f~i~yr I

DFS LIBRARY
LI BR AR Y COPY-this
p0 must be returned .

COMMENT
.

ISSUED 131'

DIRECTORATE OF FLIGHT SAFETV

R .I : .A .H' . 111":A11111 .%RTERS 0 OTTAWA . (1NT .

JANUAH1 ~ F'FRRUARY ~ 1955

R ESTRICTED
 DFS L IBRARY
I,St F;ll 1s1 LIBRARY COPY- tin,
i DIKEt'7'OR :1'1'E 0F FLIGHT SAFETY Pub must be returnPd.
R .I :.A .F . IIF:AD111 All 1'lifi5 . OTTAWA, (1NT .

)AN( 4R1 FFIi1il'AIt1 1915

C 0 \ T E N T ti

GOODSHOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
E \
\

II1-LEVEL MET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

GOT A GOOD CONNECTION? . . . . . . 8 s . .0 ..0 .0 .. ~ . .

1 __1 1 1 01 171"
, 1 1111111111 111 .1 16 10,
LOOSE PANELS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

LIFE AT ANGELS 40 . . . . . . . , , , . . 12

STATIC PHENOMENA . . . . . . . . . . . 17 ` ~\\`~\\\`\ \\\ \\~~~~~~

`\~~
~\\
\\~~ o~~\\~~~

\\\\\~~\\\\\~~\~\\
NEAR MISS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 ., .
\\\
. . ~~ ~, \ \ \ . ~.~~ `` `
~~~~\~,~~\~~\\\\~\X
~\
FORMATION COLLISIONS . . . . . . . . 24

~\~~
PX-ING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . 30

REPORTIT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

SOLID CENTRES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 f 6 3 . M arbp

ACCIDENT RESUME . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 \~\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\~
~rgt 41 . 3K . QCai r o
* * * \ ,\;:\
\~~\\~~~\\\\~\~

\
EDMOND CLOUTIER, C.M .G ., O.A  D,S.P
QUEENS PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIOHtk ~\\\~~~\~~\\\~\\\~\\\\
\

~~,,e~
0
OTTAWA I

"Flight Comment" is classified "Restricted" and its contents, or

any part thereof, are not to be divulged to persons unauthorized \\\\\\ ~ ~~\\~~U.~
to receive such information . The attention of' readers is drawn
to The Official Secrets Acts and QR Air), ar1 . 19 .36 .
 401 00
One o f the m o r e spectacular highlights i n Sgt Caird's airforce
career occurred on the RCAF's 30th anniversary . Four Canucks flown
by student pilots on a training exercise, were recalled to base when the
weather suddenly closed in . The weather continued t o deteriorate be-
low GCA limits but the aircraft could not be diverted b e c a u s e of low
fuel supplies . Three of the pilots began their descent while the fourth
climbed to 36,000 feet to conserve fuel .
iiiiliiilliiii111. 1Zi
Sgt C aird brought the first three Canucks into the GCA Pattern and
their pilots landed successfully . The fourth P i 1 o t then descended and
began his GCA . On the first run, excessive icing on the windscreenPre-
vented him from landing . He next declared h i s fuel supply so critical
that he doubted whether another GCA could be completed . In the face of
this crisis, Sgt Caird brought the Canuck around on an extremely ab-
breviated pattern and, because the pilot's v i s i o n was now completely
obscured by ice, talked him right down onto the runway instead of re-
leasing him 50 feet above the button and 500 along the runway, which is
normal GCA action .

FLIGHT COMMENT takes this Such incidents are typical of the manner in whichthese two NCOs
opportunity to pay special tribute to have performed their duties under the strain of emergencies . To the
two R C A F NCOs w h o distinguish pilot sweating it out in zero-zero conditions, the best sound in the world
themselves just a b o u t every time is the calm, clear, confident voice of the o P e r a t o r saying, "You are
the weather gets bad . They are now in G%'aA contact" . FS DarbY and Sgt Caird deserve greatcredit for
both GCA controllers and their the job they are doing because it is the skill of such men on the ground
names are FS J. Darby and Sgt E .R . SGT B .E . UM that makes safe flying possible for those in the air .
Caird . Their skill and reliability
are credited withhelping to avert anumber of major aircraft accidents
.
Both men have had considerable experience in their field . FS Darb y,
for example, has been associated with flying control since 1940 and has
logged over 1200 GCAs .
,
*

FS Darby w a s duty GC A controller when an R AF Canberra was

compelled to land at his station one night. Flying conditions were haz-
ardous -visibility and ceiling had been reduced to zero by rain and fog,
and personnel on duty i n the control tower could not even see the run-
way . Although he was unfamiliar with the Canberra, FS DarbY never-
theless controlled the pilot's approach and brought the aircraft safely
down onto the runway . On another o c c a s ion -again at night-he
"brought in" three Dakotas w h i c h had been d i v e r t e d to his station
because of bad weather at their base . Among the passengers on board
the Daks were the (then) Iviinister of National Defence and 18 Army VIPs .

*
FS J . DARSY

2 0
devoted to the problem, including investigations by the Meteorological
Service of Canada . 90° 80° 60 °

So that further research may be more readily carried out, a tech-

n i c a 1 report, entitled "The Jet Stream", has been prepared and pub-
lished under a contract between Project AROWA of the U n i t e d States
Bureau of Aeronautics and the University of Chicago . T h i s document
provides a complete evaluation and summary of all applicable jet stream
information up to the beginning of 1953 . Every study has shown that jet
101 0 100 K ---"
_120 K _. '
streams, as part of the prevailing westerlies, are largely confined to VqpK'
the regions between the 30th and 60th parallels of latitude and are close-
ly associated with frontal systems . Their cores are at the troPoPause
level, almost directly above the 500 millibar position of the associated
front, where the tropopause often b e c o m e s discontinuous due to its
sudden changes in height over adjacent warm and cold air masses . It is <<
therefore evident that a n y frontal s u r f a c e separating air masses of
sufficiently different temperatures c a n support its own jet s t r e a m . 00 K

Because t h e y are closely connected with f r o n t a 1 systems, jet

streams tend to meander over a broad area. Normally there is a west-
1_i
erly component to the direction of the winds ; on r a r e occasions there
may e v e n be an easterly component . In th e winter, wind speeds in a
well-developed jet stream may range from 150 to *ell over 200 knots ; 40 K
in summer, because temperature differences between a i r masses are
not so marked, wind speeds are somewhat lower . They are also gener-
ally less in j e t streams associated with w a r m fronts than those with
cold fronts .
90° 80° 700

As for dimensions, it has been found that, at the level of a well- Fig 2 - Isota.oh anal,ysis, showing velocity mAxima alonq a jet axis .
developed jet's core, the horizontal width of the zone of wind speeds
exceeding 70 knots is roughly 300 nautical miles . The vertical extent
of the zone is of the order of 15,000 to 20,000 feet, which represents a are the 300-and 200-millibar constant-pressure charts, representing
decrease in speed of approximately 10 to 15 knots every 1000 feet above h e i g h t s - in these latitudes-of approximately 30,000 and 40,000 feet
and below the core . In addition, wind speed drops off more rapidly on respectively .
the cold side of a jet axis than on the warm side . Typical values are a
decrease of 60 to 80 knots per 100 nautical miles on the cold side and The data from which these charts a r e prepared are supplied from
25 to 50 knots per 100 nautical miles on the warm side . The axis o f a relatively widely-scattered localities w h e r e upper air soundings are
jet stream may completely encircle the earth . More often it is broken made bywireless and radar . In most cases thedistance between report-
into several sections some thousands of miles in length and sometimes- ing points is so great that conventional analyses o f upper-level charts
in the case of a dissipating jet-into several relatively short "fingers" are of little value and recourse has had to be made to new methods . The
of high-velocity winds . There is a decided 1 a c k of uniformity in wind present method employed in connection with jet streams is isotach (line
speed along the axis . Here a succession of velocity maxima alternate of equal wind speed) analysis . This method, however, presents its own
with areas of relatively weak winds, all of w h i c h move along the axis difficulties in that winds to the desired heights are not always available
in the direction of the jet stream flow. 0 0 and frequently have to be computed . These and similar difficulties, in
conjunction with the inadequate coverage of high-level wind reporting
Despite the wealth of knowledge which has been accumulated, it is stations, are not conducive to consistently reliable forecasting .
still no s i m p 1 e matter to f o r e c a s t all the details of a jet stream's
NOTE : In the next issue of FLIGHT COMMENT,
activity . Wind directions are normally reliable ; but maximum velocities Mr . Johnstone will conclude his article
and the exact location of the jet axis and its subsequent movements are with a discussion on clear air turbulence
much m ore difficult to derive . The principal tools of th e forecaster and condensation trails .

6
where the alligator clamp ought to be attached . In o r d e r that the clip
itself will function properly, it must be fastened as closely as possible
to the web strap so that no strain will be applied to the connectors . This
can best be done by attaching the clip to the loose end of the web strap
and making c e r t a i n the strap is positioned s o that the load is pulling
across th e fastener r a th e r than lifting the button from it . One other
m e t h o d of attaching the clip is to fasten it to the s e a t harness . The
objection to this is that movement of the body may change the relative
$I
positions of the web strap and the alligator clip, thus inducing an inad-
vertent disconnect .

10
W e at DFS sincerely hope that the information contained in this
article will stimulate readers to give s o m e extra thought to the safety "A loud roar was heard f rom b e h i n d the pilot's seat a n d a sharp
features incorporated in their flying gear . They are there for a definite shudder was felt ." "At approximately 380 knots the pilot heard a noise
p u r p o s e and there is no reason why they shouldn't be used . The next
and the aircraft started to vibrate . In flight, p ilot was advised by his
time y o u climb into that aircraft, try out the hookup suggestions we've wingman th a t his starboard ammunition d o o r was missing ." "It was
made here and see for yourself how those features can be used to ad- noticed that the canopy was open one and one-half inches . After an un-
vantage . successful attempt to close it, the canopy to r e away in the slipstream
along with both crash helmets ." "The radio had fallen out, apparently
because the supporting panel had not been properly fastened ."

THE OLD ORDER CHANGETH

These quotations are all extracts f r o m a few of the too-numerous
A new AFAC pertaining to t h e reporting a n d investigation of
reports received d e a 1 i n g with the disappearance of bits and pieces of
aircraft accidents has been published. The reference is AFAO 21 .56/01,
AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS -REPORTING AND INVESTIGATION . aircraft during flight . In some cases, pilots were named responsible
This
order, dated 7 Jan 55, replace AFAO A6/3 . A useful c h e c k list f o r for the loss ; in others, maintenance was at fault . A third type of assess-
quick reference is outlined in Appendix "B" . The differences between ment placed the blame equally on pilots and maintenance . However, the
the old and the new orders will be apparent from this appendix . inescapable conclusion is that if pilots had noticed loose panels during
the pre-flight inspection, and unlocked or partly-open canopies during
the pre-takeoff check, the se occurrences would never have happened .
Improperly-fastened panels have produced a wide variety of results .
GETTING YOURS7 They have caused f a t a 1 accidents . They have also damaged wings and
tailplanes . In the lucky cases, damage was limited to the loss of the
Here is a list of the A .I .BRIEFS published by the RCAF's Director-
panels .
ate of Flight Safety during the past year . If you haven't been seeing
them, check with your Flight Safety Officer or the unit publications
section . External pre-flight inspections are done to ensure, a m o n g other
things, that detachable or h i n g e d panels are firmly secured a n d that
BEHIND THE 8-BALL AT ALTITUDE-YOUR LINK WITH LIFE dzus fasteners are 1 o c k e d so that slots a r e aligned properly with the
indicators painted on the panels . During your check, remember NOT to
AIR -TO-AIR YOUR PLIERS CAN KILL 0 0 hammer panels s o violently with your fist that you damage them . Such
treatment can lead to bending and distortion-and subsequent loss of the
DANGEROUS DEBRIS KNOW THAT BROWN PUFF panels in flight . Panels found to be insecure should be correctly fixed
before the aircraft's engine is started up . Pilots should always bear in
JET BLAST FROIN
mind that, although the securing of panels is primarily the responsibility
of groundcrew, it is the pilot's responsibility to ENSURE before takeoff
that those panels are fastened .

10 0 40
ii
 equipment and of the physiological aspects of oxygen use . Let us ex-
amine this accusation . You are responsible for a pre-flight c h e c k of
your oxygen equipment P r i o r to takeoff . If properly done, this check
will as sure that Y o u r complete system, including the mask and regu-
lator, are serviceable and that you have sufficient oxygen for the flight .
THERE IS NO EXCUSE FOR A N Y 0 N E TAKING 0 F F WITH UNSER-
VICEABLE EQUIPMENT! And the 1 i k e 1 i h o o d of an unserviceability
occurring in flight is rather remote-as we will point out later . If you
get into trouble then, the most probable cause is your own lack of know-
ledge or misuse of your equipment .

Why is so much importance attached to the use of oxygen? Without

going into the physiological aspects (which have been fully covered by
your M.O .) there is one indisputable reason : YOU NEED IT TO LIVE .
It is as simple as that and as important as that ; and the higher y o u go
the more vital oxygen becomes .

I n a complex modern aircraft there are many things which can go

wrong -and they sometimes do . L o s i n g the use of certain equipment
may make flying difficult or even impossible ; but you may still make a
safe landing or, at worst, successfully abandon your aircraft . That is
the important thing : Most damaged equipment may adversely affect
your aircraft and yet leave you in
c o m P 1 e t e command of all your
faculties-including y o u r ability
to make decisions . This is not the
c a s e with oxygen . Oxygen a n d
oxygen alone affects you and your
personal performance .

The greater your height when

any other aircraft unserviceability
occurs, the 1 o n g e r the time you
have in which to make a decision .
Exactly the reverse situation i s
true when your oxygen equipment
i s involved : The higher you are,
Recent issues of FLIGHT COMMENT (and its predecessor, "Crash the less time you have . For ex-
Comment") have contained articles on anoxia, hyperventilation, oxygen ample, if y o u have a flameout at
40, 000 f e e t in a T-33, you have
equipment and other subjects associated with the use of oxygen . Why
roughly 20 minutes in which t o
has so much emphasis been placed on this one topic when there are so
decide whether to f o r c e land o r
many other interesting aspects to high-altitude flying? The answer is # 0 abandon your aircraft . At a cabin
simple . There have beentoo many accidents, incidents and near misses
altitude of 30, 000 feet, w i th o u t
in which oxygen or oxygen equipment was a contributing factor .
oxygen you have o n e to two min-
utes before becoming unconscious ;
Why is thi s so? Well, although maintenance and equipment may
and you would not b e in complete a sense cve - ez J
have been contributing factors in a few instances, the main cause was
command of your senses during
AIRCREW'S LACK OF KNOWLEDGE-lack of k n o w 1 e d g e of oxygen t
12 10 13
the whole of that time . The crisis is heightened by the f a c t that there Summing up, then, it does not appear that there is anything com-
are no horns, clanging bells or flashing lights to warn you at the onset plicated o r troublesome about an o x y g e n system . Nevertheless, i t
of anoxia . You have only a p r e s s u r e gauge, a blinker and your own would be wise to look closely into the sort of problem that could arise .
senses . Unfortunately the effects of anoxia are such that your senses, The big headache is ANOXIA . If it ever overtakes you, it will have
rather than warn you, often react oppositely and f i 11 you with a sense sprung from one of these six causes :
of wellbeing which persists until it is too late . RARY
No oxygen in the system
10 LIBRARY COPY-this
Pressure line to the regulator blocked pub must be retur?Led.
Discouraged? You have no need to be, because the odds are large-
t
1Y in your favor . However, it is i m p o r a n t
to realize that, because High outward leakage causing excessive loss of oxygen
your senses are not entirely reliable where anoxia is concerned, you
must depend to a high degree on Y o u r personal oxygen equipment and Regulator diaphragm torn or high inward leakage between you
the aircraft's oxygen system . How reliable is this equipment? Let's and the regulator causing excessive dilution of oxygen
take a look at it . The A-13A oxygen mask h a s been i n use f o r some
time . Although there have beencomplaints about its comfort, function- Loose mask allowing excessive dilution of oxygen
ally it performs very well . Its serviceability can be determined quickly
by a few simple tests prior to flight and there is little possibility of it Inadvertent disconnect w i t h complete deprivation of oxygen .
becoming unserviceable during flight .
Possibly a little discussion of each cause would be in order . One
step in the pilot's pre-flight c h e c k is an examination o f the contents
In addition to the mask you have an emergency and bailout assembly $ a u g e to ensure that he has sufficient oxygen for his trip . He should
which, when connected to the A2 disconnect, provides a second oxygen also check this gauge periodically while enroute . If these precautionary
system entirely independent of the aircraft system . By pulling a handle measures are conscientiously comp_ lied with there is n o possibility of
you may provide yourself with a constant flow of oxygen for a period of taking off with little or no oxygen
from seven to ten minutes- ample time to get you down to a safe alti- aboard the aircraft-or running
tude . Obviously these units have not beenfully appreciated in the past ; out of oxygen in flight .
it h a s been found that some a i r c r e w do not even carry them, while
others fail to plug them in . There is on record one instance of a pilot S h o u 1 d the pressure line to
who was noted c a r r y i n g around an empty one . The boys in the back the regulator break, the contents
room call that sort of thing "cutting down on your odds" . gauge will drop q u i c k 1 y to zero
and the blinker s top blinking . If
the line is blocked, the b 1 i n k e r
Now for the aircraft system itself . All oxygen units consist essen- action will stop .
tially of the following : cylinders to hold the oxygen supply, a regulator,
a blinker, contents gauge, and the necessary piping and connections . High outward leakage will de-
Aside from leaks which may develop, there is little that can happen to plete the oxygen supply when the
the oxygen cylinders or to the plumbing between cylinders and regulator . regulator is delivering pressure .
Aircrew should have no worry in that quarter . Leaks in the tubing be- This could be caused by poor con-
tween regulator and mask are another matter . However, if you make a nections between you and the reg-
proper pre -flight check you should discover these leaks easily and b e ulator or by a hole in the regulator
able to have them rectificd prior to takeoff . T h e regulator is a rela- diaphragm . Outward leaks can be
tively simple device which, as the name implies, regulates the flow of discovered p r i o r to takeoff pro-
0 0
oxygen to ensurc that a proper ratio of oxygen to cabin air is available vided an adequate preflight check
for all altitudes up to approximately 30, 000 feet-at w h i c h point 100 is made .
per cent o x y g e n is supplied . Beyond 30, 000 feet, the regulator will
supply oxygen u n d c r pressure either as selected by aircrew or auto- Regulators are replaced every
matically . six months so that a torn dia- not ee r 1r v~ ;K_0 snel
* phragm is a remote possibility in

14 0 15
the cause list . Additionally, it i s considered that the tear would have
to be a f a i r size to a f f e c t the oxygen dilution characteristics of the
regulator . If you d o a proper preflight check for outward leakage you
are also d o i n g an adequate inward leakage check . This statement is
based on the assumption that any hole, tear, or poor connection in the
tubing or diaphragm will cause both outward and inward leakage .
';l
A loose mask will cause excessive inward leakage of air which will
result in excessive dilution of the oxygen delivered to your lungs . If
you do your preflight and inflight mask checks you should have no wor-
ries .

There are indications that a n u m b e r of inadvertent disconnects

have occurred . The possibility that they may have been the c a u s e of
some f a t a 1 accidents cannot be discounted . You should make certain
before takeoff that you are connected up properly-a detail which ought
to be included as part of your i nf 1 i gh t check, particularly after you
have P e r f o r m e d any manoeuvre that may have put a strain o n your
accordion tubing .
by
W /C H . Pearce

From the preceding paragraphs it is obvious that, if you carefully

complete the recommended-and tested-oxygen checks, there is little
risk of finding yourself upstairs with unserviceable equipment and suf-
READERS will remember that an article entitled "Storage and
fering from anoxia . When you have inspected that equipment and found Handling of Jet Fuels" appeared in the First Quarter issue of
it shipshape, you can have every confidence in it . If, flying alone, you FLIGHT COMMENT for 1954 . W/C D.D . Cunningham, Chief Tech-
suddenly become a w a r e that you are not feeling up to snuff for some nical Officer at 6 R e p a i r Depot, Trenton, took a close look and
reason, don't waste time musing about y o u r condition . Rip d o w n to decided he just couldn't "buy" it until he had asked a few questions
first,
10,000 feet and think about it there-and then go through those check8
to make sure that everything is OK . He asked those questions in a letter to the editor, and author-
itative answers were supplied for us by W/C Pearce who is Direct-
Never tangle with anoxia . It's a fight n o man can win, because or of Vehicle and Marine Engineering . First we'll quote from W/C
Cunningham's letter and then turn the chair over to W/C Pearce .
oxygen lack is a tough customer . Give him one c h a n c e to throw you
and you may s t a y down for the count . 0 xy g e n trouble or no oxygen
trouble-the choice is mainly up to you . Keep an eye on that equipment
and you'll never have an anoxia "Near Miss"!
W/C CUNNINGHAM :

Hyperventilation has not been discussed i n this The article on "Storage and Handling of Jet Fuels" has raised some
article because it was d e a 1 t with fully in "The queriesabout Presentaireraft refuelling practices which, to the bestuf
Facts on Hyperventilation", by W/C J .C . Wickett, my knowledge, are c o m m o n at most RCAF units . I n the footnote to
which a p p e a r e d in the First Quarter issue of o is the article the statement is made that "Chains dragged behind refuelling
FLIGHT COMMENT for 1954 .-ED .
tenders for the purpose of dissipating static are useless . . . . . . . The only
safe way to handle tenders is to bond from tank to ground and aircraft
to ground etc-Procedures covered by the appropriate EOs . . . . . . . . . . . . . " .

EO 00-25-6, 13 Mar 53, "Safety Precautions-Refuelling o f Air-

craft," is, I assume, the appropriate EO referred to . Under the head-

16 0 0 17
 ,rl
1

ing "Static Electricity," it is stated in Para 10 that, "Before refuelling Many experiments w e r e made
or draining operations commence, both the tender and aircraft must be over the y e a r s but the problem of
individually grounded and a bonding cable connected between the tender static o n air s u r v e y film was not
and aircraft before removing the filler cap" . In practice it has always overcome until wartime research
been accepted that th e ground chain on the refuelling t e n d e r and the into high altitude photo reconnais-
ground chain on the aircraft individually grounded the tend e r and the sance b e c a m e a pressing matter .
aircraft . The modern jet aircraft-Sabre, T-33 and Canuck, are equip- This research showed that you can-
ped with grounding chains f o r this purpose . In the light of DIVIM's in- not prevent static discharge ; you can
formation about the uselessness of grounding chains, the accepted re- only surround the object t o be pro-
fuelling practice must be unsafe . tected in such a manner as to guide
the discharge away from it . Insofar
Para 13 of the article details the grounding sequence and reference as air cameras a r e concerned this
is made t o "an approved and identified ground" . The implication is, consists in housing them in compart-
therefore, that approved grounding points are available on the tarmacs ments, the temperature of which is
or aprons where refuelling is normally carried out . I have never seen regulated so that component p a r t a
grounding p o i n t s in the tarmacs or aprons at any unit w h e r e I have are not subject t o violent temper-
been-even those operating jet aircraft . How, then, can the tender and ature changes but remain throughout
aircraft be s a f e 1 y grounded? Possibly y o u r informant in DMM can in the "comfortable realm" . There
enlighten rrie on this point and also as to what constitutes an "approved are more details to the a c t i o n but
ground" . Do the present RCAF specifications for tarmacs and aprons this statement comprises the basic
on jet units call for the installation of grounding points? principle .
*
T
W/G PEARCE : A lot of people are under the false impression that static is gener-
ated on a cold, clear day but not at all o n a warm, humid one . This is
Y o u r correspondent shows a healthy doubt regarding our findings not so, as the phenomenon of the thunderstorm should show . The dif-
so far on the effects of static o n refuelling tender operations . This is ference is only that when a charge is generated during humid weather it
a good thing if such a viewpoint leads eventually to widespread realiza- is more likely to bleed off than accumulate . That is why you seldom get
tion o f the dangers involved and to demands that corrective action be a w a 11 o P from the door handle of your car in the summer but receive
taken. The dangers are real-not imaginary . Possibly then the editor- many a s h o c k on touching it in winter . All of which brings us down to
ial chair will allow a bit more space than usual to recount what little we actual facts and the w a y in which they a f f e c t RCAF refuelling tender
do know about the subject . operations .

Benjamin Franklin, whatever else h e contributed t o American If the layman is to have a better understanding of static and refuel-
history, is b e s t remembered a s the physicist who f i r s t proved that ling tenders he must first recognize that when two dissimilar substances
clouds somehow have the ability to generate an electrical current. His are either rubbed together or pass each other rapidly and in close prox-
experiments with a kite, string and a d o o r key are t o o well known to imity, an electrical current o f high potential may be generated . Comb
repeat . That this was not an isolated incident is adequately proved at and hair, silk and glass, clouds and earth-and aircraft fuel and hose .
the moment t h i s is being written . A severe, early-evening electrical These are examples of substances which r e a c t with each other in this
storm has plunged the writer's home into darkness and stimulated him way . Usually the magnitude of the charge is proportional to the area of
to reflect further on the subject of static and its effect on RCAF oper- the object . There are a good many square feet of surface area to a re-

$ 0
ations . fuelling tender or an aircraft . If the potential of one is positive and of
the other negative and these two bodies are brought together, an elect-
The RCAF first encountered difficulty due to static phenomena dur- rical discharge will take place ; and i f contact is between the refuelling
ing the mid-1920s . At that time, during early air survey work, many hose nozzle and the aircraft's tank, a fire may be the result . May be?
rolls of air survey film were ruined b y "spiderlike" markings which, It has been-to the tune of one air c r a f t and one refuelling tender last
running throughout the film, obscured the photographic image s o as to year . "But", our correspondent says, "what of the grounding chains on
make the film unprintable . our CAS can vouch for this ; he reflew many the tender and the grounding chain on the tail wheel of the aircraft?" A
otherwise excellent photo lines ruined by this bugaboo .
fair question, but one for which the wrong a n s w e r has cost the RCAF
heavily .
18 V W 19
 have also been duplicated successfully and repeatedly in laboratory ex-
Some months ago, following no less than twelve separate refuelling
periments . For example, there was a t e ride r being filled f r o m bulk
tender fires in various parts of the country, an exhaustive investigation
s t o r a g e via one of the manholes . The cover had b e e n removed and,
w a s held . (Indeed it still goes on .) Several of these f i r e s originated
though resting on the top o f the vehicle, was insulated f r o m it by a
apparently with defective mechanical design . The causes of others re-
synthetic rubber gasket . Just at this time some "cu-nimb" clouds
mained elusive . During investigation the RGAF turned over two tenders
passed overhead . As he was replacing the cover, the operator actually
to the National Research Council f o r measurement of suspected elect-
saw a spark jump from it to the manhole edge . In the resulting "bang"
rical potential . Subsequent experiments revealed that these tenders
he was fortunately b 1 o w n clear . Investigators came to the conclusion
were veritable electrical condensers on wheels . There were differences
that a passing cloud had differentially charged the cover while it rested
in potential in pumps, tank and chassis . Most important, however, was
insulated from the tank . T he y subsequently duplicated the situation in
the discovery that the "static grounding chains" had an electrical resist-
a laboratory using a small, scale-model tender .
ance of 2 x lOB ohms . In other words, the chain is useless as a ground .
It may interest our correspondent (W /C Cunningham) to know that high-
On another occasion a fuel transport vehicle backed up to the steel
way traffic acts are being amended so that the static chain on fuel trucks
deck of a platform at a bulk storage depot so that a discharge tap a t the
will no 1 o n g e r be a compulsory fitting . On the writer's desk, as this
rear of the vehicle came in contact with the deck . T h e r e was a spark
article is being written, are several synthetic rubber straps which have
and the ensuin g fire destro yed both vehicle and tank storage . Once again
been submitted by one of the rubber companies as a satisfactory ground-
laboratory experiments confirmed that a static discharge, made possible
ing medium . They are going to be tested ; but even if they are success-
by inadequate grounding, was the most likely cause . While this was not
ful there will still be no room :or relaxing vigilance .
an RCAF accident, we have lost a b u 1 k fuel storage compound and two
tenders under conditions that are suspiciously similar . There are re-
ports on r e c o r d of differential static c h a r g e s building up to such a
potential on both vehicles and aircraft that a discharge took place between
Now to other aspects of the sub-
a whe e 1 rim and the ground, exhibiting a force sufficient to perforate
ject . JP fuels were once thought to
the tire casing . Such incidents are well documented .
be "much safer to handle" than high
octane gasoline . This is not so for
two basic reasons . Firstly, there is
some evidence that kerosene fuels Finally, an answer to your correspondent's query on grounding lugs .
flowing through refuelling hose gen- These were installed in several RCAF stations even before the last w a r .
erate static charges to a much great- There are lugs inside hangars at Rockcliffe and T r e n to n and in many
er degree than pure gasoline fuels . concrete aprons there are so-called "hold down rings" which resistance
Besides, we refuel at higher speeds investigation may show to be capable of acting as ground lugs . The lat-
today and the r ate of flow-two to est installation is at Torbay where new hardstand incorporates a metal
four hundred gallons per minute - mesh and lugs . TCA have asked the RCAF to install grounding lugs at
aggravates the situation . Secondly, units used by our civil airlines as stopping points . Greenwood, N .S .,
because of the lower volatility of JP is one of these . CAA in the U .S . now makes grounding lugs a compulsory
fuels, spillage will linger in odd feature in airport design, and the possibility of using s u c h fittings i n
pockets as an explosive v a p o r for RCAF installations w h e r e they do not now e x i s t is b e i n g explored .
prolonged periods . Highoctane, va-
porizing quickly and rising, is car- Until the s e are a reality, the best we can do is make certain that
ried away rapidly by e v e n a slight a good electrical bond exists between tender and aircraft . Only bonded
breeze . During aninvestigation that wire or approved conducting hose s h o u 1 d be used in tenders . (One of
f o 11 o w e d a vapor fire, an airman the burned tenders had been fitted with red steam hose) . Bond to ground
identified a tender a s the "one that whenever and wherever possible . If a tire casing is mysteriously dam-
a 1 w a y s left a pool of fuel under it a g e d don't rule out static . Finally, if we s ti 11 do not know too much
following refuelling operations" . about static-and n o n e of us do-let us at 1 e a s t recognize that static
potential and modernaircraft fuels are a bad combination . Laboratory
What about c o n f i r m e d static experiment has shown that the flow of one drinking glass full of static-
phenomena? S o m e have n o t only charged water c a n ignite a fuel v a p o r of explosive mixture . A spark
been uncovered by investigation but plug is not required .
Z1
20
 `'
time his aircraft reached 10, 000 feet, the hyperventilation had ceased,

zip< his anxiety had been allayed, and the pilot was capable of making a nor-
mal descent .

T wo puzzling discoveries c am e of thi s particular "Near Miss" .

1 1 Interrogation of a 11 pilots in the squadron disclosed that ONLY A FEW

OF THEM really understood the operation of the Al 3A mask . Examin-
ation revealed that many of the inlet valves were so dirty that exhalation
could have been rendered difficult-a state o f affairs which existed
i despite lectures by the station medical officer covering the proper use

I and care of oxygen masks . The entry of small amounts of dust-part-

icularly d u r i n g the summer-can occur at a n y time and will prevent
proper closure of the inlet valves in your mask .
CASE OF THE DIRTY iNLET VALVE
What do e s all this tell us? What have we learned? Nothing new,
really . It's the same old story . But in case you happen to be the "could-
An eight-plane Sabre formation was flying at 38, 000 when one of the n't care less" type, here it is again . By re-printing it we might save
pilots experienced a sensation "as though he wa s pressure breathing ." your life
His aircraft suddenly slid out u n d e r the formation and fell into an un-
controlled dive . Repeated calls o n the RT failed to elicit a response CHECK THE OPERATION OF YOUR MASK BEFORE EVERY
from the plunging plane . Down i t went-until, at about 10, 000, it sud- FLIGHT
denly levelled out and the pilot's voice came t h r o u g h to the formation
leader to say that he was OK and returning to base . HAVE YOUR MASK CHECKED BY SAFETY EQUIPMENT
SECTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH LOCAL REGULATIONS
A f t e r landing, the aircraft was examined by a n instrument tech- AND EO 20-115LB-2 (dated 29 Mar 54)
nician who blew into the hose leading from the regulator, succeeded in
producing a hissing noise in it, and concluded that a leak had developed
in the diaphragm . The regulator was r e m o ve d and forwarded to IAM
where it was tested-and found fully serviceable!

Later the pilot was interviewed in detail . During the exchange of

questions and answers i t became evident that the "pressure breathing"
he referred to c o u 1 d have arisen because of a faulty inlet valve . With
this possibility in mind, an experiment was performed on the pilot while
he was sitting in a Sabre cockpit : Unknown to him, a scrap of paper was
slipped beneath one inlet valve in his mask, m a ki ng it unserviceable .
While doing a preflight check of the oxygen equipment, he encountered I
the trouble and described the resulting sensation as "possibly similar"
to what he h a d experienced at 38, 000 just before he became partly un-
conscious . When the scrap of paper was removed, the mask functioned
normally . "

The conclusions reached were that t h e pilot experienced difficulty

exhaling due to a dirty inlet valve ; and that he became anxious, hyper-
ventilated, and consequently made himself partially unconscious. Anxiety
was 1 i k e ly stimulated by the fear that he was anoxic . Luckily, by the

22
 1 ~I

" .

X
i
11 J1
IN AN AIRFORCE like ours -dedicatedprimarily tofighter operations -
the importance of skilled formation flying cannot be overrated . The
"lone wolf" fighter pilot has little chance of s u r v i v a 1 in modern high !
4: 1 IL ILII114~s ~
a t t a i n such a d e g r e e of proficiency, a pilot must practise often and
practise hard, and have plenty of confidence in his own ability . He must
speed air warfare . Dayfightershave to workas a team, and todo so the
be keen and aggressive-but also smooth, alert and SAFE! Careless-
pilots must be capable of maintaining a high degree of formation integ-
ness or over-enthusiasm can-and of te n does-result inbroken aero-
rity, sometimes under the most exacting conditions . If a pilot becomes planes and pilots and ill-humour all round . Flight Saf ety in formation
separated fromhis formation in a combat area, he courtsdisaster him-
is really just plain commonsense and s o u n d air discipline . Except in
self and d e n i e s his team-mates the cross-cover he afforded them  certain unforeseen circumstances, preflight briefings should be followed
to the l e t t e r and the flight leader's orders and signals obeyed without
The smallest effective combat unit is a pair of aircraft, and every fail . But enough of this preaching! Let us take a look at a typical four-
function normally performed by a single ai r c r a f t is executed by th e plane formation exercise and see if we can uncover a few of the pitfalls
pair- f r o m takeoff right t h r o u g h to a GCA approach . Obviously, to common to this phase of flying .

24 0 " 25
 soon as possible, there is not much to worry about . Stay on the ball at
BRIEFING
the momentyou become airborne and be prepared to correct for a wing-
Preflight briefing i s a "must" . drop . Join-up after takeoff is a somewhat sensitive period . The leader
Here the leader lays down the whole may have throttled back and is probably in a turn . Overtaking and clos-
ing simultaneously requires a lot of judgment ; but if you appreciate that
plan of an exercise . He s h o u 1 d do
you are at a critical stage of the flight and attempt your approach care-
so c 1 e a r 1 y and comprehensively,
fully, you have no need to be apprehensive about an expensive grinding
covering everything f r o m preflight
noise . Should you overtake too fast, forget about trying to go through
inspection to engine shutdown . Flight
the leader . Aim to pass alongside and below, s o that you can maintain
call signs , R /T frequencies (and
visual contact . Then start again . Make the "happy medium" your guide-
action in event of R /T failure), take -
there is no need to lag be hi nd on a join-up, but a little care will also
off and form-up procedure, power
avoid the bull-in-the-china-shop routine . Should you be number 3 in a
settings, cockpit and oxygen checks,
formation and have a wing man formating on you during this procedure,
proposed area of operation, expected
e ta clouds and weather-these items are
avoid harsh c o n t r o 1 or p o w e r movements . Although your wing man
s h o u 1 d not be "tucked in" at this s t a g e of the formation, take it for
just as vital as the details of forma-
granted that he is and govern your movements accordingly .
tion procedures and changes of position or leadership . Flight leaders
should remember to address their briefing to the weakest and most in-
experienced member present, overlooking nothing . Ho w often the old, CLOSE FORMATION
experienced hands tend t o skip lightly over points which are obvious tq
them but frighteningly new to some up-and-coming lad who is to fly Join-up will most 1 i k e 1 y be into close formation, if o n 1 y for the
"wing "'. Leaders should be particularly watchful for signs of wandering climb, and although it is probably the easiest formation to fly-regard-
attention . Dreamers and know-it-alls are a m e n a c e at any time-and less of position-it is here that most of our accidents occur . The major
deadly in a formation . So bear down at the f i r s t indication of inatten- problem is, as always, the "hot-rock" pilot . In formation this sort of
tiveness . joker becomes more lethal than ever .

One word to the lesser pundits : If you don't know, then ask ques- During briefing, a set interval is customarily devoted to discussion
tions . Preflight briefings are no place f o r a shrinking v i o 1 e t who is of close formation flying as it applies to all members of the formation .
afraid he might ask a foolish question . The answer to the problem that
All, that is, except the boy w o n d e r who is determined to show that he
is plaguing You m a Y mean the difference between triumph and disaster can f 1Y closer than anyone else in the air . (Sad to say, he often does .)
d u r i n$ the f 1 i $h t . So don't swallow it! Spit it out! And be sure you Turbulence, d o wn w a s h from the leader's wing, overcontrolling-all
understand the answer . the s e factors can play a part in the downfall of the overconfident pilot
who is forever trying to 1 e a r n your fuel state from the instruments in
YOUR cockpit .
TAKEOFF AND FORM-UP
Air discipline is one element of formation flying that m u s t be en-
Takeoff in formation, when executed as taught, is a fairly straight- forced . If the briefing calls for a 20-foot separation, then that interval
forward operation with little real hazard involved . Perhaps the biggest should b e maintained throughout the exercise . Right there you have an
problems are overtension and overcontrolin the pilot, two factors which
usually go together .
1 excellent opportunity to demonstrate your p r o w e s s by holding station

I safely . When everyone else in the section attempts to emulate your skill,

Take it easy on those brakes . A tap of brake early in the roll may
be required to keep straight ; but remember that differential brake be-
comes more sensitive as speed builds up . The same a p p 1 i e s to nose ") " __,, t a ., ,r 1

wheel steering which,while useful early in a takeoff roll, becomes a `ri~Yd,~..

potential menace as speed increases . Right from the word "go", RELAX.
F ly your a i r c r a f t smoothly-not with the ends of your frayed nerves . ~~ ILL 1
~~~uu6 1~r
Slipstream and J'etwash can P o s e a problem when pairs are taking
off at short intervals," but if your aim is to get out of the interference as
4A*ilftwt
644 1
1
a.

u%4.~'J vv~) `r
 w ~- ~ x ., ~w _. .b 9 w I'  ~ Z a "- y '-o ~ ~. °' cn
o-° ...~nro G .b a n±o av a ya' M G'°~~`" ~.-o w b
> A'v" K-^Aa',~ :s ~~~oa
P4 .-o°r. qo
~ava ° J)
v '" O oil A (A ° 3 111 't , > ~j A ~+ G w z
r, °' ~ o\ w w 'T O
w ..y N A ~ ~ ^ rp w ~.'17

~ ~
~CA o~nm o~ O
a o'o o ~yQ. `r
.~ .~n. ~D `~A " ~ a 'b
- " . G A `Y A a' ~,a'
-x ~o
." m n A A _m `° ~' - °
~ . ~A y p, ,Ay ~ n ^ ' w
.~ r" ~
w A ~0 v° c ~.
G.'7 ~ A y r. ~ oo ~ ~ <
~ -°'~ A n o n a' ~ n ,y
OAAa "- M- '
F o ~,ti . .~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ° w ~ °'~ ~ n,o ~ ° ~ ? ~a
m O x o H O' '~l re .. . A
G °
~ a. O *
R n Q' ^ ~ ~ A '0 w w V' A F
an
A ~
'" '1w o ~
,.. H :'+ ~' n a n o~ .- O~
~ `~'~
7 r. ta G. n O -1 u+
FA O tn ~°," w ° 7 w T r. p .+ ~ An A ,..
o " ,c aGn wY A~'KO~' o m
o u) A &A CLaa~ y~'=1 n p.~~ :` C y
'd aA ti .. . 1 °",. w :'~ n ° G C~A A
O G A ,y A A Oq A qf
, . . `<w A G ~' wn
r. 3 w °' o y a tri
_ ,~+ . `~ N? r .
A ~ ~ A ~1 a ~'~' .~ Q. ~ A y ~' y O A
fi A A " ~' G, r+,

fD n A N ~" 7 ~ M A ~ ra9 M w C7
En A Ft A ~ C G
U, 1 y
~m r. A ~, A ~ w k .y znTS w w° ~'0 x ti
y A l` ? M ° ~ tA w X " '~' `~ M p y n w 'L1 O
M
C) ~ o ' A n N aL'~a*
n ~
a.awa ° ~a" ~ AF M w`°~ o <~9 "
cr A O '=l . ., O
A~nr.a~'x- p ooa A O r. 7 G ~<
b~°CU:~' x
Lr J

l'1
~'n 3 cr K QS-e ?w E A ~- C C) -G w C7
~° d
_o G M n,o A n th 0-4
A n y 0 O n' y ,~p 
~,~' ~ :
A ~- a A ,
-~-w ..r. C 2, ~< : Ln C)
-n ~A :°_< CLao M °° ~
v:a :3 A y < Cp - " Ci7 A O O O
r :-an z p,,. ~ ..
ao "~ 'd ~ a. w o a" r
< ^'Jr a ~1 a A -f " °' H a' ~' ~, M
- ° y
z un G
a R oo w ,,, c_ .-.
"d~w.^ .~'Z1w a,mw :71 A A ~ a. '^ a'
a t~o p ; ro ro ~ '+ w
O ti O n n ' ~ ~^ vJ+ a n
,. ° G y A N G
° G. A
a t~ r9 ~ '-' (0
o c a ~ .~a ~ b° : c Oo
" ~p N o r ~
O ro "' ~p n n ~°~
a' 't7 !-~ w :" °
A '1 : tA O
A A " ~  r9
C F ~' W
_°' ;.. .w ° ° q
wooaa° .va, f G ~ r, 'b
o "wA~]- ~
n a ° O qI ~t w A C
COVi :1 "o . . ..M w o w o .., U)
bn tn ~ R ~ A
cn .,o R . ~- A A c i
- ~ ~ ,~ ~w
w ~ Z7 n ti O
C) '+ a, a °' . d r~ o
' n ° ~~ ^ ~ o'v-^vA ~ ~ ~~'£,~b K ' F- 0 ,b "C1
F ° n A
~' R
.~ "~dY R'° "~~9°'F
;r .~
w r-
O
w "1 °.
G W_ " ~
.~- . w ,.
=' 0
O ~ ~+ n° 'Y
O. ° C ° _ `< `G ~ a. r~ r+ " ~
n -q ° l~Ja'° o ~AOn
r' C ~ G ~
.y ~y .7 A r ~. '.7"
a z A ~ tY O pp A d Q' q ~
a n
," n , .+ A w a T aA < ro cu ^ a '1 to ~
[vl ~ OV ~. F ~.~ O w ~ w .A., a f~ !_E ~ a
r '1 Oq n ~~'
`"'r° Op ~° n  ti., "
C7 ,wy
Cr .r . I w ° t a O GT "t a a' O ~' .-
!'~ i A fA 1 e+ er `< 00 ~ ~ A `C 00 ~ "1 A A

lop 7
.000

\\\~~'
~o d°°
Oa xO A ~ ~~''
bb " ~ ~ ~ .~~~~,
x a~ A ~ '"'~ A ~" o A A w a'~
o a
O G A , ~ O ~ r, A ~ tn A G O tn
O A En Q" A p `T ~ A O ~. N C+ n
`~ ~+ `T C ti A n P)

-yA ~~cAn0 oNc1q, ~~o =r~a,"`~°'~

o ,r O ~, .dpw
a-e*
a. -cn" ,Z~ ~ ~.` °° ~o A o ~ p ~'~ ~v w cn
-r+ ~" V+ B 'b, v. < b w
o" a, U) A ~+
~ " ~ ~ " p ~ w ,r A A O ~ A
0
~r ~ ~ ~ A A ~ ~ ~ w C~ A ~`~-r :7 ~ .' ~' C
'r " A A .t ~ '~ ~ A ,r' A ce
p ~
t~ '"',~Awap ~A~ ~ dAf~Ap~`'
R' ~*Cn ~ p u ~ ~ r»,w A
p w A G C+ b ~ r- .~ `< n
00 " 0 p 0 cAn 0 a A n PJ 0-
t~ ~ ~ ~ ~' " oOc -`"'
w a'A +a .~ yA A ~.A0'
rA+,
0
O .T.OAq p,1 ~i b p A
p ~ ,t e+ A W T p r* ~1 rr p~ I ~+ F~
A G Q, A n ~ O w C+ 'r I- O A ~n, f~
G O ~-- A , .
f~ pp A p `C ~ < x ~, ~+ M c~ .b ~ A Q, > A ~ " p `t w
Pa ',,~' 0
n n ~. A A v; " .1 O ,.~~. ~+ \\
ct ~,'d w f~ .- A~ ~ G A n
f~ O w n ,. . ~, W P~ ~'! ,"~ n .t ~ r+~ e+ \~\~\ \
~ cn 0 ~ p P~ n C* A ~ O N ~ ~ 9 ~ ~' f~~~ A O' ~ p ~ ~ A d \ \~, ,~
~ ~ ~' .-~ ~, * pOq ~* o ti M cFn w n ~ ~ ~. ;~. a, ti
~~\\\
O p r., A r,,, O A r'~ G :r 'y O 0 A p r+ f1 rr G O
(n
n ~ r .~j N p r"+, '~ H " a'' `~ r cw-f- .7 A A) tGl. ~-r a A ~ O A ~' a Q' P> on n
0 w 0
tTj
En a' ~y ~'A1 ~"..~ F A n ~ r+ . n '~'^ O~ A ~, ,'~ O' '~
a~ " a.A G ~' n
w `-' = ~ Y ~* ~ '_
" c~ ~ A A < U) Gw ar,, ~~.~"
c~~ ~p .~ a a 0 ~,' ~.,
A ACM9, acA°oAA?;,d
ACM9. C+
00 4)
r"~
~-I ~' U, ~ p ~ p ~ d G ~ ~ P'' " N y 'i (/)
A A ~
w ~
~. ~
x a. O A v~ ~' " p p c1 N w O A --t p
0 ~ O 0
cJf p e+ O ~ A O ~ (p " e+ ~ cn A '"'~ e+

ti ~ n O d t~n a O ~ n
C+
O C ~i < G A Y tn p ~ ~ n a ~ ~ A A
A A ~ O O ~ O `<
O ~ G ~ O ~ O F ~ ~ A "
U, O ~ ~.. P? R r+ G
~p O O. n A W ~i 00 A ~ ~-~, .r rr r0., Pr
0 ~ ~ o ~~ o r,~ C~
~' ~,~a y F :~ .a., + ~.,a,o
I#D
A G, ,y F A p
.r,ty ~a ~" " ~A
h
<~'
Aw~ .~x ~'a,GOP °ooAa ~a~'w ~i r
~
~ = ti7 a ~ a n x `' a ~ "M a. a p w 0 ~ " a
~
n w. cn a ~"+ to ~. ~ ~'
~ n A V+ En S, r. " A
~- W ''' tn
n x A ~+ C* ~ CL A
''~ A _ hC l) " ,+ A CT' O
a ,n A " v) a' ,.. A w a ~ w A wG
ati~G~ ~ 'b . cn0
C+ w ° o 9: o ~
0 0 0 C-91
w A ~ n x `~ ~ A ~' a ~. ~ ~ pu A c~ p 4 A ~ . o 00 "
a ~ cn 0 O

O
I
r,,,, I-'<" >
r;, i ~D
~-<
E:fl
 0 it
but after landing he found that
pilot was a b 1 e to return to base safely,
damage* The severe reprimand
his aircraft had suffered C" category
this student remember
and $ 50 .00 fine that were a warded s h o u 1 d help
low flying regulations . He is lucky to be alive,

OVERSTRESS ON FLAG

The pilot was flying as Number /, r,,  %:

~/'/%//,/I%%~~
4 t n a four-plane section, carrying
'
out an air-to-air firing mission at CALL FOR A TUG
13, 000 feet, During the last attack
h e followed in too c 1 o s e 1 y behind
Number 3 and the leader instructed J During a routine flight the pilot reported hydraulic failure . He was
instructed by radio to cancel his exercise, return to base and land . In
both aircraft to break off their at- the circuit it w a s necessary to lower the undercarriage by emergency
tacks . means-after which a successful landing was made . Sufficient brake
pressure remained to slow the Canuck and to turn it off the runway . At
Number 4 with a n airspeed of
approximately 350 knots, pulled back { this point the pilot made hi s mistake . Instead of waiting for a tow, he
elected to t a x i to the parking area . The e n s u i n g total brake failure
0n the control column and immedi- resulted in a collision between the aircraft and two refuelling trucks :
ately induced ahigh-speedstall,
over-stressing the aircraft to 110 12G
and blacking himself outcompletely .
spiral
He was seen to flick off into a
dive and lose several thousand feet
before being able to recover . The
airframe sustained considerable
damage and r e q u i r e d a complete
overhaul . The pilot was lucky in that
he had plenty of altitude at the time
0 f the accident, 0 th e r s have been
less fortunate .

There is no excuse f o r violent

overcontrol," a smoothPressure will
assure a positive pullout whereas a w

sharp "hacking" m o t i o n will most

LOW LEVEL DISASTER

The pilot was authorized to fly, in the solo area, an exercise which
likely result in at least a "mushing"
was to i n c 1 u d e aerobatics, stalls, c 1 i m b i n g and descending turns,
tendency-and possibly an acceler-
ated stall and an uncontrollable flick
manoeuvre . One last word : Violent
1? 0 straight and 1 e v e 1 f lying, and steep turns . His d e t a i 1 also required
practice in forced and precautionary landings at the relief field . Shortly
after t a k e o f f the aircraft was seen a t low level circling a farm-the
or jerky c o n t r o 1 habits picked up home of the pilot's fiancee . Watchers on the g r o u nd saw the aircraft
early in Y o u r flying career will be do a roll between two ba r n s on the property . It was apparent that the
multiplied by hydraulically boosted
pilot, on recovering from th e roll to the left, noticed a t r e e directly
controls in operational aircraft . So
in f ront of him . In t r y i n g to avoid it he p u 11 e d back too hard on the
concentrate on smooth actions :

li 39
 The accompanying photograph shows an accident
prevention bulletin board designed by 105 Communic-
ations & Rescue Flight, Edmonton, for its crew room .
How is flight safety literature displayed at your unit?

W 4) u
TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
DON'T STRETCH THE GLIDE :
ACCIDENTC tPREVENTION
105 R FLICHT
While on final approach on a hot day the pilot suddenly realized he
was undershooting . His corrective a c ti o n consisted merely of easing AI BRIEFS REX RILEY
b a c k on the control c o 1 u rn n with no addition of power . The aircraft
stalled s h o r t of the runway, its wheels striking an embankment in the
- . . .MEMO-
'' r

undershoot area . Following a 50-foot bounce it came down on the run-

I (cl ;,o L:.ti-lI II
.A 1
way . The port undercarriage collapsed on the first contact, the star-
board on the second ; and then fire broke out . The crew abandoned the
. .,1 I ~' ' - e ,ti
' .
aircraft successfully . How often has the warning been repeated about
trying to stretch the glide? The addition of a little p o w e r would have
prevented this accident .

,a a

IR
Rah :

=LICN1
DMf1EN

4V-