challenges to ating in the sale or purchase, of controlled precursors
investigations related to precursors and cybercrime that through a website or social media, or in any other manner.
may have prevented the competent national authorities In addition, such specific regulations require online trad-
from launching investigations into suspicious online post- ing platforms that facilitate trade in precursor chemicals to
ings. The obstacles and challenges identified included the provide the details of transactions involving selected
following: precursors.46
 (a)  Lack of national regulations concerning the offer-
ing for sale or distribution, or the mediating in the sale or
purchase, of precursors through a website or social media;

44 
Faraz Khan, “CTD arrests two TTP suspects for ‘terror financing’”,
The News International, 29 January 2021.
INCB report on precursors for 2021 (E/INCB/2021/4), para. 172.
45 
INCB report on precursors for 2020 (E/INCB/2020/4), box 2.
46 
 IV.  Facilitation of precursor trafficking through the Internet: a thematic study   39

Box 5.  Approaches to addressing suspicious Internet postings

In view of the large number of suspicious Internet postings, some experts advocate for the removal of such postings
from the platforms concerned, as well as the provision of relevant information on suspicious vendors and buyers to law
enforcement authorities.a While the removal of listings of chemical precursors by private companies, deprioritizationb
or the entire removal of precursors and non-scheduled chemicals from the search indices may be seen to produce
measurable results, limited practical experience from targeted operational activities supported by INCB indicates that
if the removal of suspicious listings is not supported by follow-up investigations to identify prospective buyers or sellers
of the chemicals, such an approach may end up addressing only the symptoms but not the root cause of the problem.
Instances are known where the removal of suspicious postings by cooperative Internet platforms was followed by the
appearance of the same postings on other platforms that did not have established voluntary cooperation arrangements
with the respective competent national authorities. Therefore, some experts advocate for the adoption of other legal
and practical measures, such as the setting up of “spoof”c online advertisements for precursors or non-scheduled
chemicals on business-to-business websites or social media or other platforms, or the use of undercover operations,
including sting operations, to gather information on prospective buyers or sellers of related chemicals.d

Criminal investigations, including investigations into Internet-facilitated precursor trafficking, often involve cross-border
investigations and the gathering of electronic evidence. According to Europol, electronic evidence in any form is relevant
in approximately 85 per cent of all criminal investigations, and in almost two thirds of the investigations in which
electronic evidence is relevant, a request to service providers based in another jurisdiction is needed. Europol experts
on cybercrime investigation therefore advocate for the removal of certain legal obstacles faced by investigators, including
barriers to the retention and sharing of data by Internet service providers, clearer rules for registering Internet protocol
addresses and domains, a stronger focus on undercover activities, and increased efficiency and cross-border cooperation
in investigations, including electronic data exchange.e

Some Governments have put in place specific legislation or regulations that cover Internet postings relating to precur-
sors. During Operation Acronym, India, Thailand, the United Arab Emirates and the United States were among the
countries that informed INCB that Internet-facilitated trade in at least one of the seven internationally controlled target
substances was subject to national control. In addition, the Board is aware of specific regulations applied in some
countries, such as China, where all entities that sell precursors over the Internet are required to be registered with the
competent national authorities.f Some, but not all, European Union member States participating in Operation Acronym
confirmed that trade in target substances through the Internet was subject to national control. The variety in the
responses by European Union member States indicates the different ways in which the term “Internet-facilitated trade”
in precursors is interpreted. Some countries evidently believe that regulation of precursors covers Internet activities
only when they result in actual trade and not when they remain limited to intermediary activities carried out through
the Internet, such as the advertising for the sale or purchase of precursors through business-to-business and social
media platforms and websites.

United States Commission on Combating Synthetic Opioid Trafficking, Final Report (February 2022), p. 44. Available at www.rand.org/pubs/exter-
a 

nal_publications/EP68838.html.
b 
Defined as the forced placement of relevant pages at the bottom of search result rankings.
“Spoofing” refers to a type of scam in which a criminal disguises an email address, display name, phone number, text message or website address
c 

to convince a target that he or she is interacting with a known, trusted source.

d 
United States Commission on Combating Synthetic Opioid Trafficking, Final Report, p. 43.
e 
Europol, Internet Organized Crime Threat Assessment 2021, p. 39.
INCB report on precursors for 2017 (E/INCB/2017/4), para. 232.
f 
40   INCB REPORT ON PRECURSORS 2022

Way forward gaps in data continue to exist, in both quantitative and

qualitative terms, as the amounts of precursors seized con-
210. As the Internet continues to be targeted in various tinue to be significantly lower than the amounts of the
ways as a medium for facilitating precursor trafficking, end-product equivalents seized, especially in relation to
there is a need for Governments to prioritize this issue and methamphetamine and its precursors. The data for 2021
put in place a comprehensive solution that would cover the may indicate the existence of manufacturing sites in as yet
entire spectrum, from voluntary cooperation measures unaffected countries and regions. Notable data gaps are
with relevant Internet industries, to the monitoring of and also found in relation to the flows of precursors of amphet-
investigations into suspicious postings, and to specific leg- amine and the illicit manufacture of the substance, as the
islative measures to support law enforcement efforts. The key ingredient of fake “captagon” pills that are seized in
Board, accordingly, encourages Governments to effec- massive amounts, especially in countries in West Asia.
tively implement the recommendations contained in
Commission on Narcotic Drugs resolution 54/8 and to 214. In that connection, INCB continues to be con-
adopt a balanced approach to preventing the Internet- cerned about flows of precursors in countries affected by
facilitated diversion and smuggling of precursor chem- conflict, unresolved territorial disputes, weak rule of law
icals. Furthermore, the Board recommends that, in or other circumstances that hinder the exercise of effective
doing so, authorities introduce law enforcement control. The countries concerned, as well as international
actions to identify and prosecute the traffickers respon- trading partners, need to more carefully scrutinize the
sible for such activities in order to disrupt their activi- potential modus operandi of criminal networks to deter-
ties. Where this is not possible, as a minimum, and in mine how traffickers are obtaining chemicals and moving
accordance with national circumstances and regula- them to the sites of illicit manufacture. Given the lack of
tions, authorities may consider engaging with the oper- capacity as one possible reason for the limited knowledge
ators of the Internet platforms concerned to encourage in this area, the Board encourages Governments, inter-
the removal of suspicious postings. The Board stands national donors and organizations and other relevant
ready to continue providing all necessary support to partners that engage in technical cooperation pro-
those ends. grammes to work together to build capacities and
operational knowledge to prevent chemicals from
being diverted into illicit drug manufacture.
215. A significant share of the chemicals seized globally
V. Conclusions and continues to comprise chemicals diverted from domestic
distribution channels, including common markets. As reg-
recommendations ulating the domestic market and monitoring domestic
sales and distribution pursuant to article 12, paragraph 8,
of the 1988 Convention is the exclusive prerogative of
211. The present chapter summarizes the key conclu- Governments, knowledge of industry landscapes at the
sions of this report and provides recommendations to national level is a critical first step in protecting these licit
Governments, with a view to preventing trafficking in markets and their operators from traffickers. To aid
precursors and strengthening the functioning of the Governments in acquiring or enhancing such knowledge,
precursor control system at the national, regional and INCB has prepared and disseminated an additional guid-
international levels. Specific recommendations and con- ance document on categories of relevant industries, which
clusions are also incorporated in the other chapters of the is also available on the Board’s secure website. The Board
report, presented in bold text. encourages Governments to establish whether the dif-
ferent categories of industries that might be involved
212. In the reporting period, many of the Board’s earlier in the manufacture, trade or distribution of chemicals
observations were confirmed, such as the continued emer- used for illicit drug manufacture are present in their
gence of non-scheduled alternative chemicals for use in country, as well as their sizes and geographical spread.
the illicit manufacture of an ever-wider range of drugs. Such an exercise would allow Governments to
There was also a re-emergence of trends that had disap- approach and eventually engage industries in self-
peared for some time, such as the diversion of pharmaceu- protective, proactive strategies aimed at both reducing
tical preparations containing ephedrines, in particular opportunities for infiltration by traffickers and facili-
pseudoephedrine. tating the monitoring of the potential evolution of illicit
213. The resurgence of diversions of pharmaceutical drug markets.
preparations containing controlled precursors may explain
some of the illicit drug manufacturing trends. However,
 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS   41

216. Given the number of cases described in this report to ensure the removal of such postings, in cases where
that involved precursors under international control and investigation is not possible.
that came to light through the use of the PEN Online
219. Only 45 per cent of Governments submitted their
system and the system of estimated annual legitimate
annual precursor statistics on form D for 2021 on time,
requirements, the importance of these tools in preventing
that is, by 30 June 2022, continuing a pattern that has been
the diversion of precursors from legitimate international
observed for several years. Once all forms that had been
trade has once again been proved. However, INCB notes
received as at 1 November 2022 were considered, the per-
that there continues to be a gap between the regulatory
centage of Governments that submitted form D increased
action of stopping a proposed shipment from proceeding
to 66 per cent. While the timeliness and number of sub-
and the necessary law enforcement investigations into the
missions are basic indicators of compliance, the quality of
background of the consignment, including how and by
submissions is what enables the Board, and the countries
whom it was ordered and the details of the shipping docu-
concerned, to identify the strengths and weaknesses of
ments and the consignee, to identify traffickers and pre-
national, regional and international precursor control sys-
vent them from targeting companies using similar modi
tems. The Board would therefore like to reiterate the
operandi elsewhere. The Board therefore encourages
critical importance of the quality, comprehensiveness
the regulatory and law enforcement authorities con-
and timeliness of data on precursors for meaningful
cerned to improve their cooperation at the national
analyses, the identification of new developments and
level and with their international counterparts. The
action to prevent the diversion of chemicals and their
Board also encourages them to treat stopped ship-
use in illicit laboratories.
ments as the starting point of investigations to identify
traffickers and new modi operandi, including back- 220. Finally, the Board would also like to reiterate that,
tracking investigations. in addition to chemicals, equipment is also essential for
illicit drug manufacture. The Board has therefore expanded
217. With regard to substances not included in Table I or
its work in relation to such equipment, with a view to
Table II of the 1988 Convention, INCB welcomes
enhancing the implementation of article 13 of the 1988
Commission on Narcotic Drugs resolution 65/3, in par-
Convention. A first technical report on essential equip-
ticular the recommendation to Governments, when plac-
ment was launched in October 2022 and is available on the
ing domestic controls on a substance pursuant to a decision
Board’s website. INCB stands ready to fully support
by the Commission to add that substance to Table I
Governments in their efforts to implement articles 12
or Table II, to consider also taking domestic measures on
and 13 of the 1988 Convention, with regard to precur-
related chemicals that may readily be converted to or sub-
sors under international control, chemicals not
stituted for that substance, in accordance with national
included in the tables of the Convention, and illicit
legislation. The Board encourages Governments to
drug manufacturing equipment.
implement that recommendation in order to prevent
more proactively the exploitation by traffickers of
groups of substances that are chemically related to
controlled precursors, including derivatives and ana-
logues of such precursors.
218. A modus operandi that the Board has observed and
to which it has alerted Governments for some time is the
use of the Internet, including websites and business-to-
business and social media platforms, to advertise for the
sale or purchase of precursor chemicals, regardless of
whether or not they are internationally controlled.
Chapter IV of this report examined the subject of Internet-
facilitated precursor trafficking and highlighted the need
for Governments to give due attention to precursor-related
postings on such platforms. In that connection, the
Board encourages Governments to monitor the
Internet (the surface web) for suspicious postings
regarding precursors and to investigate them with a
view to identifying the traffickers involved and dis-
rupting their activities. Voluntary cooperation with
such Internet platforms can also be gainfully utilized
42   INCB REPORT ON PRECURSORS 2022

Glossary
In the present report, the following terms and definitions have been used:

chemical intermediate A chemical generated during a multi-step synthesis process that is normally not iso-
lated but immediately consumed in the next synthesis step. Stable chemical intermedi-
ates can be isolated and have been encountered as purpose-made substitute chemicals
for controlled precursors

designer precursor A close chemical relative of a controlled precursor that is purpose-made to circumvent
controls and usually does not have any recognized legitimate use

diversion The transfer of substances from licit to illicit channels

forensic profiling analysis In-depth laboratory analysis to trace any by-products generated during illicit manufac-
ture, with a view to, inter alia, identifying the precursors used in such manufacture

immediate precursor A precursor that is generally only one reaction step away from the end product

industrial-scale laboratory A laboratory for the manufacture of synthetic drugs in which oversized equipment
and/or glassware that is either custom-made or purchased from industrial processing
sources and/or that uses serial reactions is used and in which significant amounts of
drugs are produced in very short periods of time, the amount being limited only by the
need for access to precursors and other essential chemicals in adequate quantities and
for the logistics and workers to handle large amounts of drugs and chemicals

limited international special A list prepared, pursuant to Economic and Social Council resolution 1996/29, and
surveillance list of non- regularly updated by INCB that includes substitute and alternative chemicals, as well as
scheduled substances groups of common derivatives and other related substances that can be converted into
one of the scheduled precursors by readily applicable means, and for which substantial
information exists on their use in illicit drug manufacture

pharmaceutical preparation A preparation for therapeutic (human or veterinary) use in its finished dosage form
that contains precursors present in such a way that they can be used or recovered by
readily applicable means; such preparations may be presented in their retail packaging
or in bulk

precursor In general, a starting material used to manufacture a narcotic drug, psychotropic sub-
stance or another precursor; sometimes used to refer exclusively to the substances in
Table I and Table II of the 1988 Convention

pre-precursor A precursor of a precursor

seizure An act of prohibiting the transfer, conversion, disposition or movement of property or

assuming custody of or control over property on the basis of an order issued by a court
or competent authority; it may be temporary or permanent (i.e. confiscation); different
national legal systems may use different terms

stopped shipment A shipment permanently withheld, either because reasonable grounds exist to believe
that it may constitute an attempted diversion, or as a result of administrative problems
or because of other grounds for concern or suspicion

suspicious order An order (or transaction) of questionable, dishonest or unusual character or condition,
(or suspicious transaction) for which there is reason to believe that a chemical that is being ordered, imported or
exported or is transiting a country or territory is destined for the illicit manufacture of
narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances
 Annex I  43

Annex I

Parties and non-parties to the United Nations

Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances of 1988, by region,
as at 1 November 2022
Note:  The date on which the instrument of ratification or accession was deposited is indicated in parentheses.

Region Party to the 1988 Convention Non-party to the 1988 Convention

AFRICA Algeria Eritrea Equatorial Guinea
(9 May 1995) (30 January 2002)

Angola Eswatini Somalia

(26 October 2005) (8 October 1995)

Benin Ethiopia South Sudan

(23 May 1997) (11 October 1994)

Botswana Gabon
(13 August 1996) (10 July 2006)

Burkina Faso Gambia

(2 June 1992) (23 April 1996)

Burundi Ghana
(18 February 1993) (10 April 1990)

Cabo Verde Guinea

(8 May 1995) (27 December 1990)

Cameroon Guinea-Bissau
(28 October 1991) (27 October 1995)

Central African Republic Kenya

(15 October 2001) (19 October 1992)
Chad Lesotho
(9 June 1995) (28 March 1995)

Comoros Liberia
(1 March 2000) (16 September 2005)

Congo Libya
(3 March 2004) (22 July 1996)

Côte d’Ivoire Madagascar

(25 November 1991) (12 March 1991)

Democratic Republic Malawi

of the Congo (12 October 1995)
(28 October 2005)
Djibouti Mali
(22 February 2001) (31 October 1995)

Egypt Mauritania
(15 March 1991) (1 July 1993)
44   INCB REPORT ON PRECURSORS 2022

Region Party to the 1988 Convention Non-party to the 1988 Convention

Mauritius Sierra Leone
(6 March 2001) (6 June 1994)

Morocco South Africa

(28 October 1992) (14 December 1998)

Mozambique Sudan
(8 June 1998) (19 November 1993)

Namibia Togo
(6 March 2009) (1 August 1990)
Niger Tunisia
(10 November 1992) (20 September 1990)
Nigeria Uganda
(1 November 1989) (20 August 1990)
Rwanda United Republic of Tanzania
(13 May 2002) (17 April 1996)

Sao Tome and Principe Zambia

(20 June 1996) (28 May 1993)

Senegal Zimbabwe
(27 November 1989) (30 July 1993)

Seychelles
(27 February 1992)

Regional total
51 3
54

AMERICAS Antigua and Barbuda Dominica

(5 April 1993) (30 June 1993)

Argentina Dominican Republic

(10 June 1993) (21 September 1993)

Bahamas Ecuador
(30 January 1989) (23 March 1990)

Barbados El Salvador
(15 October 1992) (21 May 1993)

Belize Grenada
(24 July 1996) (10 December 1990)

Bolivia (Plurinational State of) Guatemala

(20 August 1990) (28 February 1991)

Brazil Guyana
(17 July 1991) (19 March 1993)

Canada Haiti
(5 July 1990) (18 September 1995)

Chile Honduras
(13 March 1990) (11 December 1991)

Colombia Jamaica
(10 June 1994) (29 December 1995)

Costa Rica Mexico

(8 February 1991) (11 April 1990)
Cuba Nicaragua
(12 June 1996) (4 May 1990)
 Annex I  45

Region Party to the 1988 Convention Non-party to the 1988 Convention

Panama Suriname
(13 January 1994) (28 October 1992)

Paraguay Trinidad and Tobago

(23 August 1990) (17 February 1995)
Peru United States of America
(16 January 1992) (20 February 1990)

Saint Kitts and Nevis Uruguay

(19 April 1995) (10 March 1995)

Saint Lucia Venezuela

(21 August 1995) (Bolivarian Republic of)
(16 July 1991)
Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines
(17 May 1994)

Regional total
35 0
35

ASIA Afghanistan Japan

(14 February 1992) (12 June 1992)

Armenia Jordan
(13 September 1993) (16 April 1990)

Azerbaijan Kazakhstan
(22 September 1993) (29 April 1997)

Bahrain Kuwait
(7 February 1990) (3 November 2000)

Bangladesh Kyrgyzstan
(11 October 1990) (7 October 1994)

Bhutan Lao People’s Democratic

(27 August 1990) Republic (1 October 2004)

Brunei Darussalam Lebanon

(12 November 1993) (11 March 1996)

Cambodia Malaysia
(2 April 2005) (11 May 1993)

China Maldives
(25 October 1989) (7 September 2000)

Democratic People’s Mongolia

Republic of Korea (25 June 2003)
(19 March 2007)
Georgia Myanmar
(8 January 1998) (11 June 1991)

India Nepal
(27 March 1990) (24 July 1991)

Indonesia Oman
(23 February 1999) (15 March 1991)

Iran (Islamic Republic of) Pakistan

(7 December 1992) (25 October 1991)

Iraq Philippines
(22 July 1998) (7 June 1996)

Israel Qatar
(20 March 2002) (4 May 1990)
46   INCB REPORT ON PRECURSORS 2022

Region Party to the 1988 Convention Non-party to the 1988 Convention

Republic of Korea Timor-Leste
(28 December 1998) (3 June 2014)
Saudi Arabia Türkiyea
(9 January 1992) (2 April 1996)
Singapore Turkmenistan
(23 October 1997) (21 February 1996)
Sri Lanka United Arab Emirates
(6 June 1991) (12 April 1990)

State of Palestine Uzbekistan

(29 December 2017) (24 August 1995)

Syrian Arab Republic Viet Nam

(3 September 1991) (4 November 1997)

Tajikistan Yemen
(6 May 1996) (25 March 1996)

Thailand
(3 May 2002)

Regional total
47 0
47

EUROPE Albania Franceb

(27 July 2001) (31 December 1990)

Andorra Germanyb
(23 July 1999) (30 November 1993)

Austriab Greeceb
(11 July 1997) (28 January 1992)

Belarus Holy See

(15 October 1990) (25 January 2012)

Belgiumb Hungaryb
(25 October 1995) (15 November 1996)

Bosnia and Herzegovina Iceland

(1 September 1993) (2 September 1997)

Bulgariab Irelandb
(24 September 1992) (3 September 1996)

Croatiab Italyb
(26 July 1993) (31 December 1990)

Cyprusb Latviab
(25 May 1990) (25 February 1994)

Czechiab Liechtenstein
(30 December 1993) (9 March 2007)

Denmarkb Lithuaniab
(19 December 1991) (8 June 1998)

Estoniab Luxembourgb
(12 July 2000) (29 April 1992)

Finlandb Maltab
(15 February 1994) (28 February 1996)
 Annex I  47

Region Party to the 1988 Convention Non-party to the 1988 Convention

Monaco San Marino
(23 April 1991) (10 October 2000)

Montenegro Serbia
(3 June 2006) (3 January 1991)

Netherlandsb Slovakiab
(8 September 1993) (28 May 1993)

North Macedonia Sloveniab

(13 October 1993) (6 July 1992)
Norway Spainb
(14 November 1994) (13 August 1990)
Polandb Swedenb
(26 May 1994) (22 July 1991)
Portugalb Switzerland
(3 December 1991) (14 September 2005)

Republic of Moldova United Kingdom of

(15 February 1995) Great Britain
and Northern Irelandc
(28 June 1991)
Romaniab Ukraine
(21 January 1993) (28 August 1991)

Russian Federation European Uniond

(17 December 1990) (31 December 1990)

Regional total
46 0
46

OCEANIA Australia New Zealand Kiribati

(16 November 1992) (16 December 1998)

Cook Islands Niue Papua New Guinea

(22 February 2005) (16 July 2012)

Fiji Palau Solomon Islands

(25 March 1993) (14 August 2019)

Marshall Islands Samoa Tuvalu

(5 November 2010) (19 August 2005)

Micronesia Tonga
(Federated States of) (29 April 1996)
(6 July 2004)

Nauru Vanuatu
(12 July 2012) (26 January 2006)

Regional total
12 4
16

World total
191 7
198

a 
Since 31 May 2022, “Türkiye” has replaced “Turkey” as the short name used in the United Nations.
b 
State member of the European Union.
c 
The United Kingdom ceased to be a member of the European Union on 31 January 2020.
d 
Extent of competence: article 12.
48   INCB REPORT ON PRECURSORS 2022

Annex II

Submission of information by Governments, pursuant

to article 12 of the United Nations Convention against
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances of 1988, on form D for the years 2017–2021
Notes: The names of non-metropolitan territories and special administrative regions are in italics.
A blank signifies that form D was not received.
“X” signifies that a completed form D (or equivalent report) was submitted (including forms in which all
fields contained “nil”, “0”, “none”, etc.).
Entries for parties to the 1988 Convention (and for the years that they have been parties) are shaded.

Country or territory 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

Afghanistan X X X X
Albania X X X X
Algeria X X X
Andorra X X X X
Angola X X X
Anguillaa
Antigua and Barbuda
Argentina X X X X X
Armenia X X X X X
Aruba a

Ascension
Australia X X X X
Austria b
X X X X X
Azerbaijan X X X X X
Bahamas
Bahrain X X X X X
Bangladesh X
Barbados
Belarus X X X X
Belgium b
X X X X X
Belize X
Benin X X X
Bermuda a

Bhutan X X X X X
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) X X X X X
Bosnia and Herzegovina X X X X X
Botswana X X X X
Brazil X X X X
British Virgin Islandsa
 Annex II  49

Country or territory 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

Brunei Darussalam X X X X X
Bulgaria b
X X X X X
Burkina Faso
Burundi X
Cabo Verde X X
Cambodia
Cameroon X X X
Canada X X X X X
Cayman Islands a

Central African Republic

Chad X
Chile X X X X X
China X X X X
China, Hong Kong SAR X X X
China, Macao SAR X
Christmas Island a,c

Cocos (Keeling) Islandsa,c

Colombia X X X X X
Comoros
Congo
Cook Islands
Costa Rica X X X X X
Côte d’Ivoire
Croatiab X X X X X
Cuba
Curaçao X X X
Cyprusb X X X X X
Czechia X X X X X
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea X X X X
Democratic Republic of the Congo X X X X X
Denmark b
X X X X X
Djibouti
Dominica X X X
Dominican Republic X X X X X
Ecuador X X X X X
Egypt X X X X X
El Salvador X X X X X
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Estoniab X X X X X
Eswatini d

Ethiopia
Falkland Islands (Malvinas)
Fiji
Finlandb X X X X X
50   INCB REPORT ON PRECURSORS 2022

Country or territory 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

Franceb X X X X X
French Polynesia a

Gabon X X X X
Gambia
Georgia X X X X X
Germany b
X X X X X
Ghana X X X X
Gibraltar
Greeceb X X X X
Grenada
Guatemala X X X X X
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana X X X
Haiti X X X
Holy See e

Honduras X X X X X
Hungary b
X X X X X
Iceland X X X X
India X X X X X
Indonesia X X X X
Iran (Islamic Republic of) X X X X X
Iraq X X X
Irelandb X X X X X
Israel X X X X X
Italy b
X X X X X
Jamaica X X X X X
Japan X X X X X
Jordan X X X X X
Kazakhstan X X X X X
Kenya X X
Kiribati
Kuwait X
Kyrgyzstan X X X X
Lao People’s Democratic Republic X X X X X
Latvia b
X X X X X
Lebanon X X X X X
Lesotho
Liberia
Libya
Liechtensteinf
Lithuaniab X X X X X
Luxembourgb X X X X
Madagascar X X X X
Malawi
 Annex II  51

Country or territory 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

Malaysia X X X X X
Maldives X X
Mali
Maltab X X X X X
Marshall Islands
Mauritania X
Mauritius X X X X
Mexico X X X X X
Micronesia (Federated States of) X
Monaco X X X X X
Mongolia X X
Montenegro X X X X X
Montserrat a
X X
Morocco X X X X X
Mozambique X X X X
Myanmar X X X X X
Namibia
Nauru
Nepal X X
Netherlandsb X X X X X
New Caledonia a

New Zealand X X X X X
Nicaragua X X X X X
Niger X
Nigeria X X X X X
Niue
Norfolk Islanda,c X
North Macedonia g
X X X
Norway X X X X X
Oman X
Pakistan X X X X
Palau
Panama X X X X X
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay X X X X
Peru X X X X
Philippines X X X X X
Poland b
X X X X X
Portugal b
X X X X X
Qatar X X X X X
Republic of Korea X X X X
Republic of Moldova X X X X
Romaniab X X X X X
Russian Federation X X X X X
Rwanda X X
52   INCB REPORT ON PRECURSORS 2022

Country or territory 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

Saint Helena
Saint Kitts and Nevis
Saint Lucia X X X X X
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines X X X
Samoa
San Marino X X
Sao Tome and Principe
Saudi Arabia X X X X X
Senegal X
Serbia X X X X X
Seychelles
Sierra Leone X X X X
Singapore X X X X X
Sint Maarten
Slovakiab X X X X X
Slovenia b
X X X X X
Solomon Islands
Somalia
South Africa X X X X X
South Sudan X X
Spainb X X X X X
Sri Lanka X X X
Sudan X X X X X
Suriname X X X
Swedenb X X X X X
Switzerland X X X X X
Syrian Arab Republic X X X X X
Tajikistan X X X X X
Thailand X X X X X
Timor-Leste X
Togo X
Tonga
Trinidad and Tobago X X X X X
Tristan da Cunha
Tunisia X X X X
Türkiye h
X X X X X
Turkmenistan X
Turks and Caicos Islands a

Tuvalu
Uganda X X X X
Ukraine X X X X X
United Arab Emirates X X X X X
United Kingdom of Great Britain and
X X X X X
Northern Irelandi
United Republic of Tanzania X X X X X
 Annex II  53

Country or territory 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

United States of America X X X X X
Uruguay X X X X X
Uzbekistan X X X X X
Vanuatu
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) X X X X X
Viet Nam X X X
Wallis and Futuna Islandsa
Yemen X X X
Zambia
Zimbabwe X X X X X
Total number of Governments that
122 129 134 126 127
submitted form D
Total number of Governments requested
213 213 213 213 213
to provide information

a
 Territorial application of the 1988 Convention has been confirmed by the authorities concerned.
b
 State member of the European Union.
c
 Information was provided by Australia.
d
 Since 19 April 2018, “Eswatini” has replaced “Swaziland” as the short name used in the United Nations.
e
 The Holy See did not furnish form D separately as its data are included in the report of Italy.
f
 Liechtenstein did not furnish form D separately as its data are included in the report of Switzerland.
g
 Since 14 February 2019, “North Macedonia” has replaced “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” as the short name used in the United
Nations.
h
 Since 31 May 2022, “Türkiye” has replaced “Turkey” as the short name used in the United Nations.
i
 The United Kingdom ceased to be a member of the European Union on 31 January 2020.
54   INCB REPORT ON PRECURSORS 2022

Annex III

Seizures of substances in Tables I and II of the United

Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988, as
reported to the International Narcotics Control Board,
2017–2021
1.  Tables A and B show information on seizures of the substances included in Tables I and II of the United Nations
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988, furnished to the International
Narcotics Control Board (INCB) by Governments in accordance with article 12, paragraph 12, of the Convention. To
enhance user-friendliness, tables A and B have not been included in the present report but are available in spread-
sheet format on the INCB website, in the section on the annual reports on precursors.
 Annex IV  55

Annex IV

Submission of information by Governments on licit

trade in, legitimate uses of and requirements for
substances in Tables I and II of the United Nations
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances of 1988 for the years
2017–2021
Notes: The names of non-metropolitan territories and special administrative regions are in italics.
A blank signifies that no information was provided.
“X” signifies that a completed form D (or equivalent report) was submitted (including forms in which all
fields contained “nil”, “0”, “none”, etc.).

2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

Uses Uses Uses Uses Uses
Country or territory and/or and/or and/or and/or and/or
Trade Trade Trade Trade Trade
require- require- require- require- require-
ments ments ments ments ments
Afghanistan X X X X X X X
Albania X X X X X X X X
Algeria X X X X X
Andorra X X X X X
Angola X X X X
Anguilla
Antigua and
Barbuda
Argentina X X X X X X X X X X
Armenia X X X X X X X
Aruba
Ascension
Australia X X X X X X X
Austria a
X X X X X X X X X X
Azerbaijan X X X X X X X X
Bahamas
Bahrain X X X X X X X X X X
Bangladesh X X
Barbados
Belarus X X X X X X X
Belgium a
X X X X X X X X X X
Belize X X
Benin X X X X X X
Bermuda
Bhutan X X X X X X X X X X
56   INCB REPORT ON PRECURSORS 2022

2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

Uses Uses Uses Uses Uses
Country or territory and/or and/or and/or and/or and/or
Trade Trade Trade Trade Trade
require- require- require- require- require-
ments ments ments ments ments
Bolivia
(Plurinational X X X X X X X X X X
State of)
Bosnia and
X X X X X X X X
Herzegovina
Botswana X X X X X
Brazil X X X X X X X X
British Virgin
Islands
Brunei
X X X X X X X X X
Darussalam
Bulgariaa X X X X X X X X X X
Burkina Faso
Burundi X X
Cabo Verde X X X X
Cambodia
Cameroon X X X
Canada X X X X X X X X X X
Cayman Islands
Central African
Republic
Chad
Chile X X X X X X X X X X
China X X X X X X X X
China, Hong
X X X X X X
Kong SAR
China, Macao
X X
SAR
Christmas Island
Cocos (Keeling)
Islands
Colombia X X X X X X X X X X
Comoros
Congo
Cook Islands
Costa Rica X X X X X X X X X X
Côte d’Ivoire
Croatiaa X X X X X X X X X
Cuba
Curaçao X X X X X X
Cyprus X X X X X X X X X X
Czechia a
X X X X X X X X X X
Democratic
People’s Republic X X X X X
of Korea
 Annex IV  57

2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

Uses Uses Uses Uses Uses
Country or territory and/or and/or and/or and/or and/or
Trade Trade Trade Trade Trade
require- require- require- require- require-
ments ments ments ments ments
Democratic
Republic of the X X X X X X X X
Congo
Denmarka X X X X X X X
Djibouti
Dominica
Dominican
X X X X X X X X X X
Republic
Ecuador X X X X X X X X X X
Egypt X X X X X X X X X X
El Salvador X X X X X X X X X X
Equatorial
Guinea
Eritrea
Estoniaa X X X X X X
Eswatinib
Ethiopia
Falkland Islands
(Malvinas)
Fiji
Finlanda X X X X X X X X X
France a
X X X X X X X X X X
French Polynesia
Gabon X X X X X
Gambia
Georgia X X X X X X X X X X
Germany a
X X X X X X X X X X
Ghana X X X X X X X X
Gibraltar
Greecea X X X X X X
Grenada
Guatemala X X X X X X X X X X
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana X X X X
Haiti X X X X X
Holy See c

Honduras X X X X X X X X X X
Hungarya X X X X X X X X X X
Iceland X X X X X X X X
India X X X X X X X X X X
Indonesia X X X X X X
Iran (Islamic
X X X X X X X X X X
Republic of)
58   INCB REPORT ON PRECURSORS 2022

2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

Uses Uses Uses Uses Uses
Country or territory and/or and/or and/or and/or and/or
Trade Trade Trade Trade Trade
require- require- require- require- require-
ments ments ments ments ments
Iraq X X X X
Irelanda X X X X X X X X X X
Israel X X X X X X X X X X
Italy a
X X X X X X X X X X
Jamaica X X X X X X X X X X
Japan X X X X X X X X X X
Jordan X X X X X X X X X X
Kazakhstan X X X X X X X X X X
Kenya X X X X
Kiribati
Kuwait X X
Kyrgyzstan X X X X X X X X
Lao People’s
Democratic X X X X X X X X X X
Republic
Latviaa X X X X X X X X X X
Lebanon X X X X X X X X X X
Lesotho
Liberia
Libya
Liechtensteind
Lithuaniaa X X X X X X X X X X
Luxembourg a
X X
Madagascar X X X X X X X X
Malawi
Malaysia X X X X X X X X X X
Maldives X X X X
Mali
Maltaa X X X X X X X X X
Marshall Islands
Mauritania
Mauritius X X X X X X X X
Mexico X X X X X X X X X
Micronesia
(Federated States X X
of)
Monaco X X X X X X X X
Mongolia X X X X
Montenegro X X X X X X X X X X
Montserrat X X X
Morocco X X X X X X X X X X
Mozambique X
Myanmar X X X X X X X X X X
Namibia
 Annex IV  59

2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

Uses Uses Uses Uses Uses
Country or territory and/or and/or and/or and/or and/or
Trade Trade Trade Trade Trade
require- require- require- require- require-
ments ments ments ments ments
Nauru
Nepal X X
Netherlands a
X X X X X X X X X
New Caledonia
New Zealand X X X X X X X X X X
Nicaragua X X X X X X X X X
Niger
Nigeria X X X X X X X X
Niue
Norfolk Islande
North Macedoniaf X X X X
Norway X X X X X X X X X X
Oman X X
Pakistan X X X X X X X X X X
Palau
Panama X X X X X X X X X
Papua New
Guinea
Paraguay X X X X
Peru X X X X X X X X
Philippines X X X X X X X X X X
Polanda X X X X X X X X X X
Portugal a
X X X X X X X X X X
Qatar X X X X X X X X X
Republic of Korea X X X X X X X X
Republic of
X X X X X
Moldova
Romaniaa X X X X X X X X X X
Russian
X X X X X X X X X X
Federation
Rwanda X X X X
Saint Helena
Saint Kitts and
Nevis
Saint Lucia X X X X X X X X X
Saint Vincent and
X X X X X X
the Grenadines
Samoa
San Marinoc X X
Sao Tome and
Principe
Saudi Arabia X X X X X X X X X
Senegal X X
Serbia X X X X X X X X X X
60   INCB REPORT ON PRECURSORS 2022

2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

Uses Uses Uses Uses Uses
Country or territory and/or and/or and/or and/or and/or
Trade Trade Trade Trade Trade
require- require- require- require- require-
ments ments ments ments ments
Seychelles
Sierra Leone X X X X X X X
Singapore X X X X
Sint Maarten
Slovakiaa X X X X X X X X X X
Slovenia a
X X X X X X X X X X
Solomon Islands
Somalia
South Africa X X X X X X X X X X
South Sudan X X X X
Spain a
X X X X X X X X X
Sri Lanka X X X X X X
Sudan X X X X X X X X X X
Suriname X X
Swedena X X X X X X X X X
Switzerland X X X X X X X X X X
Syrian Arab
X X X X X X X
Republic
Tajikistan X X X X X X X X
Thailand X X X X X X X X X X
Timor-Leste X X
Togo X X
Tonga
Trinidad and
X X X X X X X X X X
Tobago
Tristan da Cunha
Tunisia X X X X X X X X
Türkiye g
X X X X X X X X
Turkmenistan X X
Turks and Caicos
Islands
Tuvalu
Uganda X X X X X X X X
Ukraine X X X X X X X X X X
United Arab
X X X X X X X X X
Emirates
United Kingdom
of Great Britain
X X X X X X X X X
and Northern
Irelandh
United Republic
X X X X X X X X X X
of Tanzania
United States of
X X X X X X X X X X
America
Uruguay X X X X X X X X X X
 Annex IV  61

2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

Uses Uses Uses Uses Uses
Country or territory and/or and/or and/or and/or and/or
Trade Trade Trade Trade Trade
require- require- require- require- require-
ments ments ments ments ments
Uzbekistan X X X X X X X X X X
Vanuatu
Venezuela
(Bolivarian X X X X X X X X X
Republic of)
Viet Nam X X X X
Wallis and
Futuna Islands
Yemen X X X X X
Zambia
Zimbabwe X X X X X X
Total number of
Governments
that submitted 117 113 117 111 118 106 116 106 117 106
information on
form D

Total number of
Governments
requested to 213 213 213 213 213 213 213 213 213 213
provide
information

a 
State member of the European Union.
b 
Since 19 April 2018, “Eswatini” has replaced “Swaziland” as the short name used in the United Nations.
c 
The Government of Italy includes on form D licit trade data for the Holy See.
d 
The Government of Switzerland includes on form D licit trade data for Liechtenstein.
e 
The information was provided by Australia.
f 
Since 14 February 2019, “North Macedonia” has replaced “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” as the short name used in the United Nations.
g 
Since 31 May 2022, “Türkiye” has replaced “Turkey” as the short name used in the United Nations.
h 
The United Kingdom ceased to be a member of the European Union on 31 January 2020.
62   INCB REPORT ON PRECURSORS 2022

Annex V

Annual legitimate requirements for ephedrine,

pseudoephedrine, 3,4-methylenedioxyphenyl-2-
propanone and 1-phenyl-2-propanone; substances
frequently used in the manufacture of amphetamine-
type stimulants
1. In its resolution 49/3, entitled “Strengthening systems for the control of precursor chemicals used in the manufacture
of synthetic drugs”, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs:

(a) Requested Member States to provide to the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) annual estimates
of their legitimate requirements for 3,4-methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone (3,4-MDP-2-P), pseudoephedrine,
ephedrine and 1-phenyl-2-propanone (P-2-P) and, to the extent possible, estimated requirements for imports of prep-
arations containing those substances that could be easily used or recovered by readily applicable means;

(b) Requested the Board to provide those estimates to Member States in such a manner as to ensure that such infor-
mation was used only for drug control purposes;

(c) Invited Member States to report to the Board on the feasibility and usefulness of preparing, reporting and using
estimates of legitimate requirements for the precursor chemicals and preparations referred to above in preventing
diversion.

2. Pursuant to that resolution, the Board formally invited Governments to prepare estimates of their legitimate require-
ments for those substances. Those estimates, as reported by Governments, were published for the first time in March
2007.

3. The Board has prepared a table reflecting the latest data reported by Governments on those four precursor chemi-
cals (and their preparations, as relevant). It is expected that those data will provide the competent authorities of export-
ing countries with at least an indication of the legitimate requirements of importing countries, thus preventing
diversion attempts.

4. To enhance user-friendliness, the table has not been included in the present report but is available in spread-
sheet format on the INCB website, in the section on the annual reports on precursors. The data are current as at 1
November 2022.

5. Governments are invited to review their requirements as published, amend them as necessary and inform the Board
of any required change. Regular updates of the table will be available throughout the year on the Board’s website, in the
section on precursors (see the section on annual legitimate requirements under the “Tools and Kits” menu).
 Annex VI  63

Annex VI

Governments that have requested pre-export

notifications pursuant to article 12, paragraph 10 (a),
of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic
in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988
1. Governments of all exporting countries and territories are reminded that it is an obligation to provide pre-export
notifications to Governments that have requested them pursuant to article 12, paragraph 10 (a), of the United Nations
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988, which provides that:

“upon request to the Secretary-General by the interested Party, each Party from whose territory a substance in Table I
is to be exported shall ensure that, prior to such export, the following information is supplied by its competent
authorities to the competent authorities of the importing country:

“(i) Name and address of the exporter and importer and, when available, the consignee;
“(ii) Name of the substance in Table I;
“(iii) Quantity of the substance to be exported;
“(iv) Expected point of entry and expected date of dispatch;
“(v) Any other information which is mutually agreed upon by the Parties.”

2. Governments that have requested pre-export notifications are listed in the table below in alphabetical order, followed
by the substance (or substances) for which pre-export notifications were requested, and the date of notification of the
request transmitted by the Secretary-General to Governments.

3. The information is current as at 1 November 2022.

Date of communication to
Substances for which pre-export notifications
Notifying Government Governments by the
have been requested
Secretary-General
Afghanistana All substances included in Tables I and II 13 July 2010
Algeria a
All substances included in Tables I and II 10 October 2013
Antigua and Barbuda a
All substances included in Tables I and II 5 May 2000
Argentina All substances included in Table I 19 November 1999
Armeniaa All substances included in Tables I and IIb,c 4 July 2013
Australia a
All substances included in Tables I and II 12 February 2010
Austria All substances included in Table I 19 May 2000d
Azerbaijana All substances included in Tables I and II 21 January 2011
Bangladesh a
All substances included in Tables I and II 12 May 2015
Barbados a
All substances included in Tables I and II b,c
24 October 2013
Belaruse Acetic anhydride, ephedrine, potassium permanganate 12 October 2000
and pseudoephedrine
Belgium All substances included in Table I 19 May 2000d
Benina All substances included in Tables I and II 4 February 2000
Bhutana All substances included in Tables I and II 6 July 2018
64   INCB REPORT ON PRECURSORS 2022

Date of communication to
Substances for which pre-export notifications
Notifying Government Governments by the
have been requested
Secretary-General
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)a Acetic anhydride, acetone, ethyl ether, hydrochloric 12 November 2001
acid, potassium permanganate and sulphuric acid
Brazila All substances included in Tables I and II 15 October 1999 and 15
December 1999
Bulgaria All substances included in Table I 19 May 2000d
Canadaa All substances included in Tables I and II 31 October 2005
Cayman Islands a
All substances included in Tables I and II 7 September 1998
Chile a
All substances included in Tables I and II 19 October 2012
China Acetic anhydride 20 October 2000
China, Hong Kong SAR a
All substances included in Tables I and II 28 December 2012
China, Macao SAR a
All substances included in Tables I and II 28 December 2012
Colombia a
All substances included in Tables I and II 14 October 1998
Costa Ricaa All substances included in Tables I and II 27 September 1999
Côte d’Ivoire a
All substances included in Tables I and II 26 June 2013
Croatia All substances included in Table I 19 May 2000d
Cyprus All substances included in Table I 19 May 2000d
Czechia All substances included in Table I 19 May 2000d
Denmark All substances included in Table I 19 May 2000d
Dominican Republica All substances included in Tables I and II 11 September 2002
Ecuador a
All substances included in Tables I and II 1 August 1996
Egypt a
All substances included in Table I, and acetone 3 December 2004
El Salvadora All substances included in Tables I and II 29 July 2010
Estonia All substances included in Table I 19 May 2000d
Ethiopiaa All substances included in Tables I and II 17 December 1999
European Union (on behalf of All substances included in Table I 19 May 2000d
all its member States)f
Finland All substances included in Table I 19 May 2000d
France All substances included in Table I 19 May 2000d
Georgiaa All substances included in Tables I and II 7 September 2016
Germany All substances included in Table I 19 May 2000d
Ghanaa All substances included in Tables I and II 26 February 2010
Greece All substances included in Table I 19 May 2000d
Haitia
All substances included in Tables I and II 20 June 2002
Honduras Acetic anhydride, N-acetylanthranilic acid, 4-anilino-N- 18 June 2020
phenethylpiperidine (ANPP), ephedrine, ergometrine,
ergotamine, isosafrole, lysergic acid, 3,4-methylenedi-
oxyphenyl-2-propanone (3,4-MDP-2-P), norephedrine,
N-phenethyl-4-piperidone (NPP), phenylacetic acid,
alpha-phenylacetoacetonitrile (APAAN), 1-phenyl-
2-propanone (P-2-P), piperonal, potassium permanga-
nate, pseudoephedrine and safrole
Hungary All substances included in Table I 19 May 2000d
Icelanda All substances included in Tables I and II 11 May 2021
Indiaa All substances included in Tables I and II 23 March 2000
 Annex VI  65

Date of communication to
Substances for which pre-export notifications
Notifying Government Governments by the
have been requested
Secretary-General
Indonesiaa Acetic anhydride, N-acetylanthranilic acid, anthranilic 18 February 2000
acid, ephedrine, ergometrine, ergotamine, isosafrole,
3,4-methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone, phenylacetic
acid, 1-phenyl-2-propanone, piperonal, pseudoephed-
rine and safrole
Iraqa All substances included in Tables I and IIb,c 31 July 2013
Ireland All substances included in Table I 19 May 2000d
Italy All substances included in Table I 19 May 2000d
Jamaica All substances included in Table Ib,c 4 July 2013
Japan All substances included in Table I 17 December 1999
Jordan a
All substances included in Tables I and II 15 December 1999
Kazakhstan a
All substances included in Tables I and II 15 August 2003
Kenyaa All substances included in Tables I and IIb,c 10 October 2013
Kyrgyzstan a
All substances included in Tables I and II b,c
21 October 2013
Latvia All substances included in Table I 19 May 2000d
Lebanona All substances included in Tables I and II 14 June 2002
Libya a
All substances included in Tables I and II b,c
21 August 2013
Lithuania All substances included in Table I 19 May 2000d
Luxembourg All substances included in Table I 19 May 2000d
Madagascar a
All substances included in Tables I and II 31 March 2003
Malaysia a
All substances included in Table I and II
b
21 August 1998 and 22
September 2021
Maldivesa All substances included in Tables I and II 6 April 2005
Malta All substances included in Table I 19 May 2000d
Mexicoa All substances included in Tables I and II 6 April 2005
Micronesia All substances included in Tables I and IIb,c 11 February 2014
(Federated States of)a
Myanmara All substances included in Tables I and II 4 November 2016
Netherlands All substances included in Table I 19 May 2000d
New Zealanda All substances included in Tables I and IIb,c 3 April 2014
Nicaragua a
All substances included in Tables I and II 8 January 2014
Nigeria a
All substances included in Tables I and II 28 February 2000
Norwaya All substances included in Table I,c and anthranilic 17 December 2013
acid, ethyl ether and piperidine
Omana All substances included in Tables I and II 16 April 2007
Pakistana All substances included in Tables I and II 12 November 2001 and 6 March
2013
Panama Ephedrine, ergometrine, ergotamine, norephedrine, 14 August 2013
pseudoephedrine
Paraguaya All substances included in Tables I and II 3 February 2000
Peru a
Acetic anhydride, acetone, ephedrine, ergometrine, 27 September 1999
ergotamine, ethyl ether, hydrochloric acid, lysergic
acid, methyl ethyl ketone, norephedrine, potassium
permanganate, pseudoephedrine, sulphuric acid and
toluene
Philippinesa All substances included in Tables I and II 16 April 1999
Poland All substances included in Table I 19 May 2000d
66   INCB REPORT ON PRECURSORS 2022

Date of communication to
Substances for which pre-export notifications
Notifying Government Governments by the
have been requested
Secretary-General
Portugal All substances included in Table I 19 May 2000d
Qatara All substances included in Tables I and IIb,c 16 July 2013
Republic of Korea a
All substances included in Table I, and acetone 3 June 2008
Republic of Moldova a
All substances included in Tables I and II b,c
29 December 1998 and 8
November 2013
Romania All substances included in Table I 19 May 2000d
Russian Federation a
Acetic anhydride, ephedrine, ergometrine, ergotamine, 21 February 2000
3,4-methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone, norephedrine,
phenylacetic acid, 1-phenyl-2-propanone, potassium
permanganate, pseudoephedrine and all substances
included in Table II
Saint Vincent and the All substances included in Tables I and IIb,c 16 July 2013
Grenadinesa
Saudi Arabiaa All substances included in Tables I and II 18 October 1998
Sierra Leone a
All substances included in Tables I and II b,c
5 July 2013
Singapore All substances included in Table I 5 May 2000
Slovakia All substances included in Table I 19 May 2000d
Slovenia All substances included in Table I 19 May 2000d
South Africaa All substances included in Table I, and anthranilic acid 11 August 1999
Spain All substances included in Table I 19 May 2000d
Sri Lanka All substances included in Table I 19 November 1999
Sudan a
All substances included in Tables I and II 6 May 2015
Sweden All substances included in Table I 19 May 2000d
Switzerland All substances included in Table I 25 March 2013
Syrian Arab Republic a
All substances included in Tables I and II 24 October 2013
Tajikistana All substances included in Tables I and II 7 February 2000
Thailand a
All substances included in Table I (except potassium 18 October 2010
permanganate), and anthranilic acidb
Togoa All substances included in Tables I and II 6 August 2013
Tongaa All substances included in Tables I and IIb,c 4 July 2013
Trinidad and Tobago a
All substances included in Tables I and II b,c
15 August 2013
Tunisia a
Acetic anhydride, N-acetylanthranilic acid, 4-anilino-N- 22 June 2020
phenethylpiperidine (ANPP), ephedrine, ergometrine,
ergotamine, isosafrole, lysergic acid, 3,4-methylenedi-
oxyphenyl-2-propanone (3,4-MDP-2-P), norephedrine,
N-phenethyl-4-piperidone (NPP), phenylacetic acid,
alpha-phenylacetoacetonitrile (APAAN), 1-phenyl-
2-propanone (P-2-P), piperonal, potassium permanga-
nate, pseudoephedrine, safrole and all substances
included in Table II
Türkiyea,g All substances included in Tables I and II 2 November 1995
Uganda a
All substances included in Tables I and II b,c
6 May 2014
United Arab Emirates a
All substances included in Tables I and II
b
26 September 1995
United Kingdom of Great All substances included in Table I 19 May 2000
Britain and Northern Irelandh
United Republic of Tanzaniaa All substances included in Tables I and II 10 December 2002
United States of America Acetic anhydride, ephedrine and pseudoephedrine 2 June 1995 and 19 January
2001
 Annex VI  67

Date of communication to
Substances for which pre-export notifications
Notifying Government Governments by the
have been requested
Secretary-General
Uruguaya All substances included in Tables I and II 30 December 2015
Venezuela All substances included in Tables I and II 27 March 2000
(Bolivarian Republic of)a
Yemena All substances included in Tables I and II 6 May 2014
Zambia a
All substances included in Tables I and II 22 June 2022
Zimbabwea All substances included in Tables I and IIb,c 4 July 2013

Note: The names of territories are in italics.

a 
The Secretary-General has informed all Governments of the request of the notifying Government to receive a pre-export notification for some or
all substances listed in Table II of the 1988 Convention as well.
b 
The Government requested to also receive pre-export notifications for pharmaceutical preparations containing ephedrine and pseudoephedrine.
c 
The Governments requested to also receive pre-export notifications for safrole-rich oils.
d 
On 19 May 2000, the Secretary-General communicated to Governments the request by the European Commission on behalf of the States mem-
bers of the European Union to receive pre-export notifications for the indicated substances.
e 
Not yet notified by the Secretary-General as, in a subsequent communication, the Government of Belarus requested the Secretary-General to
suspend such notification until a national mechanism to receive and process pre-export notifications was established.
f 
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden.
g 
Since 31 May 2022, “Türkiye” has replaced “Turkey” as the short name used in the United Nations.
h 
The United Kingdom ceased to be a member of the European Union on 31 January 2020.
68   INCB REPORT ON PRECURSORS 2022

Annex VII

Substances in Tables I and II of the United Nations

Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances of 1988

Table I Table II
Acetic anhydride Acetone
N-Acetylanthranilic acid Anthranilic acid
4-Anilino-N-phenethylpiperidine (ANPP)a Ethyl ether
tert-Butyl 4-(phenylamino)piperidine-1-carboxylate Hydrochloric acide
(1-boc-4-AP)b
Ephedrine Methyl ethyl ketone
Ergometrine Piperidine
Ergotamine Sulphuric acide
Isosafrole Toluene
Lysergic acid
3,4-MDP-2-P methyl glycidate (“PMK glycidate”)c
3,4-MDP-2-P methyl glycidic acid (“PMK glycidic acid”)c
3,4-Methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone (3,4-MDP-2-P)
Methyl alpha-phenylacetoacetate (MAPA)d
Norephedrine
Norfentanylb
N-Phenethyl-4-piperidone (NPP)a
Phenylacetic acid
alpha-Phenylacetoacetamide (APAA)c
alpha-Phenylacetoacetonitrile (APAAN)
N-Phenyl-4-piperidinamine (4-AP)b
1-Phenyl-2-propanone
Piperonal
Potassium permanganate
Pseudoephedrine
Safrole
The salts of the substances listed in this Table, whenever The salts of the substances listed in this Table, whenever
the existence of such salts is possible the existence of such salts is possible

a 
Included in Table I, effective 18 October 2017.
b 
Included in Table I, effective 23 November 2022.
c 
Included in Table I, effective 19 November 2019.
d 
Included in Table I, effective 3 November 2020.
e 
The salts of hydrochloric acid and sulphuric acid are specifically excluded from Table II.
 Annex VIII  69

Annex VIII

Use of scheduled substances in the illicit manufacture

of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances
Figures I–VI below depict the use of scheduled substances in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic
substances. The approximate quantities provided are based on common manufacturing methods. Other manufacturing
methods using scheduled substances – or even non-scheduled substances instead of or in addition to scheduled sub-
stances – may also be encountered, depending on the geographical location.

Figure I.  Illicit manufacture of cocaine and heroin: scheduled substances and the approximate quantities
thereof required for the illicit manufacture of 100 kilograms of cocaine or heroin hydrochloride

Coca leaf Opium

Sulphuric acid
(100–300 litres)

Coca base/paste Morphine

Potassium permanganate Acetic anhydride

(20–55 kilograms) (100–250 litres)

Cocaine Heroin

Acetone/ethyl ether/methyl
ethyl ketone/toluene Acetone/ethyl ether
(1,000-2,000 litres) (10–100 litres)
Hydrochloric acid Hydrochloric acid
(20–40 litres) (30–40 litres)

Cocaine hydrochloride Heroin hydrochloride

(100 kilograms) (100 kilograms)

Note: The extraction of cocaine from coca leaf and the purification of coca paste and the crude base products of
cocaine and heroin require solvents, acids and bases. A wide range of such chemicals are used at all stages of drug
manufacture.
70   INCB REPORT ON PRECURSORS 2022

Figure II.  Illicit manufacture of amphetamine and methamphetamine: scheduled substances and the
approximate quantities thereof required for the illicit manufacture of 100 kilograms of amphetamine
sulphate and methamphetamine hydrochloride

alpha-Phenylacetoacetamide (APAA)
(150–230 kilograms)a or
Phenylacetic acid alpha-Phenylacetoacetonitrile (APAAN)
(120–180 kilograms) (150–230 kilograms)a or
Methyl alpha-phenylacetoacetate (MAPA)
(150–230 kilograms)a

Acetic anhydride Sulphuric acid

(180–280 litres)

Norephedrine Pseudo/Ephedrine
1-Phenyl-2-propanoneb
hydrochloride hydrochloride
(100–150 litres)
(130 kilograms) (150 kilograms)

Amphetamine Methamphetamine

Sulphuric acid Hydrochloric acid

Amphetamine sulphate Methamphetamine hydrochloride

(100 kilograms) (100 kilograms)

Note: Methcathinone, a less commonly encountered amphetamine-type stimulant, can be manufactured from
pseudo/ephedrine hydrochloride, requiring the same approximate quantities as methamphetamine to yield 100 kilo-
grams of hydrochloride salt.

a 
The weight range reflects the fact that APAA, APAAN and MAPA are purpose-made designer precursors without recognized legitimate uses and
are therefore often impure (street-level quality).
b 
Methods based on 1-phenyl-2-propanone result in racemic d,l-meth/amphetamine, while methods based on ephedrine, pseudoephedrine or
norephedrine result in d-meth/amphetamine. In a subsequent step, racemic d,l-meth/amphetamine can be – and actually is – separated in illicit labora-
tories to also produce d-meth/amphetamine.
 Annex VIII  71

Figure III.  Illicit manufacture of 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) and related drugs:

scheduled substances and the approximate quantities thereof required for the illicit manufacture of
100 kilograms of MDMA

Piperonal Safrole-rich oilsa

(210 kilograms) (210 litres)

3,4-MDP-2-P methyl- Safrole

glycidateb (210 kilograms) Intermediate A
(150 litres)

3,4-MDP-2-P
Intermediate Bc
(110 litres)

3,4-Methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA)
(100 kilograms)

Hydrochloric acid

MDMA hydrochloride

Note: Isosafrole, another precursor of MDMA under international control, is not included in this scheme, as it is not
commonly encountered as a starting material; it is an intermediate in a modification of methods for manufacturing
MDMA from safrole, requiring approximately 300 litres of safrole to manufacture 100 kilograms of MDMA.

Assuming the safrole-rich oils have a safrole content of 75 per cent or higher.
a 

Refers, for the purpose of this scheme, to the methyl ester and salts of 3,4-MDP-2-P methyl glycidic acid (i.e. purpose-made designer precursors
b 

without recognized legitimate uses that are therefore often impure (street-level quality)).
c 
The manufacture of 100 kilograms of MDMA via intermediate B would require 200 litres of safrole.
72   INCB REPORT ON PRECURSORS 2022

Figure IV.  Illicit manufacture of methaqualone and phencyclidine: scheduled substances and the
approximate quantities thereof required for the illicit manufacture of 100 kilograms of methaqualone
and phencyclidine

Anthranilic acid
(100 kilograms)

Acetic anhydride
(100 litres)

Piperidine N-Acetylanthranilic acid

(80 litres) (125 kilograms)

Hydrochloric
acid

Phencyclidine Methaqualone
(100 kilograms) (100 kilograms)

Figure V.  Illicit manufacture of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD): scheduled substances and the approxi-
mate quantities thereof required for the illicit manufacture of 1 kilogram of LSD

Ergometrine Ergotamine
(3 kilograms) (5 kilograms)

Lysergic acid
(1.5 kilograms)

LSD
(1 kilogram)
 Annex VIII  73

Figure VI. Illicit manufacture of fentanyl: scheduled substances and the approximate quantities thereof
required for the illicit manufacture of 1 kilogram of fentanyl

N-Phenethyl-4-piperidone
(NPP) (1.5 kilograms)

4-Anilino-N-phenethyl-
N-Phenyl-4-piperidinamine
piperidine (ANPP)
(4-AP) (1.5 kilograms)
(1.3 kilograms)

tert-Butyl 4-
(phenylamino)
piperidine-1-carboxylate
(1-boc-4-AP)
(2.6-2.9 kilograms)
Norfentanyl Fentanyl base
(1.1 kilograms) (1 kilogram)
74   INCB REPORT ON PRECURSORS 2022

Annex IX

Licit uses of the substances in Tables I and II of the

United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988
Knowledge of the most common licit uses of substances in Tables I and II of the United Nations Convention against Illicit
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988, including the processes and end products in which the
substances may be used, is essential for the verification of the legitimacy of orders or shipments. The most common licit
uses of those substances reported to the International Narcotics Control Board are as follows:

Substance Licit uses

Acetic anhydride Acetylating and dehydrating agent used in the chemical and pharmaceutical
industries for the manufacture of cellulose acetate, for textile sizing agents and
cold bleaching activators, for polishing metals and for the production of brake
fluids, dyes and explosives
Acetone As a common solvent and intermediate for a variety of substances in the
chemical and pharmaceutical industries, including plastics, paints, lubricants,
varnishes and cosmetics; also used in the manufacture of other solvents, such as
chloroform
N-Acetylanthranilic acid Used in the manufacture of pharmaceuticals, plastics and fine chemicals
4-Anilino-N-phenethylpiperidine (ANPP) Used in the pharmaceutical industry for the manufacture of fentanyl
tert-Butyl 4-(phenylamino)piperidine- None, except in small amounts for research, development and laboratory
1-carboxylate (1-boc-4-AP) analytical purposes
Anthranilic acid Chemical intermediate used in the manufacture of dyes, pharmaceuticals and
perfumes; also used in the preparation of bird and insect repellents
Ephedrine Used in the manufacture of bronchodilators (cough medicines)
Ergometrine Used in the treatment of migraine and as an oxytocic in obstetrics
Ergotamine Used in the treatment of migraine and as an oxytocic in obstetrics
Ethyl ether Commonly used solvent in chemical laboratories and in the chemical and
pharmaceutical industries; mainly used as an extractant for fats, oils, waxes and
resins; also used for the manufacture of munitions, plastics and perfumes and, in
medicine, as a general anaesthetic
Hydrochloric acid Used in the production of chlorides and hydrochlorides, for the neutralization of
basic systems and as a catalyst and solvent in organic synthesis
Isosafrole Used in the manufacture of piperonal; to modify “oriental perfumes”; to
strengthen soap perfumes; in small quantities, together with methyl salicylate, in
root beer and sarsaparilla flavours; and as a pesticide
Lysergic acid Used in organic synthesis
Methyl alpha-phenylacetoacetate (MAPA) None, except in small amounts for research, development and laboratory
analytical purposes
3,4-Methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone Used in the manufacture of piperonal and other perfume components
3,4-MDP-2-P methyl glycidate None, except in small amounts for research, development and laboratory
analytical purposes
3,4-MDP-2-P methyl glycidic acid None, except in small amounts for research, development and laboratory
analytical purposes
Methyl ethyl ketone Common solvent; used in the manufacture of coatings, solvents, degreasing
agents, lacquers, resins and smokeless powders
 Annex IX  75

Substance Licit uses

Norephedrine Used in the manufacture of nasal decongestants and appetite suppressants

Norfentanyl None, except in small amounts for research, development and laboratory
analytical purposes (norfentanyl is a chemical intermediate in legitimate fentanyl
manufacture but the extent of its use as a starting material is not known)
N-Phenethyl-4-piperidone (NPP) Used in the pharmaceutical industry, mainly for the manufacture of fentanyl and
carfentanil
Phenylacetic acid Used in the chemical and pharmaceutical industries for the manufacture of
phenylacetate esters, amphetamine and some derivatives; also used for the
synthesis of penicillins and in fragrance applications and cleaning solutions
alpha-Phenyl-acetoacetamide (APAA) None, except in small amounts for research, development and laboratory
analytical purposes
alpha-Phenyl-acetoacetonitrile (APAAN) None, except in small amounts for research, development and laboratory
analytical purposes
N-Phenyl-4-piperidinamine (4-AP) May be used as a building block in the manufacture of pharmaceutical sub-
stances, including fentanyl, but the extent of its use for legitimate manufacture is
not known
1-Phenyl-2-propanone Used in the chemical and pharmaceutical industries for the manufacture of
amphetamine, methamphetamine and some derivatives; also used for the
synthesis of propylhexedrine
Piperidine Commonly used solvent and reagent in chemical laboratories and in the chemical
and pharmaceutical industries; also used in the manufacture of rubber products
and plastics
Piperonal Used in perfumery, in cherry and vanilla flavours, in organic synthesis and as a
component of mosquito repellent
Potassium permanganate Important reagent in analytical and synthetic organic chemistry; used in bleach-
ing applications, disinfectants, and antibacterial and antifungal agents, and in
water purification
Pseudoephedrine Used in the manufacture of bronchodilators and nasal decongestants
Safrole Used in perfumery, for example, in the manufacture of piperonal, and for
denaturing fats in soap manufacture
Sulphuric acid Used in the production of sulphates; as an acidic oxidizer; as a dehydrating and
purifying agent; for the neutralization of alkaline solutions; as a catalyst in
organic synthesis; in the manufacture of fertilizers, explosives, dyestuffs and
paper; and as a component of drain and metal cleaners, anti-rust compounds
and automobile battery fluids
Toluene Industrial solvent; used in the manufacture of explosives, dyes, coatings and
other organic substances and as a gasoline additive
76   INCB REPORT ON PRECURSORS 2022

Annex X

Treaty provisions for the control of substances

frequently used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic
drugs and psychotropic substances
1. Article 2, paragraph 8, of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 as amended by the 1972 Protocol pro-
vides that parties shall use their best endeavours to apply to substances which do not fall under the Convention, but
which may be used in the illicit manufacture of drugs, such measures of supervision as may be practicable.

2. Article 2, paragraph 9, of the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971 provides that parties shall use their
best endeavours to apply to substances which do not fall under the Convention, but which may be used in the illicit
manufacture of psychotropic substances, such measures of supervision as may be practicable.

3. Article 12 of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of
1988 contains provisions for the following:
(a) General obligation for parties to take measures to prevent diversion of the substances in Tables I and II of the
Convention and to cooperate with each other to that end (para. 1);
(b) Mechanism for amending the scope of control (paras. 2–7);
(c) Requirement to take appropriate measures to monitor manufacture and distribution, to which end parties may
control persons and enterprises, control establishments and premises under licence, require permits for manufacture or
distribution of substances in Tables I and II and prevent accumulation of such substances (para. 8);
(d) Obligation to monitor international trade in order to identify suspicious transactions, to provide for seizures, to
notify the authorities of the parties concerned in case of suspicious transactions, to require proper labelling and docu-
mentation and to ensure maintenance of such documents for at least two years (para. 9);
(e) Mechanism for advance notice of exports of substances in Table I, upon request (para. 10);
(f) Confidentiality of information (para. 11);
(g) Reporting by parties to the International Narcotics Control Board (para. 12);
(h) Report of the Board to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (para. 13);
(i) Non-applicability of the provisions of article 12 to certain preparations (para. 14).
 Annex XI  77

Annex XI

Regional groupings
Reference is made throughout the present report to various geographical regions, which are defined as follows:

Africa: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Central African Republic,
Chad, Comoros, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea,
Eswatini, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi,
Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal,
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania,
Zambia and Zimbabwe;

Central America and the Caribbean: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica,
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Saint Kitts and
Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago;

North America: Canada, Mexico and United States of America;

South America: Argentina, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru,
Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of);

East and South-East Asia: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Indonesia,
Japan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Singapore,
Thailand, Timor-Leste and Viet Nam;

South Asia: Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka;

West Asia: Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Georgia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Israel, Jordan,
Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, State of Palestine, Syrian Arab Republic,
Tajikistan, Türkiye,a Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan and Yemen;

Europe:

Eastern Europe: Belarus, Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation and Ukraine;

South-Eastern Europe: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Montenegro, North Macedonia,
Romania and Serbia;

Western and Central Europe: Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta,
Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland;

Oceania: Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Nauru, New Zealand,
Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.

Since 31 May 2022, “Türkiye” has replaced “Turkey” as the short name used in the United Nations.
a 
About the International Narcotics Control Board
The International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) is an medical and scientific uses and that the diversion of drugs
independent and quasi-judicial control organ, established by from licit sources to illicit channels does not occur. INCB
treaty, for monitoring the implementation of the inter­ also monitors Governments’ control over chemicals used in
national drug control treaties. It had predecessors under the the illicit manufacture of drugs and assists them in prevent-
former drug control treaties as far back as the time of the ing the diversion of those chemicals into the illicit traffic;
League of Nations.
(b) As regards the illicit manufacture of, trafficking in and
use of drugs, INCB identifies weaknesses in national and
Composition international control systems and contributes to correcting
such situations. INCB is also responsible for assessing chem-
INCB consists of 13 members who are elected by the
icals used in the illicit manufacture of drugs, in order to
Economic and Social Council and who serve in their per-
determine whether they should be placed under inter­
sonal capacity, not as government representatives. Three
national control.
members with medical, pharmacological or pharmaceutical
experience are elected from a list of persons nominated by
In the discharge of its responsibilities, INCB:
the World Health Organization (WHO) and 10 members are
elected from a list of persons nominated by Governments.
(a) Administers a system of estimates for narcotic drugs and
Members of the Board are persons who, by their compe-
a voluntary assessment system for psychotropic substances
tence, impartiality and disinterestedness, command general
and monitors licit activities involving drugs through a statisti-
confidence. The Council, in consultation with INCB, makes
cal returns system, with a view to assisting Governments in
all arrangements necessary to ensure the full technical inde-
achieving, inter alia, a balance between supply and demand;
pendence of the Board in carrying out its functions. INCB
has a secretariat that assists it in the exercise of its treaty-
(b) Monitors and promotes measures taken by Governments
related functions. The INCB secretariat is an administrative
to prevent the diversion of substances frequently used in the
entity of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, but
illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic sub-
it reports solely to the Board on matters of substance. INCB
stances and assesses such substances to determine whether
closely collaborates with the Office in the framework of
there is a need for changes in the scope of control of Tables I
arrangements approved by the Council in its resolution
and II of the 1988 Convention;
1991/48. INCB also cooperates with other international
bodies concerned with drug control, including not only the
(c) Analyses information provided by Governments,
Council and its Commission on Narcotic Drugs, but also the
United Nations bodies, specialized agencies or other compe-
relevant specialized agencies of the United Nations, particu-
tent international organizations, with a view to ensuring that
larly WHO. It also cooperates with bodies outside the United
the provisions of the international drug control treaties are
Nations system, especially the International Criminal Police
­adequately carried out by Governments, and recommends
Organization (INTERPOL) and the World Customs
remedial measures;
Organization.
(d) Maintains a permanent dialogue with Governments to
assist them in complying with their obligations under the
Functions
international drug control treaties and, to that end, recom-
The functions of INCB are laid down in the following trea- mends, where appropriate, technical or financial assistance
ties: Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 as to be provided.
amended by the 1972 Protocol; Convention on Psychotropic
Substances of 1971; and United Nations Convention against INCB is called upon to ask for explanations in the event of
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances apparent violations of the treaties, to propose appropriate
of 1988. Broadly speaking, INCB deals with the following: remedial measures to Governments that are not fully apply-
ing the provisions of the treaties or are encountering difficul-
(a) As regards the licit manufacture of, trade in and use of ties in applying them and, where necessary, to assist
drugs, INCB endeavours, in cooperation with Governments, Governments in overcoming such difficulties. If, however,
to ensure that adequate supplies of drugs are available for INCB notes that the measures necessary to remedy a serious
situation have not been taken, it may call the matter to the recommendations for improvements at both the national
attention of the parties concerned, the Commission on and international levels. The annual report is based on infor-
Narcotic Drugs and the Economic and Social Council. As a mation provided by Governments to INCB, United Nations
last resort, the treaties empower INCB to recommend to entities and other organizations. It also uses information
parties that they stop importing drugs from a defaulting provided through other international organizations, such as
country, exporting drugs to it or both. In all cases, INCB acts INTERPOL and the World Customs Organization, as well as
in close cooperation with Governments. regional organizations.

INCB assists national administrations in meeting their obli- The annual report of INCB is supplemented by detailed
gations under the conventions. To that end, it proposes and technical reports. They contain data on the licit movement of
participates in regional training seminars and programmes narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances required for
for drug control administrators. medical and scientific purposes, together with an analysis of
those data by INCB. Those data are required for the proper
functioning of the system of control over the licit movement
Reports
of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, including
The international drug control treaties require INCB to pre- preventing their diversion to illicit channels. Moreover,
pare an annual report on its work. The annual report con- under the provisions of article  12 of the 1988  Convention,
tains an analysis of the drug control situation worldwide so INCB reports annually to the Commission on Narcotic
that Governments are kept aware of existing and potential Drugs on the implementation of that article. That report,
situations that may endanger the objectives of the inter­ which gives an account of the results of the monitoring of
national drug control treaties. INCB draws the attention of precursors and of the chemicals frequently used in the illicit
Governments to gaps and weaknesses in national control manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances,
and in treaty compliance; it also makes suggestions and is also published as a supplement to the annual report.
 INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL BOARD

The International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) is the independent monitoring body for the
implementation of United Nations international drug control conventions. It was established
in 1968 in accordance with the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961. It had predecessors
under the former drug control treaties as far back as the time of the League of Nations.
Based on its activities, INCB publishes an annual report that is submitted to the United Nations
Economic and Social Council through the Commission on Narcotic Drugs. The report provides
a comprehensive survey of the drug control situation in various parts of the world. As an
impartial body, INCB tries to identify and predict dangerous trends and suggests necessary
measures to be taken.

ISBN 978-92-1-148378-9
2226852E