[ G.R. No.

246460, June 08, 2020 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MICHAEL QUINTO, ACCUSED-

APPELLANT.

DECISION

REYES, J. JR., J.:

Under consideration is the appeal filed by accused-appellant Michael Quinto (accused-appellant),

seeking the reversal of the Decision1 dated October 24, 2018 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 09732, which affirmed the Regional Trial Court's (RTC's)
Decision2 convicting the accused-appellant of the crime of Rape against the private complainant,
AAA,3 with modifying circumstance of use of bladed weapon to commit the felony.

The Antecedents

An Amended Information was filed indicting the accused-appellant for Rape under Article 266-A of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC) in relation to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 76104 by the prosecution
against the accused-appellant, the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about the 26th day of March 2004, in the [XXX], Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above- named accused, with lewd design and actuated by lust, by means
of force, threat, violence and intimidation, being then armed with bladed weapon, and taking
advantage of superior strength, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of one [AAA], a minor of 14 years old against her will and without her consent, to her
damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.5

During the arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued thereafter.

Evidence for the Prosecution

The prosecution's evidence tends to prove that complainant AAA, who was then 14 years of age,
was on her way to the store to buy bread when she noticed her neighbor, accused-appellant, behind
her pointing a knife. She was brought to the house of a certain "Bornoy"; where she saw Bornoy,
Annabelle, Lenlen and two Jenells. Accused-appellant brought AAA to another room where he
ordered her to sniff marijuana. Out of fear, she followed accused-appellant. Thereafter, she felt
dizzy. That was the time when accused-appellant undressed her and inserted his penis in her private
part. When he was done, he ordered her to put on her clothes and warned her not to tell anyone
about what transpired. She went to her house afterwards, which is located nearby. In time, she
revealed her harrowing experience to her aunt.

On March 29, 2004, AAA's aunt told BBB, AAA's mother, about what happened. Shocked, she
confronted AAA and asked her if what she came to know was true. AAA admitted the incident after
an emotional breakdown.6

The next day, AAA, together with her mother, reported the incident to the police. The National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted a medical examination on AAA. Dr. Salome Fernandez (Dr.
Fernandez), the Medico-Legal Officer of NBI assigned to assist AAA, found a clear evidence of
healed injury secondary to intravaginal penetration by a blunt object. These observations were
corroborated by Dr. Valentin Bernales, then Acting Chief of the Medico-Legal Division of the NBI.
Aside from that, Dr. Ma. Victoria Briguela (Dr. Briguela), a psychiatrist, after a thorough
psychological examination of AAA, discovered that she had been suffering from mild mental
retardation and that her mental age was between seven to eight years old compared to her
chronological age of 14 years old at the time of the alleged rape.7

Evidence for the Defense

On the other hand, accused-appellant vehemently denied the charge against him. To exculpate
himself from any liability, the accused-appellant averred that he and AAA had a relationship and that
the sexual congress was consensual. He further alleged that their relationship was known to AAA's
aunts and that they usually met at the house of accused-appellant's friend, Bornoy.

According to the accused-appellant, in the afternoon of March 26, 2004 at 3 o'clock in the afternoon,
he was at home along with his grandfather watching television. Furthermore, he testified that he did
not meet AAA that day.

The statement of the accused-appellant that he and AAA were sweethearts was affirmed by
accused-appellant's friends Alfredo Timbang (Alfredo) and Ruther Prodigalidad (Ruther). This
allegation was also confirmed by Zenaida Sangil (Zenaida), accused-appellant's neighbor.8

Ruling of the Trial Court

On July 19, 2017, the RTC rendered a Decision9 convicting the accused-appellant of the crime of
Rape defined and penalized under Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended, in relation to R.A. No.
7610. The dispositive portion reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the prosecution having proved all the elements of Rape under
Article 266-A, of our Revised Penal Code, as amended, in relation to Republic Act No. 7610, beyond
reasonable doubt, the acccused herein MICHAEL QUlNTO, of [XXX] is hereby CONVICTED of the
crime of RAPE against the private complainant, [AAA], with modifying circumstance of use of bladed
weapon to commit said felony, and the Court hereby sentence him to suffer in prison the penalty of
[reclusion perpetua] without possibility of parole and to pay his victim, [AAA] the amount of Seventy
Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as civil indemnity, Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00)
as moral damages, and Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as exemplary damages, all with
interest at the rate of Six Percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this judgement. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.10

The RTC was convinced that the prosecution was able to establish accused-appellant's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of rape with modifying circumstance of use of bladed weapon to
commit said felony.11

Based on its observation, the testimony of AAA narrating the rape incident was credible. In contrast,
the version of the defense of denial and alibi was found by the RTC to be incredulous. Likewise, the
sweetheart defense was not given credence by the RTC as it cannot prevail over the positive
identification and straightforward testimony given by AAA.12
Aggrieved, the accused-appellant filed an appeal before the CA asseverating error in the conviction
due to the incredibility of the testimony of the accused and the failure of the RTC to consider the
accused-appellant's sweetheart defense and alibi despite the fact that these were corroborated by
the numerous witnesses.13

Ruling of the CA

On October 24, 2018, the CA rendered the assailed Decision14 affirming accused-appellant's

conviction of the crime of rape with modifying circumstance of use of bladed weapon to commit the
felony. The CA reasoned that AAA's testimony was believable and sufficient to establish the incident
of rape committed by accused-appellant. The CA reiterated that as to matters relating to credibility of
witnesses, the findings of the trial court is accorded high respect, if not conclusive effect. Moreover,
the fact that AAA has been diagnosed with mild mental retardation lends more credibility in her
testimony because a witness of subnormal mental capacity would not publicly admit that she was
abused if it were not true.

Furthermore, the sweetheart theory and alibi defense espoused by the accused were rejected by the
CA because it did not prove that it was physically impossible for the accused-appellant to be at the
scene of the crime and that no abuse ever took place even if it were true that they were lovers.

Thus, the dispositive portion of the assailed CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated 19 July 2017 of the Regional
Trial Court, 4th Judicial Region, Cavite City, Branch 17, in Criminal Case No. 146-04
is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION in that the amount of exemplary damages is increased to
P75,000.00.

SO ORDERED.15

Dissatisfied with the Decision of the CA, accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal dated November
12, 2018.16 Both the plaintiff-appellee and the accused-appellant manifested that they are adopting
their respective briefs before the CA as their Supplemental Briefs before this Court.17

The Issue

The primordial issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not accused-appellant's conviction
should be sustained.

In seeking the reversal of the CA Decision, accused-appellant asserts the alleged incredibility of the
testimony of AAA. According to the accused- appellant, it was highly impossible for him to have
pointed a balisong at AAA's back within public view and in broad daylight. Likewise, accused-
appellant states that it was quite perplexing why AAA did not seek help when they were at the house
of Bornoy given that there were other people in the house. Also, no witnesses were presented to
testify that indeed AAA was at the house of Bornoy at the alleged time of the incident.

In addition, accused-appellant insists the appreciation of his sweetheart defense for the reason that
it was corroborated by credible witnesses. Furthermore, the accused-appellant avers that he was at
the house of his grandfather watching television at 3 o'clock in the afternoon and that he did not see
AAA on March 26, 2004. Such fact was corroborated by Zenaida.18
On the other hand, the People, through the Office of the Solicitor General, counters that the
prosecution proved the guilt of the accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt through the
testimony of AAA which was found by the RTC and the CA to be clear, categorical and
straightforward, unshaken by the defense's cross-examination, thereby bearing the earmarks of
truthfulness. AAA unwaveringly and positively identified accused-appellant as the person who
sexually abused her without any purpose rather than to bring him to justice.19

The Court's Ruling

The instant petition is bereft of merit. However, we find it proper to modify the nomenclature of the
offense to conform to the ruling in the case of People v. Tulagan.20

In the aforementioned case, it was already ruled that if the victim is 12 years or older, the offender
cannot be accused of both rape under Article 266-A paragraph 1(a) of the RPC and sexual abuse
under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 because it may violate the right of the accused against double
jeopardy. Furthermore, under Section 48 of the RPC, a felony, in particular rape, cannot be
complexed with an offense penalized by a special law, such as R.A. No. 7610, to wit:

Assuming that the elements of both violations of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 and of Article 266-A,
paragraph 1(a) of the RPC are mistakenly alleged in the same Information — e.g.. carnal knowledge
or sexual intercourse was due to "force or intimidation" with the added phrase of "due to coercion or
influence," one of the elements of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610; or in many instances wrongfully
designate the crime in the Information as violation of "Article 266-A, paragraph 1(a) in relation to
Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610," although this may be a ground for quashal of the Information under
Section 3(1) of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court — and proven during the trial in a case where the
victim who is 12 years old or under 18 did not consent to the sexual intercourse, the accused should
still be prosecuted pursuant to the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, which is the more recent
and special penal legislation that is not only consistent, but also strengthens the policies of R.A. No.
7610. Indeed, while R.A. No. 7610 is a special law specifically enacted to provide special protection
to children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and discrimination and other
conditions prejudicial to their development, We hold that it is contrary to the legislative intent of the
same law if the lesser penalty (reclusion temporal medium to reclusion perpetua) under Section 5(b)
thereof would be imposed against the perpetrator of sexual intercourse with a child 12 years of age
or below 18.

Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (a) in relation to Article 266-B of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353,
is not only the more recent law, but also deals more particularly with all rape cases, hence, its short
title "The Anti-Rape Law of 1997." R.A. No. 8353 upholds the policies and principles of R.A. No.
7610, and provides a "stronger deterrence and special protection against child abuse," as it imposes
a more severe penalty of reclusion perpetua under Article 266-B of the RPC, or even the death
penalty if the victim is (1) under 18 years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-
parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or common-law
spouse of the parent of the victim; or (2) when the victim is a child below 7 years old.

It is basic in statutory construction that in case of irreconcilable conflict between two laws, the later
enactment must prevail, being the more recent expression of legislative will. Indeed, statutes must
be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence,
and if several laws cannot be harmonized, the earlier statute must yield to the later enactment,
because the later law is the latest expression of the legislative will. Hence, Article 266-B of the RPC
must prevail over Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610.21
Hence, it is clear that the designation of the offense should be "Rape under Article 266-A(1) in
relation to Article 266-B of the RPC" as the accused-appellant committed "rape by carnal
knowledge" against his victim of "12 years old or below 18."

As to the substantive portion of the accused-appellant's contentions, he attacks AAA's credibility,

averring that the facts and circumstances narrated by her are beyond the realm of possibility.
Specifically, accused-appellant points out that he could not have pointed a balisong at the back of
AAA considering that it was in broad daylight and such could be readily seen by people at the store.

Likewise, accused-appellant points out the lack of witnesses that were presented to corroborate the
allegation that he was at the house of Bornoy at the time of the incident even if Anabelle, Bornoy,
Lenlen and two Jenells were in the house.

In addition, the accused-appellant reiterates the appreciation of his sweetheart defense as it was
corroborated by other witnesses aside from the testimony of the accused-appellant. Along with that,
accused-appellant emphasized his alibi that he was at the house of his grandfather watching
television at 3 o'clock in the afternoon and that he did not see AAA on March 26, 2004.

We are not convinced.

The RTC and the CA have exhaustively discussed, explained and rebutted all the defenses raised
by accused-appellant and we see no reason to deviate from such pronouncements.

It should be emphasized that when it comes to the credibility of witnesses, the trial court's
assessment deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and binding provided that it is not tainted
with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The reason is
basic. The trial court, having the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses' deportment and
manner of testifying, is in a better position than the appellate court to properly evaluate testimonial
evidence and in assessing who among the witnesses holds the truth.22 Matters of credibility are
addressed basically to the trial judge who is in a better position than the appellate court to appreciate
the weight and evidentiary value of the testimonies of witnesses who have personally appeared
before him."23 The appellate courts are far detached from the details and drama during trial and
would have to rely solely on the records of the case in its review. On the matter of credence and
credibility of witnesses, therefore, the Court acknowledges said limitations and recognizes the
advantage of the trial court whose findings must be given due deference.24 Since the defense failed
to show any palpable error, arbitrariness, or capriciousness on the findings of fact of the trial court,
these findings deserve great weight and are deemed conclusive and binding more so that it is
concurred by the appellate court.25

Thus, we agree with the RTC and the CA in applying the jurisprudential principle that testimonies of
child victims are to be given full weight and credit, for when a woman or a girl says that she has
been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed
committed.26 Here, attention must be given to the findings of Dr. Briguela saying that AAA suffers
from mild mental retardation and that she has a mental capacity of a child of 7 to 8 years old
although her actual age is 14 years old. Given such fact, it is highly improbable that AAA concocted
her story contrary to the allegations of the accused-appellant.

Besides, at any rate, even if the prosecution only presented AAA as its only witness against the
numerous witnesses of the defense, it will not suffice to discredit the former. The prosecution is
under no duty to present a definite number of witnesses. The discretion to decide who it wants to call
to the stand lies with the prosecution. It is axiomatic that witnesses are weighed, not numbered, and
the testimony of a single witness may suffice for conviction if otherwise trustworthy and reliable for
there is no law which requires that the testimony of a single witness needs corroboration except
where the law expressly mandates otherwise.27 In other words, AAA's testimony during the course
of the trial as the sole eyewitness to the whole event should not by itself diminish her credibility.

It is worthy to note that AAA testified with candor and consistency in recounting the material events
of the crime. A witness who testifies in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner
and remains consistent is a credible witness.28 She was very categorical and positive, not only in
naming the accused-appellant as the perpetrator, but also in narrating the particularities of the
criminal incident.

With respect to the defense of alibi, accused-appellant's defenses of alibi and denial cannot
outweigh the candid and straightforward testimony of AAA that he indeed had sexual intercourse
with her against her will. The Court has oft pronounced that both denial and alibi are inherently weak
defenses which cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution witness
that the accused committed the crime. Thus, as between a categorical testimony which has the ring
of truth on the one hand, and a mere denial and alibi on the other, the former is generally held to
prevail.29

Furthermore, case law provides that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not
only that he was at some other place when the crime was committed, but also that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime or its immediate vicinity through clear and
convincing evidence.30

In the present case, the RTC and the CA both correctly held that the accused-appellant was within
the immediate vicinity of the place of the crime. As the RTC held, the store and the house of
accused-appellant was just seven houses away. This is a short distance which can be traversed by
the accused-appellant to the scene of the crime in approximately 10 minutes. Hence, it was not
impossible for him to be at the place of the crime at the time it happened. His defense of alibi, thus,
fails to convince compared with the positive identification by the private complainant that it was him
who committed the rape.

As to the accused-appellant's sweetheart defense, he claims that he and AAA were lovers and the
act of sexual intercourse was a free and voluntary act between them. In short, he interposes the
"sweetheart" theory to exculpate himself from the rape charge filed against him.

Accused-appellant's claim that they are lovers is untenable. For one, such claim was not
substantiated by the evidence on record.  The only evidence adduced by accused-appellant were
1âшphi1

his and his witnesses" testimonies. According to Alfredo, he knows of their relationship because
accused-appellant told him so. While Ruther and Zenaida testified that they saw accused-appellant
and AAA very sweet and happily talking and embracing each other.

To the mind of the Court, these are not enough evidence to prove that a romantic relationship
existed between accused-appellant and AAA. In People v. Napudo31 where the accused likewise
invoked the sweetheart defense, this Court held that:

[T]he fact alone that two people were seen seated beside each other, conversing during a jeepney
ride, without more, cannot give rise to the inference that they were sweethearts. Intimacies such as
loving caresses, cuddling, tender smiles, sweet murmurs or any other affectionate gestures that one
bestows upon his or her lover would have been seen and are expected to indicate the presence of
the relationship.
Other than accused-appellants self-serving assertions and those of his witnesses which were rightly
discredited by the trial court, nothing supports accused-appellant's claim that he and AAA were
indeed lovers. "A 'sweetheart defense,' to be credible, should be substantiated by some
documentary or other evidence of relationship such as notes, gifts, pictures, mementos and the
like."32 Accused-appellant failed to discharge this burden.

Besides, even if it were true that accused-appellant and AAA were sweethearts, this fact does not
necessarily negate rape because love is not a license for lust.33

With the credibility of AAA having been firmly established, the courts below did not err in finding
accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape committed through force and intimidation.
The "sweetheart" theory interposed by accused-appellant was correctly rejected for lack of
substantial corroboration.

As to the proper penalty to be imposed, Article 266-B of the RPC provides the following, viz:

ART. 266-B. Penalty. — Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.34

In the instant case, it was proven that the accused used a bladed weapon in order to perpetrate the
felony. Thus, the penalty should be reclusion perpetua to death. However, due to the suspension of
the death penalty,35 the proper penalty to be imposed is "reclusion perpetua without eligibility of
parole."

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The October 24, 2018 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR HC No. 09732 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that, herein accused-appellant
Michael Quinto, of XXX, is hereby CONVICTED of the crime of Rape under Article 266-A(l) in
relation to Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code against AAA. The Court hereby sentences him to
suffer in prison the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility of parole and to pay his victim,
AAA, the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as civil indemnity, One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as moral damages, and One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00) as exemplary damages, all with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of
finality of this judgment until fully paid. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Peralta, C.J., (Chairperson), Caguioa, (Working Chairperson) Lazaro-Javier, and Lopez, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 172869               July 28, 2008

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
DONATO BULASAG y ARELLANO alias "DONG", Appellant.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated January 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR.–H.C. No. 00183, which had affirmed the Decision2 dated May 10, 2004 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 9, Balayan, Batangas. The trial court had found appellant Donato Bulasag y
Arellano alias "Dong", guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide in Criminal Case
No. 4850.

The Information dated December 22, 2000, charging appellant and his co-accused with the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide, defined and penalized under Article 294(1) 3 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, 4 reads as follows:

xxxx

That on or about the 27th day of July, 2000 at about 10:30 o’clock in the evening, at Barangay
Caloocan, Municipality of Balayan, Province of Batangas, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, accused, Donato Bulasag armed with an unlicensed firearm of unknown
caliber together with one John Doe and one Peter Doe whose identities and whereabouts are still
unknown, armed with knives (kutsilyo), conspiring and confederating together, acting in common
accord and mutually helping one another, with intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent
of the owner thereof did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the house owned by
Estelita Bascuguin y Besas and by means of violence or intimidation against person, take, rob and
carry away cash money amounting to more or less Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00),
Philippine Currency and assorted pieces of jewelry, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner
in the aforementioned amount of ₱20,000.00 and that on the occasion and by reason of the said
robbery, the said accused with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault[,] stab and shoot with the said weapons one Estelita Bascuguin y Besas, thereby
inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds and stab wounds on her chest, which directly caused her
death.

Contrary to law.5

Only appellant was arrested by the police authorities while the others remained at large. Upon
arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty.

The facts as found by the trial court and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, were gleaned from the
testimonies of (1) Lydia B. Siervo, the sister of the victim Estelita B. Bascuguin; (2) Michael B.
Bascuguin, the eight-year-old son of the victim; and (3) Dr. Antonio S. Vertido, Regional Medico-
Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, Region 4, Batangas.

Lydia Siervo testified that one week before the incident, Estelita told her that she had an altercation
with the appellant. Appellant tried to borrow ₱3,000 but Estelita refused to give him the money. As a
result, appellant threatened Estelita that something bad will happen to her if she will not leave her
house. Lydia added that Estelita had no misunderstanding with other people except the appellant. 6

Michael Bascuguin testified that at around 10:30 p.m. of July 27, 2000, he was watching television
inside their house with his mother and cousin, Luisito Besas. When his mother was about to close
the door of their house, the lights suddenly went off and somebody kicked the door open. Three men
wearing bonnets over their faces entered their house. One man, later identified as the appellant, had
a gun while another carried a kitchen knife. Together they held Estelita. Although Michael tried to get
out of the house, appellant chased and hogtied him. Appellant then demanded money from Estelita
threatening to kill Michael if she refused. Estelita gave appellant an undetermined amount of money.
Since appellant refused to release Michael, Estelita ran out of the house and told Michael to run
also. Appellant shot Estelita while one of his companions stabbed her. Thereafter, appellant and his
companions fled. Michael sought help from their neighbor, Jenneath, the appellant’s wife, but she
initially refused since there was no available vehicle. Later, they found a vehicle and went to the
house of Tatay Pecto, Estelita’s common-law husband, and informed him of what happened to
Estelita. They then proceeded to the police station to report the incident. 7

Dr. Antonio S. Vertido testified and confirmed his findings as stated in the Certificate of Post-Mortem
Examination8 that Estelita died of gunshot and stab wounds on the chest.9

Appellant Donato Bulasag denied the accusations against him. He testified that on the date of the
incident, he attended the birthday celebration of his nephew, Jorge Bautista. They started drinking at
10:00 a.m. At 7:00 p.m., he and Hilario Arellano left his nephew’s house and proceeded to the house
of his uncle, Rolando Holgado, to continue drinking. They stayed there for 30 minutes until his wife,
Jenneath, arrived to fetch him. Instead of going home, they went to his parents’ house. Between
8:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m., his brother Filomeno and his wife Anita brought them home. Upon arriving
home, he slept.10

Jenneath Bulasag testified that at the time of the incident, appellant was at home sleeping. She said
that appellant was drunk at that time after attending his nephew’s birthday celebration. She claimed
that she never lost sight of him that evening.11

On May 10, 2004, the trial court convicted appellant. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused Donato Bulasag y Arellano alias
"Dong" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide as
defined and penalized under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
[No.] 7659, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of reclusion perpetua, with
the accessory penalties and to pay the costs. He is also hereby ordered to pay the heirs of Estelita
Bascuguin y Besas the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) as moral damages and Fifty
Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) as indemnity in line with current jurisprudence.

IT IS SO ORDERED.12

Appellant filed a notice of appeal. On January 13, 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision
of the trial court. It observed that all the elements of the crime of robbery with homicide were present
in the case. It noted that appellant’s identity was duly established by Michael’s positive identification,
hence it disregarded appellant’s denial and alibi.

Dissatisfied, appellant appealed to this Court. As appellant and the Office of the Solicitor General
opted not to submit supplemental briefs, we shall now review the decision of the Court of Appeals,
focusing on the following issues brought before it:
 I.

THE TRIAL COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT

GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH
HOMICIDE.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING SCANT CONSIDERATION TO

THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT’S ALIBI.

III.

THE TRIAL COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION

HAD ESTABLISHED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THE IDENTITY OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT AS THE AUTHOR OF THE CRIME CHARGED.13

Briefly stated, the principal issue is whether the guilt of appellant was proved by the prosecution
beyond reasonable doubt. Subsidiarily, for our resolution are: (1) Did the prosecution sufficiently
prove appellant’s identity as the author of the crime? (2) Did the trial court err in disregarding
appellant’s denial and alibi?

Appellant contends that his identity was proven only by circumstantial evidence. Michael did not see
the face of the man who chased him and shot his mother because the man wore a bonnet over his
face. Thus, there was doubt whether the man was really appellant or somebody else. While Michael
testified that he recognized appellant’s voice, physical features and gun, he also admitted that he did
not talk often with him. There was doubt therefore whether he was in a position to identify appellant’s
voice during the incident. Appellant insists that he was so drunk at the time of the incident that it was
impossible for him to commit the crime. He contends that his wife corroborated his testimony.

Appellee counters that appellant’s identity was sufficiently established. Although appellant wore a
bonnet over his face, Michael was able to identify his voice, physical features and the gun used.
Michael was familiar with appellant’s voice and physical features since they have been neighbors for
quite some time before the incident. In fact, their families were so close that appellant even allowed
Estelita to tap electrical connection from his house. Michael was also able to identify appellant by
means of his gun because he has previously seen appellant carry it three times before the incident.
The witness stated that he saw appellant fire it once in front of their house. Appellee discredits
appellant’s alibi since it was not physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene. Additionally,
appellee contends that appellant’s testimony was corroborated insufficiently since only his wife, who
was obviously a biased witness, did so.

After weighing the parties’ conflicting testimonies and other evidence, we are in agreement that there
is no reason to reverse appellant’s conviction.

First, we find Michael’s testimony consistent to the minutest detail, and his categorical identification
of appellant as the assailant is unwavering. Also we see no reason to doubt his credibility.

The evidence on record shows that appellant and Estelita have been neighbors for quite some
time.  In fact, their families were so close that appellant even allowed Estelita to tap electrical
1avvphi1

connection from his house.14 Thus, although appellant wore a bonnet over his face to conceal his
identity, Michael could still recognize his voice since Michael already gained familiarity with his voice
and physical features. In fact, Michael described appellant’s voice as "low tone." 15

As this Court has ruled in earlier cases, identification by the sound of the voice 16 as well as familiarity
with the physical features17 of a person are sufficient and acceptable means of identification where it
is established that the witness and the accused had known each other personally and closely for a
number of years.

Noteworthy, Michael was able to recognize the gun used by the malefactor. Michael testified that he
had previously seen appellant carry it three times before the incident. He also saw appellant fire the
gun once in front of their house.18 Worth stressing, appellant never denied ownership or possession
of such gun.

Taking into account all the circumstances of this case, this Court finds credible and sufficient
Michael’s identification of appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. When there is no evidence to
indicate that the witness against the accused has been actuated by any improper motive, and absent
any compelling reason to conclude otherwise, the testimony given by a witness is ordinarily
accorded full faith and credit.19

Second, we find appellant’s defenses founded on denial and alibi lacking in truth and candor.
Despite his stance that he went to his nephew’s birthday celebration where he met with several
persons to drink gin on the day of the incident, appellant failed to present any disinterested witness
to support his claim. Thus, for corroboration we are left to rely only on the testimony of his wife,
which we find less than convincing.

Nothing is more settled in criminal law jurisprudence than that denial and alibi cannot prevail over
the positive and categorical testimony of the witness. Denial is an intrinsically weak defense which
must be buttressed with strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility. Alibi is an inherently
weak defense, which is viewed with suspicion and received with caution because it can easily be
fabricated.20 For alibi to prosper, appellant must prove not only that he was at some other place
when the crime was committed but that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus
criminis at the time of its commission.21 Appellant’s own evidence shows that he was in the
immediate environs when the incident occurred. For he stated that he was just in his own house,
barely three meters away from the house of the victim, Estelita. 22

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated January 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR.–H.C. No. 00183, which had sustained the Decision dated May 10, 2004 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Balayan, Batangas, finding appellant Donato Bulasag y Arellano
alias "Dong" guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide in Criminal Case No. 4850,
is AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
 DANTE O. TINGA PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
G.R. No. 213390

PEOPLE OF THE PHILPPINES, Plaintijf-Appellee

vs
JESSIE GABRIELy GAJARDO, Accused-Appellant

RESOLUTION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This is an appeal from the March 25, 2014 Decision  of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC
1

No. 05147 which affirmed with modification the July 19, 2011 Decision  of the Regional Trial Court
2

(RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 43, in Criminal Case No. 2010-0118-D finding appellant Jessie
Gabriel y Gajardo guilty of the crime of rape and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Appellant was indicted for rape in an Information which alleged:

That on or about the 17th day of February 2010, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused JESSIE GABRIBL y GAJARDO, with
force and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, have carnal knowledge
upon one ["AAA"],  a 17-year old minor, against her will and consent, to the damage and prejudice of
3

the latter.

Contrary to Article 266-A par. 1-a, in relation to the 2nd par. of Article 266-B of the Revised Penal
Code as amended by RA 8353. 4

Arraigned thereon, appellant entered a negative plea.

"AAA" at the time material to this case is a 17-year old first-year nursing student at the Colegio de
Dagupan and temporarily resides at the boarding house of appellant in Dagupan City. "AAA" testified
that at about 6:00 p.m. of February 17, 2010, she, with her cousin and co-boarder ''BBB," was inside
their room at the second floor of the said boarding house when appellant suddenly entered their
room and accused them of having stolen items of merchandise from his store located near the said
boarding house. "AAA" and "BBB" vehemently denied this accusation, but appellant did not believe
them. Instead, appellant directed them to see him in his room at the first floor of the boarding house
to talk about the matter. When "AAA" went inside appellant's room, the latter renewed his insistence
that "AAA" own up to having stolen the merchandise in question, otherwise he would bring her to the
Police Station and have a theft case against her blottered. He t.1-ien told her to sit on his lap and
began caressing her back. "AAA" demanded that he stop what he was doing because she did not
like it, but he paid no heed to her demand. When "AAA" stood up to leave, appellant pulled her back,
compelled her to sit on his lap anew, and then proceeded to unhook her bra. What took place after
this, "AAA" herself graphically recounted thus:

PROS. PERALTA:

xxxx

Q We go back to that incident when he removed the hook of your bra, what happened after that?
A He made me lie down, Madam.

Q What happened next?

A [T]hen he forced me, he raped me, Madam.

Q When you said he raped you, what do you mean by that?

A He made me lie down, he made me spread my legs and he undressed me, Madam.

Q What were you wearing at that time?

A I was wearing t-shirt and pajama, madam.

Q And x x x after spreading your legs, what did he do next?

A He x x x inserted his penis [into] my vagina, Madam.

Q What happened when he inserted his penis [into] your vagina?

A I [cried] and I told him that I don't like [what he was doing] but he insisted, Madam.

Q When you refused, what did he do, if any?

A I just cried, Madam.

Q How about the accused?

A He continued what he was doing, Madam.

Q What was he doing?

A He was raping me, Madam.

Q For how long did it happen?

A Minutes, Madam.

Q When you said minutes, you mean one (1) minute?

A Around thirty (30) minutes, madam.

Q What was his position at that time?

A He was on top of me, madam.

Q While he was on top of [you], what did [he] do?

A He raped me, Madam.

Q When you said he raped you, what do you mean by that?

A He inserted his penis [into] my vagina, Madam.

Q What did you feel at that time when he inserted his penis [into] your vagina?

A None, [M]adam.

Q What, if any, did you feel or notice while his penis was inside your vagina?

A None, [M]adam.

Q You said that you were crying while he was raping you, why were you crying?

A I was afraid and I don't like it, Madam.

Q When he started to insert his penis [into] your vagina, did you feel anything?

A Yes, [M]adam.

Q What did you feel?

A It was painful [M]adam.

COURT:

Q Why did you not push him while he was on top of you?

A He was forceful, [M]adam.

Q What do you mean when you said her was forceful?

A He [was strong], [M]adam. 5

Appellant's lecherous assault upon "AAA;' ceased only when his child knocked on the door and
called for him. When he heard his child's knocking, he released "AAA" from his clutches, told her to
get dressed and leave the room. "AAA" then went to the bathroom to wash and then returned to her
room at the second floor where she continued to cry. "BBB" asked her why she was crying but she
could not tell her of her forcible violation. Later that evening, "AAA's" aunt, "CCC," and her husband
"DDD," together with "BBB's'' mother "EEE" (who was earlier texted by "BBB" to come to the
boarding house) arrived. They confronted appellant about his accusation that "AAA'' and "BBB" had
stolen certain items from his store. It was then that "'AAA" told "CCC" and "DDD" that she had been
raped by appellant. A call was then made to the city police department which deployed SPO1
Esteban Martinez and PO1 Ramon Valencerina, Jr. who, upon reaching the boarding house, were
informed that "AAA" had been raped by appellant. These police officers arrested appellant and
brought him to the police station. After this, "AA.A'' submitted herself to physical examination at the
Region 1 Medical Center in that city.

The other prosecution witnesses, namely "BBB," "EEE'' and "CCC," not having actually witnessed
"AAA's" violation, claimed that they came to know of "AAA's" rape from "AAA" herself. However, they
were present just outside the boarding house when "CCC", "AAA's" aunt exploded into hyste1ical
outburst on hearing from "AAA" that she had been raped by appellant. The Medico-Legal Report
issued by Dr. Marlene Quiramol moreover showed tell-tale evidence that "AAA" had indeed been
sexually abused, as there were erythema and fossa navicularis at the external genitalia, as well as
multiple fresh lacerations at the 3, 6, 9 and 12 o'clock positions in "AAA's" hymen.

Appellant denied that he raped "AAA". He claimed that on the morning of February 17, 2010J he
noticed that some items of merchandise in his store were missing and he suspected that "AAA" and
'~BBB" were the culprits; hence, he went to their room to confront them. These two however denied
his accusation, so he confronted them with the pictures of the missing items which he earlier took in
the locker inside the room rented by "AAA" and "BBB."

Appellant nevertheless admitted that on said occasion, he talked with "AAA" inside his room at the
first floor of the boarding house for some 15 minutes, but stressed that after their conversation,
"AAA" went outside while he proceeded to his store.

The only other witness presented by appellant, one Sandro Montanez, a boarder in the former's
boarding house, simply testified that on the day in question (February 17, 2010), he saw "AAA"
doing her laundry and that he did not notice anything unusual in her appearance at all.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

Synthesizing the conflicting contentions of the prosecution and the defense, the RTC held:

The instant rape case is one of multifarious cases where there are no identified witnesses, and
where the evidence effectively boils down to the complainant's word against the accused's.
However, a pronouncement of guilt arising from the sole testimony of the victim is not unheard ot: so
long as her testimony meets the test of credibility. This is especially true in the crime of rape the
evidentiary character of which demands so much on the part of the victim - it entails her to submit to
an examination of her private parts, and to subject the sordid details of her story to a public trial and
against a given presumption of the accused's innocence.

To establish the crime of Rape under the article cited above, two elements must be shown to exist.
And these are; 'that the accused had carnal knowledge of the offended party; and that the coitus was
done through the use of force or intimidation.'

AAA cried profusely while recounting her awful experience at the hands of her abuser. As has been
repeatedly held, 'no young girl would concoct a sordid tale of so se1ious a crime as rape, undergo
medical examination, then subject herself to the stigma and embarrassment of a public trial, if her
motive was other than a fervent desire to seek justice.' AAA had revealed the incident to her
relatives. If it is not rape, what is it?

Accused's attempt to characterize the testimony of 'AAA' as incredible lacks merit. Accused['s]
defense of denial must crumble in light of AAA's positive and specific testimony. It is an established
jurisprudential rule that denial, like alibi, being negative self-serving defense, cannot prevail over the
affirmative allegations of the victim and her categorical and positive identification of the accused as
her assailant. 'Denial must be proved by the accused with clear and convincing evidence otherwise
they cannot prevail over the positive testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative
matters.'
Moreover, AAA's testimony is corroborated by the findings of the examining physician, Dr. Marlene
Quiramol x x x viz[.]; (+) Erythema at the peri hymenal and fossa navicularis; (+) Multiple fresh
lacerations at 3, 6, 9 & 12 o'clock positions. Medical examination showed evidence of sexual abuse.

'When a rape victim's account is straightforward and candid, and is corroborated by the medical
findings of the exarmining physician, the same is sufficient to support a conviction for rape.' As the
Highest Court succinctly stated in People vs. Borja,' a victim who says she has been raped almost
always says all there is to be said.'

The defense made it appear x x x that there were other people at the time of the incident. Granting
arguendo that there were other people in the house when the rape was committed, rapists are not
deterred from committing t11eir odious act by the presence of people nearby or the members of the
family. Lust, being a very powerful human urge is, to borrow from People v. Virgilio Bernabe, 'no
respecter of time and place.' For the crime of rape to be committed, it is not necessary for the place
to be ideal or the weather to be fine, for rapists bear no respect for locale and time when they carry
out their evil deed. Rape can be committed in even the unlikeliest places and circumstances and by
the most unlikely persons. The beast in a man bears no respect for time and place, driving him to
commit rape anywhere - even in places where people congregate, in parks, along the roadsides, in
school premises, in a house where there are other occupants, in the same room where other
members of the family are also sleeping, and even in places which to many would appear unlikely
and high risk venues for its commission. Besides, there is no rule that rape can be committed only in
seclusion.

In stark contrast to AAA's firm declaration, the defense of denial invoked by the accused rests on
shaky grounds. The accused insists that 'the accusation is a lie' and claims that he did not rape the
victim It should be noted however that accused himself admitted having a one-on-one confrontation
with AAA in his room about the alleged missing items as he required her to see him in his room and
it lasted for around 15 minutes. Why would he require her to go to his room when he had already
confronted them inside their room if not for his bestial desire and intention? Besides, he already went
to the extent of taking pictures of the alleged missing items inside the locker of the victim and her
cousin in their absence so as to compel them to admit the crime. Why did he not complain right
away to the police if indeed his accusation against the victim is true?

Judicial experience has taught this Court that denial like alibi are the common defenses in rape
cases. Denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be buttressed with strong evidence of non-
culpability to merit credibility. It is a negative self-serving assertion that deserves no weight in law if
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence. The barefaced denial of the charge by the
accused even if one of his boarder had testified cannot prevail over the positive and forthright
identification of him as the perpetrator of the dastardly act.

In rape, force and intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victim's perception and judgment at
the time of the commission of the crime. AAA's failure to shout or to tenaciously resist accused
should not be taken against her since such negative assertion would not ipso facto make voluntary
her submission to accused's criminal act. As already settled in our jurisprudence, not all victims react
the same way. Some people may cry out, some may faint, some may be shocked into insensibility,
while others may appear to yield to the intrusion. Some may offer strong resistance while others may
be too intimidated to offer any resistance at all. Moreover resistance is not an element of rape. A
rape victim has no burden to prove that she did all within her power to resist the force or intimidation
employed upon her. As long as the force or intimidation present, whether it was more or less
irresistible is beside the point. Though a man puts no hand on a woman, yet if by the use of mental
and moral coercion and intimidation, the accused so overpowers her mind out of fear that as a result
she dare not resist the dastardly act inflicted on her person, accused is guilty of the crime imputed to
him. In this case, the threat of reporting her to the police and have the incident blottered regarding
his accusation of theft against her speaks loudly of accused's use of force and intimidation.

Moreover, AAA said she was not able to do anything to resist the accused [when] he was raping her.
She told him to stop what he was doing [because] she didn't like it but he [persisted]. The most that
she did was to cry.  Owing to the minority of AAA and her physique as compared to her molester,
1âwphi1

the Court believes that she was cowed by the accused's act of forcing himself upon her especially so
when he threatened to report them to the authorities. 'Physical resistance need not be established in
rape when threats and intimidation are employed and the victim submits herself to her attacker
because of fear - physical resistance is not the sole test to ascertain whether or not a woman
involuntarily yielded to the lust of her attacker.'

AAA's account evinced sincerity and truthfulness and she never wavered in her story, consistently
pointing to accused as her rapist. Besides, no woman would willingly submit herself to the rigors,
humiliation and stigma attendant in a rape case if she was not motivated by an earnest desire to
punish the culprit. While there may be inconsistencies in AAA's testimony, they refer only to trivial
matters which did not affect at all her account of the incident.

'Errorless recollection of a traumatic and agonizing incident cannot be expected of a witness when
she is recounting details of an experience as humiliating and as painful as rape.' 6

Against this backdrop, the RTC disposed thus –

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused JESSIE
GABRIEL GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape, defined and penalized under
Article 266-A (a) of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, or the Anti Rape
Law of 1997 and is hereby imposed with the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. He is ordered to pay
AAA the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱50,000.00), by way of civil indemnity, FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (₱50,000.00), as moral damages and THIRTY TH0USAND PESOS
(₱30,000.00) as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED. 7

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

From this judgment, appellant appealed to the CA maintaining that the RTC erred in finding him
guilty of the crime of raped.

But the CA thumbed down the appeal, anchoring its verdict on the RTC's aforequoted ratiocination,
and more particularly on "AAA's" testimony-in-chief relative to the actual assault on her person in the
manner quoted. Indeed, the CA's findings that "AAA" was raped by appellant were a virtual
reiteration of the

RTC's own summation as regards the rape.

The CA characterized "AAA's'' testimony in this wise:

The testimony of AAA is simple, candid, straightforward, and consistent on material points, detailing

the act of rape against her by appellant. It is corroborated by the physical evidence of fresh hymenal
lacerations. The medico-legal report revealed tt1at AAA's perihymenal areal and fossa navicularis
had erythema and her hymen had multiple fresh lacerations at 3, 6, 9 & 12 o'clock positions. In short,
the medical exan1ination showed evidence of sexual abuse. x x x 8

After this, the CA addressed appellant's assault upon "AAA's" credibility, to wit:

Appellant, however, casts doubts on the credibility of AAA He contends that AAA was motivated by
revenge because he had accused her of stealing and insisted that she admit the act. He also assails
the credibility of AAA's account of the rape by pointing out that: AAA offered no resistw1ce; she first
claimed that she did not feel appellant's penis inside her vagina but later abandoned her claim; x x x
she did not tell her boardmate Montanez, "BBB", and her aunt "CCC" [about the alleged rape] but
confided to them, except Montanez, that appellant was forcing her to admit to the theft; AAA did not
immediately reveal the rape to the police but first talked to her uncle after which the latter confronted
appellant.9

The CA however found appellant's contentions unconvincing:

It is highly improbable that a young, decent woman taking up nursing would concoct a rape story
against a man who is accusing her of a petty crime which she denies. A woman who claims rape
exposes herself to the spectacle of a public trial where she would recount the sordid details of her
ordeal. Thus, it has been repeatedly ruled 1hat no young and decent woman in her right mind would
concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter pervert
herself by being subjected to a public trial if she was not motivated solely by her desire to obtain
justice for the wrong committed against her.

Even assuming that AAA did not tenaciously resist the sexual assault[,] that does not negate rape. In
rape, the force and intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victim's perception and judgment at
the time of the commission of the crime. It is settled that not all victims react the same way. Some
victims may cry out, some may faint, some may be shocked into insensibility, while others may
appear to yield to the intrusion. Some may offer strong resistance while others may be too
intimidated to offer any resistance at all. Moreover, resistance is not an element of rape. A rape
victim has no burden to prove that she did all within her power to resist the force or intimidation
employed upon her. As long as the force or intimidation is present, whether it was more or less
irresistible is beside the point. In this case, what is important is that AAA did not consent to the
intercourse. She cried as appellant ravished her and told her uncle about the rape at the first
opportunity.

xxxx

That AAA did not immediately report the rape to the police when they came to the house but to her
uncle enhances rather than weakens her testimony.  It is consistent with human experience for a
1âwphi1

woman to prefer to reveal the assault on her honor to her kin first rather than to strangers, including
the police. 10

Expounding on the usual reason for the seeming inability of the prosecution to assemble a number
of witnesses to establish a rape case, like the present case, the CA posited:

Inasmuch as the crime of rape is essentially committed in relative isolation or even secrecy, it is
usually the victim alone who can testify on the forced sexual intercourse. Therefore, in a prosecution
for rape, the credibility of the victim is almost always the single and most important point to consider.
If the victim's testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused can justifiably be convicted on the
basis of her lone testimony.11
In the end, the CA sustained the factual underpinnings of the RTC's verdict, harking back to the well-
settled dictum that the trial court is the best assayer and evaluator of witnesses and their
testimonies, thus:

The trial court gave credence to AAA and her testimony. Since the trial court had the opportunity to
examine her demeanor and conduct on the stand, We do not find any reason to depart from its
findings. Time and time again, it has been ruled that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses
and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique firsthand
opportunity to observe them under examination. x x x

There is no showing that the trial court overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance in convicting appellant. Its decision must be upheld.
Besides, appellant's defense is in the nature of a denial which hardly creates reasonable doubt of his
guilt in light of his testimony that he was at the place and time of the rape. Appellant's denial cannot
prevail over AAA' s direct, positive and categorical assertion that rings with truth. Denial is inherently
a weak defense which cannot outweigh positive testimony. As between a categorical statement that
has the earmarks of truth on the one hand and bare denial, on the other, the former is generally held
to prevail.
12

The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City,
Branch 43, dated July 19, 2011, in Criminal Case No. 2010-0118-D is AFFIRMED with modification
in that accused-appellant Jessie Gabriel is further ordered to pay interest on all damages awarded at
the rate of 6% per annum :from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED. 13

Our Ruling

We find no reason to disturb the CA's above-mentioned findings and conclusion, especially so
because in the case at bench the CA and the RTC have uniformly given short shrift to appellant's
bare denial.

In the 1901 case of United States v. Ramos,  this Court had already declared that "[w]hen a woman
14

testifies that she has been raped she says, in effect, that all that is necessary to constitute the
commission of this crime has been committed. It is merely a question then, whether or not this court
accepts her statement." Jurisprudence has clung with unrelenting grasp to this precept.

The trial court's assessment and evaluation of the credibility of witnesses vis-a-vis their testimonies
ought to be upheld as a matter of course because of its direct, immediate and first hand opportunity
to observe the deportment of witnesses as they delivered their testimonies in open court. Thus, the
trial court's findings bearing on the credibility of witnesses on these matters are invariably binding
and conclusive upon the appellate court unless of course, there is a showing that the trial court had
overlooked, misapprehended or misconstrued some fact or circumstance of weight or substance, or
had failed to accord or assign such fact or circumstance its due import or significance. Here, it bears
stressing that the CA itself declared in its Decision that:

There is no showing that the trial court overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance in convicting appellant. Its decision must be upheld.
Besides, appellant's defense is in the nature of a denial which hardly creates reasonable doubt of his
guilt in light of his testimony that he was at the place and time of the rape. Appellant's denial cannot
prevail over "AAA's" direct, positive and categorical assertion that rings with truth. Denial is
inherently a weak defense which cannot outweigh positive testimony. As between a categorical
statement that has the earmarks of truth on the one hand and bare denial, on the other, the former is
generally held to prevail.
15

To these postulations by the CA, we give our unreserved assent. Nonetheless, we have to modify
the awards for civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages. Conformably to this Court's
holding in People v. Jugueta,  the awards for civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary
16

damages should be upgraded to ₱75,000.00 each. The CA, however correctly imposed interest at
the rate of six percent (6%) per annum on all monetary awards.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed March 25, 2014 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05147 finding appellant Jessie Gabriel y Gajardo guilty of the crime
of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED with
FURTHER MODIFICATIONS that the awards for civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary
damages are increased to ₱75,000.00 each.

SO ORDERED.
 [ G.R. No. 230222, June 22, 2020 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. VVV,* ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

INTING, J.:

Assailed in this ordinary appeal is the Decision1 dated August 4, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR No. 37242 affirming with modification the Judgment2 dated September 26, 2014 of
Branch 18, Regional Trial Court (RTC), ██████████ Isabela in Criminal Case No. 5412. In the
RTC Judgment, VVV (accused-appellant) was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Rape
through sexual assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as
amended. In the assailed CA Decision, accused-appellant's conviction under paragraph 2, Article
266-A of the RPC was upheld; however, he was additionally found guilty of Rape through carnal
knowledge under paragraph 1(a) of the same Article.

The Antecedents

In an Information3 dated June 15, 2010, accused-appellant was charged with Rape as defined and
penalized under Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended. The accusatory portion of the Information
reads:

That on or about the 10th day of June, 2010, in the municipality of ██████████, province of
Isabela, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused with lewd,
designs, and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, lay with, and have carnal knowledge with his own daughter [AAA], who is a minor of 15
years old, by then and there inserting his finger in her private parts, against her will and consent.

With the aggravating circumstances that the [victim] is a minor below 18 years old and that the
accused is the father of the victim.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

On arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty.5 Pre-trial and trial on the merits ensued.

As established by the prosecution, on June 10, 2010, at around 9:00 p.m., AAA was attending the
wake of her grandmother at the latter's house in ██████████ Isabela. AAA was with her father,
herein accused-appellant, and her other siblings. Thereat, accused-appellant suddenly told AAA to
get inside the room and give him a massage. After AAA obliged, accused-appellant told her to lie
down. He then started to mash her breast.  After a while, he put his hands inside her shorts and
1âшphi1

touched her vagina. He then inserted his forefinger into her vagina and made a push and pull motion
for about three minutes. Thereupon, he pulled her right hand and placed it in his penis for about five
minutes. He told her not to tell anyone about what happened; otherwise, he would maul and kick her.
Afterwards, he took off her shorts and underwear, laid on top of her inserted his penis into her
vagina, and made a push and pull motion. He stopped after about five minutes and told her to sleep.
Throughout the molestation, he was holding a balisong (knife) in his left hand. He then left the room
and proceeded to play tong-its.6
AAA also decided to go outside the room as she could riot sleep. At around 4:00 a.m. of June 11,
2010, she decided to approach her aunt, BBB, who was then sitting near the coffin of her
grandmother. She told BBB about the incident as well as all the other sexual abuses that accused-
appellant committed against her since 2008. BBB proceeded to ██████████ Police Station and
reported the incident. Thereafter, BBB, with AAA, went to ██████████ Hospital for a medico-
legal examination.7

Dr. Mary Grace Bartolome-Agcaoili (Dr. Agcaoili) examined AAA and found that her hymen was
"crescentric, tanner stage 4." While finding that AAA's private part had no bleeding, discharges, or
lacerations in the hymen, Dr. Agcaoili did not exclude the possibility of sexual abuse.8

For his part, accused-appellant interposed denial. He testified that in the evening of June 10, 2010,
he brought his children to the house of his in-laws to attend the wake of his mother-in-law. Thereat,
he did not see where AAA and her siblings were as he became busy drinking and playing cards.9

Accused-appellant vehemently denied the charge of Rape against him and asserted that it was filed
out of hatred. He stated that he once scolded AAA for having a drinking spree in another barangay
and that there were times that she would not come home and sleep in their house.10

Accused-appellant also testified that he had quarrels with his wife regarding money matters,
particularly on the fact that she would send money to his in-laws for the purchase of medicines, and
that he had a disagreement with his in-laws when he disapproved of their wish to let his wife go to
the United States of America (USA) in the hope that she would also be able to help her brothers to
go abroad.11 Moreover, accused-appellant stated that his in-laws did not speak to him after he
refused to let his wife go to the USA.12 He claimed that his in-laws, his wife, and his daughter
conspired for him to be put in jail.13

On September 26, 2014, the RTC rendered its Judgment14 finding accused-appellant guilty of
sexual assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC. The RTC sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and
four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum; and to indemnify AAA in the following amounts:
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages.

Aggrieved, accused-appellant appealed to the CA.

Upon a reading of the Information, the CA observed that accused-appellant was charged with two
offenses: (1) rape through sexual intercourse under paragraph 1(a), and (2) rape as an act of sexual
assault under paragraph 2, both of Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended. The CA found that
accused-appellant was charged with having carnal knowledge of AAA, his 15-year-old daughter, by
means of force and intimidation; and, at the same time, he was charged with committing an act of
sexual assault against AAA by inserting his finger into her private part.15 The CA noted that the
Information merely lacked the conjunctive word "and."16 Furthermore, the CA found that the
prosecution was able to prove during trial the guilt of accused-appellant for the two charges of rape.

Thus, on August 4, 2016, the CA rendered the assailed Decision17 affirming with modification the
RTC Judgment, viz.:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court AFFIRMS with MODIFICATION the Judgment dated

September 26, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ilagan City, Isabela.
For rape through carnal knowledge/sexual assault under Art. 266-A paragraph 1(a) of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC), accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole, and to pay AAA the amount of P100,000 as civil indemnity,
P100,000 as moral damages, and P100,000 as exemplary damages.

For rape through sexual assault under Art. 266-A, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),
accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to
pay AAA the amount of P30,000 as civil indemnity, P30,000 as moral damages, and P30,000 as
exemplary damages.

Accused-appellant is likewise ordered to pay interest on all damages at the legal rate of 6% per
annum from the date of finality of this decision until full payment.

SO ORDERED.18

Hence, the present appeal. Per the Court's Resolution19 dated August 7, 2017, both parties
manifested that they would no longer file a supplemental brief before the Court.

In his appellate brief before the CA, accused-appellant raised the following assignment of errors:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-

APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF RAPE THROUGH SEXUAL ASSAULT,
DESPITE THE UNRELIABILITY OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES' TESTIMONIES.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE

THAT THE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE PROVES OTHERWISE.20

The Court's Ruling

The appeal lacks merit.

At the outset, the Court notes that the CA convicted accused-appellant for two counts of Rape, while
only one Information was filed against him. Duplicity of offenses charged contravenes Section 13,
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court (Rules) which states that "[a] complaint or information must charge
only one offense, except when the law prescribes a single punishment for various offenses."

From a reading of the Information21 dated June 15, 2010, the Court agrees with the CA that
accused-appellant was charged with two offenses—the act of having carnal knowledge of AAA
constitutes one offense, while the act of inserting his finger into AAA's private part constitutes
another. Section 3(f),22 Rule 117 of the Rules allows the accused to move for the quashal of the
information based on the ground of duplicity of the offenses charged. However, under Section
9,23 Rule 117 of the Rules, accused-appellant is deemed to have waived any objection based on
this ground due to his failure to assert it before he pleaded to the Information. Thus, the CA was
correct in holding that accused-appellant can be convicted for the two offenses.
Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 8353,24 known as The Anti-Rape
Law of 1997, provides:

ART. 266-A. Rape, When And How Committed. — Rape is committed —

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall
commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or
any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.

The Court upholds the CA's finding that accused-appellant is guilty of the two offenses charged in
the Information. Thus, accused-appellant's conviction for Rape through carnal knowledge under
paragraph 1(a), Article 266-A [in relation to Article 266-B]25 of the RPC is affirmed. With respect to
the finding of Rape through sexual assault under paragraph 2 of Article 266-A, however, there is a
need to modify the nomenclature of the crime, its corresponding penalty, and the award of damages.
This is in light of the fact that AAA was only 15 years old at the time of the incident.

In the landmark case of People v. Tulagan (Tulagan),26 the Court pronounced that if the victim is 12
years old or above but under 18 years old, or at least 18 years old under special circumstances, "the
nomenclature of the crime should be 'Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of RA 7610' with the
iniposable penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua, but it should not
make any reference to the RPC." The crime shall be called "Sexual Assault under paragraph 2,
Article 266-A of the RPC" with the imposable penalty of prision mayor only when the victim of the
sexual assault is 18 years old or above and not demented.27

Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610,28 otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children against
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act," provides:

Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. — Children, whether male or female, who for
money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate
or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon
the following:

xxxx

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse of lascivious conduct with a child exploited in
prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the [victim] is under twelve (12)
years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and
Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as
the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve
(12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period[.]

The following account, reveals that accused-appellant is guilty both of Rape through carnal
knowledge under paragraph 1(a), Article 266-A of the RPC and of Lascivious Conduct under Section
5(b), Article III of RA 7610:

Q Miss Witness, during the last time, you said that your father told you to enter the room because he
wanted you to massage him, is that correct?

A Yes, sir.

Q And then, when you entered, you saw him sitting down and then he stood up and made you lie on
the bed, is that correct?

A Yes, sir.

Q And you said that he started mashing your breast and afterwhich, he placed his hand under your
short pants and took hold of your vagina?

A Yes, sir.

Q And after he placed his hand under your shorts and took hold of your vagina, what did he do next?

A He placed his hand on top of my vagina, sir.

Q Afterwhich, what did he do next?

A He inserted his finger into my vagina, sir.

Q Do you know how many fingers did he insert in your vagina?

A Only one, sir.

Q And when his finger was inserted into your vagina, what did he do next?

A He inserted it in a push and pull motion.

Q How long did he do that?

A Three (3) minutes, sir.

Q After three (3) minutes, what did he do next?

A He made me hold his penis, sir.

Q How did he make you do that?

A He pulled my hand and placed it in his penis, sir.

COURT:

Q Which hand?

A My right hand, sir.

Q May I interrupt, regarding the insertion...so he made his right hand in that act of inserting then
which part of the hand? which finger did he use?

A Forefinger, sir.

PROS. ERESE:

Q How long did he make you hold his penis?

A Five (5) minutes, sir.

Q By the way, Miss Witness, when he made you hold his penis, did he say anything?

A Yes, sir.

Q What was it?

A He told me not to make any report to anyone, sir.

Q Anything more?

A He will maul me and kick me if I will make a report, sir.

xxx

Q Did he tell you anything about what to do with his penis when you were holding it?

A Yes, sir.

Q What did he say? Can you still remember what he made you do with his penis?

A None, sir.

Q After holding his penis for about five minutes, what happened next?

A He inserted his penis into my vagina.

xxx

Q When he inserted his penis inside your vagina, were you still wearing your shorts?

A No more, sir.
Q And who took your shorts off?

A My father, sir.

Q And when he inserted his penis inside your vagina, what were your relative positions?

A We were lying down, sir.29 (Italics supplied.)

Accused-appellant's act of inserting his penis into AAA's vagina through force and intimidation
constitutes Rape through carnal knowledge under paragraph 1(a), Article 266-A of the RPC.
Moreover, accused-appellant's acts of intentionally holding AAA's vagina and inserting into it his right
forefinger plainly constitute sexual abuse and lascivious conduct as defined in the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of RA 7610, known as the "Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and
Investigation of Child Abuse Cases," which pertinently provide:

Section 2. Definition of Terms. — As used in these Rules, unless the context requires otherwise —

xxxx

(g) "Sexual abuse" includes the employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement
or coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse
or lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest with children;

(h) "Lascivious conduct" means the intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of
the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object
into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with
an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any
person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a
person[.] (Italics supplied.)

In Quimvel v. People,30 the Court ruled that "force and intimidation" is subsumed under "coercion
and influence" and these terms are used almost synonymously, viz.:

The term "coercion and influence" as appearing in the law is broad enough to cover "force and
intimidation" as used in the Information. To be sure, Black's Law Dictionary defines "coercion" as
"compulsion; force; duress" while "[undue] influence" is defined as "persuasion carried to the point of
overpowering the will." On the other hand, "force" refers to "constraining power, compulsion; strength
directed to an end" while jurisprudence defines "intimidation" as "unlawful coercion; extortion;
duress; putting in fear." As can be gleaned, the terms are used almost synonymously. It is then of no
moment that the terminologies employed by RA 7610 and by the Information are different.31

As can be gleaned from the testimony of AAA, accused-appellant, her own father, employed force,
intimidation, coercion, and influence upon her. He threatened to maul and kick her if she would make
a report about what happened.32 Also, he was holding a balisong (knife) in his left hand throughout
the molestation.33

In Tulagan,34 the Court explained that the phrase "children exploited in prostitution," on the one
hand, contemplates four scenarios: (a) a child, whether male or female who, for money, profit or any
other consideration, indulges in lascivious conduct; (b) a female child who, for money, profit or any
other consideration, indulges in sexual intercourse; (c) a child, whether male or female, who, due to
the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulges in lascivious conduct; and (d) a
female, due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulges in sexual
intercourse.

The phrase "other sexual abuse," on the other hand, is construed in relation to the definitions of
"child abuse" under Section 3, Article I of RA 7610 and of "sexual abuse" under Section 2(g) of the
Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases. Child abuse" as
defined in the former provision refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which
includes sexual abuse, among other matters; on the other hand, "sexual abuse" as defined in the
latter provision includes the employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a
child to engage in, or assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or
the molestation, prostitution, or incest with children.35

Based on the facts of the case, it is undeniable that AAA was subjected to sexual abuse under the
above definitions. She is a child who, due to the coercion or influence of accused-appellant, was
subjected to the latter's lascivious conduct. It also bears stressing that accused-appellant is the
father of AAA; as such, he has moral ascendancy over AAA, his minor daughter. Where rape is
committed by a relative, such as a father, stepfather, uncle, or common law spouse, moral influence
or ascendancy takes the place of "force and intimidation" as an essential element of rape.36

As previously mentioned, it is undisputed that AAA was only 15 years old at the time of the incident.
This fact was alleged in the Information and shown in the Certificate of Live Birth of AAA.37 Under
Section 3(a) of RA 7610, the term "children" refers to persons below 18 years of age or those over,
but unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition.

Given that AAA was only 15 years old at the time of the incident, instead of Rape through sexual
assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC, accused-appellant should thus be held liable
for Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610. This is in addition to accused-
appellant's conviction for Rape through carnal knowledge under paragraph 1(a), Article 266-A, in
relation to Article 266-B, of the RPC, which1 was correctly ruled by the CA.

The Court rejects accused-appellant's contention that the charge of Rape against him was filed out
of hatred.

"AAA's credibility cannot be diminished or tainted by [an] imputation of ill motives. It is highly
unthinkable for the victim to falsely accuse her father solely by reason of ill motives or
grudge."38 Furthermore, motives such as family feuds, resentment, hatred, or revenge have never
convinced the Court from giving full credence to the testimony of a minor rape victim.39

In People v. Manuel,40 the Court held:

Evidently, no woman, least of all a child, would concoct a story of defloration, allow examination of
her private parts and subject herself to public trial or ridicule if she has not, in truth, been a victim of
rape and impelled to seek justice for the wrong done to her being. It is settled jurisprudence that
testimonies of child-victims are given full weight and credit, since when a woman or a girl-child says
that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed
committed.41

The Court is also not swayed by accused-appellant's insistence that the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses are unreliable.
Accused-appellant contends that it is "highly incredible and contrary to ordinary conduct and human
experience" that AAA kept silent for so many years if indeed he had been sexually assaulting her
since 2008. He avers that his wife came home for a vacation in 2008 and yet AAA did not tell her
about any of his alleged sexual acts.42 He also points out AAA's testimony that her siblings knew
what was happening and yet no one dared to inform their mother or other relatives about it.43

Furthermore, accused-appellant asserts that the place of the incident would be so unlikely for a
sexual molestation to happen.44 He specifically refers to AAA's description of the place and
circumstances of the incident, which was inside the only room of the house of her grandmother, with
no light and no door and with only a curtain made of thin material to cover it, while the wake of her
grandmother was being held at the living room.45

Between the assertions of accused-appellant and the testimony of AAA, the latter deserves
credence. Jurisprudence has emphasized that "the trial court's evaluation and conclusion on the
credibility of witnesses in rape cases are generally accorded great weight and respect, and at times
even finality, especially after the CA, as the intermediate reviewing tribunal, has affirmed the
findings."46 This applies in the absence of "a clear showing that the findings were reached
arbitrarily, or that certain facts or circumstances of weight, substance or value were overlooked,
misapprehended or misappreciated that, if properly considered, would alter the result of the case."47

Further, the Court finds no reason to rule that the delay on the part of AAA to report the alleged prior
incidents of sexual molestation puts a dent on the credibility of her testimony. The Court agrees with
the CA that it is not uncommon for young girls to conceal for some time the assault against their
virtue; and it is not expected of a young girl like AAA, as opposed to a mature woman, to have the
courage and intelligence to immediately report a sexual assault committed against her.

It is worthy to note that both the RTC and the CA found the testimony of AAA credible and
persuasive.  According to the CA, AAA's spontaneous, direct, and sincere manner of presenting her
1âшphi1

testimony on how she was raped by her father bears the earmarks of credibility.48 The CA also
noted the RTC's observation of AAA's demeanor at the witness stand which was natural, convincing,
and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.49 As observed by the RTC, AAA
was candid and truthful. Further, when asked to identify her father in court, AAA approached
accused-appellant "frontally and gave him a resounding slap on the face and cried out
unabashedly."50

"The credibility of the witnesses is best addressed by the trial court, it being in a better position to
decide such question, having heard them and observed their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under
grueling examination."51 Considering that there is no evidence that the RTC's assessment on the
credibility of the AAA's testimony was tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of a fact, it is entitled to
great weight, if not conclusive or binding on the Court.52

Accused-appellant also questions AAA's medical certificate, which showed that she did not suffer
any hymenal injury despite the fact that she was examined a few hours after the alleged sexual
molestation.53 He asserts that the lack of physical manifestation of Rape by sexual assault weakens
the case against him.54

The Court remains unswayed. As held in People v. Amarela:55

The absence of any superficial abrasion or contusion on the person of the offended party does not
militate against the claim of the latter whose clear and candid testimony bears the badges of truth,
honesty, and candor. It must be stressed that the absence or presence of visible signs of injury on
the victim depends on the degree of force employed by the accused to consummate the purpose
which he had in mind to have carnal knowledge with the offended woman. Thus, the force employed
in rape need not be so great nor of such a character as could not be resisted. It is only that the force
used by the accused is sufficient to enable him to consummate his purpose.56 (Italics in the
original.)

In sum, the Court holds accused-appellant guilty of both Rape under paragraph 1(a), Article 266-A,
in relation to Article 266-B, of the RPC and Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b), Article III of RA
7610.

As regards the penalty and damages, the Court finds that the CA's imposition with respect to the
crime of Rape under paragraph 1(a), Article 266-A, in relation to Article 266-B, of the RPC conforms
to recent jurisprudence.57 Considering the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship, the
proper penalty would have been death if not for the prohibition under RA 9346.58 As such, the CA
correctly imposed reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole in lieu of death. It also correctly
ordered accused-appellant to pay AAA civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages,
each in the amount of P100,000.00, with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality
of judgment until fully paid.

With respect to the offense of Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610,
considering that AAA was more than 12 years old but less than 18 years old at the time of the
incident, the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal, in its medium period, to reclusion perpetua.
Since the perpetrator of the offense is her own father, and this was alleged in the Information and
proven during trial, such relationship should be considered as an aggravating circumstance for the
purpose of increasing the period of the imposable penalty. There being no mitigating circumstance to
offset the alternative aggravating circumstance, the penalty provided shall be imposed in its
maximum period, i.e., reclusion perpetual.59 This is also in conformity with Section 31(c),60 Article
XII of RA 7610 which expressly provides that the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period
when the peipetrator is, among others, the parent of the victim. Moreover, pursuant to People v.
Jugueta61 and Tulagan,62 accused-appellant should be ordered to pay AAA civil indemnity, moral
damages, and exemplary damages, each in the amount of P75,000.00, with interest at the rate of
6% per annum from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid. Furthermore, pursuant to Section
31(f),63 Article XII of RA 7610, accused-appellant shall pay a fine in the amount of P15,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision dated August 4, 2016 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 37242 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant VVV
is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of:

(1) Rape under paragraph 1(a) of Article 266-A, in relation to Article 266-B, of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, without eligibility for parole, and to pay the victim, AAA, the amounts of
P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages, and P100,000.00 as
exemplary damages; and

(2)Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610 and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P15,000.00. He is
further ordered to pay the victim, AAA, the amounts of P75,000 as civil indemnity,
P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages.

All monetary awards so imposed are subject to interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of
finality of this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.
 [ G.R. No. 236686, February 05, 2020 ]

YOKOHAMA TIRE PHILIPPINES, INC., PETITIONER, V. SANDRA REYES AND JOCELYN

REYES, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

PERALTA, C.J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing
the July 10, 2017 Decision1 and the November 7, 2017 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Angeles City, Branch 56 in Case No. R-ANG-16-00138-SC. The disputed RTC Decision dismissed
herein petitioner's petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the same Rules questioning a portion of the
Decision of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Clarkfield, Pampanga, in Criminal Case No. 12-5960
which acquitted herein respondents of the crime of attempted theft. The challenged RTC Order, on
the other hand, denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the above Decision of the RTC.

The facts are as follows:

Herein respondents, together with one Celeste Tagudin (Tagudin), were former employees of herein
petitioner company.

On June 17, 2011, petitioner filed a criminal complaint3 for qualified theft against respondents and
Tagudin, accusing them of having taken HP ink cartridges from the company's stock room through
stealth and without the consent of petitioner or any of its authorized representatives.

In a Resolution/Recommendation4 dated March 22, 2012, the Assistant City Prosecutor (ACP) of

Angeles City recommended that the complaint against Tagudin be dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence, while an Information for Attempted Theft be filed against respondents. The City Prosecutor
of Angeles City approved the Resolution /Recommendation of the ACP. Thus, on May 23, 2012, an
Information for Attempted Theft was filed with the MTC of Clarkfield, Pampanga and the case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 12-5960.

On June 14, 2012, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration5 of the March 22, 2012 Resolution of
the Angeles City ACP, but the same was denied by the latter in his
Resolution/Recommendation6 dated June 20, 2012, which was, likewise, approved by the City
Prosecutor.

Thereafter, trial proceeded. Hence, on November 10, 2015, the MTC of Clarkfield, Pampanga
rendered its Decision7 acquitting herein respondents of the crime of attempted theft.

Herein petitioner, then, filed a petition8 for certiorari with the RTC, docketed as R-ANG-16-00138,

contending that the MTC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of
discretion in ruling that the pieces of HP ink cartridges found by petitioner's representatives inside
the vehicle of one of respondents, which was subsequently presented as evidence by the
prosecution, were inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of the law and of respondents'
right against unreasonable search and seizure. Petitioner prayed for the annulment of the November
10, 2015 Decision of the MTC.
In its Decision9 dated July 10, 2017, the RTC dismissed the certiorari petition for lack of merit.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied by the RTC in its
Order 10 dated November 7, 2017.

Hence, the present petition based on the following arguments:

RTC-ANGELES CITY UNDULY DEVIATED FROM THE ESTABLISHED LAWS AND SETTLED
JURISPRUDENCE THAT:

THE COURTS MUST ABIDE BY THE EVIDENCE FORMALLY OFFERED DURING THE TRIAL
SUCH THAT OBJECT AND OTHER EVIDENCE ALREADY ADMITTED SHOULD BE THE BASES
OF THE FINDINGS OF FACTS AND THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURTS x x x.

II

THE LAW AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURE IS A RESTRAINT AGAINST

THE GOVERNMENT AND NOT PRIVATE ENTITIES x x x. 11

Petitioner contends that the RTC committed error in affirming the assailed decision of the MTC.
Ultimately, petitioner basically seeks to annul the decision of the MTC which acquitted herein
respondents. In so doing, petitioner contends that the pieces of HP ink cartridges which were
submitted as part of the evidence for the prosecution should have been admitted and considered by
the MTC in determining the guilt or innocence of respondents. Petitioner argues that, under
prevailing jurisprudence, the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures,
which was cited by the MTC in excluding the HP ink cartridges from the prosecution's evidence, is
made applicable as a restraint against the government only and not against private entities.

The petition lacks merit.

At the outset, the Court notes that petitioner lacked authority in filing a special civil action
for certiorari with the RTC to seek the annulment of the decision of the MTC which acquitted herein
respondents from the crime of attempted theft.

It is settled that in criminal cases, the State is the offended party and the private complainant's
interest is limited to the civil liability arising therefrom.12 Hence, if a criminal case is dismissed by the
trial court or if there is an acquittal, a reconsideration of the order of dismissal or acquittal may be
undertaken, whenever legally feasible, insofar as the criminal aspect thereof is concerned and may
be made only by the public prosecutor; or in the case of an appeal, by the State only, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).13 The private complainant or offended party may not
undertake such motion for reconsideration or appeal on the criminal aspect of the case.14 However,
the offended party or private complainant may file a motion for reconsideration of such dismissal or
acquittal or appeal therefrom but only insofar as the civil aspect thereof is concerned.15

The rationale behind this rule is that in a criminal case, the party affected by the dismissal of the
criminal action is the State and not the private complainant.16 The interest of the private
complainant or the private offended party is limited only to the civil liability.17 In the prosecution of
the offense, the complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution such that when a
criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the
criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General.18 The private
offended party or complainant may not take such appeal, but may only do so as to the civil aspect of
the case.19

Thus, this Court's ruling in the earlier case of People v. Santiago20 is instructive, to wit:

It is well settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the interest of the
private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability. Thus, in the
prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution. If
a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the
criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor
General may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or
complainant may not take such appeal. However, the said offended party or complainant may
appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the accused.

In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be
filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the
private offended party or complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of
the case so he may file such special civil action questioning the decision or action of the
respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should not bring the action
in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in [the] name of said
complainant.21

Thus, the Court has definitively ruled that in a criminal case in which the offended party is the State,
the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability
arising therefrom. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal
of the criminal aspect may be undertaken, whenever legally feasible, only by the State through the
Solicitor General. As a rule, only the Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines
on appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not undertake such appeal.

In its petition for certiorari filed with the RTC, petitioner seeks the annulment of the MTC decision
acquitting herein respondents. In so doing, petitioner raises issues on the admissibility of evidence
which it submitted to prove the guilt of the accused. These issues necessarily require a review of the
criminal aspect of the case and, as such, is prohibited. As discussed above, only the State, and not
herein petitioner, who is the private offended party, may question the criminal aspect of the case.

In any event, even granting that petitioner has the requisite authority to question the subject RTC
Decision, this Court, after a careful review of the arguments of the parties, finds no error in the
questioned Decision of the RTC.

In the instant case, the Court agrees with the ruling of the RTC that the disputed acts of the MTC in
denying admissibility to the subject ink cartridges as part of the prosecution's evidence, its
appreciation of the entirety of evidence presented by both parties to the case, and its subsequent
finding that the prosecution failed to prove the crime charged, are assailable as errors of judgment
and are not reviewable by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari.

The Court finds no error in the ruling of the RTC that petitioner was not able to establish its
allegation of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTC. Where a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court alleges grave abuse of discretion, the petitioner should establish that
the respondent court or tribunal acted in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the
exercise of its jurisdiction as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.22

Thus, this Court has explained that:

The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a specific meaning. An act of a court or tribunal can only
be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a "capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." The abuse of discretion must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an "evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility." Furthermore, the use of a petition
for certiorari is restricted only to "truly extraordinary cases wherein the act of the lower court or
quasi-judicial body is wholly void." From the foregoing definition, it is clear that the special civil action
of certiorari under Rule 65 can only strike an act down for having been done with grave abuse of
discretion if the petitioner could manifestly show that such act was patent and gross x x x.23

As found by the RTC, there was no hint of whimsicality, nor of gross and patent abuse of discretion
as would amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law or to act at all in contemplation of law on the part of the MTC. If at all, the mistake committed by
the MTC is only an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction, which would have amounted to a grave
abuse of discretion.

This Court sustains the RTC ruling that even if the subject ink cartridges are admitted as evidence, it
does not necessarily follow that they are given probative weight. The admissibility of an evidence is
different from its probative value. Thus, this Court held in Mancol, Jr. v. Development Bank of the
Philippines24 that:

x x x [a]dmissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative value.

The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence, while the weight of
evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade. The
admissibility of a particular item of evidence has to do with whether it meets various tests by which
its reliability is to be determined, so as to be considered with other evidence admitted in the case in
arriving at a decision as to the truth. The weight of evidence is not determined mathematically by the
numerical superiority of the witnesses testifying to a given fact, but depends upon its practical effect
in inducing belief on the part of the judge trying the case.  "Admissibility refers to the question of
1âшphi1

whether certain pieces of evidence are to be considered at all, while probative value refers to the
question of whether the admitted evidence proves an issue." "Thus, a particular item of evidence
may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines
provided by the rules of evidence."25

Petitioner chose to simply focus on the MTC's act of denying admissibility to the subject ink
cartridges. Petitioner lost sight of the fact that respondents were acquitted not because the ink
cartridges were excluded as evidence but because the MTC, after considering the entirety of
evidence presented by the prosecution, found that the latter failed to prove all the elements of the
crime charged.

Stated differently, even if the seized ink cartridges were admitted in evidence, the Court agrees with
the OSG that the probative value of these pieces of evidence must still meet the various tests by
which their reliability is to be determined. Their tendency to convince and persuade must be
considered separately because admissibility of evidence is different from its probative value. As
contended by the OSG, "[e]ven granting arguendo that the MTC indeed committed an error in ruling
that there was illegal search and seizure in this case, the prosecution still has to prove that the
seized cartridges were indeed the property of petitioner."26 However, the prosecution failed in this
respect. This Court agrees with the OSG that since the employee of petitioner who allegedly
discovered the theft of the subject cartridges, and who was supposedly the one who put identifying
marks thereon was not presented in court, nobody could verify if the cartridges seized from
respondents were the ones missing from the stockroom. Parenthetically, what is very damaging to
the cause of the prosecution is its failure to present the alleged video recording which supposedly
shows respondents in the act of putting ink cartridges inside a bag.

Thus, the Court finds neither error nor grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTC when it ruled
that the prosecution failed to prove the essential element of taking in the alleged crime of theft, to
wit:

First. The prosecution attempted to establish the fact of taking through a set of pictures (exhibits DD
to UU) allegedly lifted from a video file - in DVD form - copied from a video recording allegedly taken
inside stockroom no. 2 on October 22, 2010. The pictures were not even clear - mostly black; with
the exception on (sic) Exhibit RR and SS - resembling a female individual, identified by prosecution
witness as accused Sandra Reyes. Accused Jocelyn was not even depicted in any of the pictures.
However, the video recording itself nor (sic) the DVD copy thereof was not presented nor identified
by any witness.

The testimony of witness Dolo as to the report of Edward Buan - in support of the aforementioned
pictures - was not sufficient to prove the fact of taking. Without the testimony of Buan - as to the truth
of the contents of his report - there could be no sufficient basis for the testimonies of the other
prosecution witnesses. In fact, witness Do1o had no personal knowledge of the statements made in
Buan's report nor did he had (sic) prior knowledge of the video recording taken in stockroom no. 2 on
October 22, 2012.

Witness Jose Bermundo testified that Buan told him about the missing HP ink cartridges in
stockroom no. 2. This was, without question, second-hand information. Bermuda testified that he
gave his camera to Buan - to be installed by Buan inside stockroom no. 2. Bermuda testified that he
watched the alleged video recording and narrated what he allegedly saw therein; but he never
presented nor identified the video recording from which he based most of his testimony.

Witness Jovita Matias testified that he lifted pictures from the DVD copy of the video recording;
however, his testimony on what were depicted on the pictures (Exhibits DD to UU) could not be
given much weight, as the pictures themselves were not clear and the video file from which the said
pictures were lifted from was (sic) not presented. If it were true that the video recording clearly
showed accused Sandra in the act of taking the cartridges, then the pictures which had been lifted
from said video recording should have clearly depicted such fact. Thus, it is the court’s opinion that
the best evidence of the fact of taking should have been the video recording itself; however, no
witness for the prosecution ever identified said video recording nor any DVD copy thereof.

The court cannot consider any evidence which has not been presented, identified and offered.

All of the prosecution witnesses had no personal knowledge of the fact of taking: thus, there was no
clear and convincing evidence as to the fact of taking.27

In sum, this Court finds that the RTC did not err when it held that the MTC did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in rendering its assailed decision.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The July 10, 2017 Decision and the November 7,
2017 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 56 in Case No. R-ANG-16-00138-SC
are AFFIRMED.