MAST2776B - Process Instrumentation & Control Systems

Rev.00 – 28/07/2023
 Course Objective

OBJECTIVE OF THE COURSE TOPICS OF THE COURSE

▪ This course aims to cover the basic topics

related to Process Instrumentation (measured
▪ This course will treat the following topics:
variables and types of measuring instruments • Lesson 1,1: Introduction to Process Instrumentation
for main process variables) • Lesson 1.2 : Requirements for Instruments in
▪ It provides an overview of Automatic Process Hazardous Locations
Control Systems. • Lesson 2: Measurements and instrumentation of main
▪ It is also focused on basic functionalities of process variables
Control Valves, Safety Valves and On-off Valves.
• Lesson 3: Automatic Process Control Systems
▪ It also covers main topics related to Emergency
Shutdown Systems and related logics. • Lesson 4 :Valves in Automation & Control Systems
• Lesson 5: Emergency System and Logics

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 Course Overview

DAY 1 DAY 2 & DAY 3 DAY 4

▪ Lesson 1.1: ▪ Lesson 2: ▪ Lesson 3:

✓ Introduction to Process ✓ Measurements and
Instrumentation
✓ Automatic Process Control
instrumentation of main process
Systems
variables
▪ Lesson 1.2:
✓ Requirements for Instruments in
Hazardous Locations

DAY 5 DAY 6 & DAY 7

▪ Lesson 5:
▪ Lesson 4:
✓ Emergency Systems and logics
✓ Valves in Automation & Control
Systems
✓ Course Review
✓ Final Assessment Questionnaire
and Correction
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MAST2776B - Process Instrumentation & Control Systems

Lesson 5: Emergency Systems and logics

Iraq
 Lesson Objective

OBJECTIVE OF THE LESSON TOPICS OF THE LESSON

▪ This lesson aims to provide an ▪ This lesson will treat the following topics:
overview about the measurements • ICSS
and related instruments of main • Emergency Shutdown System
process variables • Fire & Gas System

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 ICSS

Important Definitions

▪ Basic Process Control System (BPCS): a generic term to describe both DCS and PLC

▪ Safety Instrumented System (SIS): an instrumented system used to implement one

ore more Safety Instrumented Functions
▪ Safety Instrumented Function (SIF): A set of equipment intended to reduce the risk due to
a specific hazard

▪ The Integrated Control and Safety System (ICSS) approach seeks to combine the
functionality of both in a single overall system architecture

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 ICSS

Definition
An Integrated Control and Safety System (ICSS) is a technology platform that combines
elements of process control and functional safety into a single architecture.

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 ICSS

▪ Traditionally Safety Instrumented Systems and Process Control Systems have been physically
separated.
▪ They have been supplied by specialist companies

▪ Now the standard IEC 61508, which have less prescriptive safety standards, allow for the
possibility of SIS and BPCS to be combined.

ICSS
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 ICSS

ESD
IEC 61508
is an international standard governing the entire life cycle of safety-
related electrical, electronic or programmable electronic (E / E / PE)
products and systems, including their application, design, use and
maintenance.

▪ The important concept for the standard is separation, which is commonly interpreted as
functional separation.
• Safety and non-safety functions must be independent
• Failure of a non safety-related function must not cause a dangerous failure of a safety-
related function

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 ICSS

Independent Protection Layers

▪ One of the main concepts used when addressing

hazards is that of Independent Protection Layers
(IPL)

▪ In a process plant, the first protection layer will be

the BPCS…
▪ … followed by the SIS

▪ IEC 61511 states that SIS operation shall not be

affected by the behavior of the BPCS

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 ICSS

ICSS Architecture
▪ Basic Process Control System and Safety Instrumented System can be:
▪ Separate
• Totally separate and work independently
▪ Interfaced
• They use different control and I/O hardware
• Different suppliers
• Connected by a gateway to exchange data

Interfaced systems
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 ICSS

ICSS Architecture
▪ Integrated
• Separate control and I/O hardware
• Single supplier
• Common networks, engineering tools,
operator interface
Integrated systems

▪ Common
• Common platform
• Single system
• Single supplier Common systems

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 ICSS

Integrated Architecture
▪ The Common approach is possible, but an ICSS is most often realized by using the Integrated
approach.

▪ The goal is to achieve integrated control & safety by appropriate level of:
• Separation
• Resistance to common cause faults
• Access protection
• Security

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 ICSS

Integrated Architecture Techniques

▪ Access protection, with safety program

password protected

▪ Communications with safety-certified

protocols

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 ICSS

Integrated Architecture Techniques

▪ Data Integrity Checking for data passed

between blocks

▪ Hardware Diversity

▪ Program Flow Checking

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 ICSS

Integrated Architecture Techniques

▪ A safety mode, locking down the safety

program

▪ Safety Islands
• each of these islands contains
measures to detect and control faults
at the hardware level and at the
safety function level
• interference from the standard
elements of the system on the safety
function is prevented

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 ICSS

ICSS Benefits

▪ Reduced Project Capital Expenditure

(Capex)
• The cost of the project can be
lowered
• Using better integrated tools the
possibility of systematic errors is
reduced
• Managing subsequent changes on
the plant is easier

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 ICSS

ICSS Benefits
▪ Reduced Operational Expenditure (Opex)
• Better visibility of the information for the operator (alarms and general data)
• Maintenance is simplified
• The use of smart transmitters allows to predict problems

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 ICSS

ICSS Benefits
▪ Easier management of change
• Integrated toolsets and a single database can also make it easier and quicker
to manage changes to the safety system logic in accordance with IEC 61511

IEC 61511
This standard was developed and then updated in 2017 by the international
electrotechnical commission - the IEC - with the aim of creating a single set of
requirements that would consider the entire life cycle of SIS (Safety Instrumented
Systems) such as identification, design, installation, operation, maintenance, specific
for the process industry

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 ICSS

ACTIVITY

True False

ICSS combines the functionality of both the DCS and the PLC

It is important, for an ICSS, that safety and non-safety

functions are independent

Adoption of ICSS can have the advantage of a reduced Capex

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 ESD

▪ In the Oil and Gas industry, an Emergency Shutdown is a safety system that is designed to
minimize the consequences of an emergency situation, such as a failure, to reduce the potential
of flooding, escape of hazardous materials, or outbreak of fire.

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 ESD

▪ Emergency Shutdown System (ESD) philosophy is focused in protecting the

personnel, the environment and the facilities against unsafe conditions

▪ Typical examples of situations that would be controlled by ESD action:

• Uncontrolled gas release
• Oil spillage
• Blocked pipeline
• Overheating electric motor

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 ESD

Example of Environmental Protection

▪ A typical example of situation which can involve a potential hazard primarily to the
environment and that would be controlled by ESD action is an oil spillage from the system.

▪ The ESD system could act rising an alarm to alert the operators and initiating emergency
equipment such as block valve stations, pump stations, relief tanks to minimize the quantity
of oil dispersed to the environment.
▪ The ESD intervention can be therefore summarized in two steps:
• Spill source control;
• Containment and recovery of spilled hydrocarbons at the spill source to prevent their
distribution.

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 ESD

Example of Equipment Protection

▪ A typical example of situation which can involve a potential hazard primarily to the
equipment and that would be controlled by ESD action is the overheating of an electric motor.

▪ The ESD system, initiated by a temperature transmitter located on the motor, will act
switching the motor off and putting the driven equipment in a safe condition (e.g. closing
related valves, starting the spare equipment, etc.).

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 ESD

Main Features

▪ The ESD system is independent of the DCS but interfaces with it

▪ The ESD is usually based on PLC architecture

▪ It has double or triple redundancy

▪ It is designed to be fail safe

▪ It has a bypass, in order to allow:

• Maintenance
• Plant start-up
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 ESD

Main Features
What does fail- safe mean?

A fail-safe is a design feature or practice that in the event of a specific type of failure,
inherently responds in a way that will cause no or minimal harm to other equipment, to the
environment or to people

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 ESD

ESD Actions

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 ESD

International Standards

▪ IEC 61508 (Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related

systems)
▪ IEC 61511 (Functional safety of safety instrumented systems in the process industry sector)
▪ IEC 62061 (Functional safety of electrical/electronic/ programmable electronic control systems
for machinery)

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 ESD

Main Components

▪ The main components of an ESD system are:

• Field sensors
• PLCs
• Field shutdown devices (shut-off valves, vent valves, pump switches, heater switches, etc)

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 ESD

Components: Initiating device

▪ A wide range of devices is available to initiate an ESD:

• Flow sensor
• Pressure sensor
• Liquid level sensor
• Temperature sensor

▪ constantly monitor and detect abnormal levels at critical

points in the system

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 ESD

Alarm Conditions

High (H) and raising Alarm raised

High High (HH) ESD Action

Low (L) and falling Alarm raised

Low Low (LL) ESD Action

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 ESD

Components : Shutdown Devices

▪ Shutdown is usually performed through the following actions:

• Closing valves
• Opening valves
• Shutting down pumps
• Shutting down heaters

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 ESD

Components : Shutdown Devices

Initiating device…

▪ Level sensor Shutdown is ▪ Closing valves

▪ Pressure sensor effected by ▪ Opening valves
▪ Temperature sensor ▪ Shutting down pumps
▪ Flow sensor ▪ Shutting down heaters

Inputs from the Fire and Gas detection system can also be used to initiate
Emergency Shutdown

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 ESD

Manual Initiation

▪ In addition to the various automatic shutdown devices discussed

above, ESD may also be initiated manually from the control room
and other strategically located points in the plant for:

• Maintenance purposes
• Safety measures

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 ESD

ESD Valves

▪ These valves are designed to stop the flow of a hazardous fluid or external
hydrocarbons (gases) upon the detection of a dangerous event

▪ Their actuators are fail-safe fluid power type. Typical examples of these are:
• Pneumatic cylinder
• Hydraulic cylinder
• Electro-hydraulic actuator

Example of an emergency
Shutdown Valve

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 ESD

Blowdown Valves
▪ These valves are designed to open upon ESD action to release gas to atmosphere or flare
and therefore preventing a potentially dangerous overpressure situation

Typical blowdown valve representation on

Example of a Blowdown valve
P&ID, with its relevant restriction orifice

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 ESD

ESD Levels
▪ Typically, there are four levels of ESD.
• Level 1: Complete Shutdown of Plant

• Level 2: Shutdown and depressurization of individual process or utility systems

• Level 3: Shutdown and block-in of individual process and utility systems

• Level 4: Local unit (equipment) shutdown

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 ESD

ESD Levels

▪ The overall ESD control system operates in

conjunction with:

• Unit control and instrumentation

• Process control system and instrumentation
• Utility control system and instrumentation
• Fire and Gas Control Panel (F&G CP)

Fire & gas control panel

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 ESD

ESD Levels

▪ The overall ESD control system operates in conjunction with:

• HVAC control panel

• Manual Alarm Call points (MACs) ESD push button
• ESD pushbuttons.

Manual alarm call point

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 ESD

ESD Levels – Level 1

▪ Complete shutdown of installation

▪ It can be initiated:
• Automatically
• Manually via a pushbutton

▪ Pushbutton may be located:

• On the ESD Panel in the CCR (Central Control Room)
• In strategic positions around the installation

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 ESD

ESD Levels – Level 1

▪ EMERGENCY POWER GENERATOR supplies essential services, for example to:

• Standby generator control system
• Fire & gas detection systems
• Firewater pumps control system
• General alarm system
• Emergency lighting
• Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) Systems

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 ESD

ESD Levels – Level 2

▪ Shutdown and depressurization of individual process or utility systems

▪ It would be automatically initiated upon:

• Loss of instrument air
• Confirmed fire
• Gas detection
• An earlier Level 3 Shutdown had not been reset after a preset time

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 ESD

ESD Levels – Level 2

▪ It would also typically affect certain utility systems, such as:

• Heating medium
• Drains
• Diesel oil
• HVAC

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 ESD

ESD Levels – Level 3

▪ Shuts down a complete process or utility train

▪ It is initiated by:
• System instrumentation recognizing system upset conditions
• Confirmed fire or gas detection from MACs

▪ Any implementation of a Level 3 ESD will automatically bring a Level

4 ESD

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 ESD

ESD Levels – Level 4

▪ Local unit shutdown

▪ Is the least severe

▪ It is usually initiated by plant Instrumentation

▪ It is possible to have several different Level 4 ESDs active at

the same time

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 ESD

Bypass and Testing

▪ The ESD system has a facility to bypass, via operator interface,

selected field devices for:
• Testing
• Maintenance

▪ During any individual, or group bypass operation, an alarm and

constant indication of the bypass condition is displayed to the
operator to prevent a device remaining bypassed without the
operator's knowledge

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 ESD

ESD Operation

▪ Emergency plans and procedures ▪ Typically plans and procedures will be formulated to
can be categorized as: cover:
• emergency procedures • total power failure
• procedures to deal with upset • loss of emergency power generation
operating conditions • fire
• procedures to deal with • explosion
equipment failure
• major oil spill
• release of toxic gas
• release of flammable gas
• chemical spill.

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 ESD

ESD Operation
▪ Operations during the Emergency Shutdown:
• Ensure that personnel, the environment and plant and equipment have been
protected by the ESD system

• Check the plant to confirm that all shutdown devices have gone to their fail
safe positions.

• Establish the cause of the trip and take the necessary steps to rectify it.

• When it is determined that the abnormal conditions have been eliminated,

measures must be taken to restart the system.

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 ESD

Example : Pipeline ESD System

▪ A Pipeline ESD System is designed to be able to shut down the pipeline safely when all
other safety systems have failed
▪ At strategic locations, actuated ESD valves will close to isolate vulnerable sections of the
pipeline
▪ Blowdown valves may also be fitted in gas pipelines at strategic locations, which open
upon ESD action

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 ESD

Example : Pipeline ESD System

▪ The main components of a pipeline ESD system are:
• Pipeline sensors
• PLCs
• Pipeline shutdown devices (ESD valves, Blowdown valves)

An example of a pipeline sensor

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 ESD

Example : Pipeline ESD System

Cause: High-High liquid flow

Effect of the ESD system: Isolate the suspect

section of pipeline, both upstream and
downstream of the suspect break

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 ESD

Example : Pipeline ESD System

24 Volt
24V DC
Power
Valve V-1 Supply

ESD Inputs

Valve V-2

▪ Normal operation
• The solenoid of the V-1 three-way valve is energized, allowing line product to be
routed to the diaphragm of valve V-2, the ESD valve.

• The line gas pressure acts on the ESD valve diaphragm, against the force of the valve
spring, to maintain the valve in the open position.
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 ESD

Example : Pipeline ESD System

24 Volt
24V DC
Power
Valve V-1 Supply

ESD Inputs

Valve V-2

▪ Pipeline Shutdown Scenario

• ESD System (e.g., Pipeline Leak Detected) will interrupt the power supply to the solenoid

• The three-way valve will close its path to the ESD diaphragm valve and vent line gas to
atmosphere

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 ESD Block Diagrams

Example of ESD Block Diagram

▪ The ESD system structure is reported in a simplified scheme, in three figures.

▪ The figures show when the block can be requested with manual activation (HS), while for the
interventions generated by fire and very low pressure, refer to the above-mentioned cause-
effect diagrams.

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 ESD Block Diagrams

Example of ESD Block Diagram

Causes of intervention of the

general block of the system with and
PSD without depressurization without depressurization.
PSD with depressurization Cancel depression

HHL KO Drum Torch Absence Electric Air

Absence Instrument Air

Example of ESD Block Diagram

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 ESD Block Diagrams

Example of ESD Block Diagram

The intervention hierarchy of block

by line and common parts with
depressurization.

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 ESD Block Diagrams

Example of ESD Block Diagram

The intervention hierarchy of block

by line and common parts without
depressurization.

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 ESD Block Diagrams

Activity
Explain what are the primary reasons
or cause behind the intervention of
general block systems with and
PSD without depressurization without depressurization measures in
PSD with depressurization Cancel depression place?

HHL KO Drum Torch Absence Electric Air

Absence Instrument Air

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 C&E Matrices
Cause-Effect diagrams
Shutdown Logic and Cause-Effect Scheme Analysis

▪ The emergency system intervention area covers the entire treatment system, from the well to the plants.
In order to have a complete and, at the same time, detailed control, different levels of intervention have
been designed.

▪ All the plants, both Off-Shore and On-Shore, are equipped with multi-level hierarchical logic systems,
according to the extent and the deviations relevance and to the normal process conditions. They are
classified as follows:
• LSD (Local Shutdown): it consists in the rapid closure or rapid block of the production localized in a
limited portion of the plant or of a single well, due to a process anomaly.
• PSD (Production Shutdown or Process Shutdown): consists in the rapid closure or rapid block of the
whole production, due to a process anomaly.
• ESD (Emergency Shutdown): consists in the rapid closure or rapid block of the whole production, due
to a fire.
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 C&E Matrices

Shutdown Logic and Cause-Effect Scheme Analysis

▪ The levels highlights a hazard scale to which correspond from localized to global interventions
on the entire treatment plant.

▪ The emergency (ESD) and production (PSD) block sequences are performed by a PLC
(Programmable Logic Controller) or DCS (Distributed Control System) system, and they are
activated through a hydraulic generation system.

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 C&E Matrices

Shutdown Logic and Cause-Effect Scheme Analysis

▪ Thus, the system provides for the rapid closure, according to a pre-established sequence, of a
portion or of all the actuated valve (SDV = shut-down valve) of the production system by
means of a single automatic or manual command of the control system and the potential
opening of the actuated valve (BDV= Blow-down valve) for the plant depressurization.

▪ While the emergency closure can be remotely operated (remote control), the valves re-
opening requires the operator intervention «on site» to control all the recovery and plant
pressurization phases. The emergency command is installed not only on the panel located in
the control room, but also in other strategic points.

▪ For instance, on sea platforms it can be installed in lower risk areas such as offices, helipad,
docking gangway, etc.
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 ESD
Causes & Effects (C&E) Chart

▪ C&E Chart or Matrix is a logic matrix which lists the detectable problems (causes) against the
automatic control reactions (effects) taken to safeguard the process and process area.

CAUSES EFFECTS
▪ the problem (event) ▪ the action taken; the

VS
▪ the location or equipment location/equipment affected
involved (process component) (process component)
▪ the device detecting the problem ▪ which shutdown devices are
(normally the instrument tag n°.) activated (by tag n°.).

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 Causes & Effects (C&E) Chart
Effect
Optical and
Alarm in Optical and Optical and
audible Fire ESD
the audible alarm on audible alarm
Cause Control the F&G/DCS
alarm in the
throughout
pump system
involved start activation
Room Panel the Terminal
area
Alarm button activation (GAP) X X X X Cause-Effect matrix
of Anti-fire System
Signal from 1 thermosensitive
cable (1oo2 logic)
X X X
Signal from 2 thermosensitive
cables (2oo2 logic)
X X X X X
Signal from 1 IR3 flame
detector (1oo2 logic)
X X X
Signal from 2 IR3 flame
detectors (2oo2 logic)
X X X X X
Signal from 1 thermosensitive
cable and 1 IR3 flame detector X X X X X
(2ooN logic)
1 smoke detector activation in
the PLC cabinet (1ooN logic)
X X
2 smoke detectors activation in
the PLC cabinet (2ooN logic)
X X X X
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 Causes & Effects (C&E) Chart
Effect
Ventilation
Optical and
Optical and Optical and block and
Alarm in audible
audible alarm audible alarm dampers
Cause the Control alarm in the
Room
on the DCS
involved
throughout the closure in Cause-Effect matrix of
Panel Terminal the PLC Gas Detection System
area
cabinet
GAS
Signal from 1 gas
detector (20% LEL): X X
Pre-Alarm
Signal from 1 gas
detector (40% LEL): X X
Alarm
Signal from 2 gas
detectors (20% LEL): X X
Pre-Alarm
Signal from 2 gas
detectors (40% LEL): X X X X X
Alarm

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 ESD

Causes & Effects (C&E) Chart

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 ESD

Causes & Effects (C&E) Chart

LEGEND:
▪ T - Time Delay
▪ R - Reset
▪ X - Close Action
▪ A - Alarm
▪ O - Open Action
▪ & - Combination of action

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 ESD

Causes & Effects (C&E) Chart

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 ESD

Causes & Effects (C&E) Chart

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 ESD

Causes & Effects (C&E) Chart

▪ The “Cause” side of the matrix gives information about:

• List of initiators
• Tag numbers
• Reference P&IDs, etc

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 ESD

Causes & Effects (C&E) Chart

▪ The “Effect” side of the matrix gives

information about:
• Activated devices
• Automatic control reactions
• Tag numbers
• Reference P&IDs, etc.

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 Causes & Effects (C&E) Chart
(C&E) Chart

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 Causes & Effects (C&E) Chart
P&ID – 1st Stage Separator - Hammar IPF

Open position

Identification of cause and

effects on P&ID – 1st Stage
Separator - Hammar IPF

Close position x

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 Causes & Effects (C&E) Chart

P&ID – 2nd Stage Separator - Hammar IPF

Identification of cause and

effects on P&ID –2ndStage
Separator - Hammar IPF

Close x
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 Causes & Effects (C&E) Chart

P&ID –Charge pumps - Hammar IPF

Identification of cause and

effects on Charge pumps -
Hammar IPF

Close x

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 Causes & Effects (C&E) Chart

P&ID –Dehydrator - Hammar IPF

Identification of cause and

effects on Dehydrator

Trip

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 ESD

ACTIVITY

True False

ESD valves are used to release gas to atmosphere or flare

Typical initiating devices of an ESD could be a pressure sensor
or a flow sensor

ESD is a type of DCS

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 F&G System

Introduction
F&G detection, Alarm and Control System consists of the following components:
• Detection and initiation devices
• Alarm devices
• Fire alarm enunciator panel
• Local fire alarm control panels
• Subsidiary fire alarm panels

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 F&G System

Function of F&G System

The function of the fire detection, alarm and control system is:
• To identify the presence of fire in all significant areas of the production and processing
facilities

• To instigate audible and visual alarm annunciations in the local area where the fire
started, in the Central Control Room (CCR)

• To initiate operation of the appropriate fire suppression system.

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 F&G System

Fire Detection
Various fire detection and alarm systems are employed throughout hydrocarbon production and
treatment plants. These detection devices are:
• Smoke detectors
• Heat detectors
• Flame detectors
• Fusible plug detectors
• Linear detectors
• MACs

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 F&G System

F&G Protection Activation

▪ Activation of one or more of these sensors will initiate an alarm in the central control building.

▪ In some cases, alarms can generate further action such as shutting down of equipment or start-up
of a DELUGE SYSTEM.

▪ Overall, actions performed after activation of an initiator are described in the relevant C&E.

Example of Deluge Valve

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 F&G System

Smoke Detectors

Smoke Detectors are: Ionization Smoke Detectors use:

• First evidence of fire • An ionization chamber
• Useful in slow moving air (buildings) • A source of ionizing radiation to detect smoke
• Not suitable in exposed open areas
This type of smoke detector is:
• Prone to false alarms from fumes etc.
• Cheap
• Good at detecting small amount of smoke
There are two main types of smoke detectors:
• Ionization Detectors
• Photoelectric Detectors

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 F&G System

Smoke Detectors
Photoelectric Smoke Detectors consists of:
• A light source
• A reflection chamber A A
• A light-sensitive photocell
A Light Source
A Light Source
B Photo-detector
B Photo-detector

B B

Normal conditions Alarm condition

Photoelectric chamber
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 F&G System

Smoke Detectors
Inside the smoke detector there is a light and a sensor, positioned at a 90-degree angle to each other.

▪ Normally, the light from the light source on the left shoots straight across and misses the sensor.
▪ When smoke enters the chamber, however, the smoke particles scatter the light and some light hits the sensor.
▪ The sensor then triggers an alarm in the F&G system.
▪ As with the ionisation detector, the photoelectric detector is addressable; the location and intensity of smoke can,
therefore, be determined. The alarm signal is sent to the local fire alarm panel.

▪ In normal conditions no smoke particles are present and therefore , the photoelectric detector is working in normal
condition

▪ If smoke particles are present, the photoelectric detector is working in alarm condition

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 F&G System

Heat Detectors
Heat detectors are:
• Less prone to false alarms
• Not as sensitive as Smoke Detectors
• Useful where high-speed detection is not required
Example of Smoke Detector

▪ Heat detectors normally require less maintenance than other types of detectors because of their principle of
operation and simple construction.

▪ These factors may result in fewer unwarranted alarms; however, since heat detectors are inherently slower in
operation than other types of electrical detectors, they should be considered for installation in areas where
high-speed detection is not required.

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 F&G System

Fire Detectors
Typical Fire Detector

The Fire Detectors are usually based on thermoelectric detectors.

Two sets of thermocouples are mounted in a single housing, so

arranged that one set is exposed to convection and radiation while
the other is shielded.
Thermistor Detector

A voltage is produced when a temperature difference exists Normal Conditions

between the exposed and unexposed thermocouple junctions of

the detector.
Thermistor Thermistor
isolated from exposed to the
ambient ambient
Abnormal Conditions

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 F&G System

Flame Detectors

Flame detectors provide a fast response in the

detection of fires
There are three main types of flame detectors:
• Ultraviolet
• Infrared
• UV/IR

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 F&G System

Flame Detectors – Ultraviolet (UV type Detectors

Ultraviolet (UV) type

An UV Fire Detector is activated by the ultra-violet radiation

emitted by flames, in the 0.185 and 0.245 microns range.

This wavelength is outside the range of normal human visibility and

sunlight: therefore, sunlight or normal lighting such as fluorescent, mercury-
vapor light or incandescent lighting does not affect the detectors

Cone of vision

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 F&G System

Flame Detectors – Ultraviolet (UV) type Detectors

Advantages of UV Detector:
▪ Very fast response to hydrocarbon fires Limitations of UV Detector:
▪ Sensitive to hydrogen, ammonia and sulphur-fuelled fires ▪ Sensitive to arc welding, lightning and X-rays
▪ 120° cone of vision ▪ Can be blinded by airborne contaminants such
▪ Widely used and proven system as steam, or smoke oil mist
▪ Capable of detecting high pressure natural gas fires ▪ Can be blinded by oil film or smoke build up on
▪ Provides greater coverage of an area by picking up reflected lens
UV light
▪ Some vapors can absorb UV radiation
▪ Automatic and manual optical checking

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Flame Detectors – Infrared (IR) type

▪ IR systems respond to infrared light in the 4.4 micron range.
▪ Hydrocarbon fires produce infrared radiation of this frequency.

Advantages of IR Detector:
▪ Very fast response to hydrocarbon fires
▪ Not as affected by oil film on lens or smoke as UV detectors
▪ 120° cone of vision
▪ Non-sensitive to arcing and sparking

Limitations of IR Detector: INFRARED

▪ Sensitive to radiation from hot objects SENSOR
▪ Not very sensitive to high pressure natural gas fires
▪ Blind to hydrogen, ammonia, sulphur and therefore H2S fires

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Flame Detectors – UV- IR type

▪ Within this detector, the internal microprocessor combines a single frequency
IR sensor and a UV sensor in one detector unit, requiring simultaneous
responses from both sensors to actuate the alarm relay.

Advantages of IR Detector:

▪ Not affected by arc welding, lightning or X-rays

▪ Not affected by ‘black body’ radiation
▪ Both UV and IR spectrums need to be present for a fire condition
INFRARED
▪ 120° cone of vision ULTRAVIOLET
SENSOR SENSOR

Limitations of IR Detector:
▪ Can be blinded by airborne contaminations such as steam, oil
mist or smoke
▪ May not respond to high pressure “blowtorch” type flame
because of lack of flicker frequency
▪ Blind to hydrogen, sulphur fires and H2S fires

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Fusible Plug Detectors Linear Detectors

It is a fail-safe device taken to mean a plug in a service
▪ Can take the form of a heat sensitive cable
line equipped with a seal that will melt or rupture (burst) ▪ Melting of the cable insulation provides a short-circuit between
at a predetermined temperature. conductors
This will actuate shut-down devices and can also release ▪ After operation the destroyed length of cable must be replaced
compressed air to operate an automatic deluge system. ▪ May be used in large areas such as warehouses

There are basically three types of cable

available:
• Resistive Type Linear Heat Detectors
• Single Set Point (Fixed) Linear Heat
Detectors
• Continuous Thermocouples

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Manual Alarm Call (MAC) Points

Manual alarm call point

Manual pull stations

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Gas Detectors
There are essentially two types of Gas Detectors:

• Combustible Gas Detectors

• Toxic Gas Detectors

Portable Combustible Gas Detector Toxic Gas Detector

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Toxic (H2S) Gas Detectors

▪ A maximum safe exposure limit is 10 ppm.
▪ At levels of 100 ppm, H2S will paralyze the olfactory system, making it appear odorless.
▪ At levels above 700 ppm, H2S can kill instantly.
< 1 ppm (0,0001%) Detectable by odour
 10 ppm (0,001%) Allowable for 8 ours
> 20 ppm Protective Breathing Apparatus become Necessary
Kills the smell in 3-15 minutes
100 ppm (0,01%)
Eyes and Throat may sting
Kills the smell quickly
200 ppm (0,02%)
Eyes and Throat burn
H2S is only slightly denser than Lose sense of balance and reasoning.
air so detectors are normally 500 ppm (0,05%) Respiratory disturbance in 2-15 minutes
Prompt Artificial Resuscitation required
mounted at head height or near Quickly become unconscious.
700 ppm (0,07%) Breathing stops - Death may result
potential sources of leaks Immediate Artificial Resuscitation required
Unless rescue promptly,
1000 ppm (0,1%) Permanent brain damage results

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Toxic (H2S) Gas Detectors

Semi-conductor type toxic gas detector
Electrochemical type toxic gas detector
▪ A semi-conducting material is applied as a thin film to a
▪ Electrochemical sensors are essentially fuel cells composed of noble non-conducting substrate between two electrodes
metal electrodes in an electrolyte ▪ The substrate is then heated to a temperature such that the
gas being monitored can cause a reversible change in the
conductivity of the semi-conducting material.

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