106 The Phenomenology of Spirit

what is existing for itself are in themselves the simple substance, then while
it places the other into itself,3 it sublates its simplicity, or its essence, i.e., it
estranges that simplicity. This estrangement of the undifferentiated fluidity
is the very positing of individuality. The simple substance of life is thus the
estrangement of itself into shapes and is at the same time the dissolution of
these stably existing differences. The dissolution of this estrangement is to
the same extent itself an estrangement, or a division of itself into groupings.
As a result, both aspects of the entire movement, which had been distin-
guished, collapse into one another. Namely, it is the shapes motionlessly
elaborated in the universal medium of self-sufficiency and the process of
life which collapse into one another. The latter, the process of life, is just
as much a taking shape4 as it is the sublating of the shape, and the for-
107 mer, the taking shape, is just as much a sublating as it is a division into
groupings. The fluid element is itself only the abstraction of essence, or
it is only actual as a shape. That it divides itself into groupings is again
an estranging of the expressed groups, or it is their dissolution. The whole
cycle constitutes life. It is neither what is first expressed, namely, the imme-
diate continuity and unmixed character of its essence, nor is it the stably
existing shape and what is “the discrete” existing for itself, nor is it the
pure process of all of this, nor again is it the simple gathering together of
these moments. Rather, it is the whole developing itself, then dissolving
its development, and, in this movement, being the simple self-sustaining
whole.
172. While having departed from the first immediate unity, and through
the moments of settling down into shapes and processes and therewith to
unity, and thereby again having returned to the first simple substance, this
reflected unity is a unity which is different from the first one. As opposed
to that immediate unity, which was expressed as a being, this second is the
universal unity which contains all those moments as sublated within itself.
It is the simple genus, which in the movement of life itself does not exist for
itself as this simple. Rather, in this result, life points towards something other
than itself, namely, towards consciousness, for which life is as this unity, or
as genus.
173. But this other life for which the genus as such is and which is the
genus for itself, namely, self-consciousness, initially is, to itself, only as this
simple essence and, to itself, is an object as the pure I. In its experience,
which is now up for examination, this abstract object will, to itself, become
enriched and will contain the development that we have seen in life.

3 das Andre in sich setzt. 4 Gestaltung.

 B. Self-Consciousness 107
174. The simple I is this genus, or the simple universal for which the
differences are no differences at all as it is the negative essence of the shaped
self-sufficient moments. Self-consciousness is therefore only certain of itself
through the sublating of this other, which, to itself, exhibits itself as self-
sufficient life. Self-consciousness is desire. Certain of the nullity of this
other, it posits for itself this nullity as its truth, it destroys the self-sufficient
object, and it as a result gives itself the certainty of itself as true certainty,
as the sort of certainty which, to itself, has come to be in an objective
manner.
175. However, in this satisfaction it learns from experience about the
self-sufficiency of its object. Desire and the certainty of itself achieved in
its satisfaction are conditioned by the object, for the certainty is through
the sublating of this other. For this sublating even to be, there must be this
other. Self-consciousness is thus unable through its negative relation to the
object to sublate it, and for that reason it again, instead re-engenders the
object as well as the desire. There is in fact an other than self-consciousness,
the essence of desire, and it is through this experience that, to itself, this 108
truth has itself come to be. However, at the same time self-consciousness
likewise is absolutely for itself, and it is absolutely for itself only through
sublating the object, and, to itself, it is this which must become its satisfac-
tion, for self-consciousness is the truth. For the sake of the self-sufficiency
of the object, self-consciousness can thus only arrive at satisfaction by this
object itself effecting the negation in itself;5 and the object must in itself
effect this negation of itself, for it is in itself the negative, and it must be
for the other what it is. As the object is the negation in itself and at the
same time is therein self-sufficient, it is consciousness. In life, which is the
object of desire, the negation is either in an other, namely, in desire, or it
is as determinateness confronting another indifferent shape, or it is as the
inorganic universal nature of this life. However, this universal self-sufficient
nature, in which the negation is as absolute, is the genus as such, or as
self-consciousness. Self-consciousness attains its satisfaction only in another self-
consciousness.
176. In these three moments the concept of self-consciousness is brought
to completion: (a) the pure I without differences is its first immediate
object. (b) However, this immediacy is itself absolute mediation; it is only as
sublating the self-sufficient object, or it is desire. The satisfaction of desire
is indeed the reflection of self-consciousness into itself, or it is the cer-
tainty which has become the truth. (c) But the truth of that certainty is

5 indem dieser selbst die Negation an ihm vollzieht.

 108 The Phenomenology of Spirit
instead the doubled reflection, the doubling of self-consciousness. There
is an object for consciousness which in itself posits its otherness, or which
posits the difference as a nullity and is therein a self-sufficient object. To be
sure, the differentiated, only living shape also sublates its self-sufficiency in
the process of life itself, but, along with its differences, it ceases to be what
it is. However, the object of self-consciousness is just as self-sufficient in
this negativity of itself, and it is thereby for itself the genus, the universal
fluidity in the ownness of its isolation. It is living self-consciousness.
177. A self-consciousness is for a self-consciousness. Only thereby is there in
fact self-consciousness, for it is only therein that the unity of itself in its
otherness comes to be for it. The I, which is the object of its concept, is in
fact not an object. But the object of desire is only self-sufficient, for it is the
universal, inerasable substance, the fluid self-equal essence. While a self-
consciousness is the object, the object is just as well an I as it is an object. –
The concept of spirit is thereby present and available for us. What will later
come to be for consciousness will be the experience of what spirit is, this
absolute substance which constitutes the unity of its oppositions in their
complete freedom and self-sufficiency, namely, in the oppositions of the
various self-consciousnesses existing for themselves: The I that is we and the
109 we that is I. Consciousness has its turning point in self-consciousness, as
the concept of spirit, where, leaving behind the colorful semblance of the
this-worldly sensuous, and leaving behind the empty night of the super-
sensible other-worldly beyond, it steps into the spiritual daylight of the
present.

A. Self-Sufficiency and Non-Self-Sufficiency of Self-Consciousness;

Mastery and Servitude
178. Self-consciousness is in and for itself while and as a result of its being in
and for itself for an other; i.e., it is only as a recognized being.6 The concept
of its unity in its doubling, of infinity realizing itself in self-consciousness,
is that of a multi-sided and multi-meaning intertwining, such that, on
the one hand, the moments within this intertwining must be strictly kept
apart from each other, and on the other hand, they must also be taken and
cognized at the same time as not distinguished, or they must be always
taken and cognized in their opposed meanings. This twofold sense of what
is distinguished lies in the essence of self-consciousness, which is to be
infinitely or immediately the opposite of the determinateness in which it

6 ein Anerkanntes.
 B. Self-Consciousness 109
is posited. The elaboration of the concept of this spiritual unity in its dou-
bling presents us with the movement of recognizing.
179. For self-consciousness, there is another self-consciousness; self-
consciousness is outside of itself .7 This has a twofold meaning. First, it has
lost itself, for it is to be found as an other essence. Second, it has thereby
sublated that other, for it also does not see the other as the essence but
rather sees itself in the other.
180. It must sublate its otherness. This is the sublation of that first two-
sided ambiguity and is for that reason itself a second two-sided ambiguity.
First, it must set out to sublate the other self-sufficient essence in order as
a result to become certain of itself as the essence through having sublated
the other. Second, it thereby sets out to sublate itself , for this other is itself.
181. This double-edged sense of the sublating of its double-edged sense
of otherness is likewise a double-edged sense of a return into itself . This is so
in the first place because it gets itself back through sublation, for it comes
to be in equality with itself again through the sublation of its otherness.
However, in the second place, it likewise gives the other self-consciousness
back to itself, since it existed for itself in the other, but it sublates its being
in the other, and it thus sets the other free again.
182. In this way, this movement of self-consciousness in its relation to 110
another self-consciousness has been represented as the doing of one self-
consciousness, but this doing on the part of one self-consciousness has itself
the twofold significance of being its own doing just as well as it is the other’s
doing, for the other is just as self-sufficient. The other is just as enclosed
within himself, and there is nothing within him which is not there through
himself. The first does not have the object before it in the way that the
object only is initially for desire. Instead, it has an object existing for itself
self-sufficiently. For that reason, it can do nothing on its own about that
object if that object does not do in itself what the first self-consciousness
does in it. The movement is thus straightforwardly the doubled movement
of both self-consciousnesses. Each sees the other do the same as he does; each
himself does what he demands of the other and for that reason also does
what he does only insofar as the other does the same. A one-sided doing
would be useless because what is supposed to happen can only be brought
about through both of them bringing it about.

7 es ist außer sich gekommen. The term außer sich usually means “to be beside oneself” (to be swept
up in rage, or hilarity, and so on); but Hegel also clearly wants to play on the literal meaning of the
term, so that he is also saying “It has come outside of itself ,” or self-consciousness exists as an “external
object” to itself. The sentence also has the overtones of saying that “self-consciousness has come to
be anxious about itself.”
 110 The Phenomenology of Spirit
183. The doing thus carries not only a double-edged sense inasmuch as
it is a doing directed as much towards itself as it is directed towards the other,
but also inasmuch as it is just as much inseparably the doing of one as well
as the doing of the other.
184. In this movement we see the process repeat itself which had been
exhibited as the play of forces in consciousness. What existed for us in
that process is here for the extremes themselves. The mediating middle is
self-consciousness, which disintegrates into the extremes, and each extreme
term is this exchange of its own determinateness and the absolute transi-
tion into what is its opposite. However, as consciousness, it does indeed
get outside of itself ,8 but in its being-outside-of-itself, it is at the same time
kept back within itself. It is for itself , and its self-externality is for it. It is
for consciousness that it immediately is and is not an other consciousness.
Likewise, this other is only for itself as it sublates itself as existing-for-itself,
and it is for itself only in the being-for-itself of the other. Each is the medi-
ating middle to the other, through which each mediates itself with itself
and integrates itself with itself. Each is, to itself, and in that of the other, an
essence immediately existing for itself which at the same time is for itself
in that way only through this mediation. They recognize themselves as
mutually recognizing each other.
185. This pure concept of recognition, the pure concept of the doubling
of self-consciousness in its unity, is itself now up for examination according
to how its process appears for self-consciousness. It will first of all exhibit
the aspect of inequality between both of them, or the mediating middle
breaking apart into the extremes, which are, as extremes, opposed to each
other, and of which one is only recognized while the other only recognizes.
186. Self-consciousness is at first simple being-for-itself, and it is self-
equal through the exclusion from itself of all that is other, to itself, its essence
and absolute object is the I, and within this immediacy, or within this being
111 of its being-for-itself, it is a singular being.9 What is other for it, is, as an
inessential object, designated by the character of the negative. However, the
other is also a self-consciousness, and thus what comes on the scene here is
an individual10 confronting an individual. In the way that they immediately
make their appearance, they are for each other in the way ordinary objects
do. They are self-sufficient shapes absorbed within the being of life – for
8 außer sich. The sentence could be much more loosely rendered: “it becomes anxious in its externality
to itself.”
9 Einzelnes. This could be rendered more simply, but perhaps misleadingly, as “an individual.” Hegel
does speak of Individualität and Individuum in other places.
10 Individuum.
 B. Self-Consciousness 111
the existing object has here been determined to be life – which for each
other have not yet achieved the movement of absolute abstraction, they
have not yet achieved the destruction of all immediate being and of being
themselves only the purely negative being of self-equal consciousness, or
they have not yet presented themselves to each other as pure being-for-
itself , which is to say, as self-consciousness. Each is, to be sure, certain of
itself but not of the other, and for that reason its own certainty of itself is
still without truth, for its truth would be only if its own being-for-itself
were, to itself, to have exhibited itself as a self-sufficient object, or, what
is the same thing, that the object would have turned out to be this pure
certainty of itself. However, according to the concept of recognition, this
is not possible without the other being for it in the way it is for the other,
without each in itself achieving this pure abstraction of being-for-itself,
without each achieving this through its own activity and again through the
activity of the other.
187. However, the exhibition of itself as the pure abstraction of self-
consciousness consists in showing itself to be the pure negation of its objec-
tive mode, or in showing that it is fettered to no determinate existence, that
it is not at all bound to the universal singularity of existence, that it is not
shackled to life. This display is the doubled act, namely, both what the other
does and what is done through oneself. To the extent that it is what is done
by the other, each thus aims at the death of the other. However, the second
aspect is also therein present, namely, what is done through oneself , for the
former involves putting one’s own life on the line. The relation of both self-
consciousnesses is thus determined in such a way that it is through a life
and death struggle that each proves its worth to itself, and that both prove
their worth to each other.11 – They must engage in this struggle, for each
must elevate its self-certainty of existing for itself to truth, both in the other
and in itself. And it is solely by staking one’s life that freedom is proven to
be the essence, namely, that as a result the essence for self-consciousness is
proven to be not being, not the immediate way self-consciousness emerges,
not its being absorbed within the expanse of life – but rather, it is that there
is nothing present in it itself which could not be a vanishing moment for it,
that self-consciousness is only pure being-for-itself . The individual who has
not risked his life may admittedly be recognized as a person,12 but he has not
achieved the truth of being recognized as a self-sufficient self-consciousness.
As each risks his own life, each must likewise aim at the death of the other,

11 sich selbst und einander . . . bewähren. 12 Person.

 112 The Phenomenology of Spirit
for that other no longer counts to him as himself. To himself, his essence
exhibits itself as that of an other; he is external to himself,13 and he must
sublate that being-external-to-himself. The other is a diversely entangled
112 and existing consciousness; he must intuit his otherness as pure being-for-
itself, or as absolute negation.
188. However, this trial by death likewise sublates the truth which was
supposed to emerge from it, and, by doing so, completely sublates the
certainty of itself. For just as life is the natural location of consciousness,
self-sufficiency without absolute negativity, death is the natural negation
of this same consciousness, negation without self-sufficiency, which thus
endures without the significance of the recognition which was demanded.
Through death, the certainty has been established that each has risked his
life, and that each has cast a disdainful eye towards death both in him-
self and in the other. But this is not the case for those who passed the test
in this struggle. They sublate their consciousness, which was posited in
this alien essentiality which is natural existence, or they elevate themselves
and, as extremes wanting to be for themselves, are themselves sublated. The
essential moment thereby vanishes from the fluctuating interplay, namely,
that of disintegrating into extremes of opposed determinatenesses, and the
mediating middle collapses into a dead unity, which breaks down into dead
extremes which are merely existents and not opposed. Neither gives back
the other to itself nor does it receive itself from the other through con-
sciousness. Rather, they only indifferently leave each other free-standing,
like things. Their deed is abstract negation, not the negation of conscious-
ness, which sublates so that it preserves and maintains what has been sublated
and which thereby survives its having become sublated.
189. In this experience self-consciousness learns that life is as essential to
it as is pure self-consciousness. In immediate self-consciousness, the simple
I is the absolute object. However, for us, or in itself, this object is absolute
mediation and has stably existing self-sufficiency as its essential moment.
The dissolution of that simple unity is the result of the first experience.
It is through that experience that a pure self-consciousness is posited, and
a consciousness is posited which is not purely for itself but for an other,
which is to say, is posited as an existing consciousness, or consciousness
in the shape of thinghood. Both moments are essential – because they are
initially not the same and are opposed, and because their reflection into
unity has not yet resulted, they are as two opposed shapes of conscious-
ness. One is self-sufficient; for it, its essence is being-for-itself. The other is

13 außer sich.
 B. Self-Consciousness 113
non-self-sufficient; for it, life, or being for an other, is the essence. The
former is the master, the latter is the servant.
190. The master is consciousness existing for itself . However, the master
is no longer consciousness existing for itself only as the concept of such a
consciousness. Rather, it is consciousness existing for itself which is medi-
ated with itself through an other consciousness, namely, through an other
whose essence includes its being synthetically combined with self-sufficient
being, or with thinghood itself. The master relates himself to both of these 113
moments, to a thing as such, the object of desire, and to the consciousness
for which thinghood is essential; while (a) the master is, as the concept of
self-consciousness, the immediate relation of being-for-itself , but (b) hence-
forth is at the same time as mediation, or as a being-for-itself that is for itself
only through an other, the master in that way relates himself (a) immedi-
ately to both, and (b) mediately to each through the other. The master
relates himself to the servant mediately through self-sufficient being, for it is
on this very point that the servant is held fast. It is his chain, the one he
could not ignore in the struggle, and for that reason he proved himself to
be non-self-sufficient and to have his self-sufficiency in the shape of thing-
hood. However, the master is the power over this being, for he has proved
in the struggle that to him it only counted as a negative. While he is the
power over this being, this being, however, is the power over the other, so
that the master thus has within this syllogism the other as subordinate to
him. The master likewise relates himself to the thing mediately through the
servant. The servant, as self-consciousness itself, relates himself negatively
to the thing and sublates the thing. However, at the same time the thing is
for him self-sufficient, and, for that reason, he cannot through his negat-
ing be over and done with it, cannot have eliminated it; or, the servant
only processes it. On the other hand, to the master, the immediate relation
comes to be through this mediation as the pure negation of the thing, or
as the consumption of the thing. Where desire had failed, the master now
succeeds in being over and done with the thing, and he achieves satisfac-
tion in his consumption of it. On account of the thing’s self-sufficiency,
desire did not achieve this much, but the master, who has interposed
the servant between the thing and himself, as a result only links up with
the non-self-sufficiency of the thing and simply consumes it. He leaves the
aspect of its self-sufficiency in the care of the servant, who works on the
thing.
191. For the master, it is in these two moments that his recognition comes
about through another consciousness, since the latter consciousness posits
itself as inessential within those moments, first of all by working on the
 114 The Phenomenology of Spirit
thing, and second of all by his dependence on a determinate existence.
In both moments, he cannot achieve mastery over existence and achieve
absolute negation. This moment of recognition is present here such that the
other consciousness sublates itself as being-for-itself, and it thereby itself
does what the first does to it. This is just as much the case for the other
moment. What the second self-consciousness does is the first’s own doing,
for what the servant does is really the master’s doing. The latter is only
being-for-itself, the essence; he is the pure negative power for which the
thing is nothing, and he is thus the pure essential doing in this relationship.
However, the servant is not a pure but rather an inessential doing. However,
what prevents this from being genuine recognition is the moment where
what the master does with regard to the other, he also does with regard to
himself, and where what the servant does with regard to himself, he also is
supposed to do with regard to the other. As a result, a form of recognition
has arisen that is one-sided and unequal.
114 192. The inessential consciousness is therein for the master the object
which constitutes the truth of his certainty of himself. However, it is clear
that this object does not correspond to its concept, but rather that the
object in which the master has achieved his mastery has become, to the
master, something entirely different from a self-sufficient consciousness. It
is not a self-sufficient consciousness which is for him but above all a non-
self-sufficient consciousness. His certainty is therefore not that of being-for-
itself as the truth; instead, his truth is the inessential consciousness and the
inessential doing of that inessential consciousness.
193. The truth of the self-sufficient consciousness is thus the servile con-
sciousness. To be sure, this consciousness admittedly first appears external to
itself14 and not as the truth of self-consciousness. However, in the way that
mastery showed that its essence is the inversion of what mastery wants to
be, so too in its consummation will servitude become instead the opposite
of what it immediately is. As a consciousness forced back into itself, it will
take the inward turn15 and convert itself into true self-sufficiency.
194. We only saw what servitude is in relation to mastery. However, servi-
tude is self-consciousness, and thus what it is in and for itself is now up for
examination. For servitude, the master is initially the essence. Therefore,
to servitude, the truth is the self-sufficient consciousness existing for itself , a
truth which for servitude is nonetheless not yet in servitude. Yet servitude
has this truth of pure negativity and of being-for-itself in fact in servitude
in its own self, for servitude has experienced this essence in servitude. This

14 außer sich. Alternatively, this could be rendered: “beside itself.” 15 in sich gehen.
 B. Self-Consciousness 115
consciousness was not driven with anxiety about just this or that matter,
nor did it have anxiety about just this or that moment; rather, it had anxi-
ety about its entire essence. It felt the fear of death, the absolute master. In
that feeling, it had inwardly fallen into dissolution, trembled in its depths,
and all that was fixed within it had been shaken loose. However, this pure
universal movement, this way in which all stable existence becomes abso-
lutely fluid, is the simple essence of self-consciousness; it is absolute neg-
ativity, pure being-for-itself , which thereby is in this consciousness. This
moment of pure being-for-itself is also for this consciousness, for, to itself, its
object lies within the master. Furthermore, not only is there this universal
dissolution as such, but, in his service, the servant also achieves this disso-
lution in actuality. In his service, he sublates all of the singular moments
of his attachment to natural existence, and he works off his natural
existence.
195. However, the feeling of absolute power as such, and in the particu-
larities of service, is only dissolution in itself , and, although the fear of the
lord is the beginning of wisdom, in that fear consciousness is what it is that
is for it itself , but it is not being-for-itself .16 However, through work, this
servile consciousness comes round to itself. In the moment corresponding
to desire in the master’s consciousness, the aspect of the non-essential rela-
tion to the thing seemed to fall to the lot of the servant, as the thing there
retained its self-sufficiency. Desire has reserved to itself the pure negating 115
of the object, and, as a result, it has reserved to itself that unmixed feeling
for its own self.17 However, for that reason, this satisfaction is itself only
a vanishing, for it lacks the objective aspect, or stable existence. In contrast,
work is desire held in check, it is vanishing staved off , or: work cultivates
and educates.18 The negative relation to the object becomes the form of the
object; it becomes something that endures because it is just for the laborer
himself that the object has self-sufficiency. This negative mediating middle,
this formative doing, is at the same time singularity, or the pure being-for-
itself of consciousness, which in the work external to it now enters into
the element of lasting. Thus, by those means, the working consciousness
comes to an intuition of self-sufficient being as its own self .
196. However, what the formative activity means is not only that the
serving consciousness as pure being-for-itself becomes, to itself, an exist-
ing being within that formative activity. It also has the negative mean-
ing of the first moment, that of fear. For in forming the thing, his own
16 darin für es selbst, nicht das Für-sich-sein.
17 Selbstgefühl. This could also be rendered as “self-awareness,” or even “self-assurance.”
18 sie bildet.
 116 The Phenomenology of Spirit
negativity, or his being-for-itself, only as a result becomes an object to him-
self in that he sublates the opposed existing form. However, this objective
negative is precisely the alien essence before which he trembled, but now
he destroys this alien negative and posits himself as such a negative within
the element of continuance. He thereby becomes for himself an existing-
being-for-itself . Being-for-itself in the master is to the servant an other,
or it is only for him. In fear, being-for-itself is in its own self . In cultur-
ally formative activity,19 being-for-itself becomes for him his own being-
for-itself, and he attains the consciousness that he himself is in and for
himself. As a result, the form, by being posited as external, becomes to
him not something other than himself, for his pure being-for-itself is that
very form, which to him therein becomes the truth. Therefore, through
this retrieval, he comes to acquire through himself a mind of his own, and
he does this precisely in the work in which there had seemed to be only
some outsider’s mind. – For this reflection, the two moments of fear and
service, as well as the moments of culturally formative activity are both
necessary, and both are necessary in a universal way. Without the disci-
pline of service and obedience, fear is mired in formality and does not
diffuse itself over the conscious actuality of existence. Without culturally
formative activity, fear remains inward and mute, and consciousness will
not become for it [consciousness] itself.20 If consciousness engages in for-
mative activity without that first, absolute fear, then it has a mind of its
own which is only vanity, for its form, or its negativity, is not negativity in
itself , and his formative activity thus cannot to himself give him the con-
sciousness of himself as consciousness of the essence. If he has not been
tried and tested by absolute fear but only by a few anxieties, then the nega-
tive essence will have remained an externality to himself, and his substance
will not have been infected all the way through by it. While not each and
every one of the ways in which his natural consciousness was brought to
fulfillment was shaken to the core, he is still attached in himself to deter-
minate being. His having a mind of his own is then only stubbornness, a
116 freedom that remains bogged down within the bounds of servility. To the
servile consciousness, pure form can as little become the essence as can the
pure form – when it is taken as extending itself beyond the singular indi-
vidual – be a universal culturally formative activity, an absolute concept.
Rather, the form is a skill which, while it has dominance over some things,
has dominance over neither the universal power nor the entire objective
essence.

19 in dem Bilden. 20 wird nicht für es selbst.