GRC Transactions, Vol.

41, 2017

Failure Mode and Effects Analysis of Hotwell System Motor

Operated Butterfly Valve

Victor Ouma
Kenya Electricity Generating Company Ltd

Keywords
Motor operated Butterfly Valve, Failure Mode and Effects Analysis, Reliability Priority
Number, Maintenance, Geothermal Power Plant

ABSTRACT

Olkaria 280 MW Geothermal Power Plants (GPPs) have been experiencing breakdowns of the
Motor Operated Butterfly Valves (MOBFVs) over the years with negative impacts on safety,
reliability, power plant revenue and cost. The MOBFV function is to control and regulate
condensate flow from the condenser to the cooling tower. The failure of these valves have led to
turbine trip or delay turbine start up.
This paper applies the Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) tool to evaluate the reliability
of the MOBFVs in Olkaria 280 MW GPPs in order to improve safety and reliability of the
hotwell pump system. FMEA is a method used to study the reliability characteristics of systems,
processes and components. Reliability assessment of the MOBFVs will plays a very important
role in the definition of a suitable maintenance strategy and hence improve the overall plant
availability. The strategy aims to reduce unplanned shutdowns, component repair times and
elimination of risk significant components. This evaluation identified the most risk significant
components in the MOBFVs as valve seat, disc pins, driven gear, seals and bearings. Upon
implementation of new maintenance procedures, there was significant decrease in reliability
priority number (RPN) value for individual components leading to a reduced risk of failure. In
addition, a financial evaluation estimated that the application of the revised maintenance
strategies reduced the financial cost and losses by 51.10%.

1. Introduction
A butterfly valve (BFV) is a flow control valve used for isolating and regulating flow of fluids.
The BFV operation time is short because the disc element is rotated a quarter turn (90°) to open
or close the passageway. BFVs are quite versatile and can be used for industrial applications
under varying conditions such as type of fluid, sizes, pressures and temperatures. (Patil &
Basavaraj, 2015). These valves are ideal because they are lower in cost, lighter in weight
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compared to other valve designs. They can also be used to perform throttling operation. Figure. 1
shows the operation of the motor operated butterfly valve;

Figure 1: The figure above illustrates the operation of a motor operated butterfly valve (TLV, 2017)

2. Olkaria 280 MW Geothermal Power Plant (GPP)

The 280MW GPP comprises of two geothermal power stations namely Olkaria I AU and Olkaria
IV, each with a net capacity of 140 MW. Each plants has two units rated at 70 MW. These power
plants were each commissioned in 2014 and 2015. The power plants are made up of various
systems which include the steam gathering and supply, circulating water, hotwell pump, non-
condensable gas extraction, chemical dosing, water and waste water treatment, and HVAC
systems.

3. Problem Statement
This paper seeks to identify major causes of failure in 280MW GPPs MOBFVs, the effects of
such failure whenever they occur and calculate the risk significance of the failures by calculating
the reliability priority number (RPN). The RPN number gives the importance of the failure and
can easily identify which failure bears the highest risk to the operation of the plant. A review of
the design and maintenance strategies is done and maintenance tasks are selected that can
adequately mitigate the failure. Furthermore, a financial review is undertaken to estimate the
benefits of the prescribed changes.

4. Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA)

FMEA is an analytical technique (a paper test) that combines the technology and experience of
people in identifying fore-seeable failure modes of a product or process and planning for its
elimination (Reena & Venkatraj., 2013). It is the systematic identification of possible root causes
failure, failure modes, the effects of the failure and risks associated the respective failure. The
main goal is to identify and then limit or avoid risk within a design. Hence, FMEA drives
towards higher reliability, higher quality, and enhanced safety. It can also be used to assess and
optimize the design and maintenance plans. FMEA provides the following benefits. They are:
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• Improve product/process reliability and quality

• Increase customer satisfaction
• Early identification and elimination of potential product/process failure modes
• Prioritize product/process deficiencies and their elimination
• Emphasizing problem prevention
• Documenting the risk and the actions taken to reduce risk
• Minimizing changes at later stages and associated cost (Besterfield, 2005)
4.1 Reliability Priority Number (RPN)
The RPN calculates the inherent risk from a given failure mode, by assigning numerical values to
severity, occurrence and detection. As the risk increases, the RPN values of the failure mode
rises. This is what is defined as the risk priority number (RPN). High value RPNs are considered
the most risky elements of the design and should be addressed in order increase the reliability of
the product. RPN is a product of the severity, occurrence and detection as shown in the formula
below.

RPN = (S) x (O) x (D)

Where S, O and D represent Severity, Occurrence and Detection respectively.
Severity refers to the magnitude of the end effect of a system failure. The more severe the
consequence, the higher the value of severity will be assigned to the effect. Occurrence refers to
the frequency that a root cause is likely to occur, described in a qualitative way. That is not in the
form of a period of time but rather in terms such as remote or occasional. Detection refers to the
likelihood of detecting a root cause before a failure can occur (Patil & Basavaraj, 2015).
FMEA has been used in industries, including Automotive; Aeronautical; Military; Nuclear and
Electro-technical, specific standards have been developed for its application. The Severity,
occurrence and detection factors are individually rated using a numerical scale, typically ranging
from 1 to 10. In order to carry out analysis, the severity, occurrence and detection criterion have
been decided and presented in table I, II and III by which the RPN can be calculated.

Table I. Severity Criteria

Rate Severity Criteria Rating
Dangerously high Failure could lead to safety breach causing injury of staff 10
Extremely High Failure could lead endanger the machine 9
Very High Loss of primary function 8
High Lead to significant customer dissatisfaction 7
Moderate Part of the component to be scrapped 6
Low Affect performance and generate complaints 5
Very Low Results in minor performance losses 4
Minor Failure is nuisance but does not result in performance losses 3
Very Minor Failure results in minor consequence, but unlikely to be apparent 2
None No effect 1
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Table II. Occurrence Criteria

Rate Failure Rate Criteria Rating
Persistent Failure Failure once a week 10
Very High Failures Failure once a month 9
High Failure once a three month 8
Relatively high Failure once in six months 7
Moderate Failure once a year 6
Low Failure once in three years 5
Relatively Low Failure once in five years 4
Very Low Failures Once in 7 years 3
Relatively Remote Once in 10 years 2
Remote Once in 20 years 1

Table III. Detection Criteria

Rate Detection Criteria Rating
Absolute Design control will not and/or cannot detect failure Mode 10
Uncertainty
Very Remote Very remote chance the Design Control will detect the failure mode. 9
Remote Remote likelihood current controls will detect the failure 8
Very Low Very low likelihood current controls will detect the failure 7
Low Low likelihood current controls will detect the failure 6
Moderate Moderate likelihood current controls will detect the failure 5
Moderate High Moderate high likelihood controls will detect the failure mode 4
High High likelihood controls will detecting the failure mode 3
Very High Very high likelihood controls will detecting the failure mode 2
Almost Certain Current controls will almost certainly detect the existence of a failure mode. 1

Table IV. Risk Matrix

RPN Scale Risk Rate Criticality Class
1000 - 500 Very high risk A
499 - 250 High risk B
249 - 100 Moderate risk C
99 - 0 Low risk D

5. Results
To increase understanding level and detailed component knowledge of the MOBFV system, the
system is broken down to individual components. The Olkaria 280 GPPs MOBFVs are
composed of three major components:
1. Butterfly valve
2. Actuator
3. Electric motor
4. Mechanical Gearbox
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5.1 FMEA for Butterfly Valve

Table IV: Butterfly Valve FMEA

Component Function Failure Mode Failure Effect Root cause
Hand wheel Open and Close Break BFV manual operation Poor handling, Poor
Disc fail material
Stem Transfer torque Fracture, wear BFV motor/ manual Too much force, Water
operation fail hammer
material deficiencies, too
much cycling
Body Contain valve Crack Fluid leakage Improper handling, material
internals deficiencies
Seat Ensure disc Leakage Incomplete closure Foreign material, silica
complete shut deposit, Wear, poor material,
poor seat design, Too much
friction
Tear, Loss of flow control Wear, Excessive force/
Permanent pressure
deformation, Disc not fitting, Poor
Swelling material selection
Disc Allow and Wear, Poor flow control Excessive force, debris, poor
prevent flow bending design
Fail to Open/ Failure of valve Poor Installation, Silica
Fail to Close operation scaling and dirt
Slow Poor flow control Gear failure, disc is stuck
Response
Pitting Poor flow control Corrosion
Bearing Hold the stem in Wear Operation fail Improper lubrication,
position Improper mounting
Shaft misalignment
Bolts Fasten the valve Fracture Leakage Poor material
Seizure Difficulty in opening, Lack of lubrication,
threads damage Over torque
Coupling Transmit rotation Misalignment, Failure of valve Physical damage, Improper
motion shear operation installation, Wear, Improper
material, Aging
Pins Lock disc to the break Loss of opening or Excessive force, material
stem closing of valve deficiencies
bend Poor valve control Excessive force
Seal Prevent leaking leakage Wetting the Installation errors, Abrasion,
into the lubrication system and over compression, twisting,
gearing system wrong design, thermal and
chemical degradation
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The figure below shows the parts of a BFV valve.

Figure 2: The figure above illustrates parts of butterfly valve

5.2 FMEA for Motor and Actuator

A valve actuator is the mechanism for opening and closing a valve. The actuator positions the
valve in compliance with operation commands issued by the DCS. (AUMA, 2017). When
reaching end positions or intermediate positions, the actuator stops and signals the status to the
control system. The electric actuator uses an electric motor to provide torque to operate a valve.

Figure 3: The figure above is a motor operated actuator with hand wheel
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Table V: Part of Motor Operated Actuator

No. Name
1 Motor
2 Limit, torque and valve travel sensor
3 Gearing
4. Valve attachment
5. Manual operation
6. Actuator Control
7. Electrical connection
8. Field bus

Table VI: Actuator FMEA

Component Function Failure Mode Failure Effect Root cause
Limit & Signal when an end Fail Open/ Disc does not Shot, bad connection, switch
torque and position has been Close stop at desired broken, moved or bent, wiped
valve travel reached. Torque alarm position potentiometer (travel sensor)
sensors and electric motor trip Incorrect valve
signal in case the valve position
is stuck. Give real time indicator
valve position
remotely
Gearing Reduce the high output Wear, Break, No torque Excessive compressive
speed of the electric pitting transmission stresses, shock loading, bad
motor lubricant, too much cycling
Valve shaft Transmit torque to the Wear / Fracture No torque Excessive torque
valve transmission Too much cycling
Actuator Sensor fail due to corrosion,
Controls Signal open and close Spurious action Function fail deterioration, blocking, and
breakdown.
Signal processing unit fail
Fail to Function fail failure in the operative part of
open/close the actuators deteriorates its
action
Electric Transmit signals/ Break in lines, Signal failure Loose connection
Connections connect electrical loose No power Shot circuit
connection connections Oxidation contacts
Field Bus Real time data Communication Signal failure Shot circuit, bad connections
transmission in process failure
automation
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Table VII: Motor FMEA

Component Function Failure Mode Failure Effect Root cause
Bearing Reduce shaft High vibration, Overload, Overloading, Improper,
friction Seizure overheating, no aged/insufficient lubricant, solid/
rotation, hindered liquid contaminants, improper
rotation mounting, Shaft misalignment
Rotor Moving part of Eccentric rotor Bearing damage Imbalance, Thermal stress
motor Motor rebuild Assembly problems, Poor base
High cost of repair

Broken rotor Bearing damage Imbalance, Thermal stress

bars Motor rebuild Assembly problems, Poor base
High cost of repair
Stator Generate Stator defects Motor inefficiency Eccentricity, Short lamination
electricity, High cost of repair Loose iron, These can be caused by
Carry current, high temperature, corrosion and
Retain Armature contamination
Coupling Transmit rotation Misalignment Shutdown to avoid Physical damage, Improper
motion bearing damage installation, Wear, Improper material,
Aging
Insulation & Carry current Winding failure, Motor failure Overheat, Moisture, Contamination
Winding shortage Insulation breakdown, High vibration,
Voltage surges, Bad maintenance
Table VIII: Motor FMEA

Cmponent Function Failure Mode Failure Effects Root Cause

Gears Transfer torque Wear, Pitting Open/ closing fail Excessive compressive stresses,
from actuator shock loading, bad lubricant, too
much cycling

Shaft Seal Prevent water Tear, wear Leakage to into gearbox, Damaged seal, poor installation,
from accessing contamination of grease non fitting seals, over compression,
the gearbox leading to wear and twisting
corrosion

Driven Gear Rotates the valve Shear, Wear Open/ closing fail Grease contamination, corrosion
disc

Bearings Carry gear loads High vibration, Overload, overheating, Overloading, Improper,
and hold gear Seizure, wear, no rotation, hindered aged/insufficient lubricant, solid/
shaft in position pitting, fatigue, rotation liquid contaminants, improper
and reduce corrosion mounting, Shaft misalignment
rotational friction
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5.3 Reliability Priority Number Analysis

Table IX: Reliability Priority Number Analysis

Component Sub - Severity Occurrence Detection RPN Group
Component
Butterfly Valve Hand wheel 8 4 3 96 D
Stem 10 6 7 420 B
Body 8 4 3 96 D
Seat 8 8 8 512 A
Disc 10 7 6 420 B
Bearing 10 4 8 320 B
Bolts 5 8 8 320 B
Coupling 8 7 7 392 B
Pins 8 7 8 448 B
Seals 5 8 8 320 B

Actuator Limit, torque 8 4 6 192 C

and valve
travel sensors
Gearing 8 6 5 240 C
Shaft 8 4 7 224 C
Controls 10 6 5 300 B
Electrical 8 6 6 288 B
Connections
Field bus 8 5 6 240 B

Motor Bearing 8 7 8 448 B

Rotor 8 4 6 192 C
Stator 8 6 6 288 B
Insulation 8 6 6 288 B

Gearbox Gears 8 5 7 280 B

Shaft Seal 5 8 8 320 B
Driven Gear 8 7 7 392 B
Bearings 8 5 7 280 B
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5.3.1 Ranking of High Risk Sub - components

Table X: Ranking in Order of Priority

COMPONENT SUB COMPONENT RPN RANKING
Butterfly Valve Seat 512 1
Pins 448 2
Disc 420 3
Stem 420 4
Bearing 320 5
Seals 320 6
Bolts 320 7
Hand wheel 96 8
Body/ casting 96 9

Actuator Actuator Controls 300 1

Electrical connection 288 2
Gearing 240 3
Field Bus 240 4
Shaft 224 5
Limit & torque sensors 192 6

Motor Bearing 448 1

Insulation and Wiring 288 2
Stator 288 3
Rotor 192 4

Gearbox Driven Gear 392 1

Shaft Seal 320 2
Gears 280 3
Bearings 280 4

Figure 4 and 5 below show the RPN values of the risk significant components in the MOBFV
and their respective severity, occurrence and detection ratings respectively.
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Figure 4. Motor operated valve components with high RPN values

Figure 5. Severity, Occurrence and Detection (SOD) scale of high risk components
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5.3.2 Recommended Maintenance Strategies

The maintenance tasks available for consideration are:
i. Failure finding tasks (whose failure modes are hidden and require functional tests to
detect);
ii. Condition based tasks (tasks that monitor the degradation levels of failure modes);
iii. Time directed task (maintenance tasks performed periodically as scheduled);
iv. Re-design (where there is neither feasible condition directed nor time directed tasks
applicable) and,
v. Run to failure is applied on less safety and economical failure modes. Their failures
are tolerable and corrective action is applied after failure. (Ouma, Osama, Mpakani,
Baik, & Gomma, 2015)
The process of application of maintenance strategy is illustrated in figure 6 below.

Figure 6: Maintenance task selection process (Ouma, Osama, Mpakani, Baik, & Gomma, 2015)
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5.3.3 Application of New Maintenance Strategy

Table XI: Application of New Maintenance Strategy

COMPONENT SUB COMPONENT MAINTENANCE STRATEGY
Butterfly Valve Disc CBM , visual inspection, phased array ultrasonic,
radiography testing
Stem CBM, visual, dye penetrant and ultrasonic testing
Seat Time based PM, Annual inspection, develop seat
replacement capabilities on site & develop program for
seat replacement
Bearing Time based PM, Annual inspection, rotational tests,
thermography, cleaning, vibration tests, and lubrication
analysis.
Bolts Time based PM, proper lubrication with anti-seize
Hand wheel Time based PM, lubrication, visual inspection monthly
Body Time based PM, visual inspection monthly
Coupling Time based PM, visual inspection annually
Pins Redesign, with a tough material
Seals Time based PM, Annual Inspection

Actuator Actuator Controls CBM, visual, temperature, current signatures

Gearing CBM, visual, proper lubrication, wear debris analysis,
acoustic signature
Electric Connection CBM, visual, temperature, acoustic signature, voltage
and current signatures
Field Bus CBM, voltage and current signatures
Valve shaft Time based PM, Annual inspection
Limit & torque sensors Time based PM, Annual inspection

Motor Bearing CBM, rotational tests, vibration tests, lubrication

analysis, debris analysis
Rotor Time based PM, Annual inspection
Insulation and Wiring CBM, voltage and current signatures
Stator CBM, voltage and current signatures

Gearbox Driven Gear Re-design with harder material

Shaft Seal Failure Finding
Gears Time Based PM, Annual grease replace annually
Bearings CBM, rotational tests, vibration tests, lubrication
analysis, debris analysis
NB: PM stands for Preventive Maintenance
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5.4 Revised Reliability Priority Number

Table XII: Estimated Reliability Priority Number after Review of Maintenance Strategy
Component Sub - RPN
component Severity Occurrence Detection RPN Group
Butterfly Hand wheel 8 4 2 64 D
Valve
Stem 8 5 4 160 C
Body 8 4 3 96 C
Seat 8 6 7 336 B
Disc 10 5 4 200 C
Bearing 8 4 6 192 C
Bolts 5 6 4 120 C
Coupling 8 5 5 200 C
Pins 8 5 7 280 B
Seal 5 4 5 100 C

Actuator Limit & torque 8 4 5 160 C

sensors
Gearing 8 5 5 200 B
Valve shaft 8 4 5 160 C
Actuator 10 5 4 200 B
Controls
Electric 8 5 4 160 B
Connections
Field bus 8 5 5 200 C

Motor Bearing 8 5 5 200 C

Rotor 8 4 5 160 C
Stator 8 5 5 200 C
Insulation & 8 5 5 200 C
Winding

Gearbox Gears 8 5 6 240 C

Shaft Seal 5 6 7 210 C
Driven Gear 8 5 6 240 C
Bearings 8 5 5 200 C
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Table XIII: Review of Risk Priority Number

COMPONENT SUB COMPONENT INITIAL RPN REVISED RPN

Butterfly Valve Disc 420 200

Stem 420 160
Seat 512 336
Bearing 320 192
Bolts 320 120
Hand wheel 96 64
Body/ casting 96 96
Coupling 392 300
Pins 448 280
Seal 320 100

Actuator Actuator Controls 300 200

Gearing 240 200
Electric Connection 288 160
Field Bus 240 200
Valve shaft 244 160
Limit & torque sensors 192 160

Motor Bearing 448 200

Rotor 192 160
Insulation and Wiring 288 200
Stator 288 200

Gearbox Driven Gear 392 240

Shaft Seal 320 210
Gears 280 240
Bearings 280 200

5.5 Financial Analysis

The following financial analysis was done to estimate the financial loss due to MOBFV failure

Table XIV: Revenue Loss analysis

Number of No. of days to Outage days Loss of Annual revenue loss
Failures annually repair Annually Revenue ($)
per day
($)
6 2 12 60,000 720,000
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Table XV: Spares cost

Spares Number Price ($) Annual Spare Cost ($)
Butterfly valve 1 50,000 50,000
Actuator 1 2,000 2000
Bolts 10 10 100
Gears 2 700 1,400
Motor 1 1000 1,000
Others 2,000
Total Cost 56,500
NB. It is assumed that 1 BFV with motor and actuator will be replaced in one year

Table XVI: Labor costs

Designation Number Staff Rate per Number of days Annual Rate
day ($)
($)
Engineers 3 65 12 2,340
Technicians 10 60 12 7,200
Others staff 5 33 12 1,980
Total Cost 11,520

Table XVII: Material costs

Type Quantity Units Rate Number of days Annual Rate
Per day ($) ($)
Gloves 20 Pcs 5 100
Consumables 10 Pcs 20 200
Gas Masks 30 Pcs 5 2 300
Fuel 100 L 0.9 12 1,080
Others 1,600
Total Cost 3,280

Table XVIII: Total financial cost

Cost Item Cost ($)
Loss of Revenue 720,000
Spares 56,500
labour 11,520
Materials 3,280
Total 791,300

Upon implementation of the new maintenance task a financial review was undertaken. The
analysis was performed in order to estimate the saving in revenue.
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Table XIX: Loss of revenue analysis

Number of No. of days to Outage days Revenue Annual revenue loss
Failure annually repair Annually per day ($)
($)
3 2 6 60,000 360,000

Table XX: Spares cost

Spares Number Price ($) Annual revenue loss ($)
Butterfly valve 0.33 50,000 16,500
Actuator 0.33 2,000 660
Bolts 4 10 40
Gears 1 700 700
Motor 0.5 1000 500
Total Cost 18,400

Table XXI: Labor costs

Designation Number Rate ($) Number of days Annual Rate
($)
Engineers 3 65 6 1,170
Technicians 10 60 6 3,600
Others 5 33 6 990
Total Cost 5,760

Table XXII: Material costs

Type Quantity Rate Number Annual Rate
Per day ($) ($)
Gloves 20 5 100
Consumables 10 20 200
Masks 30 5 2 300
Fuel 100 0.9 6 540
Others 1,600
Total Cost 2,740
Table XXIII: Revised total financial cost
Cost Item Cost ($)
Loss of Revenue 360,000
Spares 18,400
labour 5,760
Materials 2,740
Total 386,900

Estimated saving on the new maintenance strategies is calculated as shown below.

= 791,300 - 386,900
= $ 404,400
Percentage Saving is 51.10%
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6. Discussion of FMEA Results

To reduce the risk of component failure or to eliminate a particular failure mode and its inherent
failure effect recommended action is taken depending on the failure mode. For example the
initial RPN for the valve seat is 512, which is critical A, where the severity was 8, Occurrence
was 8 and detection was 8. Upon implementing the recommended maintenance tasks, through
preventive maintenance strategies, in this case, seat cleaning, development of local capacity for
seat replacement and review of specifications for valve seat. The revised RPN decreased to 336,
which is critical B. The severity is considered the same as 8, but due to the recommended action
taken the occurrence and detection rating are reduced from 8 to 6 and 8 to 7 respectively. Again
the new risk priority number is,
PRPN = (S) x (O) x (D) = 336
This means risk of failure of seat and its effects are minimized to a greater extent. Figure 7 below
is a graph showing the initial RPNs and the revised RPNs of risk significant components.
Furthermore, the change in tasks to be applied to each component is as follows: 11 components
to be put under time based preventive maintenance, 10 components to be monitored through
condition based maintenance, 2 components will need re-designing to improve the reliability
while 1 component will require failure finding in order to identify the reason for failure.
Financial analysis was done and estimated the total annual loss of revenue amounted to $
791,300.00. On application of the new strategies the loss reduced to $386,900.00 which is a
reduction of 51.10 %.

Figure 7. Initial RPN compared to revised RPN values

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7. Conclusion
This paper was able to identify the most risk significant sub-components on the MOBFVs. The
butterfly valve had the highest number of risk significant components while the actuator had the
least. In the BFV the seat, pins, stem and disc were found to have high RPN values, hence risky
components. In the actuator the actuator controls and electric connection were found to be risk
significant. While the gearbox, the driven gear and shaft seal were identified as risk significant
components. Furthermore, motor bearing, insulation and stator were found to be risk significant
in the motor. It was observed that there was no maintenance plan for the motor operated butterfly
valve prior to this study and the butterfly valves are more or less operated on a run to failure
basis. The application of the new maintenance strategies individual component RPN values
decreased significantly. This is an indication of improved reliability of the MOBFVs and
availability of the 280 MW GPPs. In addition, an estimated loss reduction of 51.10 % annually
was predicted.

Recommendations

From this work the following recommendations are made:

1. Application of the tasks in table XI is necessary in order to improve MOBFVs reliability;
2. Development seat replacement capabilities on site would save on downtime and cost;
3. Spares of risk significant components should be readily available in stores. It is
recommended to have a minimum of two healthy MOBFVs in the stores. This can reduce
the time of replacement significantly. In addition, a design of MOBFV removal structure/
jig is necessary to aid in quick removal and replacement of the butterfly valves;
4. A review in technical specification is necessary for the very risk significant components
like the valve seat, driven gear and the pins, and
5. Actual RPN values should be calculated after the full application of the new maintenance
strategies.

References

AUMA. (2017). Electric Actuators.

Besterfield, D. (2005). Total Quality Management. Pearson Education.
Ouma, V., Osama, R., Mpakani, H., Baik, J., & Gomma, M. (2015). Reliability Centered
Maintenance for CVCS, Charging System. Ulsan: KINGS.
Patil, R., & Basavaraj, K. S. (2015). Failure Mode and Effects Analysis of Manually &
Electrically Operated Butterfly Valve. ResearchGate.
Reena, P., & V. V. (2013). Application of Reliability Analysis for Validating the Results
obtained by Failure Mode and Effects Analysis for Air Conditioner. International Journal of
Advancements in Research & Technology, 2278-7763.
TLV. (2017). Types of Manual Valves. Retrieved from http://www.tlv.com/global/TI/steam-
theory/types-of-valves.htm