Bank Strategic Management and Marketing 1986
Bank Strategic Management and Marketing 1986
Management
and
Marketing
DEREK F. CHANNON
,'WITHDRAWN
#?Tf
mjcC § & M
yny n * 19911
OCf 2 8 iyy)
* ftr,; -5 JifcjgT
m 1 2 1992.
* •
i*
f
' v
;t 4 ‘ \ . *
i
y?.R 1 6 --
Bank
Strategic Management
and Marketing
Bank
Strategic Management
and Marketing
Derek F. Channon
Professor of Marketing
International Banking Centre
Manchester Business School,
Manchester, UK
Contents
Preface . ix
Chapter 1 Introduction . 1
1.1 Changing Patterns of Bank Strategy . 1
1.2 Banking in the 1980s . 3
1.3 The Need for Market Planning . 6
1.4 The Role of this Book . 6
v
VI
Index . 230
Preface
This book and its accompanying casebook have developed over a number of
years largely as a result of the development of the International Banking
Centre at the Manchester Business School and from work undertaken with
many individual banks. The banking industry is presently undergoing a
revolution world wide. Due to the twin impacts of deregulation and
technology an industry that even quite recently in many countries operated as
a relatively undifferentiated cartel is now learning to operate in a much more
competitive environment. Under such competitive conditions marketing and
the process of strategic management suddenly become much more important.
The banking and financial services industry thus provides a fascinating area
to observe the effects of rapid industrial structure change. The introduction
and use a marketing and strategic management concepts are important
ingredients in this change process. However, it has been our experience that
such concepts need to be adjusted specifically for the industry and this has
been the intent in the case of this book. There is also an accompanying
casebook, all the material in which was developed from real banking
situations, and disguise has been used to the minimum. Given the relative
secrecy of the industry we would like to thank sincerely all those banks who
have kindly released material for publication.
The text for the book is based on experience in the areas of marketing and
strategic management and how these concepts can be specifically applied to
the banking industry. Similarly all the cases in the casebook have been
classroom tested with bankers at Manchester and around the world. We hope
that both text and the case books will provide a useful contribution to the area
of management education for banking.
In its preparation we have received much support from many bankers and
banks. We would very much like to thank all those who have helped us. In
addition I would like to thank my colleagues at the International Banking
Centre and especially its Director, Dr Jim Byrne. I must also thank my
research assistants who have helped collect and prepare data used in the
cases. In particular thanks are due to John Desmond, Sally Falshawe and
Makoto Showda. My secretary Avril Rathbone has also been responsible for
much help in preparing the manuscript and I would like to thank her for
IX
X
patience and efficiency. Finally, while the work is the result of the efforts of
many, any errors that may occur are regretted, with the responsibility being
solely mine.
Derek F. Channon
Manchester Business School
June, 1985
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
The world banking industry has been changing rapidly since the end of the
1960s. During the 1970s the industry in the developed countries of the world
experienced a substantial change in competitive conditions as a result of a
number of factors. First, the industry tended to go international, led by the
leading US money center banks. This resulted in market interpenetration by
established overseas competitors and led to substantial challenges to existing
indigenous banks, notably in the corporate market. Moreover, the new
entrants brought with them new approaches to servicing corporate accounts,
while the growing internationalization of the large corporations from all the
developed countries led in turn to customer demand for new banking services
to meet the specific needs of multicountry operations.
Secondly, new capital markets opened which transformed the traditional
patterns of funding for both banks and corporations. By the end of the 1970s
large percentages of bank deposits were being provided by funds from other
banks via the interbank market and the burgeoning growth of the deregulated
Euromarkets. Initially centered on London, the Euromarkets had evolved as
the world’s largest capital market, operating in an increasing number of major
financial centers around the world. Moreover, the instruments available within
the market had developed to provide a wide range of sophisticated products
meeting more or less any specific financial need in a growing variety of
currencies or currency combinations.
Third, in response to competition, indigenous banks in Europe reacted and
began to build up their own multinational presence, attacking notably the US
domestic market, where via aquisitions and new openings, they brought their
own brand of counterattack to the US indigenous banks with significant success
in many cases. Here it was the US banks that were on the receiving end of an
aggressive attack which some believed to be unfair, in that the regulations
affecting the new competitors appeared to give them advantages on interstate
branching and the like which were denied to US domestic banks.
1
2
Next, the banking industry, despite the constraints of banking law in many
countries, began to diversify. Again in the USA the constrictive corset of Glass
Steagall prevented a number of the moves that banks were able to undertake in
some other countries, but in general commercial banks moved into the areas of
asset-based finance, consumer credit finance, merchant banking, trust and
pension management, Eurocurrency operations and syndications, credit cards
and the like, while at the same time proliferating the range of products offered
in conventional banking services. Where legal constraints did not apply,
further areas for diversification included insurance broking and underwriting,
travel, securities management and computer services. As a result, by the end of
the 1970s banks had become more complex in the range of services offered
while competitive pressures had eroded margins on commercial lending such
that fee-based services were becoming of increasing importance.
Fifth, the industry was identified, largely because of the regulatory
constraints, by a growing number of non-banks as being especially attractive to
corporations with potential operating advantages in specific areas of activity.
Thus, automobile companies such as General Motors, which had long been
engaged in dealer and personal finance for automobile purchase, saw the
opportunity to extend leasing and credit finance business to non-General
Motors customers. Travel card companies like American Express saw the
opportunity to offer a variety of financial services to its existing account-hol¬
ders at little additional cost. And retail companies like Sears Roebuck saw its
established chain of nationwide retail outlets as an obvious point of sale for a
range of interstate financial services which banks were inhibited from
providing.
Sixth, technology began to affect the banking industry. Most notably this
appeared in retail banking as, faced with a mounting tide of paper and rising
administrative costs, banks turned to plastic cards and electronic machinery in
an effort to maintain their ability to handle an increase in transaction volume
while controlling costs. Further, the need to provide increased service,
especially outside opening hours, led to the increased use of first cash
dispensers and later automated teller machines. Similarly, the back office
gradually became more automated and from the operations centres of many
banks the possibility of selling information-processing services began to
emerge as a potential new product market in its own right.
In retail banking too, competition increased. Savings and loan banks
initiated the interest-bearing transaction account to bring them into direct
competition with commercial banks. Outside the USA, savings banks and
building societies also offered a growing range of services to attract small
depositors. Larger depositors were lured by the attraction of money market
funds or by the development of new sophisticated integrated financial service
products such as the Merrill Lynch Cash Management Account. In retail
lending, competition also increased. Credit card companies, collectively
owned and operated by banks, offered easy credit, stores offered retail
3
While change within the banking industry in the 1970s was very rapid, the 1980s
seem likely to bring an acceleration in the pace of this change. Amongst the
trends discernible for the present decade are the following.
HNWIs. Below the level of the very rich, a segment has been developed to
cater for the special needs of those individuals of moderate wealth. Making use
of sophisticated computer systems, Merrill Lynch introduced its Cash
Management Account to provide an effective money market interest rate for
deposits of $20,000 or more coupled with a Visa card and checking account
and the ability to generate loans automatically based on the value of securities
contained in the account. The rapid success of this type of account has forced
banks to respond and offer interest on current account balances at money
market rates, while other securities companies have entered the market with
similar products to that of Merrill Lynch. As a result, the traditional deposit
base of the commercial banks has been substantially eroded.
banks have begun to interrogate their existing account base with the view to
identifying accounts with potential for various specific services such as personal
loans, credit finance, insurance, first and second mortgages, insurance or
deposits. There will also be strong pressure to discard the unprofitable
segments of most banks’ retail customer base.
The trend of the 1970s toward machine banking is increasing as banks work to
reduce the cost of consumer banking using bricks-and-mortar branches and
human resources. Not only is the growth of more sophisticated automated
teller machines occurring but the development of home banking seems likely
by the end of the decade. At the same time, credit and debit cards are expected
to continue to grow and offer an increasing range of services as more
information is contained on a card in the striping or in an inbuilt microchip. The
substitution of machinery for human labor will continue and probably
accelerate as the relative cost of new technology delivery systems falls while
that of human tellers and back office personnel continues to rise.
The intensive competition that developed in the 1970s will continue and even
increase during the 1980s as banks increasingly strive for competitive
advantage and in so doing tend to cancel out one another’s efforts.
As multinational corporations find they increasingly need banks less as they
add internally the skills traditionally provided by banks and demand ever lower
rates for money, banks themselves are turning their attention to the ‘middle
market’. In so doing, however, they are forcing interest rates down in this
sector for attractive accounts while reducing customer loyalty as the companies
adopt multibank relationships. Smaller banks such as South East and Standard
Chartered have opted to concentrate on specific services such as trade finance
or geographic territories such as the Far East or the Caribbean basin. Other
banks like the Texas banks have concentrated on specific areas of lending such
as real estate and energy lending.
Further, while the American international banks led the competitive attack
in the 1970s, the 1980s have begun with the counter-attack of the large
European banks such as Barclays, Banque Nationale de Paris, Credit
Lyonnais, Algemene Bank and Deutsche Bank. As these banks build up their
global networks to match those of the leading US money center banks or build
upon already established branches, the number of major competitors entered
in all the major corporate and wholesale business centers will increase to an
average of over 50 major banks.
Still to come as major global competitors by the end of the decade are the
large Japanese commercial banks and leading specialist banks such as the
Industrial Bank of Japan and the Bank of Tokyo. These banks, which are
normally at the center of massive industrial groups, can be expected to emerge
as extremely powerful and important competitors as their industrial group
associates continue to expand overseas and develop the Japanese international
economic position. By the mid-1980s the large Japanese banks had already
achieved five positions among the top ten global banks.
Finally, a number of new important financial institutions are emerging from
the newly industrializing countries and those countries with substantial
petrodollar surpluses. Banks such as Banco do Brasil, Hong Kong & Shanghai
and those of the Gulf States can be expected to play a greater role in the world
of international banking in the future.
In the same way that banks are turning to technology to change their approach
to consumer markets, so in the corporate and wholesale markets the
development of systems-based products is becoming of increased importance.
Making use of their global networks and advanced communications, computer
6
Non-banks such as American Express, Merrill Lynch and the major credit
finance companies have already established a significant position in the
corporate market and can be expected to continue to do so. In addition, a
growing number of industrial companies are broadening the scope of their
financial services operations to enter external markets. Thus organizations like
General Motors Acceptance Corporation offer industrial credit finance,
leasing and the like to companies outside General Motors, many captive
insurance companies now legitimately trade with third party organizations, and
in the coming decade the emergence of trading companies such as those of
Japan can be expected in the West in major corporations like General Electric.
undertaken in conjunction with many of the world’s leading banks, has always
been practical in nature and courses have been designed in conjunction with
practicing line bankers. We are extremely grateful for all the help and
assistance these bankers have provided over the years and hope this may in
some small way repay their help.
The text examines techniques of bank strategic planning and marketing
based upon working systems in leading banks. In addition, the importance of
techniques such as competitor analysis and product development are discussed
from a banking perspective. A detailed analysis of corporate financial service
purchasing is included to try and emphasize the position of the bank customer.
To supplement and reinforce the text a comprehensive collection of up-to-date
banking cases is provided in an accompanying casebook. These range from
cases outlining various aspects of the strategy of many important named banks
and non-banks from around the world to a series of operational cases drawn
from the experiences of a number of cooperating banks. Nearly all the material
has been tested with line bankers drawn from many countries attending the
many programs run by the International Banking Centre, while others have
been prepared for specific banks’ internal management needs. We hope that
you will find the results helpful to your bank.
CHAPTER 2
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The plan thus describes the strategic direction the bank will take by assigning
specific objectives and investment priorities to particular market segments in
which the bank operates, so committing resources to the desired mix of
businesses which will result in achievement of the bank's long-term objectives.
As a guide to management, the bank’s plan also describes the strategies to be
pursued in the form of action plans leading to changes in business variables
under the control of management. These variables are the levers which can be
manipulated to arrive at the desired strategic position for each bank business.
The desired changes themselves define the implementation tasks of managers.
1. Mission. This states the overall purpose or raison d'etre of the bank. It
also applies at the level of the organizational subunit, stating in
addition the nature of activities and any self-imposed constraints.
8
9
The plan also needs to be developed for each organizational level of the
bank. The normal starting point for bank analysis is the individual market
segment. However, the bank’s organization structure may affect the responsi¬
bilities for making changes in market strategic variables. Further, organization
structure itself is a major variable under management control, and indeed it
turns out to be a key factor for bank differentiation. For major international
banks the question of market and business unit definition can be difficult to
resolve, due to conflicting claims of product and geography. In practice country
units are logical organizational planning centers, but for products and/or
customers which span national boundaries coordination or planning control
should focus on the customer/product segment. The differences between plan
content at various organizational levels are illustrated in Figure 2.1.
o
<-»—I
Cd
'O <D cj
d> . ? cd
c p <4-1
OX) c
<D *2
c
: -c
»- 4—»
CD £ cd
d)
cd d> wi
cd cj c
“ E
C/3
M
CD (D
E d> c
cd
x
E
ox p
c
d) C/3 >
d>
c is CD u 1) V
*4—> d> c/3 CJ
d) D c/3 E " E
’> X O ,5 - 0) C/3 OX) c
cd
X
4—* V- e b
E o CD
> C
C/3 d>
C
CJ cd X „ 5 c «-*
cd o C *D i5 o o
<4-4
E 4—* 2:5-5
o CX c
_o CD
U U .a .5 i) i ■°-o
‘■<2 XS
o c
d>
CD
O- "S S ‘G p ‘G ‘o <D
'tS
c/3 ccdj kp x
o o B
O > OX) 0) g o> d) C/3 +•*d) CD OX)
CJ u CD o-O cl cl;p P a a. d)
GO TD GO G0 U C/5 go 3 < c/5 go C/5
d)
C/3 >
d> d>
o
d>
c £ "O OX)
X b
C/3
tj 0) d>
CL
<4-1 X c
cd 5
CL
O cd ’> O- cd
O 0) OX)
■a
CD cd d>
C/3 d> v*— CJ
■— on C/3 CL & T3 C/3
E
c <L)
cd
.S o
C #>
4-* .p > cj C/3
y cd cd 4-> ’-5
cd s- OX) — <2 C c/3
o
CJ
cj
d> (U a T3 cd d> C
d> d> E O- x:
«-* cj cd
Figure 2.1
(U o
, L2 U— o
Figure 2.1
i~ d)
X d> ■g.E d) d)
X C Cxc-i OX)
5 c
<u CX « cs # ° cd cd
> rt <D <u x
c
o
u
O 1-1 >
. X >
« g CJ
d>
E
<u
• —5
CX^ -- E E CL
X>
o § u op ex ^
U. (U
C/3 O
_ -*-» c O C _cd
C C/3 <->
<o O ■— u d) O
•*-* C u. W)
2 ^ ^ C
**- t. . P ^ o
51 .a
o
CX
o
ex 5 o a F- S b:
u, <— <0 CX £ CD 3 ^cd cd D
n . d>
o o a. a o
> CJ O
U u co o U o.s U
c
'O
C/3
C/3
§
11
OO
_c
'5
c
i2
cx
<D
H
CN
(N
<L>
O
.2?
E
12
The first stage in developing the plan is the establishment of the bank’s mission
statement. Each organization has such a mission or reason for existence. This
only changes very slowly and has a major impact on what the organization
chooses to do or not to do and the way it decides to act. Understanding your
own bank’s mission and those of your competitors is an important ingredient in
establishing successful strategies, by recognizing the constraints within your
own organization and the opportunities offered by those within your
competitors’. The actual mission of the bank is determined by a number of
factors:
Corporate history
The past history of the bank will have a significant impact on behavior. Past
successes will influence the choice of future directions whilst past failures will
tend to lead to areas of avoidance. The bank’s origins will also affect its
position in relation to particular geographic areas, customer classes, and so
on. Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank thus sees its zone of influence to be the
Pacific Basin and also the USA and UK; Credit Agricole is strongly attached
to its farming depositors.
Corporate culture
Every organization has its own unique internal culture made up of the way
things are normally done, the type of people employed and the set of
organizational norms and practices which condition and govern both formal
and informal behavior. J. P. Morgan bankers thus see themselves as financial
consultants, compared with Citibank corporate bankers who are much more
lending-oriented.
Power structure
The power structure of the bank will significantly influence behaviour. This
again applies to both the formal and informal organization structure. Thus,
for example, despite protestations to the contrary, not all executives in
Barclays are perceived as equal, especially if they are descended from one of
the bank’s founding families. Similarly, a branch-oriented bank such as Bank
of America tends to structure its activities around geography, by comparison
13
Key decision-makers
The style, aspirations and values of key decision-makers have a significant
effect on the basic purpose of the bank. Virtually no major shifts in strategy
or organization occur without a prior change of leadership, and this is
normally a prerequisite for any attempt to shift the organizational purpose.
For example, the recent change in the strategic direction of Chase
Manhattan and First Chicago Corporation required such a change of
leadership.
The basic mission of the bank can thus act as a serious deterrent to shifts in
strategy but usually represents a deep strength providing some overall
distinctive competence which can be built upon for the development of future
strategy. It must, however, be recognized that to change a basic organizational
purpose is usually very difficult and takes a significant time. Strategies which
expect to make such changes quickly are therefore unlikely to be realistic. This
concept of overall purpose for the bank needs to be identified and set down in
an overall corporate mission statement. The statement sets out the overall
direction the bank wishes to pursue and identifies the nature of the activities it
will engage in and self-imposed constraints that may apply as a result of history,
culture and management values.
The second stage of developing the overall bank plan is the setting of
objectives. These are set by top management, taking into account the potential
of the external environment, any self-imposed constraints identified by the
overall mission statement, the internal resources of the bank and the
requirements of external shareholders as shown in Figure 2.3.
The corporate objectives usually remain relatively stable over the medium
term and should consist of quantified variables, although many banks also
include non-quantified objectives. Later in the planning process at other levels
within the bank, strategic groups, divisions or departments will also set out
their own mission statements and objectives as part of the detailed bank plan.
In evaluating the objectives of the bank and its operating units it is extremely
important to check that they are internally consistent and that the achievement
of one does not automatically exclude the achievement of another. All too
often internal consistency is missing. Similarly, in reviewing the overall plan
check that the objectives of the operating units are consistent with those of the
bank as a whole. Again it is common to find inconsistencies. One often
encountered is that operating units will still be seeking to grow their businesses
while the bank, as part of its market portfolio strategy, might actually require
14
The next stage in developing the bank strategic plan is strategy development.
The first step in this is to assess, and order, potential market opportunities as
shown in Figure 2.4. A market is defined as an intersection between a class of
customers and a bank product or service group. Defining the markets the bank
is engaged in is actually a very difficult task and requires a substantial degree of
creative effort. In practice, virtually no bank endeavors to service all the needs
of all potential customers. Instead the bank operates in a series of ‘served’
markets, each of which is a subset of the total market as illustrated in Figure
2.5. The concept of ‘served’ market breaks down the total market to that
segment or segments to which the bank will purposively try and sell products or
services.
Each market the bank is engaged in, therefore, should be sufficiently defined
such that you can answer each of the following questions:
For the large corporate market plans are created mainly by building up from
the marketing plans for individual accounts (see Chapter 6 on account
marketing planning), while for those larger groups of customers and
prospects marketing planning is based on aggregate strategies. Middle market
corporate accounts are usefully planned by a combination of these
techniques, using improved segmentation screening variables to initiate
marketing plans supplemented by individual account plans for those
organizations whose potential, based on the screening criteria, justifies the
expense.
17
Suissaaojd eieq
3u;5(Ojq souEjnsu]
JU3UI3SCUBIU UOISU3J
3DIApR XCX
SuinpiEq amqaBjAl
S331AJ3S J3jnduiC0
|E}idE3 ajnjus^
suro| uoipnjjsuo3
sjipajo jaXng
33UEUIJ psfoJJ
SUOIJBDipuXs UEOg
S3D1AJ3S 33JS0JX
33|ApC JU3U1JS3AUI
Suuopnj |EDOg
SuiSE3] |E30g
SU0tp3||03 |E30g
sijpjp uSpjoj
S3! ^qpuEJS
33unuy jjodui|
33UEU1J podxg
Figure 2.6(a)
SJtpSP 33UB)d333V
JJEJPJ3A0 |BDOg
z
State enterprises
Construction cos
X>
cos
l-t
Foreign MNCs
Aerospace cos
1 Insurance cos
P3 z
cos
Property cos
Government
o <
Local MNCs
Region A
Region B
Region C
Engineering
Region B
£ U
Trading cos
o
Energy cos
oj z c c
Shipping
rt o
Cl
JV
o
0/
c
O/J
o z £ <u <D
e* c oc
C3 X
o l- CC
u H
SJipSJO [BUOl}BUJ3JUJ
aaiApB SupunoDoy
Supjuuq auiqoBpv
aoiApe UOISU3J
[BjidBD aanjua^
SUBOJ 3§B§JJOJM
SUBOJ JJBjpjaAO
sjunoooB jisodap uuax
sjunooaB spajpjiq^
sjunoaoB psodap jBooq
sjunoDOB guojaaqa jBooq
Figure 2.6(b)
bO
C
O
J3
G CD
cd G
X O
cd
CL) x
G
G
J-H O C
CD
cd o
E CD
i
C/5
C bD
<D bO
C C
G "O G
O (D G O >
U > C/5
cd
C/3
19
Turnover
Turnover provides a simple crude means of segmentation. For example:
Some banks determine their mode of organization based upon turnover
measures such as accounts above $100m turnover being handled by a
director or senior vice president; some international banks will not pursue
accounts of less than $50m sales.
Turnover gives an indication of the size of business available for many
products and is perhaps the widest used single segmentation variable.
However, most banks when designing key account target lists make overuse
of this variable without coupling it with other factors such as geography,
probability of dislodging a competitor, etc. As a result, many banks are
pursuing the same key accounts and often neglecting potentially more
profitable and more readily penetrable accounts with perhaps a somewhat
lower volume of total business. The largest apparent volume segment is
seldom the easiest to penetrate or the most profitable.
Turnover is also an important variable when used in conjunction with others
to create ratios. However, remember turnover is not an available measure in
many service and public sector organizations.
Geography
Corporate accounts in fact tend to be geographically clustered. Geography
can thus be used as a variable to decide upon the allocation of business
development resources, new branches, etc., and for assessing market
potential within particular regions.
Industry classification
This is a somewhat difficult variable to use, since many companies are very
diversified and operate in a number of product market areas. Crude industry
measures are, however, useful both in terms of assigning account responsi¬
bly and developing specific products. For example, insurance broking
companies and commodity traders would be especially interested in rapid
money transfer systems. Industry specialization by account executives is a
real alternative to a geographic branch-based system of business develop¬
ment, and even if not practised it is important for bank executives to learn
about the specific financial needs of key industries.
good at. Remember, whenever you take new business, it has to come either
from growth in the overall market or from a competitor.
Subsidiary structure
The majority of larger companies or industrial groups consist of different
subsidiaries and/or are multisite operations. It may be possible to gain an
early foothold at an account by taking business at a subsidiary or specific
plant. The decision process for bank appointments can rely heavily on the
attitude of subsidiary units, especially for some services, and this may
therefore represent a significant potential route for building a lead bank
relationship. It is, however, important to understand the decision process for
banking appointments before spending too long trying to gain business at a
subsidiary of a larger group.
Number of employees
A useful indicator of organization size, this can also be used to indicate
sensitivity to wage demands, and when taken in conjunction with other
factors provides a number of useful derived variables such as value added per
employee, capital employed per employee, etc. It can be used in the design
of service packages incorporating personal services, which often form a
suitable starting point for account penetration.
Current assets
Subdivided into major components, with stocks and debtors being singled
out for specific attention, these indicate managerial ability when compared
with industry averages, degree of working capital intensity, and the like.
They also suggest specific types of banking service such as factoring,
overdraft lending, acceptance credits, transaction services, and the like.
Current liabilities
Subdivided into major components, with creditors and short debt being
singled out for specific attention, these indicate debt capacity level and
managerial control over creditors.
21
Fixed assets
Subdivided into property and plant and equipment for use in security
evaluation and identification of capital funding needs and capital intensity,
fixed assets can be usefully examined to explore financing opportunities in all
forms including leasing commercial paper and the like.
Interest paid
Subdivided into long and short interest, this, in conjunction with earnings,
indicates capacity to repay lending. Short interest should be checked against
actual year-end balance-sheet short debt to identify seasonal overdraft
requirements.
Profitability
Several versions are used. EBIT indicates absolute level of earnings, also
used in conjunction with other variables to indicate gross margin and return
on investment.
Earnings before tax may also be used on its own and as a measure of ROI.
Earnings after tax indicates levels of tax paid. Industry average is useful as an
indicator of tax saving potential, managerial capability and corporate
viabilty.
them, it is possible to subdivide the corporate market into very small segments
which can be assigned priorities and attacked systematically. In addition, it is
possible to monitor your own accounts to assess the impact of changing market
conditions and to identify possible targets which your competitors might seek
to exploit.
For example, your bank might be interested in accounts with an overall level
of sales of more than $50m, exports of more than $8m, a debt/equity ratio
of not more than 50 per cent and interest cover of at least five times. In most
countries the number of accounts fulfilling this set of criteria would actually be
extremely small and could be quickly isolated and serviced.
Superich
Customers with a deposit capability or net worth of $1 million and above.
While such individuals are seen as a primary source of relatively low-cost
deposits, they are also attractive prospects for investment management
services, tax advice, insurance and large loans.
HNWI
Today this segment is virtually a mass market group. They provide a
substantial element of the endowment in current account balances and have
for years been neglected by traditional banks, who have offered low or no
interest on deposits. This group has been the principal segment attacked by
money market funds, Amex Gold Card and Merrill Lynch with dramatic
success, causing a massive drain on bank deposits in the USA, especially for
savings and loan banks. It is not merely a source of deposits, however: its
members are also active purchasers of investment management services,
insurance, travel services, large mortgages and other loan products. Banks
will have to look carefully at this customer group in the coming years to try to
23
win them back from the attractive package of financial services offered by
the broking houses.
Professionals
This group of specialist, professionally qualified self-employed such as
dentists, doctors, lawyers and accountants are attractive prospects not
merely because of their net worth but also as good potential for small
business loans, data processing and pension planning services, which need to
be carefully packaged to meet their specific needs. Thus, although they
overlap with the HNWI group, they form a specific subsegment which can be
addressed separately.
Self-employed
A wider segment than the professional group and usually associated with
higher risk lending, this group is also attractive not only for loan services but
for insurance pension planning, tax advice and possibly data processing.
Students
A large number of banks make specialized marketing appeals to students in
the expectation that capturing their accounts at this stage will ultimately
leave the bank with valuable up-market accounts after the student
graduates. Regrettably, this anticipated long-term loyalty is breaking down
as other banks attempt to provide specialist services to postgraduation
groups such as professionals.
Senior citizens
A generally neglected segment until recently, senior citizens actually have a
high propensity to save. A number of savings and loan banks have found that
this segment can be kept very loyal by providing specialist services such as
group travel, social events and the like to meet a real need for companion¬
ship often felt by such customers.
Youth
Many banks are attempting to generate loyalty very early by picking off the
child and youth market. This forms a significant small savings market in
aggregate, which banks have attempted to attract with offers of higher
interest rates and free gifts.
substantial loan commitment. The accounts which are unprofitable are those
with a low balance and high transaction rate. Some such as student accounts
may be tolerated at this stage in the expectation that they will subsequently
mature and become attractive. Others can be improved by efforts at service
cross-selling, bearing in mind that the type of services required by particular
individuals will vary according to demographics and lifestyle. You will also
usually find a smaller group of accounts with low balances, a high level of
transactions and limited future potential. With these accounts you will have to
decide if you can raise the cost of transactions to make them economically
viable, encourage the accounts to bank elsewhere or maintain the loss-makers
on social grounds. This group of unprofitable accounts may represent some 30
per cent of the average retail customer base. An illustration of consumer
segmentation variables and their impact is given in Table 2.1, which shows
how lifestyles and demographics have been combined to create consumer
segments which account for a known percentage of the population and can be
specifically addressed as a part of bank strategy. Such segment sizes and
characteristics will of course vary according to location and it is therefore
important to conduct detailed market research before adopting specific
strategies aimed at individual segments.
Many banks pay insufficient attention to segmentation of either corporate or
consumer markets. However, segmentation is crucial to strategic management
and will be of paramount importance in the coming decade as banks strive to
differentiate themselves in a relatively fragmented and highly competitive
marketplace. In these conditions, without specialization and service differen¬
tiation, most banking activities will become price-sensitive commodity services
with few opportunities for attractive margins.
Market characteristics
• Market size
• Historic growth rate
• Projected growth rate
• Number of accounts in total
• Number making up 50 per cent and 80 per cent of the market
• Trend in market concentration
• Buying decision process
• Service usage characteristics
• Service delivery process
• Financial characteristics of customers
25
Service characteristics
• Degree of service differentiation
• Relative capital intensity
• Value added
• Level and type of risk to the bank
• Relative profitabilty of the service
• Rate of service change/innovation
• Details of add-on service characteristics
• Cross-selling potential
• Impact on shared cost structures
• Service integration with other bank services
Competitive characteristics
• Identity of major competitors and their market shares (including non¬
banks where relevant)
• Bank’s market share and relative share
• Changes in number of competitors
• Trends in market share
• Degree of competitor concentration
• Relative service quality (assess the full concept of the service, including
delivery, time, accuracy, etc.)
• Relative service price
• Relative service cost
• Relative capital intensity
• Relative marketing effort
• Relative delivery system capability (includes network size and coverage,
account officer skill, etc.)
• Relative employee skills
• Relative resource availability
• Relative systems capability
• Barriers to entry or exit
Environmental characteristics
• Economic trends and their impact on the market
• Social trends and their impact
• Political trends and their impact
• Technological trends and their impact
The quality of your plans will be heavily dependent upon the information
you use to generate them. The careful selection of information is therefore
important. Japanese banks can teach Western banks a great deal about
information gathering and analysis, while the intelligence systems developed
by their associate trading companies have no parallel amongst Western
26
3
cj Is
<D 'C > <D 3
CJ jd 3 T3 s
3
<D <D C/3 -3
e o
C/3 <d ^3 X
w £
<U a<D x:Q_ <d X <D 3
£ •S t/5 2
X) 3
ca <- T3
<D O <D -(3 3 c/3 X U « 3
x o c o C/3 e s ^ ■ 3 <D C O. .*J
03 O o S L
Si O -*—•
CJ O 3
a ^ Li d) IE c 3 = X TT 3 iis.
O >"s C/3 a d) -
9
cj a Cl .tii ’+c
c L- L- 03 x o
OX) u, d) CJ 3 „o -a
> L- 2 ■*->" l—
L- cs ^
C
> o j§ E 3 <d c CD d> Ed « « 0X) 3 c3
c/3 <D 3
•—ope a ° + | C/3 3 e C*J 7T X>
o .5 3 3
o £ rjn
e ^ O OJ<d ^ o o d) ^
3 2 3 o Jhffl ^ i/) J J CQ S J a- D c/t Z
d>
U O 2 Q
<d
X
>s o
3 e
o X
C/3
X)
d)
o <D <d 3 ^•a y 0.|
CL -a
O ■g E O
2 3 a3 C/3
3
3 <d o
3
e SoJ
,2 w " d) *0 '5
o
l<
3
c/i
y
c Li >
e
o
e
o
3
x
3
o. e «j o 1e L-L ” CD § “
. O T3 CL CL 3 OX) 3 d) o O X
> V o & - ’C 3 L-
3 C/3 Li — *3 3
3 .'3 Jf i s OX)
i_
<u
c/>
W)
>
A .§ s 3 3
OX)
3 <u ~C/3 2
d) .E OX)
o
x
x CJ
3 o x
OX) <u
C/3 C
C '> ^ 3
r9 to d) d) IE
c
175 . —i ■*-> | -c E 5 3 c3
=3 > X) CQ HH 3
CL) H Oh d) ^ _C W 0^ U LO z z
U GO "O hJ Q E CQ
to o >s
3 X o
-a 0) <u
a. OX) x
Identifying Bank Market Segments
o d) "O "O
a3 C
3 3 3 X
Lh CD
o 4—•
u>
.§ “e QJ> oIn
a. O E 3 <4-1 <u
CL
X q-5 2 p 3 >
> Cl CJ o
4-
d)
O
ox
C E 2 > l- o <D > <D
-o x
EE °03 So I « s
= O
.5 o g :s O CL C
OX) X 3
o 2 is
c <u o
OX)
Li
3
u
c
3
o C/3
X 3
^
0X) -g
<D
H J 3 WWffl £ m J hJ c < Z
<D
U a
Table 2.1
(U
CJ Li <u
c X C/3
L— X
•U d) Li <D <D
Li D 3
as CJ c y >s £ CJ Li
3
■*- £
qj 3
<D
X 2 (U X <4—1 X
c
3
c«
E <D 3 X (D C 3
C 3 '£ c CD <D <D 3 X OJ
Lh cd § O <D 3 CJ E X 3 D 3 ^ 2 §
O 53 4—* .2 ^ o Li 3 c^ Li _C
+L CJ > c CJ 2 C/3 3 X
o °
CL o Li _ r- Li
3 ■S ^ CD OB C/3 *3
o X D. ro 3 C/3 Vh 3 OB <D OB O L- C
Cl C/3 £ L.
Q-.2 3 3 Li o Li Ih O '3 OB O o 3
CJ Q 2 <D X <D
<D 2 >- Li 3 3 C/3 >
E 2 « E M *2 2 S 4—1 > Li Li 3 X X 3
O <D
-H 3 C/3 3 CD 3 O
o S
; g e OX) P S o —J CD <D O C/3 > CJ O o
3 £ 3 N-J CQ 0* z
— <u o J H
<D W 1 ^ z < Z Z
U Z nJ
o
00
3u >s
X 3 c
<u <U (U >
<d cl > c 3 T3
CL T3 C/D C
a '2 9 C
3
c
o
<u
-o CL 3 3
3 g 8 o o 3 C Li
o Li X O c X
o
C x c <D 3 c/3 <u >
CL o cl <u
Cl o CL 0B CL
C/3
_o CD 2 &o Li o £ 2 «* •-
L- d) E <D .3 E Li 3 CJ
3 OX) ^ ^ .2 S c 3
C/3
OX)
U
c
S y TJ
“3 (D
d> i- 3 ’o o CJ O -f > o C ^ Li 4—* Li
E 3 X C/3 O <D <U c t/3 <D
E ^ « 3 « X C o °
|
X
£
<u o CQ 0- 3 lJ d> tn X Oh c Qi Oh Z Z
<D
U Z s Q
<U •
§ c o3 c
T-^ d)8 <D
E g C«
C Li
o 3
<u 3
X
d) 15 a <u
o
a
3
E c C/3 -d ii 3 O
s £ 2 c <D O o 3 o « « (U
Li > O o £ c c X o 3
o - Li ^ 3 o c c c o u » HI 3 £)
a|
o 1 a «• <D '2 4T) 3 3
d) o 3 X W)
CL •C c CL
8 .2 2 « a L- C/3 C d) 3
E ox) w <u E 2 •TT vw
' d)
qj ^ “E
<D g—i
i C3 .2 E - •>
*2 2 E ii ^
d) Li
*3 d)
OJ o CL o E °
<U rv
n SrCL 'tt
CL n O 3 rD2 2 'o ^ w
a cl c ^ X C/3
3
W .5 o Jr" a
XT u. 0> 3 S o. ^ “
J2 CL 2 W W H J liS' D Oh H Uh c O i—1
U D hJ Q E
27
d> 00
X) 3 C/5
E
3
5
3 J-
s o.a
3 o ^ 5 a £
O <->
d>
00 d>
00
o +-* jd T2 o d>
C/5 Cd x 3 £ C/5
cd
d>
6
00
d>
t_ ;5£ oo
3 ^- .o
c
1« >? C/5 03> .E ° — Cd
•J c/5" 2 X) ’■5
03
Source: D. H. Robertson and D. N. Bellenger, Identifying bank market segments, Journal of Bank Research, Winter 1977, 280-81.
op « L*3 ' 3 <D
.5 o ^ o I § ° 12
^ -O -0 o o o -3 c/5 .2 M
3cd <
^ CQ c
13 s
CQ s
<D lx X
C/5 ' 3
d> 3
^ .£ d> ^ (0
U 00
0) — 00
cd
c
w
00 d>u.
03 <4x
d> E
oo !/3 £ C
d> 3
Jo ss 03S)
-v
i
3 00
3 O d>
U .5 d> h
03 73 OO lx 73
00 ° c §
Id 03 u <D
« 3 ■ J7 c/5 lx <u
<u Cl 3
I-
X
o
d>
y J3
*£ £ X X E 3
> X
CJ C/5 u ^ 73 •— 00
2 2 2 3
E §
3 .E 03 <4X 00 > d>
*—1 X 3
> <d oo
3
c iS
<4X 3
i
<D o c 03 3
O ^ 13
> d) ’> E 3
S ■g 3 X
<4- 3 'X O C/5 cd 03
3 ~ O C/5 X 3 C/5
d> c "5 g ^ J3
303 X
^ <
CQ
O 3
d/ 4>
x 3 3 lx C/5
<y5 3
_C
cd 3 cd
o
C/) X C/5 •E 3 13
X d) d) 3 lx X
d>
00 00 cd 3 o o
oo J>
<3
2 S
00
13 K. 03
-5
d) lx d> lx
cd % O
*60
ca O.
‘o X Wh C/5
d> d> u. d> T3 o
x w 3 Id d) oo C/5
•4—*
d) *L>
X > O > o.
ed > cd d> cd <XI cd 3 X 3 ^ r
_C/5 C d) X 3 3
X ? 3 C/5 o O -a
d> d> CA 12 cd
00 ^ X 3 > Vh
_o > lx cd 3 d> X
£ O 7~! o d) o d> GO cd X
X 13 cd X X X a C/5 X
X 00 •2
X
D
3
03
rn
^ < < 5 a 2 d> CQ
CQ
o X
T3 3
M C/5 3
3 i-J lx D 03
X 3
3 X X O “ .2
03 03 d) X x Jn X
X H C/5 d> cd
X o
£ oo 4-* > lx
*o 03 <x Cd <4X
X X
x .E 15
03 O 4<u ^ cd
lx oo 0> CO V O
> d) <X 3 X > «
c
O 3 O
ca) cd
> _o
x X 3 X
2
03
3 <
03^
cd
C/5
X
d> <
CQ
Pc
> •-3 >,
03
<D 73
d>
X
C/5
a> C/5
C/5
00 c
73
D00 cd
c^
(U
oo
X 3 3 oo 3 § 3 3 Ox
*P X 03 tO 03 C4X 03 «4X d)
4-* lx > CA 3 lx 4—) cd
Wh
O i <u X
p
lx
cd —>
4 X
X d> 03 3 *8 s 2 O <D
o
u-
X
oo C/5
4—>
u.
d)
X
cd
c
X X > o c/3 03 3 u > lx X
u "cd cd >
C/5
c
d>
_CJ ’X d) 4—* __ X
lx X3 cd 4-*
? ^
u
03
03
i
d>
X d)
X
3
15
>
cd <4X 3
C/5
lx
o -2
users
4—1 X i (U O cd
o
3 X *55 X cd
i~
cd
oo £ d) "X Si E c/5 73 <D r“
E X
X
15
3
cd d)
Q-
O CL 3 ’53 d> 4-*
O P > cd X d)
3 H d) 3 lx
u 3 o
4X
3 3
03
-o ^
o 3
c .£ x
O 3
3
C/5
’X
cd
.2
O CZ1r 03
O-
O cd o C/5
O <U 15 77
d> 3 X E
3
X
d)
3 H
X
Q 2 U z 3
cd CQ < C/0 S ffl
CQ £
28
- Annual reports
- Industry statistics
- Government consumer statistics
- Newspapers
- Trade magazines
- Industry association reports
- Company newspapers
- Company product literature
From the data on each market the relative market attractiveness can be
assessed and this, in conjunction with the current position assessment, can be
used to clarify the bank’s relative competitive position.
Next, from the data collected on the bank’s markets and the relative position of
the bank, conduct an appraisal of the strengths and weaknesses, threats and
opportunities facing the organization. Using the form shown in Figure 2.7,
each executive at the corporate strategic sector and business unit level should
identify the five most important current strengths and weaknesses and the five
most important threats and opportunities facing the bank over the next five
years. Each should then complete the cross-impact matrix, indicating how the
strengths and weaknesses impact if at all on the threats and opportunities.
Where a strength for example can be expected to have a major positive impact
on a threat or opportunity, this should be indicated with a score of two pluses as
shown, while a large negative impact scores two minuses. Mark no impact with
a zero.
This exercise should be conducted periodically throughout the bank at
various levels. It is extremely useful in identifying and assessing a number of
important issues:
Opportunities Threats
-
00
ro
in
Strengths
-
00
ro
in
Opportunities
1 Bank network
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ +
O
1 Project finance
+
+
+
+
+
+
2 Service quality
m
2 Global cash monogement
+
+
3 Lending power
+
+
+
o
o
in
3 Global HNWI bonking
in
m
Weaknesses Threats
1
i
II
1 1
1 Systems ca pa b i li t y
o
CO
n
i
•
2 Geographic organization
ii
i i
r-
2 Non-bank competition
ro
ro
in
in
00
oo
ro
-
ro
Internal communications
A detailed and common understanding of the position of the bank is an
important ingredient in getting organizational acceptance of overall
strategy. Compare the key issues developed at various levels of manage¬
ment. When these are relatively similar, the organization is viewing the
internal and external environment in a like manner. When a large divergence
occurs it is an indication that a communication gap exists which needs
correction.
Management cohesion
At each level of management, and especially at senior levels, check the total
number of different issues identified. Where the responses indicate a wide
variation in issues, this implies a lack of cohesion in the way management
sees the organization and its external environment. A cohesive management
group by comparison will identify a substantial number of common issues.
Having completed the SWOT analysis, check the outcome against the bank’s
present strategy. It is common to find that existing plans fail to address many of
the key strategic issues identified. Check therefore:
31
• Does the existing plan deal adequately with all the strategic issues?
• Does the analysis suggest any change in short-term strategy?
• Does the analysis suggest any change in long-term strategy?
• Are any communications programs necessary to achieve organizational
understanding?
• Does top management need to improve its cohesion?
• Are any particular units of the organization in need of reinforcement as a
priority?
Competitive Position
From the competitive position measures assess the bank’s relative strength.
Score each factor from 1 to 5, with the high score representing a very strong
32
competitive position and the low score a very weak one. Sum the position
scores for each factor and calculate the overall percentage of the total possible
score. This figure can be used to plot your competitive position on the market
portfolio matrix. You can also weight the relative importance of each of the
factors according to the consensus opinion of your managers. In general,
market share, relative share, capital intensity and product quality are usually
especially important factors.
Using the form shown in Figure 2.8, indicate the relative importance of each
of the key success factors in achieving success in each market and the relative
strength or weakness of your bank in each factor. This will give some indication
of likely strategic priorities and provide a valuable input in assessing the
practicality of attacking particular market segments.
Selling
Network
Operations
Financing
Innovation
Systems
Promotion/
communications
Other (specify)
• Past growth rate: Examine the past growth rate as a guide to assessing the
future trends.
• Projected growth rate: Indicate your base case assumption about future
growth prospects. Sensitivity analysis later might review other possible
rates of growth.
• Number of competitors: Indicate the number of competitors in the
market. The larger the number the less attractive the market.
• Competitor concentration: Identify the number of competitors account¬
ing for 80 per cent of the market. More concentrated markets are
generally more attractive, fragmented markets are usually more
price-competitive.
• Market profitability: Specify the average level of profitability for the
market.
• Degree of product differentiation: Indicate what percentage of services
in the market are differentiated. The higher the level of differentiation
the more attractive the market, since high differentiation reduces the
level of price competition.
• Level of capital intensity: Indicate the level of capital intensity of the
market.
• High capital intensity markets are less attractive as they have a lower rate
of return on assets.
• Relative customer power: Indicate the relative strength of customers
versus the banks. Usually a small number of large customers means high
relative customer power.
• Profitability trend: Indicate the trend in market profitability.
• Market fit: Assess the fit of this market relative to the overall position of
the bank.
Market attractiveness
For each factor score the market on a scale from 1 to 5, with the high score
indicating a high level of attractiveness and the low score indicating the market as
unattractive. Sum the scores to arrive at the overall score out of a possible
maximum. This figure can be used to plot the position of the market on the
attractiveness dimension of the market portfolio matrix. You can also weight the
relative importance of each of the factors according to the consensus opinion of
your managers. In general, market size, growth rate, capital intensity, customer
concentration and market fit are usually especially important factors.
Strategy Characteristics
Certain market/industry characteristics are useful in assessing effective
strategies. Such characteristics include:
Trends in demographics
Birth rate
Population size
Age distribution
Socioeconomic distribution
Geographic population distribution
Education/skill distribution
35
CS
C
C
<D
E
e
o
S-
c
<D
6
o
c
o
o
<u>
o
ON
CN
<u
o
36
Socio-cultural trends
Lifestyle trends
Career expectations
Education trends
Public opinion
Family formation rate
Banking usage trends
Trends in technology
Industry technology changes
Non-bank competitor investment
EFT systems
Information processing systems
Machine banking
Political!Legal trends
Bank regulations
Tax laws
Exchange controls
Attitudes to foreign banks
Attitudes to non-bank competitors
seeking small niches, for example in certain geographic markets, where useful
profits can be achieved. Businesses in the bottom right cell are both in
unattractive markets and have a weak competitive position. Such businesses
may be losing money and will not be likely to produce a strong positive cash
flow. As a result they should be considered for divestment or closure. A more
sophisticated alternative might be to use them as attack businesses to be
deployed against a competitor’s harvest businesses to depress their cash-gener¬
ating capability. Detailed alternative market segment investment strategies are
shown in Figure 2.11. Although the listed investment strategies can
conceivably be used with any attractiveness/position combination the choice
should be guided by the cost and probability of success in moving from the
existing to the desired position. An ideal portfolio resembles that illustrated in
Figure 2.12.
After the bank’s portfolio has been mapped, each market should be assigned
a specific investment strategy and an associated objective which indicates the
desired results in the market segment. Examples of such objectives might
include:
Market B: Harvest
Improve ROA to 0.6 per cent after tax by 1983 by giving up customers with high
servicing costs and reduce net assets exposed by $250m in Belgium.
38
O HH
Willing to accept
E*
HH
J-. G
g £
£ £ o
Z H >
Short
o too
>> G O
G O 3 4)
3
Oh hJ C/D E C/D
competitive inroads,
G cl a £ o) E c§E
<D 0) E M o <D
1/5 G CD G £ ^ <D
< 2 O >
C ll| > * ^j <D
C/2
O • v- 8 &.S
<D .£ .£ <n ^
G G 3 ° ^
£ "O (D
<D D TD 5
CD fa -S-2
G £ £ c s e TD
(D £2 CL
03 C/2 C/D •I 2 E 3 CD CD
' <D CD « <u -s tE
risk.
bO O
G > > .31 <u Vh O
G G 2 <
C/3 C/3 u £ E
M _
c 2 CD
opportunities can
o
bO £ ~ O O- >4^ c £
^ G E 3 a. until attractive
V G o ££* 3 3 X O 2
W)43 3 n. feb
xT o •E W
o C/2 C -3 '“
- > 3
c CL. U ° E
G C 3 £ O
3«B > ! 3
replace
o O u
CD
C (D X> 3 u 3 ^ o
•5 3 4) ^ £ -3
C G
CD
« ts o G g G *0 3 O '32 U 3
o 9 *- (D
Ph CD CL. S a£ Soi O 8.S £
C/2
4) c
£
margin. Limited volume
bO GO
G O -a
c c v-
bJO
c E 3
CD G <3 G - E
earnings. Declining
G C/2
G
Significant current
<D G C bO 3 2 w
bO <D c § J& S
c
o G G
'£ Lh cGO ■*G-»
*-> /2
G O G o .C ^
G _o (D
'£ *£
(D -4-* a-5 c *-<
3 03 C/2 S g G G ^
O bO
X) .a u U 3
growth
<-G < C 4) 33
G '£ ’£ ’s W) 3 ^
<4-< O .2“ E M 3 bO 3 O
< O O on <u K ° c/5 (3 wi
C/2
CD
>
G
T3 <D
o 4)
Defend
bO
(D & 4) £ £ ts
o c O 3 JD
g Uc
U
4)
o CL.
rfc "c3 13
U JD DO
39
o
43
00
Disinvest gradually at rate
M
C/3
T- ^ *C
— . o >1
3-ao on
to avoid collapse of
§ ° a c o
£ 2 o w c o i- -+-»
-4-* 3 3 CX 3 cd
C/5 H o 5 Vh
a>
c/5 3 © g
II
C/5 4_,
^ <D 5 £ 22 1- c '5b
> CD
c E w o O <D
<D X> ■*—1 "Td 4-* ^ E
c/5 ^
£ 'O T3 S
3 cj >1.3
<U •r- <D > > on c
Vh O
<D FT
_B c _B <u c 3 <L>
'Tn <L> 3 O3 T3 3 2 cr ^ C
C CJ o Oh O CD
3 ^ a w « £
42 O '-3 T3 E z ts u 0- T3
C/5
(D
>
mC
earnings. Allow gradual
cj 2 o
<D "S
Vh
o ^ CD Vh
Maximize current
C/5 cd
bJDX
« .2 CD
Vh
s
E
s2 on 3^
£ & §
3 b o cd to CD
o
Vh 9
4-h > *3 3 C5JD >
X g
g 5/3 ■3 O •- S
Cj O 03 td
<D 3 3 §/E c
3 C X)
g > C CJ 3 0-
T3 O ° o 2
o o
’E fc g -E JS u U C
O c .E <*3 «
o E t-H > ‘3
v-i H c o S
oj .5 U 3 a o U -3 E
0A cj (N
Significant current earnings
c E eC/5
1/5 o <D
t-H
from strong position but
3
u
C/5
cd C T3
i
2
<d «4-i °
■4—>
>v
3
.2?
<D •- £ 3
<d •—* -+-> oc 3 a £
T3 *-* C cd 3 o 3 o ’£
cd _ CD 0) C
E <d 4-<
v- £ E -2 4-
O g a - £ 3 o
3 Vh <U •*-»
s.
3 uo cj C a.
q3 CJ X &
3 ° c *g a
.ts .c > jD * = p- I—i E o -a
4- 0)
M .
§ (U C/5 ~ — tSl
3 O X
r 2 on w> <D <D .2
O CJ 'S g r- t-
O M O ’X! .£ (u 5 O 5 3
c ^ Tj E ' •*—* cd
Vh cd <u b
&g cd _C g cd Z
Cd +rf
C/5
o E O o <D C/5 Q <u <D C/5 <D
<D
Vh
2 s
3
Harvest
0-
3 "O
vh rs •o
43 •- 2
HH Si B o
>qc a > ^ >X
40
Competitive position
The unit strategic plan therefore mirrors the corporate and divisional plans
and comprises:
Action plans will each consist of one or more programs designed to change the
methods, process, staffing levels, organizational skills, equipment, systems or
premises of the bank unit. In addition each will specify the resources needed to
carry them out, covering such areas as funding, capital, country limits, systems,
equipment and personnel. An example of the hierarchy of action plans and
programs is given below:
Summary
The process of bank strategic planning is a vital ingredient in the development
of systematic strategic management at all levels of the bank. The plan itself
should be developed to become an important working document for
management and not produced once a year as a chore and never used again.
However, it is only a guide and framework for action; it is not and never can be
a substitute for initiative, drive and creativity, which can only be supplied by
the manager and his officers.
• Market definition
• Competitive position
• Environmental factors
• Market attractiveness
• Momentum
Strategy
• Strategy (invest men t/market approach)
• Strategic objectives
Acfion plon(s)
• Action plan(s) ca pabi I i t y * change
Program (s )
• Program (to ochieve change)
with milestones
• Program objectives
segment managers and give additional insights into the thinking behind the
development of unit strategy. Use the following checklist as a guide to the
review and for focusing upon items to be discussed in greater depth. In
particular, check for inconsistencies in the plan. This meeting, however, should
be seen as a constructive opportunity for two-way feedback and communica¬
tion and not as an interrogation of unit management plans, opening the way to
destructive criticism.
8. Are the customers’ needs known and do the banks’ services meet
these?
9. Are the relevant competitors and their relative power and strategies
identified?
10. Is the assessment of the bank’s position relative to the competitors
accurately developed?
11. Does the bank have the resources to serve this market?
12. Would serving it be consistent with the bank’s overall objectives?
13. Have environmental influences on the market been adequately
considered?
14. Is the ability to differentiate examined and is it satisfactory?
15. Is the profitability and price sensitivity of the market identified?
16. Are the key success factors for this market identified?
Plan review
Mission and objectives
1. Is the mission statement clear and appropriate?
2. Are objectives specified, quantified and identified by people and
time?
3. Are these objectives realistic?
Competitive strength
7. Is the bank’s market share and those of the major competitors clearly
identified?
8. Is the bank’s profitability relative to competition identified?
9. Is the bank’s relative service quality identified and evaluated?
10. Is the price of the bank’s service evaluated relative to major
competitors?
11. Is the bank’s delivery system and marketing effort identified relative
to major competitors?
12. Is the bank’s level of resources committed relative to major
competitors identified and evaluated?
Opportunity assessment
13. Are the opportunities clearly defined and assessed as to direction and
potential impact?
47
14. Are any external threats clearly identified and assessed as to direction
and potential impact?
Program plans
21. Are the steps required to implement the programs clearly identified
together with appropriate milestones?
22. Are the necessary staffing levels needed identified within the unit?
23. Is the necessary skill mix needed identified within the unit?
24. Are any training and/or recruitment procedures identified?
25. Are the personnel/staffing skills needed from elsewhere in the
bank identified?
26. Are the communications/organizational linkages between the unit
and other parts of the bank identified?
27. Are the funding resources needed identified? Are they costed?
28. Are the credit procedures and risks identified?
29. Are any systems/operations requirements identified and costed?
30. Are any equipment requirements identified and costed?
31. Are the potential competitor reactions identified?
32. Has ‘what if analysis been conducted to assess the impact of
changes?
33. Have contingency plans been developed?
34. Have the cost/benefit estimates been prepared and are they
reasonable?
35. Has the organization for each program been spelt out together with
the identification of the individual responsible?
48
36. Does the program seem feasible in the light of resource availability,
past experience and unit capabilities?
37. Will the accomplishment of the program achieve the program
objective?
38. Will the accomplishment of all the programs in each action plan
achieve the action plan objective?
CHAPTER 3
3.1 INTRODUCTION
49
50
When sudden and unplanned losses occur there is always a major inquest inside
any bank. The result of such an inquest usually means changes in control
systems in an attempt to prevent any recurrence of the problem; reorganization
to penalize those responsible for the area of loss; and reappraisal of the
planning system to try to reduce business uncertainty. Thus the failure of
Chase Manhattan at Drysdale and Penn Square has resulted in a review of
control systems and reorganization of the sector concerned.
Strategic Shock
A strategic shock takes place when a major unexpected event occurs for which
top management has no prepared response. This could be an unexpected and
unwelcome acquisition bid or tender offer. If management has not adequately
planned for the future the shock of such an event forces rapid and rigorous
reappraisal of plans and the planning system.
Without the presence of such a recognized need by those with the power to
ensure that planning system change should take place, it is unlikely that it will.
Indeed in banks where strategic planning is not well established its introduction
is likely to be strongly resisted, especially within line banking units, since it
threatens the existing power structure and provides a potential check on
perhaps previously unmonitored and essentially uncontrolled autonomy.
to gain line management commitment. This does not mean that the planning
unit itself should be overpowerful but rather that it should be acting as the
arm of senior executive management in the construction and implementation
of bank strategic plans. Moreover, if senior management is not seen to take
the planning process seriously it will lack credibility within the bank.
In practice the introduction of planning, and certainly significant changes in
the system of planning, usually takes place shortly after a change in the
chairmanship or chief executive officer of the bank. In part the change in
planning may be seen as an element of the new chief executive’s method of
adjusting the culture of the bank to take on new strategic directions.
Examples of this type of shift where the strategic planning system becomes a
more important element in the management of the bank include the
appointment of Barry Sullivan as chairman at First Chicago and that of Sam
Armacost to the presidency of Bank of America.
Most of the major changes in bank strategic planning systems that have
occurred in leading banks to date have been undertaken in conjunction with
the use of external catalysts, mainly management consultants. This is perhaps
not altogether surprising for two main reasons.
Firstly, if the bank had the internal skills to introduce the strategic planning
system itself then it would probably already have done so. However, banks
have not long been concerned with the industrial concepts of strategic
management and few line bankers have been trained in an understanding of
them. Therefore it is perhaps natural to turn to external consultants as a
source of assistance and conceptual advice. Unfortunately, few consultants
have used their conceptual tools within the banking industry and as a result a
number of major contracts have been conducted to introduce strategic change
in banks where the consultants have spent much of their time learning about
the banking industry and trying to modify their concepts to fit its needs.
Secondly, consultants are often used by incoming chief executives as an
element in modifying the power base and culture of the organization. One
essential ingredient in achieving such a change is the introduction of
management information, planning and control systems suited to this
purpose.
organized. Structure will be adapted to fit the needs of strategy rather than, as
is common, the strategy being unsatisfactorily fitted on to the existing
structure.
With the introduction of strategic planning top management has a
substantially improved knowledge of the bank’s businesses and can delegate
authority with more confidence. The flow of information and the manner of
central management intervention will, however, be changed. In practice this
shift in organization very often forms a further element in the succession
strategy of a new chief executive officer.
While the structure of the bank should fit its strategy appropriately,
successful planning will usually require the creation of a separate planning unit
which is concerned with the bank as a whole. Planning also takes place in the
line divisions, but the central unit should be perceived as an arm of the board
and in particular the chief executive officer. It is also important for strategic as
distinct from financial planning that such a unit should not form part of the
finance department or treasury. However, it is desirable that planning and
control should be separated, the controller’s function being that of plan
monitoring, utilizing control systems in whose design the planning unit is
concerned. The controller’s function in this respect is not that of the bank audit
unit, and it is noticeable that some banks have found it desirable to create a new
management information systems unit.
Qualitative assessment
Control system component Report Concept
Report
availability clarity validity
Profit measurement
Branches/departments Very good Fair Fair
Services Fair Fair Poor
Accounts Poor Poor Poor
Funds management Very poor Very poor Very poor
Risk measurement
Credit risk Very good Good Good
Interest rate risk Poor Poor Very poor
Exchange rate risk Fair Poor Very poor
branch, although this can be influenced by the internal pool rate for funds. In
the main, however, controls are satisfactory. Control systems which provide
adequate information on either individual services or customers are much less
well developed. Few banks have to date developed worldwide controls for
large accounts like those referred to in Chapter 6. Similarly, with a few
exceptions such as foreign exchange execution and other major services, few
banks have developed satisfactory controls over individual non-interest
fee-based products.
The development of an appropriate management information and control
system allows the bank to better decide on segmentation, delivery system,
market communication and pricing strategies. Without such information, for
much of the time the bank may be providing uneconomic services, to customer
groups which may be unattractive, through an inappropriate and overexpen-
sive delivery system. Further, marketing and advertising may be devoted to
exacerbating the difficulties. While profitable services and customers thus
exist within a bank, without adequate management information the bank does
not know which of its customers and services these are. At the same time, the
bank cannot measure its progress towards the achievement of strategic
objectives since these cannot really be set without some way of measuring
them.
The assessment of risk is similarly weak in some areas. While banks have
long been concerned with credit analysis, the ‘lemming syndrome’ reappears
regularly every few years when heavy losses occur as a result of individual
banks rushing into a fashionable marketplace and in so doing abandoning all
their normal credit assessment procedures. In the mid-1970s this occurred in
property, in the late 1970s in shipping, and in the early 1980s in sovereign risk
lending and some areas of energy and project finance.
The precise choice of what controls to concentrate on will vary for individual
banks depending upon the primary strategy. This is illustrated in Figure 3.2
for banks with different emphases in their core strategy. Bank A is primarily a
bank with multiple branches servicing retail and small business customers. The
bank has a lesser emphasis on servicing large corporate accounts, in investment
management and in related banking services such as credit finance and leasing.
The control system priority for Bank A is to gain a clear understanding of
profitability by branch and secondly, to evaluate the profitability of the
individual services offered. Customer-based controls are of less significance,
while extensive funds management and detailed key account controls are not
required. Similarly, the priority risk assessment in Bank A relates to credit
assessment, while exchange rate risk is of less significance since the bank’s
customer base is likely to be localized.
By contrast, Bank B is primarily a corporate bank with only a limited retail
activity, usually within a limited geographic environment by comparison with
the large account needs which may well be international. The control priority in
such a bank is for an account-based profit system, with branch-based profits
55
Risk measurement
d| dj ro ro CVJ
96 ud^o x 3
9| DJ
J S 0J9|U|
CVJ — —
J! P 9 J 3 — CVJ ro
Control system priorities
■H -
Profit measurement
s|u noooo
A0>| - uon ro
siunoo do
A9X
—i CM
S931AJ93 CVJ ro ro
saqouojg - CM
C
Figure 3.2
5
o
TD
SXL
o
CD
O
CL
56
second and profits by service line third. Similarly, the primary risk for such a
bank is interest rate variation, with credit assessment second and exchange rate
variation third.
In addition to these formal financial controls, however, banks also need
strategic controls to monitor the progress of strategic plans and point to
contingency action as appropriate at specific predetermined trigger points.
Unlike financial controls, strategic controls require not only the analysis of
internal factors but also external market characteristics such as market share
change, relative cost, relative product quality, relative market coverage, and
the like. Further, the data are future oriented, whereas financial control tends
to monitor historic performance. As a consequence strategic control data are
less accurate, more sporadic and less regularly available, less processable by
computer and less susceptible to variance analysis. Nevertheless, careful
attention must be paid to introducing suitable monitoring systems to measure
progress towards strategic plan goals based upon the implementation of
detailed action programs.
3.2.9 Time
— The primary purpose should be to help the author manage his own
operations better.
— It must identify the action options open and their expected conse¬
quences.
— The plan must be clearly linked with the process of resource allocation.
— Planning must be woven into the bank such that it becomes an integral
component of the corporate culture.
— Planning should be adjusted to suit the needs of the bank as they evolve
over time.
‘Adapted from G. Steiner, Strategic Planning — What Every Manager Must Know (New York:
Free Press) 1979, pp. 301-303.
60
Competitor Analysis
62
63
At the corporate level, the competition for analysis will be those banks or
other financial institutions it is felt impact most strongly on the bank’s overall
corporate mission and objectives. For example, competitors studied will
normally include all those other local banks drawing funds from the same
equity market. Care should be taken, however, not to exclude other
competitors outside this area. For example, most US banks compare
themselves with other indigenous banks but often fail to examine important
international competitors such as those from Britain, Germany, France and
Japan. The review of competitor strategies should examine the impact on
overall bank mission and objectives and check where the strategic position of
particular competitors threatens those. The theme of such analysis therefore
tends to be broad in scope, the appropriate time frame being medium to long
term.
At the local market level, however, competitors will usually be the
indigenous banks in home or host countries within the appropriate geographic
served market. At this level details are required of individual bank operational
programs, organization, account structure, branch coverage, and the like, with
the view to pinpointing appropriate market segment strategies which can be
used to penetrate competitor banks’ markets.
The corporate and unit systems of competitor intelligence should be
integrated and, in addition, should be linked to the account planning process,
which is a particular source of information on competitor activities and
intentions. The collection of intelligence data is thus a responsibility for
everyone in the bank, but specific resources need to be allocated to it,
especially at the corporate level, and the results systematically collated. Today
such systems are becoming computerized.
1. Annual reports and lOks, and where available the annual reports or returns
of subsidiaries/business units.
3. Bank internal newspapers and magazines. These can be very useful for
details of all major appointments, staff background profiles, business unit
descriptions, statements of philosophy, new branches and services and
activities, and strategic moves.
66
4. Bank and company histories. These volumes are very useful to gain an
understanding of the organizational culture, the rationale for the existing
position and details of the internal systems and politics.
7. Financial industry press. Most banks make use of the financial press for
announcements and this is a very useful source for details of all significant
changes in products, prices, sales and marketing persoinnel, new units and
investments. Also, check bank press releases if available. Libraries such as
the Financial Times’ will have most of these and will allow access to library
service subscribers.
8. Financial, national and international press. These sources are useful for
bank financial and strategic announcements and analysis and senior
personnel/organization announcements. Specialist agencies such as
McCarthy may provide a clippings service to obviate the need for internal
press monitoring. A check of the local press where the competitor has
major branches, subsidiaries, divisional or corporate headquarters is also
useful when the competitor’s activity is significant relative to the area. This
is especially true in the US, where local coverage is often all there is on
regional banks. Funk and Scott provide an international index. Index
facilities are available for WSJ, NY Times, The Times, Financial Times,
Frankfurter Allemande, Euromoney, The Banker, etc.
9. Papers and speeches of corporate executives. These are useful for details of
internal procedures, organization, senior management philosophy and
strategic intentions.
success has been reported with individual customer studies, focus groups,
and the like.
13. Professional advisers. Many banks are making active use of consultants to
improve their strategic planning, cost control and marketing systems. Who
these consultants are will usually tell you a great deal about the sort of
systems and procedures the bank is likely to adopt.
15. Bank association and society contacts. The industry is one where formal
associations such as the ABA and Institute of Bankers are primary forums
for discussion. Education programs, informal discussions and the like are
major opportunities to learn about competitors’ activities and procedures.
The present frankness which pervades these may reduce as bank industry
competition intensifies and approaches that found in other industries.
1. By function.
Marketing Strategy
Competitor
1 2 3 Your bank
Narrow line V
Full line V V V
4. What is the policy toward new services adopted by each competitor? What
has been the rate of new service introduction in the past five years? What
particular approaches to new service launches have been used consistently?
Competitor
1 2 3 Your bank
Service line A L F _ F
B L F F F
C F F F L
L, leader; F, follower.
Competitor
1 2 3 Yours
Service line A S I S
B S A I A
C S A I A
Competitor
1 2 3 Yours
Service line A H L A
B A A A A
C H A L H
Competitor
Total expenditure 12 3 Yours
As percentage of deposits
By geographic region
By customer segment
By media type
By month
By season
10. How quickly is each competitor able to modify its marketing policies to
meet a new entry situation? In what way has such modification occurred in
the past?
Competitor
12 3 Yours
Operations Strategy
1. What are the number, size and location of each competitor’s branches and
offices? How do these compare with one another? What service range does
each offer? What is the estimated capacity of each service range by
competitor, e.g. estimated total loan capacity for given equity base,
. estimated transaction capacity for given computer capability?
72
5. What is the relative loans and services output/capital employed for each
competitor?
6. What is the loans and services output per employee for each competitor?
What is the relative employee cost?
9. What service costs do you estimate each competitor has relative to your
own?
11. What services if any are subcontracted for each competitor? Is this
increasing/decreasing?
12. How does operations fit into each competitor’s organization? Has
operations historically been a major background for key executives/
chief executives?
Financial Strategy
4. What are the liabilities needs of this business in its present position? What
flexibility does the business have for improving its funds utilization? What
are the most sensitive variables for using/relaxing cash?
6. How does each competitor’s growth rate compare with average industry
rate (with and without allowance for inflation)? In the event of a shortage
of adequate deposit base what additional capital resources are available?
What would be the cost of these funds? What alternative uses might have
priority for these funds?
management attitudes to the unit, amount of resources allocated, and the like.
In assessing the objectives of a business unit the following questions are
helpful.
1. What are the stated (and unstated but obvious from management actions)
financial objectives for the business in terms of return on assets, cash flow
and market share penetration?
2. What is management’s attitude to risk? How are profits/market
share/asset growth and unit risk balanced?
3. What non-economic objectives, values or beliefs prevail? How, where and
when do these supersede economic objectives? Typical non-economic
values/objectives might be as follows:
4. What is the competitor business unit organization structure? How are key
decision responsibilities allocated? How well are separate functions
coordinated within the business unit? Between this business unit and
others which are integrated with it? Organizational differences are a key
distinguishing feature between banks and lack of inter and intra business
unit coordination is a principal reason for competitive weakness.
5. What control and incentive systems operate? What behavior is rewar¬
ded/sanctioned? What is the nature of the existing incentive/sanction
system? Again significant differences between banks may be identified.
Relatively few have well-developed cost systems for example and few
presently offer significant variable reward schemes which are related to
quantified performance goals.
6. What kinds of managers lead the competitor SBU? What are their
backgrounds and experience? What is the make-up/style/skills/back-
ground of junior managers?
7. What social/government/union/legal constraints on behavior occur in
this business?
8. Where does the SBU fit into the bank group organization structure? Who
does the SBU head report to? Check.
— Direct to CEO/chairman
— To senior executive VP
— To divisional executive with influence
— To corporate hitman
— Other (specify)
9. What is the status of the SBU head? Check.
— Sharetaker
— Caretaker
— Undertaker
75
10. What economic relationships exist between this SBU and others in the bank
portfolio? Check:
— Source of funds
— Use of funds
— Integrated operations
— Geographic integration
— Horizontal integration
11. Do integrated relationships affect strategic behavior within the SBU?
Check for:
— Cross-subsidization
— Profit movement/transfer to other SBUs
— Unit hold/grow strategy to protect/help other SBUs
12. Does this SBU enjoy sacred cow status? Likely signs are positive answers to
any of the following:
— Are any former SBU heads in top management positions?
— Was this SBU one of the bank’s earliest businesses?
— Does the SBU have special emotional appeal to top management?
— Was the SBU originally developed by the present top manage¬
ment?
13. How does the performance of this SBU compare with that of the bank
as a whole?
— Underperformers are usually under pressure
— Overperformers are usually pampered
14. Why did the parent enter this business? Check:
— To exploit global network
— Pressure from customers/competitors
— Planned diversification move
— Random chance or accident
— Personal whim of senior management
15. What is the strategic importance of this business to the parent bank? Is it a
core business or peripheral to the bank’s major activity? Where does the
SBU appear to fit in a corporate portfolio? Check the portfolio strategy
position:
— Growth
— Maintenance
— Harvest
— Divest
16. Where does the SBU fit in bank diversification strategy? Is the bank
diversifying and directing financial people/resources in this direction or
away from it? Will its diversification moves help/hinder this SBU?
1. What are the the overall group financial objectives? Check the impact of:
— Inflation
— Technology change
— Wage costs
— Foreign exchange rates
— Interest rates
— Capital needs
— Equity costs
2. What is the competitor’s growth capability? Check.
— What is short-run growth capacity?
— What is long-run growth capacity?
— What is financially sustainable growth rate?
—- How does competitor’s strategic capability change with growth?
3. What are the competitor’s key strengths and weaknesses?
— What capability changes seem likely?
4. How adaptable is the competitor’s overall strategy? Check:
— What is fixed vs variable cost structure? Cost of unused capacity?
Influence on strategic change capability?
— What is competitor’s ability to adapt to functional change?
• Ability to compete on cost
• Ability to introduce new services
• Ability to increase marketing support
— What is competitor’s ability to adapt to environmental change?
Check adaptability to:
• Sustained high inflation
• Technological change
• Recession
• Higher wage costs
• Changing regulatory environment domestically/interna¬
tionally
5. Can you sketch the competitor's business portfolio?
— Don’t forget to use his classification scheme
— Identify relative SBU positions and size from the competitor's
perspective
— Use a similar three by three matrix to that in Chapter 2 (Figure
4.1). Score competitor business units in the same way as you did
your own.
The matrix summary can also be utilized to show the expected trends in
77
position if no changes are made in strategy (Figure 4.2) and the apparent
desired competitor trend (Figure 4.3).
6. Interrogate the competitor’s business portfolio by asking:
— Which businesses stabilize the portfolio?
— Which are the core businesses?
— Which are the growth businesses?
— Which are the problem businesses?
— Check if competitor appears to be following the suggested
investment strategy for specific business. Check if not then why
not?
— Which businesses defend the core businesses?
— Which businesses look most promising for further investment?
— Which have the greatest ‘leverage’ on bank performance?
— Which businesses are employed as attack businesses or could be
used to reduce another competitor’s strength?
7. What does the competitor bank appear to believe about his relative market
position? Check relative position on:
78
18. What strategies have previously worked for top management? What
strategies have previously failed for them? Successful strategies will often be
tried again and failing strategies avoided.
19. What other businesses have top management worked in? How successful
were they? Why did they leave? This history will also influence their
strategic behavior, e.g. Aboud at First Chicago.
20. What major events have top management lived through which might
influence them, e.g. German bank management attitudes to inflation?
21. What attitudes do top management portray in their speeches/writings?
What are their interests/pastimes and how do these influence their
behavior, e.g. Rockefeller at Chase?
22. Who advises top management? What strategic patterns have these
advisors installed in other companies, e.g. McKinsey at Continental
Illinois, Boston Consulting Group at Bank of America, General Electric
at Chase Manhattan?
23. What sort of executives seem to get on in the competitor?
24. How fast do managers move in and out of SBUs? How is performance
rewarded/sanctioned?
25. What does the competitor appear to believe about future demand and
industry trends? How well has the competitor estimated in the past?
26. What does the competitor appear to believe about its competitors? Are
there any over or under estimations?
4.8 SUMMARY
The competitor intelligence system of the bank is an important ingredient in the
development of market and corporate strategy. The relative competitive
position of the bank needs to be systematically established as a component in the
allocation of market investment strategy. Check the analysis of the appropriate
competitors at corporate, division or market level using the following checklist:
1. Are the appropriate competitors correctly identified?
2. Are all major competitive new entries identified, including non-banks?
3. Have all appropriate sources of competitor intelligence been reviewed?
4. Is the data base on each competitor adequate for competitor analysis? Are
any essential data missing and, if so, where can they be obtained, how, by
when and at what cost?
5. Has the analysis of each key bank function been undertaken at the
appropriate level for each market segment?
6. Is the competitor business unit strategy adequately identified? Is its position
within the competitor bank’s overall portfolio assessed realistically?
7. Have the business units’ objectives been determined adequately?
8. Are the competitor bank’s overall mission and objectives identified?
9. Has the competitor’s market portfolio been developed and interrogated
adequately?
10. Have the competitor s culture, organization, leadership and history been
analysed and the impact of these factors on strategy been assessed?
11. Has the competitor’s strategic capability been assessed and likely offensive
and defensive strategic moves identified?
12. Have your bank’s relative strengths and weaknesses been assessed
realistically and the most appropriate strategic moves to adopt against
specific competitors identified?
CHAPTER 5
What you need to know is: Who buys? How do they buy? When do they buy?
Where do they buy? and Why do they buy? Changing technology and the
development of alternative delivery systems are providing a growing choice of
possibilities to both individual and corporate customers, making an under¬
standing of customer behavior even more important. As illustrated in Figure
5.1, buyers respond to external stimuli with specific patterns of behavior. The
role of marketing is to understand the intervening process which influences
buying decisions.
81
82
1. Culture. The society in which both the individual and corporations develop
significantly influences behavior. Attitudes to risk, degree of competitive¬
ness, efficiency, degree of individualism, personal freedom, pursuit of
success and the like are all key values significantly influenced by the
culture in which we exist. Moreover, most of us also belong to subcultures
within the wider society. For example, ethnic groups, regional differences,
climatic and religious differences can all influence behavior. Similarly,
each corporate organization tends to have its own internal subculture
influenced by its own history, the participants, established norms and
practices and company’s leadership.
2. Reference groups. Individuals and corporations are also usually members
of various groups which in turn influence behavior. Primary groups with
which an individual interacts regularly include family, neighbors and
fellow workers. Secondary groups can include professional association
memberships, trade unions, trade associations and industry confedera¬
tions. It is an important element in marketing strategy for banks to
identify and reach those opinion leaders in appropriate reference groups
for personal and corporate clients to gain service endorsements which can
be used in the relevant personal or media communication channels.
3. Personal factors. Personal factors influence the type of service required,
the location of purchase, the price to be paid and how to reach the
individual. While personal factors are critical for retail banking, they also
influence the corporate decision purchasing process. Significant personal
factors include:
(a) age and life-cycle stage;
(b) occupation;
(c) economic status, including disposable income, savings and assets,
borrowing power and attitude to spending vs saving;
(d) lifestyle.
83
The reasons for utilizing specific bank services reflect the desire to satisfy both
rational and emotional needs on the part of both the individual and the
corporation. The principal emotional motivators which apply in both individual
and corporate purchase situations include the following:
Table 5.1
Criteria Used in Selecting Lead Banks by MNCs (%)
well as a global branch network. Moreover, European MNCs seem much more
concerned with competitive pricing than their US counterparts. The relative
difference in emphasis reflects in part the strategic differences between MNCs
from the two continents. US MNCs tend to be more concerned with the
operation of a global strategy, with substantial product interflows across
national boundaries. European MNCs, however, are presently much less
organized on an integrated global basis and many of their subsidiaries tend to
operate purely within local rather than regional or global markets.
While these criteria apply to MNC parent companies, their subsidiary
companies operating in Europe or North America use somewhat different ones
for the selection of lead banks for operations within their host countries. The
criteria used by subsidiary companies are shown in Table 5.2.
The subsidiaries of European MNCs emphasize four criteria in selecting lead
banks:
Table 5.2:
Criteria used in Selecting lead Banks by Subsidiary Companies (%)
European American
subsidiaries subsidiaries
Criterion in US In Europe
treasury function is useful, and depending upon how this is conducted so the
approach to individual accounts may vary.
The organization of the corporate treasury function varies in relation to a
number of factors, including:
— Size
— Degree of geographic diversification
— Degree of product diversification
— Role of product diversification
— Number and location of sites/subsidiaries
— Formal corporate structure
Features :
• Small staff
• Receives reports
but a I lows high
subs id iary autonomy
• No international
f inance specialists
independent Iy
of porent
• Manages local
cash position
• Initiates capital
investment
proposals
— Modest levels of international activity (c. 15-40 per cent of sales) with
some intercompany activity
— With all forms of international organization structure, but common
with international division type organizations
— Previous history of serious international loss in a subsidiary, especially
due to foreign exchange losses or uncovered devaluation
— Corporate financial staff who have responsibility for both domestic
and international operations. Global financial planning is not conduc¬
ted
Features
• Large staff
• International
finance skills slowly
added
• High centralization
of finance decisions
including capital and
operating budgets,
exchange risk
management, invest¬
ment appraisal cash
management, capital
sourcing and control
system design
Features:
• Large staff
• Global planning of
long - and short -
term money
• Heavy use of
formal rules
and guide I ines
• OveraI I forex
ex posure
management
• Capital investment
appraisal conducted
• Limited autonomy
within regional and
H Q guidel ines
• Possible capital
investment initiation
involvement
• Coordination of product
activities within a
country
made at local and regional level. Such organizations require global financial
servicing as well as local transaction and lending facilities. An increasing
number of major international banks are developing specialist organizational
units to service the leading MNCs which enjoy the finest lending rates and
require high levels of service sophistication.
new banks are made at the corporate headquarters. Amongst US MNCs, while
the chief financial officer typically decides when to add a bank, the analysis of
the decision is usually delegated to a treasurer or assistant treasurer for
international banking. European MNCs do not tend to have as well developed
a central treasury function and decisions are more likely to be taken by the chief
financial officer or a treasurer for international banking. When these questions
are asked at the subsidiary level, however, a somewhat less centralized picture
emerges. The local subsidiaries of both European and US MNCs claim that
bank appointment decisions are shared about equally between headquarters
and the subsidiary treasury management. The truth probably lies somewhere
between the two, but it is essential if banks wish to gain a substantial share of
business at such accounts that a coordinated team marketing effort be
developed for each account involving calling both on the central treasury and at
major international subsidiaries (and, in particular, regional headquarters
units where these exist, as in the advanced treasury management organiza¬
tion). Details of the bank appointment decision process are shown in Table 5.3.
Table 5.3:
How MNCs Make Banking Relationships for their International Operations (%)
Subsidiary co.
Chief executive
officer 0 9 0 7 0 5 0 5
Senior financial
officer 7 9 11 11 8 9 13 7
Financial officer of
parent & overseas
co. jointly 7 9 11 5 7 11 2 5
Other officer 2 2 1 2 0 2 0 4
Total 16 29 23 25 15 27 16 21
Centralized functions
Shared decisions
Subsidiary-dominated functions
Decentralized functions all relate only to the subsidiary and also generally
only apply to short-term financial considerations. Overseas subsidiaries
receive slightly more freedom than domestic ones. For bank product design
this position suggests that corporate customers might be interested in
mechanisms that provide them with better or cheaper control system
information to so allow greater decentralization.
The major factors considered by middle market accounts in choosing their
lead bank are shown in Table 5.4 for a sample of around 160 such accounts in
the UK. The most important factors are the breadth of services offered, the
price of loans and an understanding by the bank of the company’s needs and
problems.
The lower level of interest in international services is immediately apparent
in middle market accounts, and this negates one of the key strengths of large
international banks. These banks are also less likely to be able to provide the
wide service range offered by local banks in overseas countries, are likely to
have a higher-cost deposit base which reduces their chance of loan competitive¬
ness, and are less likely to understand local needs than domestic banks. Those
international banks wishing to penetrate overseas middle market segments will
therefore need to modify their marketing strategies and adjust to the
requirements of local middle market accounts if they are to be successful.
95
Table 5.4:
Factors in the Choice of Principal Bank
Percentage saying
‘very important’
Table 5.5:
Middle Market Requirements of Bank Calling Officers
% company mentions
The most important factors are the prompt and efficient follow-up of
promises made, an ability to convince the bank about the customer’s credit
needs and a proper understanding of what the customer’s actual needs are. The
second of these reasons is perhaps especially interesting, implying that selling
takes place as much within the bank itself as it does to external customers.
96
5.7 CONCLUSION
It is extremely important to understand the purchasing process at the personal
and corporate accounts you are servicing or wish to penetrate in order to
improve the chances of marketing success. Check your understanding of your
customers and main prospects by asking the following questions:
Corporate banking
Retail banking
9. Which are the key individual banking account segments that you wish
to service?
10. What are the key factors that determine the decision process for each
of these?
11. Who are the critical opinion leaders who might influence individual
behavior?
12. How can these opinion leaders be best reached and influenced?
13. What specific needs do your actual and potential customers have?
14. How well do your services meet these needs?
CHAPTER 6
6.1 INTRODUCTION
The underlying support for market segment/business unit plans in the
corporate banking market is the analysis of individual accounts and the
preparation of account strategic plans setting out objectives for each account
and supplying a strategy to achieve these. The development of such account
plans will be a major element in the business unit plan. Account planning will
not, however, normally apply to market segments concerned with mass
markets such as very small business sectors or normal consumer markets,
where the preparation of individual account plans would be impractical. For
large corporate and high net worth individual markets, on the other hand, such
plans form an essential part of a systematic marketing approach.
The development of account plans provides the market manager with an
essential tool for utilizing and monitoring his account officer resources in
achieving the overall business unit plan. Account plans fit into the business unit
planning structure as shown in Figure 6.1.
Financial
— Sales
— Gross margin
— Sales growth rate
97
Figure 6.1
Net margin
Margin trend
Sales percentage by major line of business
Stocks
Debtors
Creditors
Trends in working capital items
Plant and equipment
Property
Trends in fixed capital investment
Short-term debt
Long-term debt
Debt maturity schedule
Interest paid
Times interest covered
Equity capital
Major shareholdings
99
General business
— Lines of business
— Production/service sites (number and location)
— Subsidiaries (domestic and overseas)
— Number of employees
— Market position
— Main brand names
— Names and position of board and financial officers
Competitor analysis
— Existing lead bankers
— Other bankers
Advisors
— Accountants
— Lawyers
— Consultants used
Review the basic data to ensure that the potential account is consistent with
bank exposure and risk requirements and that an adequate apparent profitable
potential exists at the account which might be expected to be open to a competitive
approach. Assuming the potential is evaluated as positive, the account is added
to the list of active prospects. This list of prospects will often exceed available
calling officer capacity, especially where the bank is operating outside its home
country. In this event it is important that the available call capacity is allocated
to the best prospects. Bear in mind this will not always mean the largest
accounts but rather those where the open market potential is highest. Indeed,
many large multinational accounts despite their size are probably now
unattractive in profitability terms to most banks. Such accounts are operating
100
in a buyer’s market, where there are almost as many banks anxious to provide
them with funds and services as there are accounts to be serviced. As a result
these large accounts with a high credit standing can command the finest rates
for lending and other services.
As a consequence many banks have turned their attention to the ‘middle
market’. Here too, however, the bank which provides nothing better than an
average service will find that competition is intense and profits difficult to
achieve. It is important to remember that for banks operating abroad or
outside their normal territory most business must be won from indigenous
competition by finer rates, superior service or some combination of these two
factors. Banks that rely on price alone, however, to win business are unlikely
to hold it in the long term unless they can maintain a superior cost of funds
position, which will be extremely difficult.
Within each market proposed for expansion as part of the overall bank
strategy endeavor to establish an attack order for your accounts for
preliminary prospecting. This can usually be achieved by ranking the
potential prospects in three or four dimensions drawn from the basic account
data such as size, growth rate, capital intensity and competitor lead banks.
Having ranked potential prospects, assign these to the available account
officers.
6.3 PROSPECTING
After the potential accounts have been screened to identify priority pros¬
pects, the second stage of account development is contacting the account with
a view to establishing a call program. For those prospects which are priority
targets, contact should be made usually with the central finance function.
Where this is outside the territory you are planning for, check first that the
local subsidiary has autonomy over local bank service choice, and if not clear
with account officers in the territory containing the central treasury that your
approach is welcome. Don't be discouraged if you are unable to meet with the
top finance officer at the first meeting. Indeed, it is often preferable to meet
with junior officers initially as the main priority of early meetings is the
identification of customer needs, which junior officers may sometimes reveal
better than their superiors.
Bear in mind also that at most good corporate accounts you are operating
in a buyer s market. The treasuries of most major corporations in developed
countries are today almost besieged by a wide array of bankers all seeking to
sell their organizations’ services. As a result, in many corporate treasuries of
major corporations interviewing new banks is delegated to less senior
treasury managers. Some companies have even installed a ‘bank relationship
manager’ to shield their line treasury officers. Further, in some countries such
as Japan, the status of the calling officer will determine the level of the per¬
son seen at the corporate account. Thus one of the tasks in the early stages of
101
3. Mail shots Mail shots skim the market and although response levels are
low they can be used to identify likely warm prospects.
102
Many mail shots are seen as ‘junk mail’ and never reach the person intended.
They should therefore appear personalized, not as a bulk production.
Always try to address an individual by name; never just refer to the
company.
Mail shots can be very selective in terms of product, customer group, time,
geography, etc.
They can be used to spread news quickly.
They can be used to cover market prospects for which the business
development executive doesn’t have time and as a foil to competitors.
Mail shots should contain news. However, brochures should be used
carefully, because if you put too much information in the prospective
customer’s hands he may decide it’s not worth meeting you.
Covering letters should cover no more than one side of paper. Ideally, such a
letter should consist of four paragraphs:
The mail shot should indicate the action you intend to take. Only in exceptional
circumstances or when you know you will get the answer you want should you
leave the recipient to take action and reply.
Mail shots should be sent out at a rate at which the necessary follow-up can
be handled.
5. Telephone calling The telephone can be used for many purposes. It is far
cheaper than a personal call, enables you to cover substantial numbers of
customers quickly, and can be used to substantially improve your probability of
business development success. The telephone can be used for:
The telephone is by far the best way of seeking an initial appointment unless
the appointment is overseas. If your contact won’t talk to you on the ’phone the
probability of success is so low that you should either try another contact at a
higher level in the company or try another company.
Always retain the initiative on the telephone. If your contact is not in, make
sure you telephone back at a time you know he will be in. If he is in but asks you
to call back, try to set a provisional appointment with him which it is his
responsibility to break.
Don’t give away too much information on the telephone — it offers the
customer the opportunity of saying there is no need for you to call.
Make sure you speak to the person you want. Do not be sidetracked by
secretaries or telephonists.
The objective of a first telephone call is to arrange a meeting. Offer a benefit,
sound interesting and commit him to action.
Keep the initiative in arranging the meeting. If your initial contact is not the
decision-maker or key decision influencer get him to give you an introduction
and arrange a meeting with the decision-maker.
104
Service analysis
— What banking services and in what volume are used by the account?
— What service usages are growing? Stable? Declining?
— Are there any new services presently unused which might meet account
needs?
Competitive analysis
gupjireq suiqaBpj
S33IAJ3S JOjnduiOg
[BJldB3 3jnjU3y\
subo[ uoipnjjsucQ
sjipajo isAng
sjuauiXcd sSem
33UBUIJ joafojg
S331AJ3S 3pBJ} U§I3JOJ
SUOIJBDipuAs UBCrj
S33IAI3S 33JSOIJ,
33IApB JU3UIJS3AUI
§UUOpBJ |B30g
§UISE3[ [B30g
SU0ip3||03 [B30g
SJJBJp U§l3JOJ
S3! ^qpuBJS
33UBUIJ Jjoduij
Figure 6.2
33UBUIJ Jjodxg
S1JP3J3 33UB}d333y
JJBjpjSAO [B30g
% share
% share
% share
This bank Volume
Volume
Volume
Volume
Volume
Volume
Trend
Trend
Trend
Trend
Trend
Trend
V
Bank 4
Bank 3
Bank 2
Bank 1
Total
CL
Cl
3
m
106
What would be the weakest competitor to move against and with what
service?
Decision process
Bank factors
— What services that the bank offers appear best suited to attack this
account?
— Are interest rates and services prices stable enough and profitable
enough to be attractive?
— How should we best service this account?
— How many calls should be made by whom and where?
— Is it necessary to set up inter busines unit coordination?
— Is specific industry/service advice required?
— What would be the expected cost of servicing the account?
— What revenue might the bank expect to receive?
— Would the bank be asked to provide loss-making services to penetrate
the account?
not therefore aim to sell inferior quality services to your customers but rather
concentrate on those which are as good as or superior to those of competitors
but which are also profitable to your bank.
Competitive position
High Low
High
Low
— Objectives
— Strategy summary sheet
109
Account objectives
Using a form such as that shown in Figure 6.4, identify the objectives for the
account both short and long term. These should indicate in quantified terms the
expected service volume to be achieved, the level of resulting profitability and
the market share to be obtained. In addition, a summary strategy statement
should be included on how the objective will be achieved. This should identify
precisely where other market units or parts of the bank will be involved in this
achievement. Finally, specify the dates by when short-term and long-term
objectives will be achieved. It is important that the objectives and strategy
summary should be sufficiently precise for the result to be clearly and
unequivocably measured and progress monitored. All too often plans are
written and objectives specified in such general terms that there is virtually no
way of assessing whether or not they have been achieved.
Action plans
Using a form such as that shown in Figure 6.5, set out the marketing plan for
attacking the account. This form should identify the key account needs
established by preliminary calling and account analysis. The needs should be
specified in terms of particular service requirements and their estimated
priority, the expected volume involved and the level of resulting profitability
which might be achieved.
Secondly, the present competitive position should be outlined, indicating
realistically the bank’s relative strengths and weaknesses compared with the
entrenched competition. Where possible an attack should be directed towards
a specific competitor, and an indication of what that competitor’s strategy is,
why yours is superior and what reaction can be expected from such an attack
should be included in the action plan.
The plan should also outline the resource needs required to service the
marketing strategy. These needs should be indicated in terms of people,
including existing account officer calling and any specialist or senior
management requirements, any new systems or operations development,
specific additional facilities and the level and type of funds required.
Finally, the plan should set out the precise services which you propose to
introduce and by when. Indicate how this will be achieved and outline the call
program and follow-up strategy you propose to pursue. In the event of a
significant under or over achievement of your plan indicate what contingencies
you have established to cope with the deviation.
no
o
^ H
<S oo
to
<u >-4
c •*—> «-»—i
iP O o
<u ^
U Cl e
'<V ^ * S
’o’ ^
■a £ <d
Wh
CL
^ ^ juj .£
& § .£ 8
<D
u
c eS^1¥
lx '—✓ cd
O
G
C
o <u
N >
G <t>
G T3
G <u G
C/2 J-i > Uh
a>
G H <d ^
O 2 Cl c/2
G
O c E-i
a> o 3
O 'qj o
O
G bD
G
< G O
G 2 O o
Oh < fcfi .> >
•G
cO o
■4—* T3
x>
o </> C
<L> (U C <0
00 _2
O
cd
<L> bO CO to
CJ
-g G
C/2 C/2 O *-* a ^ '“T
^ C/2 G r-i CD
&> (L) 3
»-i ir
c go >
^
cO , ._i
22Q 3 ’5 <U o
03 "O Cj <u H- t- <U
o £
<< O -a O 3 r" X>
^ G. & M O
< &
00 o
<u
u
CO
c O a <u
—i a> c
t; O <u
o G J—i Oh
—I 0)
U
N SJ < C
O
CD
CJ
>-
X
3 O
a
00 >,
ON U
c .<3
CO W) Ch
Wh
D. <D 3
■S3 C
O 1)
cd £ o CX 3=
a> o c
Oh hJ
o « X
C/3 Q Lx
Ill
^
CN
O
o
o
^t-
H
o
cd
^
a.
>
2
98 ious )fear
REV/ REV/ REV/ REV/ REV/ REV/
«
a
>
o
-ti
<D
£
>
Vol.
o
£
uJ
>
o
3
EXF
>
o
EXP
*
cd
<D
>
o
EXP EXP EXP Rate EXP
Local currency
Short-term credits
Medium-term credits
Other credit products
cd
G
a3
Fh
2
4-*
<D
3
4-H
CD
<D
c/5
3;
Non-interest beanng deposits
interest bearing deposits
Local net tunds revenue
Foreign currency
Short-term credits
Medium-term credits
Other credit products
3
cd
G
D
Fh
od
CD
"O
<D
<D
c/5
Non-interest beanng deposits
Interest bearing deposits
£
Fh
C
G
G
5
4-(
G
C
■O
u.
<d
>
C/5
<D
C
G
<D
££
o
■4—*
c3
c
"S
i
TD
C/5
Fh
>
CD
<D
G
G
<d
Foreign exchange revenue
cd
G
cd
<D
—
<D
■Fh
<D
<D
c/5
3-
ai
C
Fh
j 5
G CD
C
O
G
c
O
<d
O
V-i
>
<D
<D
C
G
<D
Fh
J
CD
5
O
C/5
C/5
CD
C/5
Cost of servicing
Net profit
performance is different from budget when it is too late to take corrective action.
Call intensity also varies significantly with size. For middle market accounts
banks vary their account loadings from around 15 to 60 accounts per officer.
Again wide variations occur, with European banks in general tending to give
less intensive call cover than North American banks.
No precise rules, therefore, apply to establishing call patterns. For each
account the call strategy should be determined on the following basis:
By and large the policy of one call a year to review existing overdraft
arrangements is unsatisfactory for building a close relationship, and for grow,
defend or penetrate strategy accounts a minimum call value of four per annum
would be reasonable. For large accounts requiring a substantial range of bank
services call intensity should obviusly be greater and involve different tiers of
the bank’s management in order to broaden the personal base of the account
relationship. This is in addition to the use of specialists for relevant services
such as foreign exchange or cash management. In setting your call strategy,
therefore, plan, using a form similar to that in Figure 6.7, for the following
factors:
— Number of calls
— Timing of calls
— Who to contact
— Who to make the call
Each time a call is made it should then be reported using a form similar to
that shown in Figure 6.8. Firstly, the call objectives should be specified to
indicate what it was you expected to achieve. Secondly, details should be
provided of who was present and what was discussed, together with any action
which was required. Such initiatives should always involve the bank rather than
relying upon the customer to take action if positive selling techniques have
been used. Further, a successful close should always aim to commit the
customer to at least an incremental step towards your account objective
CO
3
<L> -o
CJ <D
-c
SBU: Brazil
cj
CO
C E
03
3 i->
O toO
cj
cj
o
'~
a.
03
CJ
CO
s
Uh
o
too
.c
’E
a
-E
a.
o
cj
o
<
j9UOj;uo3 <D
cj »-
o3 D
c .2f
O j3jnsB3JjL 'issy E
U
e
cd joinsBQJX
D-
E
o
033
Company: XYZ Corpn SA
ubuiiibiq
Account officer
Sen. Manager
0)
CJ
Specialist
Manager
EAO
toO
c
13
U
116
Call objective:
Discussion summary:
By others:
u
*■?
~
W
O
>
<U
E
a)
cs
C/3
W
>
W
O
<D
C/3
O
>
S
<u
£
<D
in
w
O
/
£
(u
Total
O
| E
c
C/3
3
X)
on
3
2
b
C/3
3
X)
C/3
£ Is
2
C/5
3
-s
£
-O
2
b
c/3
3
^
2
cx
iccoun
IBnpy
pgpng
pgpng
pgpng
33UBUBA
IBnpy
pgpng
IBnpy
pgpng
aouBUByy
IBnpy
33UBUBA
33UBUBy\
90UEUBA
IBnpy
pgpng
pmpy
Loan demand ($)
|Loan demand local
| Deposits ($)
| Deposits local
|Net funds revenue
I Loan fees
FX commission
Cash management
| Collections
example, an acceptance of, say, poor sovereign risk lending in one country
which leads to a loss can be accepted if at the same time a compensatory
arrangement can be made elsewhere such that the overall level of return is
satisfactory. Overall responsibility for global account plan achievement rests
with the GAO, with each local unit account officer being responsible for the
component under his or her control. In a similar way the bank’s control system
should report on consolidated account performance at regular intervals using a
form similar to that shown in Figure 6.9.
6.9 SUMMARY
Account analysis and marketing planning is an important method of
systematically attacking your key accounts and an essential component in
wholesale banking market strategy. From the strategic decision of what
markets you intend to adopt particular strategies in, account planning involves
a six-stage process. Firstly, an account data base should be built which can be
interrogated in order to identify account potential and so determine whether
the account is worth actively soliciting. For those accounts seen as being
attractive to call on, active prospecting begins with an attempt to contact the
account with a view to establishing a call program. Initial contact should be
made using warm lead techniques where possible. The primary purpose of
early calls should be to clearly establish account needs, the decision process for
purchasing banking services and needs, the decision process for purchasing
banking services and the existing structure of competition at the account. This
information established, the account can be classified and assigned to an
appropriate marketing strategy. Once this has been done detailed account
marketing plans are drawn up which identify the objectives set for the account
and the action plans for achieving them. This stage also includes a budget of
services to be used and the expected profitability. In addition, where
appropriate, consolidation plans are prepared for accounts involving several
bank business units. Call plans are also established for each account consistent
with bank resources policy and the nature and complexity of the individual
account needs.
1. Are the basic account data sufficient to judge the account? If not,
what additional information is required and where can it be obtained?
2. Is the review of account potential realistic?
119
3. Does the potential meet the bank’s criteria for profitability and risk?
4. Has the account been correctly ranked as to its priority for
development consistent with overall bank strategy?
5. Has the account been allocated to an account officer with adequate
time to undertake business development?
Needs identification
Strategy assessment
17. Has the appropriate strategic category for the account been specified
and is this accurate?
18. Is the strategy category consistent with the bank’s strategy assessment
for this market?
Action planning
19. Is the action plan drawn up for the account complete and does it sound
feasible?
20. Are the short-term and long-term moves suggested appropriate to
the account strategy?
120
21. Are the account objectives specified in a measurable form with clear
milestones as to when they will be achieved?
22. Are the resources identified as necessary to implement the
proposed account strategy realistic and available?
23. Are any critical constraints identified and if so are measures
indicated on how to overcome these?
24. Has the account profitability budget been prepared and is it realistic?
25. Has an appropriate call plan been specified and can this be met from
existing officer and management resources?
26. Are areas for interunit coordination identified and steps proposed to
ensure that adequate integration actually occurs?
27. Has a global account plan been developed if appropriate and do all
concerned know and accept their role in its implementation?
28. Have contingency plans been developed in the event of over or under
achievement and are these plans realistic?
CHAPTER 7
— banks are not all the same in their skill at delivering particular services;
— banks do not organize to offer similar services in similar ways;
— may banks specialize in particular services in which they will have a
distinctive competence relative to their competitors;
— most banks service the corporate market without adequately integrat¬
ing their own organizational capability, resulting in multiple calling
and individual bankers having only limited knowledge about their own
bank’s service range;
— many bank’s product manuals are overcomplex and do not act as a
marketing guide to the account officers responsible for servicing
individual accounts;
— many calling officers who are allegedly generalist bankers are weak in
product knowledge, especially of non-credit services.
The most important basic services offered by a bank are the generation of
deposits and the subsequent lending of these for interest. The majority of bank
profitability is presently still obtained from the interest differential between
these services. However, there are many specific forms or alternative products
which can be generated within these basic services. It is largely the way that
individual banks can develop specially tailored lending and deposit-generating
products that enables them to differentiate themselves from competitors and to
build market share within specific market segments.
121
122
— Current accounts
— Savings accounts
— Term deposit accounts
— Treasury certificate accounts
— Bank certificates of deposit
— Foreign currency hold accounts
— Collections and float (cheques, notes, money drafts, trade accept¬
ances, letters of credit)
— Interbank deposits
Personal deposits have traditionally been the main source of bank funds.
These were collected as savings and also constituted the balance on current or
checking accounts. It was a popular misconception that such current account
credit balances constituted a ‘free’ resource to large commercial banks. This is
not so, the real cost of such deposits being around 6-8 per cent dependent upon
the efficiency of individual banks in servicing such accounts. In many countries
these accounts are now being forced to pay interest as consumers become more
sophisticated and competition for deposits develops.
In the UK, the share of personal deposits held by the major banks has been
subject to a steady decline in the postwar period due largely to the attack of
building societies, so that today banks are increasingly dependent upon the
interbank market and other wholesale deposit sources, notably the eurocur¬
rency markets, as sources of funds. This trend, together with intensified global
competition between banks, has sharply reduced the spreads between deposits
and lending. Banks have still not been forced to pay money market interest
rates on current account balances nor do they voluntarily offer sweep facilities
between savings and current accounts.
In the United States, by contrast, banks have been forced to pay competitive
rates for virtually all forms of consumer deposits. In the late 1970s, seizing on
the interest rate ceiling of around 5 per cent imposed on banks by Regulation
Q, brokerage houses offered an alternative service, packaging small parcels of
retail deposits into large money market funds which were mainly invested in
bank certificates of deposit at current money market wholesale rates. During
the inflationary early 1980s the gap between wholesale rates and bank deposit
rates widened dramatically, with the result that banks suffered a severe loss of
retail deposits as money market funds grew.
From 1981 US banks were allowed to offer interest-bearing checking
accounts, NOW accounts, although these were still restricted to 5.25 per cent
interest. To stem the flow of deposits, banks moved to sell their own certificates
of deposit direct but it was not until early 1983 that they were able to offer
123
— Overdraft
124
third of the companies had added a bank for an international credit service
during the past year.
The list of lending products is long and many others exist. However, a
number of factors should be borne in mind regarding these:
also enabled banks to reduce their balance sheet exposure. For the commer¬
cial banks this trend was leading them to strengthen their merchant
or investment banking groups and to run down their traditional lending
activities.
Bankers need to understand about such products in order to recommend the
most appropriate service. Unfortunately, many bank executives have poor
product knowledge of service ranges immediately outside those offered by the
bank component of a related financial services corporation such as most major
banks now are.
Not all loan services are normally offered by one section of the bank. Large
term lending, currency loans and the like are often handled by international or
merchant banking divisions, while credit finance, leasing and specialist loans
may well be made by specialist subsidiaries.
Sovereign Risk
In the mid-1980s sovereign risk lending had become an area of major difficulty
as a growing number of developing economies loomed close to default. Forced
to borrow to finance energy deficiencies and to fund economic growth, many
countries took advantage of the Eurocurrency markets’ recycling of oil-pro-
128
ducing country trade surpluses. Having placed their surpluses with Western
banks, the oil producers’ funds were recycled to the developing economies,
building a sovereign risk loan portfolio which had grown to a massive $800b by
1984. Unable to pay these sums back, the developing economies were forced to
seek rescheduling agreements which rolled up not only the repayments of
principal but also of interest, causing a potentially massive problem for the
leading Western private banks. As a result, sovereign risk lending, while still
important, was an area which banks were extremely reluctant to increase
unless coupled with adequate guarantees.
Real Estate.
For some large commercial US banks real estate lending constitutes around 25
per cent of the loan portfolio. This usually consists of a combination of
activities some of which are more profitable than others. Fixed mortgage
lending is a poor area for lending in times of high interest variation and many
US banks have significant portions of their portfolios locked in at low rates for
mortgage finance. Variable rate or medium-term bullet loans are an alternative
which reduces the risk of such lending. In specific segments first mortgage
lending can thus be relatively attractive.
The second mortgage market for home improvement/personal spending is
also attractive since interest rates are closer to credit finance rates and still
involve the security of personal property. Commercial real estate lending tends
to be mainly short and medium term, covering construction finance, although
some long-term mortgage finance may be attractive, especially if it can be
designed to incorporate elements of capital gain. Banks have been periodically
caught by fluctuating real estate values, particularly when rising markets fall
sharply for a period. However, good spreads are achievable given a sufficient
core of expertise. Those banks successful in commercial real estate lending are
likely to have a full core of specialists including construction engineers, valuers,
progress inspectors, and the like. Further, they will be focused on particular
geographic areas and/or industrial sectors such as shopping center com¬
plexes. Geographic markets such as South Florida, Texas and Southern
California in the US have constituted such high growth areas, offering excellent
lending and profit opportunity for the knowledgeable bank but also serious
potential pitfalls for the unwary.
Energy
Like real estate, energy is a high potential sector presenting good opportunities
(including capital gains) for knowledgeable bankers offering creative financing
packages. The most attractive opportunities are likely to be in particular
segments of the energy market, such as large projects which require both
long-term and interim construction finance as well as forex, and in intermedi¬
ate sized energy companies, where collateral may well consist of oil in the
129
ground or the like. Again direct equity participation (where permitted) may
be attractive or cash flow financing may provide a similar opportunity for
non-interest profits. In energy, as in real estate, superior ROAs can be
achieved by banks with expertise. Some US banks, notably those based in
areas such as Texas, have high energy elements in their loan protfolio and
specialize in lending to independent operators rather than large MNC oil
companies. Such banks carry a full staff of energy specialists including
petroleum engineers, geologists and the like capable of evaluating oil or other
energy deposit potential. Banks unable to provide such expertise should not
engage in speculative investment because risks can be high without adequate
knowledge. The recent disaster of Penn Square is a timely reminder of how a
lack of adequate loan evaluation can end in disaster.
This is closely related to energy and project finance and the same rules tend to
apply. Such lending, however, may be more international in its make up and
potentially vulnerable to sovereign risk; this, while true in oil, can be
constrained there by the choice of geographic areas of concentration.
Trade Finance
Long an attractive area for bankers, trade finance still offers potential
opportunities of above-average prospect. In particular, the potential develop¬
ment of more interventionist roles by the banker in stimulating all elements of
a trade finance chain may well offer high growth. Japanese commercial
banks, which are usually part of a highly diversified industrial group which
also contains a major trading company, offer a prime example of an
integrated organizational model which many Western banks would do well to
take note of. Successful banks concerned with trade finance will also require
adequate knowledge of the geographic areas in which they wish to specialize,
e.g. South-east Bancorp in the Caribbean Basin, Hong Kong and Shanghai
covering the Pacific Rim. In addition, good operations processing skills are
important.
The area of trade finance, however, may develop into one which presents
future dangers for the banking industry. Many banks and non-banks are
creating international trading companies similar in concept to the Japanese
Soga Shosha but clearly lacking the latter’s depth of product, communications
and trading experience. Moreover a growing element of such trading is likely
to be in the form of counter or barter trading, since many developing
economies are already at or beyond prudent country limit exposures. In
practice, counter trade and barter also represent a variant of sovereign
lending coupled with commodity futures, and considerable care will be
needed if banks stake exposed positions in countertrade to ensure future
difficulties do not occur.
130
Correspondent Banking
This is an area which has tended to be neglected in the past and has now
reemerged as fashionable. While lending per se is not seen as a primary
product, the provision of correspondent banking financial services in a variety
of areas from operations, transactions and correspondent provisions to joint
venture lending is all of potential interest for large commercial banks. Again,
specialization to identify service needs and provide service quality is the key to
success.
Project Finance
Credit Finance
The area of credit finance has been seen as attractive by many banks. A variety
of products exist under this general heading for both consumer and corporate
markets. Credit finance products usually cover medium-term loans and are
supported by the value of the article which is being financed. Generally, rate
structures are significantly higher than with conventional loans, although
administrative costs together with risk are also higher, both due to default and
mistakes in the calculation of residual values.
Credit finance has traditionally been treated by most banks as a separate
business. It is also seen by many bankers as different and of lower status. As a
consequence, most banks manage their credit finance subsidiaries (many of
which were independent before being acquired and added to bank business
portfolios in recent years) via a separate organization. This often means
suboptimal performance by banks who do not maximize any synergy that may
exist with other banking products. A recent trend has been the development of
global credit finance businesses, notably in consumer lending.
Leasing
Leasing has been an area of significant growth for banks in recent years. It
131
usually offers a customer a lower interest rate when the leasee is unable to use
the investment tax benefits normally available for capital investment. These
are taken by the lessor and passed back to some extent in the form of a lower
interest rate. However, leasing usually provides the bank with a superior rate
of return to that obtained on conventional lending.
Leasing is potentially a form of lending which offers substantial opportuni¬
ties for creative financing to tailor the final product to the customer’s need. It
also effectively provides a tax shield to bank earnings. Cross-border leasing
may be expected to continue to grow substantially and for large ticket items
banks will be able to continue to develop the business by moving to leveraged
leasing if and when internal profitability or balance sheet constraints make the
use of internal funds undesirable.
Like credit finance, leasing still tends to be organized separately from
conventional banking activities. As an activity it developed in a similar manner
to credit finance and outside mainstream banking. In practice, however,
leasing clearly represents an alternative to conventional term lending and its
fundamentals need to be clearly understood by lending bankers. There are
some signs that in future leasing in particular may be integrated with banking
services and, while specialist officers may be used to develop creative leasing
contracts, the service may be actively sold by relationship officers.
Venture Capital
A number of banks have begun to take a very active interest in venture capital
132
situations, for many years a neglected product in the banking industry. In many
of the leading Japanese and US banks specialist units have been established to
provide advice, consultancy and finance to venture corporations, especially
those engaged in high technology areas. In return the banks have taken
significant equity positions which it is hoped will ultimately produce substantial
capital profits.
Middle Market
The key corporate market segment for competitive attack in the mid-1980s has
become the ‘middle market’. Loosely defined in most banks as organizations
with turnovers of between $10 and £150m per annum, many banks are
beginning to carefully segment this group of companies and endeavor to offer
their less sophisticated treasury functions a range of asset- and fee-based
services.
In addition to lending and deposit products, banks also provide a range of other
general and specialist services which are usually fee-generating or provided
free or highly subsidized to customers making use of other revenue-producing
services. These services would include:
— International transfers
• Mail transfers
• EFT transfers
• Bank draft
• Customers’ cheques
133
— Commercial credits
• Clean credits
• Documentary credits
• Import and export credits
2. Specialist services
— Consultancy services
• Money management
• Invoicing centers
• Treasury management services
• Pension fund management advice
• Insurance management advice
• Foreign exchange rate forecasting
• Banking and financial education
— Trust services
• Stock and bond purchases
• Executorships
• Trusteeships
• Pension fund management
• Life insurance
• Corporate trustee services
• Stock registrars
• Dividend payments
• Investment portfolio advice and management
• Safety deposit services
• Estate planning
• Tax planning
— Other services
• Payroll management and acountinb
• Data processing services
• Factoring
• Travel arrangements
• Correspondent banking services
• Non-life insurance
• Life insurance
• Economic study services
• Consumer banking services
134
High
Desirable Desirable services-
services - well received
poorly
>s
received
JD
O
0) Undesirable Undersirable
o> services - services-
o
poorly well received
>
0) received
CO
Low
Low High
Competitive position
Cumulative time
Figure 7.2 Most new products or services fail. Source: Booz Allen
138
Cumulative time
Product range and knowledge alone are not enough to convince and give
conviction to customers. They will also be influenced by other characteristics
which will color their view of your service range and your ability to deliver the
benefits you claim. Most important in this are the image of your bank and of
you as an individual.
140
— Size
— Nationality
— Awareness
— Perceived image of the market
— Organization structure
— Branch network domestic and international
— Correspondent relationships
— Industry knowhow and specialization
— Geographic knowhow and specialization
— Product and service range
— Management philosophy and policy
— Skills, personality and knowledge of account executive
15. Does the service have distinctive selling features and are these sufficiently
attractive to persuade potential customers to adopt our service?
16. Is the service one which would be seen as consistent with our present range
and image?
17. Is there any synergy/competition with existing services?
18. What pricing strategy should be adopted for the service? How price-sensi¬
tive is the market?
19. How does this compare with that of competitors? Other bank services?
20. Prepare crude expected financial statements for the service. What is the
breakeven market share? What is the target ROA market share?
21. Test financial statements for volume/credit risk/country risk sensitiv¬
ity. Does the service have an acceptable risk profile? If not can this be
improved? If not should the service be killed before heavy expenditure is
incurred?
22. How would we advise potential customers about the service’s existence?
Assess advertising spending level/message/media/target audience. Assess
personal selling time/training/motivation/opportunity cost.
23. How would we advise those in the bank about the service’s existence?
Identify training or product literature/targeting/incentive/motivation/
time needs.
24. How would we monitor progress? How should we make any necessary
amendments to the launch/product/servicing?
25. What back-up services/guarantees/contracts does this service require/
imply?
26. What would be the effect of not providing this service on other aspects of
the bank’s business?
CHAPTER 8
8.1 INTRODUCTION
Price is the key determinant of revenue, while other factors in the marketing
mix affect costs. Yet pricing strategy in the banking industry is usually badly
developed. Prices tend to be set without reference to overall marketing
strategy and without any real understanding of underlying cost structures. This
results from the traditional method adopted by banks of bundling their service
offerings in a way which disguises the price of individual services in favor of
concentrating on overall profitability, usually based on branch economics.
Historically the pattern of bank control systems failed to identify the specific
costs of providing individual services or servicing individual customers,
concentrating rather on profits only at the branch level. Moreover, the
principal source of profitability came from the bank intermediary role of
achieving an adequate spread on interest rates between the average cost of
deposits and the rates charged for loans.
The changing nature of competition in the banking industry is removing the
traditional regulatory barriers which encouraged commonality in pricing
between similar institutions restricted to operating within specific market areas
such as ‘commercial banking’. With the breakdown of traditional sector entry
barriers as a result of deregulation, new competitors have been able to exploit
cost advantages and use pricing tactics to gain market share relative to those
institutions still adopting service bundling tactics. In addition, other competi¬
tors have been able to maintain price but offer differentiated service quality in
order to pick off selected segments on both the retail and wholesale markets.
The transformation from reliance on interest spread differential caused by
rising costs of deposits and lower relative interest rates on assets has also led to
the growing importance of fee-based income. Here pricing strategies have
tended to emphasize one of two directions. In the first of these based on ‘skill’,
product or service differentiation is achieved by the relative uniqueness or
creativity of service offerings provided by variable levels of individual skill
from different banks. Notably in the corporate market, investment or
142
143
Many banks will wish to set price to maximize current profits. This usually means
charging as much as they think the market will bear even when they are unsure of
underlying costs and irrespective of long-term strategic consequences. For
example, banks have been reluctant to pay reasonable rates of interest on
current account balances for up-market consumers until forced to by new-entry
competitors such as brokerage companies. As a result many banks have tended
to be seen by this customer segment to be offering a poor service and when
superior alternatives have become available clients have tended to move to
them. This in turn has forced rapid increases in the costs of funds of the banks as
they have had to respond by offering money market interest rates to retain their
deposit base.
Some banks may adopt the objective of endeavoring to be the product quality
leader in a specific product market segment. This usually means customers will
be prepared to pay a somewhat higher price for perceived superior service
quality. J. P. Morgan, for example, is seen as providing excellent investment
banking services and deep long-term client relationships with the Fortune 500
companies. As a consequence it is able to price its overall service offerings at a
level which provides it with superior profitability compared with other US
money center banks and despite intense competition for these large accounts.
Capacity maintenance
(a) Staff direct costs. The staff costs per hour for each grade of staff involved in
providing a service should be computed. This cost, multiplied by the standard
time for each activity element when summed to cover all the activities, provides
the direct staff cost of each service.
(b) Other direct costs. All other direct unit costs associated with a service,
including telephone, postage, office space rental, computer processing costs,
advertising and the like, also need to be identified and added to the direct staff
costs.
(c) Overhead costs. Any branch and head office overhead costs not incurred
directly in providing a service can also be identified and absorbed to provide a
fully absorbed standard cost using an appropriate basis. This area is often one
of considerable debate and some banks prefer to use only direct cost standards
and contribution margin analysis. In practice both need to be considered.
Once an appropriate basis for overhead cost absorption has been agreed,
however, the total standard unit cost of a service can be calculated.
To arrive at the total cost of specific services the unit costs should be multiplied
by the appropriate transaction volume. The total service costs calculated can
then be compared with actual total costs to test the accuracy of the costing
system.
In practice individual accounts make use of a mix of bank services, and given
the costs associated with each the relative profitability of each account can be
calculated. To undertake such an analysis, however, the bank will usually also
require an integrated data base which readily permits the calculation of the
cumulative service usage of all the individual accounts of a particular customer
and for costs to be compared to revenue. In corporate banking this can be
justifiably done on an individual account basis. As a consequence, since the
data needs and service usages are usually different to those of retail customers,
a growing number of banks are developing two such integrated data bases, one
for each class of customer. For retail accounts such an individual customer
analysis is usually not an economic proposition for large customer base banks.
Here the tendency would be to cluster the account base using cut points in the
numbers of transactions, levels of deposit and the like. Such clusters can also be
146
In the banking industry, as in other industrial sectors, the Pareto law effect is
normally found. In retail banking it is relatively common that 85 per cent of cost
structure on staff, premises, central computer processors and even marketing
expenses can be attributed to the bottom 15 per cent of the account base in
terms of deposits. This is because the majority of accounts tend to be low on
deposits and relatively high on transaction volume.
The traditional bundling of branch operations, where ‘free’ current account
balances were used to cover losses on transaction business, is now giving way to
a recognition of the cost of branch operations as interest rate spreads diminish.
Banks now increasingly accept that they must recover transaction costs from
those customers which incur them, while rewarding with market related
interest payments the accounts of low transaction volume and high relative
balance customers. As a consequence, many banks are introducing prices
related to costs for transaction business, charging differently for machine
versus human teller transactions and offering different interest rates for
different levels of account balance. A few are going further and actually
attempting to shake out unprofitable accounts by discriminatory pricing or
deliberate account closures, while introducing superior service at higher prices
to preferred accounts.
147
In the New York retail market Citibank subdivided its retail account base
into seven segments. Those with $15,000 or more on deposit were given
service by a personal financial advisor in a pleasantly equipped part of the
bank. Customers with lower balances were allowed to use the human teller
system but were also encouraged to use teller machines. Customers with less
than $1000 in deposits were encouraged to bank elsewhere.
This system of segmentation created significant consumer resentment and
eventually segregation against low value accounts was technically withdrawn.
However, by this time Citibank had largely purified its customer base. This
purification even included those corporate accounts for whom Citibank
undertook payroll processing and where the bulk of employees instantly
withdrew their funds after pay day. As a consequence, because the bank was
able to offer a superior service to its better customers by partially eliminating
worse customers over a period of five years, it actually doubled its share of the
New York retail market. At the same time, the bank reduced its branch
network from 260 to 220 branches and its staff from 7000 to 5000, while
achieving 70 per cent of cash withdrawals on ATMs, thus substantially reducing
its overall cost base.
As a generalization, therefore, you should carefully examine the cost and
revenue structures of both customers and services. As shown in Figure 8.1, the
probability is that 20 per cent of customers and 20 per cent of services will
contribute 80 per cent of revenue. Therefore, rather than continuously adding
customers and services indiscriminately and thereby increasing costs but not
necessarily profits, look carefully also at rationalizing those accounts and
Service revenue
80% -20%!
1 20% - 80 %-
No. of services
i
Clear customer/
20% 80% service candidates
t _L_ / for elimination
-T
Customer account candidates for
purification
services which may be making losses. The 80 per cent of customers and services
which only contribute 20 per cent of revenue are candidates for service
rationalization or account purification, and that group of customers and services
which intersect in the bottom right-hand corner will almost certainly be running
at a loss. Such services or customer accounts should clearly be eliminated unless
they can be justified for specific strategic reasons.
the provision of a service; that not all competitors need be on the same curve; that
‘shared’ experience effects are possible as a result of synergy between services
using the same facilities such as central processing units; and that the experience
effect is volume and not time related.
Based upon these three criteria a number of pricing options are open to the
bank. These alternatives include cost plus pricing, breakeven and profit impact
target pricing, value in use pricing, market rate pricing, relationship pricing,
penetration pricing and skimming pricing.
curve, starting at zero, usually rises in a linear form with increasing volume.
Where the two curves meet is the breakeven volume position Vj, while to meet
the desired profit impact target a higher level of volume V2 is required. In
banking fixed costs tend to be relatively high unless staff and premises are
treated as variable, and historically these have both tended to be fixed.
In calculating breakeven and profit impact target prices, it is important to
check what market share position such a strategy implies. Where it is necessary
for the bank to take a high market share to achieve its desired profitability it is
important to understand where this share gain will come from. Unless the
market segment is high growth, it will usually be necessary for the bank to take
share from existing competitors. Since in many cases there is service over
capacity, unless the precise competitor has been carefully targeted the likely
reaction may be price erosion as established competitors use price in an effort
to maintain share. This may substantially change breakeven and profit impact
target volumes as revenues decline, and strategies that are very sensitive to
competitor price reaction should be examined carefully to test whether the
probable end result is worth the effort.
prepared to pay for these facilities. Adding these to the average competitive
base price provides an overall ‘value’ price for the service. Actual offered prices
usually represent a discount from this overall value price, but at the same time
such prices are usually above the market average.
An example of such added value service prices is the Merrill Lynch Cash
Management Account, which offers up-market consumers not only a checking
service but also a Visa card facility, brokerage account, automatic margin
loans, money market rate interest on credit balances and investment
management facilities. As a result of offering this superior quality of service
Merrill Lynch attracted some $70 billion in funds in a few years, much to the
chagrin of the banks, who have found it difficult to compete with such an
attractive package.
The use of such a pricing strategy, however, infers substantial understanding
of your own cost structure as well as that of your competitors. Without such a
detailed understanding it is impossible to calculate relative service quality and
price between competitors. Moreover, without ongoing market research it is
also difficult to check the impact of alternative pricing strategies on customer
demand.
With this system of pricing the bank cedes the initiative to key competitors to
set price. Smaller banks ‘follow the leader’ in pricing services, and while price
leaders are usually other banks, non-bank competitors are increasingly
influencing service prices as these new entrants may well have operational cost
advantage and use price as a conscious weapon to gain market penetration.
For example, the entry by brokerage houses into the market for money
market mutual funds had a dramatic efect on the deposit base of US banks,
especially those of savings and loan institutions. Offering money market
interest rates compared with low fixed rates by the banks, the money funds
grew rapidly from the late 1970s. Much of this money was subsequently lent
back to the banks in the form of certificates of deposit, significantly raising the
banks’ cost of funds. When banks were later allowed to compete with the
money funds, they were also forced to price their deposit products at
competitive rates. In practice, however, most banks were also operating with a
substantially higher cost structure due to the high premises and staff costs of
their expensive branch delivery system compared with the simple mail or
telephone system used by the fund operators.
Nevertheless, market rate pricing remains common with the banking
industry due to the lack of cost knowledge. The dangers of this system come
from ceding the strategic initiative to competitors and the potential threat of
sudden price shifts caused by new entrants or changes in delivery system
capability.
154
For new services when high experience effects are present and if the market is
price-sensitive, it is best to deliberately price low in order to rapidly build
market share and so gain a cost advantage over competitors. Failure to use
penetration pricing may well encourage new market entries and provide a price
umbrella for the higher cost competitors. Ultimately such a strategy usually
leads to a shake-out when a number of competitors exit from the market as a
result of a price war due to market overcapacity. The banking industry is
perhaps particularly prone to possible overcapacity due to the large number of
competing institutions in most countries and an historic tendency to
overbanking.
The use of penetration pricing in electronic banking products has proved to
be a preemptive weapon and has already led to the forced exit of some
competitors while causing other low share competitors to operate at a
continuing economic disadvantage. In the New York retail banking market for
155
example, faced with the need for major systems investment to compete
effectively. Bankers Trust made the clear decision to withdraw from the
market in order to concentrate on wholesale operations.
8.6.3 Geography
Generally, banks charge different prices for services in different parts of the
world dependent upon local money market conditions and regulations. In the
large corporate market, however, there is a growing need to price on a global
basis. Banks which continue to operate on a localized pricing basis may well
find themselves at a strategic disadvantage compared to those which have
moved to global account profit planning and hence can allocate price and
country risk, for example, against overall account profitability. Such pricing
strategy can also be used for global services such as corporate cash
management.
8.6.4 Discounts
Discounts in banking usually apply for both volume and value. Large users of
services can normally negotiate price with the bank and few banks have clear
policies for pricing services to such customers. In part this is due to the failure of
banks to adequately understand their costs, but also many banks tend to be
volume rather than profit oriented.
Value discounts are offered for example for early payments for debit
products, while price premiums may be provided for longer maturities on
credit balances. Similarly users of debit cards in point of sale terminals
purchasing gasoline in the United States are being offered the same price as
cash purchasers. Credit card users by comparison pay a slight premium. In the
same way, higher rates of interest are usually offered for term versus demand
deposits.
In adopting discounts for value or volume, check that the effect is actually
consistent with the bank’s product market strategy rather than merely
responding to either competitor or customer pressure.
Banks will often modify their basic pricing to discriminate between customers,
product or service form, place and time. With deregulation, price discrimina¬
tion is becoming of increasing importance in heightening segment entry
barriers. Examples of bank service price discrimination include the following.
157
Customer Discrimination
Different customers pay different prices for the same service or are provided
with different service packages at the same price. For example, many banks
offer especially favorable terms for students, including promotional items like
book allowances. Similarly, a growing number of banks are offering collective
discount packages for senior citizen savings account holders.
Product-form Discrimination
Here different versions of the same product or service are priced differently
but not proportionately to their respective costs. For example, the relative cost
of the American Express green and gold cards is not the threefold price
differential which is charged for the use of the latter.
Place Discrimination
Prices differ according to the place in which the service is delivered. For
example, many banks now charge a lower price for transactions made on
ATMs versus the use of counter service tellers.
Time Discrimination
Prices vary according to the time of use of a service. Time discrimination has
not yet been used extensively in the banking industry, although such factors as
branch opening hours seem likely to become of major importance as
deregulation continues.
8.7 SUMMARY
Price is a critical ingredient in the marketing mix for a service or product.
Because of regulatory constraints, the use of price as an important element in
bank marketing has tended to be neglected. Deregulation, coupled with the
introduction of new technology and the arrival of new aggreessive bank and
non-bank competitors, is forcing a reappraisal of the use of pricing strategy. At
present many banks sacrifice their strategic position by operating market rate
pricing because they do not know their own underlying service cost structure.
In the future, banks will be required to undertake regular specialist service
cost analysis, build integrated corporate and personal banking data bases and
so identify losing services and/or customer segments. Overall marketing
strategies will then need to be designed utilizing pricing policy as an essential
ingredient to meet the needs of specific customer segments.
158
1. What is your present pricing strategy for your service range? Is this policy
consistent with overall bank marketing strategy?
2. If you are intent on current profit maximization, will this have a negative
impact on your long-term strategic position?
3. If you wish to maximize market share, is this share gain attainable and will
it be profitable if you achieve it? Is market share a critical factor in service
profitability?
4. If you wish to drive for service quality leadership, do the customer
segments for your services perceive your bank as offering superior quality?
Remember the only measure of service quality is that of the customer, not
of the bank.
5. If your objective is capacity maintenance, have you tested your overall
strategy for a volume versus a profit orientation? Would sacrificing volume
for improved profitability be acceptable to top management, who may be
size-motivated?
6. How well do you know your services cost structure?
7. Have standard costs been developed for each service? Are these standards
regularly updated?
8. Have you checked the contribution effect from particular groups of
accounts and services?
9. Have you questioned whether particular services and/or customer groups
should be rationalized?
10. Included in such analysis, have you checked whether you are servicing the
needs of your best customers as well as you might? Are any new
competitors threatening your best customers with superior services priced
lower than your own?
11. What services do you offer that exhibit a substantial experience effect?
How does your market share compare with leading competitors? Can you
compete effectively in the long term in these services?
12. Do you know the effect on demand of different price levels for particular
services?
13. Do you really know the pricing strategies of competitors for specific
services and/or customer segments?
14. What services could appropriately use cost plus pricing?
15. Do you develop breakeven and profit impact calculations for specific
services and alternative pricing strategies? Do you post-audit your
successes or failures to find out where you miscalculated?
16. Have you attempted to build up value in use calculations for your services
relative to your competitors?
17. If you use market rate pricing, are you satisfied you know whether or not
particular services are profitable?
159
9.1 INTRODUCTION
In a major review of strategy concluded in 1980, Citibank identified one
particular trend which is having a fundamental effect on bank delivery system
strategy. The bank concluded that as a result of the development of new, and
particularly electronic, delivery systems, by the end of the decade the
customer, whether individual or corporate, would determine the time, the
place and the method of the banking transaction. If this trend is correct, and the
evidence increasingly suggests that it may well be, it potentially transforms the
traditional delivery system strategy of banks, which was based on branch
banking. In this chapter we will examine branch and alternative delivery
systems for financial services, exploring modifications in conventional branch
design, branch coverage, electronic banking, telephone banking, home
banking, automated teller machine strategy and electronic service delivery
systems.
The conventional delivery system within the banking industry has been the full
service branch. Although graded by size, it is still the case that in many banks
160
161
virtually all branches, irrespective of size, are said to be able to deliver the full
range of products and services offered by the bank to both individual and
corporate customers. Since the late 1960s, however, the range of bank services
has increased dramatically as deregulation has gradually proceeded and banks
have also moved to significantly extend their range of conventional banking
service variants. In North America branch architecture has tended to move to
an open plan mode as illustrated in Figure 9.1, to encourage the sale of
non-transaction services, but in many other countries, notably in Western
Europe, branch architecture still tends to stress transaction operations as
shown in Figure 9.2.
Management offices
Teller
positions
Real estate branches. Centered upon mortgage finance, such branches have
emerged from conventional savings and loans and building society opera¬
tions. They have reduced the space devoted to savings and withdrawals and
deposit transactions and focused on mortgage customers. In addition to
mortgage finance such branches also offer real estate brokerage for both the
sale and purchase of property; personal loans, especially for home
164
Loan production offices. These are non-deposit taking offices which can
write asset business and have been used especially in the United States by
corporate oriented commercial banks to cross state boundaries.
In a drive to improve productivity and cut costs still further, the fully
automated bank branch has begun to appear in a number of countries. Perhaps
most advanced in Japan, such units provide a range of machines within the area
of the branch which enable the customer to undertake most basic bank
transactions. Such a branch is illustrated in Figure 9.3.
In this branch, which does not use especially advanced technology, cash
deposits and withdrawals, balance enquiries and interaccount transactions can
be conducted by the customer without bank employee intervention. Two
employees are present in the branch to assist customers in using the machines
165
ATM
Drive-up
^ teller
The installation of automated teller machines has expanded rapidly during the
1980s. By the end of 1984 the number of ATMs installed in the United States
was estimated at 45,000, up from 13,800 in 1979. In Western Europe at the end
of 1982 the number of machines installed was estimated at over 11,000,
similarly up from 3850 in 1980. In Europe around half these machines were
installed in France and the UK, while installations in Western Germany were
notably lower. In Japan, however, compared with their relatively small
number of branches, the major city banks had the highest number of ATMs
installed per branch than any other banks in the world. A list of major banks,
their branch coverage and ATM installations is shown in Table 9.1.
Table 9.1
Bank ATM and Branch Network Coverage 1984
fallen and transaction volume has risen, while transactions with human tellers
have increased in cost as labor rates have risen. In other countries similar
trends can be detected, and by the end of 1985 it is estimated that in most
developed countries ATM transaction costs will be lower than those involving
human tellers.
Initially the great majority of ATMs were installed in the lobbies or
through the walls of existing banks and savings and loan institutions. For
suburban banks ATMs were also provided on bank sites for drive-in
utilization. Increasingly, however, new ATM installations are occurring in
off-site locations with high levels of traffic flow such as airports, railway
stations, shopping centers and especially supermarkets and convenience
stores. In the USA a substantial number of supermarket and convenience
store retailers are installing on their own behalf, or in conjunction with banks
or non-bank ATM operators, extensive machine networks. Moreover, unlike
many banks, retailer installed ATMs strive for universality to maximize the
number of card holders who can access machines on their premises. In this
way the retailers anticipate being able to provide a convenience attraction
which will help to lure retail custom for their traditional services while at the
same time generating significant revenue from effectively renting their floor
space to ATM operators in return for a percentage of individual transaction
charges. The same trend of growing retail involvement is also occurring in
Western Europe, where a number of major retailers in the UK, France,
Belgium and West Germany are experimenting with or have announced plans
to install ATMs in their stores.
The desire by retailers for universality for all card holders to be able to
access machines on their premises has been shared by a number of banks. As
a result in the United States there has been a rapid growth in the number of
ATMs linked by some form of shared network. Some of these work in
localized geographic areas while others cover much of the country. In France
the largest overall shared network links the electronic point of sale and ATM
networks of all the leading banks. In Germany moves are in train to create a
Europewide electronic card access system based on the Eurocard. Finally, the
two leading credit card companies Visa and Mastercard are endeavoring to
create global ATM access systems for the cardholders of member banks.
ATMs have become an important delivery system for cash withdrawal,
deposits, balance reporting and interaccount transfers in retail banking. The
number of ATMs installed is still increasing at around 30 per cent per annum
worldwide and their growing numbers pose a substantial threat to traditional
transaction based branches. This is especially true for new ATM installations,
which will tend increasingly to be off bank sites and relatively universal in the
cards that will be able to access them. For banks the installation of further
ATMs must be carefully considered as a component in overall delivery system
strategy, and where such installations are undertaken consideration should at
169
the same time also be given to the size and shape of the existing branch
network.
base in the USA is Citibank’s, with around 11 million card holders. Sears
Roebuck’s charge card base is over three times this number. Further, they
have traditionally been strong in retail revolving credit finance, usually written
on their own book.
After purchasing the brokerage firm. Dean Witter Reynolds and real estate
brokerage operator Coldwell Bank, Sears Roebuck began experimentally to
open financial service centers in their existing retail stores in 1983. In the state
of California, Sears also offered banking services after purchasing a savings and
loan bank. Following successful experiments by the end of 1984, Sears planned
to have 300 in-store financial centers open offering insurance, real estate and
investment brokerage services. By 1986, the number of such outlets was
expected to rise to 600 nationwide.
In offering financial services in-store. Sears Roebuck has a number of
significant advantages. Firstly, the store group’s image for quality and
reliability inspires confidence, especially among middle American consumers.
Second, Sears automatically has the store traffic generated by its department
store merchandise range, unlike a competitor bank which has no such traffic.
Third, Sears has an established customer base using its in-house credit card
facility, and also its catalog sales purchasers who can provide automatic target
audiences for advertising messages about Sears’ financial service offerings.
Fourth, in its advertising Sears stresses the relative differences in its store
opening hours compared with those of the banks. Sears' financial centers are
open 10 am till 9 pm Monday to Friday, 10 am till 5 pm on Saturdays and 12 am
till 4 pm on Sundays. Finally, relative staff and premises costs for the retailer
have been estimated at around 60 per cent of those of a commercial bank due to
lower relative rental costs and a combination of lower actual costs and longer
opening hours for employees.
Sears’ pattern of entry into financial services has been eagerly monitored by
many other lending retailers who believe they have a similar retail image to
Sears. As a result leading department stores, mail order operators and
up-market supermarket groups are actively contemplating or have decided to
enter the financial services industry in a significant way. Around the world,
therefore, the financial services supermarket concept is being developed as an
active component of strategy by leading retailers.
Card-based delivery systems have rapidly expanded the array of services they
are capable of delivering via a variety of distribution outlets including banks,
stores, airports, ATMs and the like. The future potential of cards still seems
considerable as ‘smart’ cards with memory capability provide new opportuni¬
ties for service expansion. Already Citibank’s Focus Account Card based
service is stated to be able to deliver some 30 products or services to card
holders, with services being accessed in a variety of bank and non-bank
outlets.
Branch closures. In the United States many banks have announced branch
closure plans. For example, the Bank of America in California is closing
around a third of its overall network while increasing its number of ATM
installations and introducing home banking. Branch closures are also
occurring among international branch networks which were expanded
rapidly during the 1970s. Many of these branches, operating largely in the
corporate market in world financial centers, have consistently been
unprofitable. In Japan, for example, the majority of most international bank
branches were operating only marginally profitably in 1983. For many banks
the initial desire to service large-scale multinationals via a global branch
network has given way to a more focused strategy on a more limited
geographic, customer or service base, leading to a rationalization of
unnecessary, expensive international branches.
More limited service branches. To cut costs, a growing number of banks are
relying more on limited service branches or thin branches. For example, in
the United Kingdom Barclays has announced plans to cut its 3000 plus
network of full service branches by half. After some 100 closures, half the
remaining branches are being converted either to limited service satellite
branches or to agency or support branches of the machine and teller variety.
Electronic terminal banking for both corporate and retail sectors is also of
growing importance. Corporate intelligent terminal banking will rapidly
become common, although retail home banking is unlikely to form a major
element in customer services for some years. Again for smaller banks the cost
of electronic service development are potentially prohibitive and therefore
such institutions are likely to rely more on franchised or shared systems.
In deciding upon its delivery system strategy, the established branch bank
today is forced in most cases into a mixed delivery system strategy. For new
entrants the choice of delivery system strategy may be more open; dependent
upon the service range and customer base covered by overall product market
strategy. Thus organizations without established branch networks may seek
to reach a segment of a wider market by adopting only electronic, telephone
or direct mail service delivery systems, using price to offset the lower service
quality of a non-physical presence. Some form of physical presence is usually
necessary, however, for anything other than a limited segment service range
strategy. A critical ingredient in such a strategy is the outlet location decision.
In this decision process the following steps need to be considered:
The area over which a banking outlet operates can be divided into three
parts as shown in Figure 9.5, namely primary, secondary and fringe. The
175
primary operating area embraces 50-75 per cent of branch customers and is
the area closest to the branch with a minimum of overlap with other branches.
The secondary operating area contains a further 15-25 per cent of
customers. Customers from this area are more widely dispersed and there
may be different overlaps with different branches or outlets. The circular
pattern shown in Figure 9.5 need not be characteristic and the actual
operating area will be determined by a number of other factors such as
number and type of branch outlet, location and density of competition, actual
travel time and mode of travel, and location surroundings. For example, bank
branches are relatively low traffic generators, even parasites, whereas certain
types of retail stores are high generators and adjacent bank branches may well
gain from spin-off traffic.
The size and shape of the branch operating area can be determined relatively
accurately from a study of branch records. Such investigations can be improved
by additional trend analysis and specific surveys to measure actual and
potential changes in operating area traffic volume. The value of specific areas
176
for individual service volumes can also be calculated based on patterns such as
Reilly’s law1 or refinements proposed by Huff2 and Gautschi3 as follows:
Expected annual service use = number of customers by segment in the area
X
percentage of customers in area using your
outlet
X
annual expected service use per customer.
Thus the nature of the customer base and the type of services used by different
sociodemographic groups can be included to assess branch or outlet potential.
For this analysis it is possible to assess the total value of a particular area and,
coupling these data with the degree of competitive activity, some estimates can
be made as to the economic viability of alternative branch or outlet strategies
for particular areas as shown in Figure 9.6.
Figure 9.6
William J. Reilly, Method for the Study of Retail Relationships, Research Monograph No 4
2 (Austin University of Texas Press, 1929), University of Texas Bulletin No. 2944.
‘ David L. Huff and Larry Blue, A Programmed Solution for Estimating Retail Sales Potential
^ (Lawrence: University of Kansas), 1966.
3 David A- Gautschi, Specification of patronage models for retail choice,
177
9.5 SUMMARY
The choice of delivery system for the individual bank has become a critical
strategic issue. In evaluating delivery system strategy the bank must first
evaluate its overall product market strategy and determine the most
appropriate geographic coverage and outlet type to meet the service needs of
its served market customer base. Moreover, care must also be taken to
evaluate the future trends in these served market customer needs and in
various delivery system cost structures. Evaluating specific outlet sites should
be done in a rational manner, by evaluating various service modes and
estimating the economics of such alternatives. In particular, care must be taken
not to treat the existing branch network as an inflexible system which must be
preserved at all costs. Such an attitude will lead to more agile competitors
potentially gaining and using important cost advantages to achieve a
competitive edge.
Communications Strategy
10.1 INTRODUCTION
There are many variants of each of the four main communication elements as
shown in Figure 10.1. One problem for banks which makes the communication
178
179
task more difficult is that for most service offerings there is no physical product
that consumers can see. This makes it especially important to describe the
service clearly and to identify the benefits that can be expected to accrue from
its use and that satisfy customer needs.
A message is sent from the sender to the desired audience via a communica¬
tion channel. (Figure 10.2) This in turn results in feedback from the audience
which may or may not be the action desired by the sender. When an unwelcome
result occurs, this is due to system noise, which results in the wrong message
being received. This communication failure occurs for a variety of reasons,
including:
its value to them and to become familiar with its usage. Examples would
include the offering of its Diners Club service by Citibank to new users free for
six months; the provision of free corporate cash management interactive
terminals to corporate treasurers for several months; and free home banking
terminals for trial periods by a number of banks.
Premiums are products offered at a relatively low cost or free as an incentive
to use a particular service. Premiums come in a wide variety of forms, and
although the use of consumer appliances and the like as incentives for opening
different levels of deposits which developed in the later 1970s when interest
rates were controlled in the USA has diminished, they are still widely used.
They include the provision of free T-shirts, specially shaped children’s piggy
banks, low-price telephones, home computers, book vouchers for students and
the like. Coupons, which are certificates entitling the holder to a specific saving
on a specific service, are not widely used in the banking industry. They are,
however, effective in stimulating sales of new services and have been used to
increase penetration in specific segments such as student, young people and
senior citizen groups, where free banking services may be offered to new
accounts. The travel and entertainment card concerns American Express and
Diners Club also make extensive use of coupons as part of tie-in deals with
restaurants and airlines to stimulate extra card usage.
2. Point of sale displays and demonstrations. Point of sale displays are used as
silent salesmen in most bank branches. In general, however, such displays are
weak and rely on impulse selection of bank service literature. This is often
unattractive, being in leaflet form and rarely advertised to stimulate consumer
awareness or interest. Demonstrations are, however, becoming much more
important activities in bank marketing via the use of seminars and out-of-bank
displays presented to focused corporate and individual customer groups.
Professional demonstration teams and multimedia techniques are becoming
common today and this area of activity is likely to increase in all market
segments.
The bank’s reasons for these guidelines are that, as there are too many
individuals to choose between it would be dysfunctional to make choices;
bricks and mortar projects are not noticeable because they fail to involve
people; sponsorship relates to the retail banking market which for Lloyds is
largely in the UK; and sport is much too expensive for the bank's limited public
relations budget. As a result the bank targets its activities very closely to
specific groups such as the better educated young, farmers, young businessmen
and the like. In its regional sponsorship the bank is looking mainly for
opportunities for regional head offices and branches to combine customer
entertainment with a demonstration of the bank's commitment to the
community. As a result the bank is a strong supporter of agricultural shows,
concerts and cultural events by touring national arts companies. Care should
also be taken to link public relations strategy to overall communications policy.
For example, the Midland Bank launched a major TV and press campaign to
stress its friendliness and interest in customers under the theme of the ‘listening
bank’. However, when a number of press stories broke about court cases by the
bank against individual customers who appeared to have overextended their
credit positions this friendly image campaign looked like rebounding badly.
Strenuous public relations efforts were required to reduce the negative impact
the court cases had on the overall effect of the campaign.
10.5 ADVERTISING
Once the overall platform has been established the copywriter has a number
of further decisions to make:
1
W. K. Hafer and G. E. White, Advertising Writing, West Publishing Co., p. 48.
191
Copy format. Having decided upon what the ad platform should be, the next
step is to determine which to select from among the choice of copy formats
open to the copywriter. The copy format establishes the way in which the ad
message will be presented. Major formats include the following;
Cartoons—cartoon formats are often used in combination with humor and may
be employed by banks to lower their forbidding image. The use of a cartoon
version of the Midland Bank’s Griffin corporate identity in its listening bank
campaign illustrates this.
Straight sell—Ads using a straight sell format stress the expected conscumer
benefits and aim for direct action. The Trustee Savings Bank home contents
insurance services campaign illustrates such a format. The ad stresses the
dangers of burglary and the benefits of TSB cover; it ends with an application
form to complete including a table enabling the applicant to calculate the
precise premium to be paid for a particular level of cover.
News—such a format reads like a magazine story and gives the impression of
being part of the newspaper or magazine in which it is contained. News ads tend
to generate high readership levels because of their format.
can dramatically affect its appeal as well as its cost. Larger ads do gain more
attention but this is not necessarily proportional to the addition in cost.
Media Reach. Each medium has its own specific audience. The media
planner must identify from this audience how well the specific medium
, S; ^hnstian- Stopping power: one of six characteristics of great ads. Marketing News
,
14 No. 6 (February 6, 1981), p. 18.
193
reaches the target audience he is interested in, since rates will not normally
be related to this group but rather to the coverage as a whole.
Media availability. Not all media are available in all markets. Media plans
must therefore take account both of specific media and of time and space
slots which might be desired for particular campaigns.
Today media planning models are commonly used to optimize the choice of
specific media to reach given target audiences with the desired frequency. The
advantages and disadvantages of particular media are summarized in Figure
10.4. The use of broadcast media by banks has grown substantially in recent
years although in the United States the regionalization of banking has tended
to militate against national broadcast campaigns. In countries allowing
nationwide branching, however, TV and radio for retail and mortgage banking
services have become the main media used. Press is still used heavily and has
grown in real terms in line with the overall rise in bank advertising. It has been
found especially important in the growth of direct response retail services,
notably for the sale of savings and insurance products. Corporate service
advertising has tended to stress press, with financial journals, the specialist
international financial press and general business magazines being the major
media. Direct marketing has also grown in importance for both retail and
corporate banking services. Point of sale is used in branches but has not been
developed to a significant degree, while outdoor media have not been heavily
used by banks except for promotion purposes.
Many bank advertising campaigns have been badly conceived and conducted in
a haphazard manner at great cost. The advertising appropriation decision and
the allocation of these funds to specific campaigns need to be carefully
determined and the rationale for the decisions established as part of the bank’s
overall marketing program. Unfortunately, there is no clearly superior method
194
D
D
03
CX
uo
<4- X>
'? S '> T3 C/3
° 03 D JD D
^ -C b*).;P +-•
o O
D
.5 a C X D
p 3 o JB U
Oh CX |-J pH C/D <
D-
3 P
C/3 53
C
D
D X
. o X> cd
03 ^ c 03 D
,t- D +_* D D v-<
£ J-H
> g GS +-* 4-*
tJ ^ cd X) ^ c/3
P _ l- 'q
CJ D
q
fi cd
C" . _ rr(
o
D
c
D _o
*1 5
c3
u.
"S
P "S
V-,
Source: Derived from: William H. Bolen, Advertising 2nd Edition, John Wiley, 1984
bo 4-*
£ CD
o o •, C
> -G CD <D
»-.
D
£
O —.
p
H C/D a 04 CU U U
0) CD
5 13
Cj c/i
o3
P ^ '-3
IS o D
CX-G . 03
o3 03 u-. +- x>
bO
„ X) o. -C D £? 5/5 “O
> ^ cs .C/3 O cd G
X3 O - x OJ CO „x p
03 CD u - 'C 3 Cl ^ o
D r—< 03 zr ^ X
C* o .£ p< O Oh U P c/3 bXj
Figure 10.4
O
JJ
>>X3
13 CD
Wi
a. O XJ •g 15
CX 03
D a, cd S -2
-c O p x 03
CX C D > D
D 03 --.
^
*-i Q_ CP cd >
_C v-. D rrt
o3 cd
P *“u
bX) , ' G X> -a -W3
*N
P o • 03
C D C
bo E\ E
G W) m
O D
03 <u D “a g
o
p
E CX
X
Q 04 W C/3 hJ W
D
o pG
v-
Q D p CX
> D p
<u Vh
O XJ -a G bJO
CX P 03 03 P
CX O
CX D
p Wh D bo E
Ui H- ^ E
D
CX
<u
bo
C^ >
-G s D D G
_o
-D3. p
S ip p
CX c
bO C3 CX cd XJ
03 S >>s
CX
c/3 e
4—>
• —
■C ^
f—1 1-1C X ^ 3
O CT
X5
D P
> r£ D- „ ^
£
a
'-P x 2 § ajL- o G ^ G
D
0) "a D 3 g O
Z ^ a P-1 C/D u Q
195
of fixing these sums. In practice a variety of methods are in use. The main such
methods include the following:
Care must be taken in the use of this method since it may not be an
appropriate one in achieving desired marketing strategy outcomes. It is
popular, however, due to its simplicity and because as deposits rise so too
does advertising appropriation.
What you can afford method? A number of banks, notably smaller ones,
decide on an advertising appropriation based upon what they believe they
can afford. The determination of this amount is, however, obviously
subjective.
' 9Lary L' Jr'11*:" and P' Kotler’ Marketing Decision Making, Harper and Row, New York
IVMJ, pp. 492-501.
2 ABA Banking Journal, October 1983, p. 31.
1 P. Kotler, Marketing Management, 5th edn., Prentice Hall, London, 1984, pp. 655-656.
197
Recall tests. Researchers test consumers who have been exposed to ads to
recall ads and copy themes. Such recall scores measure impact and
memorability.
10.6 SUMMARY
11.1 INTRODUCTION
A key factor which differentiates banks in servicing the markets in which they
operate and a crucial element in successful strategy implementation is the
form of organization adopted. Some structures do appear more appropriate
than others in serving particular markets, but history and the nature of the
bank’s core business tend to significantly influence the form of organization
adopted for other markets. These differences can thus provide a particular
bank with a specific advantage or disadvantage. While the overall
administrative requirements of the bank must be taken into account
therefore, it is important to bear in mind that under normal circumstances the
requirements of particular customer clusters should receive priority.
200
201
services are seldom integrated within mainstream bank operations but are
organized as loosely coordinated separate subsidiaries. Many such banks have
recently developed key account units for major corporate customers whose
brief is to provide a global account officer and international coordination
crossing the normal geographic divisional boundaries. However, profit
responsibility is usually left with the regional units. Examples of banks like this
would include Barclays, Lloyds and AmRo Bank. Details of this type of
structure are shown in Figure 11.1.
Many US banks with limited local state branching capability have organized
with structures based around customer clusters. These banks have primarily
focused upon corporate accounts and have relatively small retail businesses.
They tend to organize around local banking and international operations, with
the latter being primarily concerned with large corporations. Locally the focus
will be retail banking, local metro-business and out-of-state US corporate
banking. Corporate banking is therefore handled at the level of the branch for
very small business, with geographic account officer structures dealing with
middle market accounts and industry specialization being quite common for
large corporate acounts. International activities tend to be organized largely on
a geographic regional basis, but below this level in large branches and in the
USA customer structuring by industry specialization is also common. Many
such banks also have a key multinational account unit responsible for servicing
around 500 or so major global MNCs. Related banking services, trust and
investment services tend to be organized firstly by function and separately from
retail and commercial banking. Such banks tend to have only limited retail
aspirations away from their local geographic areas although many have offered
high net worth private banking as a special service for a limited number of
individual accounts. Examples of such structures would include Continental
Illinois, Chemical New York Corpn and Manufacturers Hanover. Details of
this type of structure are shown in Figure 11.2.
Board
I
1
m
i—
o
c
o
a>
w
si
1 -U
if)
C7>
Relative to the position in Western banks the large commercial city banks in
Japan tend to be less diversified both in terms of the service range offered and
also in terms of loan maturity. This is a function of industry structure in Japan,
which limits the deposit type and maturity open to such banks. By comparison,
however, these banks, although providing retail services, lend mainly to the
corporate sector.
While operating through a branch network, the banks are also subdivided by
both geography and industry in servicing the corporate market. Large
customers may be serviced by account officers from the central office while
branches look after smaller local accounts. Credit review and economic
analysis are, however, conducted by industry and a very detailed level of
industry understanding is the norm.
These banks are also the central short-term funds provider to a large group of
companies based around the old Zaibatsu concept or formed in the post-war
period around the banks themselves. Such an industrial group, which usually
covers almost the entire spectrum of the economy, may well embrace over a
thousand companies.
Outside Japan these banks operate via an international division, although
the principal contact with domestic based companies occurs via the domestic
corporate banking divisions. In decision-making Japanese banks operate a
consensus approach, with loans being decided by a formal ‘Ringi’ system
involving all relevant departments. Discretion limits at individual units are thus
low. An example of a Japanese-type structure is illustrated in Figure 11.4.
Apart from service range, branch network cover and nationality, one of the
most notable competitive differences observed amongst banks is the way in
Planning Legal Personnel Financial Economics
o
O
a
o
05
E
3
U
3
C/3
o
E
<U
j-
X)
03
C/3
0)
TD
p
o
P
<D
205
206
which they organize their marketing and selling effort for the corporate
market. In organizing to service the corporate market a number of variables
have to be carefully balanced. In particular, organization structures must take
account of:
Geography This variable plays a major role in branch based banking systems
and in international banking, where time zone, language, currency and
national boundaries all influence structure.
Account executive
Relationship manager
Branch manager
This was the system historically operated by banks in countries or states
allowing branch banking. The local branch manager was traditionally
responsible for servicing all the accounts within the geographic boundaries of
his branch with all the bank’s products. Where corporate accounts might have
operations in several branch territories or overseas, integration of bank
services was largely informal.
Corporate branches
A recent variation of the branch manager system has removed responsibility
for larger accounts from local branches and concentrated it in a regional
corporate branch where specialist corporate bankers look after the affairs of
institutional customers only. Integration between regions and internationally
in such structures tends to remain informal.
210
Mixed systems
A further variation of the branch manager system involves the use of bank
directors and/or account executives to provide a coordination role for very
large dispersed accounts in conjunction with branch manager and/or
corporate branches. The location of the coordinating role varies according to
account size and may be at regional or head office level.
Product managers
At the same time, the branch manager rarely has sufficient lending discretion
to adequately meet the needs of even medium-sized accounts. He therefore
runs the risk of being perceived as a form of ‘messenger’ rather than as a
responsible executive.
The branch manager system is not without advantages, however, including
the following:
The corporate branch system also gets around many of the negative aspects
211
of the traditional branch system and is well suited to handle middle market
accounts. Thus, coupled with industry specialized large corporate account
bankers operating from national or regional centers, European bankers have
substantially improved their capability to handle corporate accounts.
The account executive system tends to provide a much more detailed (and
expensive) level of service to corporate accounts. To recover its cost good
penetration and a high volume of profitable business is important. This mode
of servicing, therefore, should normally not be used below medium sized
accounts where a minimum call rate of four per year for an active account is
profitably sustainable.
o —
51
> 0l o
c > >k—
03m o
o Cl
m o CO
Cl
> c O 3
03 O
O CO Z
CL
CL o>
a> c
> CL o — m , - e ~
oC7>
c > o 03 w - 00 2 .t:
o o c c o E E i? «n ® c
m o 3 3 “ =>
CL ■ i e 03 O'
03 o 03 -C o <D <X)
Q CO o X3 O O Q_ </3
m
World corporation group
or03 O o
o < "O o
c
Q_ _Q LU E <d a> a>
c > « 2 IDo o a>
o O c 0)
0) O <D
a> 03
w Q. a> o ci 5 ^
c 03k- oL. CO e> — Z CO CO CO 3
_i_i_i_i_l
a> > 3
CO O LU
Figure 11.5
o
=3
•o
o
c
3 o
. . (n jO C .2 a>
CL _ <13 O JD o 3
> 03 </3 — — — C3
o
C — *3 E °
e • r 03
<v ®O' nN C° —3 3x
=> -O C C C C 03 o 2 O O ^ a>
^ O —N 3 3 3 CO o. <n < CD O U 2 Q. >
c C
L
'
—I_I—I-1 O 3 <D i i
CD
CO
O
O -o
3-
E co •n -O £
O' 03 03
o
m c
o
o C k_
CL < —
o
o </)
03 in CL
O
CL c
2 CL o
m in k_ c c o >s O
> o a> o O' o o o 03 O O* *
<i</>> .co </)
-O CL k_ c
*#» 3 g 1 c
o O
2
JC
CL CO
o
H
c o < I £ “3 *
a) M o
co O J3 0-
216
Many banks have added real estate and mortgage specialists or sub¬
sidiaries, including construction engineers, quantity surveyors, and progress
monitors to evaluate construction projects both before and during building.
Successful banks tend to specialize in particular sectors and also particular
geographic areas. Confidence is also developed from long-established
relationships with particular developers. An example of a real estate specialist
unit is shown in Figure 11.6. Many US regional banks have large real estate
loan portfolios either as components of direct lending or via mortgage
subsidiaries. The same function is also provided by many European banks but
UK based institutions have only recently entered the mortgage market.
The involvement of many US banks in housing and property finance has
been a major source of problems as the US domestic inflation rate has risen.
Traditionally US mortgage lending was at fixed rates. As a result much of the
US banks’ domestic property portfolio has been at a fixed rate. This has in
recent times been substantially lower than the bank's marginal cost of funds,
which has been high due to a rising inflation rate. The savings and loans banks
which specialized in mortgage lending have been under particular pressure
but even major US banks have found themselves severely affected.
European banks, where they have real estate specialists, tend to have
substantially fewer than their US counterparts, have few if any engineers and
progress chasers, and treat such specialists as staff as distinct from line
officers.
11.5.4 Energy
As with real estate, many banks have added specialists in energy and
particularly oil (and more recently coal) to their commercial banking staff.
The scale of lending and services to this industry is usually large and
syndications are common. Evaluation of lending propositions usually requires
a careful analysis of specific energy investments, while collateral may well be
based on oil in the ground or the like. As a result specialist energy units may
include geologists and petroleum engineers in addition to specialist account
officers. Lending to the sector may also involve peripheral areas such as
drilling platforms, oilfield safety equipment, offshore harbour facilities, pipe¬
line construction, and the like.
Banks like the Texas commercial banks may well employ 100 or more
officers in energy departments embracing many aspects of the industry. An
example of such an energy department structure is shown in Figure 11.7. By
comparison most European banks would have only a handful of specialists
and these would be staff rather than line lending positions. Japanese banks
have only limited in-house technical expertise but might rely on their
industrial group associates in a particular industry to provide technical
expertise. The lack of adequate expertise in many banks suggests that energy
218
>
<D
(f)
lending may well present similar problems for the banking industry in the 1980s
as real estate did in the 1970s.
11.5.5 Commodities
Commodity markets are a more recent area for the appointment of specialist
officers and the development of special products. Relatively few banks have
such departments, which tend to be concentrated in major commodity market
centers, notably New York, London and Chicago. An example of the
organization of such a worldwide market is shown in Figure 11.8.
11.5.6 Shipping
Many banks have added shipping specialists, although like real estate this has
been an area of unfortunate lending experience for several. Shipping
departments are usually smaller than other major specialist sectors. Geog¬
raphic concentration is normally centered upon London (handling the UK and
220
Scandinavia), Piraeus (dealing with the Greek market), New York, Tokyo and
Hong Kong.
11.5.8 Aerospace
This speciality is not found in every bank but is a common one of West Coast
US based banks, where the US aerospace companies tend to be centered.
Sometimes aerospace departments also cover airline transportation companies
but these are usually serviced by transportation units. The number of
aerospace specialists is usually small and this speciality is less common in
international banking.
While virtually all major banks provide trade finance services of various kinds
there are now a number of specialist units being created which may actually
initiate trade activities and act as an intermediary. This type of activity is
somewhat similar to that of the international confirming house, and indeed it
seems likely that a number of banks may acquire such companies rather than
developing internal units. The Japanese banks have long been part of industrial
groups which invariably contain major international trading companies. These
organizations are always core concerns in Japanese industrial groups and are
much larger and more sophisticated than activities presently contemplated or
undertaken by Western banks. Nevertheless, the development of specialist
trading company units reminiscent of the Japanese concerns seems likely to be
important in the 1980s both within banks and in many industrial companies. A
specialist trade banking unit is illustrated in Figure 11.9.
The rapid growth of electronic banking in both wholesale and retail sectors is
leading to the introduction of a wide range of possible fee-generating products.
221
O
a>
CL o
o c
a> ^
o «♦_
LxJ o
o
a> TD
C
o
CO
k_
o
Q_
o
>-
*
a>
Z
<L>
i—
p
a> u
o p
a> ~
— Q> c
2E T) p
\ 2 a)
a> £ c o
CL
o *- -a
O G
o3
i_ CO c C
3 0 0
LiJ LU —I
<D
X)
03
a>
o Os
o
<U
J-H
P
.2P
E
co O
< X
4>
O
O **-
a> -SC
■o k-
o o
a> >
o
cn C *
a>
h_
Z> o Z
222
While operations traditionally formed the back office of the bank, the
development of new products such as money management services with
customer operated intelligent terminals essentially places banks in the
international information processing business.
During the 1980s the range of electronic banking products is likely to
increase significantly. As a result some banks have begun to split out
electronic banking as a separate profit center with its own direct customer
interface capability. An example of such a system unit is shown in Figure
11.10. In addition advanced systems banks have created additional informa¬
tion provision and processing units within correspondent banking groups,
merchant banking and capital market groups to provide financial information
and securities trading service and in retail banking divisions for card based
services.
While a number of industries have been singled out as above for specialist
unit attention the general trend in wholesale banking is towards the division
of corporate expertise by industry sector. Many US banks are organized in
this way in their corporate banking but this pattern is still less common in
Western Europe. Japanese banks, while perhaps servicing accounts via their
branch network, are also very strongly divided by industry in their central
economics evaluation and credit assessment units. A typical industry-based
corporate banking organization unit is shown in Figure 11.11.
<D
o
«n
<n
>
petroleum
& mining
engineering
While net loan interest will continue to represent the bulk of bank earnings for
the next decade, the ability of a bank to obtain credit business will increasingly
Figure 11.12 Global private banking unit structure
225
226
rely upon its ability to supply creative specialist financial services. Bank calling
officers trained as credit or lending bankers will need to become more like
merchant bankers, knowledgeable in a wide range of services and able to apply
this knowledge to solve the financial problems of corporate treasurers. This
will require substantial retraining of existing calling officers and the probable
recruitment of many new executives with different backgrounds and attitudes.
The present common dividing lines between conventional banking and asset
based finance products are likely to diminish to provide a comprehensive
financial service offering to corporate accounts.
Every organization has its own unique culture developed from a blend of
corporate history, environment, norms and traditions, participants and
leadership. Such a culture is very difficult to change. However, many banks fall
into the trap of trying to emulate other organizations they feel are successful
but without undertaking the necessary cultural adjustment. Again leadership
change is normally a prerequisite for organization cultural change.
The changing strategies of banks will require a different mix of people skills.
Some of these can be obtained by the retraining of existing personnel but the
process of achieving the desired skill changes requires training that is extensive,
ongoing and carefully planned.
The move to add new services may well require the introduction of new
specialist skills such as merchant banking, project finance, energy specialists
and the like. The integration of such specialists into the structure of the bank
requires careful planning to ensure adequate communication and coordina¬
tion.
Service integration
Growing diversity adds complexity to banking operations and increases the
need to ensure that adequate organizational integration takes place. This is
especially true in banks which were traditionally retail branch based operations
and which have extended their international corporate interests. Great care
228
Much of the change taking place in the banking industry is likely to lead to staff
reductions in less skilled parts of the bank organization while additions are
made to specialist skills in merchant banking and systems. While staff turnover
is relatively high among such personnel enforced redundancy is likely to be
required in many banks as they are forced to trim their cost structures. Few
banks know how to handle such redundancies and also how to cope with the
increased militancy of trade unions anxious to protect members’ jobs. It is
therefore important for them to develop appropriate policies in these areas to
reduce the difficulties of organizational change.
11.8 SUMMARY
231
232
Card 138,139
access system, Europe wide and ATMs, importance of good, 57, 58
167 internal, 30, 31
-based delivery systems, 171 strategies, bank’s, 54, 177-198
German, 4, 78,164, 166 strategy checklist, 196-198
credit, 2, 4 Competition, growth of, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 76,
debit, 4, 155, 170 100
smart, 4, 171 Competitive
Career expectations, 36 position market attractiveness matrix,
Cash dispensers, 2, 162 36,37,52
Cash flow, 73, 74, 99, 126 strength evaluation, 9,10, 31, 32, 34,
Cash management services, 17, 40, 105, 41,45,46,52,68,69,76
134,155,163, 170,183 supplier/customer needs matrix, 104,
Catalyst, external and strategic planning, 105
51 weakness, sources of, 74, 78
‘Central Values’ Group of top manage¬ Competitor
ment, creation of, 57 analysis, 19, 25, 28, 46, 47, 62-80,104,
Centralized international division organi¬ 105, 106, 107, 149, 150, 191,192,
zational structure, 203, 206, 207 205
Change data-base, 68,104,105
implementation of, 12 bank relationships and corporate mar¬
organizational, problems of, 52, 225- ket segmentation, 19, 21, 22, 25,
227 49,64
Charge card, Sears Roebuck, 169 concentration, degree of, 25, 31,33
Chase Manhattan, 13,16, 50, 79, 190, intelligence sources, 65-67
203, 205 intelligence systems, 62
at Drysdale, 50 development of, 63, 64
at Penn Square, 50, 129 investment, non-bank, 36, 62
Chemical Bank, 149, 170, 181 prices as determinants of pricing
Chemical New York Corporation, 200 method, 149,156
Chemlink, corporate cash management strategic capability, assessing, 79, 80
systems, 149, 170 strategy, analysing, 68-79
Cheques, 122, 132, 165,170 success and need of strategic planning,
Citibank Corporation, 12, 50, 74, 146, 50,62
149, 159, 166,169,170,183, 184, Competitors
188, 190,203,213 attitudes to non-bank, 36
Focus Account Card, 171 existing direct, 64, 65
Clearing, international via automated new bank, 65
systems, 41 new non-bank,65,135,156
Coldwell Bank, 169 Competitors’ business portfolio, asses¬
Collections, local, 17,105 sing, 76, 77, 78
Commercial credits, 132 Computer services, 2, 5, 6, 17, 105, 134,
Commodity and stock loans, 124 135
Commodity futures, 129, 218 Computerization and analysis of corpo¬
Commodity trading companies, 19,129 rate market segmentation, 21
Communication Confirming business, 20
failures, 178,179 Consistency of strategic mission state¬
of bank intentions, 177-198 ments, importance of, 13, 14
process, 178 Construction companies, 17
Communications Construction loans, 17, 105, 125, 128
banking and advanced, 5, 6, 129 Consumer
clear and good customer relations, 93, banking services, 133
235
branches and services, 162, 163, 168, Safety deposit services, 133
169,172 Sale and leaseback, 124
Recall, selective and communication pro¬ Sales, volume of, 97, 98
cess, 178 Samples as promotional tools, 182, 183
Redundancies of personnel and bank Sanwa Bank, 74, 166
organization, 227 Saving accounts, 122
Reference group and decision to purch¬ Saving-conscious, the, as a consumer
ase, 82 market, 18
Regulatory barriers, removal of in bank¬ SBUs, Strategic Business Units, 35, 73,
ing, 141,143,148,156 110,111
Reilly’s Law, 174 and bank group organization structure,
Relationship manager and servicing 74,75,76,97,212
corporate accounts, 208, 211 management of, 74, 79
Relationship pricing, 153 performance vs. bank as a whole, 75
Remittance policies of MNCs, 88 reasons for establishing, 75
Representative offices as corporate Schickendanz, 164
branch variant, 163 Sears Roebuck, 2, 4, 65, 168, 169
Resistance to strategic planning, 50 Securities companies, 4
Resource allocation, 8, 9, 12 Securities management, 2
Resource procurement, 44 Securities trading, off-site via electronic
Resources, internal and establishment of banking, 134, 135
strategic objectives, 13, 14, 41, 42, 46 Security deposit services, 18
Restructure/rebuild, 37, 39 Security Pacific, 74, 162
Retail Selectively invest, 37, 38
instalment financing for dealers, 124 Self-employed people as a consumer
market segmentation, 18, 22-24, 26, market, 18, 23
27, 146,171 Seminars as a warm lead technique, 102,
revolving systems, 2, 3, 125, 127, 169, 103,181
181 ‘Served’ markets, 14, 16, 40, 45, 64
transactions and EFTPOS, 170 Service
bundling techniques and costing, 141,
Retailers, 17
Retirees as a consumer market, 18, 23, 143,171
costing and strategic planning, 53, 107,
156
108, 135,136,137, 143,144,
Reuters, 149
Revenue, bank’s and pricing strategy, 145-149
-line innovation, analysis of competi¬
141
Revenue structures for customers and tors’, 70, 135
services, 146, 147 -line profits, 54, 55, 56,135
Reward and sanction programs, manage¬ -line strategy, competitors, 69, 70
marketing guides, 138
ment, 44
Reward and sanction system balance, 56, rationalization, 146, 147
sector and turnover as corporate mar¬
57,74
ket segmentation indicator, 19
Reward system development of, 52, 56
Ringi system, 203 unbundling, 153
Risk, level and type of, to bank, 25, 54, usage characteristics, 24, 104
Services offered by banks
55,74,99
and analysis of competitors’ services,
Risk assessment, quality of, 54
Risk generating services, desirability of, 67, 104, 105, 108,109
assessment criteria for, 135, 136, 137,
135,136
ROA, Return on Assets, 33, 37, 41,42, 139, 140
barriers to entry or exit, 25, 34,168
56, 73, 74, 80
checklist for developing new, 139, 140
ROI, Return on Investment, 21,38, 39
244
This book is the first of its kind to address the issues of strategic management and
marketing in the banking industry in an international context. Developed over a
number of years at the International Banking Centre at the Manchester Business
School, the text provides practical information and unique guidelines to help
bankers apply the concepts of marketing and strategic management specifically
to the banking industry. Bank Strategic Management and Marketing is based on
experience, and has been tried and tested throughout the world. It will provide an
invaluable contribution to the area of management education for banking in a
time of rapid change. An accompanying book of case studies is also available.
Contents
Preface
1 Introduction
2 Bank Strategic Planning
3 Implementing Strategic Planning Successfully
4 Competitor Analysis
5 Purchasing Financial Services
6 Planning Corporate Account Strategy
7 Product Range and Development Strategy
8 Bank Pricing Strategy
9 Delivery System Strategy
10 Communications Strategy
11 Bank Organization Structure
Index