The petitioner Leonardo Suario filed a complaint against his former employer Bank of the Philippine Islands for separation pay, damages, and attorney's fees claiming his dismissal was illegal and discriminatory. The labor arbiter ordered the bank to pay separation pay but dismissed claims for other damages. The NLRC affirmed this decision. The issue is whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying other damages. The Supreme Court ruled that based on applicable law at the time, the NLRC had jurisdiction to rule on claims for moral and other damages, and its denial of such claims was an error.
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SURIO Vs BPI
The petitioner Leonardo Suario filed a complaint against his former employer Bank of the Philippine Islands for separation pay, damages, and attorney's fees claiming his dismissal was illegal and discriminatory. The labor arbiter ordered the bank to pay separation pay but dismissed claims for other damages. The NLRC affirmed this decision. The issue is whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying other damages. The Supreme Court ruled that based on applicable law at the time, the NLRC had jurisdiction to rule on claims for moral and other damages, and its denial of such claims was an error.
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G.R. No.
L-50459 August 25, 1989
LEONARDO D. SUARIO, petitioner, vs. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Davao Branch or The Manager/Cashier and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, respondents. FACTS: On August 4,1977, petitioner Leonardo D. Suario filed a complaint for separation pay, damages and attorney's fees against the Bank of the Philippine Islands, Davao Branch/ or the Manager and Assistant Manager/Cashier alleging: 3. That during the time of the complainant's employment with the respondent bank, he pursued his studies of law without criticism or adverse comments from the respondent bank but instead praises were showered and incentives and considerations were bestowed in view of the complainant's determination for intellectual advancement; 6. That complainant never suspected that his application would be disapproved, much less any bad faith on the part of the respondent bank to discriminate union member (sic), since it has been the policy of the respondent bank to grant request of this nature as shown in the case of four (4) former employees who were all granted leave of absence without pay. 10. That during the first week of August, 1976, the complainant received a letter from the Asst. Manager/Cashier, Mr. Douglas E. Aurelio, ordering the complainant to report back for work since the complainant's request was allegedly disapproved and that failure to report back for work would be a conclusive proof that the complainant is no longer interested to continue working and therefore considered resigned. ... That sometime during the first week of December, 1976, the complainant went to the respondent bank but was verbally informed that he was already dismissed; That the dismissal of the complainant was clearly illegal and without just cause, being discriminatory in character he being an active union member and in fact the Vice President of the ALU-BPI Chapter until his dismissal in view of the uneven application of the respondent's policy; ... (Rollo, pp. 15-19) The case was set for conciliation but since the parties could not agree on any settlement, the case was certified to the Labor Arbiter. Thereafter, the Executive Labor Arbiter required the parties to submit their position papers. Based on the position papers submitted, a decision was rendered on December 7, 1977. The dispositive portion reads as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is hereby ordered to pay complainant's claim for separation pay in the amount of P11,813.36. His claim for moral, actual, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees are hereby dismissed for lack of merit. (Rollo, p. 46) The decision of the Executive Labor Arbiter was affirmed on appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission on October 9, 1978. A motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioner's claim for actual, moral and exemplary damages plus attorney's fees in addition to his separation pay. RULING: On the matter of NLRC jurisdiction over claims for damages, it clearly appears that the complaint was filed on August 4, 1977 and decided by the Labor Arbiter on December 7, 1977; hence, the applicable law is Article 217 of the Labor Code which took effect on October 1, 1974, and which provides: xxx xxx xxx ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. — (a) The Labor Arbiters shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural: (1) Unfair labor practice cases; (2) Unresolved issues in collective bargaining including those which involve wages, hours of work, and other terms and conditions of employment duly indorsed by the Bureau in accordance with the provisions of this Code; (3) All money claims of workers involving non-payment or underpayment of wages, overtime or premium compensation, maternity or service incentive leave, separation pay and other money claims arising from employer-employee relation, except claims for employee's compensation, social security and medicare benefits and as otherwise provided in Article 128 of this Code; (4) Cases involving household services; and (5) All other cases arising from employer-employee relationship unless expressly excluded by this Code. (b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor Arbiters, compulsory arbitrators, and voluntary arbitrators in appropriate casino provided in Article 263 of this Code. ... The contention of private respondent that the NLRC is not clothed with authority to entertain claims for moral and other forms of damages is based on PD 1367 which took effect on May 1, 1979 and which amended Article 217 by specifically providing that "Regional Directors shall not indorse and Labor Arbiters shall not entertain claims for moral or other forms of damages." This limitation on jurisdiction did not last long. This Court in the case of Ebon v. De Guzman, (113 SCRA 52 [1982]) explained: Evidently, the lawmaking authority had second thoughts about depriving the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC of the jurisdiction to award damages in labor cases because that set up would mean duplicity of suits, splitting the cause of action and possible conflicting findings and conclusions by two tribunals on one and the same claim. So, on May 1, 1980, Presidential Decree No. 1691 (which substantially reenacted Article 217 in its original form) nullified Presidential Decree No. 1367 and restored to the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC their jurisdiction to award all kinds of damages in cases arising from employer-employee relations (Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines v. Martinez, G.R. No. 58877). It is now well settled that money claims of workers provided by law over which the labor arbiter has original and exclusive jurisdiction are comprehensive enough to include claims for moral damages of a dismissed employee against his employer. (Vargas v. Akai Phil. Inc., 156 SCRA 531 [1987]).