DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS AND CHECKS AND BALANCES

PRINCIPLE OF CHECKS AND BALANCES

SEPARATION OF POWER (MAGKAHIWALAY NA KAPANGYARIHAN)

Article II, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution states that “the Philippines is a democratic
and republican state.”

One of the manifestations of republicanism is separation of powers among the three co-
equal branches of government, namely the legislative, executive, and judicial branches.

In the book of former Supreme Court Justice Antonio Nachura explains that the purpose
of this separation of powers is “to prevent concentration of authority in one person or
group of persons that might lead to an irreversible  error or abuse in its exercise to the
detriment of republican institutions.”

SEPARATION OF POWERS
Meaning of the Doctrine
The Doctrine of Separation of
Powers entails: first, the
division of the powers of the
government
into three, which are legislative,
executive, and judicial; and
second, the distribution of these
powers to the three major
branches of the government,
which are the Legislative
Department,
Executive Department, and the
Judicial Department. Basically,
it means that the Legislative
Department is generally limited
to the enactment of the law and
not to implementation or
interpretation of the same; the
Executive Department is
generally limited to the
implementation
of the law and not to the
enactment or interpretation of
the same; and the Judicial
Department is
generally limited to the
interpretation and application of
laws in specific cases and not to
the
making or implementation of
the same
THUMBNAIL:

Meaning of the Doctrine

The doctrine of separation of powers entails two parameters or criterion:

1. The division of the powers of the government into three:

a. Executive
b. Legislative
c. Judiciary
2. And the distribution of these powers to the three branches.
  The Legislative department is generally limited to the enactment of the law and
not the implementation or interpretation of the same.

Purpose of the Doctrine

Prevention of monopoly of power. This is said to be an attribute of republicanism

which seeks to prevent monopoly or concentration of power to one person or
group of persons thereby forestalls despotism (the exercise of absolute power,
especially in a cruel and oppressive way) dictatorship for instance.

Separation NOT Exclusive

It is important to note and understand that the meaning of “separation” is not as

exclusive as it termed or as it is but as “collaboration.

Meaning, while it is true that each of the department s exercises their respective
powers, it does so in collaboration with the other departments because in the end, they
all belong in one unified government with a common purpose. (Blending of powers
comes in)

Example: Appointment of members of the SC by the president, must be upon the

recommendation of the JBC. In here, the president who belongs to the executive
branch, appoints a SC Justice upon the recommendation of the JBC which is an
independent body of the judiciary.

Another example would be the use of public funds. The president prepares the budget,
on the basis of which the congress enacts an appropriations bill which will then be
submitted and approved by the president.

Example: The Anti Terrorism Act of 202 (naging operational ba ang tinatawag na
checks and balances sa example na ito?)
Originated from the Legislative

Pass on to the Executive (veto power)

Reviewed by the Judiciary

Note: na kahit mayroong separation of powers it does not mean they are strictly
separated. Ito ang tinatawag na blending of powers

So ang instance kung saan nagbleblend ang powers ng 3 branches of government natin
is yung pag gawa ng Budget

Example: The Executive ang gumagawa ng Budget. Legislative (Kongreso) ang

gumagawa ng appropriations bill)
Separation of powers is a doctrine of constitutional law under which the three branches
of government (executive, legislative, and judicial) are kept separate. This is also known
as the system of checks and balances, because each branch is given certain powers so
as to check and balance the other branches.

Following the ratification of the 1935 Philippine Constitution in a plebiscite, the principle
of separation of powers was adopted not by express and specific provision to that
effect, but by actual division of powers of the government—executive, legislative, and
judicial—in different articles thereof.

What is the doctrine of separation of powers and checks and balances Philippines?
Separation of powers is a principle deeply ingrained in constitutional law. Also called the
system of checks and balances, this doctrine grants certain powers to the executive,
legislative, and judicial branches of government as a way of balancing and checking
each other.

Why is it important to have separation of powers in the Philippines?

The intent of separation of powers is to prevent the concentration of unchecked
power and to provide for checks and balances, in which the powers of one branch of
government is limited by the powers of another branch—to prevent abuses of power
and avoid autocracy.

As has often been repeated by this Court, the doctrine of separation of powers is the
very wellspring from which the Court draws its legitimacy. Former Chief Justice Reynato
S. Puno has traced its origin and rationale as inhering in the republican system of
government:

The principle of separation of powers prevents the concentration of legislative,

executive, and judicial powers to a single branch of government by deftly allocating their
exercise to the three branches of government.

In his famed treatise, The Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu authoritatively analyzed the
nature of executive, legislative and judicial powers and with a formidable foresight
counselled that any combination of these powers would create a system with an
inherent tendency towards tyrannical actions…
Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and
the executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would
be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would be then the legislator. Were it joined
to the executive power, the judge might behave with violence and oppression.
There would be an end of everything, were the same man or the same body, whether of
the nobles or of the people, to exercise those three powers, that of enacting laws, that
of executing the public resolutions, and that of trying the causes of individuals. 

The principle of separation of powers is explained by the Court in the leading case
of Angara v. Electoral Commission:

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It

obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each
department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact
that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended
them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has
provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the
workings of the various departments of the government. x x x And the judiciary in turn,
with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other department in
its exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and
legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution. 38

What are the examples of checks and balances in place today?

 Congress can make laws, but the President can veto those laws.
 The President has the power to veto laws, but Congress can override a
President's veto.
 Congress has the power to make laws, but the courts can declare those laws to
be unconstitutional.

How is the principle of checks and balances manifested in the Philippine

government?

There is a system of checks and balances in our government, designed to avert

excesses in the wielding of government authority. Thus a President can veto any law
passed by Congress which, in turn, can overturn the veto if it has the numbers.

ANGARA VS ELECTORAL COMMISSION

G.R. No. L-45081 July 15 1936

FACTS:
Jose Angara and Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor were candidates
voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the 1st district of Tayabas
province.

On Oct 17 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-

elect of the Nat'l Assembly for garnering the most number of votes. He then took his
oath of office on Nov 15th. On Dec 3rd, Nat'l Assembly passed Res. No 8 which
declared with finality the victory of Angara. On Dec 8, Ynsua filed before the Electoral
Commission a motion of protest against the election of Angara, that he be declared
elected member of the Nat'l Assembly. Electoral Commission passed a resolution in
Dec 9th as the last day for the filing of the protests against the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. On Dec 20, Angara filed before
the Elec. Commission a motion to dismiss the protest that the protest in question was
filed out of the prescribed period. The Elec. Commission denied Angara's petition.
Angara prayed for the issuance of writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral
Commission taking further cognizance of Ynsua's protest. He contended that the
Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the said Electoral Commissions as
regards the merits of contested elections to the Nat'l Assembly and the Supreme Court
therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject
matter of the controversy;

Whether or not The Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction.

RULING:

In this case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final
constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created
by the Constitution. The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the
subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character,
scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of
the National Assembly." (Sec 4 Art. VI 1935 Constitution). It is held, therefore, that the
Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the election protest filed by Ynsua.

G.R. No. 45081, 63 Phil 139 [July 15, 1936]

Separation of Powers: Doctrine of implication – the grant of an express power carries

with it all other powers that may be necessarily inferred from it.

Facts:

The Electoral Commission was created pursuant to Art VI sec 4 of the 1935 Constitution
(now sec 17) which conferred to it the power to “be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly.”
The National Assembly (NA) passed a resolution confirming the election of petitioner
Angara as member of the NA on Dec 3, 1935.
On Dec 9, 1935, the respondent Electoral Commission formally organized for the first
time and resolved to fix the same date as the final day of filing of election protests.
Ynsua, a candidate vying for the Angara’s position, filed his election protest before the
Electoral Commission on the same date. Angara sought to prohibit the Electoral
Commission from taking further cognizance of the Ynsua’s motion. Angara argues: the
Constitution excludes from the Commission’s jurisdiction the power to regulate the
proceedings of such election contests. Morever, the Commission can regulate the
proceedings of election protests only if the NA has not availed of its primary power to so
regulate such proceedings.

Issues:

(1) Does the Electoral Commission have the constitutional power to promulgate rules of
procedure (such as fixing a deadline for filing election protests) relating to election
protests notwithstanding the lack of express conferment of such power in the
Constitution?

(2) Does it have the power the promulgate such rules notwithstanding the resolution of
the NA?

Held:

(1) Yes. It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred or
duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the
performance of the other is also conferred. In the absence of any further constitutional
provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral
Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the
exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election must be deemed by
necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

(2) Yes. The purpose of the of the creation of the Electoral Commission was to transfer
in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the Legislature in matters pertaining
to contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. The
express lodging [in the now Art VI, sec 17] of that power in the Electoral Commission is
an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the NA. If the NA is permitted to claim
the power to regulate proceedings of election contests, then the grant of power to the
Commission would be ineffective for such power would be xxx subject at all times to the
regulation of the NA. The purpose of the framers of our Constitution would be frustrated.
And then we have what we call the political question doctrine. In the case of Tanada vs.
Cuenco, the SC defined this as “those questions which under the Constitution are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislature or executive branch of government.”

Nachura in his book cited the case of Defensor-Santiago vs. Guingona (1998) where
Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago questioned the election of Sen. Teofisto Guingona as
minority floor leader. The high court said the judiciary “has no authority to interfere and
unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm, without running afoul of constitutional
principles that it is bound to protect and uphold – the very duty that justifies the court’s
being.”

The court added: “Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts
of a co-equal branch prevent this court from prying into the internal workings of the
Senate.”

But this does not mean the principle of checks and balances, which Nachura explained,
allows one department to rectify mistakes or excesses committed by the other
departments, does not apply.

The scope of the political question doctrine, he said in his book, has been limited by
Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution which vests in the judiciary the power “to
determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government.”

In the case of Angara vs. Electoral Commission, the court pointed out that when the
court mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries or invalidates the acts of a
coordinate body, what it upholds is not its own superiority, but the supremacy of the
Constitution.

Thus, when one branch of government wants to question the validity of an act
committed by a co-equal branch, it has to be done through the filing of a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which is the relief allowed “when any
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without
or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.”