Dean Salvador N.

Moya II
Chairperson of Remedial Law Department

Atty. Alma D. Lanzo

Chairperson of Legal Ethics Department

Dean Roderick E. Manzano

Asst. Dean Wilson A. Legaspi
Judge Dionis P. Jacobe
Judge Edgardo B. Bellosillo
Contributors

Department Chairs
State Solicitor Ruben S. Ayson, Jr.
Political Law Department

Atty. Voltaire T. Duano

Labor Law Department

Prof. Jose R. Ortiz

Civil Law Department

Atty. Mark Anthony P. Tamayo, Jr.

Taxation Law

Chief City Prosecutor Aldrin P. Evangelista

Criminal Law

Dean Aristeo R. Cruz

Commercial Law Department

2
 Bar Operations Committee
Political Law and Public International Law
Atty. Charmaine Ann N. Valenzuela (Supervising Lawyer)
Belleza, Jan Pauline - Team Leader; Sibayan, Richard – Asst.
Members: Acosta, Pamela; Bactin, April Joy; Constantino, Alvin;
De Ocampo, Julina; Doctor, Lorenz Benedict; Juan, Rodelito; Llamera, Julie
Ann; Navarro, Mary Anne; Olidan, Mariea; Sanchez, Ferdinand;
Takai, Karah Lykah June; Valoria, Jeric; Villanueva, Rainier Albert

Commercial and Taxation Laws

Atty. Joseph C. Bautista; Atty. Kimgerlie M. Junio (Supervising Lawyers)
Sembrana, Jonel – Team Leader; Balero, Ma. Lourdes – Asst.
Members: Clemente, Jhoanna Luz; Corona, Catherine;
Mercado, Bai Amina Shayen; Reotiras, Lara Jane

Civil Law
Atty. Satriani De Guzman (Supervising Lawyer)
Coso, Catalina , Team Leader; Perez, Mila - Asst.
Members: Bernal, Thea; Canlas, Viene Rebecca; Dela Cruz, Arthur Michael;
Dimaculangan, Leila; Javier, Wincess Julie Ann; Mabuti, Charmaine;
Onera, Martha Cecilia; Sison, Luzviminda; Tambalo, Pamela

Labor Law and Social Legislation

Atty. Waynya P. Valdez (Supervising Lawyer)
Felimon, Jean Lianne – Team Leader; Maninit, Maricris – Asst.
Members: Andres, Alyssa Faith; De La Ros, Ma. Kathyrine Rose; Garcia,
Reynaldo; Gonong, Eduard; Laput, Nicolas III; Regunay, Christian Joseph;
Saguibo, Ma. Josephine; Tagulob, Gizella Kym; Uy-De Mesa, Jhannia

Criminal Law
Atty. Angelica T. Bernardo (Supervising Lawyer)
Del Agua, Athena – Team Leader; Abad, Samuel Edrian – Asst.
Members: Aguilar, Gail; Balan, Ailene Jonel; Bangasan, Roxanne Angela
Claire; Buscar, Gilbert; Butchayo, Marvin; Cabang, John Benedick; Estorque,
Annie; Guinto, Beatriz; Maun, Prencess; Reyes, Mark Andrew; Vargas, Janice

Remedial Law, Legal and Judicial Ethics

Atty. Nezila May M. David; Atty. Mary Jobeth E. Pallasigue
(Supervising Lawyers)
Vicedo, Lloyd David – Team Leader; Garil, Mary Ann – Asst.
Members: Arciaga, Alexie; Cruz, Pilar; Garong, Ivanessa Joy; Palero, Rudilyn;
Prado, Kenneth; Santiago, Vanessa Grace; Talana, Vanessa; Vicada, Jeffrey

3
Executive Board
Atty. Nezila May M. David
Chairperson

Jean Lianne Felimon

Asst. Chairperson

Atty. Mary Jobeth E. Pallasigue

Co-Chairperson

Jonel Sembrana
Asst. Co-chairperson

Lloyd David Vicedo

Adjutant

Ma. Lourdes Balero

Asst. Adjutant

Members
Atty. Joseph C. Bautista
Atty. Angelica T. Bernardo
Atty. Satriani De Guzman
Atty. Kimgerlie M. Junio
Atty. Waynya P. Valdez
Atty. Charmaine Ann N. Valenzuela

Academic Division
Jean Lianne Felimon – Head
Richard Sibayan – Asst.
Mary Ann Garil – Asst.

Layout Division
Jan Pauline Belleza – Head
Maricris Maninit – Asst.

Adviser
DEAN RODERICK E. MANZANO

4
Administrative Officers
Roderick E. Manzano
College Dean

Atty. Wilson A. Legaspi

Assistant Dean

Brother Manuel F. Rufin, Jr.

Ministrong Tagasubaybay

Atty. Ida Marie V. Escolano-Canton

College Secretary

Atty. Gerald Villanueva

Director, Legal Aid Clinic

Staff
Ms. Eunice N. Arenas
Dean’s Office Staff

Mr. Nikko Louise S. Ysagun

Dean’s Office Staff

Mr. Ronald C. Llana

Dean’s Office Staff

Mr. Arnel R. Gomez

Legal Aid Clinic’s Staff

Mr. Loue C. Tolentino

Legal Aid Clinic’s Staff

5
 Table of Contents
Problem Nos.
General Principles .............................................................................................................. 1-15

Civil Procedure to Special Civil Actions ....................................................................... 16-55

Special Proceedings (56 to 70) ......................................................................................... 56-70

Criminal Procedure (71 to 100) ..................................................................................... 71-100

Evidence (101 to 120) .................................................................................................... 101-120

Legal and Judicial Ethics (121 to 150) ......................................................................... 121-150

Relevant Provisions Under CPRA (A.M. No. 22-09-01-SC)

vi
 GENERAL PRINCIPLES

PROBLEM NO. 1: Pochita’s action for sum of money against Denji amounting to
Php80,000 accrued before the effectivity of the rule providing for shortened procedure
in adjudicating claims that do not exceed Php100,000. Pochita filed her action after the
rule took effect. Will the new rule apply to her case?

ANSWER: Yes, procedural rules generally apply prospectively to pending cases.

Remedial statutes or statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which do
not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the
remedy or confirmation of rights already existing, do not come within the legal
conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation of
statutes. A new statute which deals with procedure only is presumptively applicable
to all actions – those which have accrued or are pending. (Cabarios vs. People, G.R. Nos.
228097-103 & 228139-41, 29 September 2021, Lazario-Javier, J.) In this case, Pochita’s
action accrued before the effectivity of the rule, but she filed her action after the rule
took effect. Hence, the new rule shall apply.

------------------------------
PROBLEM NO. 2: What is the doctrine of hierarchy of courts?

ANSWER: The doctrine of hierarchy of courts, as a rule, requires that recourse must
be first made to the lower-ranked courts exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a
higher court. (Dio vs. Subic Bay Marine Exploration, Inc., G.R. No. 189532, 11 June 2014,
Perez, J.)
------------------------------
PROBLEM NO. 3: What are the exceptions to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts?

ANSWER: The exceptions to said doctrine are as follows:

a. Special and Important reasons clearly stated in the petition;

b. When dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public policy;
c. When demanded by the broader interest of justice;
d. When the challenge orders were patents nullities;
e. When analogous exceptional and compelling circumstances called for and
justified our immediate and direct handling of the case.

------------------------------

1
PROBLEM NO. 4: What is the doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference?
ANSWER: It provides that no court has the authority to interfere by injunction with
the judgment of another court of coordinate jurisdiction (Lapu-Lapu Dev’t vs. Group
Management, G.R. No. 141407, 9 September 2002, Panganiban, J.). The rationale for the
rule is founded on the concept of jurisdiction: a court that acquires jurisdiction over
the case and renders judgment therein has jurisdiction over its judgment, to the
exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its execution and over all its incidents, and
to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting in
connection with this judgment. (Barroso vs. Omelio, G.R. No. 194767, 14 October 2015,
Peralta, J.)

------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 5: Amorsolo, a Filipino citizen permanently residing in New York

City, filed with the RTC of Lipa City a Complaint for Rescission of Contract of Sale of
Land against Brigido, a resident of Barangay San Miguel, Sto. Tomas, Batangas. The
subject property, located in Barangay Talisay, Lipa City, has an assessed value of
Php19,700. Appended to the complaint is Amorsolo’s verification and certification of
non-forum shopping executed in New York City, duly notarized by Mr. Joseph
Brown, Esq., a notary public in the State of New York. Brigido filed a motion to dismiss
the complaint on the ground that the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the person
of Amorsolo because he is not a resident of the Philippines. Is there any merit to the
contention?

ANSWER: No. The ground raised lacks merit because jurisdiction over the person of
a plaintiff is acquired by the court upon the filing of plaintiff’s complaint therewith.
In the case of Dilweg vs. Phillips (G.R. No. L-19596, 30 October 1964, Reyes, J.), it was held
that jurisdiction over the persons of the parties is acquired by their voluntary
appearance in court and their submission to its authority, or by the coercive power of
legal process exerted over their persons. Residency or citizenship is not a requirement
for filing a complaint, because plaintiff thereby submits to the jurisdiction of the court.

------------------------------
PROBLEM NO. 6: In connection to the problem above, what if the ground Amorsolo
raised was that the RTC does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action
involving real property with an assessed value of Php19,700 because the exclusive and
original jurisdiction is with the Municipal Trial Court where the defendant resides.
Does it now have merit?
ANSWER: No. It is still without merit because the subject of the litigation, Rescission
of Contract, is incapable of pecuniary estimation, the exclusive original jurisdiction to

2
which is vested by law in the Regional Trial Courts. The nature of the action renders
the assessed value of the land involved irrelevant. (Roldan vs. Spouses Barrios, G.R. No.
214803, 23 April 2018, Peralta, J.)

------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 7: Distinguish jurisdiction from exercise of jurisdiction.

ANSWER: Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is
the authority to decide a cause, and not the decision rendered therein. Where there is
jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, the decision on all other questions
arising in the case is but an exercise of the jurisdiction. And the errors which the court
may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are
the proper subject of an appeal. (Republic vs. G Holding Inc., G.R. No. 141241, 22
November 2005, Corona, J.)

------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 8: Angelina sued Armando before the Regional Trial Court of Manila
to recover the ownership and possession of two parcels of land; one situated in
Pampanga, and the other in Bulacan. May the action prosper? Explain.
ANSWER: No, the action shall not prosper. The action affecting title of possession of
real property is a real action. Under Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, actions
affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein, shall be commenced
and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real
property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.

------------------------------
PROBLEM NO. 9: In connection to the problem above, will your answer be the same
if the action was for foreclosure of the mortgage over the two parcels of land? Why or
why not?
ANSWER: Yes, my answer would still be the same. An action for foreclosure of
mortgage over two parcels of land is still a real action. Under Section 1, Rule 4 of the
Revised Rules of Court, venue in real action lies with the court having jurisdiction
over the place where the real property is situated. Thus, the action of Angelina may
be dismissed.
------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 10: Goodfeather Corporation, through its President, Al Pakino, filed
with the Regional Trial Court a complaint for specific performance against Robert
White. Instead of filing an answer to the complaint, Robert White filed a motion to

3
dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of the appropriate board resolution from
the Board of Directors of Goodfeather Corporation to show the authority of Al Pakino
to represent the corporation and file the complaint in its behalf. The RTC granted the
motion to dismiss and, accordingly, it ordered the dismissal of the complaint. Al
Pakino filed a motion for reconsideration which the RTC denied. As nothing more
could be done by Al Pakino before the RTC, he filed an appeal before the Court of
Appeals. Robert White moved for dismissal of the appeal on the ground that the same
involved purely a question of law and should have been filed with the Supreme Court.
However, Al Pakino claimed that the appeal involved mixed questions of fact and law
because there must be a factual determination if, indeed, Al Pakino was duly
authorized by Goodfeather Corporation to file the complaint. Whose position is
correct? Explain.
ANSWER: Al Pakino is correct in claiming that the appeal involved mixed questions
of fact and law. There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to
what the law is on a certain state of facts. On the other hand, there is a question of fact,
when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of alleged facts (Mirant
Philippines Corporation vs. Sario, G.R. No. 197598, 21 November 2012, Brion, J.). Since the
complaint was dismissed due to the alleged lack of appropriate board resolution from
the Board of Directors of Goodfeather Corporation, the appeal will necessarily involve
a factual determination of the authority to file the complaint for the said corporation.
Hence, the appeal before the Court of Appeals is correct.

------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 11: Santa filed against Era in the RTC of Quezon City an action for
specific performance praying for the delivery of a parcel of land subject of their
contract of sale. Unknown to the parties, the case was inadvertently raffled to an RTC
designated as a special commercial court. Later, the RTC rendered judgment adverse
to Era, who, upon realizing that the trial court was not a regular RTC, approaches you
and wants you to file a petition to have the judgment annulled for lack of jurisdiction.
What advice would you give to Era? Explain your answer.
ANSWER: I will advise Era that a petition for annulment of judgment on lack of
jurisdiction will not prosper. In a similar case decided by the Supreme Court in
Gonzales vs. GJH Land, (G.R. No. 202664, November 20, 2015, Perlas-Bernabe, J.), it was
held that the designation of the said RTC Branch as a Special Commercial Court by no
means diminished its power as a court of general jurisdiction to hear and decide cases
of all nature, whether civil, criminal, or special proceedings. As a court of general
jurisdiction, it still has jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof. Hence, the special
commercial court had jurisdiction to try and decide the action for specific performance
and to render a judgment therein.

4
PROBLEM NO. 12: Juliet, invoking the provisions of the Rule on Violence Against
Women and their Children, filed with the RTC designated as a Family Court a petition
for issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her husband, Romeo. The
Family Court issued a 30-day TPO against Romeo. A day before the expiration of the
TPO, Juliet filed a motion for extension. Romeo in his opposition raised, among others,
the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9262 arguing that the law authorizing the issuance of
a TPO violates the equal protection and due process clauses of the 1987 Constitution.
The Family Court judge, in granting the motion for extension of the TPO, declined to
rule on the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9262. The Family Court judge reasoned that
Family Courts are without jurisdiction to pass upon constitutional issues, being a
special court of limited jurisdiction and R.A. No. 8369, the law creating the Family
Courts, does not provide for such jurisdiction. Is the Family Court judge correct when
he declined to resolve the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9262?

ANSWER: No, the Family Court Judge is not correct when it declined to resolve the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 9262. In Garcia vs. Hon. Rey Allan Drilon (G.R. No. 179267,
June 25, 2013, Perlas-Bernabe, J.), the Supreme Court held that the “Family Courts have
authority and jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute. Despite its
designation as a family court, the RTC remains to possess the authority as a court of
general original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases whether civil, criminal,
special proceedings, land registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or
insolvency. This authority is embraced in the general definition of judicial power to
determine the valid and binding laws in conformity with the fundamental law.”
Hence, the Family Court has jurisdiction over the present case.

------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 13: On July 6, 2017, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office
of the Special Prosecutor, filed two Informations with the Sandiganbayan charging
City Vice Mayor Ranchoddas Chanchad with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019
and Falsification of Public Document under Article 171(2) of the Revised Penal Code
in connection with the appointment of one Pia Nono to the vacant position of
Secretary to the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Angeles City in 2014. At the time of the
commission of the alleged offenses, Ranchoddas Chanchad was the Vice Mayor of
Angeles City, Pampanga, with salary grade 26 as classified under R.A. No. 6758. Does
the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over the case? Explain briefly.
ANSWER: Yes, Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case. Under PD 1606, a Vice
Mayor is one of the positions specifically enumerated where Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction regardless of the salary. In this case, although Ranchoddas Chanchad, has
a salary grade which is below 27, the Sandiganbayan still has jurisdiction over him,
since his position as Vice Mayor is one of the positions specifically enumerated under

5
the provisions of PD 1606. (See Inding vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 143047, July 14, 2004,
Callejo, Sr., J.)

------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 14: On May 15, 1990, Monty was already running late for work. He
parked and left his car at a Loading and Unloading Zone. On May 17, 1990, a
complaint was filed with the prosecutor’s office against Monty by Tyson Parking
Systems Corp. for violation of City Ordinance No. 17. It was alleged that Monty
illegally parked and left his car unattended. The Information was filed with the
Municipal Trial Court on September 8, 1990. The judge dismissed the case on the
ground of prescription. Was the judge correct? Explain briefly.
ANSWER: Yes, the judge is correct. Under the Rules on Summary Procedures, it
provides that violations of City Ordinances are governed by the said rule. The same
rule also provides that violations of City Ordinances shall prescribe after two months
from the time of the commission of the offense and shall be interrupted only upon the
institution of the appropriate judicial proceedings. In this case, the offense was
committed on May 15, 1990 but the information was filed with the MTC only on
September 8, 1990 which is already beyond the prescriptive period of two months.
(Zaldivia vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 102342, 3 July 1992, Cruz, J.)

------------------------------
PROBLEM NO. 15: An unlawful detainer case praying that the defendant vacates the
premises and pays the amount of Php3,000,000 unpaid rentals was filed in the MTC.
Bogart, the defendant, moved to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter and over the person. Will the motion of Bogart prosper? Explain briefly.

ANSWER: No. The motion of Bogart will not prosper. Under the New Rules on
Summary Procedure, (A.M. No. 0-8-8-7-SC) all forcible entry and unlawful detainer
cases are cognizable by the first level courts regardless of the amount of damages or
unpaid rental sought to be recovered. Here, the case involving Bogart is an unlawful
detainer case; thus, he cannot move to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.

------------------------------

6
 CIVIL PROCEDURE TO SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS

PROBLEM NO. 16: A bought a Volvo Sedan from ABC Cars for Php5.0M. ABC Cars,
before delivering to A, had the car rust proofed and tinted by XYZ Detailing. When
delivered to A, the car's upholstery was found to be damaged. ABC Cars and XYZ
Detailing both deny any liability. Who can A sue and on what cause(s) of action?
Explain.
ANSWER: A can file an action for specific performance and damages against ABC
Cars. Under Article 1170 of the Civil Code, it provides that those who in the
performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those
who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages. In this case,
the damage to the Volvo Sedan’s upholstery was caused before the delivery of the
same to A. An action for specific performance against ABC Corporation to deliver the
agreed Volvo Sedan in the contract free form any damage or defects, with
corresponding damages will lie against ABC Cars.

------------------------------
PROBLEM NO. 17: Elise obtained a loan of Php3.0M from Merchant Bank. Aside
from executing a promissory note in favor of Merchant Bank, she executed a deed of
real estate mortgage over her house and lot as security for her obligation. The loan fell
due but remained unpaid; hence, Merchant Bank filed an action against Elise to
foreclose the real estate mortgage. A month after, and while the foreclosure suit was
pending, Merchant Bank also filed an action to recover the principal sum of P3 Million
against Elise based on the same promissory note previously executed by the latter. In
opposing the motion of Elise to dismiss the second action on the ground of splitting
of a single cause of action, Merchant Bank averred that the ground relied upon by
Elise was devoid of any legal basis considering that the two actions were based on
separate contracts, namely, the contract of loan evidenced by the promissory note, and
the deed of real estate mortgage. Is there a splitting of a single cause of action? Explain
your answer.
ANSWER: Yes, there is splitting of a cause of action. Under Section 4, Rule 2 of the
Revised Rules of Court, splitting of a single cause of action is the act of instituting two
or more suits for the same cause of action. In this case, the foreclosure of mortgage
and an action to recover the principal sum of three (3) million based on the promissory
notes arose from the same cause of action, which is the nonpayment of loan.

------------------------------
PROBLEM NO. 18: A sued B in the RTC of Quezon City, joining two causes of action:
for partition of real property and breach of contract with damages. Both parties reside

7
in Quezon City but the real property is in Manila. May the case be dismissed for
improper venue?
ANSWER: No, it shall not be dismissed. Under Section 5, Rule 2 of the Revised Rules
of Court, where the causes of action are between the same parties but pertain to
different venues or jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in the Regional Trial
Court provided one of the causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of said court
and the venue lies therein. Here, the causes of action pertaining to different venues
may be joined in the RTC of Quezon City since one of the causes of action falls within
its jurisdiction.

------------------------------
PROBLEM NO. 19: Spouses Marlon and Edith have three (3) children aged, 15, 12 and
7, who are studying at public schools. They have combined gross monthly income of
Php30,000 and they stay in an apartment in Manila with a monthly rent of Php5,000.
The monthly minimum wage per employee in Metro Manila does not exceed
Php13,000. They do not own any real property. The spouses want to collect a loan of
Php25,000 from Jojo but do not have the money to pay the filing fees. Would the
spouses qualify as indigent litigants under Legal fees, Section 19, Rule 141 of the
Revised Rules of Court?
ANSWER: No. Spouses Marlon and Edith would not qualify as indigent litigants.
Under Section 19 of Rule 141, Indigent litigants who shall be exempt from payment of
legal fees include those (a) whose gross income and that of their immediate family do
not exceed an amount double the monthly minimum wage of an employee; and (b)
who do not own real property with a fair market value as stated in the current tax
declaration of more than three hundred thousand (Php300,000) pesos. Here, the
spouses’ combined gross monthly income of Php30,000 exceeds the limit provided by
Section 19, Rule 141; accordingly, the spouses do not qualify as indigent litigants.
(Section 19, Rule 141, Revised Rules of Court; Administrative Matter No. 04-2-04-SC,
August 16, 2004; Algura vs. Local Government Unit of the City of Naga, G.R. No. 50135, 30
October 2006, Velasco, Jr., J.)

------------------------------
PROBLEM NO. 20: Following the problem above, if the spouses do not qualify as
indigent litigants, what other remedy can they avail of under the Rules to exempt
them from paying the filing fees?
ANSWER: The Spouses can avail the following remedies under the Rules in order to
be exempted from the payment of the filing fees:

8
 a. When the application does not satisfy one or both requirements under Section
19 of Rule 141, then the application should not be denied outright; instead, the
court should apply the "indigency test" under Section 21 of Rule 3 and use its
sound discretion in determining the merits of the prayer for exemption (Algura
vs. Local Government Unit of the City of Naga, G.R. No. 50135, 30 October 2006,
Velasco, Jr., J.). Hence, the spouses may be authorized to litigate as indigents if
the court, upon an ex parte application and hearing, is satisfied that they do not
have money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter, and basic
necessities for themselves and their family (Rule 3, Section 21, Revised Rules of
Court; In re: Query of Mr. Roger Prioreschi, A.M. No. 09-6-9-SC August 19, 2009).
b. The Spouses can also file a motion to sue as indigent under the Rules of
Procedure on Small Claims. The Motion shall be referred to the Executive Judge
for immediate action in case of multi-sala courts. If the motion is granted by the
Executive Judge, the case shall be raffled off or assigned to the court designated
to hear small claims cases. (Section 10, A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC, 2016 Rules of
Procedure for Small Claims Cases)

c. The spouses may also claim exemption from payment of legal fees by seeking
the help of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines pursuant to AM. No. 08-11-7-
SC (IRR), Rule on the Exemption from the Payment of Legal Fees of the Clients
of the Notional Committee on Legal Aid of the Legal Aid Offices in the Local
Chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

------------------------------
PROBLEM NO. 21: Strauss filed a complaint against Wagner for cancellation of title.
Wagner moved to dismiss the complaint because Grieg, to whom he mortgaged the
property as duly annotated in the TCT, was not impleaded as defendant. Should the
complaint be dismissed?
ANSWER: No. The complaint should not be dismissed because the mere non-joinder
of an indispensable party is not a ground for the dismissal of the action. (Section 11,
Rule 3, Rules of Court; Republic vs. Hon. Mangotara, G.R. No. 170375, 7 July 2010,
Leonardo-De Castro, J.)

------------------------------
PROBLEM NO. 22: Following the problem above, if the case should proceed to trial
without Grieg being impleaded as a party, what is his remedy to protect his interest?

ANSWER: If the case should proceed to trial without Grieg being impleaded as a
party, he may intervene in the action (Sec. 1, Rule 19). He may also file a petition for
annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. In Metrobank vs. Hon.

9
Floro Alejo (G.R. No. 141970, 10 September 2001, Panganiban, J.), the Supreme Court held
that in a suit to nullify an existing Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in which a real
estate mortgage is annotated, the mortgagee is an indispensable party. In such suit, a
decision cancelling the TCT and the mortgage annotation is subject to a petition for
annulment of judgment, because the non-joinder of a mortgagee deprived the court
of jurisdiction to pass upon the controversy.

------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 23: Eduardo, a resident of the City of Manila, filed before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila a complaint for the annulment of a Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage he signed in favor of Galaxy Bank (Galaxy), and the consequent foreclosure
and auction sale on his mortgaged Makati property. Galaxy filed a Motion to Dismiss
on the ground of improper venue alleging that the complaint should be filed with the
RTC of Makati since the complaint involves the ownership and possession of
Eduardo's lot. Resolve the motion with reasons.

ANSWER: The Motion to dismiss should be granted. An action for nullification of the
mortgage documents and foreclosure of the mortgaged property is a real action that
affects the title to the property; thus, venue of the real action is before the court having
jurisdiction over the territory in which the property lies (Go vs. United Coconut Planters
Bank, GR. No. 156187, 11 November 2004, Chico-Nazario, J.; Chua vs. Total Office Products
& Services, G.R. No. 152808, 30 September 2005, Quisumbing, J.). Being a real action, it
shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area
where the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated (Section 1, Rule 4,
Rules of Court). The complaint should be filed in the RTC of Makati where the
mortgaged property is situated.

------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 24: After working for 25 years in the Middle East, Evan returned to
the Philippines to retire in Manila, the place of his birth and childhood. Ten years
before his retirement, he bought for cash in his name a house and lot in Malate, Manila.
Six months after his return, he learned that his house and lot were the subject of
foreclosure proceedings commenced by ABC Bank on the basis of a promissory note
and a deed of real estate mortgage he had allegedly executed in favor of ABC Bank
five years earlier. Knowing that he was not in the country at the time the promissory
note and deed of mortgage were supposedly executed, Evan forthwith initiated a
complaint in the RTC of Manila, praying that the subject documents be declared null
and void. ABC Bank filed a motion to dismiss Evan's complaint on the ground of
improper venue on the basis of a stipulation in both documents designating Quezon
City as the exclusive venue in the event of litigation between the parties arising out of

10
the loan and mortgage. Should the motion to dismiss of ABC Bank be granted?
Explain your answer.

ANSWER: No. ABC Bank's motion to dismiss should be denied. In Briones vs. Court
of Appeals (GR. No. 204444, 14 January 2015, Perlas-Bernabe, J.), the Supreme Court ruled
that a complaint directly assailing the validity of the written instrument itself should
not be bound by the exclusive venue stipulation contained therein and should be filed
in accordance with the general rules on venue. The Supreme Court ruled that it would
be inherently inconsistent for a complaint of this nature to recognize the exclusive
venue stipulation when it, in fact, precisely assails the validity of the instrument in
which such stipulation is contained. In this case, Evan's complaint directly assails the
validity of the promissory note and deed of mortgage, which contains said venue
stipulation; hence, said venue stipulation is not binding on him. Evan correctly filed
his complaint with the Manila RTC pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.

------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 25: Abraham filed a complaint for damages in the amount of
Php750,000 against Salvador in the RTC in Quezon City for the latter's alleged breach
of their contract of services. Salvador promptly filed his answer, and included a
counterclaim for Php250,000 arising from the allegedly baseless and malicious claims
of Abraham that compelled him to litigate and to engage the services of counsel, and
thus caused him to suffer mental anguish. Noting that the amount of the counterclaim
was below the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC, Abraham filed a motion to
dismiss vis-a-vis the counterclaim on that ground. Should the counterclaim of
Salvador be dismissed? Explain your answer.

ANSWER: No, Salvador's counterclaim shall not be dismissed. Under Section 7, Rule
6 of the Rules of Court, in relation to the case of Bungcayao vs. Fort Ilocandia (G.R. No.
170483, 19 April 2010, Carpio, J.), it defines a compulsory counterclaim as any claim for
money or any relief, which a defending party may have against an opposing party,
which at the time of suit arises out of, or is necessarily connected with, the same
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's complaint. Further,
in the case of Spouses Arenas vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No 126640, 23 November 2000
Pardo, J.), it explained that a counterclaim is compulsory where: a) it arises out of or is
necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence that is the subject flatter of
the opposing party's claim; b) it does not require the presence of third parties of whom
the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, and; c) the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain
the claim. Moreover, Section 7 of the same Rules explicitly states that in an original
action before the Regional Trial Court, the counterclaim may be considered

11
compulsory regardless of the amount. In this case, Salvador’s claim is compulsory in
nature as it is necessarily connected with his claim.

------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 26: As a new lawyer, Attorney Novato limited his practice to small
claims cases, legal counseling, and the notarization of documents. He put up a solo
practice law office and was assisted by his wife who served as his secretary/helper.
He used a makeshift hut in a vacant lot near the local courts and a local transport
regulatory agency. With this practice and location, he did not have big-time clients
but enjoyed heavy patronage assisting walk-in clients. What role can Attorney Novato
play in small claims cases when lawyers are not allowed to appear as counsel in these
cases?

ANSWER: Atty. Novato may only give counseling and assist claimants in
accomplishing the Statement of Claims and the Affidavits necessary to initiate a small
claims action. He can also notarize the aforementioned documents since the Statement
of Claims and Response are required to be verified. (Section 7, Rules of Procedure for
Small Claims, A.M. No. 8-8-7 SC)

------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 27: What legal remedy, if any, may Attorney Novato pursue for a
client who loses in a small claims case and before which tribunal or court may this be
pursued?

ANSWER: Atty. Novato may file a Petition for Certiorari before the RTC since a
decision in small claims cases is final and unappealable (Section 23, A.M. No. 8-8-7 SC).
The petition for certiorari should be filed before the RTC conformably to the Principle
of Judicial Hierarchy.
------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 28: Mr. Humpty filed with the Regional Trial Court a complaint
against Ms. Dumpty for damages. The RTC, after due proceedings, rendered a
decision granting the complaint and ordering Ms. Dumpty to pay damages to Mr.
Humpty. Ms. Dumpty timely filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals, questioning
the RTC decision. Meanwhile, the RTC granted Mr. Humpty’s motion for execution
pending appeal. Upon receipt of the RTC’s order granting execution pending appeal,
Ms. Dumpty filed with the CA another case, this time a special civil action for
certiorari assailing said RTC order. Is there a violation of the rule against forum

12
shopping considering that two (2) actions emanating from the same case with the RTC
were filed by Ms. Dumpty before the CA? Explain.

ANSWER: No. There is no violation of the rule against forum shopping. Forum
shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final
judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the action under consideration
(Benedicto vs. Manuel Lac-son, G.R. No. 141508, 5 May 2010, Peralta, J.). In Philippines
Nails and Wires Corporation vs. Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. (G.R. No. 143933, 14
February 2003, Panganiban, J.), the Supreme Court held that one party may validly
question a decision in a regular appeal and at the same time assail the execution
pending appeal via certiorari without violating the rule against forum shopping. This
is because the merits of the case will not be addressed in the Petition dealing with the
execution and vice versa. Since Ms. Dumpty merely filed a special civil action for
certiorari, the same will not constitute a violation of the rules on forum shopping
because the resolution or a favorable judgment thereon will not amount to res judicata
in the subsequent proceedings between the same parties. (Benedicto vs. Manuel Lacson,
G.R. No. 141508, 5 May 2010, Peralta, J.)

------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 29: Juan sued Roberto for specific performance. Roberto knew that
Juan was to file the case so he went out of town and temporarily stayed in another city
to avoid service of summons. Juan engaged the service of Sheriff Matinik to serve the
summons but when the latter went to the residence of Roberto, he was told by the
caretaker thereof that his employer no longer resides there. The caretaker is a high
school graduate and is the godson of Roberto. Believing the caretaker's story to be
true, Sheriff Matinik left a copy of the summons and complaint with the caretaker.
Was there a valid substituted service of summons? Discuss the requirements for a
valid substituted service of summons.

ANSWER: No. There was no valid substituted service of summons. In an action

strictly in personam, personal service on the defendant is the preferred mode of service,
that is, by handing a copy of the summons to the defendant in person. If defendant
for excusable reasons, cannot be served with the summons within a reasonable period,
then substituted service can be resorted to.
The Supreme Court laid down the requirements for a valid substituted service of
summons as follows: impossibility of prompt personal service, i.e., the party relying
on substituted service, or the sheriff must show that defendant cannot be served
promptly or there is impossibility of prompt service within a reasonable time.
Reasonable time being "so much time as is necessary under the circumstances for a

13
reasonably prudent and diligent man to do, conveniently, what the contract or duty
requires that should be done, having a regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if
any, to the other party." Moreover, it must be indicated therein that the sheriff has
made several attempts at personal service for at least three (3) times on at least two (2)
different dates. Specific details in the return, i.e., the sheriff must describe in the
Return of Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding their attempted
personal service. Substituted service effected on a person of suitable age and
discretion residing at defendant's house or residence; or on a competent person in
charge of defendant's office or regular place of business (Manotoc vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 130974, 16 August, 2006, Velasco, Jr., J.)

------------------------------
PROBLEM NO. 30: Tristan filed a suit with the RTC of Pasay against Arthur King
and/or Estate of Arthur King for reconveyance of a lot declared in the name of Arthur
King under TCT No. 1234. The complaint alleged that "on account Arthur King's
residence abroad up to the present and the uncertainty of whether he is still alive or
dead, he or his estate may be served with summons by publication." Summons was
published and nobody filed any responsive pleading within sixty (60) days therefrom.
Upon motion, defendants were declared in default and judgment was rendered
declaring Tristan as legal owner and ordering defendants to reconvey said lot to
Tristan. Jojo, the court-designated administrator of Arthur King's estate, filed a
petition for annulment of judgment before the CA praying that the decision in favor
of Tristan be declared null and void for lack of jurisdiction. He claims that the action
filed by Tristan is an action in personam and that the court did not acquire jurisdiction
over defendants Arthur King and/or his estate. On the other hand, Tristan claims that
the suit is an action in rem or at least an action quasi in rem. Is the RTC judge correct in
ordering the service of summons by publication? Explain.

ANSWER: Yes, the RTC judge is correct in ordering service of summons by

publication. In Republic vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 122269, 30 September 1999,
Mendoza, J.), it was held that an action for reconveyance is an action in personam. Under
Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, it provides that: In any action where the
defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his or her
whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, within
ninety (90) calendar days from the commencement of the action, service may, by leave
of court, be effected upon him or her by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation and in such places and for such time as the court may order. Any order
granting such leave shall specify a reasonable time, which shall not be less than sixty
(60) calendar days after notice, within which the defendant must answer.

14
This rule applies to any action, whether in personam, in rem or quasi in rem. Hence, the
RTC Judge is correct in ordering service of summons by publication. (See Baltazar vs.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 78728, 8 December 1988, Feliciano, J.)

------------------------------
PROBLEM NO. 31: Miguel filed a complaint for damages against Jose, who denied
liability and filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of
action. In an Order received by Jose on January 5, 2015, the trial court denied the
Motion to Dismiss. On February 4, 2015, Jose sought reconsideration of that Order
through a Motion for Reconsideration. Miguel opposed the Motion for
Reconsideration on the ground that it was filed out of time. Jose countered that the 15-
day rule under Section 1, Rule 52 of the Rules does not apply where the Order sought
to be reconsidered is an interlocutory order that does not attain finality. Is Jose correct?
Explain.

ANSWER: Yes, Jose is correct. Under Section 1, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court, a party
may file a motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution within fifteen
(15) days from notice thereof, with proof of service on the adverse party. Here, what
is involved is an order denying a motion to dismiss, which is not a final order as it
does not terminate the case. The order is simply an interlocutory order which may be
reconsidered by the trial court at any time during the pendency of the case. (See Rasdas
vs. Estenor, G.R. No. 157605, 13 December 2005, Tinga, J.)

------------------------------
PROBLEM NO. 32: Shoppy filed a case against Noddy, who filed a motion to dismiss
for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, which was granted. Shoppy refiled the
complaint against Noddy with the appropriate court. Before summons could be
served on Noddy, Shoppy moved to dismiss the case without prejudice, which the
court granted. Noddy filed a motion for reconsideration of the second order of
dismissal, arguing that the dismissal should have been with prejudice under the Two-
Dismissal Rule. Should the motion of Noddy be granted? Explain briefly.

ANSWER: No, the motion for reconsideration should not be granted. Rule 17 of the
Rules of Court governs dismissals at the instance of the plaintiff, not of the defendant.
In this case, the first dismissal was upon the instance of the defendant while the second
dismissal was upon the instance of the plaintiff before service of the answer or of a
motion for summary judgment, where a dismissal without prejudice is allowed. As a
general rule, dismissals under Section 1 of Rule 17 are without prejudice except when
it is the second time that the plaintiff caused its dismissal. For the two-dismissal rule
to apply where the second dismissal would be with prejudice, the following requisites

15
must be present: (1) there was a previous case that was dismissed by a competent
court; (2) both cases were based on or include the same claim; (3) both notices of
dismissal were filed by the plaintiff; and (4) when the motion to dismiss filed by the
plaintiff was consented to by the defendant on the ground that the latter paid and
satisfied all the claims of the former. The purpose of the "two-dismissal rule" is "to
avoid vexatious litigation." (Ching vs. Cheng, G.R. No. 175507, 8 October 2014, Leonen,
J.)

------------------------------
PROBLEM NO. 33: Discuss the three (3) Stages of Court Diversion in connection with
Alternative Dispute Resolution.

ANSWER: The three stages of diversion are Court-Annexed Mediation (CAM),

Judicial Dispute Resolution (JDR), and Appeals Court Mediation (ACM). During
CAM, the judge refers the parties to the Philippine Mediation Center (PMC) for the
mediation of their dispute by trained and accredited mediators. If CAM fails, the JDR
is undertaken by the JDR judge, acting as a mediator-conciliator-early neutral
evaluator. The third case is during appeal, where covered cases are referred to ACM.
(A.M. No. 11-1-6-SC-PHILJA)

------------------------------
PROBLEM NO. 34: Briefly explain the procedure on "Interrogatories to Parties” under
Rule 25 and state the effect of failure to serve written interrogatories.

ANSWER: Under Rule 25, there is no deposition officer. The questions are direct. Any
party desiring to elicit material and relevant facts from any adverse parties shall file
and serve upon the latter written interrogatories to be answered by the party served
or, if the party served is a public or private corporation or a partnership or association,
by any officer thereof competent to testify in its behalf (Section 1, Rule 25, Rules of
Court). The interrogatories shall be answered fully in writing and shall be signed and
sworn to by the person making them. The party upon whom the interrogatories have
been served shall file and serve a copy of the answers on the party submitting the
interrogatories within fifteen (15) days after service thereof, unless the court on motion
and for good cause shown, extends or shortens the time (Section 2, Rule 25, Rules of
Court). Objections to any interrogatories may be presented to the court within ten (10)
days after service thereof, with notice as in case of a motion; and answers shall be
deferred until the objections are resolved, which shall be at as early a time as is
practicable (Section 3, Rule 25, Rules of Court). Should a party fail to file and serve
written interrogatories on an adverse party, he cannot compel the latter to give
testimony in open court or to give deposition pending appeal, unless allowed by the

16
court for good cause shown and to prevent a failure of justice. (Section 6, Rule 25, Rules
of Court; Spouses Afulugencia vs. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co., G.R. No. 185145, 5
February 2014, Del Castillo, J.)
------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 35: Ernie filed a petition for guardianship over the person and
properties of his father, Ernesto. Upon receipt of the notice of hearing, Ernesto filed
an opposition to the petition. Ernie, before the hearing of the petition, filed a motion
to order Ernesto to submit himself for mental and physical examination which the
court granted. After Ernie's lawyer completed the presentation of evidence in support
of the petition and the court's ruling on the formal offer of evidence, Ernesto's lawyer
filed a demurrer to evidence. Ernie's lawyer objected on the ground that a demurrer
to evidence is not proper in a special proceeding. If Ernesto defies the court's order
directing him to submit to physical and mental examinations, can the court order his
arrest?

ANSWER: No, the court cannot validly order the arrest if the order for the conduct of
physical and mental examination is issued as a mode of discovery and Ernesto defies
the said order. Section 3, Rule 29 of the Rules of Court provides that if any party or an
officer or managing agent of a party refuses to obey an order requiring him or her to
submit to a physical or mental examination, the court may make such orders in regard
to the refusal as are just, and among others: In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or
in addition thereto, an order directing the arrest of any party or agent of a party for
disobeying any of such orders except an order to submit to a physical or mental
examination.
------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 36: Royal Bank (Royal) filed a complaint for a sum of money against
Ervin and Jude before the RTC of Manila. The initiatory pleading averred that on
February 14, 2010, Ervin obtained a loan from Royal in the amount of Phpl.0M, as
evidenced by Promissory Note No. 007 (PN) signed by Ervin. Jude signed a Surety
Agreement binding herself as surety for the loan. Royal made a final demand on
February 14, 2015 for Ervin and Jude (defendants) to pay, but the latter failed to pay.
Royal prayed that defendants be ordered to pay the amount of Phpl.0M plus interests.
In their answer, Ervin admitted that he obtained the loan from Royal and signed the
PN. Jude also admitted that she signed the Surety Agreement. Defendants pointed out
that the PN did not provide the due date for payment, and that the loan has not yet
matured as the maturity date was left blank to be agreed upon by the parties at a later
date. Defendants filed a Motion for a Judgment on the Pleadings on the ground that

17
there is no genuine issue presented by the parties' submissions. Royal opposed the
motion on the ground that the PN' s maturity is an issue that must be threshed out
during trial. Resolve the motion with reasons.

ANSWER: The Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings should be denied. Under the
Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion for judgment on the pleadings may be filed only
by the plaintiff or the claimant. In this case, it was the defendants, not the plaintiff
Royal Bank, which filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Hence, the motion
should be denied.
------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 37: Distinguish "Summary Judgment" from "Judgment on the

Pleadings."

ANSWER: Judgment on the pleadings is proper "where an answer fails to tender an

issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading.”
Summary judgment, on the other hand, will be granted "if the pleadings, supporting
affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file, show that, except as to the amount of
damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”

The existence or appearance of ostensible issues in the pleadings, on the one hand,
and their sham or fictitious character, on the other, are what distinguish a proper case
for summary judgment from one for a judgment on the pleadings. In a proper case for
judgment on the pleadings, there is no ostensible issue at all because of the failure of
the defending party’s answer to raise an issue. On the other hand, in the case of a
summary judgment, issues apparently exist—i.e. facts are asserted in the complaint
regarding which there is as yet no admission, disavowal or qualification; or specific
denials or affirmative defenses are in truth set out in the answer-but the issues thus
arising from the pleadings are sham, fictitious or not genuine, as shown by affidavits,
depositions, or admissions. (Adolfo vs. Adolfo, G.R. No. 201427, 18 March 2015, Del
Castillo, J.)

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: A summary judgment is distinguished from a judgment

on the pleadings as follows:
a. A summary judgment is proper even if there is a remaining issue as to
the amount of damages, while a judgment on the pleadings is proper if
it appears that there is no genuine issue between the parties.
b. A summary judgment is based not only on the pleadings but also upon
affidavits, depositions, and admissions showing that, except as to the

18
 amount of damages, there is no genuine issue, while a judgment on the
pleadings is based exclusively upon the pleadings without the
presentation of any evidence.
c. A motion for summary judgment requires a 10-day notice (Section 3, Rule
35, Rules of Court), while a motion for judgment on the pleadings is
subject to a 3-day notice rule (Section 4, Rule 15, Rules of Court).
d. A summary judgment may be prayed for by a defending party (Section
2, Rule 35, Rules of Court), while a judgment on the pleadings may be
prayed for only by a plaintiff or claimant.

------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 38: Mr. X filed a complaint for sum of money against his old friend,
Mr. Y. In order to ensure that Mr. Y would not be able to file a responsive pleading
and much more, participate in the case, Mr. X paid off Mr. Y's counsel, Atty. Z, who
deliberately let the case proceed as such without his client's knowledge. Eventually,
judgment was rendered on March 1, 2016 in Mr. X's favor, a copy of which was
received by Atty. Z on April 4, 2016. Bothered by his conscience, Atty. Z brought the
copy of the decision to Mr. Y on June 1, 2016, thereby surprising the latter and causing
him grief. Meanwhile, the decision became final and executory in due course on April
19, 2016. Thereafter, Mr. Y took steps in vindicating his rights, which culminated on
August 15, 2016 when he, as represented by a new counsel, filed a petition for
annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals on the ground of extrinsic fraud.
The CA dismissed the petition on the ground that Mr. Y failed to submit a satisfactory
explanation as to why he directly resorted to a petition for annulment of judgment,
when he could have filed a petition for relief from judgment. What are the differences
between a petition for relief from judgment and a petition for annulment of judgment
in terms of grounds and periods to file?

ANSWER: In a petition for relief from judgment, the grounds are: (1) a judgment or
final order is entered or a proceeding is thereafter taken against the party through
fraud, accident, mistake and inexcusable negligence, or (2) when a party is prevented
to appeal a judgment or final order through the same circumstances. In a petition for
annulment of judgment, the grounds are: (1) extrinsic fraud, (2) lack of jurisdiction,
and (3) lack of due process.
In a petition for relief from judgment, the period to file is within 60 days after the party
learns of the judgment, and not more than 6 months after the judgment or final order
was entered or such proceeding was taken. In a petition for annulment of judgment,
if it is based on extrinsic fraud, within 4 years from the discovery thereof, if based on
lack of jurisdiction or lack of due process, before it is barred by laches or estoppel.

19
PROBLEM NO. 39: Following the problem above, was the CA's dismissal of Mr. Y's
petition for annulment of judgment proper? Explain.

ANSWER: Yes, the CA's dismissal is proper. A petition for relief from judgment is the
proper remedy when the same is still within 60 days from the time the petitioner
learns of the judgment, and within 6 months from the judgment was entered. Here,
Mr. Y still has 60 days to file a petition for relief from judgment from June 1, 2016
where he learns of the same. If he was able to file it during such period, it would still
be within 6 months from April 19, 2016 where the judgment became final and
executory. Therefore, the CA is correct in dismissing the petition for annulment of
judgment for being an improper remedy.

------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 40: What is the Harmless Error Rule in relation to appeals?

ANSWER: Under Rule 51, Section 6 of the Rules of Court, the Harmless Error Rule
states that no error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence and no error
or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the trial court or by
any of the parties is a ground for granting a new trial or for setting aside, modifying,
or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears
to the court to be inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the
proceeding must disregard any error or defect which does not affect the substantial
rights of the parties.
------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 41: Tom Wallis filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition for
Declaration of Nullity of his marriage with Debi Wallis on the ground of psychological
incapacity of the latter. Before filing the petition, Tom Wallis had told Debi Wallis that
he wanted the annulment of their marriage because he was already fed up with her
irrational and eccentric behavior. However, in the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage, the correct residential address of Debi Wallis was deliberately not alleged
and instead, the resident address of their married son was stated. Summons was
served by substituted service at the address stated in the petition. For failure to file an
answer, Debi Wallis was declared in default and Tom Wallis presented evidence ex
parte. The RTC rendered judgment declaring the marriage null and void on the ground
of psychological incapacity of Debi Wallis. Three (3) years after the RTC judgment was
rendered, Debi Wallis got a hold of a copy thereof and wanted to have the RTC
judgment reversed and set aside. If you are the lawyer of Debi Wallis, what judicial

20
remedy or remedies will you take? Discuss and specify the ground or grounds for said
remedy or remedies.

ANSWER: Debi Wallis may file a Petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47
of the Rules of Court, on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, extrinsic fraud, and denial
of the right to due process (See Leticia Diona vs. Romeo Balange, G.R. No. 173559, 7
January 2013, Del Castillo). An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law
independent of the case where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered. The
purpose of such action is to have the final and executory judgment set aside so that
there will be a renewal of litigation. It is resorted to in cases where the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or other appropriate
remedies are no longer available through no fault of the appellant and is based on the
grounds of extrinsic fraud, and lack of jurisdiction. (Aleban vs. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 156021, 23 September 2005, Tinga, J.)
Relative thereto, the act of Tom Wallis in deliberately keeping Debi Wallis away from
the Court, by intentionally alleging a wrong address in the complaint constitutes
extrinsic fraud. Moreover, the failure of the Court to acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the respondent, being an indispensable party, necessitates the annulment of
judgment of the Regional Trial Court. Likewise, there is denial of the right to due
process when Debi Wallis was not given an opportunity to be heard in the case. Hence,
the judgment rendered by the RTC may be annulled by the Court of Appeals under
Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, it is evident that the ordinary remedies of
new trial, petition for relief, or other appropriate remedies are no longer available
through no fault of Debi Wallis because she was able to obtain a copy of the Decision
only three (3) years after the same was rendered by the Trial Court.
At any rate, the Court erred in declaring the defendant in default because there is no
default in a Petition for declaration of nullity of marriage (Section 3, Rule 9, Rules of
Court). Thus, a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court would be an
appropriate remedy within the reglementary period allowed by the Rules.
------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 42: Aldrin entered into a contract to sell with Neil over a parcel of
land. The contract stipulated a Php500,000 down payment upon signing and the
balance payable in twelve (12) monthly installments of Phpl00,000. Aldrin paid the
down payment and had paid three (3) monthly installments when he found out that
Neil had sold the same property to Yuri for Phpl.5M paid in cash. Aldrin sued Neil
for specific performance with damages with the RTC. Yuri, with leave of court, filed
an answer-in-intervention as he had already obtained a TCT in his name. After trial,
the court rendered judgment ordering Aldrin to pay all the instalments due, the

21
cancellation of Yuri's title, and Neil to execute a deed of sale in favor of Aldrin. When
the judgment became final and executory, Aldrin paid Neil all the installments, but
the latter refused to execute the deed of sale in favor of the former. Aldrin filed a
Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution with proper notice of hearing. The
petition alleged, among others, that the decision had become final and executory, and
he is entitled to the issuance of the writ of execution as a matter of right. Neil filed a
motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that it lacked the required certification
against forum shopping. Should the court grant Neil's Motion to Dismiss?

ANSWER: No, the court should not grant Neil’s Motion to Dismiss. Under Section 5,
Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, it provides that the plaintiff or principal party shall certify
under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or
in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that
he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same
issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge,
no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending
action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should
thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending,
he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his
aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
In the case of Arquiza vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No 160479, 8 June 2005, Callejo, Sr., J.)
the court ruled that certification against forum shopping is only required in a
complaint or other initiatory pleading.
Since a petition for the issuance of the writ of execution is not an initiatory pleading,
it does not require a certification against forum shopping.
------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 43: Following the problem above, despite the issuance of the writ of
execution directing Neil to execute the deed of sale in favor of Aldrin, the former
obstinately refused to execute the deed. What is Aldrin's remedy?

ANSWER: Aldrin may move for the issuance of a court order directing the execution
of the Deed of Sale by some other person appointed by it. Under Section 10, Rule 39
of the Rules of Court, if a judgment directs a party to execute a conveyance of land or
personal property, or to deliver deeds, other documents, or to perform, any other
specific act in connection therewith, and the party fails to comply within the time
specified, the court may direct the act to be done at the cost of the disobedient party
by some other person appointed by the court and the act when so done shall have like
effect as if done by the party. If real or personal property is situated within the

22
Philippines, the court in lieu of directing a conveyance thereof may, by an order, divest
the title of any party and vest it in others, which shall have the force and effect of a
conveyance executed in due form of law. The phrase “some other person appointed
by the court” may refer to the branch clerk of court, sheriff or even the Register of
Deeds, and their acts when done under such authority shall have the effect of having
been done by Neil himself.
------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 44: Bayani, an overseas worker based in Dubai, issued in favor of
Agente, a special power of attorney to sell his house and lot. Agente was able to sell
the property but failed to remit the proceeds to Bayani, as agreed upon. On his return
to the Philippines, Bayani, by way of a demand letter duly received by Agente, sought
to recover the amount due him. Agente failed to return the amount as he had used it
for the construction of his own house. Thus, Bayani filed an action against Agente for
sum of money with damages. Bayani subsequently filed an ex parte motion for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment duly supported by an affidavit. The court
granted the ex parte motion and issued a writ of preliminary attachment upon Bayani’s
posting of the required bond. Bayani prayed that the court’s sheriff be deputized to
serve and implement the writ of attachment. On November 19, 2013, the Sheriff served
upon Agente the writ of attachment and Agente levied on the latter’s house and lot.
On November 20, 2013, the Sheriff served upon Agente summons and a copy of the
complaint. On November 22, 2013, Agente filed an Answer with Motion to Discharge
the Writ if Attachment alleging that at the time the writ of preliminary attachment
was issued, he has not been served with summons and, therefore, it was improperly
issued. Is Agente correct?

ANSWER: No, Agente is not correct. Section 2, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court provides
that a writ of attachment may be issued ex parte or upon motion with notice and
hearing by the Court in which the action is pending. Under the Rules, the applicant of
the writ is only required to (i) submit an affidavit and (ii) post a bond before the court
can validly issue the writ of attachment. The Rules do not require prior service of
summons for the proper issuance of a writ of attachment (Torres vs. Satsatin, G.R. No.
166759, 25 November 2009, Peralta, J.). Accordingly, the issuance of the writ of
attachment is valid, notwithstanding the absence of a prior service of summons to
Agente.

------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 45: Following the problem above, was the writ of preliminary
attachment properly executed?

23
ANSWER: No, the writ of preliminary attachment was not properly executed.
Although a writ of attachment may issue even before summons is served upon the
defendant, the same, however, may not bind and affect the defendant until
jurisdiction over his person is obtained (Davao Light and Power Co., Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 93262, 29 December 1991, Narvasa, J.). Thus, the writ of preliminary
attachment must only be served simultaneous or at least after the service of summons
to the defendant. (Torres vs. Satsatin, G.R. No. 166759, 25 November 2009, Peralta, J.)

------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 46: A temporary restraining order (TRO) was issued on September
20, 2023, by the RTC against defendant Jeff enjoining him from entering the land of
Regan, the plaintiff. On October 9, 2023, upon application of Regan, the trial court,
allegedly in the interest of justice, extended the TRO for another 20 days based on the
same ground for which the TRO was issued. On October 15, 2023, Jeff entered the land
subject of the TRO. May Jeff be liable for contempt of court? Why?

ANSWER: No, Jeff may not be held liable for contempt. Under Section 5, Rule 58 of
the Rules of Court, it provides that no preliminary injunction shall be granted without
hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined. If it shall appear
from facts shown by affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable
injury would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the court
to which the application for preliminary injunction was made, may issue a temporary
restraining order to be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days from service on
the party or person sought to be enjoined, except as herein provided. Within the said
twenty-day period, the court must order said party or person to show cause, at a
specified time and place, why the injunction should not be granted, determine within
the same period whether or not the preliminary injunction shall be granted, and
accordingly issue the corresponding order.
Thus, its effectivity is not extendible without need of any judicial declaration to that
effect, and no court shall have authority to extend or renew the same on the same
ground for which it was issued, thus, Jeff cannot be held liable for contempt.
------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 47: Hannibal, Donna, Florence, and Joel, concerned residents of
Laguna de Bay, filed a complaint for mandamus against the Laguna Lake
Development Authority, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, the
Department of Public Work and Highways, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Department of Agriculture, Department of Budget, and Philippine
National Police before the RTC of Laguna alleging that the continued neglect of

24
defendants in performing their duties has resulted in serious deterioration of the
water quality of the lake and the degradation of the marine life in the lake. The
plaintiffs prayed that said government agencies be ordered to clean up Laguna de Bay
and restore its water quality to Class C waters as prescribed by Presidential Decree
No. 1152, otherwise known as the Philippine Environment Code. Defendants raise the
defense that the clean-up of the lake is not a ministerial function and they cannot be
compelled by mandamus to perform the same. The RTC of Laguna rendered a
decision declaring that it is the duty of the agencies to clean up Laguna de Bay and
issued a permanent writ of mandamus ordering said agencies to perform their duties
prescribed by law relating to the cleanup of Laguna de Bay. Is the RTC correct in
issuing the writ of mandamus? Explain.

ANSWER: Yes, the RTC is correct is issuing the writ of Mandamus. In a similar case
decided by the Supreme Court in MMDA vs. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay (G.R.
Nos. 171947-48, 18 December 2008, Velasco, Jr., J.), the court ruled that the cleaning or
rehabilitation of Manila Bay can be compelled by mandamus. The ruling in MMDA
may be applied by analogy to the clean-up of Laguna de Bay. While the term issued
by the RTC of Laguna is a permanent writ of mandamus, this should be considered
only as a semantic error and that what the RTC really intended to issue is a writ of
continuing mandamus. There is no such thing as a permanent writ of mandamus since
the writ shall cease to be effective once the judgment is fully satisfied.
------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 48: Jaime was convicted for murder by the Regional Trial Court of
Davao City in a decision promulgated on September 30, 2023. On October 5, 2023,
Jaime filed a Motion for New Trial on the ground that errors of law and irregularities
prejudicial to his rights were committed during his trial. On October 7, 2023, the
private prosecutor, with the conformity of the public prosecutor, filed an Opposition
to Jaime's motion. On October 9, 2023, the court granted Jaime's motion. On October
12, 2023, the public prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration. The court issued an
Order dated October 16, 2023, denying the public prosecutor's motion for
reconsideration. The public prosecutor received his copy of the order of denial on
October 20, 2023, while the private prosecutor received his copy on October 26, 2023.
What is the remedy available to the prosecution from the court's order granting
Jaime's motion for new trial?

ANSWER: The remedy is to file a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. Under Section 1(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, it provides that an appeal
may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or

25
of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable. No
appeal may be taken from an order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration.
The denial of a motion for reconsideration is merely an interlocutory order and there
is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy under the course of law.
------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 49: The Ombudsman found probable cause to charge with plunder
the provincial governor, vice governor, treasurer, budget officer, and accountant. An
Information for plunder was filed with the Sandiganbayan against the provincial
officials except for the treasurer who was granted immunity when he agreed to
cooperate with the Ombudsman in the prosecution of the case. Immediately, the
governor filed with the Sandiganbayan a petition for certiorari against the
Ombudsman claiming there was grave abuse of discretion in excluding the treasurer
from the Information. Will a writ of mandamus lie to compel the Ombudsman to
include the treasurer in the Information?

ANSWER: No, a writ of Mandamus will not lie to compel the Ombudsman to include
the treasurer in the Information. In the case of Ampatuan, Jr. vs. Secretary De Lima (G.R.
No. 197291, 3 April 2013, Bersamin, J.), it was ruled that in matters involving exercise
of judgment and discretion, mandamus may only be resorted to in order to compel
respondent tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person to take action, but it cannot
be used to direct the manner or particular way the discretion is to be exercised, or to
compel the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of judgment
or discretion. The act of granting the treasurer immunity is a discretionary duty that
is not the subject of Writ of Mandamus.
------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 50: Who may file for a quo warranto petition?

ANSWER: An action for quo warranto under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court may be filed
against one who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office.
It may be brought (1) by the Republic of the Philippines through the OSG or (2) by the
person claiming to be entitled to such office. In quo warranto, the petitioner who files
the action in his name must prove that he is entitled to the subject public office.
Otherwise, the person who holds the same has a right to undisturbed possession and
the action for quo warranto may be dismissed. (Moro vs. Del Castillo, G.R. No. 184980,
30 March 2011, Abad, J.)
------------------------------

26
PROBLEM NO. 51: Is the buyer in the auction sale arising from an extra-judicial
foreclosure entitled to a writ of possession even before the expiration of the
redemption period? If so, what is the action to be taken?

ANSWER: Yes, the buyer in the auction sale is entitled to a writ of possession even
before the expiration of the redemption period. Under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as
amended, the writ of possession may be issued to the purchaser in a foreclosure sale
either within the one-year redemption period upon the filing of a bond, or after the
lapse of the redemption period, without need of a bond. Hence, upon the purchaser's
filing of the ex parte petition and posting of the appropriate bond, the RTC shall, as a
matter of course, order the issuance of the writ of possession in favor of the purchaser.
(Spouses Marquez vs. Spouses Alindog, G.R. No.184045, 22 January 2014, Perlas-Bernabe;
Spouses Gatuslao vs. Yanson, G.R. No.191540, 21 January 2015, Del-Castillo, J.)

------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 52: Suppose that after the title to the lot has been consolidated in the
name of the auction buyer, said buyer sold the lot to a third party without first getting
a writ of possession. Can the transferee exercise the right of the auction buyer and
claim that it is a ministerial duty of the court to issue a writ of possession in his favor?
Briefly explain.

ANSWER: Yes. The Supreme Court has held that a transferee of the purchaser or
winning bidder may file an ex parte motion for the issuance of a writ of possession.
The reason is that the transferee steps into the shoes of the purchaser and acquires
whatever rights the transferor had. (Laureno vs. Bormaheco Inc., G.R. No. 137619 6
February 2001, Gonzaga-Reyes, J.)
------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 53: Judgment was rendered against defendant Jaypee in an action for
unlawful detainer. The judgment ordered Jaypee to vacate and to pay attorney's fees
in favor of Bart, the plaintiff. To prevent the immediate execution of the judgment,
would you advise the posting of a supersedeas bond as counsel for Jaypee? Explain
your answer briefly.

ANSWER: I would advise Jaypee to post a supersedeas bond, but I would also advise
him that the posting of a supersedeas bond alone does not prevent the immediate
execution of the judgment. To stay the immediate execution of the judgment in an
ejectment case, the defendant: (1) must perfect an appeal; (2) file a supersedeas bond;
and (3) periodically deposit the rentals becoming due during the pendency of the

27
appeal; otherwise, the writ of execution will issue upon motion of the plaintiff. (Section
19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court; Acbang vs. Hon. Luczon, G.R. No. 164246, 15 January
2014, Bersamin, J.)
------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 54: Briefly explain the concept of contempt of court.

ANSWER: The power to declare a person in contempt of court and in dealing with
him accordingly is an inherent power lodged in courts of justice, to be used as a means
to protect and preserve the dignity of the court, the solemnity of the proceedings
therein, and the administration of justice from callous misbehavior, offensive
personalities, and contumacious refusal to comply with court orders. And, as in all
other powers of the court, the contempt power, however plenary it may seem, must
be exercised judiciously and sparingly. A judge should never allow himself to be
moved by pride, prejudice, passion, or pettiness in the performance of his duties.
(Sison vs. Caoibes, A.M. No. RTJ-03-177, 27 May 2004, Callejo, Sr., J.)

------------------------------
PROBLEM NO. 55: May a person charged with direct contempt appeal therefrom?
How about indirect contempt?

ANSWER: No. The person adjudged in direct contempt by any court may not appeal
therefrom, but may avail himself of the remedies of certiorari or prohibition pursuant
to Section 2, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. Conversely, the judgment or final order of
a court in a case of indirect contempt may be appealed to the proper court as in
criminal cases.

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

PROBLEM NO. 56: Lee Bon Bon is a Chinese citizen, married to Catalina San Gabriel
and had two sons, namely, Lee Sun Sun and Lee Sen Sen, who are naturalized Filipino
citizens. During his lifetime, a residential lot consisting of 1,500 square meters in San
Nicolas, Iriga City, Camarines Sur was sold to him by Feleciano Aguirre. After his
death, his heirs entered into an Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate, which eventually
transferred the title of the residential lot to his two sons. Subsequently, vendor Aguirre
filed an annulment of sale for alleged violation of the Constitution prohibiting the sale
of land to aliens. Is the contention of Vendor Aguirre correct? Explain.

28
ANSWER: No, the convention of Aguirre is not correct. The Supreme Court has ruled
consistently that where a Filipino citizen sells land to an alien who later sells the land
to a Filipino, the invalidity of the first transfer is corrected by the subsequent sale to a
citizen. Similarly, where the alien who buys the land subsequently acquires Philippine
citizenship, the sale is validated since the purpose of the constitutional ban to limit
land ownership to Filipinos has been achieved. In short, the law disregards the
constitutional disqualification of the buyer to hold land if the land is subsequently
transferred to a qualified party, or the buyer himself becomes a qualified party.
(Republic vs. Register of Deeds of Roxas City, G.R. No. 158230, 16 July 2008, Carpio, J..)

------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 57: Thomas and Martha Wayne are husband and wife. They own 99%
of the shares of stock of Wayne Enterprises. While walking in an alley after watching
a movie, the spouses, together with their 12-year-old son Bruce, were waylaid by a
robber and tried to snatch the diamond necklace of Martha. Thomas defended his wife
and prevented the attempted robbery. However, the robber shot him and his wife,
which led to their death from this failed robbery attempt. Bruce would also have died
were it not for the speedy response of one by-stander in the name of Barry Allen,
owner of comics store Flashpoint Paradox. Bruce’s butler, Alfred Pennyworth, is the
only companion that young Bruce now has. Thomas and Martha’s estates have to be
settled for their sole heir Bruce Wayne. However, Bruce is still a minor. Likewise,
Alfred cannot prepare on behalf of minor Bruce an Extrajudicial Settlement because
the spouses and their company, Wayne Enterprises, have existing creditors. Discuss
the proceedings that Alfred has to institute, as butler of Bruce, in order that the estate
of the deceased spouses be settled in favor of their only son.

ANSWER: Alfred must first have to institute a proceeding for guardianship over the
person and property of Bruce. Thereafter, Bruce must file, as represented by his legal
guardian Alfred, a petition for the judicial settlement of the estate of his parents.
Under the Rules, a petition for guardianship must be instituted over the person and
property of a minor. The same must be instituted because a minor has restrictions on
his or her capacity to act. Likewise, under the Rules, the petition for the judicial
settlement of estate of a deceased person must be filed before the residue of the estate,
after paying the obligations and taxes, will be distributed to the heirs. Hence, a petition
for guardianship must be instituted first before a petition for the judicial settlement of
estate can be filed.
------------------------------

29
PROBLEM NO. 58: During the pendency of the proceedings, it was found out that
there were two holographic wills separately made by Thomas and Martha. These
holographic wills contain identical provisions which provide that the 60% of the
annual net proceeds of all the profits of Wayne Enterprises shall be used equally for
the treatment of patients of Arkham Asylum and for the research and development
that will look for a cure for their psychological condition. Upon discovery of these
holographic wills, Lucius Fox filed a separate petition for the probate of will in the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, the place the spouses last resided before their death.
Alfred then filed an Opposition. In his Opposition, he raised as issue the fact that
Lucius Fox was not the named executor of the will, a devisee, legatee, or an interested
party in the settlement of estate. Hence, he cannot have the right to file a petition for
probate. Is the ground for opposition raised by Alfred valid?

ANSWER: Yes, the ground raised by Alfred is valid. Under the Rules and settled
jurisprudence, it is the executor of the will or the heirs, or any interested person such
as the devisee or legatee, who can file a petition for probate. Since Lucius is not the
named executor, and there is no statement in the problem that he is a devisee or
legatee, he cannot file a petition for probate.
------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 59: Bishop Sofronio left a will that was probated in 1937. He left half
of his properties to his parents and the remaining half to his sister Dolores Hacbang
Alo. The admission of his will to probate is conclusive with respect to its due execution
and extrinsic validity. However, the settlement proceedings were never concluded;
the case was archived without any pronouncement as to the intrinsic validity of the
will or an adjudication of the properties. If the will was not probated, can intestate
succession govern? Explain.

ANSWER: No. Our jurisdiction accords great respect to the testator’s freedom of
disposition. It is settled that "the law favors testacy over intestacy" and hence, "the
probate of the will cannot be dispensed with. (In the matter of the petition for the
probate of the will of Consuelo Santiago Garcia, G.R. No. 204793, 8 June 2020, Hernando, J.)
------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 60: Johnny, a naturalized citizen of the United States of America
(USA) but formerly a Filipino citizen, executed a notarial will in accordance with the
laws of the State of California, USA. Johnny, at the time of his death, was survived by
his niece Anastacia, an American citizen residing at the condominium unit of Johnny
located at Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City; a younger brother, Bartolome, who manages

30
Johnny’s rental condominium units in Makati City. Johnny’s entire estate which he
inherited from his parents is valued at P200 million. Johnny appointed Anastacia’s
executrix of his will. Can Johnny’s notarial will be probated before the proper court in
the Philippines?

ANSWER: Yes, Johnny’s notarial will can be probated before the proper court in the
Philippines. A foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of
the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the
Philippines if made in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law of the place
where he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country (Palaganas vs.
Palaganas, G.R. No. 169144, 26 January 2011, Abad, J.)
------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 61: In connection to the problem above, is Anastacia qualified to be

the executrix of Johnny’s notarial will?

ANSWER: Yes, Anastacia is qualified. Under the Rules, the following persons are
incompetent to serve as executor or administrator: (a) a minor; (b) not a resident of the
Philippines; and (c) is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties of the trust
by reason of drunkenness, improvidence, or want of understanding or integrity, or by
reason of conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude (Sec. 1, Rule 78). While
she is an American citizen, she is nonetheless a resident of the Philippines.
Accordingly, Anastacia is not disqualified because there is no prohibition against an
alien residing in the Philippines to serve as an executor of an estate.

------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 62: Pedrillo, a Fil-Am permanent resident of Los Angeles, California
at the time of his death, bequeathed to Winston a sum of money to purchase an
annuity. Upon Pedrillo's demise, his will was duly probated in Los Angeles and the
specified sum in the will was in fact used to purchase an annuity with XYZ of Hong
Kong so that Winston would receive the equivalent of US$1,000 per month for the next
15 years. Wanting to receive the principal amount of the annuity, Winston files for the
probate of Pedrillo's will in the Makati RTC. As prayed for, the court names Winston
as administrator of the estate. Winston now files in the Makati RTC a motion to compel
XYZ to account for all sums in its possession forming part of Pedrillo's estate. Rule on
the motion.

ANSWER: The motion should be denied. Makati RTC has no jurisdiction over XYZ of
Hong Kong. The letters of administration granted to Winston only covers all Pedrillo's

31
estate in the Philippines (Section 4, Rule 77, Rules of Court). This cannot cover the
annuities in Hongkong. At the outset, Makati RTC should not have taken cognizance
of the petition filed by Winston, because the will does not cover any property of
Pedrillo located here in the Philippines.

------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 63: Hercules was walking near a police station when a police officer
signalled for him to approach. As soon as Hercules came near, the police officer
frisked him but the latter found no contraband. The police officer told Hercules to get
inside the police station. Inside the police station, Hercules asked the police officer,
"Sir, may problema po ba?" Instead of replying, the police officer locked up Hercules
inside the police station jail. What is the remedy available to Hercules to secure his
immediate release from detention?

ANSWER: The remedy available to Hercules to secure his immediate release from
detention is to file a Petition for habeas corpus regarding the illegality of his arrest.
Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, it provides that except as otherwise
expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which
the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. Thus,
the writ can be extended to person any who is illegally detained or confined.

------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 64: The residents of Mt. Ahohoy, headed by Masigasig, formed a non-
governmental organization - Alyansa Laban sa Minahan sa Ahohoy (ALMA) to
protest the mining operations of Oro Negro Mining in the mountain. ALMA members
picketed daily at the entrance of the mining site blocking the ingress and egress of
trucks and equipment of Oro Negro, hampering its operations. Masigasig had an
altercation with Mapusok arising from the complaint of the mining engineer of Oro
Negro that one of their trucks was destroyed by ALMA members. Mapusok is the
leader of the Association of Peace Keepers of Ahohoy (APKA), a civilian volunteer
organization serving as auxiliary force of the local police to maintain peace and order
in the area. Subsequently, Masigasig disappeared. Mayumi, the wife of Masigasig, and
the members of ALMA searched for Masigasig, but all their efforts proved futile.
Mapagmatyag, a member of ALMA, learned from Maingay, a member of APKA,
during their binge drinking that Masigasig was abducted by other members of APKA,
on order of Mapusok. Mayumi and ALMA sought the assistance of the local police to
search for Masigasig, but they refused to extend their cooperation. Immediately,
Mayumi filed with the RTC, a petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo against

32
Mapusok and APKA. ALMA also filed a petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo
with the Court of Appeals against Mapusok and APKA. Respondents Mapusok and
APKA, in their Return filed with the RTC, raised among their defenses that they are
not agents of the State; hence, cannot be impleaded as respondents in an amparo
petition. a. Is their defense tenable?

ANSWER: No, the defense is not tenable. The writ of amparo is a remedy available to
any person whose right to life, liberty and security has been violated or is threatened
with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public officer or employee or of a
private individual or entity. The writ covers extra-legal killings, enforced
disappearances or threats thereof (Sec. 1, The Rule on the Writ of Amparo, A.M. No. 07-
9-12-SC). Moreover, the rules do not require that the respondents should be agents of
the State in order to be impleaded as respondents in an amparo petition. (Secretary of
National Defense vs. Manalo, G.R. No. 180906, 7 October 2008, Puno, C.J.)
------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 65: In continuation of the problem above, respondents Mapusok and
APKA, in their Return filed with the Court of Appeals, raised as their defense that the
petition should be dismissed on the ground that ALMA cannot file the petition
because of the earlier petition filed by Mayumi with the RTC. Are respondents correct
in raising their defense?

ANSWER: Yes, the respondents are correct in raising the defense. Under section 2(c)
of the Rules on the Writ of Amparo, the filing of a petition by Mayumi who is an
immediate member of the family of the aggrieved party already suspends the right of
all other authorized parties to file similar petitions. Hence, ALMA cannot file the
petition because of earlier petition by Mayumi with the RTC.

------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 66: What is the writ of amparo? How is it distinguished from the writ
of habeas corpus?

ANSWER: The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person
whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats
thereof. The writ of amparo differs from a writ of habeas corpus in that the latter writ
is availed of as a remedy against cases of unlawful confinement or detention by which
any person is deprived of his liberty, or cases by which rightful custody of any person

33
is withheld from another who is lawfully entitled thereto (Sec 1, Rule 102, Rules of
Court).
------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 67: Ms. A filed a petition for a writ of amparo, claiming that she was
being threatened by Mr. B, her ex-boyfriend, with whom she has a child out of
wedlock, named C. Ms. A alleged that since she started dating someone else, Mr. B
began stalking her, parking his car on the street outside her house, and watching her
house until the wee hours of the morning. She thus feared for her life. Is Ms. A entitled
to a writ of amparo? Explain.

ANSWER: No, Ms. A is not entitled to a writ of amparo. Such writ cannot be applied
against private individuals, as the same was intended only to protect one's life, liberty
and security against unlawful government actions. Here, Ms. A filed a writ of amparo
against her ex-boyfriend for acts causing her to fear for her life. However, there was
no showing of any government intervention causing such fear. Therefore, Ms. A is not
entitled to such writ.
------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 68: Following the problem above, assuming that Mr. B took away C
without Ms. A's knowledge and consent, what is the proper remedy for Ms. A to
immediately recover C's custody? Explain.

ANSWER: If Mr. B took away C without Ms. A's knowledge, the remedy is to file a
writ of habeas corpus. The writ is proper when a person is deprived of his rightful
custody over another. Since the law grants sole parental authority to Ms. A for C's
custody, being an illegitimate child, any deprivation of such authority makes the
application for a writ of habeas corpus proper to recover C's custody.

------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 69: Hades, an American citizen, through a dating website, got
acquainted with Persephone, a Filipina. Hades came to the Philippines and proceeded
to Baguio City where Persephone resides. Hades and Persephone contracted
marriage, solemnized by the Metropolitan Trial Court judge of Makati City. After the
wedding, Hades flew back to California, United States of America, to wind up his
business affairs. On his return to the Philippines, Hades discovered that Persephone
had an illicit affair with Phanes. Immediately, Hades returned to the United States and
was able to obtain a valid divorce decree from the Superior Court of the County of
San Mateo, California, a court of competent jurisdiction against Persephone. Hades

34
desires to marry Hestia, also a Filipina, whom he met at Baccus Grill in Pasay City. a.
As Hades' lawyer, what petition should you file in order that your client can avoid
prosecution for bigamy if he desires to marry Hestia?

ANSWER: As Hades’ lawyer, I would file a petition for recognition of a foreign

divorce decree, or at least a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries
in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court and include therein a prayer
for recognition of the aforementioned divorce decree. In Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas (G.R.
No. 186571, 11 August 2010, Brion, J.), the High Court declared that “the recognition of
the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object
of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to
establish the status or right of a party or particular fact” (Fujiki vs. Marinay, G.R. No.
196049, 26 June 2013, Carpio, J.).
------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 70: A was adopted by B and C when A was only a toddler. Later on
in life, A filed with Regional Trial Court (RTC) a petition for change of name under
Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, as he wanted to reassume the surname of his natural
parents because the surname of his adoptive parents sounded offensive and was
seriously affecting his business and social life. The adoptive parents gave their consent
to the petition for change of name. May A file a petition for change of name? If the
RTC grants the petition for change of name, what, if any, will be the effect on the
respective relations of A with his adoptive parents and with his natural parents?
Discuss.

ANSWER: No. A cannot file a petition for change of name because the reasons he
invoked do not fall among the grounds that would justify the filing of a petition for
change of name, to wit: (1) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce; (2) when the change results as a legal consequence, as
in legitimation; (3) when the change will avoid confusion; (4) when one has
continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was
unaware of alien parentage; (5) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs
of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (6) when
the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change
of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice
public interest. Moreover, the touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that
there be “proper and reasonable cause” for which the change is sought. To justify a
request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling
reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official
name (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 97906, 21 May 1992, Regalado, J.).

35
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by A for the change of his surname is that
it is offensive and it seriously affects his business and social life. Accordingly, A’s
reasons are not considered proper and compelling that would justify the filing of his
Petition for change of name. Assuming that the court allows A to reassume the use of
the surname of his biological parents, there will be no effect on the respective relations
of A with his adoptive parents and his natural parents. Until and unless the adoption
is rescinded by the court, the paternity and filiation which exist by reason of adoption
subsists. Ergo, the grant of A’s Petition for change of name will have no effect on the
respective relations of A with his adoptive and natural parents. After all, the change
of name does not define or effect change in one’s existing family relations or in the
rights and duties flowing therefrom. It does not alter one’s legal capacity, civil status
or citizenship; what is altered is only the name (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, G. R. No.
97906, 21 May 1992, Regalado, J.).

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

PROBLEM NO. 71: Engr. Magna Nakaw, the District Engineer of the DPWH in the
Province of Walang Progreso, and Mr. Pork Chop, a private contractor, were both
charged in the Office of the Ombudsman for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (RA. No. 3019) under a conspiracy theory. While the charges were
undergoing investigation in the Office of the Ombudsman, Engr. Magna Nakaw
passed away. Mr. Pork Chop immediately filed a motion to terminate the
investigation and to dismiss the charges against him, arguing that because he was
charged in conspiracy with the deceased, there was no longer a conspiracy to speak
of and, consequently, any legal ground to hold him for trial had been extinguished.
Rule on the motion to terminate filed by Mr. Pork Chop, with brief reasons.

ANSWER: The motion to terminate the investigation and to dismiss charges against
Mr. Pork Chop should be denied. In the case of People vs. Go (G.R. No. 168539, 24 March
2014, Peralta, J.), the Supreme Court ruled that the avowed policy of the State and the
legislative intent to repress acts of public officers and private persons alike, which
constitute graft or corrupt practices, would be frustrated if the death of a public officer
would bar the prosecution of a private person who conspired with such public officer
in violating R.A. No. 3019. Since the absence or presence of conspiracy is factual in
nature and involves evidentiary matters, the allegation of conspiracy against Mr. Pork
Chop is better ventilated before the trial court during the trial, where he can adduce
evidence to prove or disprove its presence. Thus, the motions should not be dismissed.
------------------------------

36
PROBLEM NO. 72: Yvonne, a young and lonely OFW, had an intimate relationship
abroad with a friend, Percy. Although Yvonne comes home to Manila every six
months, her foreign posting still left her husband Dario lonely so that he also engaged
in his own extramarital activities. In one particularly exhilarating session with his
girlfriend, Dario died. Within 180 days from Dario’s death, Yvonne gives birth in
Manila to a baby boy. Irate relatives of Dario contemplate criminally charging Yvonne
for adultery and they hire your law firm to handle the case. a. Is the contemplated
criminal action a viable option to bring?

ANSWER: No. Section 5 of Rule 110 provides that the crimes of adultery and
concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon complaint by the offended spouse.
Since the offended party is already dead, then the criminal action for adultery as
contemplated by offended party’s relatives is no longer viable.
------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 73: Tomas was criminally charged with serious physical injuries
allegedly committed against Darvin. During the pendency of the criminal case, Darvin
filed a separate civil action for damages based on the injuries he had sustained. Tomas
filed a motion to dismiss the separate civil action on the ground of litis pendentia,
pointing out that when the criminal action was filed against him, the civil action to
recover the civil liability from the offense charged was also deemed instituted. He
insisted that the basis of the separate civil action was the very same act that gave rise
to the criminal action. Rule on Tomas' motion to dismiss, with brief reasons.

ANSWER: The motion to dismiss should be denied. Darwin's civil action is based on
physical injuries and is therefore an independent civil action which may proceed
independently of the criminal case (Article 33, Civil Code). However, Darvin cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action
(Section 2, Rule 111, Rules of Court). As the Supreme Court ruled in People vs. Lipala
(G.R. No. 200302, 20 April 2016, Carpio, J.), "the independent civil actions in Articles 32,
33, 34, and 2176, as well as claims from sources of obligations other than delict, are not
deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by the offended
party even without reservation."
------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 74: Solomon and Faith got married in 2005. In 2010, Solomon
contracted a second marriage with Hope. When Faith found out about the second
marriage of Solomon and Hope, she filed a criminal case for bigamy before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila sometime in 2011. Meanwhile, Solomon filed a

37
petition for declaration of nullity of his first marriage with Faith in 2012, while the
case for bigamy before the RTC of Manila is ongoing. Subsequently, Solomon filed a
motion to suspend the proceedings in the bigamy case on the ground of prejudicial
question. He asserts that the proceedings in the criminal case should be suspended
because if his first marriage with Faith will be declared null and void, it will have the
effect of exculpating him from the crime of bigamy. Decide.

ANSWER: The motion filed by Solomon should be denied. The elements of prejudicial
question are: (1) the previous instituted civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue determines the subsequent criminal action; and (2) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
In order for a prejudicial question to exist, the civil action must precede the filing of
the criminal action (Dreamwork Construction, Inc. vs. Janiola, G.R. No. 184861, 30 June
2009, Velasco, Jr., J.). Since the criminal case for bigamy was filed ahead of the civil
action for declaration of nullity of marriage, there is no prejudicial question. At any
rate, the outcome of the civil case for annulment has no bearing upon the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case for bigamy
because the accused has already committed the crime of bigamy when he contracted
the second marriage without the first marriage having been declared null and void.
Otherwise stated, he who contracts marriage during the subsistence of a previously
contracted marriage runs the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.

------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 75: X was driving the dump truck of Y along Cattleya Street in Sta.
Maria, Bulacan. Due to his negligence, X hit and injured V who was crossing the street:
Lawyer L, who witnessed the incident, offered his legal services to V. V, who suffered
physical injuries including a fractured wrist bone, underwent surgery to screw a metal
plate to his wrist bone. On complaint of V, a criminal case for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Serious Physical Injuries was filed against X before the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of Sta. Maria. Atty. L, the private prosecutor, did not reserve the filing
of a separate civil action. V subsequently filed a complaint for Damages against X and
Y before the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan in Urdaneta where he resides. In his
"Certification against Forum Shopping” V made no mention of the pendency of the,
criminal case in Sta. Maria. a. Is V guilty of forum shopping?

ANSWER: No, V is not guilty of forum shopping. In the case of Mampo vs. Morada
(G.R. No. 214526, 3 November 2020, Caguioa, J.) it was held that Forum shopping is the
institution of two or more actions or proceedings involving the same parties for the
same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, on the supposition that
one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. Here, the cases are not

38
based from the same causes of action, the case in Sta. Maria, Bulacan, is a criminal
action rued in the name of the People of the Philippines, where civil liability arising
from the crime is deemed also instituted therewith; whereas the case rued in
Urdaneta, Pangasinan, is a civil action for quasi-delict in, the name of V and against
both X and Y for all damages caused by X and Y to V, which may be beyond the
jurisdiction of MTC. The actions are entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action.
------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 76: You are the defense counsel of Angela Bituin who has been
charged under R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) before the
Sandiganbayan. While Angela has posted bail, she has yet to be arraigned. Angela
revealed to you that she has not been investigated for any offense and that it was only
when police officers showed up at her residence with a warrant of arrest that she
learned of the pending case against her. She wonders why she has been charged before
the Sandiganbayan when she is not in government service. What "before-trial" remedy
would you invoke in Angela’s behalf to address the fact that she had not been
investigated at all, and how would you avail of this remedy?

ANSWER: The available remedy would be to file a motion to conduct preliminary

investigation or reinvestigation or question the validity/recall the warrant of arrest
with prayer to suspend the arraignment. Under Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court, after filing of the complaint or information in court without a preliminary
investigation, the accused, may, within five days from the time he learns of its filing
ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his
defense. Moreover, Section 26, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
that an application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from challenging
the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from assailing
the regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation of the charge
against him, provided that he raises them before entering his plea. The court shall
resolve the matter as early as practicable as but not later than the start of the trial of
the case.
------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 77: In connection to the problem above, what "during-trial" remedy
can you use to allow an early evaluation of the prosecution evidence without the need
of presenting defense evidence; when and how can you avail of this remedy?

ANSWER: The available remedy would be to file first a motion for leave to file a
demurrer within five (5) days from the time the prosecution rested its case. If the same

39
is granted, then a demurrer to evidence shall be filed within ten (10) days (Section 23,
Rule 119 of the Rules of Court). This remedy would allow the evaluation of the
sufficiency of prosecution’s evidence without the need of presenting defense
evidence. It may be done through the court’s initiative or upon motion of the accused
and after the prosecution rests its case (Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court).

------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 78: An information for murder was filed against Rapido. The RTC
judge, after personally evaluating the prosecutor's resolution, documents, and parties'
affidavits submitted by the prosecutor, found probable cause and issued a warrant of
arrest. Rapido's lawyer examined the rollo of the case and found that it only contained
the copy of the information, the submissions of the prosecutor, and a copy of the
warrant of arrest. Immediately, Rapido's counsel filed a motion to quash the arrest
warrant for being void, citing as grounds:
1. The judge, before issuing the warrant, did not personally conduct a searching
examination of the prosecution witnesses in violation of his client's constitutionally
mandated rights;
2. There was no prior order finding probable cause before the judge issued the arrest
warrant. May the warrant of arrest be quashed on the grounds cited by Rapido's
counsel? State your reason for each ground.

ANSWER: No, the motion to quash the arrest warrant shall be denied. The two
grounds cit-ed by Radio are untenable as the same are not mandatory or necessary for
the issuance of a warrant. In the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the mandate of the
Constitution is for the judge to personally determine the existence of probable cause.
The words “personal determination,” was interpreted by the Supreme Court in Soliven
vs. Makasiar (G.R. No. 82585, 14 November 1988) as the exclusive and personal
responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself as to the existence of probable
cause. What the law requires as personal determination on the part of a judge is that
he should not rely solely on the report of the investigating prosecutor. Thus, personal
examination of the complainant and his witnesses is not mandatory and indispensable
in the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. (People
vs. Joseph “Jojo” Grey, G.R. No. 10109, 26 July 2010, Nachura, J.)

As to the first ground, the Rules does not require the judge to personally conduct a
searching examination on the prosecution witnesses. The judge is only required to
personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence based
on probable cause. As to the second ground, a prior order finding probable cause is
not necessary before the issuance of the arrest warrant. The Rules does not require

40
such prior order before the judge may issue a warrant. It is enough that the judge finds
probable cause based on the evidence on record.
------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 79: In a buy-bust operation, 30 kilos of shabu were seized from Dave
and Daryll. They were arrested and placed on inquest before Prosecutor Danilo Doon
who ordered their continued detention. Thereafter, the information for the sale and
distribution of shabu was filed in court. When arraigned, Dave and Daryll pleaded
not guilty to the charge. During pre-trial, counsel for both of the accused raised, for
the first time, the illegality of the arrest. The case proceeded to trial. After trial, the
court scheduled the promulgation of judgment with notice to both the accused and
their counsel, Atty. Dimayuga. Was the challenge to the validity of the arrest timely
raised?

ANSWER: No, the challenge to the validity of the arrest was not timely raised. In the
case of Lapi vs. People (G.R. No. 210731, 13 February 2019, Leonen, J.), the Court has
consistently ruled that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure
for the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be
made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. In this case,
both Dave and Daryl have already pleaded not guilty to the charge against them
before they questioned the illegality of their arrest during pre-trial. Thus, their
objection is deemed waived and not timely raised.

------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 80: Following the problem above, only Dave and Atty. Dimayuga
were present during the promulgation of judgment, but both the accused were
convicted of the crime charged. What is the remedy available to Daryl, if any, to be
able to file an appeal?

ANSWER: There are available remedies to Daryl such as surrendering himself to the
court and by filing a motion for leave of court within 15 days from promulgation of
judgment. As stated in the case of Villena vs. People (G.R. No. 184091, 31 January 2011,
Nachura, J.), a person who has failed to appear for the promulgation of his judgment
shall lose the remedies available to him. However, the Rules allow the accused to
regain his standing in court to avail remedies such as motion for new trial or
reconsideration and appeal from judgment of conviction, provided that: (1) he
voluntarily and physically surrenders himself and (2) he files a motion for leave of
court to avail such remedies, stating justifiable reasons for his absence within 15 days
from the date of promulgation.

41
PROBLEM NO. 81: “Murder in Law School.” This was the headline in almost all daily
newspapers and online news websites when a law professor was found dead in
Hankuk University Law School - Manila. He was Prosecutor Seo Byung-Ju. Initially
ruled to be caused by heart attack, investigators later concluded that there was foul
play. They concluded that it was caused by a drug overdose forcefully administered
to the deceased by a previously unidentified suspect. Several law students who were
near the scene of the crime when the deceased was found dead were investigated,
namely: Han Joon Hwi, Jeon Ye-seul, Kang Sol A, and Yoo Seung-jae. However, the
police did not charge them after they were subjected to custodial investigation because
of lack of evidence. It was their professor in Criminal Law Review, Prosecutor Yang
Jong Hoon, who was apprehended 5 days after the incident. He was arrested because
someone volunteered information that he was last seen with the deceased
approximately 30 minutes after he was found dead. Claiming hot pursuit, agents of
the National Bureau of Investigation apprehended Prosecutor Yang in his office
without warrant of arrest. Simultaneous with the arrest, the NBI agents also
conducted a search in his office and seized several items such as his laptop, mobile
phone, external hard drive, and several sugar packets similar to those found in the
scene of the crime. He was then subjected to inquest proceedings by prosecutor Jin
Hyeong-woo whom the accused had a long history of professional and personal
animosity. After the inquest, Prosecutor Jin filed an Information for murder against
Prosecutor Yang in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Is there a valid warrantless
arrest and warrantless search?

ANSWER: No. There was no valid warrantless arrest and warrantless search. Under
the Rules, arrest may be made when an offense had just been committed, and the
arresting officer has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts
and circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed the offense or what is
also called Hot Pursuit. In this case, it cannot be said that an offense had just been
committed because 5 days had already passed from the incident before Prosecutor
Yang Jong Hoon was apprehended; thus, the arrest based on "Hot Pursuit" cannot be
sustained. Consequently, the search and seizure were likewise not valid because such
search and seizure was not incidental to a lawful warrantless arrest. Hence, there was
no valid warrantless arrest and warrantless search.
------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 82: A policeman approaches you for advice and asks you how he will
execute a warrantless arrest against a murderer who escaped after killing a person.
The policeman arrived two (2) hours after the killing and a certain Max was allegedly
the killer per the information given by a witness. He asks you to clarify how long after
the commission of the crime can he still execute the warrantless arrest?

42
ANSWER: I will tell him that he can execute the warrantless arrest within a
reasonable time which establishes the twin requisites of personal knowledge and
immediacy. Case law provides that in order to effectuate a valid “hot pursuit”
warrantless arrest, the circumstances shall indubitably show that the twin requisites
of personal knowledge and immediacy are present. Personal knowledge refers to the
knowledge of the arresting officer of facts indicating that a crime had just been
committed and the person to be arrested is the perpetrator thereof. This personal
knowledge must be coupled with the element of immediacy (Vaporoso vs. People, G.R.
No. 238659, 3 June 2019, Perlas-Bernabe, J.). Considering the above-given set of facts, the
two (2) hour period between the arrest and the commission of the crime is not an
appreciable lapse of time that will invalidate the warrantless arrest. Therefore, the
twin requisite of personal knowledge and immediacy are present.

------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 83: In connection to the problem above, the policeman asks you to
further clarify what does "personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances that the
person to be arrested committed it" mean?

ANSWER: "Personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances that the person to be
arrested committed it" means personal knowledge not of the commission of the crime
itself but of facts and circumstances which would lead to the conclusion that the
person to be arrested has probably committed the crime. Such personal knowledge
arises from reasonably worthy information in the arresting person’s possession
coupled with his own observation and fair inferences therefrom that the person
arrested has probably committed the offense. (Pestilos vs. Generoso, G.R. No. 182601
10 November 2014, Brion, J.)
------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 84: As Cicero was walking down a dark alley one midnight, he saw
an owner-type jeepney approaching him. Sensing that the occupants of the vehicle
were up to no good, he darted into a corner and ran. The occupants of the vehicle -
elements from the Western Police District - gave chase and apprehended him. The
police apprehended Cicero, frisked him, and found a sachet of 0.09 gram of shabu
tucked in his waist and a Swiss knife in his secret pocket, and detained him thereafter.
Is the arrest and body search legal?

ANSWER: No. The arrest and the body search conducted by the police were not legal.

43
Under the prevailing jurisprudence, stop-and-frisk searches should be balanced with
the need to protect the privacy of citizens in accordance with Article III, Section 2 of
the Constitution. The balance lies in the concept of "suspiciousness" present in the
situation where the police officer finds himself or herself in. The basic criterion would
be that the police officer, with his or her personal knowledge, must observe the facts
leading to the suspicion of an illicit act. In this case, there is no reason that will give
rise to suspiciousness. Cicero's act of walking down an alley, or of running, does not
show any reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed or is about
to be committed for the police officers to apprehend him and conduct a body search.
Hence, the arrest was illegal as it does not fall under any of the circumstances for a
valid warrantless arrest provided in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.

------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 85: On his way home, a member of the Caloocan City police force
witnesses a bus robbery in Pasay City and effects the arrest of the suspect. Can he
bring the suspect to Caloocan City for booking since that is where his station is?
Explain briefly.

ANSWER: No, the police officer cannot bring the suspect in Caloocan City. Under
Section 3, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, it provides that after a lawful warrantless
arrest by a police officer, he should immediately deliver the suspect at the nearest jail
or police station. In this case, since the bus robbery and the arrest took place in Pasay
City, the police officer should deliver the suspect to the nearest jail or police station in
Pasay City and not in Caloocan City.

------------------------------
PROBLEM NO. 86: Accused Pineda was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of
homicide and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal
as maximum. Pending appeal of his conviction to the Court of Appeal, accused Pineda
applied to the Court of Appeals for bail arguing his advanced age and ill health as
grounds and the absence of any of the bail-negating circumstances under Section 5 of
Rule 114. Accused Pineda contends that, in the absence of any of the bail-negating
circumstances, he is entitled to bail as a matter of right. Is his contention correct?

ANSWER: No, Pineda's contention is not correct. The rules provide that bail is only a
matter of right if (1) before or after the conviction of an offense cognizable by the
MTCs, and (2) before the conviction of an offense cognizable by the RTC with a
penalty not punishable by death, life imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua. Now,
while it is true that jurisprudence provides that advanced age and ill health may be

44
considered as an exception for bail, the same is not a matter of right. In this case,
Pineda was already convicted by the RTC, and the law only provides bail as a matter
of right "before the conviction by RTC", thus, it cannot be said that Pineda is entitled
to the same. Therefore, Pineda's contention is not correct because he is not entitled to
bail as a matter of right.
------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 87: A was charged with a non-bailable offense. At the time when the
warrant of arrest was issued, he was confined in the hospital and could not obtain a
valid clearance to leave the hospital. He filed a petition for bail saying therein that he
be considered as having placed himself under the jurisdiction of the court. May the
court entertain his petition? Why or why not?

ANSWER: Yes, his petition may be entertained by the court. In the case of Panderangga
vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 115407, 28 August 1995, Regalado, J.), a person is deemed
to be under the custody of the law either when he has been arrested or has surrendered
himself to the jurisdiction of the court. The accused who is confined in a hospital may
be deemed to be in the custody of the law if he clearly communicates his submission
to the court while he is confined in a hospital. Thus, A’s petition may be considered
by the court if he clearly communicate his submission.

------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 88: An indigent mother seeks assistance for her 14 year-old son who
has been arrested and detained for malicious mischief. Would an application for bail
be the appropriate remedy or is there another remedy available?

ANSWER: Yes, an application for bail is an appropriate remedy to secure provisional

remedy of the 14 year-old boy. Under the Rules, bail is a matter of right before or even
after conviction before the MTC which has jurisdiction over the crime of malicious
mischief (Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court). Consequently, bail can be posted as
a matter of right.
------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 89: Juancho entered a plea of guilty when he was arraigned under an
information for homicide. To determine the penalty to be imposed, the trial court
allowed Juancho to present evidence proving any mitigating circumstance in his
favor. Juancho was able to establish complete self-defense. Convinced by the evidence
adduced by Juancho, the trial court rendered a verdict of acquittal. May the

45
Prosecution assail the acquittal without infringing the constitutional guarantee
against double jeopardy in favor of Juancho? Explain your answer.

ANSWER: Yes, the prosecution may assail Juancho's acquittal without violating his
right against double jeopardy. In the case of People vs. Balisacan (GR. No. L-26376, 31
August 1966, Bengzon, J.P., J.), the Supreme Court held that if an accused who first
entered a plea of guilty was later on allowed to prove any mitigating circumstance,
his prior plea is deemed vacated. The court should require him to plead anew on the
charge, or at least direct that a new plea of not guilty be entered for him. Here, the
trial court allowed Juancho to present evidence proving any mitigating circumstances
in his favor, there can be no double jeopardy with respect to the appeal of the
prosecution.

------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 90: Paz was awakened by a commotion coming from a condo unit
next to hers. Alarmed, she called up the nearby police station. PO1 Remus and PO2
Romulus proceeded to the condo unit identified by Paz. PO1 Remus knocked at the
door and when a man opened it, PO1 Remus and his companions introduced
themselves as police officers. The man readily identified himself as Oasis Jung and
gestured for them to come in. Inside, the police officers saw a young lady with her
nose bleeding and face swollen. When asked by PO2 Romulus what happened, the
lady responded that she was beaten up by Oasis Jung. The police officers arrested
Oasis Jung and brought him and the young lady back to the police station. PO1 Remus
took the young lady's statement who identified herself as AA. She narrated that she is
a sixteen year-old high school student; that previous to the incident, she had sexual
intercourse with Oasis Jung at least five times on different occasions and she was paid
Php5,000 each time and it was the first time that Oasis Jung physically hurt her. PO2
Romulus detained Oasis Jung at the station's jail. After the inquest proceeding, the
public prosecutor filed an information for Violation of R.A. No. 9262 for physical
violence and five separate informations for violation of R.A. No. 7610. Oasis Jung's
lawyer filed a motion to be admitted to bail but the court issued an order that approval
of his bail bond shall be made only after his arraignment. Before arraignment, Oasis
Jung's lawyer moved to quash the other four separate informations for violation of the
child abuse law invoking the single larceny rule. Should the motion to quash be
granted?

ANSWER: No. The court should not grant the motion to quash, because the “single
larceny rule” does not find application where the charges involve violations of R.A.
No. 9262 (Anti-VAWC Law) and R.A. No. 7610 (Anti-Child Abuse Law), considering
that each criminal act is based on a different criminal impulse and intent. In Santiago

46
vs. Garchitorena (G.R. No. 109266, 2 December 1993, Quiason, J.), the Supreme Court
explained that the “Single Larceny Doctrine” applies only to criminal crimes
committed delicto continuado, which exists if there should be plurality of acts
performed during a period of time; unity of penal provision violated; and unity of
criminal intent or purpose, which means that two or more violations of the same penal
provisions are united in one and same instant or resolution leading to the perpetuation
of the same criminal purpose or aim. The said rule applies in theft cases, where the
taking of several things, whether belonging to the same or different owners, at the
same time and place constitutes but one larceny.

(N.B: More importantly, the Single Larceny Doctrine finds applicability to larceny cases. It is
better not to associate it with crimes against persons or special laws not involving crimes
against property. In the cited case of Santiago vs. Garchitorena, it just so happens that the SC
discussed the concept of continuous crime. However, it must be clarified that the Single
Larceny doctrine is generally only applied in theft cases.)

------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 91: During custodial investigation, Atty. M, the mayor's legal
consultant who was supposed to assist the accused, arrived only at 1PM, after the
accused had been subjected to questioning in the police station beginning at 6AM.

[A] Was the accused afforded the right to counsel?

[B] Would your answer be the same if he has no lawyer during the police line-up
where the Mayor was positively identified as the culprit?

ANSWER: [A] No, the accused was not afforded his right to counsel. Under Section
2(a) of Republic Act No. 7438, it is provided that any person arrested detained or
under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel. In this case, the
mayor was not assisted by counsel when the police subjected him to questioning; thus,
his right was violated.

[B] No, my answer would be different. Police Line-up is not a part of Custodial
Investigation, and there is no right to counsel on this stage. In the case of People vs.
Hatton (G.R. No. 85043, 16 June 1992, Medialdea, J.), it was stated that the right to counsel
attaches upon the start of an investigation. i.e., when the investigating officer starts to
ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the
respondent/accused. At such point or stage, the person being interrogated must be
assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced
admission or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation, for the
commission of an offense.

47
PROBLEM NO. 92: Ludong, Balatong, and Labong were charged with murder. After
trial, the court announced that the case was considered submitted for decision.
Subsequently, the Clerk of Court issued the notices of promulgation of judgment
which were duly received. On promulgation day, Ludong and his lawyer appeared.
The lawyers of Balatong and Labong appeared but without their clients and failed to
satisfactorily explain their absence when queried by the court. Thus, the judge ordered
that the judgment be entered in the criminal docket and copies be furnished to their
lawyers. The lawyers of Ludong, Balatong, and Labong filed within the reglementary
period of Joint Motion for Reconsideration. The court favorably granted the motion of
Ludong downgrading his conviction from murder to homicide but denied the motion
as regards Balatong and Labong. Was the court correct in taking cognizance of the
Joint Motion for Reconsideration?

ANSWER: No, the court is not correct in taking cognizance of the Joint Motion for
Reconsideration. Under Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, it provides that if
the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without
justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available against the judgment and the
court shall order his arrest. Here, the other accused failed to explain their non-
appearance. Aptly, Ludong’s motion shall only be considered by the court. (See People
vs. De Grano, G.R. No. 167710, 5 June 2009, Peralta, J.).
------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 93: Briefly define trial in absentia and lay down its requisites.

ANSWER: Although it is the right of an accused to be present at his trial, he need not
be present in every hearing if he so desires from arraignment to the rendition of the
judgment. In such a case, there is trial in absentia. The requisites of a valid trial in
absentia, are as follows: (1) the accused has already been arraigned, (2) he has been
duly notified of the trial, and (3) his failure to appear is unjustifiable. (Bernardo vs.
People, G.R. No. 166980, 4 April 2007, Carpio Morales, J.)
------------------------------
PROBLEM NO. 94: After the prosecution had rested and made its formal offer of
evidence, with the court admitting all of the prosecution evidence, the accused filed a
demurrer to evidence with leave of court. The prosecution was allowed to comment
thereon. Thereafter, the court granted the demurrer, finding that the accused could
not have committed the offense charged. If the prosecution files a motion for
reconsideration on the ground that the court order granting the demurrer was not in
accordance with the law and jurisprudence, will the motion prosper? Explain your
answer.

48
ANSWER: No, the motion will not prosper. With the granting of the demurrer, the
case shall be dismissed, and the legal effect is the acquittal of the accused. A judgment
of acquittal is immediately executory, and no appeal can be made therefrom.
Otherwise, the Constitutional protection against double jeopardy would be violated.
------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 95: What is the effect of foreign judgment or final orders of a foreign
country having jurisdiction?

ANSWER: The effect of a judgment or foreign order of a tribunal of a foreign country,

having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
a. In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final
order is conclusive upon the title to the thing; and
b. In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order
is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors
in interest by a subsequent title.
c. In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake law or fact. (Section 48, Rule 39, Rules of Court)

------------------------------
PROBLEM NO. 96: Kiwi was charged with 2 counts of rape of his then 11 year-old
niece-in-law, AAA. After the trial in the RTC, he was found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for 2 counts of simple statutory rape. Kiwi was sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua for each count of rape and to indemnify AAA the amounts of
Php50,000 and Php30,000 as civil indemnity and exemplary damages, respectively, for
each count of rape without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. On appeal,
the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC with modification adjusting the award of
damages to Php100,000 civil indemnity, Php100,000 moral damages, and Php100,000
exemplary damages plus legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum from finality of the
ruling until fully paid. Dissatisfied, Kiwi moved for reconsideration but was denied.
He then filed an appeal to the Supreme Court via Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45. Was the remedy of Kiwi correct? Explain briefly.

ANSWER: No, the remedy of Kiwi was not correct. According to Section 3(a) , Rule
122 of the Rules of Court, the appeal to the Regional Trial Court, or to the Court of
Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction, shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered
the judgment or final order appealed from and by serving a copy thereof upon the

49
adverse party. In this case, Kiwi availed of the incorrect remedy. Kiwi should have
filed a Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals.

------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 97: Maja was charged with 2 counts of murder and 3 counts of
attempted murder together with Sebastian, her 16 year-old nephew. She was charged
on the strength of the confession made by her nephew as regards their commission of
the crime. The confession was made during custodial investigation in the presence of
Sebastian’s mother. Later on, after Sebastian signed his sworn statement under the
guidance of his mother, his lawyer joined him and likewise signed the sworn
statement. On the strength of the said confession, police authorities conducted a
search in the place of the incident. To prevent the possibility that the evidence will be
compromised, they sealed and quarantined the place. Not even Maja who is a resident
of the house could enter the premises until after the investigation is done. After the
conduct of investigation, the authorities discovered the knife used in the crime and
Maja’s fingerprints on it. Can the court convict Maja based on the available evidence
for the prosecution, i.e., testimony of Sebastian and Maja’s fingerprints on the knife
used in the crime?

ANSWER: No, the court cannot convict Maja based on the available evidence such as
the testimony of Sebastian and Maja’s fingerprint. Under Section 8, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court, no search of a house, room, or any other premise shall be made unless
in the presence of the lawful occupant, a member of his family, or two witnesses of
sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. In this case, the police sealed
and quarantined the place and conducted the search without the presence of the
occupants. Thus, the court cannot convict Maja based on the available evidence.

------------------------------
PROBLEM NO. 98: A search warrant was issued for the purpose of looking for
unlicensed firearms in the house of Assasin, a notorious gun for hire. When the police
served the warrant, they also sought the assistance of barangay tanods who were
assigned to look at other portions of the premises around the house. In a nipa hut
thirty (30) meters away from the house of Assasin, a Barangay tanod came upon a kilo
of marijuana that was wrapped in newsprint. He took it and this was later used by the
authorities to charge Assasin with illegal possession of marijuana. Assasin objected to
the introduction of such evidence claiming that it was illegally seized. Is the objection
of Assasin valid?

50
ANSWER: Yes, Assasin’s objection is valid since the confiscated items are not
specifically described in the search Warrant. Under Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution it provides that the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination un-der oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized. The search warrant specifically designates or describes the house
as the place to be searched. The nipa hut was not among the place to be searched, thus,
the seized items are fruit of the poisonous tree. (See Del Castillo vs. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 185128, 30 January 2012, Peralta, J.). Besides, the search is also
illegal because the marijuana confiscated in the nipa hut was wrapped in a newsprint.
Therefore, the same cannot be considered validly seized in plain view (Abraham Miclat
vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 176077, 31 August 2011, Peralta, J.).
------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 99: A PDEA asset/informant tipped the PDEA Director Shabunot that
a shabu laboratory was operating in a house at Sta. Cruz, Laguna, rented by two (2)
Chinese nationals, Ho Pia and Sio Pao. PDEA Director Shabunot applied for a search
warrant. Describe the procedure that should be taken by the judge on the application.

ANSWER: The judge must, before issuing the warrant, examine personally in the
form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to
the record their sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted (Section 5,
Rule 126, Rules of Court). If the judge is satisfied of the existence of facts upon which
the application is based or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, he
shall issue the warrant, which must be substantially in the form prescribed by the
Rules (Section 6, Rule 126, Rules of Court).
------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 100: Where do you file an application for Cybercrime Warrants
(Section 2.1 of A.M. No. 17-11-03-SC)

ANSWER: In cases of violation of Section 4 (Cybercrime Offenses) and/or Section 5

(Other Offenses), Chapter II of R.A. No. 10175, the application shall be filed by the law
enforcement authorities before any of the designated cybercrime courts of the
province or the city where the offense or any of its elements took place, or where any

51
part of the computer system used is situated, or where any of the damage caused to a
natural or juridical person took place.

However, the cybercrime courts in Quezon City, the City of Manila, Makati City, Pasig
City, Cebu City, Iloilo City, Davao City, and Cagayan De Oro City shall have the
special authority to act on applications and issue warrants which shall be enforceable
nationwide and outside the Philippines. All crimes defined and penalized by the
Revised Penal Code and other special laws if committed by, through, and with the use
of ICT: filed by the law enforcement authorities with the regular or other specialized
regional trial courts, as the case may be, within its territorial jurisdiction in the places
above-described. (Section 6, Chapter II of Republic Act No. 10175)

EVIDENCE

PROBLEM NO. 101: What is the equipoise rule?

ANSWER: The equipoise rule states that where the inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with
the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence
does not fulfil the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction.
The equipoise rule provides that where the evidence in a criminal case is evenly
balanced, the constitutional, presumption of innocence tilts the scales in favor of the
accused. (People vs. Lanurias, G.R. No. 207662, 13 April 2016, Perez, J.)
------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 102: Distinguish positive and negative evidence.

ANSWER: Testimony is positive when the witness affirms that a fact did or did not
exist; and it is negative when he says that he did not see or know of the factual
occurrence (Tanala vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 116588, 24 January 1996, Regalado, J.). Positive
evidence is entitled to greater weight, the reason being that he who denies a certain
fact may not remember exactly the circumstances on which he bases his denial (People
vs. Mendoza, 236 SCRA 666).
Furthermore, positive evidence such as an admission prevails over negative evidence,
a denial for instance. (People vs. Compacion, G.R. No. L-33951 September 28, 1979)
Evidence is negative when the witness states that he did not see or know the
occurrence of a fact and positive when the witness affirms that a fact did or did not
occur. (Revilla vs. Court of Appeals, 217 SCRA 583, G.R. No. 95329 January 27, 1993)

52
PROBLEM NO. 103: When should objection to the admissibility of evidence be made?

ANSWER: The grounds for the objection must be specified and it must be made at the
proper time; otherwise, it is deemed waived. In case of documentary evidence, an
offer is made after all the witnesses of the party making the offer have testified,
specifying the purpose for which the evidence is being offered. It is only at this time,
and not at any other, that objection to the documentary evidence may be made. When
a party failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they were offered
in evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived. This is true even if by its
nature the evidence is inadmissible and would have surely been rejected if it had been
challenged at the proper time. Thus, the photos taken from his account are admissible
in evidence. (Cadajas vs. People, G.R. No. 247348, 16 November 2021, Lopez, J. J.)

------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 104: What elements should concur for circumstantial evidence to be
sufficient for conviction?

ANSWER: For circumstantial evidence to warrant the conviction of the accused, the
following elements should concur:
1. There is more than one circumstance;
2. The facts from which the circumstances arose are duly established in court; and
3. The circumstances form the unbroken chain of events leading to the conclusion
of the culpability of the accused for the crime for which he is convicted. (Bacolod
vs. People, G.R. No. 206236, 15 July 2013, Bersamin, J.)

------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 105: Jose Dima contracted a second marriage with Salome without
his first marriage with Amalia being annulled. When a case for bigamy was filed
against him by Amalia, Dima presented a Certification from the Civil Registrar of the
City of Iriga written in this way: After a diligent search on the files of Registry Book
on Application for Marriage License and License Issuance available in this office, no
record could be found on the alleged issuance of this office of Marriage License No.
8683519 in favor of Mr. Jose D. Dima and Ms. Amalia M. Gana dated July 17, 1987. Is
this certification admissible in compliance with Section 28, Rules 132 of the RROE?
Explain.

ANSWER: No. The Certification does not prove that Dima’s first marriage was
solemnized without a marriage license. It does not categorically state that Marriage

53
License No. 8683519 does not exist. The certification issued by the local civil registrar
must categorically state that the document does not exist in his office or the particular
entry could not be found in the register despite a diligent search. The certification to
that effect complies with the provision of Section 28, Rules 132 of the Revised Rules of
Evidence. (Vitangcol vs. People, G.R. No. 207406, 13 January 2016, Leonen, J.)

------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 106: If the court will take judicial notice, what does it mean?

ANSWER: It means that the usual form of evidence will be dispensed with if
knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired. This is because the court assumes
that the matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed. Generally speaking, matters
of judicial notice have three material requisites:

(1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge;

(2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain, and
(3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The
principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is
that of notoriety.

Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records
and facts of general notoriety.
------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 107: For over a year, Nenita had been estranged from her husband
Walter because of the latter’s suspicion that she was having an affair with Vladimir, a
barangay kagawad who lived in nearby Mandaluyong. Nenita lived in the meantime
with her sister in Makati. One day, the house of Nenita’s sister inexplicably burned
almost to the ground. Nenita and her sister were caught inside the house but Nenita
survived as she fled in time, while her sister tried to save belongings and was caught
inside when the house collapsed. As she was running away from the burning house,
Nenita was surprised to see her husband also running away from the scene. Dr.
Carlos, Walter’s psychiatrist who lived near the burned house and whom Walter
medically consulted after the fire, also saw Walter in the vicinity some minutes before
the fire. Coincidentally, Fr. Platino, the parish priest who regularly hears Walter’s
confession and who heard it after the fire, also encountered him not too far away from
the burned house. Walter was charged with arson and at his trial, the prosecution
moved to introduce the testimonies of Nenita, the doctor, and the priest-confessor,

54
who all saw Walter at the vicinity of the fire at about the time of the fire. May the
testimony of Nenita be allowed over the objection of Walter?

ANSWER: Yes. Nenita may be allowed to testify over the objection of Walter. Sec. 22,
Rule 130 of the 2019 Revised Rules on Evidence provides the general rule that during
their marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other
without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the
other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the
latter’s direct descendants or ascendants. Like the rule itself, the exceptions are backed
by sound reasons which, in the excepted cases, outweigh those in support of the
general rule. One of the exceptions is where the marital and domestic relations are so
strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility
which may be disturbed, the reason based upon such harmony and tranquility fails.
In such a case, identity of interests disappears, and the consequent danger of perjury
based on that identity is non-existent.

In this case, the act of private respondent in setting fire to the house of his sister-in-
law, knowing fully well that his wife was there, and in fact with the alleged intent of
injuring the latter, is an act totally alien to the harmony and confidences of marital
relation which the disqualification primarily seeks to protect. (Alvarez vs. Ramirez, G.R.
No. 143439, 14 October 14, 2005, Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.).

------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 108: Following the problem above, may the testimony of Dr. Carlos,
Walter’s psychiatrist, be allowed over Walter’s objection?

ANSWER: Yes. The testimony of Walter’s psychiatrist may be allowed. Setion 24 (c),
Rule 130 of the 2019 Revised Rules on Evidence provides psychotherapists to the
enumeration of persons who cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence. The
term “psychotherapist” is a person licensed as a psychologist by the government
while similarly engaged. In this case, however, the information obtained by Dr. Carlos
was not obtained through confidence and is not communicated to him by Walter for
the purpose of diagnosis or treatment of the latter’s health condition. Dr. Carlos will
testify not in his professional capacity as a psychologist but as an ordinary witness
who saw Walter within the vicinity of the crime scene.

------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 109: Still following the above problem, may the testimony of Fr.
Platino, the priest-confessor, be allowed over Walter’s objection?

55
ANSWER: Yes. The testimony of Fr. Platino may be allowed over Walter’s objection.
Sec. 24 (d), Rule 130 of the 2019 Revised Rules on Evidence provides that a minister,
priest or person reasonably believed to be so cannot, without the consent of the
affected person, be examined as to any communication or confession made to or any
advice given by him or her, in his or her professional character, in the course of
discipline enjoined by the church to which the minister or priest belongs. In this case,
the information about to be testified by Fr. Platino were not obtained in his
professional character as a priest or in the course of discipline enjoined by their
church.
------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 110: On March 12, 2008, Mabini was charged with Murder for fatally
stabbing Emilio. To prove the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation, the
prosecution introduced on December 11, 2009 a text message, which Mabini's
estranged wife Gregoria had sent to Emilio on the eve of his death, reading: "Honey,
pa2tayin u ni Mabini. Mtgaln nyang plano i2. Mg ingat u bka ma tsugi k." A subpoena
ad testificandum was served on Gregoria, for her to be presented for the purpose of
identifying her cellphone and the text message. Mabini objected to her Presentation
on the ground of marital privilege. Resolve.

ANSWER: The objection should be overruled. However, the objection must be on the
ground of marital disqualification. Under Section 23, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
during their marriage, the husband or the wife cannot testify against the other without
the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in
a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter's direct
descendants or ascendants. Here, Mabini and Gregoria’s marriage still subsists and
the case is not under the exception to the disqualification by reason of marriage.

------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 111: John filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to
Anne on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
He obtained a copy of the confidential psychiatric evaluation report on his wife from
the secretary of the psychiatrist. Can he testify on the said report without offending
the rule on privileged communication? Explain.

ANSWER: Yes, John can testify on the psychiatric report without offending the rule
on privileged communication. In a similar case decided by the Supreme Court in
Krohn vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 108854, 14 June 1994, Bellosillo, J.), it was ruled that
there is no violation of physician-patient privilege since the one testifying is not the

56
psychiatrist. The privilege bars only the physician, not other persons. The report is not
a confidential communication between the spouses. Thus, there is no violation.

(N.B.: Note, however, that under the 2019 Revised Rules on Evidence, privileged
communication also applies to persons, including members of the patient's family, who have
participated in the diagnosis or treatment of the patient under the direction of the physician or
psychotherapist. (Sec. 24 (d), Rule 130).

Thus, in the above-given set of facts, if John happens to participate in the medical diagnosis of
Anne’s psychologist, the information will then be considered privileged communication. This
is also true because the disqualification also covers any person who obtained the information
through confidence.)
------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 112: What are the contents of a judicial affidavit?

ANSWER: A judicial affidavit shall be prepared in the language known to the witness
and, if not in English or Filipino, accompanied by a translation in English or Filipino,
and shall contain the following:
(a) The name, age, residence or business address, and occupation of the witness;
(b) The name and address of the lawyer who conducts or supervises the examination
of the witness and the place where the examination is being held;
(c) A statement that the witness is answering the questions asked of him fully
conscious that he does-so under oath, and that he may face criminal liability for false
testimony or perjury;
(d) Questions asked of the witness and his corresponding answers, consecutively
numbered, that:
(1) Show the circumstances under which the witness acquired the facts upon
which he testifies;
(2) Elicit from him those facts which are relevant to the issues that the case
presents; and
(3) identify the attached documentary and object eyidence and establish their
authenticity in accordance with the Rules of Court;
(e) The signature of the witness over his printed name; and
(f) A jurat with the signature of the notary public who administers the oath or an
officer who is authorized by law to administer the same. (Section 3, AM. No.12-8-8 SC,
Judicial Affidavit Rule)
------------------------------

57
PROBLEM NO. 113: Pedro was charged with theft for stealing Juan's cellphone worth
Php20,000. Prosecutor Marilag at the pre-trial submitted the judicial affidavit of Juan
attaching the receipt for the purchase of the cellphone to prove civil liability. She also
submitted the judicial affidavit of Mario, an eyewitness who narrated therein how
Pedro stole Juan's cellphone. At the trial, Pedro's lawyer objected to the prosecution's
use of judicial affidavits of her witnesses considering the imposable penalty on the
offense with which his client was charged. Is Pedro's lawyer correct in objecting to the
judicial affidavit of Mario?

ANSWER: Yes, Pedro’s lawyer is correct in objecting to the judicial affidavit of Mario.
The Judicial Affidavit Rules shall apply only to criminal actions where the maximum
of the imposable penalty does not exceed 6 years (Section 9(a)(1), A.M. No. 12-8-9-SC
or the Judicial Affidavit Rule). Here, the maximum imposable penalty for the crime of
theft of a cellphone worth Php20,000 is prision mayor in its minimum to medium
periods, or six years and one day to eight years and one day. Thus, Pedro’s lawyer is
correct in objecting to the judicial affidavit of Mario.

------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 114: In connection to the above problem, is Pedro's lawyer correct in
objecting to the judicial affidavit of Juan?

ANSWER: No. Pedro’s lawyer is not correct in objecting to the judicial affidavit of
Juan because the Judicial Affidavit Rules apply with respect to the civil aspect of the
actions, regardless of the penalties involved (Section 9, A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC or the Judicial
Affidavit Rule). Here the judicial affidavit of Juan was offered to prove the civil liability
of Pedro. Thus, the objection of Pedro’s lawyer to the judicial affidavit of Juan is not
correct.
------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 115: Still following the above problem, at the conclusion of the
prosecution's presentation of evidence, Prosecutor Marilag orally offered the receipt
attached to Juan's judicial affidavit, which the court admitted over the objection of
Pedro's lawyer. After Pedro's presentation of his evidence, the court rendered
judgment finding him guilty as charged and holding him civilly liable for Php20,000.
Pedro's lawyer seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision asserting
that the court erred in awarding the civil liability on the basis of Juan's judicial
affidavit and documentary evidence which Prosecutor Marilag failed to orally offer.
Is the motion for reconsideration meritorious?

58
ANSWER: No. The motion for reconsideration is not meritorious. The judicial
affidavit is not required to be orally offered as separate documentary evidence,
because it is filed in lieu of the direct testimony of the witness. It is offered, at the time
the witness is called to testify, and any objection to it should have been made at the
time the witness was presented (Section 6 and 8, A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC or the Judicial
Affidavit Rule). Since the receipt attached to the judicial affidavit was orally offered,
there was enough basis for the court to award civil liability.

------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 116: A foreign dog trained to sniff dangerous drugs from packages
was hired by FDP Corporation, a door-to-door forwarder company, to sniff packages
in their depot at the international airport. In one of the routinary inspections of
packages waiting to be sent to the United States of America (USA), the dog sat beside
one of the packages, a signal that the package contained dangerous drugs. Thereafter,
the guards opened the package and found two (2) kilograms of cocaine. The owner of
the package was arrested and charges were filed against him. During the trial, the
prosecution, through the trainer who was present during the incident and an expert
in this kind of field, testified that the dog was highly trained to sniff packages to
determine if the contents were dangerous drugs and the sniffing technique of their
highly trained dogs was accepted worldwide and had been successful in dangerous
drugs operations. The prosecution moved to admit this evidence to justify the opening
of the package. The accused objected on the grounds that : (i) the guards had no
personal knowledge of the contents of the package before it was opened; (ii) the
testimony of the trainer of the dog is hearsay; and (iii) the accused could not cross-
examine the dog. Decide.

ANSWER: The objections of the accused should be overruled. An evidence is

admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or the rules
(Section 3, Rule 128, Rules of Court). Under Section 36, Rules 130 of the Rules of Court,
a witness can testify only to those which he knows of his personal knowledge and
derived from his own perception. The contention that the guards had no personal
knowledge of the contents of the package before it was opened is without merit. The
guards can testify as to the facts surrounding the opening of the package since they
have personal knowledge of the circumstances thereof, being physically present at the
time of its discovery.

On the other hand, the testimony of the trainer of the dog is not hearsay based on the
following grounds:
a. He has personal knowledge of the facts in issue, having witnessed the same;

59
 b. Hearsay merely contemplates an out-of-court declaration of a person which is
being offered to prove the truthfulness and veracity of the facts asserted
therein;
c. He is an expert witness, hence, his testimony may constitute an exception to
the hearsay rule;
d. The accused has the opportunity to cross-examine him; and
e. Testimony of a witness as to statements made by nonhuman de-clarants does
not violate the rule against hearsay. The law permits the so-called “non-human
evidence” on the ground that machines and animals, unlike humans, lack a
conscious motivation to tell falsehoods, and because the workings of machines
can be explained by human witnesses who are then subject to cross-
examination by opposing counsel.

And lastly, human witnesses who have explained the workings of the non-human
evidence is the one that should be cross-examined and not the dog. Hence, the
contention of the accused that the he could not cross-examine the dog is misplaced.

------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 117: How may judicial admissions be contradicted?

ANSWER: As an exception to the general rule, judicial admissions may be

contradicted only by showing that: (1) it was made through palpable mistake; or (2)
the imputed admission was not, in fact, made (Section 4, Rule 129, Rules of Court).
An admission against interest binds the person who makes the same, and absent any
showing that this was made through palpable mistake, no amount of rationalization
can offset it. (Heirs of Donton vs. Stier, G.R. No. 216491, 23 August 2017, Perlas-Bernabe,
J.)

------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 118: Immediately before he died of gunshot wounds to his chest,
Venancio told the attending physician, in a very feeble voice, that it was Amulfo, his
co-worker, who had shot him. Venancio added that it was also Amulfo who had shot
Vicente, the man whose cadaver was lying on the bed beside him. In the prosecution
of Amulfo for the criminal killing of Venancio and Vicente, are all the statements of
Venancio admissible as dying declarations? Explain your answer.

ANSWER: No, not all statements of Venancio are admissible as dying declarations. A
dying declaration is a statement made under the consciousness of an impending death
(Section 37, Rule 130, Rules of Court). It may be received in any case wherein his death

60
is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of
such death. In this case, presuming there is evidence that Venancio was conscious of
his impending death when he made his statement that it was Amulfo who shot him,
said statement may be considered as a dying declaration which is admissible in
evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule.

------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 119: In a prosecution for murder, the prosecutor asks accused Darwin
if he had been previously arrested for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act. As defense counsel, you object. The trial court asks you on what ground/s.
Respond.

ANSWER: The objection is on the ground that the fact sought to be elicited by the
prosecution is irrelevant and immaterial to the offense under prosecution and trial.
Moreover, the Rules do not allow the prosecution to adduce evidence of bad moral
character of the accused pertinent to the offense charged, except on rebuttal and only
if it involves a prior conviction by final judgment (Sec. 51, Rule 130, Rules of Court).

------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 120: Counsel A objected to a question posed by opposing Counsel B

on the grounds that it was hearsay and it assumed a fact not yet established. The judge
banged his gavel and ruled by saying "Objection Sustained." Can Counsel B ask for a
reconsideration of the ruling? Why?

ANSWER: Yes, Counsel B may ask the Judge to specify the ground/s relied upon for
sustaining the objection and thereafter move its reconsideration thereof (Section 38,
Rule 132, Rules of Court)

LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS

PROBLEM NO. 121: Atty. ZAZA, 40 years of age, had always dreamed of becoming
a judge, and eventually, a justice, but his legal practice took a different turn. Upon
graduation, he joined a government-owned financial firm where he worked in the
Loans and Claims Division. He also taught Negotiable Instruments Law in a nearby
law school at night. He has been active in his IBP Chapter and other law organizations.
However, in his 12 years of practice, he has never done trial or litigation work.

(A) Is Atty. ZAZA engaged in the “practice of law”?

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(B) Is Atty. ZAZA qualified to become a Regional Trial Court Judge?

ANSWER: (A) Yes, Atty. ZAZA is engaged in the practice of law. In the case of
Cayetano vs. Monsod (G.R. No. 100113, 3 September 1991, Paras, J.), it was held that
"practice of law" means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application
of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice
of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal
profession. Here, ZAZA teaches Negotiable Instruments Law, thus, he is engaged in
the practice of law.

(B) Yes, as long as he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, at least 35 years of

age, and has practiced law or held public office requiring practice of law for at least
10 years.

------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 122: On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking
of successful bar examinees as members of the Philippine Bar, Serena filed against
Novak a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar. The Supreme Court allowed
Novak to take his oath as a member of the Bar during the scheduled oath-taking
ceremony on 22 May 2001 at the Philippine International Convention Center.
However, the Supreme Court did not allow Novak to sign the Roll of Attorneys
pending the resolution of the charge against him. Thus, Novak took the lawyer's oath
on the scheduled date but did not sign the Roll of Attorneys until the administrative
case is resolved. Sometime later, Serena charged Novak with unauthorized practice of
law and grave misconduct. She alleges that Novak, while not yet a lawyer, appeared
as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of
Election Canvassers ("MBEC") of Mandaon, Masbate. Serena further alleges that
Novak filed with the MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection
to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-
Mayor. In this pleading, respondent represented himself as "counsel for and in behalf
of a Vice Mayoralty Candidate” and signed the pleading as counsel. If you were a
Supreme Court Justice assigned to this case, will you vote to allow or disallow Novak
to sign the Roll of Attorneys? Explain.

ANSWER: I will vote to disallow Novak from signing the Roll of Attorneys. In the
case of Aguirre vs. Rana (B.M. No. 1036, 10 June 2003, Carpio, J.), the right to practice
law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege that can be withheld even
from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had
practiced law without a license. To be a full-fledged lawyer, one must pass the bar,

62
take the oath, and sign the roll of attorney. Here, Novak engaged in unauthorized
practice of law, thus, he does not deserve to be admitted to the bar.

------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 123: As a new lawyer, Attorney NONO started with a practice limited
to small claims cases, legal counseling, and notarization of documents. He put up a
solo practice law office and was assisted by his wife who served as his
secretary/helper. He used a makeshift hut in a vacant lot near the local courts and a
local transport regulatory agency. With this strategic location, he enjoyed heavy
patronage assisting walk-in clients in the preparation and filing of pleadings and in
the preparation and notarization of contracts and documents. He had the foresight of
investing in a good heavy duty copier machine that reproduces quality documents,
and charges a reasonable fee for this service. He draws electric power from an
extension wire connected to an adjoining small restaurant. He put up a shingle that
reads: "Atty. NONO, Specialist in Small Claims, Fastest in Notarization; the Best and
Cheapest in Copier Services." Is Attorney NONO’s manner of carrying out his
professional practice – i.e., mixing business with the practice of law, announcing his
activities via a shingle and locating his office as above-described – in keeping with
appropriate ethical and professional practice?

ANSWER: No. Attorney NONO’s manner of carrying out his professional practice is
not in keeping with appropriate ethical and professional practice. He has degraded
the law profession which may result to loss of respect to lawyers as a whole. His
shingle shows that he has considered the law profession as a business. He should have
separate shingle for his copier services business. When he included in his shingle the
phrases “Specialist in Small Claims” and “Fastest in Notarization” he has transgressed
the rule that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only dignified
information or statement of facts (Canon 3, Code of Professional Responsibility).
The norm that a lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any misleading, undignified,
self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal
services (Rule 3.01, Canon 3, Code of Professional Responsibility). The use of the phrases
“Specialist in Small Claims” and “Fastest in Notarization” is misleading
advertisement because they are likely to create an unjustified expectation about the
results the lawyer can achieve or implies that the lawyer can achieve results by
improper means.
------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 124: Cite at least 4 factual circumstances which exemplifies that legal
profession is not a business.

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ANSWER:
1. A lawyer cannot advertise his profession like a merchant advertise his wares.
Hence, you he cannot put shingles or loud, direct, blatant, announcement or
advertisement of what he can do as a lawyer.
2. A lawyer cannot solicit cases. A lawyer, in any way is prohibited in soliciting
cases. Barratry and ambulance chasing are a no-no.
3. A lawyer can be appointed as counsel de oficio for destitute clients without
compensation.
4. A lawyer cannot enter into any agreement, with fellow or non-lawyers, to
enhance his service or expand his clientele base nor refer clients to fellow
lawyers for a fee.
------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 125: Expound: “Not everything legal is moral.”

ANSWER: Ethics and law are founded on morality. The act of lawyers should not
only be bounded by law but also by ethical and moral standards. While an act may
strictly be legal, it might not be ethical or moral. Thus, in case of doubt whether an act
is ethical, the lawyer should adopt the most stringent interpretation and consider the
act as unethical. Hence, lawyers must act with the highest degree of morality if they
are to retain the people’s trust.
------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 126: Explain why the practice of law is not a business but a noble
profession.

ANSWER: The practice of law, a noble profession, requires a lawyer, at all times, to
conduct himself with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach in his
dealings with his clients and the public in general. He must faithfully perform his duty
to the society, to his colleague, to the court and to his clients. He can even be called to
serve as counsel de oficio for destitute clients without violating the constitutional
provision on involuntary servitude. The reward that practices of law births is not
financial in character, but more on public service to serve the ends of justice.

------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 127: Atty. A, a passer of the Best bar Ever, disappointed by the series
of failed job hunts in different public law offices, frustrated by the experiences of his
colleagues who joined private law offices, decided to put in the newspaper a whole
page advertisement of the opening of his own law office. Is this allowed? Reason.

64
ANSWER: No, it is not allowed. Section 17, Canon 2 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Accountability provides that a lawyer shall not, directly or
indirectly, solicit, or appear to solicit, legal business. A lawyer shall not, directly or
indirectly, advertise legal services on any platform or media except with the use of
dignified, verifiable, and factual information, including biographical data, contact
details, fields of practice, services offered, and the like, so as to allow a potential client
to make an in-formed choice. In no case shall the permissible advertisement be self-
laudatory. A lawyer, law firm, or any of their representatives shall not pay or give any
benefit or consideration to any media practitioner or personality in anticipation of, or
in return for, publicity, in mass media, whether traditional or electronic, including
mainstream, alternative, and social media, to attract legal representation, service or
retainership.

------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 128: In a complaint filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) against Atty. ABAKADA, a senior citizen, it was shown that: a) he failed to pay
his IBP dues for six (6) years; b) he indicated uniformly in his pleadings for three
consecutive years “IBP Cebu City OR No. 12345” as proof of payment of his IBP fees;
and c) he did not indicate any Professional Tax Receipt number to prove payment of
his professional dues. In his defense, Atty. ABAKADA alleged that he is only engaged
in a “limited” law practice, and his principal occupation, as disclosed in his income
tax return, is that of a farmer of a 30-hectare orchard and pineapple farm in Camarines
Sur. He also claimed that he believed in good faith that, as a senior citizen, he was
exempt from payment of taxes, such as income tax under Republic Act No. 1111
which grants senior citizens “exemption from the payment of individual income taxes
provided that their annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as
determined by the NEDA for that year.” As a member of the IBP Board of Governors,
decide on the claim of Atty. ABAKADA that for being engaged in a limited practice
of law and being a senior citizen who is exempt from the payment of taxes, he is not
required to pay his IBP and professional dues.

ANSWER: Atty. ABAKADA should still pay his IBP and professional dues. In
accordance with the Rules, Atty. ABAKADA can engage in the practice of law only by
paying his IBP dues, and it does not matter that his practice is “limited.” While it is
true that R.A. No. 1111 grants senior citizen exemption from the payment of
individual income taxes provided that their annual taxable income does not exceed
the poverty level as determined by the NEDA for that year, the exemption does not
include payment of membership or association dues, which is not a tax. (Santos, Jr. vs.
Llamas, A.C. No. 4749, 20 January 2000, Mendoza, J.)

65
PROBLEM NO. 129: Atty. Dimagiba started teaching Obligations and Contracts and
Taxation on June 12, 2001 in the Commerce Department of the Far Eastern University.
In 2005, he moved to NEU College of Law where he taught Legal Ethics and Judicial
Ethics and Practical Exercises. Is Atty. Dimagiba exempt from complying with the
MCLE for the 4th compliance period in April 2013?

ANSWER: No, Atty. Dimagiba is not exempt from complying with the MCLE. He has
only 8 years of teaching experience in an accredited law school. His teaching
experience in the Commerce Department is not credited. Note also that the 10-year
period under the Rule is ‘not’ consecutive. Thus, if one is teaching in a law school for
five years, and this is interrupted by a 4-year study abroad, he will need another five
years of teaching in an accredited law School to become MCLE exempt. To support
this MCLE exemption eligibility, you need to produce a written certification from the
law school indicating your service.

------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 130: Following the problem above, when does the initial MCLE
compliance period of MCLE of a newly admitted or readmitted member of the bar
begin and end?

ANSWER: It will begin on the first day of the month of his/her admission or
readmission and shall end on the same day as that of all other members.

------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 131: One year after he retired from the judiciary, Justice Dado
Bersamira wanted to practice law. But he did not comply the MCLE requirement
contending that he is exempt. Is the contention of Justice Bersamira proper?

ANSWER: Yes, the contention of Justice Bersamira is proper. Under section 5 of MCLE
Bar Matter 850, a retired member of the judiciary is exempt from the MCLE
requirement. But he has to secure a Certificate of Exemption from IBP and to pay for
his professional tax and update his IBP dues.

------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 132: Ki-ang filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) a formal
Entry of Appearance as private prosecutor in a criminal case for Grave Threats where
his father was the complainant. He informed that court that he is a third year law
student, which he used to justify his appearance as private prosecutor in court on the

66
basis of Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. However, the MeTC denied his
request on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student practice in
conjunction with Rule 138-A should take precedence over the ruling of the Court that
a non-lawyer may appear before the inferior courts as an agent or friend of a party
litigant. Was the denial of the court proper?

ANSWER: No, the denial by the court is not proper. In a Resolution dated June 10,
1997 in Bar Matter No. 730, the Court En Banc clarified: “The rule, however, is different
if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the issues and procedure are
relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his personal capacity
without the supervision of a lawyer.” Here, Ki-ang expressly anchored his appearance
on Section 34 of Rule 138. The court must have been confused by the fact that peti-
tioner referred to himself as a law student in his entry of appearance. Rule 138-A
should not have been used by the courts a quo in denying permission to act as private
prosecutor against petitioner for the simple reason that Rule 138-A is not the basis for
petitioner’s appearance. (Cruz vs. Mina, et al, G.R. No. 154207, 27 April 2007, Austria-
Martinez, J.)
------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 133: The lawyer’s oath is a source of any lawyer’s obligations, and its
violation is a ground for the lawyer’s suspension, disbarment, or other disciplinary
action. Without stating your name and other circumstances that will identify you,
substantially write down the lawyer’s oath that a person who has passed the bar
examinations is required to take and subscribe to before the Supreme Court.

ANSWER: “ I, _________________________ do solemnly swear that I will maintain

allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey
the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will
do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or
willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor
consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself
as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion, with all good
fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself these voluntary
obligations without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
So help me God.”
------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 134: Atty. Bibo, together with his client Rey, went to Chris for
purposes of rediscounting a check in the name of Rey. Atty. Bibo claimed that Rey

67
owes him attorney's fees but do not have cash to pay him. What Rey have is a check
under his name worth Php300,000 but dated 6 months from that day. Since Atty. Bibo
is in dire need of money, he approached Chris to rediscount the check so he could be
paid. Atty. Bibo assured Chris that the check is good thus Chris obliged and paid Php
270,000. However, upon maturity date of the check, it was dishonored on the ground
of “Account Closed.” Aside from filing a case for B.P. Blg. 22 against the drawer of
the check, Chris also filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Bibo. In his defense,
Atty. Bibo averred that he cannot be held liable as he was not the drawer of the check.
Will the complaint against Atty. Bibo prosper?

ANSWER: Yes. It has long been settled that a lawyer may be disciplined not only for
malpractice in connection with his profession, but also for gross misconduct outside
of his professional capacity. Here, the undisputed facts clearly show that Atty. Bibo
presented a worthless check for rediscounting and failed to pay their face amount
when they became due. While Atty. Bibo merely acted as a guarantor for the check,
the fact that Atty. Bibo was instrumental in its rediscounting by Chris, clearly shows
Atty. Bibo's culpability for violation of the CPR as a lawyer. When Atty. Bibo evaded
payment of a just and demandable debt, whether or not he was the actual debtor or
merely a guarantor, showed his deceitful character and lack of integrity. Moreover,
Atty. Bibo's representation that the check would be funded on time, coupled with his
being as a lawyer, were factors that persuaded and prompted Chris to part with his
money. (David vs. Atty. Batalla, A.C. No. 12828, 15 November 2021)

------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 135: Atty. X met Lexy sometime in 2021 and the former was
enamored with the latter's beauty and wit. Atty. X courted Lexy, however, the latter
learned that the former is already married but separated in fact with his wife and
children. Despite what she discovered, Lexy had a romantic relationship with Atty. X
and they lived in a condominium. Lexy later on got pregnant and it was also then that
she learned that Atty. X had a relationship with another woman who also lives in the
condominium building. Enraged, Lexy filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. X.
Will the disbarment complaint prosper on the ground of gross immorality?

ANSWER: Yes, the complaint for disbarment against Atty. X will prosper on the
ground of gross immorality. In the case of Hosoya vs. Atty. Contado (A.C. No. 10731,
October 5, 2021), it was held that a married person's abandonment of his or her spouse
to live with and cohabit with another constitutes gross immorality as it amounts to
either adultery or concubinage. Thus, Atty. X committed gross immorality
unbecoming a lawyer.

68
PROBLEM NO. 136: Romana filed a case against Roman, a successful bar candidate
in the 2019 Bar Examinations, praying that Roman be denied admission to the legal
profession. In her petition, Romana averred that Roman and she had been sweethearts
since high school, that a child out of wedlock was born to them, and that respondent
failed to fulfill his promise to marry her after he passes the bar examinations. Hence,
she charged him of gross immorality. Is there a valid ground to deny Roman
admission to the bar? Explain.

ANSWER: No, there is no valid ground to deny Roman admission to the bar. These
facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting permanent exclusion of Roman
from the legal profession. To justify suspension or disbarment, the act complained of
must not only be immoral but grossly immoral. A grossly immoral act is one that is so
corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to
be reprehensible to a high degree. It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act which shows
a moral indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the community.
Engaging in premarital sexual relations and promising to marry suggests a doubtful
moral character but the same does not constitute grossly immoral conduct. (Figueroa
v. Barranco, Jr., SBC Case No. 519, 31 July 1997, Romero, J.)

------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 137: George, an American and living in the Philippines, asked his
friend Atty. Vic to draft a contract to sell involving a real property in Batangas he
wanted to purchase. Atty. Vic obliged and drafted the contract to sell with George as
the buyer. However, the signing of the Contract to Sell did not materialize since the
notary public refused to witness the signing and notarize the same since the buyer is
a foreigner. George countered that the one who drafted the contract is a lawyer and
he was assured that everything is above board. George then filed a disbarment case
against Atty. Vic. In his defense, Atty. Vic asserts that he cannot be held
administratively liable for proscription against counseling activities aimed at defiance
of the law since the contract is merely a contract to sell and nothing materialized after
the same was not signed and notarized. Is Atty. Vic's defense tenable?

ANSWER: No. The prohibition against foreign ownership of Philippine private lands
is too basic a rule for even non-attorneys to be unaware of. As a lawyer, Atty. Vic is
presumed to know this. Despite being equipped with such knowledge, Atty. Vic still
drafted the contract with the subject property for sale to George, a foreigner. He is
deemed to have acted in contravention of Canon 1, Rule 1.02 – CPR's proscription
against counseling activities aimed at defiance of the law. (Partsch vs. Atty. Vitorillo,
A.C. No. 10897, 4 January 2022, Hernando, J.)

69
PROBLEM NO. 138: From January to October 2002, Atty. BANG, in fraudulent
connivance with brokers, convinced MAMANG to deliver to him advance money for
the titling of a beachfront property in CamSur. Six months had elapsed and Atty.
BANG had made absolutely no progress in the titling of the land. He also could not
return the advance money paid by MAMANG because he had converted the money
to his personal use. After almost a decade, and the property could still not be titled in
MAMANG’s name, she filed an action with the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD)
in 2013 for deceit, malpractice, and conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar. In
his defense, Atty. BANG asserted that since the acts complained of took place more
than 10 years ago, the case had already prescribed. Rule on the defense of Atty. BANG.

ANSWER: A disbarment proceeding is imprescriptible. Unlike other proceedings, it

is not subject to the defense of prescription. The ordinary statutes of limitations have
no application to disbarment proceedings (Calo vs. Degamo, A.C. No. 516, 27 June 1967,
Reyes, J.B.L., J.). However, an unexplained long delay in the filing of an administrative
case creates suspicion on the motives of the complainant. (Salamanca vs. Bautista, A.C.
No. 204, 31 July 1963, Bengzon, C.J.)

------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 139: Pedro Teves, a known toughie, asked Atty. Miriam to meet with
him at Max Restaurant inside elliptical circle in Quezon City because he wanted to
seek her legal advice on an important matter. Atty. Miriam had once before been
consulted by Pedro Teves, who had then paid her well. When they met in Max
Restaurant, he confided his plan to assassinate Totoy Bato, who is Teves’s rival for
the control of the neighborhood in Cubao area. He wanted her to represent him should
he be apprehended for the assassination. Atty. Miriam did not agree and left the
restaurant in a hurry before Pedro Teves could utter anything more. A few days
afterward, Totoy Bato was killed near his house in New York, Cubao. The Police
follow-up team arrested Pedro Teves on the basis of the testimony by at least two
residents that they have heard him saying two days before the kiling that Totoy Bato
would not live beyond 48 hours. Should Atty. Miriam reveal to the police investigator
What Pedro Teves had stated to her at the restaurant without violating the confidence
of the latter as a client? Explain your answer.

ANSWER: Yes. Atty. Miriam has an obligation to disclose what Pedro Teves had told
her without violating the lawyer-client confidentiality rule. As a rule, the protection
of the attorney-client privilege has reference to communication which are legitimately
and properly within the scope of a lawful employment and does not extend to those
made in contemplating of a crime or perpetuation of fraud. There is privileged
communication only as to crimes already committed before its communication to the

70
lawyer. The lawyer-client relationship does not prevent her from disclosing
information because it refers to an illegal act. The purpose of the Rule is to solve
criminality and maintain peace and order. If she does not inform the officer of what
was communicated to her, she would be violating her oath to obey laws and the
Constitution.
------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 140: In a complaint for disbarment, PAMPI alleged that she engaged
the services of Atty. MALI in the preparation and execution in her favor of a Deed of
Sale over a parcel of land from her common-law husband. Subsequently, Atty. MALI
filed a civil case on behalf of Constantine, the legal wife of PAPMI’s common-law
husband, for the annulment of the Deed of Sale, impleading PAMPI as defendant. In
his defense, Atty. MALI asserted that, with the permission of Constantine, he wrote a
letter to PAMPI informing the latter of Constantine’s adverse claim and urging her to
settle the same, but PAMPI ignored his letter. He also said that PAMPI did not object
to his handling of the case on behalf of Constantine; and therefore, he felt free to file
the complaint against her. Is Atty. MALI guilty of misconduct for representing
conflicting interests?

ANSWER: Yes. Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a

lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Atty. MALI was clearly guilty of
misconduct for representing conflicting interests. Not only did Atty. MALI agree to
represent one client against another client in the same action, he also accepted a new
engagement that required him to oppose the interest of his other client in a property
in which his legal service had been previously retained. Atty. MALI did not qualify
for the exception under Canon 15. He did not make a full disclosure of facts to PAMPI
and Constantine before he accepted the new engagement from Constantine. He failed
to obtain the written consent of his two clients as required under Canon 15 (Josefina
M. Aniñon vs. Atty. Clemencio Sabitsana, Jr., A.C. No. 5098, 11 April 2012, Brion, J.).

------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 141: Atty. Winnie, a member of the Philippine Bar who was also
admitted to the New York Bar, was disbarred from the practice of law in New York
for violation of Anti-Money Laundering laws of that State. She returned to the
Philippines in order to resume her Philippine law practice. Can she also be disbarred
from practicing law in the Philippines for the same infraction committed in the foreign
jurisdiction?

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ANSWER: Yes, she can, if the ground for which she was disbarred in New York is
also a ground for disbarment in the Philippines. But she is entitled to due process and
she can be disbarred here only after notice and hearing. The disbarment decision in
New York will only constitute prima facie evidence of her guilt. (In re: Maquera B.M.
No. 793, 30 July 2004, Tinga, J.)
------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 142: In need of legal services, Koko secured an appointment to meet
with Atty. Honey. During the meeting, Koko divulged highly private information to
Atty. Honey, believing that the lawyer would keep the confidentiality of the
information. Subsequently, Koko was shocked when he learned that Atty. Honey had
shared the confidential information with his law partner, Atty. Mayer, and their
common friend, private practitioner Atty. Momo. When confronted, Atty. Honey
replied that Koko never signed any confidentiality agreement, and that he shared the
information with the two lawyers to secure affirmance of his legal opinion on Koko’s
problem. Did Atty. Honey violate any rule of ethics? Explain fully.

ANSWER: Yes, Atty. Honey violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. Under
Canon 21, Rule 21.01, a lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or secrets of his client.
In the case of Atty. Mayer, Rule 21.04 of the same Code provides that a lawyer may
disclose the affairs of a client of the firm to partners or associates thereof unless
prohibited by the client. Atty. Honey committed no wrong in giving information to
him. However, in the case of Atty. Momo, Atty. Honey committed a gross violation of
Canon 21.

------------------------------
PROBLEM NO. 143: Atty. Shasha was appointed counsel de oficio for Yoyo, who was
accused of raping his own daughter. Yoyo pleaded not guilty but thereafter privately
admitted to Atty. Shasha that he did commit the crime charged. In light of Yoyo’s
admission, what should Atty. Shasha do? Explain.

ANSWER: Atty. Shasha should suggest to Yoyo that he should plead guilty to the
crime as charged. Canon 19, Rule 19.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
states that “a lawyer who has received information that his client has, in the course of
the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal, shall promptly call
upon the client to rectify the same, and failing which he shall terminate the
relationship with such client in accordance with the Rules of Court.”

------------------------------

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PROBLEM NO. 144: Following the problem above, can Atty. Shasha disclose the
admission of Yoyo to the court? Why or why not?

ANSWER: No, Atty. Shasha cannot disclose Yoyo's admission to the court. Canon 21,
Rule 21.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that “a lawyer shall not,
to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in the course of
employment, nor shall he use the same to his own advantage or that of a third person,
unless the client with full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.” Atty.
Shasha cannot disclose the admission without violating the abovementioned
canon. The information disclosed is in the nature of a privileged communication,
hence, she cannot disclose it to the court without Yoyo's consent.

------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 145: Atty. Swapang was the lawyer of plaintiff Ramon in a collection
case. An amicable settlement was reached and the defendant paid Atty. Swapang the
amount of Php500,000. Atty. Swapang gave only Php100,000 notwithstanding their
agreement that Atty. Swapang was to receive as his professional fee only 20% of the
amount collected. Relying on this agreement, Ramon demanded Php300,000 more
from Atty. Swapang. When the latter refused, Ramon filed a complaint for estafa, for
which Atty. Swapang was eventually convicted. While proceedings to disbar Atty.
Swapang were pending, he was granted absolute pardon by the president. Premised
thereon, Atty. Swapang moved for the dismissal of the disbarment proceedings.
Should the motion be granted? Why?

ANSWER: The motion to dismiss the disbarment proceedings should be denied.

Absolute pardon for a criminal offense affects the disbarment in two ways. One, where
the disbarment proceedings are founded and rest alone upon a statute making the fact
of conviction a ground for disbarment, absolute pardon for the offense is a bar to
disbarment. Second, where the disbarment proceedings are based upon the
professional misconduct of a lawyer which culminated in a criminal prosecution and
conviction, absolute pardon erases the penal consequences of the conviction but does
not relieve the lawyer from the ethical consequences of his misconduct. He may still
be disbarred. The case at bar refers to the second situation.

------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 146: Janice contested Arni’s possession of one of the apartments she
owns. The latter ignored the demand to vacate the premises. Thus, a complaint was
filed before the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Pamplona, Dumaguete City
where both parties reside. Atty. Dugami, as Punong Barangay, summoned the parties

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to conciliation meetings. When parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, Atty.
Dugami issued a Certificate to File Action. Thereafter, Janice filed a complaint for
ejectment against Arni before the MTC. Atty. Dugami entered his appearance as
counsel for Arni in that case. Because of this, Janice filed an administrative complaint,
claiming that Atty. Dugami committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a
public officer when he stood as counsel for Arni even though he presided over the
conciliation proceedings between the parties as Punong Barangay. Is the
administrative complaint against Atty. Dugami meritorious? Explain.

ANSWER: Yes, the administrative complaint is meritorious. While Punong Barangays

are not prohibited from practicing their private professions, the Revised Civil Service
Rules provides that no government officer or employee shall engage directly in any
private profession or be connected with any commercial undertaking without a
written permission from the head of the department. As Punong Barangay, Atty.
Dugami should have therefore obtained the prior written permission of the Secretary
of DILG before he entered his appearance as counsel for Arni. This he failed to do. In
acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission,
respondent not only engaged in the unauthorized practice of law but also violated
civil service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides: “A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.” (Catu vs. Rellosa, A.C. No. 5738, 19 February 2008,
Corona, J.)
------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 147: While the administrative case filed against him is still pending
with the Supreme Court, Judge Kulbahinam accepted radio and television interviews
wherein he discussed the merit of his case and criticizing the procedure and the
manner the case is proceeding before the Supreme Court by challenging the Court’s
authority and accusing the justices for being bias and partial to his case even before
the rendition of decision. Did Judge Kulbahinam violate the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary?

ANSWER: Yes, Judge Kulbahinam violated the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary (NCJC). Under Section 4, Canon 4 of the NCJC, Judges shall not
knowingly, while a proceeding is before, or could come before, them make any
comment that might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of such proceeding
or impair the manifest fairness of the process. Nor shall judges make any comment in
public or otherwise that might affect the fair trial of any person or issue.
------------------------------

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PROBLEM NO. 148: During the hearing of an election protest filed by his brother
Tambok, Judge Niwang sat in the area reserved for the public and allowed his brother
to proceed to the area provided for the party of the case. While thereat, Judge Niwang
was seen to be passing some notes to his brother Tambok and the latter’s lawyer.
Judge Niwang’s brother won the election protest. Candidate Pildi filed an
administrative case against Judge Niwang for employing influence and pressure to
the judge who heard and decide the election protest. However, Judge Niwang
explained that his presence was only to give moral support to his brother and as an
ordinary taxpayer. Did Judge Niwang violate the New Code of Judicial Conduct for
the Philippine Judiciary?

ANSWER: Yes. Judge Niwang committed an act of impropriety by attending, in

another court, the hearing of the election protest of his brother Tambok. As a judge,
he has duty to maintain and preserve the integrity of the entire Judiciary. “Propriety
and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of
a judge” (Canon 4, New Code of Judicial Conduct). His defense that he attended the
hearing to give his moral support to his brother is considered as more consequential
than his duty to preserve the integrity of the entire judiciary. The fact that he was at
the courtroom during the hearing of the election protest and is even acting as if giving
advice by passing notes would make the public suspect that he is trying to influence
his colleague even if that was not his intention (See Vidal vs. Dojillo, A.M. No. MTJ-05-
1591, 14 July 2005, Austria-Martinez, J.).
------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 149: In an action to prevent the condominium developer from

building beyond ten (10) floors, Judge Cardo rendered judgment in favor of the
defendant developer. The judgment became final after the plaintiffs failed to appeal
on time. Judge Cardo and Atty. Crocs, counsel for the developer, thereafter separately
purchased a condominium unit each from the developer. Did Judge Cardo and Atty.
Crocs commit any act of impropriety or violate any law for which they should be held
liable or sanctioned?

ANSWER: Judge Cardo and Atty. Crocs did not commit any act of impropriety, nor
did they violate any law. The prohibition imposed by the Civil Code, Art. 1491(5),
prohibiting judges and attorneys, and that contained in the Canons of Professional
Ethics, Canon 10, with regard to purchase of any interest in the subject matter of the
litigation both refer only to instances where the property is still the subject of
litigation. The prohibition does not apply to instances, such as in the problem, where
the conveyance takes place after the judgment because the property can no longer be

75
said to be the “subject of litigation.” (Director of Lands vs. Ababa, G.R. No. L-26096, 27
February 1979, Makasiar, J.)

------------------------------

PROBLEM NO. 150: Carlos contracted two marriages: the first was with Consuelo,
whom he left in the province, and the second was with Corinne in Manila, with whom
he had six (6) children. Both women were unaware of Carlo’s marriage to the other.
When Carlos entered law school, he met Cristina, a classmate, to whom he confided
his marital status. Not long after, Carlos and Cristina became involved in an
extramarital affair, as a result of which Carlos left Corinne and their children. During
Carlos and Cristina’s senior year in law school, Consuelo passed away. After their
admission to the bar, Atty. Carlos and Atty. Cristina decided to get married in Hong
Kong in a very private ceremony. When Corinne learned of Carlos and Cristina’s
wedding in Hong Kong, she filed a disbarment case against Atty. Carlos and Atty.
Cristina on the ground of gross immorality. Will the disbarment case prosper?

ANSWER: Yes. The possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent
for admission to the bar and a continuing condition to remain a member of the legal
profession. Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. As a
privilege bestowed by law through the Supreme Court, membership in the Bar can be
withdrawn where circumstances concretely show the lawyer’s lack of the essential
qualifications required of lawyers. For a misconduct that seriously affects the standing
and character of a lawyer as a legal professional and as an officer of the Court, the
Court may withdraw such privilege. (Garrido vs. Garrido, A.C. No. 6593, 4 February
2010)
------------------------------

76
 Relevant Provisions Under the Code of Professional Responsibility
and Accountability (A.M. No. 22-09-01-SC)

CANON I

• INDEPENDENCE

SECTION 1. Independent, accessible, efficient, and effective legal service. — A lawyer shall
make legal services accessible in an efficient and effective manner. In performing this
duty, a lawyer shall maintain independence, act with integrity, and at all times ensure
the efficient and effective delivery of justice.

SECTION 2. Merit-based practice. — A lawyer shall rely solely on the merits of a cause
and not exert, or give the appearance of, any influence on, nor undermine the
authority of, the court, tribunal or other government agency, or its proceedings.

CANON II

• PROPRIETY

SECTION 3. Safe environment; avoid all forms of abuse or harassment. — A lawyer shall
not create or promote an unsafe or hostile environment, both in private and public
settings, whether online, in workplaces, educational or training institutions, or in
recreational areas.

To this end, a lawyer shall not commit any form of physical, sexual, psychological, or
economic abuse or violence against another person. A lawyer is also prohibited from
engaging in any gender-based harassment or discrimination.

SECTION 4. Use of dignified, gender-fair, and child- and culturally-sensitive language. —

A lawyer shall use only dignified, gender-fair, child- and culturally-sensitive language
in all personal and professional dealings.

To this end, a lawyer shall not use language which is abusive, intemperate, offensive
or otherwise improper, oral or written, and whether made through traditional or
electronic means, including all forms or types of mass or social media.

SECTION 18. Prohibition against self-promotion. — A lawyer shall not make public
appearances and statements in relation to a terminated case or legal matter for the
purpose of self-promotion, self- aggrandizement, or to seek public sympathy.

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SECTION 19. Sub-judice rule. — A lawyer shall not use any forum or medium to
comment or publicize opinion pertaining to a pending proceeding before any court,
tribunal, or other government agency that may:

(a) cause a pre-judgment, or

(b) sway public perception so as to impede, obstruct, or influence the decision of such
court, tribunal, or other government agency, or which tends to tarnish the court’s or
tribunal’s integrity, or

(c) impute improper motives against any of its members, or

(d) create a widespread perception of guilt or innocence before a final decision.

SECTION 20. Disclosure of relationship or connection. — A lawyer shall, at the first

available opportunity, formally disclose on record the lawyer’s relationship or
connection with the presiding officer of any court, tribunal, or other government
agency, or any of its personnel, or the lawyer’s partners, associates, or clients, that may
serve as a ground for mandatory inhibition in any pending proceeding before such
court, tribunal, or other government agency.

SECTION 22. No undue advantage of ignorance of the law. — A lawyer shall not take
advantage of a non-lawyer’s lack of education or knowledge of the law.

SECTION 32. Lawyers in the academe. — A lawyer serving as a dean, administrative

officer, or faculty member of an educational institution shall at all times adhere to the
standards of behavior required of members of the legal profession under the CPRA,
observing propriety, respectability, and decorum inside and outside the classroom,
and in all media.

SECTION 33. Conflict of interest for lawyers in the academe. — A lawyer serving as a
dean, administrative officer, or faculty member of an educational institution shall
disclose to the institution any adverse interest of a client.

Upon discovery of any adverse interest of the lawyer’s client which directly affects
any student who is under his or her direct supervision and guidance, the lawyer shall
likewise disclose the same to the institution.

SECTION 34. Paralegal services; lawyer’s responsibility. — A paralegal is one who

performs tasks that require familiarity with legal concepts, employed or retained by a
lawyer, law office, corporation, governmental agency, or other entity for non-
diagnostic and non-advisory work in relation to legal matters delegated by such
lawyer, law office, corporation, governmental agency, or other entity.

78
A lawyer must direct or supervise a paralegal in the performance of the latter’s
delegated duties.

The lawyer’s duty of confidentiality shall also extend to the services rendered by the
paralegal, who is equally bound to keep the privilege.

SECTION 35. Non-delegable legal tasks. — A lawyer shall not delegate to or permit a
non-lawyer, including a paralegal, to:

(a) accept cases on behalf of the lawyer;

(b) give legal advice or opinion;

(c) act independently without the lawyer’s supervision or direction;

(d) to hold himself or herself out as a lawyer, or be named in association with a lawyer
in any pleading or submission to any court, tribunal, or other government agency;

(e) appear in any court, tribunal, or other government agency, or actively participate
in formal legal proceedings on behalf of a client, except when allowed by the law or
rules;

(f) conduct negotiations with third parties unless allowed in administrative agencies,
without a lawyer’s supervision or direction;

(g) sign correspondence containing a legal opinion;

(h) perform any of the duties that only lawyers may undertake. (9.01a)

These provisions shall not apply to law student practitioners under Rule 138-A of the
Rules of Court.

• RESPONSIBLE USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA

SECTION 37. Online posts. — A lawyer shall ensure that his or her online posts,
whether made in a public or restricted privacy setting that still holds an audience,
uphold the dignity of the legal profession and shield it from disrepute, as well as
maintain respect for the law.

SECTION 39. Prohibition against fraudulent accounts. — A lawyer shall not create,
maintain or operate accounts in social media to hide his or her identity for the purpose
of circumventing the law or the provisions of the CPRA.

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SECTION 40. Non-disclosure of privileged information through online posts. — A lawyer
shall not reveal, directly or indirectly, in his or her online posts confidential
information obtained from a client or in the course of, or emanating from, the
representation, except when allowed by law or the CPRA.

SECTION 42. Prohibition against influence through social media. — A lawyer shall not
communicate, whether directly or indirectly, with an officer of any court, tribunal, or
other government agency through social media to influence the latter’s performance
of official duties.

SECTION 43. Legal information; legal advice. — Pursuant to a lawyer’s duty to society
and the legal profession, a lawyer may provide general legal information, including
in answer to questions asked, at any fora, through traditional or electronic means, in
all forms or types of mass or social media.

A lawyer who gives legal advice on a specific set of facts as disclosed by a potential
client in such fora or media dispenses Limited Legal Service and shall be bound by all
the duties in the CPRA, in relation to such Limited Legal Service.

CANON III

• FIDELITY

SECTION 1. Practice of law. — The practice of law is the rendition of legal service or
performance of acts or the application of law, legal principles, and judgment, in or out
of court, with regard to the circumstances or objectives of a person or a cause, and
pursuant to a lawyer-client relationship or other engagement governed by the Code
of Professional Responsibility and Accountability for lawyers. It includes employment
in the public service or private sector and requires membership in the Philippine bar
as qualification.

SECTION 6. Fiduciary duty of a lawyer. — A lawyer shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed by the client.

To this end, a lawyer shall not abuse or exploit the relationship with a client.

SECTION 8. Lawyer’s duty to encourage settlement. — A lawyer shall encourage the

client to avoid, end or settle a controversy, whether pending or not, in order to reach
a settlement or a compromise if the matter can be compromised under the law and
will admit of a fair settlement.

To this end, the lawyer shall actively assist the parties and the court, tribunal, or other
government agency to effect mediation and/or dispute resolution.

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SECTION 10. Responsibility over a subordinate lawyer, paralegal, or employee. — A lawyer
or law firm shall be responsible for the mistakes, negligence, and/or acts or omissions
of a subordinate lawyer, paralegal, or employee under the lawyer’s direct supervision
and control, who is acting within the scope of the assigned tasks, that cause damage
or injury which brings dishonor to the profession or violates the rule on
confidentiality.

However, such liability of the supervising lawyer does not attach upon proof of
exercise of diligence of a good parent of a family in the selection and supervision of
subordinate lawyer, paralegal, or employee.

SECTION 11. Responsibility of a supervisory lawyer over a supervised lawyer. — A

supervisory lawyer shall co-sign a pleading or other submission to any court, tribunal,
or other government agency with a supervised lawyer. A supervisory lawyer shall be
responsible for a violation of the CPRA by the supervised lawyer in any of the
following instances:

(a) the supervisory lawyer orders or directs the specific conduct or, with knowledge
of the specific conduct, ratifies it; or

(b) the supervisory lawyer knows of such conduct at a time when it could be
prevented or its consequences avoided or mitigated, but fails to take reasonable
remedial action; or

(c) the supervisory lawyer should have known of the conduct so that reasonable
remedial action could have been taken at a time when the consequences of the conduct
could have been avoided or mitigated. (n)

A supervisory lawyer is a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another

lawyer, including a supervising lawyer under Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court.

SECTION 16. Prohibition against dating, romantic or sexual relations with a client. — A
lawyer shall not have dating, romantic, or sexual relations with a client during the
engagement, unless the consensual relationship existed between them before the
lawyer-client relationship commenced.

SECTION 20. Legal services organization; conflict of interest. — A legal services

organization is any private organization, including a legal aid clinic, partnership,
association, or corporation, whose primary purpose is to provide free legal services.

A lawyer-client relationship shall arise only between the client and the handling
lawyers of the legal services organization. All the lawyers of the legal services

81
organization who participated in the handling of a legal matter shall be covered by
the rule on conflict of interest and confidentiality.

SECTION 24. Active involvement in legal education. — A lawyer shall keep abreast of
legal developments, participate in continuing legal education programs, and support
efforts to achieve standards of excellence in law schools as well as in the practical
training of law students.

In addition, a lawyer shall assist the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, law schools,
law alumni associations, law associations, or civic organizations, in educating the
public on the law and jurisprudence.

The IBP Chapters shall provide supervising lawyers to the legal aid clinics in their
jurisdiction.

SECTION 25. Support for legal internship, apprenticeship and training. — To prepare the
next generation of lawyers for ethical practice, lawyers shall support legal internship
and apprenticeship programs and accept law students for training.

The lawyer shall treat the apprentices as junior colleagues and future counsels and
shall conscientiously supervise them.

SECTION 26. Prompt payment of membership dues. — A lawyer shall promptly pay the
annual membership dues in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, unless expressly
exempt from such payment by law or rules.

SECTION 31. Prohibition against filial disclosure. — A lawyer shall not discuss a client’s
confidences even with family members.

SECTION 33. Foreign lawyers. — Foreign lawyers cannot, directly or indirectly,

practice law in the Philippines.

SECTION 36. Pro bono Limited Legal Services. — A lawyer appointed by the court
as counsel de oficio shall not refuse to render Limited Legal Services pro bono on the
ground of conflict of interest. Instead, the lawyer shall disclose to all affected parties
such conflict of interest.

In any case, the lawyer may not refuse to render such pro bono legal services to the
person concerned if only to the extent necessary to safeguard the latter’s fundamental
rights and not to deprive such person of remedies available under the law or rules.

A lawyer currently serving in the government shall not be exempt from pro bono
service and may be appointed by any court, tribunal, or other government agency as

82
counsel de officio, unless prohibited by law, or the applicable Civil Service rules and
regulations, or when there is a conflict of interest with government.

CANON IV

• COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE

SECTION 9. Practice of law concurrent with another profession. — A lawyer who is

engaged in another profession or occupation concurrently with the practice of law
shall expressly provide in the pertinent contract the nature of the services the lawyer
is engaged to perform.

The practice of another profession or occupation shall not jeopardize such lawyer’s
competence, integrity, probity, and independence in rendering legal services.

SECTION 10. Non-legal activities. — A lawyer who is engaged in business or other

non-legal profession shall likewise observe the ethical duties and responsibilities of a
lawyer under the CPRA.

CANON V

• EQUALITY

SECTION 1. Non-discrimination. — A lawyer shall not decline to represent a person

solely on account of the latter’s nationality or ethnicity, sexual orientation or gender
identity, religion, disability, age, marital status, social or economic status, political
beliefs, or such lawyer’s or the public’s opinion regarding the guilt of said person,
except for justifiable reasons. (14.01)

SECTION 2. Treatment of vulnerable persons. — In dealing with a client who belongs to

a vulnerable sector, a lawyer shall be mindful and sensitive of, and consider the
client’s special circumstances, as well as the applicable laws and rules.

The lawyer shall observe a higher standard of service suited to the particular needs of
the vulnerable person and shall assert such person’s right to meaningful access to
justice.

A vulnerable person is a person who is at a higher risk of harm than others, and shall
include children, the elderly, the homeless, persons with disability, persons deprived
of liberty, human rights victims, victims of domestic violence, victims of armed
conflict, those who are socio-economically disadvantaged, those who belong to racial
or ethnic minorities, or those with debilitating physical or mental conditions.

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CANON VI

• ACCOUNTABILITY

SECTION 1. Nature of disciplinary proceedings against lawyers. — Disciplinary

proceedings against lawyers shall be confidential in character and summary in nature.
(CBD Rules, Rule I, Sec. 4) Nonetheless, the final order of the Supreme Court shall be
published like its decisions in other cases.

SECTION 42. Penalty when the respondent has been previously disbarred. — When the
respondent has been previously disbarred and is subsequently found guilty of a new
charge, the Court may impose a fine or order the disbarred lawyer to return the money
or property to the client, when proper. If the new charge deserves the penalty of a
disbarment or suspension from the practice of law, it shall not be imposed but the
penalty shall be recorded in the personal file of the disbarred lawyer in the Office of
the Bar Confidant or other office designated for the purpose. In the event that the
disbarred lawyer applies for judicial clemency, the penalty so recorded shall be
considered in the resolution of the same.

SECTION 48. Petition for judicial clemency. — The verified petition for judicial
clemency shall allege the following:

(a) that the verified petition was filed after five years from the receipt of the order,
decision, or resolution of disbarment;

(b) that the disbarred lawyer has fully complied with the terms and conditions of all
prior disciplinary orders, including orders for restitution;

(c) that he or she recognizes the wrongfulness and seriousness of the misconduct for
which he or she was disbarred by showing positive acts evidencing reformation;

(d) that he or she has reconciled, or attempted in good faith to reconcile, with the
wronged private offended party in the disbarment case, or if the same is not possible,
an explanation as to why such attempt at reconciliation could not be made.

Where there is no private offended party, the plea for clemency must contain a public
apology; and

(e) notwithstanding the conduct for which the disbarred lawyer was disciplined, he
or she has the requisite good moral character and competence.

Any of the following allegations may also be made in support of the petition:

84
(a) that he or she still has productive years that can be put to good use if given a
chance; or

(b) there is a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal

acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system
or administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for public service.

85