Case Digest AGRA
Case Digest AGRA
Facts:
Petitioner Natalia is the owner of three contiguous parcels of land located in Banaba, Antipolo, Rizal
that was included in the areas that was set aside by Presidential Proclamation 1637 to become
townsite reservation.
The petitioner applied for locational clearances and was approved, then it became the Antipolo Hills
Subdivision.
Then on 1988, the Comprehensive of Agrarian Reform (CARL) was enacted and the Dept. of Agrarian
Reform issued notice of coverage to undeveloped portions of Antipolo Hills
Natalia and EDIC protested and the Samahan ng Magsasaka sa Bundok Antipolo, Inc. (SAMBA), filed
a complaint against Natalia to restrain them from developing the areas
DAR Regional ruled by temporarily restraining Natalia from further developing the subdivision.
Natalia then contended that the properties already ceased to be agricultural lands when they were
included in the areas reserved by presidential fiat for town site reservation.
Issue:
Whether or not lands already classified for residential, commercial or industrial use are covered by
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
Held: The SC held that the said lands are not covered by CARL. It held that as to what constitutes
agricultural land, it is referred to as "land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and
not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. It is clear that the
undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision were intended for residential use and cannot
in any language be considered as "agricultural lands."
Facts:
These are consolidated cases which involve challenges to the constitutionality of certain provisions
that pertains to the acquisition and expropriation of lands that questions the exercise of the agrarian
reform law.
In one case, he petitioners are questioning the of separation of powers, due process, equal
protection and the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use
without just compensation.
In another case, petitioners contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment of just
compensation as it is traditionally understood. Another, petitioners that the mentioned Executive
orders are violative of the constitutional provision that no private property shall be taken without
due process or just compensation.
And lastly, Petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of
retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules
required.
Ruling: The SC held that there is distinction between the police power and the power of eminent
domain. Property condemned under the police power is intended for a noxious purpose for the
interest of public morals. The taking of property under the power of expropriation requires the
payment of just compensation to the owner.
The cases present no complication in the question of compensable taking of private property in
accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to
deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there
is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is
imperative.
HEIRS OF AUGUSTO SALAS, JR., REPRESENTED BY TERESITA D. SALAS, PETITIONERS, VS. MARCIANO
CABUNGCAL, ET AL., RESPONDENTS
Facts:
Augusto Salas, Jr. (Salas) was the registered owner of a vast tract of agricultural land in Lipa
City, Batangas.
Respondents Marciano Cabungcal et al. were tenant farmers in his agricultural land and are
agrarian reform beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
The Human Settlements Regulatory Commission approved the Zoning Ordinance of Lipa City,
Batangas and Salas' agricultural land was reclassified as a farm lot subdivision
Salas entered into an Owner-Contractor Agreement with Laperal Realty Corporation and the
sold 31 lots which was approved by the HLURB (Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board),
then unspecified were sold by Laperal Realty.
When the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program was signed into law, the landholdings
were contemplated for acquisition and distribution to qualified farmer beneficiaries.
The heirs of Salas assailed the inclusion of their landholdings in the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP). The DAR dismissed it for lack of merit.
Then the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, an action was filed for the
cancellation of the Certificates of Land Ownership Award.
The Estate of Salas again filed an application for exemption from the coverage of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform and claimed that the property had been reclassified as non-
agricultural prior to the effectivity of CARP.
The farmer-beneficiaries opposed the estate's petition for exemption claiming that they had
already received Certificates of Land Ownership Award over the properties.
The Secretary of Agrarian Reform granted respondents' motion for reconsideration and set
aside the order for the exemption. Hence the petitioners filed a petition for review.
ISSUE: Whether the reclassification of petitioners' land exempts it from the coverage of CARP.
RULING:
The SC denied the petition. It held that the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program covers the all-
private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture. Agricultural lands that were reclassified as
commercial, residential, or industrial by the local government, as approved by the HLURB are
excluded from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. However, a farm lot which is a subject
of this case is not included in any of these categories.
The general policy of Republic Act No. 6657 is to cover as many lands suitable for agricultural
activities as may be allowed. Where there is doubt as to the intention of the local government in the
area where the property is located, the interpretation should be towards the declared intention of
the law.
G.R. No. 86889 Case Digest
Luz Farms
Ponente: Paras
Facts:
Luz Farms is a corporation engaged in livestock and poultry business and was affected by the
enforcement of Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. Luz Farms petitions CARP to be declared
unconstitutional together with a restraining the order. The Court resolved to deny the petition.
Later, after a motion for reconsideration, the Court granted the motion regarding the injunction and
required the parties to file their respective memoranda.
Luz Farm contended that poultry raising is not similar to crop or tree farming. Land is not the
primary resource in this undertaking and represents no more than five percent (5%) of the total
investment of commercial livestock and poultry raisers.
On the otherhand the Department of Agrarian Reform argued that poultry raising is embraced in the
term "agriculture" and cited Webster's International Dictionary, "Agriculture — the art or science of
cultivating the ground and raising and harvesting crops, often, including also, feeding, breeding and
management of livestock.
Ruling: The SC granted the petition. It held that the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
on the meaning of the word "agricultural," clearly show that it was never the intention of the
framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the
constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program of the Government.
It held that inclusion of the raising of livestock as well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines
promulgated in accordance therewith, are hereby DECLARED null and void for being
unconstitutional.
Robustum Agricultural Corporation vs DAR
G.R. No. 221484, November 19, 2018
Facts:
Petitioner Robustum Agricultural Corporation is the registered owner of a 50,000-square
meter parcel of agricultural land in Silay City per Transfer Certificate that was a part of a
300,000-square meter mother estate owned by Puyas Agro, Inc. (PAI).
The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), issued a letter containing a notice of coverage
which identifies the mother estate as subject to the agrarian reform program.
The letter informs petitioner that, as a transferee of a portion of the mother estate, it will be
included by the DAR as an "alternative land owner and payee" for purposes of valuation and
the payment of compensation proceeds for the mother estate.
Petitioner filed before the RTC of Silay City a petition for quieting of title and declaratory
relief[14] against the DAR and the Land Bank of the Philippines. Therein, petitioner
questioned the efficacy of the notice coverage published by the DAR.
Petitioner claimed the notice as ineffective because the publication in a newspaper of general
circulation was not properly served and the same cannot be enforced as against the subject
land.
RTC issued an Order dismissing the petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC remained steadfast.
Held: The SC held that the RTC have no jurisdiction on the case. DAR maintains the
authority to bring the said proceeding into conclusion pursuant precisely to Section 30 of RA
No. 9700. THE NOTICE OF COVERAGE IS PART OF THE POWER OF DAR TO
IMPLEMENT LAND REFORM.
“The grant of authority upon the DAR to conclude a “proceeding involving the
implementation of the [agrarian reform law}, like any statutory grant of authority, must be
deemed to include all such powers, even those not expressly stated, that are necessary to
effectuate the granted authority.
Facts:
The petitioners of this case are the heirs of Leonilo Sebastian Nuñez and the respondents are
the heirs of Tenant-farmer Villanoza
(Sebastian) owned a land measuring 2.833 hectares located at San Leonardo, Nueva Ecija.
This land was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT).
Sebastian mortgaged this property to then ComSavings Bank now GSIS Family Bank, to
secure a loan. His loan matured but the bank did nothing to collect the payment due at that
time.
Tenant-farmer Villanoza started tilling Sebastian's land. It was only about 19 years after the
maturity of Sebastian's loan, that GSIS Family Bank extrajudicially foreclosed his mortgaged
properties including the land tenanted by Villanoza.
A public auction was held, and GSIS Family Bank emerged as "the highest and only
bidder." Sebastian's land title was cancelled and the title was issued to GSIS.
Sebastian filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court to annul the extrajudicial
foreclosure sale. Sebastian argued that an action to foreclose the mortgage prescribed after 10
years. GSIS Family Bank's right of action accrued on June 30, 1978, but it only foreclosed
the property 19 years later. Thus, its right to foreclose the property was already barred.
While the case was pending at the Regional Trial Court, the Department of Agrarian Reform
sent a notice of coverage under Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program to GSIS Family Bank, then landowner of the disputed property.
Neither GSIS Family Bank nor Sebastian exercised any right of retention within 60 days from
this notice of coverage.
ISSUE: Whether petitioners have a right of retention over the land awarded to farmer
beneficiary Gabino T. Villanoza?
RULING: The SC denied the petition, it held that the area selected for retention by the landowner is
tenanted, the tenant shall have the option to choose whether to remain therein. In this case the petitioner’s
application for Retention stated that Villanoza occupied the property as a tenant and farmer beneficiary.Thus, the
option to remain in the same land was for Villanoza to make.
Also, the issuance of the title to Villanoza could no longer be revoked. Acquiring the lot in good faith,
Villanoza registered his Certificate of Land Ownership Award title under the Torrens system, it is an
absolute title, without qualification or restriction.
Case Digest: Daez vs Court of Appeals G.R. No. 133507, Feb 17, 2000,325 SCRA 856 (2000)
Facts:
Daez was the owner of an approximate 4.26 hectare riceland in Bulacan which was being
cultivated by respondents Soriente et. al under a system of share-tenancy. The said land was
subjected to the Operation Land Transfer Program .
With an affidavit, the petitioners claimed that they are not share tenants but hired laborers,
Daez applied for the exemption of said riceland from coverage of P.D. No. 27 due to non-
tenancy as well as for the cancellation of the land titles issued to private respondents. The
application of the petitioner was denied.
Daez next filed an application for retention of the same rice land, this time under R.A. No.
6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. DAR allowed Daez to retain the
subject riceland but denied the application of her eight (8) children to retain three (3) hectares
each for their failure to prove actual tillage of the land.
Office of the President ruled in favor of Daez or her heirs and rendered judgment authorizing
the retention but the application of the children was still denied.
CA reversed and set aside the decision of the Office of the President.
WON the land owner can still exercise their right of retention despite the fact that a previous
decision denying petition for exemption under Presidential Decree 27 had long been
executory.
Held:
YES. Petitioner heirs of Daez may exercise their right of retention over the subject of
riceland. In the case of Association of Small Landowners in the Phil., Inc. v. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform 23 , we held that landowners who have not yet exercised their retention
rights under P.D. No. 27 are entitled to the new retention rights under the CARL.
However, if a landowner filed his application for retention after August 27, 1985 but he had
previously filed the sworn statements required, he is still entitled to the retention limit of
seven (7) hectares under P.D. No. 27. 25 Otherwise, he is only entitled to retain five (5)
hectares under R.A. No. 6657.
Without doubt, this right of retention may be exercised over tenanted land despite even the
issuance of Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) to farmer-beneficiaries. What must be
protected, however, is the right of the tenants to opt to either stay on the land chosen to be
retained by the landowner or be a beneficiary in another agricultural land with similar or
comparable features.
ALITA vs CA , G.R. No. 78517 February 27, 1989 - Case Digest
The subject matter of the case consists of two (2) parcels of land, acquired by private respondents'
predecessors-in-interest through homestead patent under the provisions of Commonwealth Act No.
141.
Private respondents herein are desirous of personally cultivating these lands, but petitioners refuse
to vacate, relying on the provisions of P.D. 27.
Respondents (then plaintiffs), instituted a complaint Regional Director of MAR Region IX, and herein
petitioners (then defendants) for the declaration of P.D. 27 and all other Decrees, Letters of
Instructions and General Orders issued in connection therewith as inapplicable to homestead lands.
Petitioners filed an urgent motion to enjoin the defendants from declaring the lands in litigation
under Operation Land Transfer and from being issued land transfer certificates to which the
defendants filed their opposition.
The said complaint and the motion to enjoin the defendants was denied.
ISSUE: W/N lands obtained through homestead patent are covered by the Agrarian Reform under
P.D. 27.
HELD: NO. The contention of P.D. 27 cannot be invoked to defeat the very purpose of the enactment
of the Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act No. 141. Thus,
The Homestead Act has been enacted for the welfare and protection of the poor. The law gives a
needy citizen a piece of land where he may build a modest house for himself and family and plant
what is necessary for subsistence and for the satisfaction of life's other needs.
... Provided further, That original homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs who still own
the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as
they continue to cultivate said homestead.'
Facts:
Subject of this petition are four (4) parcels of land with an aggregate area of 160.1161 hectares
registered in the name of Salvador N. Lopez AgriBusiness Corporation. 2 of which are Lopez lands
and the 2 other is Limot lands
The titles for said land was cancelled and a new one issued in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines.
The petitioner then executed a letter affidavit addressed to the respondent Secretary requesting for
the exclusion from CARP coverage of lot 2 portions the ground that they needed the additional area
for its livestock business and the 2 others for grazing.
The DAR Regional Director denied the request as the Limot lands was not clearly shown that the
same were actually, directly and exclusively used for livestock raising since in its application,
petitioner itself admitted that it needs the lots for additional grazing area.
The application for exemption, however of the other two (2) parcels of land was approved.
On its partial motion for reconsideration, petitioner argued that Lots reclassified to a Pollutive
Industrial but was denied.
The Court of Appeals partially granted the SNLABC Petition and excluded the two (2) parcels of land
but denied the remaining parcels as they were already covered by a new title under the name of the
Republic of the Philippines.
Issue:
Whether or not the Limot lands of SNLABC can be considered grazing lands for its livestock business
and are thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL under
Held:
The Lopez lands of SNLABC are actually and directly being used for livestock and are thus exempted
from the coverage of the CARL. However, the Limot lands of SNLABC are not actually and directly
being used for livestock and should thus be covered by the CARL.
Limot lands were found to be agricultural lands devoted to coconut trees and rubber and are thus
not subject to exemption from CARP coverage.
Verily, the MARO itself, in the Investigation Report cited by no less than SNLABC, found that the
livestock were only moved to the Limot lands sporadically and were not permanently designated
there.
. The said lands are more suitable and are in fact actually, directly and exclusively being used -- for
agricultural purposes
REPUBLIC V. CA 139592
FACTS:
Respondent Morato filed a free patent application on a parcel of land, which was approved and
issued an original certificate of title. Both the free patent and title specifically mandate that the land
shall not be alienated nor encumbered within 5 years from the date of the issuance of the patent.
The District Land Officer, acting upon reports that Morato had encumbered the land and upon
finding that the subject land is submerged in water during high tide and low tide, filed a complaint
for cancellation of the title and reversion of the parcel of land to the public domain. RTC dismissed
the complaint. CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not respondent violated the free patent condition prohibiting encumbering the land
within the 5-year period?
HELD
1. Yes. Public Land Act Sec. 18 provides that…lands acquired under free patent or homestead
provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of approval of the
application and for a term of 5 years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant…The
contracts of lease and mortgage executed by
Morato constitute an encumbrance as contemplated by section 18 of the Public Land Act because
such contracts impair the use of the property.
2. Yes. Based from the facts, the land is clearly foreshore as it is subject to the ebb and flow of the
tide. When the sea moved towards the estate and the tide invaded it, the invaded property became
foreshore land and passed to the realm of the public domain.
In Government v. Cabangis, the Court annulled the registration of land subject of cadastral
proceedings when the parcel subsequently became foreshore land. In another case, the Court
voided the registration decree of a trial court and held that said court had no jurisdiction to award
foreshore land to any private person or entity. The subject land in this case, being foreshore land
should therefor be returned to the public domain.