CRIMES AGAINST NATIONS SECURITY & THE LAW OF NATIONS

TREASON

LAUREL vs. MISA, G.R. No. L-409, January 30, 1947

FACTS:

Laurel was charged with treason during the Japanese occupation. Anastacio Laurel filed a
petition for habeas corpus contending that he cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason
defined and penalized by the Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code on the grounds that the
sovereignty of the legitimate government and the allegiance of Filipino citizens was then
suspended, and that there was a change of sovereignty over the Philippines upon the
proclamation of the Philippine Republic.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the absolute allegiance of the citizens suspended during

2. Whether or not the petitioner is subject to Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code?

RULING

FIRST ISSUE:

A citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute and permanent
allegiance, which consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his government or
sovereign. The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by
the enemy of their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the
enemy occupation; that what may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with
the control and government of the territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the
occupant.

The political laws which prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties and obligation of government and
citizens, are suspended or in abeyance during military occupation, for the only reason that as
they exclusively bear relation to the ousted legitimate government, they are inoperative or not
applicable to the government established by the occupant. Yet article 114 of the said Revised
Penal Code, was applicable to treason committed against the national security of the
legitimate government, because the inhabitants of the occupied territory were still
bound by their allegiance to the latter during the enemy occupation.

All acts of the military occupant dictated within the occupied territory are obligatory
upon the inhabitants of the territory, who are bound to obey them, and the laws of the
legitimate government which have not been adopted, as well and those which, though
continued in force, are in conflict with such laws and orders of the occupier, shall be
considered as suspended or not in force and binding upon said inhabitants.
Since the preservation of the allegiance or the obligation of fidelity and obedience of a citizen
or subject to his government or sovereign does not demand from him a positive action, but only
passive attitude or forbearance from adhering to the enemy by giving the latter aid and
comfort, the occupant has no power, as a corollary of the preceding consideration, to repeal or
suspend the operation of the law of treason, essential for the preservation of the allegiance
owed by the inhabitants to their legitimate government, or compel them to adhere and give aid
and comfort to him. It is evident that such action is not demanded by the exigencies of the
military service or not necessary for the control of the inhabitants and the safety and protection
of his army, and because it is tantamount to practically transfer temporarily to the occupant
their allegiance to the titular government or sovereign. Therefore, if an inhabitant of the
occupied territory were compelled illegally by the military occupant, through force, threat or
intimidation, to give him aid and comfort, the former may lawfully resist and die, if necessary, as
a hero, or submit thereto without becoming a traitor.

The Supreme Court said, that adoption of the petitioner's theory of suspended allegiance would
lead to disastrous consequences for small and weak nations or states, and would be repugnant
to the laws of humanity and requirements of public conscience, for it would allow invaders to
legally recruit or enlist the Quisling inhabitants of the occupied territory to fight against their
own government without the latter incurring the risk of being prosecuted for treason, and even
compel those who are not aid them in their military operation against the resisting enemy
forces in order to completely subdue and conquer the whole nation, and thus deprive them all
of their own independence or sovereignty — such theory would sanction the action of invaders
in forcing the people of a free and sovereign country to be a party in the nefarious task of
depriving themselves of their own freedom and independence and repressing the exercise by
them of their own sovereignty; in other words, to commit a political suicide;

SECOND ISSUE:

The crime of treason against the government of the Philippines defined and penalized in article
114 of the Penal Code, which was made, upon the establishment of the Commonwealth
Government in 1935, a crime against the Government of the Philippines established by authority
of the people of the Philippines, in whom the sovereignty resides according to section 1, Article
II, of the Constitution of the Philippines, by virtue of the provision of section 2, Article XVI
thereof, shall remain operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution and all references in
such laws to the Government or officials of the Philippine Islands, shall be construed, in so far as
applicable, to refer to the Government and corresponding officials under this constitution.

The change of our form of government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect
the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed during the
Commonwealth, because it is an offense against the same government and the same
sovereign people, for Article XVIII of our Constitution provides that "The government
established by this constitution shall be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Upon
the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation
of Philippine independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known
as the Republic of the Philippines";

This Court resolves, to deny the petitioner's petition, as it is hereby denied, for the reasons
above set forth.
 PPvs. PEREZ, G.R. No. L-856, April 18, 1949

FACTS:

Susano Perez alias Kid Perez alias Kid Perez was convicted of treason by the 5th Division of the
People's Court sitting in Cebu City and sentenced to death by electrocution. The case alleges
that the accused, together with the other Filipinos, recruited, apprehended and commandeered
numerous girls and women against their will for the purpose of using them, as in fact they were
used, to satisfy the immoral purpose and sexual desire of Colonel Mini and other Japanese
Officers. It was also substantially alleged that the accused and others raped the other women
before they were delivered to the Japanese officers.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the deeds committed by the accused do not constitute treason

RULING:

ACCUSED and OTHERS are not liable for treason but are liable for rape.

If furnishing women for immoral purposes to the enemies was treason because women's
company kept up their morale, so fraternizing with them, entertaining them at parties, selling
them food and drinks, and kindred acts, would be treason. For any act of hospitality without
doubt produces the same general result. yet by common agreement those and similar
manifestation of sympathy and attachment are not the kind of disloyalty that are punished as
treason.

In a broad sense, the law of treason does not prescribe all kinds of social, business and political
intercourse between the belligerent occupants of the invaded country and its inhabitants. In the
nature of things, the occupation of a country by the enemy is bound to create relations of all
sorts between the invaders and the natives. What aid and comfort constitute treason must
depend upon their nature degree and purpose. To draw a line between treasonable and
untreasonable assistance is not always easy.

As general rule, to be treasonous the extent of the aid and comfort given to the enemies must
be to render assistance to them as enemies and not merely as individuals and in addition, be
directly in furtherance of the enemies' hostile designs. To make a simple distinction: To lend or
give money to an enemy as a friend or out of charity to the beneficiary so that he may buy
personal necessities is to assist him as individual and is not technically traitorous. On the other
hand, to lend or give him money to enable him to buy arms or ammunition to use in waging
war against the giver's country enhance his strength and by same count injures the interest of
the government of the giver. That is treason.

Applying these principles to the case at bar, appellant's first assignment of error is correct. His
"commandeering" of women to satisfy the lust of Japanese officers or men or to enliven the
entertainment held in their honor was not treason even though the women and the
entertainment helped to make life more pleasant for the enemies and boost their spirit; he was
not guilty any more than the women themselves would have been if they voluntarily and
willingly had surrendered their bodies or organized the entertainment. Sexual and social
relations with the Japanese did not directly and materially tend to improve their war efforts or
to weaken the power of the United State. The acts herein charged were not, by fair implication,
calculated to strengthen the Japanese Empire or its army or to cripple the defense and
resistance of the other side. Whatever favorable effect the defendant's collaboration with the
Japanese might have in their prosecution of the war was trivial, imperceptible, and
unintentional. Intent of disloyalty is a vital ingredient in the crime of treason, which, in the
absence of admission, may be gathered from the nature and circumstances of each particular
case.

But the accused may be punished for the rape of Eriberta Ramo, Eduarda Daohog, Eutiquia
Lamay and Flaviana Bonalos as principal by direct participation. Without his cooperation in the
manner above stated, these rapes could not have been committed.

Conviction of the accused of rapes instead of treason finds express sanction in section 2 of
Commonwealth Act No. 682, which says:

Provided further, That where, in its opinion, the evidence is not sufficient to support the offense
(treason) charged, the People's Court may, nevertheless, convict and sentence the accused for
any crime included in the acts alleged in the information and established by the evidence.

All the above-mentioned rapes are alleged in the information and substantiated by the
evidence.
Counsel assails the constitutionality of this of his provision as violative of section 1, paragraph
17, Article III of the Constitution, which guarantees to an accused the right "to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him." The contention is not well taken. The
provision in requires that the private crimes of which an accused of treason may be convicted
must be averred in the information and sustained by evidence. In the light of this enactment,
the defendant was warned of the hazard that he might be founded guilty of rapes if he was
innocent of treason and thus afforded an opportunity to prepare and meet them. There is no
element of surprise or anomaly involved. In facts under the general law of criminal procedure
convicted for crime different from that designated in the complaint or information is allowed
and practiced, provided only that such crime "is included or described in the body of the
information, and afterwards justified by the proof presented during the trial."

The defendant personally assaulted and abused two of the offended girls but these assaults are
not charged against him and should be ruled out. The crime of coercion alleged need not be
noticed in view of the severity of the penalty for the other crimes which he must suffer.

We find the defendant guilty of four separate crimes of rape and sentence him for each of them
to an indeterminate penalty of from 10 year of prision mayor to 17 year and 4 months of
reclusion temporal, with the accessories of law, to indemnify each of the offended women in the
sum of P3,000, and to pay the costs; it being understood that the total duration of these
penalties shall not exceed forty years.
 PP vs. ADRIANO, G.R. No. L-477, June 30, 1947

FACTS:

During the occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese Imperial Forces, in the Province of
Nueva Ecija and in the mountains in the Island of Luzon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Court, accused, Apolinario Adriano, a Filipino citizen owing allegiance to the United
States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines, in violation of said allegiance, did then and
there willfully, criminally and treasonably adhere to the Military Forces of Japan in the
Philippines, against which the Philippines and the United States were then at war, giving the
said enemy aid and comfort wherein the accused bore arm and joined and assisted the
Japanese Military Forces and the Makapili Army in armed conflicts and engagements against the
United States armed forces and the Guerrillas of the Philippine Commonwealth in the
Municipalities of San Leonardo and Gapan, Province of Nueva Ecija, and in the mountains of
Luzon, Philippines.

The People's Court found is that the accused participated with Japanese soldiers in certain raids
and in confiscation of personal property. The court below, however, said these acts had not
been established by the testimony of two witnesses, and so regarded them merely as evidence
of adherence to the enemy.

Having joined a Makapili organization is evidence of both adherence to the enemy and giving
him aid and comfort. Unless forced upon one against his will, membership in the Makapili
organization imports treasonable intent, considering the purposes for which the organization
was created, which, according to the evidence, were "to accomplish the fulfillment of the
obligations assumed by the Philippines in the Pact of Alliance with the Empire of Japan. At the
same time, being a Makapili is in itself constitutive of an overt act. It is not necessary, except for
the purpose of increasing the punishment, that the defendant actually went to battle or
committed nefarious acts against his country or countrymen. The crime of treason was
committed if he placed himself at the enemy's call to fight side by side with him when the
opportune time came even though an opportunity never presented itself. Such membership by
its very nature gave the enemy aid and comfort.

But membership as a Makapili, as an overt act, must be established by the deposition of

ISSUE:

Whether or not the evidence in the present case meets this statutory test of two-witness
requirement that should make the accused guilty of treason.

RULING:

Learned Hand, J., in United States vs. Robinson, expressed the idea: "It is necessary to produce
two direct witnesses to the whole overt act. It may be possible to piece bits together of the
overt act; but, if so, each bit must have the support of two oaths; . . .." Every act, movement,
deed, and word of the defendant charged to constitute treason must be supported by the
testimony of two witnesses."

In the light of these decisions and opinions we have to set aside the judgment of the trial court.
To the possible objection that the reasoning by which we have reached this conclusion savors of
sophism, we have only to say that the authors of the constitutional provision of which our
treason law is a copy purposely made conviction for treason difficult, the rule "severely
restrictive." This provision is so exacting and so uncompromising in regard to the amount of
evidence that where two or more witnesses give oaths to an overt act and only one of them is
believed by the court or jury, the defendant, it has been said and held, is entitled to discharge,
regardless of any moral conviction of the culprit's guilt as gauged and tested by the ordinary
and natural methods, with which we are familiar, of finding the truth. Natural inferences,
however strong or conclusive, flowing from other testimony of a most trustworthy witness or
from other sources are unavailing as a substitute for the needed corroboration in the form of
direct testimony of another eyewitness to the same overt act.

In this case, those who gave evidence that the accused took part in raids and seizure of personal
property, and performed sentry duties and military drills, referred to acts allegedly committed
on different dates without any two witnesses coinciding in any one specified deed. There is only
one item on which the witnesses agree: it is that the defendant was a Makapili and was seen by
them in Makapili uniform carrying arms. Yet, again, on this point it cannot be said that one
witness is corroborated by another if corroboration means that two witnesses have seen the
accused doing at least one particular thing, it a routine military chore, or just walking or eating.

Certainly, the treason rule, whether wisely or not, is severely restrictive." It must be remembered,
however, that the Constitutional Convention was warned by James Wilson that "'Treason may
sometimes be practiced in such a manner, as to render proof extremely difficult — as in a
traitorous correspondence with an enemy.' The provision was adopted not merely in spite of the
difficulties it put in the way of prosecution but because of them. And it was not by whim or by
accident, but because one of the most venerated of that venerated group considered that
"prosecutions for treason were generally virulent.'"

Such is the clear meaning of the two-witness provision of the American Constitution. By
extension, the lawmakers who introduced that provision into the Philippine statute books must
be understood to have intended that the law should operate with the same inflexibility and
rigidity as the American forefathers meant.

The judgment is reversed and the appellant acquitted with costs charged de oficio.
 People v. Almazora, G.R. No. L-2954, November 16, 1950

FACTS:

The appellant Alejandro Almazora a Filipino citizen, a native and resident of the Philippines, was
found guilty of five counts of treason and sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Laguna to
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal with the accessory
penalties provided by law, and to pay a fine of P5,000, with costs. Half of the period of his
provisional imprisonment was credited to him.

Almazora was accused of having acted as informer or agent of the Japanese forces, going with
them and participating in their raids, and of having joined and served in the organization
"Makabayang Katipunan Ng Mga Pilipino" otherwise known as the Makapili. To prove this count,
three witnesses Federico Baylon, Tranquilino Martinez and Briccio Malitic testified to the effect.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Almazora is guilty of Treason

RULING:

After examining the evidence, the court found the accused guilty of and were duly proven by
the witnesses. The Supreme Court disagrees with the lower court when it held that although the
evidence of the prosecution is definite, conclusive and convincing that the accused together
with former members of the Sakdalista and Ganap organizations in Calauan attached
themselves to and cooperated with the enemy invaders since there is no direct and conclusive
proof that he was actually appointed or inducted into the Makapili organization, and that
consequently, the accused could not be considered as having joined the Makapili organization.

In the case of People v. Alitagtag, it was held that appointment to enemy forces need not be
proven by any enlistment or appointment, but may be inferred from circumstances. It is
satisfactory that from the acts of the accused in being seen frequently at the headquarters of
the Makapili organization at Calauan, associating with well-known Makapili members, joining
them in their raids against the guerrillas either by themselves or in company with Japanese
soldiers, being armed with a rifle like the other Makapili members and otherwise conducting
himself like any other member of that military organization, it can be inferred and found as we
do find that he joined the Makapili organization.

The appellant denied the charges made against him. He equally denied that he ever joined the
Makapili organization. He claims that the witnesses who testified against him hated his father
who was a Ganap before the war and that after his death, which occurred while he was confined
in Bilibid awaiting trial as a treason indictee, said witnesses tried to heap all their animosity,
hatred and feeling of revenge on him as the son of the man they hated. It has been proven
however that the affidavits of these witnesses who testified against the appellant had been
made and filed long before the death of his father, so that it cannot be true that in testifying
against the accused they merely wanted to send him to jail in place of his father, the object of
their hatred, who was already dead.

"The acts of the defendant, conclusively established by the evidence presented, constitute both
adherence to the enemy and overt acts of treason. The defense of alibi put up by the accused
cannot be taken seriously. As between his sole, unsupported declaration, and the logical,
straight-forward, and unbiased testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution, the choice is not
hard to make."

In conclusion, we find the appellant guilty of the charge of treason.

FACTS:

Charged with treason on four counts in the Court of First Instance of Zambales, the accused
Norberto E. Bernardino alias Monkey but was found guilty on only one count. The accused
appealed to this Court. The count on which appellant was convicted charges him with having
intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy by ordering the apprehension of Adriano Valdez
and Tranquilino de la Rosa, who were thereafter tortured by his men and investigated by himself
for guerrilla activities.

The evidence shows that, Adriano Valdez, a captain in the intelligence division of the Subic
guerrilla sector, was sent to the barrio of Agosohim, Subic, Zambales, to spy on the enemy
defenses and size up the strength of the pro-Japanese elements there. To conceal his mission,
Valdez went to a firewood dealer. While he was conversing with his compadre, two armed men
came, one of whom, Isidro Fausto alias Hitler, a son of Juan Fausto and accused in one of the
treason cases, told Valdez and De la Rosa that they were wanted by appellant and Jorge Lopera
and then escorted them to where the latter two were. There appellant asked Valdez and De la
Rosa what business had brought them to Agosohim. Valdez explained that he and De la Rosa
were there to buy firewood. But appellant was not convinced, and so he told them to go up the
house of Juan Fausto and had them guarded. There the two remained until 10 o'clock at night,
when a guard ordered them to come down, and once on the ground they were bound by Jorge
Lopera, who, together with appellant and other solders, thereafter took them to a place under a
mango tree where Lopera, with appellant standing by, maltreated and tortured De la Rosa,
hoisting him up the mango tree several times in an effort to make him admit that he and Valdez
were guerrillas who had come to Agosohim to spy. As De la Rosa would not admit that fact, he
was taken to the barracks for further investigation by the appellant, while Valdez was, on his
part, taken to another place and also investigated. But the two would not confess, and so they
were released the following day.

ISSUE: Whether or not Bernardino is guilty of Treason

RULING:

Appellant denied having had anything to do with the apprehension, investigation, and
maltreatment of Valdez and De la Rosa and claimed that he had been himself maltreated or
tortured by the enemy during the occupation.

While the evidence does not show that appellant had himself laid hands on either Valdez or De
la Rosa, there is no denying the fact that he was present when they were maltreated, that he
took active part in the investigation, and that it was he who had Valdez and De la Rosa
apprehended and detained under guard in the house of Juan Fausto. These facts were
established by the combined declaration of Valdez and De la Rosa, who testified to the same
overt acts which took place before they were separated for further investigation. In addition,
there is also proof of appellant's adherence to the enemy, for he had been seen armed and
dressed in Japanese military uniform and to be among those who surrounded and guarded the
guerrillas when the latter surrendered in mass in 1943. Our conclusion is that on the evidence of
record appellant has been rightly convicted of the crime of treason.