Mind War
Mind War
nobulart.com/mindwar/
Psychotronic research is in its infancy, but the U.S. Army already possesses an
operational weapons system designed to do what LTC Alexander would like ESP to do –
except that this weapons system uses existing communications media. It seeks to map
the minds of neutral and enemy individuals and then to change them in accordance with
U.S. national interests. It does this on a wide scale, ewbracing military units, regions,
nations, and blocs. In its present form it is called Psychological Operations (PSYOP).
Does PSYOP work, or is it merely a cosmetic with which field commanders rather not be
bothered?
Had that question been asked in 1970, the answer would have been that PSYOP works
very well indeed. In 1967 and 1968 alone, a total of 29,276 armed Viet Cong/NVA (the
equivalent of 95 enemy infantry battalions) surrendered to ARVN or MACV forces under
1/9
the Chiou Hoi amnesty program – the major PSYOP effort of the Vietnam War. At the time
MACV estimated that the elimination of that number of enemy troops in combat would
have cost us 6,000 dead.
On the other hand, we lost the war – not because we were out-fought, but because we
were out-PSYOPed. Our national will to achieve victory was attacked more effectively
than we attacked that of the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong, and perception of this fact
encouraged the enemy to hang on until the United States finally broke and ran for home.
So our PSYOP failed. It failed not because its principles were unsound, but rather
because it was outmatched by the PSYOP of the enemy. The Army’s efforts enjoyed
some battlefield success, but the MACV PSYOP did not really change the minds of the
enemy populace, nor did it defend the U.S. populace at all against the propaganda of the
enemy. Furthermore the enemy’s PSYOP was so strong that it – not bigger armies or
better weapons – overcame all of the Cobras and Spookys and ACAVs and B-52s we
fielded. The lesson is not to ignore our own PSYOP capability, but rather to change it and
strengthen it so that it can do precisely that kind of thing to our enemy in the next war.
Better hardware is nice, but by itself it will change nothing if we do not win the war for the
mind.
The first thing that is necessary to overcome is a view of PSYOP that limits it to routine,
predictable, over-obvious, and hence marginally effective “leaflet and loudspeaker”
applications. Battlefield devices of this sort have their place, but it should be that of an
accessory to the main effort. That main effort cannot begin at the company or division
level; it must originate at the national level. It must strengthen our national will to victory
and it must attack and ultimately destroy that of the enemy. It both causes and is affected
by physical combat, but it is a type of war which is fought on a far more subtle basis as
well – in the minds of the national populations involved.
So let us begin with a simple name change. We shall rid ourselves of the self-conscious,
almost “embarrassed” concept of “psychological operations”. In its place we shall create
MindWar. The term is harsh and fear-inspiring, and so it should be: It is a term of attack
and victory – not one of rationalization, coaxing and conciliation. The enemy may be
offended by it; that is quite all right as long as he is defeated by it. A definition is offered:
2/9
Compare this definition with that of psychological warfare as first offered by General
William Donovon of the CSS in his World War II-era, “Basic Estimate of Psychological
Warfare”:
“Psychological warfare is the coordination and use of all means, including moral
and physical, by which the end is attained – other than those of recognized military
operations, but including the psychological exploitation of the result of those
recognized military actions – which tend to destroy the will of the enemy to achieve
victory and to damage his political or economic capacity to do so; which tends to
deprive the enemy of the support, assistance, or sympathy of his allies or
associates or of neutrals, or to prevent his acquisition of such support, assistance,
or sympathy; or which tend to create, maintain, or increase the will to victory of our
own people and allies and to acquire, maintain, or to increase the support,
assistance, and sympathy of neutrals.”
If the euphemism “psychological operations” resulted from, as one general officer put it in
a 1947 letter, “a great need for a synonym which could be used in peacetime that would
not shock the sensibilities of a citizen of democracy”, then it may have succeeded
domestically. On the other hand it does not seem to have reassured the sensibilities of
the Soviets, who in 1980 describe U.S. PSYOP as including:
The reluctance with which the Army has accepted even an “antiseptic” PSYOP
component is well-documented in Colonel Alfred Paddock’s brilliant treatise on the history
of the PSYOP establishment. Again and again efforts to forge this weapon into its most
effective configuration were frustrated by leaders who could not or would not see that
wars are fought and won or lost not on battlefields, but in the minds of men. As Colonel
Paddock so aptly concludes:
“In a real sense, the manner in which psychological and unconventional warfare
evolved from 1911 until their union as a formal Army capability in 1952 suggests a
theme that runs throughout the history of special warfare: the story of a hesitant and
reluctant Army attempting to cope with concepts and organizations of an
unconventional nature.”
MindWar cannot be so relegated. It is, in fact, the strategy to which tactical warfare must
conform if it is to achieve maximum effectiveness. The MindWar scenario must be
preeminent in the mind of the commander and must be the principal factor in his every
3/9
field decision. Otherwise he sacrifices measures which actually contribute to winning the
war to measures of immediate, tangible satisfaction. [Consider the rationale for “body
counts” in Vietnam.]
Accordingly PSYOP “combat support” units as we now know them must became a thing
of the past. MindWar teams must offer technical expertise to the commander from the
onset of the planning process, and at all levels down to that of the battalion. Such teams
cannot be composed – as they are now – of officers and NCOs who know simply the
basics of tactical propaganda operations. They must be composed of full-time experts
who strive to translate the strategy of national MindWar into tactical goals which maximize
effective winning of the war and minimize loss of life. Such MindWar teams will win their
commanders’ respect only if they can deliver on their promises.
What the Army now considers to be its most effective PSYOP – tactical PSYOP – is
actually the most limited and primitive effort, due to the difficulties of formulating and
delivering messages under battlefield constraints. Such efforts must continue, but they
are properly seen as a reinforcement of the main MindWar. If we do not attack the
enemy’s will until he reaches the battlefield, his nation will have strengthened it as best it
can. We must attack that will before it is thus locked in place. We must instill in it a
predisposition to inevitable defeat. Strategic MindWar must begin the moment war is
considered to be inevitable. It must seek out the attention of the enemy nation through
every available medium, and it must strike at that nation’s potential soldiers before they
put on their uniforms. It is in their homes and their communities that they are most
vulnerable to MindWar. Was the United States defeated in jungles of Vietnam, or was it
defeated in the streets of American cities?
To this end MindWar must be strategic in emphasis, with tactical applications playing a
reinforcing, supplementary role. In its strategic context, MindWar must reach out to
friends, enemies, and neutrals alike across the globe – neither through the primitive
“battlefield” leaflets loudspeakers of PSYOP nor through the weak, imprecise, and narrow
effort of psychotronics – but through the media possessed by the United States which
have the capabilities to reach virtually all people on the face of the Earth. These media
are, of course, the electronic media – television and radio. State of the art developments
in satellite communication, video recording techniques, and laser and optical transmission
of broadcasts make possible a penetration of the minds of the world such as would have
been inconceivable just a few years ago. Like the sword Excalibur, we have but to reach
out and seize this tool; and can transform the world for us if we have but the courage and
the integrity guide civilization with it. If we do not accept Excalibur, then we relinquish our
ability to inspire foreign cultures with our morality. If they then devise moralities
unsatisfactory to us, we have no choice but to fight them on a more brutish level.
MindWar must target all participants if it is to be effective. It must not only weaken the
enemy; it must strengthen the United States. It strengthens United States by denying
enemy propaganda access to our people, and explaining and emphasizing to our people
the rationale for our national interest in a specific war. Under existing United States law,
PSYOP units may not target American citizens. That prohibition is based upon the
4/9
presumption that “propaganda” is necessarily a lie or at least a misleading half-truth, and
that government has no right to lie to the people. The Propaganda Ministry of Goebbels
must not be part of the American way of life. Quite right, and so it must be axiomatic of
MindWar that it always speaks the truth. Its power lies in its ability to focus recipients’
attention on the truth of the future as well as that of the present. MindWar thus involves
the stated promise of a truth that the United States has resolved to make real if it is not
already so.
MindWar is not new. Nations’ greatest – and least costly – victories have resulted from it,
both in time of actual combat and in time of threatened combat. Consider the atomic
attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The physical destruction of those two cities did not
destroy Japan’s ability to continue fighting. Rather the psychological shock of the
weapons destroyed what remained of Japan’s national will to fight. Surrender followed; a
long and costly ground invasion was averted.
“What all this boils down to is that if our persuasive communication ends up with a
net positive effect, we must attribute it to luck, not science… The effectiveness of
propaganda may be even be less predictable and controllable than the
effectiveness of mere persuasive communication.”
“The propagandist is not, and cannot be, a ‘believer’. Moreover he cannot believe in
the ideology he must use in his propaganda. He is merely a man at the service of a
party, a state, or some other organization, and his task is to insure the efficiency of
that organization… If the propagandist has any political conviction, he must put it
aside in order to be able to use some poplar mass ideology. He cannot even share
that ideology, for he must use it as an object and manipulate it without the respect
that he would have for it if he believed in it. He quickly acquires contempt for these
popular images and beliefs …“
5/9
Unlike PSYOP, MindWar has nothing to do with deception or even with “selected” – and
therefore misleading – truth. Rather it states a whole truth that, if it does not now exist,
will be forced into existence by the will of the United States. The examples of Kennedy’s
ultimatum to Khrushchev during the Cuban Missile Crisis and Hitler’s stance at Munich
may be cited. A MindWar message does not have to fit conditions of abstract credibility as
do PSYOP themes; its source makes it credible. As Livy once said:
“The terror of the Roman name will be such that the world shall know that, once a
Roman army has laid siege to a city, nothing will move it – not the rigors of winter
nor the weariness of months and years – that it knows no end but victory and is
ready, if a swift and sudden stroke will not serve, to persevere until that victory is
achieved.”
Unlike Ellul’s cynical propagandist, the MindWar operative must know that he speaks the
truth, and he must be personally committed to it. What he says is only a part of MindWar;
the rest – and the test of its effectiveness – lies in the conviction he projects to his
audience, in the rapport he establishes with it. And this is not something which can be
easily faked, if in fact it can be faked at all. “Rapport”, which the Comprehensive
Dictionary of Psychological Psychoanalytical Terms defines as “unconstrained relations of
mutual confidence”, approaches the subliminal; some researchers have suggested that it
is itself a subconscious and perhaps even ESP-based “accent” to an overt exchange of
information. Why does one believe one television newsman more than another, even
though both may report the same headlines? The answer is that there is rapport in the
former case; and it is a rapport which is recognized and cultivated by the most successful
broadcasters.
We have covered the statement of inevitable truth and the conviction behind that
statement; these are qualities of the MindWar operative himself. The recipient of the
statement will judge such messages not only by his conscious understanding of them, but
also by the mental conditions under which he receives them. The theory behind
“brainwashing” was that physical torture and deprivation would weaken the mind’s
resistance to suggestion, and this was true to a point. But in the long run brainwashing
does not work, because intelligent minds later realize their suggestibility under such
conditions and therefore discount impressions and opinions inculcated accordingly.
For the mind to believe in its own decisions, it must feel that it made those decisions
without coercion. Coercive measures used by the MindWar operative, consequently, must
not be detectable by ordinary means. There is no need to resort to mind-weakening drugs
such as those explored by the CIA; In fact the exposure of a single such method would do
unacceptable damage to MindWar’s reputation for truth. Existing PSYOP identifies purely-
sociological factors which suggest appropriate idioms for messages. Doctrine in this area
is highly developed, and the task is basically one of assembling and maintaining
individuals and teams with enough expertise and experience to apply the doctrine
effectively. This, however, is only the sociological dimension of target receptiveness
6/9
measures. There are some purely natural conditions under which minds may become
more or less receptive to ideas, and MindWar should take advantage of such phenomena
as atmospheric electromagnetic activity, ionization, and extremely low frequency waves.
At the root of any decision to institute MindWar in the U.S. defense establishment is a
very simple question: Do we wish to win the next war in which we choose to become
involved, and do we wish to do so with minimm loss of human life, at minimum expense,
and in the least amount of time? If the answer is yes, then MindWar is a necessity. If we
wish to trade that kind of victory for more American lives, economic disaster, and
negotiated stalemates, then MindWar is inappropriate, and if used superficially will
actually contribute to our defeat.
7/9
8/9
9/9