Table of Contents

(1) The Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC..............................................................................2

(2) Tañada v. Angara.................................................................................................................4
(3) Kulayan, et al. v. Gov. Abdusakur M. Tan etc., et al........................................................7
(4) Ynot v. IAC...........................................................................................................................9
(5) Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS,............................................................................................10
(6) Chiongbian v. Orbos..........................................................................................................13
(7) LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents,
corporations and partnerships adversely affected. by Republic Act No. 1180 v. JAIME
HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City Treasurer
of Manila...................................................................................................................................15
(8) IBP v. Zamora....................................................................................................................21
(9) MAXIMO CALALANG v. A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL.,................................................22
(10) JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA
v. THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR................................................24
(11) Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tanon Strait (Toothed
Whales, Dolphins, Porpoises and other Cetacean Species) represented by Atty. Osorio
and Estenzo-Ramos v. Secretary Angelo Reyes....................................................................29
(12) Ass'n. of Small Land Owners v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform...........................................32
(13) Cruz v. Secretary of DENR.............................................................................................34
(14) La Bugal B’laan Tribal Assn. v. DENR Secretary........................................................36
(15) LOLOY UNDURAN v. RAMON ABERASTURI........................................................40
(16) Francisco Chavez v. Public Estates Authority and Amari Costal Bay Development
Corp.,........................................................................................................................................41
(17) SULTAN ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA v. CONTE MANGELIN, et al.....................43
(18) AKBAYAN et.al. v. Aquino et.al....................................................................................46
(19) Belgica v. Ochoa...............................................................................................................48
(20) Francisco Jr. v. HREP.....................................................................................................60
 (1) The Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC
GR No. 205728, January 21, 2015

DOCTRINE:

1. The lemon test in determining a particular religious act whether an expression is

ecclesiastical in character the following questions must be asked:
a. it has a secular legislative purpose;
b. it neither advances nor inhibits religion; and
c. it does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.
2. All governmental authority emanates from our people. No unreasonable restrictions of
the fundamental and preferred right to expression of the electorate during political
contests no matter how seemingly benign will be tolerated.

FACTS:

1. The petitioners posted two tarpaulins within a private compound housing the San
Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet by ten feet in
size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view.
2. The first tarpaulin contains the message "IBASURA RH Law" referring to the
Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is
the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading "Conscience Vote"
and lists candidates as either "(Anti-RH) Team Buhay" with a check mark, or "(Pro-RH)
Team Patay" with an "X" mark. The electoral candidates were classified according to
their vote on the adoption of the RH law. Those who voted for the passing of the law
were classified by petitioners as comprising "Team Patay," while those who voted against
it form "Team Buhay".
3. The tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any candidate. Petitioners also
conceded that the tarpaulin contains names of candidates for the 2013 elections, but
excludes politicians who helped in the passage of the but were not candidates in the
elections.
4. The Election Officer of Bacolod City, issued a Notice to Remove Campaign Materials.
The election officer ordered the tarpaulin’s removal within three days from receipt for
being oversized. In reply, the petitioners requested that they be given a definite ruling by
the COMELEC Law Department regarding the tarpaulin; and pending this opinion and
the availment of legal remedies, the tarpaulin be allowed to remain.
5. The COMELEC Law Department issued a letter ordering the immediate removal of the
tarpaulin reiterating the previous notice; otherwise, it will be constrained to file an
election offense against petitioners. The letter of COMELEC Law Department was silent
on the remedies available to petitioners.
6. Aggrieved, the petitioners filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with
application for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court seeking to nullify COMELEC’s Notice to Remove Campaign
Materials.
 7. Respondent COMELEC Contended that the tarpaulin violates the principle of separation
of church and state, on the other hand Petitioners posits that the order of removal of the
tarpaulin encroaches on their freedom of expression.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or Not the posting of the tarpaulins violates the principle of separation of church
and state.
2. Whether or Not the removal of the tarpaulins violates freedom of expression.

RULING:

1. No, the tarpaulin and its message are not religious speech. At the outset, the Constitution
mandates the separation of church and state. Not all acts done by those who are priests,
bishops, ustadz, imams or any other religious make such act immune from any secular
regulation. The religious also have a secular existence, and they exist within a society
regulated by law. Although the Bishop of Bacolod caused the posting, not all acts of a
bishop amounts to religious expression. The tarpaulin on its face, does not convey any
religious doctrine of the church.
2. The removal of tarp violates freedom of speech. It is still protected speech. The
Philippines is a republican state because and solely because the people in it can be
governed only by the officials whom they themselves have placed in office by their votes.
It is in this cornerstone that when the freedom of speech, press and peaceful assembly and
redress of grievances are being exercised in relation to suffrage or as a means to enjoy the
inalienable rights of the qualified citizen to vote, they are absolute and timeless. If the
democracy and republicanism are to worthwhile, the conduct of public affairs by our
officials must be allowed to suffer incessant and unabating scrutiny, favorable or
unfavorable, every day at all times.
 (2) Tañada v. Angara
272 SCRA 18

DOCTRINES:

1. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the
dispute. "The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate)
remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld." Once a "controversy
as to the application or interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised before this
Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by
constitutional mandate to decide."
2. The principles and state policies enumerated in Article II and some sections of Article
XII are not "self-executing provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of
action in the courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but
guidelines for legislation."
3. The constitutional policy of a "self-reliant and independent national economy" does not
necessarily rule out the entry, of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates
neither "economic seclusion" nor "mendicancy in the international community.

FACTS:

1. Rizalino Navarro, then Secretary of Department of Trade and Industry, Representing the
Government of the Philippines, signed the Final Act to be a founding member of the
WTO. The terms were submitted to the Senate for their concurrence, in accordance with
Section 21, Art. VII of the Constitution. President Ramos certified the necessity of its
immediate adoption. The actions were questioned because allegedly, the WTO requires
Philippine local goods to be placed on the same footing with the national goods of other
countries. This is a violation of the Filipino First policy.

ISSUES:

1. Is the question justiciable or political? What is the scope of judicial review?

2. Are the state policies and principles self-executing?
3. Does the Philippine Constitution prohibit Philippine participation in worldwide trade
liberalization and economic globalization?
4. Was the action to join the WTO a grave abuse of discretion?

RULING:

1. The issue submitted is a Juridical Question within the scope of judicial review.

In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it

contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where
an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution,
it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.
 "The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains
to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld." Once a "controversy as to the
application or interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in
the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional
mandate to decide."

Scope of Judicial Review

The jurisdiction of this Court to adjudicate the matters raised in the petition is
clearly set out in the 1987 Constitution, as follows: "Judicial power includes the duty of
the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality, of the government." The foregoing text emphasizes the judicial
department’s duty and power to strike down grave abuse of discretion on the part of any
branch or instrumentality, of government including Congress. It is an innovation in our
political law. As explained by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, "the judiciary is
the final arbiter on the question of whether or not a branch of government or any of its
officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously, as to
constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a
judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature." As this Court has
repeatedly and firmly emphasized in many cases, it will not shirk, digress from or
abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in matters that involve
grave abuse of discretion brought before it in appropriate cases, committed by any
officer, agency, instrumentality or department of the government.

2. No, State Policies and Principles are not self-executory.

By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a "declaration of principles and

state policies." The counterpart of this article in the 1935 Constitution is called the "basic
political creed of the nation" by Dean Vicente Sinco. These principles in Article II are not
intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They
are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial
review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws. As held in the leading case of
Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato, the principles and state policies enumerated in
Article II and some sections of Article XII are not "self-executing provisions, the
disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They do not embody
judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation."

3. No, the Constitution does not prohibit participation in worldwide trade.

While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods,

services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business
exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits
protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that
are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy.
 It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the
Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of
foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either.
In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on
foreign competition that is unfair.

The constitutional policy of a "self-reliant and independent national economy"

does not necessarily rule out the entry, of foreign investments, goods and services. It
contemplates neither "economic seclusion" nor "mendicancy in the international
community.

4. No, there was no grave abuse of discretion.

Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious and whimsical exercise of

judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough.
It must be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the
duty, enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.

The Senate, whose act is under review, is one of two sovereign houses of
Congress and is thus entitled to great respect in its actions. It is itself a constitutional
body independent and coordinate, and thus its actions are presumed regular and done in
good faith. Unless convincing proof and persuasive arguments are presented to overthrow
such presumptions, this Court will resolve every doubt in its favor. Using the foregoing
well-accepted definition of grave abuse of discretion and the presumption of regularity in
the Senate’s processes, this Court cannot find any cogent reason to impute grave abuse of
discretion to the Senate’s exercise of its power of concurrence in the WTO Agreement
granted it by Sec. 21 of Article VII of the Constitution. That the Senate, after deliberation
and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO Agreement
thereby making it "a part of the law of the land" is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign
duty and power. We find no "patent and gross" arbitrariness or despotism "by reason of
passion or personal hostility" in such exercise. It is not impossible to surmise that this
Court, or at least some of its members, may even agree with petitioners that it is more
advantageous to the national interest to strike down Senate Resolution No. 97. But that is
not a legal reason to attribute grave abuse of discretion to the Senate and to nullify its
decision. To do so would constitute grave abuse in the exercise of our own judicial power
and duty. Ineludably, what the Senate did was a valid exercise of its authority. As to
whether such exercise was wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial
inquiry and review. That is a matter between the elected policy makers and the people.
As to whether the nation should join the worldwide march toward trade liberalization and
economic globalization is a matter that our people should determine in electing their
policy makers. After all, the WTO Agreement allows withdrawal of membership, should
this be the political desire of a member.
 (3) Kulayan, et al. v. Gov. Abdusakur M. Tan etc., et al.
G.R. No. 187298

DOCTRINE:

1. The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President.
An exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and
may not be justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government Code.
2. The net effect of Article II, Section 3, when read with Article VII, Section 18, is that a
civilian President is the ceremonial, legal and administrative head of the armed forces.

FACTS:

1. On 15 January 2009, three members from the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) were kidnapped in the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol in Patikul, Sulu (Notter –
Swiss; Vagni – Italian; Lacaba – Filipino) by members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).
2. A task force was created by the ICRC and the Philippine National Police (PNP) which
then organized a parallel local group known as the Local Crisis Committee. The local
group, convened under the leadership of respondent Abdusakur Mahail Tan, the
Provincial Governor of Sulu.
3. On 31 March 2009, Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009
(Proclamation 1-09), declaring a state of emergency in the province of Sulu. It cited the
kidnapping incident as a ground for the said declaration, describing it as a terrorist act
pursuant to the Human Security.
4. It also invoked Section 465 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160), which
bestows on the Provincial Governor the power to carry out emergency measures during
man-made and natural disasters and calamities, and to call upon the appropriate national
law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder and lawless violence.
5. In the same Proclamation, respondent Tan called upon the PNP and the CEF to set up
checkpoints and chokepoints, conduct general search and seizures including arrests, and
other actions necessary to ensure public safety.
6. Petitioners contend that Proclamation No. 1 and its Implementing Guidelines were issued
ultra vires, and thus null and void, for violating Sections 1 and 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, which grants the President sole authority to exercise emergency powers and
calling-out powers as the chief executive of the Republic and commander-in-chief of the
armed forces.

ISSUE: Whether the Proclamation is null and void for violating the Constitution

RULING:

1. Yes. It has already been established that there is one repository of executive powers, and
that is the President of the Republic. This means that when Section 1, Article VII of the
Constitution speaks of executive power, it is granted to the President and no one else.
Corollarily, it is only the President, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise
emergency powers as provided under Section 23, Article VI, of the Constitution, as well
 as what became known as the calling-out powers under Section 7, Article VII thereof.
While the President is still a civilian, Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution mandates
that civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military, making the civilian
president the nation’s supreme military leader.
2. The net effect of Article II, Section 3, when read with Article VII, Section 18, is that a
civilian President is the ceremonial, legal and administrative head of the armed forces.
The Constitution does not require that the President must be possessed of military
training and talents, but as Commander-in-Chief, he has the power to direct military
operations and to determine military strategy. Normally, he would be expected to
delegate the actual command of the armed forces to military experts; but the ultimate
power is his.
3. Given the foregoing, Governor Tan is not endowed with the power to call upon the armed
forces at his own bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded
his authority when he declared a state of emergency and called upon Armed Forces, the
police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force. The calling-out powers contemplated
under the Constitution is exclusive to the President. An exercise by another official, even
if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justified by the invocation
of Section 465 of the Local Government Code.
 (4) Ynot v. IAC
148 SCRA 659

DOCTRINE:

1. Omission of a right to a prior hearing can be justified only where a problem needs
immediate and urgent correction.

FACTS:

1. Restituto Ynot transported 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo in 1984 and these were
confiscated by the Police Station Commander of Barotac, Iloilo for violating E.O. 626 A
which prohibits transportation of a carabao or carabeef from one province to another.
2. The petitioner then sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a
writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. Petitioner raised the
issue of EO’s constitutionality and filed case in the lower court. However, the court
sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced,
ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the
constitutionality of the executive order, as raised by the petitioner. Therefore, petitioner
appealed the decision to IAC with the following contentions:
a. EO is unconstitutional as confiscation is outright
b. Penalty is invalid as it is imposed without the owner's right to be heard before a
competent and impartial court.
c. Measure should have not been presumed
d. Raises a challenge to the improper exercise of the legislative power by the former
President.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Order is constitutional?

RULING:

1. The Supreme Court ruled that Executive Order No. 626 is unconstitutional. The said EO
is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A created a presumption based on
the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from one area to the other does
not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be given to
defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred before they can be
confiscated.
2. The Supreme Court found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police
power because the method employed to confiscate the carabaos is not reasonably
necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive.
3. Due process was violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the
right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The
conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the
supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the
doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative
powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the
distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.
 (5) Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS,
G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997

DOCTRINES:

1. A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the
1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in
itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or
that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed
or protected, is self-executing.
2. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the
Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of
the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources,
but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.

FACTS:

1. Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of

the Philippine Government, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the
issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation. The winning
bidder, or the eventual “strategic partner,” is to provide management expertise and/or an
international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the
profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel.
2. In a close bidding, only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel
Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC, and Renong
Berhad, a Malaysian firm, which bid for the same number of shares at P2.42 more than
the bid of petitioner.
3. Petitioner wrote to respondent GSIS offering to match the bid price of P44.00 per share
tendered by Renong Berhad. It even subsequently tendered a manager’s check to pay for
the shares, which respondent GSIS refused to accept.
4. Petitioner filed a case before the Supreme Court for prohibition and mandamus.
5. Petitioner invokes par., Art. XII, Section 10, par. 2 of the 1987 Constitution and submits
that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically
become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and
culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the
nobility and sacredness of independence and its power and capacity to release the full
potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a part of the
national patrimony.
6. It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony
and its business also unquestionably part of the national economy petitioner should be
preferred after it has matched the bid offer of the Malaysian firm.
7. Respondents argued that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely
a statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires
implementing legislation(s) . . . Thus, for the said provision to Operate, there must be
existing laws “to lay down conditions under which business may be done.”
 8. Second, granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under
the term national patrimony which only refers to lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,
forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all marine wealth in its territorial sea, and
exclusive marine zone as cited in the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987
Constitution.
9. According to respondents, while petitioner speaks of the guests who have slept in the
hotel and the events that have transpired therein which make the hotel historic, these
alone do not make the hotel fall under the patrimony of the nation. What is more, the
mandate of the Constitution is addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which
possesses a personality of its own separate and distinct from the Philippines as a State.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Article XII, Section 10, par. 2 of the Constitution is self-executing.
2. Whether or not Manila Hotel is part of national patrimony

RULING:

1. Article XII, Section 10, par. 2 of the Constitution is self-executing.

A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of
the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in
itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or
that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed
or protected, is self-executing.
Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the
right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they
can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no
language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.
Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are
self-executing If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead
of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify
the mandate of the fundamental law.
In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact
legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further
the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement,
provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the determination
thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right.

2. Manila Hotel is part of national patrimony.

In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When
the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources
of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural
resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
Manila Hotel has become a landmark — a living testimonial of Philippine
heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, it
immediately evolved to be truly Filipino, Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has since
then become the venue of various significant events which have shaped Philippine
history. It was called the Cultural Center of the 1930’s. It was the site of the festivities
during the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth. Dubbed as the Official Guest
House of the Philippine Government. it plays host to dignitaries and official visitors who
are accorded the traditional Philippine hospitality.
The history of the hotel has been chronicled in the book The Manila Hotel: The
Heart and Memory of a City. During World War II the hotel was converted by the
Japanese Military Administration into a military headquarters. When the American forces
returned to recapture Manila the hotel was selected by the Japanese together with
Intramuros as the two (2) places fro their final stand. Thereafter, in the 1950’s and
1960’s, the hotel became the center of political activities, playing host to almost every
political convention. In 1970 the hotel reopened after a renovation and reaped numerous
international recognitions, an acknowledgment of the Filipino talent and ingenuity. In
1986 the hotel was the site of a failed coup d’etat where an aspirant for vice-president
was “proclaimed” President of the Philippine Republic.
For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the
triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed
with public interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty,
independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national
economy and patrimony.
 (6) Chiongbian v. Orbos
245 SCRA 253

DOCTRINE:

1. While the power to merge regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a
power traditionally lodged with the President, in view of the POWER OF GENERAL
SUPERVISION OVER LOCAL GOVERNMENTS.

FACTS:

1. Congress passed the ORGANIC ACT FOR ARMM, calling for a plebiscite in Mindanao.
Only four provinces voted for the creation of ARMM (Lanao Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu,
Tawi Tawi) The other provinces who did not vote for ARMM shall remain in the existing
administrative regions, provided that the PRESIDENT may by ADMINISTRATIVE
DETERMINATION, MERGE THE EXISTING REGIONS.
2. So, President Cory issued EO 429 which reorganized those regions who did not vote for
ARMM. Petitioners are Congressmen who opposed the issuance of EO 429.
3. They claim that President Cory had no authority to restructure new administrative
regions. They insist that the provinces should remain as they are.

ISSUE:

1. Whether the Organic Act for ARMM unduly delegates legislative power to the President
by allowing Cory to merge the existing regions by mere ADMINISTRATIVE
DETERMINATION.
2. Whether the Organic Act provided a standard to guide President Cory’s discretion.

DEFENSE:

1. The SOLGEN argues that the Act is valid and there is no undue delegation but only a
POWER TO FILL IN THE DETAILS OF LEGISLATION which was given to Cory.

RULING:

1. LAW VALID. NO UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS TO THE

PRESIDENT. While the power to merge regions is not expressly provided for in the
Constitution, it is a power traditionally lodged with the President, in view of the POWER
OF GENERAL SUPERVISION OVER LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. Thus there is no
abdication by Congress of its legislative powers in conferring on the President the
POWER TO MERGE ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS.
2. As to the question of STANDARD, a legislative standard NEED NOT BE EXPRESSED.
IT MAY SIMPLY BE GATHERED OR IMPLIED. Nor need it be found in the law
challenged because it may be EMBODIED IN OTHER STATUTES ON THE SAME
SUBJECT as that of the challenged legislation. With respect to the power to merge
existing administrative regions, the STANDARD IS TO BE FOUND IN THE SAME
POLICY underlying the grant o the PRESIDENT in RA5434, THE POWER TO
REORGANIZE THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT. Under said law, the standard is “to
promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government, to enable it to pursue
programs consistent with national goals for acceleration socioeconomic development and
to improve the service in the transaction of public business.” Since the original 11
administrative regions were established with this same law/ policy, it is but logical to
suppose that in authorizing the President to merge by administrative determination, the
existing regions (following the rejection of the ARMM by some regions), the purpose of
Congress in enacting the Organic Act of ARMM was to reconstitute the original basis for
the organization of administrative regions.
 (7) LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents,
corporations and partnerships adversely affected. by Republic Act No. 1180 v.
JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO,
City Treasurer of Manila
G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957

DOCTRINE: POLICE POWER; EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE and DUE PROCESS

CLAUSE

FACTS:

1. Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business.” In effect it
nationalizes the retail trade business. The main provisions of the Act are:
a. a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against
associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly
owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the
retail trade;
b. an exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged in
said business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue to engage therein,
unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or
voluntary retirement in case of natural persons, and for ten years after the
approval of the Act or until the expiration of term in case of juridical persons;
c. an exception therefrom in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United
States;
d. a provision for the forfeiture of licenses (to engage in the retail business) for
violation of the laws on nationalization, economic control weights and measures
and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry;
e. a prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in
the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business,
f. a provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business to present for
registration with the proper authorities a verified statement concerning their
businesses, giving, among other matters, the nature of the business, their assets
and liabilities and their offices and principal offices of juridical entities; and
g. a provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business who
die, to continue such business for a period of six months for purposes of
liquidation.

2. Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents corporations
and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, “An Act
to Regulate the Retail Business,” filed to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is
unconstitutional contending that:
a. it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their
liberty and property without due process of law ;
b. the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof;
c. the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the
Philippines;
 d. the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business
thru hereditary succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a
corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail business, violate the spirit
of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution.

3. In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that:
a. the Act was passed in the valid exercise of the police power of the State, which
exercise is authorized in the Constitution in the interest of national economic
survival;
b. the Act has only one subject embraced in the title;
c. no treaty or international obligations are infringed;
d. as regards hereditary succession, only the form is affected but the value of the
property is not impaired, and the institution of inheritance is only of statutory
origin.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not RA 1180 violates the equal protection of laws

(If the disputed legislation were merely a regulation, as its title indicates, there would
be no question that it falls within the legitimate scope of legislative power. But it goes
further and prohibits a group of residents, the aliens, from engaging therein. The
problem becomes more complex because its subject is a common, trade or
occupation, as old as society itself, which from the immemorial has always been open
to residents, irrespective of race, color or citizenship.)

2. Whether or not citizenship is a legal and valid ground for classification.

RULING:

1. On the first issue: No. The Court held that the Act was approved in the exercise of the
police power.

It has been said that police power is so far-reaching in scope, that it has become
almost impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence of
the State itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be co-
extensive with self-protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and active
of all governmental processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially is it
so under a modern democratic framework where the demands of society and of nations
have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of police power
has become almost boundless, just as the fields of public interest and public welfare have
become almost all- embracing and have transcended human foresight. Otherwise stated,
as we cannot foresee the needs and demands of public interest and welfare in this
constantly changing and progressive world, so we cannot delimit beforehand the extent or
scope of police power by which and through which the State seeks to attain or achieve
public interest or welfare. So it is that Constitutions do not define the scope or extent of
the police power of the State; what they do is to set forth the limitations thereof. The most
important of these are the due process clause and the equal protection clause.

The basic limitations of due process and equal protection are found in the
following provisions of our Constitution:

SECTION 1.(1) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without

due process of law, nor any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. (Article III,
Phil. Constitution)

These constitutional guarantees which embody the essence of individual liberty

and freedom in democracies, are not limited to citizens alone but are admittedly universal
in their application, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or
class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not
intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object to which it is directed
or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The
equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons
falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and
reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such
class and those who do not.

The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in
pursuance of the police power, Is there public interest, a public purpose; is public welfare
involved? Is the Act reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the legislature’s
purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or
reason in connection with the matter involved; or has there not been a capricious use of
the legislative power? Can the aims conceived be achieved by the means used, or is it not
merely an unjustified interference with private interest? These are the questions that we
ask when the due process test is applied.

The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process
and equal protection of the laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the power
and the guarantees are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the essence or, shall it be
said, the indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any
democratic society. There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that would
be tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and
anarchy.

So the State can deprive persons of life, liberty and property, provided there is due
process of law; and persons may be classified into classes and groups, provided everyone
is given the equal protection of the law.
 The test or standard, as always, is reason. The police power legislation must be
firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist
between purposes and means. And if distinction and classification has been made, there
must be a reasonable basis for said distinction.

The power of the legislature to make distinctions and classifications among

persons is not curtailed or denied by the equal protection of the laws clause. The
legislative power admits of a wide scope of discretion, and a law can be violative of the
constitutional limitation only when the classification is without reasonable basis.

The guaranty of due process demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable,
arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial
relation to the subject sought to be attained.

So far as the requirement of due process is concerned and in the absence of other
constitutional restriction a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may
reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation
adapted to its purpose. The courts are without authority either to declare such policy, or,
when it is declared by the legislature, to override it. If the laws passed are seen to have a
reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor
discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination
to that effect renders a court functus officio.

The test of reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness or adequacy under all

circumstances of the means adopted to carry out its purpose into effect. Judged by this
test, the disputed legislation, which is not merely reasonable but actually necessary, must
be considered not to have infringed the constitutional limitation of reasonableness.

Republic Act No. 1180 is not the product of racial hostility, prejudice or
discrimination, but the expression of the legitimate desire and determination of the
people, thru their authorized representatives, to free the nation from the economic
situation that has unfortunately been saddled upon it rightly or wrongly, to its
disadvantage. The law is clearly in the interest of the public, nay of the national security
itself, and indisputably falls within the scope of police power, thru which and by which
the State insures its existence and security and the supreme welfare of its citizens.

2. On the second issue;

Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids a classification

otherwise justified simply because the limitation of the class falls along the lines of
nationality. That would be requiring a higher degree of protection for aliens as a class
than for similar classes than for similar classes of American citizens. Broadly speaking,
the difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable
classification in the exercise of police power.
 As pointed out above, the mere fact of alienage is the root and cause of the
distinction between the alien and the national as a trader. The alien resident owes
allegiance to the country of his birth or his adopted country; his stay here is for personal
convenience; he is attracted by the lure of gain and profit. His aim or purpose of stay, we
admit, is neither illegitimate nor immoral, but he is naturally lacking in that spirit of
loyalty and enthusiasm for this country where he temporarily stays and makes his living,
or of that spirit of regard, sympathy and consideration for his Filipino customers as would
prevent him from taking advantage of their weakness and exploiting them. The faster he
makes his pile, the earlier can the alien go back to his beloved country and his beloved
kin and countrymen. The experience of the country is that the alien retailer has shown
such utter disregard for his customers and the people on whom he makes his profit, that it
has been found necessary to adopt the legislation, radical as it may seem.

Another objection to the alien retailer in this country is that he never really makes
a genuine contribution to national income and wealth. He undoubtedly contributes to
general distribution, but the gains and profits he makes are not invested in industries that
would help the country's economy and increase national wealth. The alien's interest in
this country being merely transient and temporary, it would indeed be ill-advised to
continue entrusting the very important function of retail distribution to his hands.

The practices resorted to by aliens in the control of distribution, as already pointed

out above, their secret manipulations of stocks of commodities and prices, their utter
disregard of the welfare of their customers and of the ultimate happiness of the people of
the nation of which they are mere guests, which practices, manipulations and disregard
do not attend the exercise of the trade by the nationals, show the existence of real and
actual, positive and fundamental differences between an alien and a national which fully
justify the legislative classification adopted in the retail trade measure. These differences
are certainly a valid reason for the State to prefer the national over the alien in the retail
trade. We would be doing violence to fact and reality were we to hold that no reason or
ground for a legitimate distinction can be found between one and the other.

It is true that some decisions in the United States hold that the distinction between
aliens and citizens is not a valid ground for classification. But in those decisions, the laws
declared invalid were found to be either arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious, or were the
result or product of racial antagonism and hostility, and there was no question of public
interest involved or pursued. The case at bar is radically different. As we already have
said, aliens do not naturally possess the sympathetic consideration and regard for the
customers with whom they come in daily contact, nor the patriotic desire to help bolster
the nation's economy, except in so far as it enhances their profit, nor the loyalty and
allegiance which the national owes to the land

The disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to
national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free
citizens and country from such dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls
within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its
own personality and insures its security and future; that the law does not violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction
between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process
of law clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of
aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that the
wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly
evident — as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary — and
that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose
power and discretion the Judicial department of the Government may not interfere; that
the provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no
duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the segment of the population affected; and
that it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no
treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and the police power may not be
curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement. The Treaty of
Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China of April 18,
1947 is also claimed to be violated by the law in question. All that the treaty guarantees is
equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals “upon the same terms as the nationals of
any other country.” But the nationals of China are not discriminated against because
nationals of all other countries, except those of the United States, who are granted special
rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited from engaging in the retail trade. But even
supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is always subject to
qualification or amendment by a subsequent law, and the same may never curtail or
restrict the scope of the police power of the State.
 (8) IBP v. Zamora
G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000

DOCTRINE:

1. Civilian supremacy clause (Sec. 3, Art. II)

2. Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military.

FACTS:

1. President Ejercito Estrada directed the Armed Forces of the Philippines Chief of Staff
and Philippine National Police Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper
deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing
criminal or lawless violence by invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec.
18, Art. VII of the Constitution. The President declared that the services of the Marines in
the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only,
until such time when the situation shall have improved. The Integrated Bar of the
Philippines filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines
null and void and unconstitutional. Solicitor General contend that petitioner has no legal
standing to assail.

ISSUE: Does the deployment of the Marines violate the civilian supremacy clause?

RULING:

1. NO. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian
supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of
military assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the
conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. The limited participation
of the Marines is evident in the provisions of the Letter of Instruction (LOI) itself, which
sufficiently provides the metes and bounds of the Marines’ authority.
2. The local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real
authority belonging to the PNP. In fact, the Metro Manila Police Chief is the overall
leader of the PNP-Philippine Marines joint visibility patrols.
3. The deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character
of the police force. Neither does it amount to an "insidious incursion" of the military in
the task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI (No member of the
armed forces in the active service shall, at any time, be appointed or designated in any
capacity to a civilian position in the Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or any of their subsidiaries) of the Constitution.
4. The real authority in these operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution and
not with the military. What is in here is mutual support and cooperation between the
military and the civilian authorities, not a derogation of civilian supremacy
 (9) MAXIMO CALALANG v. A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL.,
G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940

TOPIC: Social justice

DOCTRINE:

1. Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so
that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be
approximated.
2. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of ill the people, the adoption by the
Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent
elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social
equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally,
through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the
exercise of rowers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored
principle of salus populi est suprema lex.

FACTS:

1. The National Traffic Commission recommended the Director of Public Works and to the
Secretary of Public Works and Communication that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited
from passing along Rosario St. extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarinas
St. from 7:30 am to 12 pm and 1:30 pm to 5:30 pm and also along Rizal Avenue from 7
am to 11 pm from a period of one year from the date of the opening of Colgante Bridge
to traffic.
2. It was subsequently passed and thereafter enforce by Manila Mayor and the acting chief
of police.
3. Maximo Calalang then, as a citizen and a taxpayer, challenges its constitutionality.

ISSUE: Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the Director of Public Works
infringes upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice.

RULING:

1. The above provisions of law do not confer legislative power upon the Director of Public
Works and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. The authority therein
conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now
complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the
legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act.
2. Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so
that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be
approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the
adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the
 competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social
equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally,
through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the
exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored
principle of salus populi est suprema lex.
3. Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence
among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally
and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life,
consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting health,
comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about “the greatest good to the greatest
number.”
Calalang lost here
 (10) JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed
OPOSA v. THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR

TOPIC:

1. This petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which
the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational
responsibility" and "inter-generational justice."

DOCTRINES:

1. Environmental protection, being of common and general interest with numerous parties,
classifies as a class suit.

The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several,
but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it
becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court.

2. Intergenerational responsibility

Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for
the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology.

3. Article 16, Section II, 1987 Constitution is a legal right

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration
of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it
is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a
right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than
self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners —
the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions.

4. If the enforcement of a right is in question, the civil case is not political in nature

Policy formulation or determination by the executive or legislative branches of

Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement
of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation.

5. TLAs are not contracts, its revocation is not in violation of the non-impairment clause

FACTS:

1. The petitioners are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. The
complaint2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all
citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use
and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical
 forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about
the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring
them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn."4 Consequently, it is prayed for that
judgment be rendered:

. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf
to —
a. Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
b. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
timber license agreements.

2. Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and
deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be
submitted as a matter of judicial notice.

3. The defendants countered that:

a. Petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the
respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in
the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental
right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in
its capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal
a valid cause of action.
b. The granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts
which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.

4. Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment

clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are
not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by
the said clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the
public interest so requires.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the case is a class suit.

2. Whether the petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or
impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the
country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth.
3. Whether the granting of the relief would result in the impairment of contracts which is
prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.

RULING:

1. YES. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to
several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so
 numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before
the court. Moreover, the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to
ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing
of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present
both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the
former.

Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as

generations yet unborn. Thus, they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and
for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the
succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such
a right, considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature."

Nature means the created world in its entirety.9 Such rhythm and harmony
indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management,
renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife,
off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development
and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm
and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little
differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the
same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for
the generations to come.

2. Yes, the petitioners have a cause of action.

The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in the nation's constitutional
history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the
1987 Constitution explicitly provides:

Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced
and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding
section of the same article:

Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and
instill health consciousness among them.

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not
follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the
latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns
nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by
 the petitioners — the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments
and constitutions.

As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution
for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly
mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers
that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as
state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance
and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and
advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for
the present generation, but also for those to come — generations which stand to inherit
nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to
refrain from impairing the environment.

Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:

Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State to

ensure the sustainable use, development, management, renewal, and conservation of the
country's forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and other natural resources, including the
protection and enhancement of the quality of the environment, and equitable access of the
different segments of the population to the development and the use of the country's
natural resources, not only for the present generation but for future generations as well. It
is also the policy of the state to recognize and apply a true value system including social
and environmental cost implications relative to their utilization, development and
conservation of our natural resources.

Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and
healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty — under its mandate and by virtue of its
powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 — to
protect and advance the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or
obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action.

3. NO. Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) provides:

. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend,
modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of
privilege granted herein . . .

Thus, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a
contract, property or a property right protested by the due process clause of the
Constitution.
 Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:

Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed cannot be
invoked.

In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the
instant case does not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the
cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment
clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually
been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be
stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very
nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed in the exercise of the police
power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare.

In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state.
 (11) Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tanon Strait (Toothed
Whales, Dolphins, Porpoises and other Cetacean Species) represented by Atty.
Osorio and Estenzo-Ramos v. Secretary Angelo Reyes
G.R. No. 181527, April 21, 2015

FACTS:

1. This is a consolidated petition filed by two different petitioners. This is an original

petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus assailing the validity of Service
Contract No. 46 (SC-46), which allowed the exploration, development, and exploitation
of petroleum resources within Tañon Strait, a narrow passage of water situated between
the islands of Negros and Cebu. SC-46 originated from a Geophysical Survey and
Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-102) entered by DOE with JAPEX. This contract
involved geological and geophysical studies of the Tañon Strait. The studies included
surface geology, sample analysis, and reprocessing of seismic and magnetic data.
JAPEX, assisted by DOE, also conducted geophysical and satellite surveys, as well as oil
and gas sampling in Tañon Strait.
2. JAPEX committed to drill one exploration well during the second sub-phase of the
project. Since the well was to be drilled in the marine waters of Aloguinsan and
Pinamungajan, where the Tañon Strait was declared a protected seascape in 1988,10
JAPEX agreed to comply with the Environmental Impact Assessment requirements
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1586. This was approved by the Protected Area
Management Board12 of the Tañon Strait (PAMB-Tañon Strait), and an ECC was
subsequently released to JAPEX for the offshore oil and gas exploration project in Tañon
Strait. From 16 November 2007 to 8 February 2008, JAPEX drilled an exploratory well
with a depth of 3,150 meters near Pinamungajan town. Being adversely affected by the
activities, this petition was filed.

ISSUE: Whether SC-46 is unconstitutional.

RULING:

1. YES. Petitioners maintain that SC-46 transgresses the Jura Regalia Provision or
paragraph 1, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution because JAPEX is 100%
Japanese-owned. Furthermore, the FIDEC asserts that SC-46 cannot be considered as a
technical and financial assistance agreement validly executed under paragraph 4 of the
same provision. It is petitioner’s position that service contracts involving foreign
corporations or entities have been banned by the 1987 Constitution. The Court went back
to discuss the case of La Bugal, and explained that par.4 of Sec.2 Article XII of the
Constitution is the exception to the general rule in par.1 of the same provision (in short,
pwede ra mo enter into service
2. The following are the safeguards this Court enumerated in La Bugal:

Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to minerals,
petroleum and other mineral oils. The grant thereof is subject to several safeguards,
among which are these requirements:
 The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general law that will set
standard or uniform terms, conditions and requirements, presumably to attain a certain
uniformity in provisions and avoid the possible insertion of terms disadvantageous to the
country.

The Court finds that there was a law. PD 87 (The Oil Exploration and
Development Act of 1972). This law has not been repealed, and so is an existing valid
law governing oil explorations. But note must be made at this point that while
Presidential Decree No. 87 may serve as the general law upon which a service contract
for petroleum exploration and extraction may be authorized, as will be discussed below,
the exploitation and utilization of this energy resource in the present case may be allowed
only through a law passed by Congress, since the Tañon Strait is a NIPAS area

The President shall be the signatory for the government because, supposedly
before an agreement is presented to the President for signature, it will have been vetted
several times over at different levels to ensure that it conforms to law and can withstand
public scrutiny.

Not met. Paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution requires that
the President himself enter into any service contract for the exploration of petroleum. SC-
46 appeared to have been entered into and signed only by the DOE through its then
Secretary, Vicente S. Perez, Jr., contrary to the said constitutional requirement.
Moreover, public respondents have neither shown nor alleged that Congress was
subsequently notified of the execution of such contract.

Cannot fall under the alter-ego doctrine, because in cases where the Chief
Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the
situation demand that he act personally, the alter ego doctrine cannot apply. In this case,
the public respondents have failed to show that the President had any participation in SC-
46. Their argument that their acts are actually the acts of then President Macapagal-
Arroyo, absent proof of her disapproval, must fail as the requirement that the President
herself enter into these kinds of contracts is embodied not just in any ordinary statute, but
in the Constitution itself. These service contracts involving the exploitation,
development, and utilization of our natural resources are of paramount interest to the
present and future generations. Hence, safeguards were put in place to insure that the
guidelines set by law are meticulously observed and likewise to eradicate the corruption
that may easily penetrate departments and agencies by ensuring that the President has
authorized or approved of these service contracts herself.

3. Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it to Congress to
give that branch of government an opportunity to look over the agreement and interpose
timely objections, if any.

Not complied as well.

 Adhering to the aforementioned guidelines, this Court finds that SC-46 is indeed
null and void for noncompliance with the requirements of the 1987 Constitution.
 (12) Ass'n. of Small Land Owners v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform
175 SCRA 343
G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989

Facts:

1. The subjects of this petition are a 9-hectare rice land worked by four tenants and owned
by petitioner Nicolas Manaay and his wife and a 5- hectare rice land worked by four
tenants and owned by petitioner Augustin Hermano, Jr.
2. The tenants were declared full owners of these lands by E.O. No. 228 as qualified farmers
under P.D. No. 27. The petitioner contends that the issuance of E.O. Nos. 228 and 229
shortly before Congress convened is anomalous and arbitrary, besides violating the
doctrine of separation of powers. The legislative power granted to the President under the
Transitory Provisions refers only to emergency measures that may be promulgated in the
proper exercise of the police power. They contend that President Aquino usurped
legislative power vested in Congress when she promulgated E.O. No. 228 and 229.
3. They are claiming equal protection clause is also violated because the order places the
burden of solving the agrarian problems on the owners only of agricultural lands. No
similar obligation is imposed on the owners of other properties. They also said that the
measure is invalid also for violation of Article XIII, Section 4, of the Constitution, for
failure to provide for retention limits for small landowners. Moreover, it does not
conform to Article VI, Section 25(4) and the other requisites of a valid appropriation.

ISSUES:
1. Whether this statute is an exercise of police power or the power of eminent domain.
2. Whether the statutes are valid exercises of police power.
3. Whether the equal protection clause was violated.
4. Whether the EO 228 and 229 are valid.
5. Whether or not the content and manner of the just compensation provided for in the
CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution.

RULING:

1. It is an exercise of the power of eminent domain because there is payment of just

compensation unlike in the exercise of police power wherein confiscation of property is
not compensable.
2. YES. A statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is a concurrence of
the lawful subject and the lawful method. As the subject and purpose of agrarian reform
have been laid down by the Constitution itself, we may say that the first requirement has
been satisfied. What remains to be examined is the validity of the method employed to
achieve the constitutional goal.
3. NO. The petitioners have not shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a
different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other
properties must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be
rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of owners that is
clearly visible except to those who will not see.
4. EO 228 and 229 are valid. They are not a result of the President’s usurpation of powers.
These Executive Orders were issued prior the creation of the Ad Interim Congress.
According to the transitory provisions of the 1973 Constitution, prior to the convening of
the Ad Interim Congress, the presidential orders, proclamations, and letters of instruction
of the president formed part of the law of the land, unless they were modified or repealed
subsequently by the Ad Interim Congress.

In other words, prior to the creation of the Ad Interim Congress, the legislative
power was expressly delegated to the president of the Philippines by the Constitution.
The Constitution deemed the delegation necessary in order to enable the transition to a
new government. Also, in principle, there was no other branch or department to which
the president may usurp such powers as Congress was yet to be created. We may even
argue that the delegation was created to ensure that such a Congress would materialize. It
has also been provided that, after the creation of Congress, the Executive Orders and
Issuances carrying legislative power does not lose its effects. They simply become part of
the law of the land, unless they are modified or repealed by a subsequent legislation by
the newly formed Congress.

5. NO. It is declared that although money is the traditional mode of payment, other modes
of payment shall be permitted as compensation. The court accepts the theory that
payment of the just compensation is not always required to be made fully in money, they
find further that the proportion of cash payment to the other things of value constituting
the total payment, as determined on the basis of the areas of the lands expropriated, is not
unduly oppressive upon the landowner. The other modes, which are likewise available to
the landowner at his option, are also not unreasonable because payment is made in shares
of stock, LBP bonds, other properties or assets, tax credits, and other things of value
equivalent to the amount of just compensation.

(Court: We do not mind admitting that a certain degree of pragmatism has

influenced our decision on this issue. The Court is as acutely anxious as the rest of our
people to see the goal of agrarian reform achieved at last after the frustrations and
deprivations of our peasant masses during all these disappointing decades. We are aware
that invalidation of the said section will result in the nullification of the entire program,
killing the farmer's hopes even as they approach realization and resurrecting the spectre
of discontent and dissent in the restless countryside. That is not in our view the intention
of the Constitution, and that is not what we shall decree today.)
 (13) Cruz v. Secretary of DENR
GR. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000
IPRA

DOCTRINE:

1. There is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural
resources within their ancestral domain.
2. Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and
the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their
ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the
resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these resources, and at the
same time, a priority in their large scale development and exploitation.

FACTS:

1. Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as
citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic
Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA)
and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR).
2. The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these
amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public
domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the
Regalian Doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

ISSUE: Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?

RULING:

1. No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA,
there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural
resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the
ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the
ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives them, as
owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the right to the small
scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large scale
development and exploitation.
2. Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public
domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a
concept of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State.
However, the right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral
domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the
same.
3. In the case, the votes of the Justices were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary
majority was not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after
 redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7
of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.
4. In a separate opinion, Justice Puno analyzed the development of the Regalian Doctrine in
the Philippine Legal System, and argued that the provisions of the IPRA did not
contravene the constitution, as ancestral domains and ancestral lands were the private
property of indigenous peoples and did not constitute part of the land of the public
domain.
 (14) La Bugal B’laan Tribal Assn. v. DENR Secretary
GR No. 127882, January 27, 2004

TOPIC: Adopting the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the
land.

DOCTRINES:

1. The utilization of inalienable lands of the public domain through license, concession or
lease is no longer allowed under the 1987 constitution.
2. The equal protection clause guarantees that such decision shall apply to all contracts
belonging to the same class.

FACTS:

1. Pres. Aquino issued EO 279 authorizing the DENR Secretary to accept, consider and
evaluate proposals from foreign-owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts or
agreements involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate recommendation of the
Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign proponent.
2. Thereafter, Pres. Ramos approved RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, to
"govern the exploration, development, utilization and processing of all mineral
resources."
3. Shortly before the effectivity of R.A. No. 7942, the President entered into an FTAA with
WMCP covering 99,387 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del
Sur and North Cotabato.
4. Petitioners demanded that the DENR stop the implementation of R.A. No. 7942. They
allege that at the time of the filing of the petition, 100 FTAA applications had already
been filed, covering an area of 8.4 million hectares,64 of which applications are by fully
foreign-owned corporations covering a total of 5.8 million hectares, and at least one by a
fully foreign-owned mining company over offshore areas.
5. Among the respondents, is WMCP, which entered into the assailed FTAA with the
Philippine Government.
6. Among the petitioners are La Bugal B'laan Tribal Association, Inc., a farmers and
indigenous people's cooperative organized under Philippine laws representing a
community actually affected by the mining activities of WMCP, members of said
cooperative, as well as other residents of areas also affected by the mining activities of
WMCP.
7. Petitioners claim that the WMC FTAA, which was entered into pursuant to E.O. No. 279,
violates Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution because, among other reasons:
a. It allows foreign-owned companies to extend more than mere financial or
technical assistance to the State in the exploitation, development, and utilization
of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils, and even permits foreign owned
companies to "operate and manage mining activities."
b. It allows foreign-owned companies to extend both technical and financial
assistance, instead of "either technical or financial assistance."
 c. According to the Constitution, “The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth
in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and
reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.”
d. “The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by
Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence
fishermen and fish-workers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.”
e. “The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations
involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils
according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such
agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific
and technical resources.”

8. THE CONCESSION SYSTEM

Under the concession system, the concessionaire makes a direct equity investment
for the purpose of exploiting a particular natural resource within a given area. Thus, the
concession amounts to complete control by the concessionaire over the country's natural
resource, for it is given exclusive and plenary rights to exploit a particular resource at the
point of extraction. In consideration for the right to exploit a natural resource, the
concessionaire either pays rent or royalty, which is a fixed percentage of the gross
proceeds.

9. THE SERVICE CONTRACT SYSTEM

A service contract is a contractual arrangement for engaging in the exploitation

and development of petroleum, mineral, energy, land and other natural resources by
which a government or its agency, or a private person granted a right or privilege by the
government authorizes the other party (service contractor) to engage or participate in the
exercise of such right or the enjoyment of the privilege, in that the latter provides
financial or technical resources, undertakes the exploitation or production of a given
resource, or directly manages the productive enterprise, operations of the exploration and
exploitation of the resources or the disposition of marketing or resources.

10. Thereafter, President Marcos proclaimed the ratification of a new Constitution. Article
XIV of which, regard to Filipino participation in the nation's natural resources. While
Section 9 of the same Article maintained the Filipino-only policy in the enjoyment of
natural resources, it also allowed Filipinos, upon authority of the Batasang Pambansa, to
enter into service contracts with any person or entity for the exploration or utilization of
natural resources.
11. The original idea was to authorize the government, not private entities, to enter into
service contracts with foreign entities.
12. Shortly after its ratification, the President promulgated PD 151 which allowed Filipino
citizens or entities which have acquired lands of the public domain or which own, hold or
control such lands to enter into service contracts for financial, technical, management or
 other forms of assistance with any foreign persons or entity for the exploration,
development, exploitation or utilization of said lands.
13. In short, our version of the service contract is just a rehash of the old concession regime
14. The service contract as we know it here is antithetical to the principle of sovereignty over
our natural resources restated in the same article of the [1973] Constitution containing the
provision for service contracts. If the service contractor happens to be a foreign
corporation, the contract would also run counter to the constitutional provision on
nationalization or Filipinization, of the exploitation of our natural resources.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is unconstitutional for
permitting fully foreign owned corporations to exploit the Phil natural resources within
its territory.
2. Whether or not these FTAAs as service contracts that grant beneficial ownership to
foreign contractors are violative of the law.

RULING:

1. Yes. R.A. No. 7942 is invalid insofar as said Act authorizes service contracts.

By allowing foreign contractors to manage or operate all the aspects of the mining
operation, the above-cited provisions of R.A. No. 7942 have in effect conveyed beneficial
ownership over the nation's mineral resources to these contractors, leaving the State with
nothing but bare title thereto.

Moreover, the same provisions, whether by design or inadvertence, permit a

circumvention of the constitutionally ordained 60%-40% capitalization requirement for
corporations or associations engaged in the exploitation, development and utilization of
Philippine natural resources.

2. Yes. The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs is an
exception to the rule that participation in the nation’s natural resources is reserved
exclusively to Filipinos. Accordingly, such provision must be construed strictly against
their enjoyment by non-Filipinos. Therefore, RA 7942 is invalid insofar as the said act
authorizes service contracts.

The invalidation of the subject FTAA, it is argued, would constitute a breach of

said treaty which, in turn, would amount to a violation of Section 3, Article II of the
Constitution adopting the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the land. One of these generally accepted principles is pacta sunt servanda, which
requires the performance in good faith of treaty obligations.

Even assuming arguendo that WMCP is correct in its interpretation of the treaty
and its assertion that "the Philippines could not . . . deprive an Australian investor (like
[WMCP]) of fair and equitable treatment by invalidating [WMCP's] FTAA without
likewise nullifying the service contracts entered into before the enactment of RA
7942 . . .," the annulment of the FTAA would not constitute a breach of the treaty
invoked. For this decision herein invalidating the subject FTAA forms part of the legal
system of the Philippines. The equal protection clause guarantees that such decision shall
apply to all contracts belonging to the same class, hence, upholding rather than violating,
the "fair and equitable treatment" stipulation in said treaty.
 (15) LOLOY UNDURAN v. RAMON ABERASTURI
G.R. No. 181284, October 20, 2015

TOPIC: Jurisdiction of NCIP under the IPRA (Indigenous People’s Rights Act)

DOCTRINE:

1. NCIP does not have jurisdiction over a case if one of the parties is not a member of the
tribe. Exceptions: a) claims over boundary disputes and b) fraudulent claims by parties
who are not members of the same ICC/IP.

FACTS:

1. Unduran and others (petitioners) are members of the Talaandig tribe, who claimed to
have been living since birth on the land located at Barangay Miarayon, Talakag,
Bukidnon, Mindanao, which they inherited from their forefathers.
2. The Lopezes represented by Atty. Aberasturi, claiming to be the owners and possessors
of agricultural land within the Talaanding Tribe filed a petition for accion
reinvindicatoria before the RTC of Bukidnon.
3. Petitioners filed motion to dismiss alleging that the National Commission of Indigenous
People (NCIP) and not the RTC who had jurisdiction over the case because it involves
disputes and controversies involving ancestral domain of the Indigenous Cultural
Communities (ICC’s) and Indigenous People (IP) regardless of the parties involved.

ISSUE: Whether the NCIP has jurisdiction over the case

RULING:

1. NCIP does not have jurisdiction over this case.

2. Under the IPRA, the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving
rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the same
ICC/IP. When such claims and disputes arise between or among parties who do not
belong to the same ICC/IP, i.e., parties belonging to different ICC/IPs or where one of the
parties is a non-ICC/IP, the case shall fall under the jurisdiction of the proper Courts of
Justice, instead of the NCIP. In this case, while most of the petitioners belong to
Talaandig Tribe, respondents do not belong to the same ICC/IP.
3. Thus, even if the real issue involves a dispute over land which appear to be located within
the ancestral domain of the Talaandig Tribe, it is not the NCIP but the RTC which shall
have the power to hear, try and decide this case.
 (16) Francisco Chavez v. Public Estates Authority and Amari Costal Bay
Development Corp.,
G.R. No. 133250 July 9, 2002

DOCTRINE:

1. In Chavez v. PEA and Amari, G.R. No. 133250, it was held that the right to information
contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation n of the transaction.
Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if no contract is consummated, or if
one is consummated, it may be too late for the public to expose its defects.
2. However, the right only affords access to records, documents and papers, which means
the opportunity to inspect and copy them at his expense.
3. The exercise is also subject to reasonable regulations to protect the integrity of public
records and to minimize disruption of government operations (note this is July 9, 2002
Resolution)

FACTS:

1. Involved is a government contract that conveyed to a private entity 157.84 hectares of

reclaimed public lands along Roxas Boulevard in Metro Manila at the negotiated price of
P1,200 per square meter. However, published reports place the market price of land near
that area at that time at a high of P90,000 per square meter.
2. PEA is the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects
nationwide. PEA is the government agency charged with leasing or selling all reclaimed
lands of the public domain. PEA then entered into a JVA with AMARI, a Thai-Philippine
Corporation.
3. Later, the JVA was amended, but the bulk of the lands subject of the Amended JVA are
still submerged lands even to this very day, and therefore inalienable and outside the
commerce of man. Of the 750 hectares’ subject of the Amended JVA, 592.15 hectares or
78% of the total area are still submerged, permanently under the waters of Manila Bay.
Under the Amended JVA, the PEA conveyed to Amari the submerged lands even before
their actual reclamation, although the documentation of the deed of transfer and issuance
of the certificates of title would be made only after actual reclamation.
4. The Amended JVA states that the PEA "hereby contributes to the Joint Venture its rights
and privileges to perform Raw Land Reclamation and Horizontal Development as well as
own the Reclamation Area." The Amended JVA further states that "the sharing of the
Joint Venture Proceeds shall be based on the ratio of thirty percent (30%) for PEA and
seventy percent (70%) for AMARI."13 The Amended JVA also provides that the PEA
"hereby designates AMARI to perform PEA’s rights and privileges to reclaim, own and
develop the Reclamation Area." In short, under the Amended JVA the PEA contributed
its rights, privileges and ownership over the Reclamation Area to the Joint Venture which
is 70% owned by Amari. Moreover, the PEA delegated to Amari the right and privilege
to reclaim the submerged lands.

ISSUE: Whether the Amended JVA violates Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution.
RULING:

1. Yes. The JVA is unconstitutional.

2. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as
private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
3. PEA will simply turn around, as PEA has now done under the Amended JVA, and
transfer several hundreds of hectares of these reclaimed and still to be reclaimed lands to
a single private corporation in only one transaction.
4. This scheme will effectively nullify the constitutional ban in Section 3, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution which was intended to diffuse equitably the ownership of alienable
lands of the public domain among Filipinos, now numbering over 80 million strong.
 (17) SULTAN ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA v. CONTE MANGELIN, et al.
G.R. No. 80391 February 28, 1989

TOPIC: Autonomy of Local Governments

DOCTRINE:

1. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates

administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of
government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and
accountable," "and ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make
them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress."
2. Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in
the favor of local governments units declare to be autonomous.

FACTS:

1. On September 24, 1986, petitioner Limbona was appointed as a member of the

Sangguniang Pampook, Regional Autonomous Government, Region XII, representing
Lanao del Sur.
2. On March 12, 1987 petitioner was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly
or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly for brevity).
3. Said Assembly is composed of eighteen (18) members.
4. On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the Committee
on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited Mr. Xavier Razul and the
petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly, Region XII.
5. Consistent with the said invitation, petitioner sent a telegram to the Acting Secretary to
wire all Assemblymen that there shall be no session in November.
6. On November 2, 1987, the Assembly held session in defiance of petitioner's advice.
7. After declaring the presence of a quorum, the Speaker Pro-Tempore was authorized to
preside in the session. On Motion to declare the seat of the Speaker vacant, all
Assemblymen in attendance voted in the affirmative, hence, the chair declared said seat
of the Speaker vacant. On November 5, 1987, the session of the Assembly resumed and
twelve (12) members voted in favor of the motion to declare the seat of the Speaker
vacant; one abstained and none voted against.
8. Accordingly, the petitioner prays the proceedings held by respondents of their session on
November 2, 1987 as null and void and hold the election of petitioner as Speaker of said
Legislative Assembly held on March 12, 1987 valid and subsisting.

ISSUE: Whether the so-called autonomous governments of Mindanao, as they are now
constituted, are subject to the jurisdiction of the national courts.

RULING:

1. YES. Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power.

There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates
 administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of
government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and
accountable," "and ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make
them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress."
At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local
affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises
"general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered
according to law." He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute
their judgments with his own.
2. Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in
the favor of local governments units declare to be autonomous . In that case, the
autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with
minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author,
decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation," since in that event, the
autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its
constituency.
3. Under the 1987 Constitution, local government units enjoy autonomy in these two senses,
thus:

Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the

Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. Here shall be
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao ,and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.

Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.

xxx xxx xxx

See. 15. Mere shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in
the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas
sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social
structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution
and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines.

An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST.

(1987), art. X, sec. 15.] is subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and
accepted principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy." On the other hand, an
autonomous government of the former class is, as we noted, under the supervision of the
national government acting through the President (and the Department of Local
Government). If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous in the
latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same
way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are beyond our
jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category only, it comes unarguably
under our jurisdiction.
4. An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of
Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second
sense (decentralization of Power), that is, in which the central government commits an
act of self-immolation. Presidential Decree No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that
"[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control over
Autonomous Regions."
5. Hence, this Court assumes jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of
the expulsion in question, with more reason can we review the petitioner's removal as
Speaker.
6. Upon the facts presented, this Court holds that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were
invalid. The petitioner is reinstated as Member and Speaker of the Sanggunian.
 (18) AKBAYAN et.al. v. Aquino et.al.
G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008

TOPIC: (Sec. 28, Article II)

DOCTRINE: The right to information and the policy of full public disclosure is not absolute

FACTS:

1. The petitioners (non-government organizations, Congresspersons, citizens and

taxpayers), through a petition for mandamus and prohibition demanded the full text of the
Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) including the Philippine
and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent
attachments and annexes thereto.
2. The JPEPA, which will be the first bilateral free trade agreement to be entered into by the
Philippines with another country in the event the Senate grants its consent to it, covers a
broad range of topics as follows: trade in goods, rules of origin, customs procedures,
paperless trading, trade in services, investment, intellectual property rights, government
procurement, movement of natural persons, cooperation, competition policy, mutual
recognition, dispute avoidance and settlement, improvement of the business environment,
and general and final provisions.
3. The complexity of JPEPA became more evident at the Senate hearing conducted by the
Committee on Trade and Commerce on November 2006. The committee, chaired by
Senator Mar Roxas, heard differing views and perspectives on JPEPA. On one hand the
committee heard Government’s rosy projections on the economic benefits of JPEPA and
on the other hand the views of environmental and trade activists who raised there very
serious concerns about the country being turned into Japan’s toxic waste basket. The
discussion in the Senate showed that JPEPA is not just an issue concerning trade and
economic relations with Japan but one that touches on broader national development
concerns.
4. Petitioners assert, first, that the refusal of the government to disclose the documents
bearing on the JPEPA negotiations violates their right to information on matters of public
concern and contravenes other constitutional provisions on transparency, such as that on
the policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest. Second,
they contend that non-disclosure of the same documents undermines their right to
effective and reasonable participation in all levels of social, political, and economic
decision-making. Lastly, they proffer that divulging the contents of the JPEPA only after
the agreement has been concluded will effectively make the Senate into a mere rubber
stamp of the Executive, in violation of the principle of separation of powers.
5. Repondents claim that neither the right to information nor the policy of full public
disclosure is absolute, there being matters which, albeit of public concern or public
interest, are recognized as privileged in nature.

ISSUE: Whether the right to information sought by the petitioners are of public concern that
needs full public disclosure?
RULING:

1. Yes the court explained that the information sought by the petitioners are of public
concern but are covered by the doctrine of executive privilege.
2. It is well-established in jurisprudence that neither the right to information nor the policy
of full public disclosure is absolute, there being matters which, albeit of public concern or
public interest, are recognized as privileged in nature.
3. The privileged character of diplomatic negotiations has been recognized in this
jurisdiction. In discussing valid limitations on the right to information, the Court in
Chavez v. PCGG held that information on inter-government exchanges prior to the
conclusion of treaties and executive agreements may be subject to reasonable safeguards
for the sake of national interest. Even earlier, the same privilege was upheld in Peoples
Movement for Press Freedom (PMPF) v. Manglapus wherein the Court discussed the
reasons for the privilege in more precise terms.
4. In PMPF v. Manglapus, the therein petitioners were seeking information from the
Presidents representatives on the state of the then on-going negotiations of the RP-US
Military Bases Agreement. The Court denied the petition, stressing that secrecy of
negotiations with foreign countries is not violative of the constitutional provisions of
freedom of speech or of the press nor of the freedom of access to information. Verily,
while the Court should guard against the abuse of executive privilege, it should also give
full recognition to the validity of the privilege whenever it is claimed within the proper
bounds of executive power, as in this case. Otherwise, the Court would undermine its
own credibility, for it would be perceived as no longer aiming to strike a balance, but
seeking merely to water down executive privilege to the point of irrelevance.
 (19) Belgica v. Ochoa
G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013

G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013

GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L.
GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,
vs. HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR. SECRETARY
OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B. ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER
ROSALIA V. DE LEON SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by FRANKLIN
M. DRILON m his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES represented by FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. in his capacity as
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 208493

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) PRESIDENT SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, Petitioner,
vs. HONORABLE FRANKLIN M. DRILON in his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and
HONORABLE FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR., in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 209251

PEDRITO M. NEPOMUCENO, Former Mayor-Boac, Marinduque Former Provincial
Board Member -Province of Marinduque, Petitioner,vs. PRESIDENT BENIGNO
SIMEON C. AQUINO III* and SECRETARY FLORENCIO BUTCH ABAD,
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Respondents.

TOPIC: PORK BARREL SCAM CONTROVERSY

DOCTRINES:
1. SEPARATION OF POWERS;
2. CHECKS AND BALANCES; and
3. LOCAL AUTONOMY

FACTS:

1. This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R. No. 209251.

2. The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since about 1922.
Pork Barrel is commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of
the Congress. It underwent several legal designations from “Congressional Pork Barrel”
to the latest “Priority Development Assistance Fund” or PDAF. The allocation for the
pork barrel is integrated in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).
3. Over the decades, "pork" funds in the Philippines have increased tremendously, owing in
no small part to previous Presidents who reportedly used the "Pork Barrel" in order to
gain congressional support. It was in 1996 when the first controversy surrounding the
"Pork Barrel" erupted. Former Marikina City Representative Romeo Candazo (Candazo),
then an anonymous source, "blew the lid on the huge sums of government money that
regularly went into the pockets of legislators in the form of kickbacks." He said that "the
kickbacks were ‘SOP‘(standard operating procedure) among legislators and ranged from
a low 19 percent to a high 52 percent of the cost of each project, which could be anything
from dredging, rip rapping, sphalting, concreting, and construction of school buildings."
"Other sources of kickbacks that Candazo identified were public funds intended for
medicines and textbooks. A few days later, the tale of the money trail became the banner
story of the Philippine Daily Inquirer issue of August 13, 1996, accompanied by an
illustration of a roasted pig." "The publication of the stories, including those about
congressional initiative allocations of certain lawmakers, including ₱3.6 Billion for a
Congressman, sparked public outrage."

4. Thereafter, or in 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF as
enacted in the 2004 GAA for being unconstitutional. Unfortunately, for lack of "any
pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has
become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress," the petition was
dismissed.

5. Recently, or in July of the present year, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) began
its probe into allegations that "the government has been defrauded of some ₱10 Billion
over the past 10 years by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and
various government agencies for scores of ghost projects."The investigation was spawned
by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation –
"JLN" standing for Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles) – had swindled billions of pesos from
the public coffers for "ghost projects" using no fewer than 20 dummy NGOs for an entire
decade. While the NGOs were supposedly the ultimate recipients of PDAF funds, the
whistle-blowers declared that the money was diverted into Napoles‘private accounts.
Thus, after its investigation on the Napoles controversy, criminal complaints were filed
before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three
(3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the complaints are some of
the lawmakers‘ chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the heads and other officials of three
(3) implementing agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles.

6. On August 16, 2013, the Commission on Audit (CoA) released the results of a three-year
audit investigation. covering the use of legislators' PDAF from 2007 to 2009, or during
the last three (3) years of the Arroyo administration. The purpose of the audit was to
determine the propriety of releases of funds under PDAF and the Various Infrastructures
including Local Projects (VILP) by the DBM, the application of these funds and the
implementation of projects by the appropriate implementing agencies and several
government-owned-and-controlled corporations (GOCCs).
 7. Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following manner:

a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to – P40 million
for “hard projects” (infrastructure projects like roads, buildings, schools, etc.), and
P30 million for “soft projects” (scholarship grants, medical assistance, livelihood
programs, IT development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to – P100 million for hard projects,
P100 million for soft projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to – P100 million for hard
projects, P100 million for soft projects.

8. The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain
cabinet members may request for the realignment of funds into their department provided
that the request for realignment is approved or concurred by the legislator concerned.

9. Presidential Pork Barrel

The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the GAA.
The so-called presidential pork barrel comes from two sources: (a) the Malampaya
Funds, from the Malampaya Gas Project – this has been around since 1976, and (b) the
Presidential Social Fund which is derived from the earnings of PAGCOR – this has been
around since about 1983.

As for the "Presidential Pork Barrel", whistle-blowers alleged that" at least ₱900
Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan
province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO."
According to incumbent CoA Chairperson Maria Gracia Pulido Tan (CoA Chairperson),
the CoA is, as of this writing, in the process of preparing "one consolidated report" on the
Malampaya Funds

Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of corruption.
In July 2013, six whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last
decade, the corruption in the pork barrel system had been facilitated by Janet Lim
Napoles. Napoles had been helping lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel funds into
about 20 bogus NGO’s (non-government organizations) which would make it appear that
government funds are being used in legit existing projects but are in fact going to “ghost”
projects. An audit was then conducted by the Commission on Audit and the results
thereof concurred with the exposes of Luy et al.

10. Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions
before the Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel system.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and
justiciable controversy
 2. Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws
similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles
of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of
legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d) accountability; (e) political dynasties; and
(f) local autonomy.
3. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.

RULING:

1. On the first issue:

Yes. By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual
case or controversy. This is embodied in Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
which pertinently states that "judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable
x x x." Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is one which "involves a
conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial
resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. In other
words, "there must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on
the basis of existing law and jurisprudence." Related to the requirement of an actual case
or controversy is the requirement of "ripeness," meaning that the questions raised for
constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for adjudication. "A question is ripe for
adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the
individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished
or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner
must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the
challenged action." "Withal, courts will decline to pass upon constitutional issues through
advisory opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve hypothetical or moot
questions."

Based on these principles, the Court finds that there exists an actual and
justiciable controversy in these cases.

2. On the second issue:

No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. Broadly speaking,

there is a violation of the separation of powers principle when one branch of government
unduly encroaches on the domain of another. US Supreme Court decisions instruct that
the principle of separation of powers may be violated in two (2) ways: firstly, "one
branch may interfere impermissibly with the other’s performance of its constitutionally
assigned function"; and "alternatively, the doctrine may be violated when one branch
assumes a function that more properly is entrusted to another." In other words, there is a
violation of the principle when there is impermissible (a) interference with and/or (b)
assumption of another department‘s functions.

It is unconstitutional because it violates the following principles:

 A. Separation of Powers

The enforcement of the national budget, as primarily contained in the

GAA, is indisputably a function both constitutionally assigned and properly
entrusted to the Executive branch of government. In Guingona, Jr. v. Hon.
Carague (Guingona, Jr.), the Court explained that the phase of budget execution
"covers the various operational aspects of budgeting" and accordingly includes
"the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities," the
"regulation and release of funds" as well as all "other related activities" that
comprise the budget execution cycle. This is rooted in the principle that the
allocation of power in the three principal branches of government is a grant of all
powers inherent in them. Thus, unless the Constitution provides otherwise, the
Executive department should exclusively exercise all roles and prerogatives
which go into the implementation of the national budget as provided under the
GAA as well as any other appropriation law.

In view of the foregoing, the Legislative branch of government, much

more any of its members, should not cross over the field of implementing the
national budget since, as earlier stated, the same is properly the domain of the
Executive. Again, in Guingona, Jr., the Court stated that "Congress enters the
picture when it deliberates or acts on the budget proposals of the President.
Thereafter, Congress, "in the exercise of its own judgment and wisdom,
formulates an appropriation act precisely following the process established by the
Constitution, which specifies that no money may be paid from the Treasury
except in accordance with an appropriation made by law." Upon approval and
passage of the GAA, Congress‘ law -making role necessarily comes to an end and
from there the Executive‘s role of implementing the national budget begins. So as
not to blur the constitutional boundaries between them, Congress must "not
concern itself with details for implementation by the Executive."

The foregoing cardinal postulates were definitively enunciated in Abakada

where the Court held that "from the moment the law becomes effective, any
provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role
in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of
separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional." It must be clarified, however,
that since the restriction only pertains to "any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law," Congress may still exercise its oversight function which
is a mechanism of checks and balances that the Constitution itself allows. But it
must be made clear that Congress‘ role must be confined to mere oversight. Any
post-enactment-measure allowing legislator participation beyond oversight is
bereft of any constitutional basis and hence, tantamount to impermissible
interference and/or assumption of executive functions. As the Court ruled in
Abakada:
 Any post-enactment congressional measure x x x should be limited to
scrutiny and investigation. In particular, congressional oversight must be confined
to the following:
i. scrutiny based primarily on Congress ‘power of appropriation and the
budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of
departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any
matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation; and
ii. investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the
power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.

Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers
guaranteed by the Constitution.

B. Non-delegability of Legislative Power

As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle, legislative power shall

be exclusively exercised by the body to which the Constitution has conferred the
same. In particular, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states that such
power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a
Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people
by the provision on initiative and referendum. Based on this provision, it is clear
that only Congress, acting as a bicameral body, and the people, through the
process of initiative and referendum, may constitutionally wield legislative power
and no other.

Exceptions to the rule are:

1. Delegated legislative power to local governments which, by immemorial

practice, are allowed to legislate on purely local matters; and
2. Constitutionally-grafted exceptions such as the authority of the President to,
by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national
policy in times of war or other national emergency, or fix within specified
limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may
impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and
other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development
program of the Government.

Notably, the principle of non-delegability should not be confused as a

restriction to delegate rule-making authority to implementing agencies for the
limited purpose of either filling up the details of the law for its enforcement
(supplementary rule-making) or ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual
operation (contingent rule-making).

The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a

relaxation of the principle of separation of powers and is an exception to the non-
delegation of legislative powers. Administrative regulations or "subordinate
legislation" calculated to promote the public interest are necessary because of "the
growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the law."

Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the rule-making power must be

confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the
law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or
expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the
statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned.

In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar
as it confers post-enactment identification authority to individual legislators,
violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are effectively
allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which – as settled in
Philconsa – is lodged in Congress. That the power to appropriate must be
exercised only through legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution which states that: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." To understand what
constitutes an act of appropriation, the Court, in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice
and Insular Auditor (Bengzon), held that the power of appropriation involves (a)
the setting apart by law of a certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a
specified purpose. Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual
legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate
(a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary
that they themselves also determine. As these two (2) acts comprise the exercise
of the power of appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that the 2013
PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly,
said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution
does not, however, allow. Thus, keeping with the principle of non-delegability of
legislative power, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all
other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar legislative
identification feature as herein discussed, as unconstitutional.

C. Principle of Checks and Balances

A prime example of a constitutional check and balance would be the

President’s power to veto an item written into an appropriation, revenue or tariff
bill submitted to him by Congress for approval through a process known as "bill
presentment." The President‘s item-veto power is found in Section 27(2), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution which reads as follows:

Sec. 27. x x x

(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item
or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not
affect the item or items to which he does not object.
 The justification for the President‘s item-veto power rests on a variety of
policy goals such as to prevent log-rolling legislation, impose fiscal restrictions on
the legislature, as well as to fortify the executive branch‘s role in the budgetary
process. In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the US Supreme
Court characterized the President‘s item-power as "a salutary check upon the
legislative body, calculated to guard the community against the effects of factions,
precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good, which may happen
to influence a majority of that body"; phrased differently, it is meant to "increase
the chances in favor of the community against the passing of bad laws, through
haste, inadvertence, or design."

For the President to exercise his item-veto power, it necessarily follows

that there exists a proper "item" which may be the object of the veto. An item, as
defined in the field of appropriations, pertains to "the particulars, the details, the
distinct and severable parts of the appropriation or of the bill." In the case of
Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice of the Philippine Islands, the US Supreme Court
characterized an item of appropriation as follows:

An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which, in itself,

is a specific appropriation of money, not some general provision of law which
happens to be put into an appropriation bill.

On this premise, it may be concluded that an appropriation bill, to ensure

that the President may be able to exercise his power of item veto, must contain
"specific appropriations of money" and not only "general provisions" which
provide for parameters of appropriation.

Further, it is significant to point out that an item of appropriation must be

an item characterized by singular correspondence – meaning an allocation of a
specified singular amount for a specified singular purpose, otherwise known as a
"line-item." This treatment not only allows the item to be consistent with its
definition as a "specific appropriation of money" but also ensures that the
President may discernibly veto the same. Based on the foregoing formulation, the
existing Calamity Fund, Contingent Fund and the Intelligence Fund, being
appropriations which state a specified amount for a specific purpose, would then
be considered as "line- item" appropriations which are rightfully subject to item
veto. Likewise, it must be observed that an appropriation may be validly
apportioned into component percentages or values; however, it is crucial that each
percentage or value must be allocated for its own corresponding purpose for such
component to be considered as a proper line-item. Moreover, as Justice Carpio
correctly pointed out, a valid appropriation may even have several related
purposes that are by accounting and budgeting practice considered as one
purpose. Finally, special purpose funds and discretionary funds would equally
square with the constitutional mechanism of item-veto for as long as they follow
the rule on singular correspondence as herein discussed. Anent special purpose
funds, it must be added that Section 25(4), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
requires that the "special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it
is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually available as certified by the
National Treasurer, or t o be raised by a corresponding revenue proposal therein."
Meanwhile, with respect to discretionary funds, Section 2 5(6), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution requires that said funds "shall be disbursed only for public
purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines
as may be prescribed by law."

In contrast, what beckons constitutional infirmity are appropriations which

merely provide for a singular lump-sum amount to be tapped as a source of
funding for multiple purposes. Since such appropriation type necessitates the
further determination of both the actual amount to be expended and the actual
purpose of the appropriation which must still be chosen from the multiple
purposes stated in the law, it cannot be said that the appropriation law already
indicates a "specific appropriation of money‖ and hence, without a proper line-
item which the President may veto. As a practical result, the President would then
be faced with the predicament of either vetoing the entire appropriation if he finds
some of its purposes wasteful or undesirable, or approving the entire
appropriation so as not to hinder some of its legitimate purposes.

In these cases, petitioners claim that "in the current x x x system where the
PDAF is a lump-sum appropriation, the legislator‘s identification of the projects
after the passage of the GAA denies the President the chance to veto that item
later on." Accordingly, they submit that the "item veto power of the President
mandates that appropriations bills adopt line-item budgeting" and that "Congress
cannot choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionally-
given power of the President useless."

On the other hand, respondents maintain that the text of the Constitution
envisions a process which is intended to meet the demands of a modernizing
economy and, as such, lump-sum appropriations are essential to financially
address situations which are barely foreseen when a GAA is enacted. They argue
that the decision of the Congress to create some lump-sum appropriations is
constitutionally allowed and textually-grounded.

The Court agrees with petitioners.

Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of ₱24.79 Billion only appears
as a collective allocation limit since the said amount would be further divided
among individual legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum
allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF
funds based on their own discretion. As these intermediate appropriations are
made by legislators only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law, it
necessarily means that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have
been written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without
veto consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative
identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a budget within a budget"
which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently impairs
the President‘s power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point out, the above-
described system forces the President to decide between (a) accepting the entire
₱24.79 Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects of the
legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his national agenda and (b)
rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate
projects.

Moreover, even without its post-enactment legislative identification

feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would remain constitutionally flawed since it
would then operate as a prohibited form of lump-sum appropriation above-
characterized. In particular, the lump-sum amount of ₱24.79 Billion would be
treated as a mere funding source allotted for multiple purposes of spending, i.e.,
scholarships, medical missions, assistance to indigents, preservation of historical
materials, construction of roads, flood control, etc. This setup connotes that the
appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes of the appropriation for
further determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible item
which may be subject to the President‘s power of item veto.

In fact, on the accountability side, the same lump-sum budgeting scheme

has, as the CoA Chairperson relays, "limited state auditors from obtaining
relevant data and information that would aid in more stringently auditing the
utilization of said Funds." Accordingly, she recommends the adoption of a "line
by line budget or amount per proposed program, activity or project, and per
implementing agency."

Hence, in view of the reasons above-stated, the Court finds the 2013
PDAF Article, as well as all Congressional Pork Barrel Laws of similar operation,
to be unconstitutional. That such budgeting system provides for a greater degree
of flexibility to account for future contingencies cannot be an excuse to defeat
what the Constitution requires. Clearly, the first and essential truth of the matter is
that unconstitutional means do not justify even commendable ends.

D. Local Autonomy

As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local
affairs. Through their Local Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can
develop their own programs and policies concerning their localities. But with the
PDAF, particularly on the part of the members of the house of representatives,
what’s happening is that a congressman can either bypass or duplicate a project
by the LDC and later on claim it as his own. This is an instance where the national
government (note, a congressman is a national officer) meddles with the affairs of
the local government – and this is contrary to the State policy embodied in the
Constitution on local autonomy. It’s good if that’s all that is happening under the
 pork barrel system but worse, the PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on the
part of legislators.

3. On the third issue:

Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.

Petitioners preliminarily assail Section 8 of PD 910 and Section 12 of PD1869

(now, amended by PD 1993), which respectively provide for the Malampaya Funds and
the Presidential Social Fund, as invalid appropriations laws since they do not have the
"primary and specific" purpose of authorizing the release of public funds from the
National Treasury. Petitioners submit that Section 8 of PD 910 is not an appropriation
law since the "primary and specific‖ purpose of PD 910 is the creation of an Energy
Development Board and Section 8 thereof only created a Special Fund incidental thereto.
In similar regard, petitioners argue that Section 12 of PD 1869 is neither a valid
appropriations law since the allocation of the Presidential Social Fund is merely
incidental to the "primary and specific" purpose of PD 1869 which is the amendment of
the Franchise and Powers of PAGCOR. In view of the foregoing, petitioners suppose that
such funds are being used without any valid law allowing for their proper appropriation
in violation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: "No
money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by
law."

The Court disagrees.

"An appropriation made by law under the contemplation of Section 29(1), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution exists when a provision of law (a) sets apart a determinate or
determinable amount of money and (b) allocates the same for a particular public purpose.
These two minimum designations of amount and purpose stem from the very definition
of the word "appropriation," which means "to allot, assign, set apart or apply to a
particular use or purpose," and hence, if written into the law, demonstrate that the
legislative intent to appropriate exists. As the Constitution "does not provide or prescribe
any particular form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or
appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be ‘made by law,‘" an
appropriation law may – according to Philconsa – be "detailed and as broad as Congress
wants it to be" for as long as the intent to appropriate may be gleaned from the same. As
held in the case of Guingona, Jr.:

There is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes any particular

form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by
Congress shall be made, except that it be "made by law," such as precisely the
authorization or appropriation under the questioned presidential decrees. In other words,
in terms of time horizons, an appropriation may be made impliedly (as by past but
subsisting legislations) as well as expressly for the current fiscal year (as by enactment of
laws by the present Congress), just as said appropriation may be made in general as well
as in specific terms. The Congressional authorization may be embodied in annual laws,
such as a general appropriations act or in special provisions of laws of general or special
application which appropriate public funds for specific public purposes, such as the
questioned decrees. An appropriation measure is sufficient if the legislative intention
clearly and certainly appears from the language employed (In re Continuing
Appropriations, 32 P. 272), whether in the past or in the present.

To constitute an appropriation there must be money placed in a fund applicable to

the designated purpose. The word appropriate means to allot, assign, set apart or apply to
a particular use or purpose. An appropriation in the sense of the constitution means the
setting apart a portion of the public funds for a public purpose. No particular form of
words is necessary for the purpose, if the intention to appropriate is plainly manifested.

Thus, based on the foregoing, the Court cannot sustain the argument that the
appropriation must be the "primary and specific" purpose of the law in order for a valid
appropriation law to exist. To reiterate, if a legal provision designates a determinate or
determinable amount of money and allocates the same for a particular public purpose,
then the legislative intent to appropriate becomes apparent and, hence, already sufficient
to satisfy the requirement of an "appropriation made by law" under contemplation of the
Constitution.
 (20) Francisco Jr. v. HREP
G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003

TOPIC: Declaration of Principles and State Policies

DOCTRINE:

1. The doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial

branches of government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge
by each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.
2. The doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully calibrated by the
Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three branches must be given
effect without destroying their indispensable co-equality.

FACTS:

1. In the year 2002, the House of Representatives, sponsored by Representative Felix

William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice, adopted a Resolution
“to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and
expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development
Fund (JDF)”
2. A year after, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed a first impeachment complaint
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the Court for
“culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes”
The complaint was endorsed by several representatives and was referred to the House
Committee on Justice.
3. The House Committee on Justice ruled that the first impeachment complaint was
“sufficient in form” but voted to dismiss the same for being insufficient in substance.
Four months after from the first complaint, a second impeachment complaint was filed
with the Secretary General of the House by several representatives against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by
above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was
accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-
third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.
4. Several petitions were brought up and among those alleged that House Resolution No.
260 (calling for a legislative inquiry into the administration by the Chief Justice of the
JDF) infringes on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and is a direct
violation of the constitutional principle of fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.

ISSUE: Whether the Judiciary has the power to review the validity of impeachment complaints.

RULING:

1. Yes, Judiciary has the power to do so.

2. As quoted by Justice Laurel in the case of Angara v. Electoral Commission, “In times of
social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt
 to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial
department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the
proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or
constituent units thereof.”
3. This “moderating power” to “determine the proper allocation of powers” of the different
branches of government and “to direct the course of government along constitutional
channels” is inherent in all courts as a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself,
which is “the power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable.”
4. Judicial review is indeed an integral component of the delicate system of checks and
balances which, together with the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the
bedrock of our republican form of government and ensures that its vast powers are
utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves.
5. The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It
obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each
department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction,
and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three
powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be
absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for
an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the
various departments of the government. The judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as
the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to
determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of
the Constitution.