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IN THE IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR POLK COUNTY

PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF THE

HEARTLAND, INC., EMMA GOLDMAN Case No. EQCE089066
CLINIC and SARAH TRAXLER, M.D.,

Petitioners, RULING ON PETITIONERS’

EMERGENCY MOTION FOR
vs. TEMPORARY INJUNCTION

KIM REYNOLDS ex rel. STATE OF

IOWA and IOWA BOARD OF
MEDICINE,

Respondents.

The above-captioned matter came before the court for argument on July 14, 2023 on the

Petitioners’ Emergency Motion for Temporary Injunction filed July 12, 2023. Arguing on behalf

of the Petitioners, Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc., Emma Goldman Clinic and Sarah

Traxler, M.D., was Peter Im of the Planned Parenthood Federation of America. Arguing on behalf

of the Respondents, Kim Reynolds, State of Iowa and Iowa Board of Medicine, was Assistant

Attorney General Daniel Johnston. After reviewing the court file and considering the arguments

of counsel, the court now enters the following ruling.

I. BACKGROUND.

In May 2018, Governor Reynolds signed S.F. 359 into law. That bill created a new chapter

of the Iowa Code, 146C, which would generally prohibit an abortion1 once a “fetal heartbeat”2 is

detected. There were specific exceptions, including medical emergencies,3 miscarriages, fetal

1
The statute defines “abortion” as “termination of a human pregnancy with the intent other than to produce a live
birth or to remove a dead fetus.” Iowa Code § 146C.1(1).
2
The statute defines a “fetal heartbeat” as “cardiac activity, the steady and repetitive rhythmic contraction of the
fetal heart within the gestational sac.” Iowa Code § 146C.1(2).
3
The statute uses the same definition of “medical emergency” that is used in Iowa Code § 146A.1. Iowa Code §
146C.1(3). That section defines it as “a situation in which an abortion is performed to preserve the life of the
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abnormalities, and pregnancies that are the result of rape or incest that has been reported to

authorities. Iowa Code § 146C.1(4). The law would have changed the amount of time that women

have to seek an abortion from twenty weeks post-fertilization to as little as six weeks. Planned

Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc. v. Reynolds, No. EQCE083074, 2019 WL 312072, at *1 (Polk

Cnty. Dist. Ct., Jan. 22, 2019). Planned Parenthood of the Heartland (PPH) (with other Petitioners

joining) challenged the constitutionality of this law and asked the district court to enjoin

enforcement of it. Id. Ultimately the court granted PPH’s Motion for Summary Judgment and

granted their request for a permanent injunction. Id.

Following changes to federal and state law—discussed more in-depth below—in 2022 the

State petitioned the district court to dissolve the permanent injunction from 2019. Planned

Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc. v. Reynolds, No. EQCE083074, Ruling Mot. Dissolve Perm.

Inj., 2022 WL 17885890, at *2 (Polk Cnty. Dist. Ct., Dec. 12, 2022). The district court denied the

State’s motion, leaving the injunction in place. Id. at *7. The denial was appealed to the Iowa

Supreme Court, where the Justices deadlocked on a decision.4 Planned Parenthood of the

Heartland, Inc. v. Reynolds, No. EQCE083074, No. 22-2036, slip op. at 1 (Iowa June 16, 2023).

Because the decision was evenly split, the lower court’s decision denying the dissolution stayed in

place. Id. (citing State v. Effler, 769 N.W.2d 880, 884 (Iowa 2009)).

Shortly after the Iowa Supreme Court’s split, Governor Reynolds signed a proclamation to

convene a Special Session of the Iowa Legislature for the purpose of passing a law regarding

abortion access. Governor Kim Reynolds, PROCLAMATION OF SPECIAL SESSION (July 5, 2023). The

pregnant woman whose life is endangered by a physical disorder, physical illness, or physical injury, including a
life-endangering physical condition caused by or arising from pregnancy, but not including psychological
conditions, emotional conditions, familial conditions, or the woman’s age; or when continuation of the pregnancy
will create a serious risk of substantial or irreversible impairment of a major bodily function of the pregnant
women.” Iowa Code § 146A.1(6)(a).
4
Justice Oxley took no part in the decision, allowing for a 3-3 split.

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Iowa Legislature convened for one day on July 11, 2023 and passed H.F. 732, a bill which is

virtually identical to the bill that was passed in 2018.5 H.F. 732 also provided that it would take

effect upon enactment. Governor Reynolds informed the public that she would be signing the bill

on July 14, 2023.

On July 12, 2023, Petitioners filed this lawsuit, arguing that H.F. 732 violates the Iowa

Constitution’s protections for due process, equal protection, and the inalienable rights of persons.

Pet. ¶¶ 77-82. Petitioners also filed the instant motion for a temporary injunction, asking that this

court temporarily enjoin the enforcement of the law pending a final judgment on the merits of their

case.

Governor Reynolds signed H.F. 732 on July 14, 2023.

II. LEGAL STANDARD.

There are three circumstances in which a court may grant a temporary injunction under

Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.1502: (1) when it “pertains to an act causing great or irreparable

harm,” (2) when it “pertains to a violation of a right tending to make the judgment ineffectual,”

or (3) when the court is statutorily authorized. Max 100 L.C. v. Iowa Realty Co., Inc., 621

N.W.2d 178, 181 (Iowa 2001) (internal citations and quotations omitted). “Generally, the

issuance of an injunction invokes the equitable powers of a court and courts apply equitable

principles.” Id. To prove that it is entitled to a temporary injunction, Petitioners must show

that (1) they are likely to succeed on the merits; (2) in the absence of the injunction they will

suffer irreparable harm; and (3) injunctive relief is warranted considering the circumstances

confronting the parties and “balance[ing] the harm that a temporary injunction may prevent

against the harm that may result from its issuance.” Id.

5
The only difference in the two bills is that the term “medically necessary” in the 2018 bill was replaced by “fetal
heartbeat exception” in the 2023 bill. The definition of the two terms and their use within the bills is the same.

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“[T]emporary injunctions require a showing of the likelihood of success on the merits

whereas permanent injunctions require actual success.” PIC USA v. North Carolina Farm

Partnership, 672 N.W.2d 718, 723 (Iowa 2003) (citing Max 100 L.C., 621 N.W.2d at 181)

(emphasis in original). “Rules of evidence are applied more strictly on final hearing of a cause

than on an application for temporary injunction, when evidence that would not be competent to

support a perpetual injunction may properly be considered.” Id. (quoting Kleman v. Charles City

Police Dep’t, 373 N.W.2d 90, 95 (Iowa 1985)). Ultimately, “the decision to issue or refuse ‘a

temporary injunction rests largely [within] the sound judgment of the trial court.’” Max 100 L.C.,

621 N.W.2d at 181.

III. ANALYSIS.

A. STANDING.

First, the Respondents ask this court to dismiss the Petitioners’ action due to a lack of

standing, stating that their claim is not ripe, and that they lack third-party standing.

i. Ripeness.

The Respondents propose that the Petitioners’ claims are not ripe because at the time they

filed their action, H.F. 732 had not yet been enacted by the Governor’s signature. In order to be

ripe, the Petitioner’s claimed injury ‘“cannot be ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical,’ but must be

‘concrete’ and ‘actual or imminent.’ ”’ LS Power Midcontinent, LLC v. State, 988 N.W.2d 316,

330 (Iowa 2023), reh'g denied (Apr. 26, 2023) (quoting DuTrac Cmty. Credit Union v. Hefel, 893

N.W.2d 282, 289 (Iowa 2017) (quoting Hawkeye Foodservice Distrib. Inc. v. Iowa Educators

Corp., 812 N.W.2d 600, 606 (Iowa 2012))). “To demonstrate sufficient imminence, ‘[o]nly a

likelihood or possibility of injury need be shown’; ‘[a] party need not demonstrate injury will

accrue with certainty, or already has accrued.”’ Id. (quoting Iowa Bankers Ass'n v. Iowa Credit

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Union Dep't, 335 N.W.2d 439, 445 (Iowa 1983)).

H.F. 732 was passed on July 11, 2023. That same evening, Governor Reynolds’ office

issued a statement which included: “Gov. Reynolds plans to sign the bill on Friday, July 14, 2023.”

Pet. Ex. C. The passage of the bill and the Governor’s stated intent to sign the bill on a specific

date provided sufficient imminence to make the Petitioners’ claim ripe when it was filed.

ii. Third-Party Standing.

The Respondents’ assertion that the Petitioners do not have standing is twofold. First, they

claim that because abortion providers do not have a freestanding right to provide abortions, they

lack third-party standing to bring this action on behalf of women seeking abortions. Second, they

argue that the Petitioners’ standing to assert a derivative claim fails because, after the Iowa

Supreme Court’s holding in Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc. v. Reynolds ex rel. State,

975 N.W.2d 710 (Iowa 2022) (PPH 2022)6, there is no right to an abortion protected by the Iowa

Constitution. For the first proposition, the Respondents cite Planned Parenthood of the Heartland,

Inc. v. Reynolds, 962 N.W.2d 37, 56 (Iowa 2021) (PPH 2021). There, however, the Plaintiffs’

brought an “unconstitutional conditions” claim, and the standing issue was decided based upon the

“unconstitutional conditions doctrine.” Id. at 55-56. The Court specifically stated, “[o]ur holding

under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine does not implicate PPH's ability to bring a derivative

constitutional challenge asserting a woman's rights, a claim PPH did not make.” Id. at 56. Here,

the Petitioners bring, at least in part, such a derivative constitutional challenge.

As to the second proposition that the Petitioners’ derivative claim fails because women no

longer have a right to an abortion protected by the Iowa Constitution, the dispositive holding in

6
The parties and the court refer to several Iowa Supreme Court cases involving Planned Parenthood of the
Heartland (“PPH”). The Petitioners refer to the cases by numbers (I, II, III, etc.), where the Respondents refer to
them by the year they were decided. The court prefers the latter, finding that to be a little less confusing.

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PPH 2022 was actually that, “the Iowa Constitution is not the source of a fundamental right to an

abortion necessitating a strict scrutiny standard of review for regulations affecting that right.”

PPH 2022, 975 N.W.2d at 716 (emphasis added). As discussed in detail below, the court finds that

the distinction means something, and that the current state of the law in Iowa remains, at least for

the time being, that some level of constitutional protection applies to women seeking abortion in

Iowa, requiring an undue burden standard for analysis. Therefore, there also remains an underlying

justification for the Petitioners’ standing to assert the constitutional rights of women seeking

abortions in Iowa. See PPH 2021, 962 N.W.2d at 56 (“allowing an abortion provider to claim

standing to vindicate the constitutional rights of a third party ‘should not be applied where its

underlying justifications are absent.’” (quoting Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 114 (1976)).

The Petitioners’ claims are ripe, and they have standing to pursue them.

B. TEMPORARY INJUNCTION.

i. Likelihood of Success on the Merits.

The Petitioners seek to permanently enjoin the enforcement of H.F. 732, claiming the bill

is unconstitutional because it violates the Due Process and Inalienable Rights Clauses of the Iowa

Constitution.7 Addressing the Due Process argument first, the likelihood of the Petitioners’ success

on the merits comes down to which standard of scrutiny the court will use.

The standards Iowa courts have been instructed to apply to laws governing abortion have

vacillated within the last decade. In Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc. v. Iowa Bd. of Med.

(PPH 2015), the Iowa Supreme Court struck down a promulgated rule that would have restricted

access to medication abortions to in-person appointments. 865 N.W.2d 252, 260-61 (Iowa 2015).

The Court applied the undue burden test used by federal courts at the time. Id. at 263. “[U]nder

7
Although the Petitioners’ Petition states a claim under the Equal Protection Clause of the Iowa Constitution (Pet.
¶¶ 81-82), they do not argue that claim as part of their Motion here.

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the undue burden test for a state regulation to place an undue burden on a woman's right to

terminate a pregnancy, the state regulation must have ‘the purpose or effect of placing a substantial

obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.’” Id. (quoting Planned

Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878–79 (1992) (plurality opinion)). A law that meets

this test is an unconstitutional restriction on individual rights. Id.

In 2018, the Iowa Supreme Court again spoke on this issue in Planned Parenthood of the

Heartland, Inc. v. Iowa Bd. of Med., 915 N.W.2d 206 (Iowa 2018) (PPH 2018). There the Court

held that the right to terminate a pregnancy before viability was a fundamental right under the Iowa

Constitution. Therefore, laws that would restrict that right were subject to strict scrutiny. Id. at

240-41. “Strict scrutiny requires state actions be narrowly tailored to further a compelling state

interest.” Id. at 243. Applying this standard, the Court found that a mandatory 72-hour waiting

period did not further a compelling state interest and therefore was unconstitutional. Id.

In 2022, there were two major shifts in the jurisprudence surrounding this topic, one at the

federal level and one at the state level. In the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Dobbs v. Jackson

Women's Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022), the Court held that abortion was not a

constitutionally protected right, thus overruling Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and subsequent

decisions such as Casey that had relied on the reasoning of Roe.

The most recent Iowa Supreme Court pronouncement on the topic came one week prior to

the Dobbs decision, when the Iowa Supreme Court published its decision in Planned Parenthood

of the Heartland, Inc. v. Reynolds ex rel. State, 975 N.W.2d 710 (Iowa 2022) (PPH 2022). This

narrow decision overturned PPH 2018’s standard of strict scrutiny.

Hence, all we hold today is that the Iowa Constitution is not the source of a
fundamental right to an abortion necessitating a strict scrutiny standard of review
for regulations affecting that right. For now, this means that the Casey undue burden
test we applied in [PPH 2015] remains the governing standard. On remand, the

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parties should marshal and present evidence under that test, although the legal
standard may also be litigated further.

PPH 2022, 975 N.W.2d at 715–16.

The Respondents assert “a majority of PPH 2022 Justices agreed that the Iowa

Constitution does not protect a fundamental right to an abortion. That means that this Court

should apply rational basis review to determine the Fetal Heartbeat Statute’s constitutionality.”

Resp’ts’ Resistance, 20. That is precisely the argument that Justice McDermott made in his

dissent in PPH 2022:

But I dissent from my colleagues’ remand directing the district court to apply an
“undue burden” standard, subject (apparently) to the standard being “litigated
further” by the parties. In my view, we should emphatically reject—not recycle—
Casey’s moribund undue burden test and instead direct the district court to apply
the rational basis test to the plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge.

PPH 2022, 975 N.W.2d at 746 (McDermott, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Nevertheless, Justice Mansfield’s plurality decision setting forth the controlling disposition of

the case under the “narrowest grounds doctrine,” specifically held that “the Casey undue burden

test we applied in [PPH 2015] remains the governing standard.” Id. at 716 (emphasis added).

This is the controlling precedent that this court is to follow.8 This court is not at liberty to

overturn precedent of our Supreme Court. “[I]t is the role of the supreme court to decide if case

precedent should no longer be followed.” State v. Miller, 841 N.W.2d 583, 584 n.1 (Iowa 2014)

(citing Kersten Co. v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 207 N.W.2d 117, 121–22 (Iowa 1973) (“If trial courts

8
The Respondents imply that the plurality opinion in PPH 2022 is not a precedential disposition. It is. “[I]n Godfrey
v. State, where three justices joined the lead opinion to reverse the district court, and three justices dissented and
would have affirmed the district court, the dispositive opinion was that of the Chief Justice, whose opinion reversed
the district court but did so on a narrower basis than the lead opinion. See 898 N.W.2d 844, 880–81 (Iowa 2017)
(Cady, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Wagner v. State, 952 N.W.2d 843, 858 (Iowa 2020)
(describing the Chief Justice's opinion in Godfrey as “dispositive”).” PPH 2022, 975 N.W.2d at 716, n. 2. Then, in
May of this year, the Iowa Supreme Court overruled Godfrey in Burnett v. Smith, stating “we have decided to
overrule Godfrey and to restore the law as it existed in this state before 2017.” See 990 N.W.2d 289, 291 (Iowa
2023), reh'g denied (May 23, 2023). If Godfrey had no precedential effect, there would have been no need to
overrule it, or to declare the law that existed prior to Godfrey restored.

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venture into the business of predicting when this court will reverse its previous holdings … they

are engaged in a high-risk adventure which we strongly recommend against.”)).

The Respondents also argue that the controlling finding in PPH 2022 that undue burden

remains the governing standard was in error because “the Iowa Supreme Court has not

independently adopted the undue burden standard under the Iowa Constitution to evaluate state

abortion laws.” Resp’ts’ Resistance 20. That may be a valid argument. See Planned

Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc. v. Reynolds, No. EQCE083074, No. 22-2036, slip op. at 45-49

(Iowa June 16, 2023) (“My colleagues repeatedly state that PPH 2015 adopted the undue burden

standard for claims arising under the Iowa Constitution. That is an untrue statement.”

(McDonald, J., non-precedential op.)). Regardless, this court does not get to declare that our

Supreme Court got it wrong and then impose a different standard. Such would be an alarming

exercise of judicial activism. This court is bound to decide this matter pursuant to the instruction

of our Supreme Court.

The Respondents also argue that because PPH 2015 applied (but did not adopt) the

federal Casey undue burden standard, and because the U.S. Supreme Court overruled Casey in

Dobbs, the Casey standard no longer exists, leaving the court to apply the rational basis test. The

Respondents maintain that the Iowa Supreme Court in PPH 2022 held as much by deferring to

the then upcoming Dobbs decision. That is not the holding of the controlling PPH 2022 opinion:

[T]he United States Supreme Court is expected to decide an important abortion case
this term. See Dobbs, ––– U.S. ––––, 141 S. Ct. 2619, 209 L.Ed.2d 748. That case
could decide whether the undue burden test continues to govern federal
constitutional analysis of abortion rights. We expect the opinions in that case will
impart a great deal of wisdom we do not have today. Although we take pride in our
independent interpretation of the Iowa Constitution, often our independent
interpretations draw on and contain exhaustive discussions of both majority and
dissenting opinions of the United States Supreme Court.

We do not prejudge the position our court will take. We agree with the [PPH 2018]

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majority that “[a]utonomy and dominion over one's body go to the very heart of
what it means to be free.” 915 N.W.2d at 237 (majority opinion). We also agree
that “being a parent is a life-altering obligation that falls unevenly on women in our
society.” Id. at 249 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). Yet, we must disapprove of [PPH
2018]’s legal formulation that insufficiently recognizes that future human lives are
at stake—and we must disagree with the views of today's dissent that the state has
no legitimate interest in this area.

PPH 2022, 975 N.W.2d at 745–46 (emphasis added). Once again, the controlling opinion in

PPH 2022, which this court is bound to follow, is that Casey undue burden test applied in PPH

2015 remains the governing standard, and there is not yet any Iowa Supreme Court decision

changing that after Dobbs.

The Respondents further cite State v. Middlekauff, 974 N.W.2d 781 (Iowa 2022), reh’g

denied (June 10, 2022), and Horsfield Materials, Inc. v. City of Dyersville, 834 N.W.2d 444

(Iowa 2013), for the proposition that when no fundamental Constitutional right is implicated, the

court is to apply the rational basis test. See Middlekauff, 974 N.W.2d at 803 (“Unless a suspect

class or a fundamental right is at issue, equal protection claims are reviewed under the rational

basis test.”; see also Horsfield Materials 834 N.W.2d at 458 (“Because no suspect class or

fundamental right is at issue, we apply the rational basis test.”). The controlling opinion in PPH

2022, however, did not find that there was no fundamental right to an abortion protected under

Iowa’s Constitution. Rather, the Court only held that “the Iowa Constitution is not the source of a

fundamental right to an abortion necessitating a strict scrutiny standard of review for regulations

affecting that right.” PPH 2022, 975 N.W.2d at 716 (emphasis added). That a distinction was

intended is apparent from the Respondents’ reasoning itself. If the court simply found that there

was no fundamental right to an abortion, there would have been no reason to direct that undue

burden remained the governing standard; the standard would have defaulted to the rational basis

test under the same rationale as Middlekauff and Horsfield. That did not happen, prompting

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Justice McDermott’s dissent as quoted, infra p. 8.

Undue burden is where our Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the issue has left off, with

an invitation to litigate the issue further. This, perhaps, is the litigation that accepts the invitation,

and the jurisprudence will pick up again and presumably further refine or define the governing

standard. In the meantime, this court will be required to apply the Casey undue burden standard

when deciding the merits of the Petitioners’ claim. The Respondents, of course, can argue for and

provide proof pursuant to the rational basis test. But any decision to apply that test in this case

will have to come from our Supreme Court. See State v. Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d 260, 267 (Iowa 2010)

(stating that “a state supreme court cannot delegate to any other court the power to engage in

authoritative constitutional interpretation under the state constitution”).

When the undue burden standard is applied, it is readily apparent that the Petitioners are

likely to succeed on their claim that H.F.732 violates the Due Process clause, article I, section 9 of

the Iowa Constitution. Last December, this court (Judge Gogerty presiding), applying the undue

burden standard to the virtually identical 2018 version of H.F.732 (Iowa Code chapter 146C),

found:

The ban on nearly all abortions under Iowa Code chapter 146C would be an undue
burden and, therefore, the statute would still be unconstitutional and void. See
Casey, 550 U.S. at 878-79 (“an undue burden exists, and therefore a provision of
law is invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of
a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability”); Iowa Const., Art.
XII, § 1 (“This constitution shall be the supreme law of the state, and any law
inconsistent therewith, shall be void”)… Therefore, under the undue burden test …
the State has failed to show a change in the law that would warrant dissolving the
permanent injunction issued on January 22, 2019.

Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc. v. Reynolds, No. EQCE083074, Ruling Mot. Dissolve

Perm. Inj., 2022 WL 17885890, at *7 (Polk Cnty. Dist. Ct., Dec. 12, 2022). In their appeal of that

ruling, the Respondents conceded that the 2018 law did not satisfy the undue burden standard. See

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Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc. v. Reynolds, No. EQCE083074, No. 22-2036, slip op.

at 13 (Iowa June 16, 2023) (noting it is “clear and indeed conceded by the State at oral argument”

the 2018 statute is unconstitutional under undue burden standard). (Waterman, J., non-precedential

op.). Counsel for the Respondents made the same concession during his oral argument on

Petitioners’ Motion here.

Clearly, then, the Petitioners are likely to prevail on their Due Process claim based upon

the undue burden standard that the district court must apply at the trial stage of this litigation. That

being the case, the court need not address the Petitioners’ Inalienable Rights Clause argument in

determining likelihood of success for the purposes of a temporary injunction.

ii. Irreparable Harm to Movants.

The Petitioners charge that enforcement of H.F. 732 will result in harm that is irreparable

by any monetary remedy. They set forth a wide range of physical, mental and economic

consequences for patients who would otherwise seek abortions in Iowa. They also note the

economic burdens and potential health risks of patients having to seek abortions in other states.

Finally, they address the interference that enforcement of the act would cause to Petitioners’ ability

to provide abortion services and medical care consistent with their medical judgment and in

support of patient well-being, noting also the threat of reputational harm through civil penalties.

The court generally acknowledges the existence of harms without endorsing each and every

one of the harms the Petitioners claim. They are the types of harms that result from the irreparable

loss of isolated and unique opportunities (individual patients seeking abortion services from Iowa

providers) should the temporary injunction not be granted. See LS Power Midcontinent, LLC v.

State, 988 N.W.2d 316, 338 (Iowa 2023), reh'g denied (Apr. 26, 2023) (“These sorts of injuries,

i.e., deprivations of temporally isolated opportunities, are exactly what preliminary injunctions are

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intended to relieve.”)(quoting Bao Xiong ex rel. D.M. v. Minn. State High Sch. League, 917 F.3d

994, 1003 (8th Cir. 2019)). Further, the Iowa Supreme Court has recognized that the “irreparable

harm” requirement is met when the movant shows it is likely to succeed in showing a constitutional

violation. See id. (“Federal courts have held that the “irreparable harm” requirement is met when

the movant shows it is likely to succeed in showing a constitutional violation. Am. C.L. Union of

Ky. v. McCreary County, 354 F.3d 438, 445 (6th Cir. 2003), aff'd sub nom. McCreary County v.

Am. C.L. Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 125 S.Ct. 2722, 162 L.Ed.2d 729 (2005). We reach the same

conclusion here.”). The Petitioners are able to show irreparable harm.

iii. The Balance of the Harms.

There should be no ignoring that there are harms either way the court rules on this request

for a temporary injunction. See PPH 2022, 975 N.W.2d at 745–46 (“We agree … that ‘[a]utonomy

and dominion over one's body go to the very heart of what it means to be free.’ We also agree that

‘being a parent is a life-altering obligation that falls unevenly on women in our society.’ Yet, we

must disapprove of [the] legal formulation that insufficiently recognizes that future human lives

are at stake—and we must disagree with the views … that the state has no legitimate interest in

this area.”) (internal citations omitted). Ultimately, however, the court must consider the balance

of the harms in light of its finding today that the Petitioners are likely to succeed on the merits of

their claim that H.F. 732 is unconstitutional. The interests of the Respondents “have no right to

protection from an unconstitutional statute.” LS Power Midcontinent, LLC v. State, 988 N.W.2d at

339. The balance of the harms, then, favors the Petitioners.

C. CONCLUSION.

The court will grant the temporary injunction requested here. In doing so, it recognizes that

there are good, honorable and intelligent people - morally, politically and legally - on both sides

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of this upsetting societal and constitutional dilemma. Patience and perseverance are also hallmark

traits on both sides, traits that continue to deserve respect. The court believes it must follow current

Iowa Supreme Court precedent and preserve the status quo ante while this litigation and

adversarial presentation which our Supreme Court has invited9 moves forward.

However, as the Governor has now signed H.F. 732 into law, the court should except from

that status quo, section 2, paragraph 5 of H.F. 732, directing the Iowa Board of Medicine to adopt

rules pursuant to Chapter 17A. Should the injunction entered today ultimately be dissolved, it

would only benefit all involved, patients and providers alike, to have rules in place to administer

the law.

IV. DISPOSITION.

For the reasons stated above,

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Respondents are temporarily enjoined

from enforcing H.F. 732, to be codified as Iowa Code chapter 146E (2023); with the sole

exception of section 2, paragraph 5 thereof pertaining to the adoption of rules by the Iowa

Board of Medicine pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 17A, which provision is not enjoined by

this Order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this temporary injunction shall remain in place

until the court’s final adjudication on the merits in this matter.

9
See PPH 2022, 975 N.W.2d at 716, 745 (“the parties should marshal and present evidence under that [undue
burden] test, although the legal standard may also be litigated further…. we should not engage in ‘freelancing under
the Iowa Constitution without the benefit of an adversarial presentation.’”)

14
 E-FILED EQCE089066 - 2023 JUL 17 02:33 PM POLK
CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT Page 15 of 15

State of Iowa Courts

Case Number Case Title
EQCE089066 PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF HEARTLAND ET AL VS KIM
REYNOLDS ET AL
Type: OTHER ORDER
So Ordered

Electronically signed on 2023-07-17 14:33:24