3rd Edition

Gregor Theeg | Sergej Vlasenko (Eds.)

Railway Signalling
and Interlocking
International Compendium

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 Railway Signalling
and Interlocking
International Compendium
3rd Edition

Editors:
Dr.-Ing. Gregor Theeg, Germany
Dr.-Ing. Sergej Vlasenko, Russia/Kazakhstan/Germany

Authors:
Dr.-Ing. Enrico Anders, Germany
Jelena Arndt, MA, Serbia/Austria/Germany
Prof. Dr.-Ing. Thomas Berndt, Germany
Prof. Dr. rer. nat. Jens Braband, Germany
Dipl.-Ing. Dmitriy Chelobanov, Russia/Kazakhstan/USA
Dipl.-Ing. Artem Glybovskii, Russia/Germany
Dipl.-Math. Stephan Griebel, Germany
Dipl.-Ing. Thomas Heinig, Germany
Dr.-Ing. Michael Dieter Kunze, Germany
Dr. Eng. Andrej Lykov, Russia
Doc. Ing. Peter Márton, PhD., Slovakia
PD Dr.-Ing. habil. Ulrich Maschek, Germany
Dr.-Ing. Daria Menzel, Russia/Germany
Dr. Eng. Nino Mukhigulashvili, Georgia
Rolf Natterer, Germany
Prof. Dr.-Ing. Jörn Pachl, Germany
Dipl.-Ing. (FH) Martin Rosenberger, MSc, Austria
Dipl.-Phys. Carsten Sattler, Germany
PD Dr. Andreas Schöbel, Austria
Dr.-Ing. Eric Schöne, Germany
Dipl.-Ing. Max Schubert, Germany
Dr. Eng. Dmitrij Shvalov, Russia
Dipl.-Ing. Martin Sommer, Germany
Dr.-Ing. Gregor Theeg, Germany
Prof. Dr.-Ing. Jochen Trinckauf, Germany
Dr.-Ing. Sergej Vlasenko, Russia/Kazakhstan/Germany
Dipl.-Ing. Dirk Zimmermann, Germany

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 Contents

Contents

Preface���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������15

1 Introduction................................................................................... 17

1.1 Historical Abstract.................................................................................................17

1.2 Scope of this Book................................................................................................18

1.3 Characteristics of Railway Systems.....................................................................18

1.4 Safety of Rail Traffic...............................................................................................19

1.5 Definitions..............................................................................................................19

1.6 Protective Functions..............................................................................................20

1.7 The Control Loop ..................................................................................................20

1.8 Attempts for Unification of Signalling...................................................................21

2 Safety in Signalling Systems......................................................... 23

2.1 Overview of Regulations and Standards of Safety and IT Security....................23

2.2 Safety Basics.........................................................................................................24

2.2.1 Glossary Referring to Latest EN 50126....................................................................24
2.2.2 Relationship of RAMS Components.........................................................................25
2.2.3 What is RAMS(S)?...................................................................................................26

2.3 Railway Operation/Safety Referring to EN 50129................................................27

2.3.1 Safety Principles......................................................................................................28
2.3.2 Risk Analysis Process..............................................................................................30
2.3.3 Safety Case and Assessment (EN 50126 and EN 50129)........................................32
2.3.4 TSR (EN 50129 in Connection with EN 50128)........................................................34
2.3.5 Methods..................................................................................................................36
2.3.6 Example of Calculation of TFFR...............................................................................37

2.4 Security Principles in Railway Operation/Security...............................................39

3 Railway Operation Processes....................................................... 41

3.1 Historical Background...........................................................................................41

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3.2 Classification of Tracks, Stations and Signals.....................................................44

3.2.1 Classification of Tracks.............................................................................................44
3.2.2 The Role of Lineside Signals....................................................................................45
3.2.3 Definitions of Stations and Interlocking Areas...........................................................46
3.2.4 Signal Arrangement for Double Track Operation.......................................................50

3.3 Movements with Railway Vehicles........................................................................51

3.3.1 Train Movements.....................................................................................................51
3.3.2 Shunting Movements...............................................................................................52

3.4 Principles of Train Separation...............................................................................54

3.4.1 Signalled Fixed Block Operation ..............................................................................55
3.4.2 Cab Signal Operation ..............................................................................................58
3.4.3 Non Signal-controlled Operation .............................................................................61

3.5 Dispatching Principles ..........................................................................................61

3.5.1 Decentralised Operation..........................................................................................61
3.5.2 Centralised Traffic Control........................................................................................62
3.5.3 Control Centres.......................................................................................................63
3.5.4 Automation Technologies.........................................................................................64

3.6 Special Operating Situations................................................................................65

3.6.1 Handling of Signal Failures.......................................................................................65
3.6.2 Temporary Track Closures........................................................................................66
3.6.3 Non-shunting Vehicles.............................................................................................67

4 Interlocking Principles................................................................... 69

4.1 Overview................................................................................................................69
4.1.1 Introduction.............................................................................................................69
4.1.2 Basic Principles of Safeguarding a Train’s Path........................................................69
4.1.3 Protection of Trains by a Signal at Stop in Rear........................................................70

4.2 Element Dependences..........................................................................................71

4.2.1 Classification............................................................................................................71
4.2.2 Coupled Elements...................................................................................................71
4.2.3 Unidirectional Locking..............................................................................................72
4.2.4 Simple Bidirectional Locking....................................................................................73
4.2.5 Conditional Bidirectional Locking.............................................................................73

4.3 Routes....................................................................................................................74
4.3.1 Introduction.............................................................................................................74
4.3.2 Extension of Routes and Related Speed Restrictions...............................................75

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4.3.3 Basic Route Locking Functions................................................................................78

4.3.4 Route Selection.......................................................................................................83
4.3.5 Flank Protection.......................................................................................................84
4.3.6 Overlaps and Front Protection.................................................................................87
4.3.7 Route Elements in the Start Section.........................................................................90
4.3.8 Life Cycle of Routes.................................................................................................92
4.3.9 Principles of Route Formation in the Track Layout....................................................97
4.3.10 Shunting Routes......................................................................................................99
4.3.11 Automation of Route Operation..............................................................................101

4.4 Block Dependences............................................................................................102

4.4.1 Introduction...........................................................................................................102
4.4.2 Geographical Assignment of Block Sections..........................................................104
4.4.3 Overlaying Block and Route Interlocking Systems..................................................105
4.4.4 Classification of Block Systems..............................................................................105
4.4.5 Process of Block Working in Token Block Systems................................................107
4.4.6 Process of Block Working in Tokenless Block Systems..........................................108
4.4.7 Locking Functions of Tokenless Block Systems.....................................................110
4.4.8 Returning Movements............................................................................................112

4.5 Degraded Mode Operation.................................................................................113

4.5.1 Purpose.................................................................................................................113
4.5.2 Safety in Degraded Mode Operation......................................................................114
4.5.3 Auxiliary Route Release..........................................................................................115
4.5.4 Bypassing Defective Elements when Setting a Route.............................................116
4.5.5 Degraded Mode Operation in Manual Block Systems............................................117
4.5.6 Degraded Mode Operation in Automatic Block Systems........................................117
4.5.7 Several Trains between Two Signals.......................................................................119
4.5.8 Clearance Check for Absolute Block and Station Areas.........................................120
4.5.9 Technical Failure of Short Duration.........................................................................121

5 Detection..................................................................................... 123

5.1 Requirements and Methods of Detection..........................................................123

5.1.1 Introduction...........................................................................................................123
5.1.2 Types of Objects....................................................................................................123
5.1.3 Safety Requirements..............................................................................................124
5.1.4 Detection Purposes...............................................................................................124

5.2 Technical Means of Detection.............................................................................127

5.2.1 Classification..........................................................................................................127

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5.2.2 Spot Wheel Detectors............................................................................................128

5.2.3 Linear Wheel and Axle Detectors...........................................................................134
5.2.4 Area Detectors for Vehicles and External Objects...................................................135
5.2.5 Three-dimensional Detection..................................................................................142
5.2.6 Systems with Active Reporting from the Train........................................................144
5.2.7 End of Train (EOT) Detection Systems....................................................................147

5.3 Track Circuits.......................................................................................................149

5.3.1 Basic Structure and Function of Track Circuits ......................................................149
5.3.2 Geometrical Assembly of Track Circuits.................................................................151
5.3.3 Treatment of Traction Return Currents....................................................................153
5.3.4 Additional Functions of Track Circuits ....................................................................157
5.3.5 Immunity against Foreign Currents.........................................................................158
5.3.6 Electrical Parameters and Dimensioning................................................................159
5.3.7 Application of the Types of Track Circuits...............................................................161

5.4 Axle Counters......................................................................................................168

5.4.1 Basic Structure and Function of Axle Counters......................................................168
5.4.2 Rail Contact...........................................................................................................169
5.4.3 Digitiser and Evaluator...........................................................................................170
5.4.4 Treatment of Counting Errors.................................................................................173

5.5 Comparison of Track Circuits and Axle Counters..............................................177

5.5.1 Advantages and Disadvantages.............................................................................177
5.5.2 Application.............................................................................................................178

6 Movable Track Elements............................................................. 181

6.1 Types of Movable Track Elements and their Geometry.....................................181

6.1.1 Overview................................................................................................................181
6.1.2 Simple Points.........................................................................................................181
6.1.3 Other Solutions for Connection of Tracks...............................................................184
6.1.4 Arrangements of Several Movable Track Elements.................................................186
6.1.5 Derailing and Protective Devices............................................................................187

6.2 Safety Requirements at Movable Track Elements.............................................188

6.3 Track Clear Detection at Points and Crossings.................................................189

6.4 Point Machines....................................................................................................190

6.4.1 Overview................................................................................................................190
6.4.2 Electric Point Machines..........................................................................................192
6.4.3 Supervision of Point Position on the Example of SP-6............................................194

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6.5 Point Locking Mechanisms.................................................................................196

6.5.1 External Locking Mechanism: Clamp Lock.............................................................196
6.5.2 Internal Locking Mechanism..................................................................................197
6.5.3 Mechanical Key Lock.............................................................................................198

6.6 Circuitry of Point Operation and Control in Relay Technology..........................198

6.6.1 General Overview...................................................................................................198
6.6.2 Example with Type N Relays: Russian Five-wire Point Circuitry...............................200
6.6.3 Example with Type C Relays: GS II DR (Germany)..................................................202

6.7 Point Diagnostics.................................................................................................209

6.7.1 Purpose and Principle............................................................................................209
6.7.2 Date Capturing......................................................................................................209
6.7.3 Data Evaluation......................................................................................................210
6.7.4 Example for Electrical Supervision of EPM.............................................................211

7 Signals......................................................................................... 213

7.1 Requirements and Basic Classification..............................................................213

7.2 Signals with Filament Lamps..............................................................................215

7.2.1 Structure of a Light Signal......................................................................................215
7.2.2 Signal Units............................................................................................................216
7.2.3 Subsidiary Indicators..............................................................................................217
7.2.4 Control and Supervision of Signal Lamps...............................................................218

7.3 LED Signals..........................................................................................................219

7.3.1 LED Development for Signalling.............................................................................219
7.3.2 Distributed Light Source........................................................................................220
7.3.3 Concentrated Light Source....................................................................................222
7.3.4 Multicolour LED.....................................................................................................222
7.3.5 State of the Art and Outlook..................................................................................223

7.4 Optical Parameters..............................................................................................224

7.5 Retro-reflection of Passive Signal Boards..........................................................224

7.6 Principles of Signalling by Light Signals............................................................225

7.6.1 Utilisation of Signal Colours....................................................................................225
7.6.2 Stop Aspects.........................................................................................................226
7.6.3 Signalling of Movement Authorities........................................................................227
7.6.4 Signalling of Speed Reductions..............................................................................230
7.6.5 Combination of Main and Distant Signals...............................................................234
7.6.6 Shunting Signals....................................................................................................235

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7.7 Redundancy and Degraded Mode Operation....................................................235

7.8 Signal System Examples.....................................................................................236

7.8.1 German Mechanical and ‘H/V’ Light Signals..........................................................236
7.8.2 Belgian Mechanical Signals....................................................................................237
7.8.3 British Light Signals...............................................................................................238
7.8.4 OSŽD Signals........................................................................................................240
7.8.5 Modern Dutch Signal System................................................................................241
7.8.6 German System ‘Ks’..............................................................................................242
7.8.7 Signal System on Japanese Commuter Lines........................................................243
7.8.8 NORAC Signals.....................................................................................................244

8 Train Protection........................................................................... 247

8.1 Requirements, Classification and Conditions for Application...........................247
8.1.1 General Overview...................................................................................................247
8.1.2 Cab Signalling Functions........................................................................................247
8.1.3 Supervision Functions............................................................................................249
8.1.4 Intervention Functions............................................................................................250
8.1.5 Role in the Railway Operation Process...................................................................251
8.1.6 Automation of Train Operation................................................................................251

8.2 Technical Solutions for Data Transmission.........................................................253

8.2.1 Overview of Forms of Transmission........................................................................253
8.2.2 Spot Transmission.................................................................................................254
8.2.3 Linear Transmission...............................................................................................257

8.3 Particular Systems...............................................................................................259

8.3.1 Classification of Systems.......................................................................................259
8.3.2 Group 1: Systems with Intermittent Transmission and without Braking Supervision......259
8.3.3 Group 2: Systems with Intermittent Transmission at Low Data Volume
and with Braking Supervision.................................................................................263
8.3.4 Group 3: Systems with Continuous Transmission of Signal Aspects
by Coded Track Circuits.........................................................................................267
8.3.5 Group 4: Systems with Intermittent Transmission at High Data Volume
and D
­ ynamic Speed Supervision...........................................................................275
8.3.6 Group 5: Systems with Continuous Transmission at High Data Volume
and D
­ ynamic Speed Supervision...........................................................................278

8.4 ETCS ...................................................................................................................280

8.4.1 History and European Standardisation...................................................................280
8.4.2 Application Levels..................................................................................................284
8.4.3 Technical Components..........................................................................................294
8.4.4 Functional Concepts..............................................................................................296

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8.4.5 Operation Modes...................................................................................................302

8.4.6 Data Structure.......................................................................................................304

8.5 CBTC....................................................................................................................304
8.5.1 History of Development and Deployment...............................................................304
8.5.2 Technical Components..........................................................................................305
8.5.3 Functional Concepts..............................................................................................310
8.5.4 Challenges and Prospects.....................................................................................312

8.6 PTC ......................................................................................................................313

8.6.1 System Overview...................................................................................................313
8.6.2 Types of PTC Systems...........................................................................................314

9 Interlocking Machines................................................................. 321

9.1 Classification.......................................................................................................321

9.2 Mechanical Interlocking......................................................................................322

9.2.1 Historical Development..........................................................................................322
9.2.2 System Safety in Mechanical Interlocking...............................................................322
9.2.3 Structure of Mechanical Interlocking Systems........................................................323
9.2.4 Example: British Origin Mechanical Interlocking......................................................324
9.2.5 Example: German Type ‘Einheit’.............................................................................327

9.3 Relay Interlocking................................................................................................332

9.3.1 Historical Development..........................................................................................332
9.3.2 System Safety in Relay Interlocking........................................................................332
9.3.3 Design of Relay Interlocking Systems.....................................................................336
9.3.4 Example: SGE 1958 (Britain)..................................................................................339
9.3.5 Example: SpDrS 60 (Germany)..............................................................................340
9.3.6 Example: UBRI (Russia).........................................................................................345

9.4 Electronic Interlocking.........................................................................................349

9.4.1 Historical Overview................................................................................................349
9.4.2 System Safety in Electronic Interlocking.................................................................350
9.4.3 Hardware Structure................................................................................................351
9.4.4 Geographical Distribution.......................................................................................353
9.4.5 Software Structure.................................................................................................354
9.4.6 Operation Control..................................................................................................358
9.4.7 Communications....................................................................................................358
9.4.8 Outdoor Cabling of Field Elements.........................................................................364
9.4.9 Energy Supply.......................................................................................................367
9.4.10 Local-electrical Operated Point Switches (LOPS)...................................................370

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9.5 Hybrid Technologies............................................................................................371

9.5.1 Hybrid Mechanical and Electrical/Pneumatic/Hydraulic Forms...............................371
9.5.2 Hybrid Relay and Electronic Forms........................................................................372

9.6 Technical Diagnostics..........................................................................................373

9.6.1 Methods of Maintenance.......................................................................................373
9.6.2 Diagnostic Tasks....................................................................................................373
9.6.3 Development Stages of Technical Diagnostics.......................................................373
9.6.4 Modern Diagnostic of Railway Signalling Equipment..............................................376
9.6.5 Future Development of Diagnostic Systems...........................................................378

10 Block Systems............................................................................. 379

10.1 Classification.......................................................................................................379

10.2 Safety Overlays for Systems with the Staff Responsible for Safety.................380

10.3 Token Block.........................................................................................................381

10.3.1 Overview................................................................................................................381
10.3.2 Electric Token Block...............................................................................................381

10.4 Tokenless Manual and Semi-automatic Block...................................................382

10.4.1 Overview................................................................................................................382
10.4.2 Manual Block Siemens & Halske............................................................................383
10.4.3 Relay Block RB II 60..............................................................................................386
10.4.4 Relay Block RPB GTSS.........................................................................................388
10.4.5 Japanese Electronic Block for Secondary Lines (COMBAT)....................................389

10.5 Automatic Block..................................................................................................390

10.5.1 Overview................................................................................................................390
10.5.2 Number of Tracks and Traffic Directions.................................................................393
10.5.3 Block Sections.......................................................................................................394
10.5.4 Communication between Block Points and Interlockings.......................................394
10.5.5 Example: North American Automatic Block Signalling System...............................395

10.6 Centralised Systems for Safety on Open Lines.................................................396

10.6.1 Overview................................................................................................................396
10.6.2 Centralised Block Systems for Secondary Lines....................................................398
10.6.3 Radio Electronic Token Block.................................................................................399
10.6.4 Open Line Controlled from Neighbouring Interlockings...........................................400
10.6.5 Train Control Systems for High Speed Lines..........................................................401

10.7 Moving Block Systems........................................................................................402

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11 Remote Control and Operation Technology............................... 405

11.1 The Objectives of Remote Control and Monitoring...........................................405

11.2 Remote Control and Monitoring.........................................................................406

11.2.1 Types of Dispatcher Control/Monitoring.................................................................406
11.2.2 Command Output..................................................................................................408

11.3 Timetable Scheduling..........................................................................................409

11.3.1 Timetable Preparation............................................................................................409
11.3.2 Timetable Optimisation..........................................................................................410

11.4 Technical Solutions for CTC................................................................................410

11.4.1 Basic Structure of CTC System.............................................................................410
11.4.2 Types of Communication between CTC and Stations.............................................410
11.4.3 CTC Integration with Relay Interlockings................................................................412
11.4.4 CTC Integration with Hybrid (Relay-electronic) Interlockings...................................414
11.4.5 CTC Integration with ETCS....................................................................................415

11.5 Examples for Operation Control Systems..........................................................416

11.5.1 Centralised Traffic Control in USA...........................................................................416
11.5.2 Centralised Traffic Control in Germany...................................................................420
11.5.3 Centralised Traffic Control in Russia.......................................................................423

12 Safety and Control of Shunting and Marshalling....................... 427

12.1 Principles of Marshalling of Trains......................................................................427

12.2 Parts of Marshalling Yards and their Function...................................................428

12.2.1 General Structure and Functioning.........................................................................428
12.2.2 Layout Variants......................................................................................................429
12.2.3 Automation............................................................................................................430

12.3 Control of Marshalling Yards...............................................................................431

12.3.1 Introduction...........................................................................................................431
12.3.2 Retarders...............................................................................................................432
12.3.3 Handling Systems for Freight Wagons ...................................................................436
12.3.4 Points....................................................................................................................437
12.3.5 Sensors.................................................................................................................437
12.3.6 Track Clear Detection.............................................................................................439
12.3.7 Flange Lubricating Devices....................................................................................439
12.3.8 Yard Management Systems...................................................................................439

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13 Level Crossings .......................................................................... 445

13.1 Requirements and Basic Classification..............................................................445

13.2 Static Roadside Signs.........................................................................................446

13.3 Passive Level Crossings......................................................................................447

13.4 Active Level Crossings........................................................................................451

13.4.1 Overview................................................................................................................451
13.4.2 Dynamic Roadside Safeguarding...........................................................................452
13.4.3 Activation and Deactivation of Level Crossings.......................................................456
13.4.4 Supervision of Level Crossings...............................................................................460
13.4.5 Possibilities of Degraded Mode Operation..............................................................465
13.4.6 Combination with Road Junctions.........................................................................466

13.5 Removal of Level Crossings................................................................................468

14 Hazard Alert Systems.................................................................. 469

14.1 Hazard in Railway Systems.................................................................................470

14.1.1 Safety Related Hazards..........................................................................................471
14.1.2 Security Related Hazards.......................................................................................474

14.2 Solutions for Hazard Detection...........................................................................474

14.2.1 Ways of Inspection.................................................................................................475
14.2.2 Fault States to Monitor...........................................................................................476
14.2.3 Integrated Approach of Inspection.........................................................................476
14.2.4 Extract of Available Technologies and Products.....................................................478

14.3 Aspects of Application........................................................................................490

14.3.1 Network Oriented Positioning of Wayside Train Monitoring Systems (WTMS).........490
14.3.2 Operational Handling Options................................................................................491
14.3.3 Cost-benefit Analysis of Wayside Train Monitoring Systems ..................................493
14.3.4 Demand for a Generic Approach for Data Exchange..............................................494

15 Future of Signalling..................................................................... 497

15.1 Today’s Situation..................................................................................................497

15.2 Decentralised Interlocking..................................................................................498

15.3 Signals..................................................................................................................499

15.4 Track Clear Detection Substituted by Train Integrity.........................................499

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15.5 Maintenance........................................................................................................499

15.6 New Concept of Safeguarding Vehicle Movements...........................................500

15.7 Security................................................................................................................500

References�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������501

Glossary�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������511

Explanation of Symbols in Track Layout Schemes����������������������������������������������������������531

The Authors�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������533

Index����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������541

Advertisements������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������552

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   Preface

Preface
In the era of globalisation, the future success of the railway sector depends significantly on the
worldwide sharing of knowledge. However, railway signalling is still one of the few sectors of
technology in which national solutions differ substantially.
For a long time, there were no common terms and definitions, and there was a corresponding
lack of understanding of the underlying principles. In the technical literature, descriptions of
railway signalling principles tended to concentrate on the railways of a single country, or group
of countries.
Ten years ago, the first edition of the textbook was published, with the intention that merely
comparing different national solutions was not sufficient. What was really needed was a
generic description of the principles that allowed the reader to look outside the national
viewpoint. The result was that an international team of experts analysed and compared
operation and signalling principles in different parts of the world, with the aim of putting
together a systematic overview.
The book became a great success, used by many universities, libraries, companies and
private individuals, and was very well received by readers. The demand was higher than
expected, and technical developments have continued to advance. The result has been the
publication of the second and now this third updated edition. This new edition builds upon its
predecessors and adds much new content to reflect subsequent important developments.
We would like to express our gratitude to all readers for their support. We hope that this
textbook will remain a valuable resource for students at universities and colleges, and for
practitioners in the railway environment alike. Comments from readers to be considered for
future editions are always welcome.
We wish to thank Alexandra Schöner, Dr Bettina Guiot and the whole staff of PMC Media
House for their support in this venture. We also thank Uwe Lehne of TU Dresden for technical
support in the production of the manuscripts and railway author John Glover for the linguistic
editing. We also thank Aleksej Efremov, editor of the journal Railways of the World, for his
advice and supply of a variety of illustrations, and for the successfully publishing of a Russian
edition.

Gregor Theeg and Sergej Vlasenko

October 2019

General note: F
 or better readability, when talking about persons and functions (such as signallers, train drivers etc.),
the pronoun "he" is usually used in this book. However, also female persons are equally meant.

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Our knowledge
for your success
PMC Rail International Academy stands for instruction
and further training in the rail industry, independent of
the manufacturer and meeting the customers‘ needs.
The offer we provide appeals to members of staff on all
levels of the company hierarchy – from track workers
to managers. Our aim is to develop a training programme
covering all activities required for the operation and
maintenance of rail infrastructure.

The team of PMC Rail, particularly the competent and

practically experienced trainers, is looking forward to
sharing its knowledge in an ideal balance of theory and
practice. State-of-the-art simulation technology allows
training under realistic conditions but without track
damage entailing costs in case of errors.

“PMC Rail International Academy

is fully committed to the railway
system. This commitment is an
integral part of our identity. Our
aim is to strengthen the railway
sustainably and to contribute to
its positive development with our
offer. We want our knowledge to
help optimise the success of the
railway system and our customers.”

Antonio Intini,
Managing Director, PMC Rail

PMC Rail International Academy

T +49 (0) 2171 58088-10
E office@pmcrail.com
www.pmcrail.com

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 1.1 Historical Abstract

1 Introduction
Gregor Theeg, Ulrich Maschek, Sergej Vlasenko, Jochen Trinckauf

1.1 Historical Abstract

In the 1830s, Britain pioneered the main line railway. The new technology soon spread across
the world, as the first means of mass transportation. In the early years, trains were kept apart
by the use of the time interval system, but there was no means of knowing what might be
happening once they were out of sight. If a train did not arrive at the next station when it was
expected, a locomotive would be sent out to look for it. The assumption would be, probably
correctly, that it had broken down.
Operational safety depended on the obedience of rules by staff, with a rather high probability of
human error, while the rules themselves were imperfect. They soon became insufficient as the
speed of trains increased, as did the payloads which could be carried and the density of the traffic.
Safety measures which appeared over the years were fixed signals which could be seen from
a distance and by all personnel, replacing flags, the establishment of signal boxes, which were
able to control points and signals over an area without staff having to walk between them,
the electric telegraph which enabled communication between adjacent signal boxes, and the
establishment of the block system dividing the track into sections. ‘No more than one train to
be allowed in any one section (or block) at any one time’.
All these helped staff to avoid mistakes. However, accidents caused by human error still
occurred, as the increasing complexity of operations could overwhelm the staff. Destructive
accidents with many casualties were the result.
Learning from this, the railways searched for methods to enforce correct behaviour of the staff
involved. This led to the development of rule books and other manuals, setting out what was
supposed to happen and how it was to be achieved.
The first mechanical signal boxes with interlocked points and signals were introduced in the
second half of the 19th century. The interlocking prevented opposing indications being given,
such as points set for one direction but signals for another.
There were two major electro-technical inventions in the same period, which became decisive
for further development:
–– The electro-mechanical block instruments by Siemens & Halske in Germany, which enabled
remote interlocking functions between different signal boxes.
–– The track circuit in the USA, which enabled the tracks to be proved clear before a train
was allowed to move onto them, and which also enabled the transmission of information
between different trackside entities and the trains.
From the beginning of the 20th century, systems came into use to protect against the failure
of drivers to stop at a signal at danger, or if the permitted speed was exceeded. These
developed from simple systems which only provided an attentiveness check or enforced
braking if the train had already passed a red signal. These early forms of braking supervision
later progressed to advanced systems with continuous guidance of the train, which can make
even trackside signals obsolete.
During the 20th century, mechanical technologies in railway signalling were replaced
progressively by electricity, and later by micro-electronics. Additional and sophisticated
functions were added over time, but the principles of railway signalling and interlocking
remained unchanged from those established in the early years.
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1 Introduction

1.2 Scope of this Book

The railway system, from the technical point of view, consists of three main segments (figure 1.1):
–– the track infrastructure on which the rail traffic is moving
–– the vehicles, which are the moving units of the railway system to carry passengers and goods
–– the trackside and onboard signalling and interlocking systems, which make those
movements safe
These three components make up the railway operation as a whole, together with its rules and
processes.
The focus of this book is on signalling and interlocking, which have many interfaces with the
other segments, but with operational rules and procedures in particular.

Figure 1.1: Scope of the book in the overall railway system

1.3 Characteristics of Railway Systems

Some basic characteristics of railway systems, which distinguish them from other modes of
transport, are:
1. Guidance: The path taken by the train is determined by the mechanical guidance system
of wheel and rail, and maintaining that guidance is essential for safety. Thus derailments
have to be prevented, and this includes the non-continuous guideway locations at (for
example) points. Also, the driver has no means of evading obstacles. The path of a train
can be changed only by points. It follows that it must be possible to predetermine the route
to be followed and to set the points accordingly. As the vehicle is very closely related to the
guidance system, it can also be termed a linear control system.
2. Long braking distance: The steel wheel has relatively poor braking performance on the
steel rail, but there is a relatively high running speed. Depending on the braking system,
braking distances at as little as 50 to 70 km/h are often longer than the visible and clear
route in front of the driver, and braking from 160 km/h to zero needs one kilometre or more.
Braking distances increase in some weather conditions, especially when icy or during the
leaf fall season. The sighting distances are insufficient for the driver to decide when to
reduce speed or stop. The driver has very limited means of avoiding collisions, but has to
rely on the technical systems and his own route knowledge to decide when to brake.

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 1.5 Definitions

Figure 1.2: Dangers and safety measures in railway operation (issues relevant to signalling only)

1.4 Safety of Rail Traffic

Railways are one of the safest means of transport. In terms of fatalities or injuries per trip or
per distance travelled, railways are safer than roads by a factor of 20. Only aviation reaches a
similar level of safety.
This higher safety level is required by society: While road users have relative freedom to
choose their driving behaviour and therefore can to some extent choose their level of risk, rail
or air passengers rely almost entirely on the safety level that the system provides. This results
in a social expectation that railways will be safer than road traffic.
A further consideration with railways (and even more for aviation), when compared with road
traffic, is that there will seldom be accidents. However, should an accident happen, its average
severity, measured in killed and injured persons, is much higher. A single such accident is
perceived by the public as much more serious than many lesser road traffic accidents. This will
be so, even if the total number of fatalities might be lower.
When railway accidents happen in highly developed countries, they are rarely caused by
technical failures. The main causes are, in this order:
1. Wrong behaviour of road users at level crossings (see chapter 13).
2. After experiencing technical failure and associated fail-safe systems, the prime problem is
human errors by staff in degraded mode operation. This results in the need to keep the
technical systems as reliable as possible and to minimise working in degraded mode (see
chapter 4.5).

1.5 Definitions

Railway signalling and control systems are needed for the safe operation of rail traffic.
The objectives and tasks of the signalling system ensure the safe control of the movement of
railway vehicles, in which the safety aspect is stressed. Those for the operation control system

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1 Introduction

ensure the operation is optimised in terms of the use of mobile assets, avoiding conflicting
moves, meeting customer demand, service reliability and punctuality.
As demonstrated in figure 1.3, it can be seen that processes in the signalling system are
triggered by internal events. In the sector of the operation control system, railway operation
processes are triggered by external influences, such as timetable requirements, response to
traffic demands, and so on.

1.6 Protective Functions

Based on the low friction and the guidance of rails as basic characteristics of rail operation, the
necessity for the following protective functions can be concluded (figure 1.2):
–– protection against following movements (chapter 4)
–– protection against opposing movements (chapter 4)
–– protection against flank movements (chapter 4)
–– safety at movable track elements (chapters 4 and 6)
–– definition of permitted speed (chapters 7 and 8)
–– speed control and supervision (mainly chapter 8)
–– protection at level crossings (chapter 13)
–– protection against obstacles (mainly chapter 5)

1.7 The Control Loop

Control loops are a common means to describe the control of technical systems of any type,
taking into account the variety of technical solutions. Figure 1.3 shows the control loop for the
railway signalling system. The word train in this context means all railway vehicle movements,
including shunting.

Figure 1.3: Control loop of the railway signalling system

The controlled element is ‘movement in the track section’, which is monitored. A track section has
two main features, the position of the movable track elements and the state of the clearance profile.

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 1.8 Attempts for Unification of Signalling

Movable track elements are mainly points. However, there are also other movable track
elements, which are considered in chapter 6. The control loop, though, is applicable even if
the train moves in a track section without movable track elements.
The clearance profile is the envelope of space above rail level, through which the train travels.
This has to be clear of any obstacles to enable its safe passage. The clearance profile may
be or may have been occupied by an earlier train, which has used the same track section
immediately beforehand. Alternatively, there may be an external obstruction such as road
vehicles at a level-crossing. Details are discussed in chapter 5.
In the course of data collection of the control loop, the following are detected:
–– positional information of the movable track elements
–– status information of the tracks (clear or occupied)
–– information on other obstacles
The input of the values measured is processed in the core of the interlocking systems. The logical
principles are discussed further in chapter 4 and the technical solutions in chapters 9 and 10.
Finally, control values are issued. These refer to the movable track elements, which have to be
positioned as required by the trains (chapter 6). However, they also have to be locked into this
position before a corresponding movement authority can be issued to the train. How these
commands are given out to the trains is described in chapter 7.
It is now up to the train driver to drive according to these movement authorities, which also
include the permitted speed.
There are means for monitoring the train speed and actions that can be taken if a maximum
speed is exceeded. These may be simple train stops, highly complex automatic train
protection systems, or driverless systems, as dealt with in chapter 8.
The control loop is valid for the highly complex systems of control technology as well as for
simple solutions, which are merely based on organisational procedures. This applies to all
combined forms of organisational and technical processes, at the highest and lowest levels.
In summary, the railway safety theory results in the following technological basic railway control
requirements. They apply generally and are independent from the technological method
of resolution and the technical detail solution. Furthermore, they are independent of local
peculiarities, which are country-specific and/or related to historical experiences:
1. All track sections in front of the train have to be clear and kept clear, until they have been
completely passed by that train.
2. All movable route elements in front of the train have to be held in their correct positions and
kept there, until they have been completely passed by that train.
3. Speed changes of the train have to be begun in sufficient time in order to reach the
permitted speed at the target speed point.

1.8 Attempts for Unification of Signalling

Starting from common basic principles, detailed operational rules and signalling systems
developed differently over many years in countries throughout the world. Such variations
might even occur within the same country. However, today this is primarily an obstacle to
interoperability and the requirement for open markets. The terminology too can differ, even
between countries which speak the same language, e. g. between Britain and the USA, or
between Germany, Austria and Switzerland. Several attempts for the unification of signalling
systems have been made over the years, examples being:
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1 Introduction

–– In the early 20th century, the introduction of one unified type of mechanical interlocking in
each country out of many different proprietary types from different manufacturers, for
example type “Einheit” in Germany (chapter 9.2.5).
–– After World War II in Europe, there were attempts to unify the trackside colour light signals
in Europe. In the Western part of the continent, these attempts were soon given up, but in
the Eastern part they resulted at least in a unified scheme of OSŽD signals which, however,
still gave space for variations (chapter 7.8.4). Most railways in the world at least agreed on a
common meaning of the colours red, yellow and green (chapter 7.6.1).
–– In North America in the 1980s, trackside signals were much more diverse than in Europe,
but the operational rules behind them were more uniform. Attempts to standardise both
resulted in the NORAC signals (see chapter 7.8.8).
–– Beginning in the 1990s, the ERTMS program in Europe is being implemented to
standardise parts of signalling, in particular train communication (GSM-R) and train control
(ETCS) (chapter 8.4). These standards, which have become quite complex due to the large
variety in operational rules and national preferences, are being implemented more and more
within but also outside Europe.
However, the main obstacle to standardisation was and is the large variety in historically based
national operational rules, where there is a high resistance to change. This makes a completely
unified signalling system in the future improbable.
Even today, this can still result in an enforced change of locomotives and drivers at national
borders, while manufacturers need to make extensive changes to their products to meet the
requirements of a different country.

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 2.1 Overview of Regulations and Standards of Safety and IT Security

2 Safety in Signalling Systems

Jens Braband, Enrico Anders, Stephan Griebel, Thomas Heinig

2.1 Overview of Regulations and Standards of Safety and IT Security

The regulatory pyramid (figure 2.1) is used as an overview of the numerous rules and
regulations and organises European, national and internal regulations at different levels. The
top shows the European rules. This is due to their current number and their value compared
with the other regulations. A prominent example is the regulation of Common Safety Methods
of Risk Assessment (CSM-RA). It also includes EC directives, European standards and Notified
National Technical Rules (NNTRs). NNTR have to be explicitly nominated to the European
Railway Agency (ERA) by the National Railway Agencies (NSA).
Most of the National Technical Regulations are located in the middle and lower part of the
regulatory pyramid. In the middle part, a distinction is made between laws, subordinate legal
regulations and national standards.
In addition, there are a large number of company-internal rules and regulations, some of which
are also accessible to people outside the responsible company.

Figure 2.1: Regulatory pyramid

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2 Safety in Signalling Systems

Risk-oriented Approach
The regulatory framework recognises that complex technical systems cannot be designed to
be totally free of error; as a consequence, a certain residual risk must be accepted. Therefore,
a tolerable residual risk must be defined, which must not be exceeded after implementation
of all effective safety precautions. The risk-oriented approach is understood to include any
procedures by which safety is defined, using a risk limit.
For a better understanding of the motivation for the specifications contained in the standards,
it is necessary to consider the fundamental technical and political requirements:
1. The approach should be risk-oriented.
2. The procedure must be non-discriminatory, in that the definition of safety requirements
must not favour particular solutions or manufacturers.
3. The procedure must be flexible and open to new technologies.
4. The responsibilities of each of the parties involved must be defined clearly.
While requirement 1 arises from the risk-related definition of safety, requirement 2 is a political
demand with the purpose of promoting free trade. While requirement 3 is partly politically
motivated, it also originates from the inherent necessities of the work of the standards
committees. Requirement 4 corresponds to a wish, mainly of manufacturers and operators,
who want clear responsibilities (and therefore also cost responsibility).
Standards are of central importance when implementing the risk-oriented approach in railway
engineering, as they define the acknowledged rules of technology. This reflects – after approval
by experts and National Committees – the state of the art. This is the designation of the
respective stage of development of technically advanced procedures, equipment, operational
modes or designs which have proven themselves in terms of practical suitability and technical
expedience.
However, in doing so, the scope of the standards must also be considered, which must stay
within the valid laws and regulations (figure 2.1).
The topic of “risk analysis” is of dual significance in standardisation. The initial focus is on
specifying methods and procedures of risk analysis; see (EN 50126) or (EN 50129) for
example. These must then be applied specifically to each project, in order to demonstrate the
safety of a system.
On the other hand, it is also possible to perform a generic risk analysis for standardised
products or systems with defined operating conditions. The results can then be incorporated
into a product standard or planning regulations. Using this approach, it is no longer necessary
to produce a project-specific risk analysis for the standardised product. Only the requirements
of the product standard derived from the generic risk analysis or the defined operating
conditions then need to be satisfied. The generic approach – once implemented for a railway
and not for each individual installation – creates the potential for considerable cost savings.

2.2 Safety Basics

2.2.1 Glossary Referring to Latest EN 50126

–– Reliability: ability (of an item) to perform as required, without failure, for a given time interval,
under given conditions
–– Availability: ability of an item to be in a state to perform a required function under given
conditions, either at a given instant of time or over a given time interval, assuming that the
required external resources are provided

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 2.2 Safety Basics

–– Maintainability: ability (of an item) to be retained in, or restored to, a state to perform as
required, under given conditions of use and maintenance
–– Safety: freedom from unacceptable risk
–– Security: indicates the resilience of a railway system to vandalism, malevolence and
intentionally harmful human behaviour

2.2.2 Relationship of RAMS Components

Referring to EN 50126, RAMS is a combination of the inter-related characteristics of Reliability,

Availability, Maintainability and Safety. It determines the way a system operates in the long
term and is achieved by the application of established engineering concepts, methods, tools
and techniques throughout its life cycle. RAMS is a qualitative and quantitative indicator of the
degree that a system, or the subsystems and components comprising that system, can be
relied upon to function as specified, and to be both available and safe over a period of time.
For example, a safety target can be achieved by ensuring the system enters a safe state (e. g.
all trains stopped) in the event of a particular failure.
The definition of a safe state can depend on the operational or maintenance context.
An example would be a train at standstill in a platform, rather than in a tunnel. If there are
circumstances where this safe state has a significant adverse impact on reliability or availability,
then a different and optimised solution might be needed in order to achieve the RAMS targets
without compromising safety.

Figure 2.2: Relationship of RAMS components

Figure 2.2 shows the structured overview of the RAMS components. First, is there a risk of
danger (D) from (say) an avalanche (figure 2.3)? If so, the case has to be proven. Does the

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2 Safety in Signalling Systems

(potential) danger have an effect on a something that needs to be protected, such as a railway
line? If so, a (specific) hazard (H) has been identified. If no measures against this hazard are
taken and no suitable barriers are found, then an accident such as an avalanche meeting a
train may occur.
This will happen with a specific probability (PUS). If the damage (Da) and the hazard rate (HR)
of this probable risk (Ri) in addition to this probability (PUS) are available, the risk of occurrence
of such an accident can also be determined. If all the unacceptable risks of a system can be
found and suitable counter measures created, it can be assumed that the system is safe from
those unacceptable risks.
For the safe operation of a system RAM (reliability, availability, maintainability) are contributory
factors, as they have a strong impact to the hazard rate (HR).

Figure 2.3: Difference between danger, hazard and accident

2.2.3 What is RAMS(S)?

The RAMS(S) goals are to achieve a defined level of rail traffic safety and to ensure the (safe)
functioning of a product and system over a period of time. Consequently, overall operational
safety requires a system that is safe from a technical signalling point of view but remains highly
available at the same time. Therefore, the RAMS(S) elements can be divided into three parts:
RAM (reliability/availability/maintainability) and safety (first “S”) and security (second “S”). The
reason for division is that if technical problems occur, the affected parts of the system will be
shut down safely as far as technical signalling is concerned. But there is an increased (safety)
risk because of human activity in degraded mode operation until the repair work is complete
and the equipment has been restarted.
The availability targets will be achieved by optimising reliability and maintainability whilst also
maintaining safety. The RAM properties of a system are a key factor for the life cycle costs.
If a system is more reliable, the actions needed to restore normal operation are only used
infrequently. This reduces the life cycle and repair costs of a system as well as downtime for
the railway.
In contrast, the safety targets will be achieved by ensuring a safe state (e. g. all trains stopped)
in the case of a certain fault occurring in a system. Furthermore, a hazardous situation (e. g.
collision of two trains) and system failure or system shut down should be avoided. A system
failure is defined as a malfunction of the entire system, deviating from fault free operation.
Consequently, the system cannot carry out its normal functions.
In such a fault mode, the superior system or at least the operator undertakes safety-relevant
functions, such as visually checking the clear state of the tracks or setting a starting signal
to a proceed aspect. This increases the susceptibility to errors of the overall system, due

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 2.3 Railway Operation/Safety Referring to EN 50129

to a higher probability of incorrect human actions, and decreases its safety. Such situations
because of failures or system errors can be minimised by defining dedicated safety targets for
different safety functions.
Security issues affecting the resilience of a system might also have an impact on its safety and
should always be considered together with the safety aspects.
The rail-related norm EN 50126 is applied to ensure that a product or system obtains RAMS(S)
properties and fulfils the required features over the product or system life cycle. This norm
defines procedures for railway companies, the rail industry and its suppliers in the European
Union, to implement a management system for reliability, availability, maintainability and
safety and to control the RAMS(S) factors/properties specific to railway applications. This
management system is to be applied during the complete life cycle of a product or system
(figure 2.4).

Figure 2.4: Phases in the life cycle of systems (V-diagram) according to (EN 50126)

The main goal of the V-diagram is to develop and maintain an available and reliable product or
system.

2.3 Railway Operation/Safety Referring to EN 50129

The railway continues to be one of the safest means of transport with a safety level
comparable only with that of civil aviation. However, as with other complex systems, despite
all the technical and organisational efforts to avoid them, accidents do occur from time to time,
some with catastrophic consequences.

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2 Safety in Signalling Systems

It is now recognised by the scientific community that the reasons for such accidents are rarely
simple and that apparent or direct causes such as human error often conceal a whole range of
latent or indirect causes. The same is true of incidents which involve a number of near misses
or risks. The main purpose of railway safety work is therefore to avoid or to seek control over
such causes as far as possible.
The main causes can be classified into four fundamental categories:
1. errors by the operating or maintenance personnel
2. insufficient technical activity
3. ineffective organisation and communication (management)
4. weaknesses in the safety culture
Traditionally, safety problems have also been addressed in roughly the order outlined above.
Initially the priority was on finding ways of preventing human error – particularly with technical
improvements. Later, technical failure and the management of safety features became the
focus of attention. Examination of these areas has become state of the art as demonstrated
by the attention to it in the standards. In future, however, the considerations will increasingly
focus on the topic of “safety culture”, as this is where the greatest potential for further reducing
accident frequency lies.
It follows that safety must be seen as an integrated approach, requiring in particular a
balanced mixture of reactive elements (e. g. accident analysis, learning from mistakes, etc.) as
well as proactive elements (e. g. risk analysis, safety cases, etc.). The standards and methods
presented below focus mainly on the latter aspect.
In particular, information technology security requirements are growing rapidly in industry
generally. These are questioning current concepts and demanding answers for as yet
unsolved challenges. On an international level, a variety of different standards and regulations
on IT security already exist, such as for example the so-called Common Criteria or the
international standard IEC 62443/ISA99 (IEC 62443). With this in mind, this chapter will
establish and elaborate on how the international standards and terminology about IT security
could be adopted for the existing system of railway application standards in CENELEC for
communication, signalling and processing systems ((EN 50129) and (EN 50159)).

2.3.1 Safety Principles

A basic requirement in safety-related systems is to limit the effects in the event of human error,
technical failures and unexpected external disturbances. People, goods and the environment
must not be exposed to unacceptably high risks. This is fulfilled, as long as the system reacts
safely and takes the so-called safe state. A profound knowledge of the behaviour of the
components used in the system is the basis for the definition of the safe state.
This knowledge influences the choice of measures which have to be undertaken to reach a
sufficient safety level. Systematic failures, such as during the production of a component, can
be discovered by careful inspection before putting the system into operation. By contrast, a
spontaneous (random) failure during operation cannot be prevented. However, dangerous
consequences of such a random failure can be prevented by system design.
The following strategies can be applied:
–– elimination (inherent fail safety)
–– elimination of the consequences (composite fail safety)
–– limitation of the consequences (reactive fail safety)
These may apply to human errors, technical failures and unexpected external disturbances.

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2 Safety in Signalling Systems

Inherent Fail Safety

Each component has defined physical characteristics. Inherent fail safety can be assumed as
long as they remain unchanged. This means that technical failures cannot occur due to these
characteristics. Components used in the railway system must have high mechanical and/or
electrical robustness. This implies that external influences such as vibration and traction return
currents must not affect the desired function. This robustness can be achieved by the use of
proper materials (e. g. contact materials that cannot be welded together), special structures
(e. g. mechanical stability) and special production methods (e. g. use of checklists).
An example of inherent fail safety is making it impossible for a relay armature of type N to
drop down. Non-technical inherent fail safety can be provided by forbidding the standing of
unsecured wagons on tracks with a gradient.

Composite Fail Safety

If inherent fail safety cannot be proven, the elimination of dangerous consequences of human
errors, technical failures and unexpected external disturbances have to be proven, which
means that the system must go into a safe state. This proof is based on the following basic
safety requirements:
–– non-dangerous singular and multiple failures
–– non-propagation of singular failures
–– proof of independence of singular failures

Reactive Fail Safety

If neither inherent fail safety nor composite fail safety can be guaranteed, the probability of
dangerous consequences in case of the various causes of errors or failures has to be
sufficiently low. The exact value of this acceptable probability has to be defined in safety
requirements specifications.
To achieve reactive fail safety, one approach is a rapid revealing of their occurrence and the
other is the limitation of the possible damage. An example in railway signalling is the limitation
of speed in degraded mode operation.

2.3.2 Risk Analysis Process

2.3.2.1 Tolerable Hazard Rate

The process described here (often referred to as the “bowtie”) was normatively specified for
European railway signalling technology in EN 50129 and has later been adopted by IEC and
EN 50126.
The focal point of the process is a clearly defined interface between the operating processes
and conditions, with the signalling and safety system as the technical solution.
It is the duty of the operator to perform a risk analysis, in particular:
–– specification of functional requirements for the system concerned
–– identification of system-related hazards
–– analysis of the consequences of hazards
–– ensuring that the resulting risk is tolerable
–– derivation of the tolerable hazard rates (THR)

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 2.3 Railway Operation/Safety Referring to EN 50129

The manufacturer is obliged to perform a hazard analysis, in particular:

–– specification of system architecture, taking into consideration the THR for each hazard
–– analysis of possible causes for each hazard
–– determination of safety requirements (safety integrity level and hazard rates) for functions
and/or the subsystems performing them
In the risk analysis, regulatory requirements have to be taken into account. In particular, this
refers to risk tolerability such as the risk acceptance criteria of the European CSM regulation
(CSM-RA). This demands that technical functions whose failure may directly lead to a
catastrophic accident, may not occur more often than 10-9 per hour per hazard.
In the causal analysis, the tolerable hazard rate for each hazard is divided up into the level
of system functions, taking into account the selected safety architecture. The apportioned
THR is assigned to the safety functions by the Tolerable Functional Failure Rate (TFFR) in
order to distinguish it from the THR. On this level, safety integrity levels are specified for the
subsystems which implement the functionality. The hazard rate for a subsystem is converted
into a safety integrity level using the “SIL table” (table 2.1). The SIL table was taken from
the generic safety standard IEC 61508-2 (IEC 61508-2). Compliance with these safety
requirements must be demonstrated in the safety case.

TFFR Safety Integrity

per hour and per function Level
10-9 ≤ TFFR < 10-8 4
10-8 ≤ TFFR < 10-7 3
10-7 ≤ TFFR < 10-6 2
10-6 ≤ TFFR < 10-5 1

Table 2.1: The SIL table

2.3.2.2 Safety Integrity Level

With the assignment of safety integrity levels, a balance will be created between the measures
for the prevention of systematic errors and those aimed at controlling random failures.
It is state of the art that safety against systematic errors cannot be quantified (at least not
for applications with a high safety level). The detailed requirements for satisfying a SIL are
compiled in standards (EN 50128) and (EN 50129). The quantitative context in line with EN
50129 is shown in figure 2.5.
However, the fact that systematic errors cannot be quantified so that the necessary measures
against systematic errors must be specified using the SIL, does not mean that such errors
cannot occur, nor that they cannot result in hazardous situations. It must be understood
that the safety target cannot be quantitatively split up and the value for random failures is
not reduced, although a large percentage of the tolerable risk refers to systematic errors.
Experience indicates that the hazard potential from systematic errors is considerably higher
than that from failures and disturbances. In order not to exceed the safety target, therefore,
either the THR must not be “used” to its full extent for failures and disturbances, or it must
be determined using conservative assumptions, so that a safety margin remains (even if
not explicitly identified). The latter possibility was selected in EN 50129. It is manifested,
for example, in the strict requirements regarding proof of independence of entities or
the requirement, with hazardous types of failure of complex components, to take into
consideration the complete component failure rate (instead of a fraction of it, as is usual with
reliability analyses).

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2 Safety in Signalling Systems

2.3.3 Safety Case and Assessment (EN 50126 and EN 50129)

The safety case contains the documented safety evidence for a product or system and will
follow the structure according to (EN 50129) (figure 2.5).

Figure 2.5: Structure of safety case according to (EN 50129)

The aim of a safety case is the analysis of the applied technical safety principles, to provide
signalling safety proof for the product or system. In addition, the safety case summarises the
results of the different parts of the considered product or system, so that it can be evaluated to
see if it is fit for the purpose intended.
The several parts contain but are not limited to following contents:
–– Part 1 – Definition of System:
• a description of the product or system under consideration, including its physical location
• definition of system boundaries and interfaces, including assumptions about other
systems, services and facilities
• identification of constituent subsystems or components and, if appropriate, a reference
to the safety cases for subsystems or components
–– Part 2 – Quality Management Report (QMR):
• documentary evidence to demonstrate that the quality of the product or system has
been and will continue to be controlled by an effective quality management system
• will summarise the quality management system activities and justify their appropriateness
to the project
• will show how it is ensured that the safety measures presented in the Technical Safety
Report are actually implemented in practice

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 2.3 Railway Operation/Safety Referring to EN 50129

–– Part 3 – Safety Management Report (SMR):

• sets out the arrangements for hazard identification, analysis and management
• hazard identification is recorded in a series of hazard analysis reports which are reference
documents of the safety cases
• includes a hazard log that is the principal means of monitoring the progress of the
hazard management process. This contains information on all identified hazards and the
control measures currently in use to reduce the associated risks to an acceptable level
of risk (by using one of the methods ALARP, GAME or MEM to define risk acceptance
criteria)
–– Part 4 – Technical Safety Report (TSR): see next chapter 2.3.4
–– Part 5 – Related Safety Cases:
• includes a consideration of related safety cases of the underlying subsystems or
components used; references to other safety cases upon which this safety case
depends; a demonstration that any assumptions, limitations or restrictions in the related
safety cases are either fulfilled or carried forward into this safety case
–– Part 6 – Conclusions:
• This part will make a statement on the acceptability of the considered product or system
in terms of the safety requirements and
• summarises the results from validation (via validation report), quality management (via
QMR), safety management (via SMR) and the technical evidence for the proof of safety
(via TSR). If necessary, it may also contain constraints and safety-related conditions that
need to be observed before commissioning of the product or system.
With respect to (EN 50126) and (EN 50129) a safety case can be divided into three different
categories:
–– Generic Product Safety Case (GPSC):
A product is a generic (sub-)system which can be used for different classes or types of
applications.
–– Generic Application Safety Case (GASC):
A generic application is a system with a different safety-related and additionally non-
safety-related subsystem and/or components which can be re-used for a class or type of
application with common functions.
–– Specific Application Safety Case (SASC):
A specific application based on a generic application system; but it is configured, installed
and used for only one particular installation (e. g. a station).
The following figure 2.6 serves as an example to illustrate the differences between the categories.
An Axle Counter (AC) is a safety-related generic product and has its own GPSC. It is adaptable
and consists of several components like Detections Points (DP) in various types that can be
configured according to engineering rules. If the AC is to be used in a certain country, then that
country’s specific requirements will be checked according to the limitation of use of an AC. Often,
the country-specific requirements have some restrictions, e. g. to use only certain DPs.
In order to use the AC in a country – for example in Belgium – a GASC will be created. This
GASC takes into account the country-specific requirements of Belgium, the resulting country-
specific engineering rules, which only allowed some predetermined variants/configurations of
AC in context with designated DP types, and applies to the use of the product AC for the
Belgian rail network. To use the AC in any station or on any line in Belgium, a SASC will
need to be created. The SASC considers the GASC, the country-specific engineering rules,
the installation instructions for the AC and DP as well as the geographical location of the
installation of the AC (site specific application).

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2 Safety in Signalling Systems

Figure 2.6: Example of dependencies of the different safety case categories

After the creation of a safety case for a generic product/application, an independent safety
assessment begins. This is based mainly on the rules given in EN 50126. The assessment
starts with the “system definition” and checks that the defined system covers all requirements.
It ends with a judgement, separate from any system design and development, which is
presented in a report. In general, the independent safety assessment will assess whether:
–– the functional and safety requirements given for the defined system (often defined by a
customer) have been complied with,
–– the risk management and safety process has been adequately implemented and
–– the defined system (generic product/application) is fit for its intended purpose – from the point
of view of their functional use and safety.
To perform a safety assessment, the Independent Safety Assessor (ISA) must be accepted by
the national railway agency in accordance with the national legal regulations or have national
approval. In addition, the ISA can also be a member of an inspection body. An inspection body
is a safety assessment centre which is accredited according to (ISO/IEC 17020) and their
requirements for an inspection body, type A, B or C.
Independently from a safety assessment for a generic product/application, the European
regulation (CSM-RA) defines a risk assessment process for changes to a railway system.
These changes can affect a generic product/application, technical installations, vehicles
as well as operational rules and is carried out by a proposer. The proposer (mostly on the
customer’s side) is in charge of completing the (technical) generic product/application with
information about operational changes. Risk acceptance criteria are added to show that
the change in the railway system does not increase the overall risk. The complete “system”
(generic product/application with operational rules) issued by the proposer requires a risk
assessment according to (CSM-RA). Usually a so-called “Assessment Body” conducts that
kind of risk assessment. This “Assessment Body” needs to be recognised by the national
railway authority of the country respectively.

2.3.4 TSR (EN 50129 in Connection with EN 50128)

The Technical Safety Report is a part of the safety case for a defined system (generic
product/application) and presents the technical evidence for safety according to the rail-
related norms (EN 50129) and (EN 50128). It gives an account of the risk control and

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 2.3 Railway Operation/Safety Referring to EN 50129

mitigation measures which are provided through the content of referenced documents.
These refer particularly to the hazard analysis (for coverage of faults associated with
application design and engineering) and the operation and support hazard analysis (for
action following detection of faults). In detail, the TSR deals with:
–– Section 1 – Introduction:
Introductory words to the content of the TSR
–– Section 2 – Assurance of correct functional operation:
The correct operation under fault-free conditions in accordance with the specified
operational and safety requirements is proven.
–– Section 3 – Effects of faults:
The ability to continue to meet its specified safety requirements in the event of random
hardware or software faults and, as far as reasonably practicable, systematic faults is
proven. (This means that the fulfilment of TFFRs needs to be justified.)
–– Section 4 – Operation with external influences:
The ability to operate correctly and safely when subjected to specified external influences
is proved. Furthermore, the evidence for the qualitative/non-functional requirements (e. g.
environmental conditions, EMC, interference, etc.) is shown.
–– Section 5 – Safety-related application conditions:
The safety-related application conditions resulting from the TSR and related to the safety
of the system are listed and forwarded to the superior application level (e. g. generic
application, specific application or operator). The conditions can be addressed to various
domains such as e. g. commissioning, operator, maintenance or project management.
They can contain on the one hand safety-related application conditions of underlying
subsystems or components which could not be closed on this system level. On the other
hand they consist of constraints how to use and configure this system.
–– Section 6 – Safety Qualification tests:
Tests related to functional and safety qualifications are considered. This includes the
integration tests of the various subsystems or components, as well as between the
hardware and software of a component/product. All are considered and the successful
execution confirmed.
The core of the TSR is Section 3 above, with reference to the effects of failure. Therein it is
shown in detail that:
–– every single fault is disclosed
–– there is a sufficient independence of the used subsystems or components within the
system that is under consideration
–– measures against errors, failures and disturbances have been taken (it is irrelevant whether
the error is in hardware or software)
–– detection of hardware or software failures takes place within the maximum fault detection
time (FDT). This is calculated on the basis of the FDT of subsystems or components used
within the defined system.
In the TSR the procedures and the measures of fault detection are also presented. This
ensures timely and safe fault detection in the subsystems or components under consideration.
The essential methods to verify fault detections are the Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
(FMEA) and the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) (more details see following chapter 2.3.5).

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2 Safety in Signalling Systems

2.3.5 Methods

The majority of the analysis methods can be divided into two classes: bottom-up or inductive
methods and top-down or deductive methods. The main difference is the way of reasoning
or flow of analysis: Bottom-up methods start usually from causes and work their way up
inductively to consequences, while top-down methods work deductively just the other way
around. As bottom-up methods often have limitations with respect to the complexity or size of
the system, it is highly recommended to supplement them by appropriate top-down methods,
which often have problems with completeness.
The most popular combination is FMEA complemented with FTA.
As an example, a FMEA is used here to illustrate a possible hazard identification procedure.
As a starting point, a schematic representation of the system is created (such as a functional
description and/or system architecture) which describes the entities (functions, components,
etc.), of which a numbered list of entities is generated.
In the next step, a complete list of all conceivable types of failure is created (e. g. by means of
brainstorming or known checklists) and numbered. Examples of typical types of failure are:
–– function is not performed
–– function is incorrectly performed
–– function performed too early or too late
–– etc.
The actual creative activity is in defining every conceivable type of failure for every component,
evaluating the consequences and deciding whether it results in a hazard.
Similarly a FMEA can be performed to almost any system (IEC 60812) and is the analysis
method used by far the most often, e. g. to show that in a safety-critical system any single
failure is not hazardous. There are many variants of bottom-up methods, e. g. Hazard and
Operability study (HAZOP), Event Tree Analysis (ETA) etc.
By contrast, the FTA (IEC 61025) is a deductive method, i. e. its purpose is the systematic
analysis of all possible causes of a particular undesirable consequence (TOP event). The fault
tree represents in Boolean logic the combinations of events which lead to the TOP event
(mainly logical AND/OR operations).
The analysis is then performed top-down (in contrast to the FMEA or event tree analysis),
“backwards” (also regarding time) from the TOP event to the causes. Each event in the tree for
which no further causes are (can be) determined is a so-called basic event.
Unfortunately, there are no standard symbols for FTAs. However, in most Anglo-Saxon tools
the symbols shown in figure 2.7 are those most commonly used (normally without text labels).
Events are identified using rectangles, basic events with circles. The priority AND stands for
a timely condition: It is true only if the events occur in a particular order (normally from left to
right).

Figure 2.7: Common Fault Tree Analysis symbols

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 2.3 Railway Operation/Safety Referring to EN 50129

Usually a FTA assumes statistical independence among basic events for the quantitative
evaluation. If this assumption is violated, then the results may be too optimistic by orders of
magnitude. As a justification for independence a Common-Cause-Failure (CCF) analysis has to
be performed.
The purpose of the CCF analysis is to reveal all cases in which two or more events may occur
as the result of a common cause or a triggering event. If the probability of a common cause is
significantly higher than the probability that the two or more events occur independently, the
common cause may make a decisive contribution to the hazard rate.
It must be taken into account that as a rule functions and components are not independent,
i. e. independence is the exception and CCFs are the rule. However, functions may often be
divided up into independent sub-functions and sub-functions which are dependent as a result
of common cause failures.

2.3.6 Example of Calculation of TFFR

As an example, one particular type of automatic level crossing (LX) is analysed, which uses
light signals to warn the road user and a distant (supervision) signal to tell the train driver
whether the LX is closed or not (see also chapter 13.4.2. and 13.4.4.3).
The switch-on and switch-off functions, which are discussed in detail, are defined here as
simple switches, without duplication. The triggering of switch-on does not mean that the LX
is activated, merely that the information that a train is approaching the LX is transmitted; the
subsequent actions being performed by the controller.
In a functional FMEA one might discover entries such as shown in table 2.2:

No. Function Failure mode Effect Hazard? Remarks

01 Switch-on Late or no detection Late or no Possible if LX
of train protection of LX monitoring
also fails
...
03 LX supervision Distant signal shows Train driver will not Possible if
wrong aspect (“green”) stop before LX switch-on also
fails
...
06 Power supply Complete immediate LX may remain in an Possible if Details
failure undefined or given road signals depend on
state are off and operational
distant signal procedures
not obeyed
...
07 Controller Undetected incorrect LX may change to Yes, if
output any state command is
on the wrong
side
...

Table 2.2: Example of functional Failure Modes and Effects Analysis

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2 Safety in Signalling Systems

From the FMEA it can be seen that the switch-on (01) and monitoring functions (03) are linked.
Only a failure of both functions can create a hazard. There are, however, common causes
which could lead to simultaneous failure of both functions. Failure of the controller or power
supply (it is assumed here that this will always lead to a hazard, to keep things simple; in fact,
not every failure of these functions does usually lead to a hazard). This could be represented
using a fault tree as follows (figure 2.8):

Figure 2.8: Functional Fault Tree Analysis for switch-on

Assuming these were the only CCF (for the sake of brevity, a detailed analysis is not given
here), the switch-on and monitoring functions are independent because the AND relationship
between the two functions holds regardless of whether the cause of the failure is random or
systematic (no distinction was made in the above FMEA table). If this AND gate is exploited in
the causal analysis, the two functions must also be implemented independently. As the power
supply and the controller are also CCF for other parts of the complete LX fault tree, they need
to be regarded only once at the top level of the fault tree and are disregarded in the further
analysis.
To exploit the AND gate in the further apportionment process we need to look at the failure
detection mechanisms and failure detection rates for the two functions. Failure of the switch-
on function is detected by the driver of the next approaching train, but detection of a distant
signal failure depends on further operational details (failure means here that the signal never
shows the danger aspect). Some railways require train drivers to observe the change of
signal aspect during the approach. If this is not required, failure may be detected either after
an incident or during regular maintenance. Example results are summarised in the following
table 2.3:

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 2.4 Security Principles in Railway Operation/Security

No. Function Failure detection Assumed average Remarks

mechanism failure detection time
01 Switch-on Supervision 8 hours If switch-on fails, the distant signal
shows a restrictive aspect. The
driver then stops before the LX
and notifies the control centre. The
failure is detected. He can then
pass the LX in fall-back mode.
03 Supervision Train driver 24 hours If the train driver is required to
observe a change of signal aspect
(Not all train drivers will obey this
rule!).
Maintenance 1 year

Table 2.3: Example of detection mechanisms and times

The tolerable functional failure rates for the two functions TFFR01 and TFFR03 would have to
meet the requirements of the following formula:
TFFR01 TFFR03
THRS ø · ∙ (DR01 + DR03)
DR01 DR03

where DR is detection rate (EN 50129).

Assuming an overall THR of 10-8/h the following equation must be satisfied:
TFFR01 TFFR03
1 · 10-8 ø · ∙ (DR01 + DR03)
DR01 DR03
TFFR01 TFFR03
· ∙ (1/8 + 1/24)
1/8 1/24

If the requirements were apportioned equally, the result would be

TFFR01 = TFFR03 ≤ 2 · 10-5 h-1.
Using the SIL table (table 2.1), we obtain basic integrity in both cases. But a different
apportionment is possible: If the TFFR01 for switch-on is defined as 10-4 h-1, the result is
TFFR03 = 3 · 10-6 h-1, corresponding to SIL 1.
But the result depends heavily on the detection rates. Keeping the requirement for switch-on
as TFFR01 = 2 · 10-5 h-1, but changing the detection rate for the supervision to one year, the
result would be:
TFFR03 ≤ 6 · 10-8 h-1,
which is equivalent to SIL 3. This demonstrates the importance of the failure detection
mechanisms and rates.

2.4 Security Principles in Railway Operation/Security

On an international level, a variety of different standards and regulations on IT security already

exist, such as, for example, the so-called common criteria or the international standard IEC
62443/ISA99 (IEC 62443). These documents emphasize that not only technical aspects
are of importance to IT security, but ever more so additional factors such as operational
circumstances, human aspects, management systems and cultural influences.

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2 Safety in Signalling Systems

CENELEC is looking at how the international standards and terminology about IT security could be
adopted for the existing system of railway application standards in CENELEC for communication,
signalling and processing systems ((EN 50129) and (EN 50159)).
The 2018 edition of EN 50129 defines only the general principles of how to deal with IT security,
mainly from a safety point of view:
–– The safety management process aims at minimising the residual risk of safety-related
systematic faults and security threats (including IT security threats) so far as safety is concerned.
–– IT security threats are managed during the Risk Assessment and Hazard Control, or existing
analysis will be referenced. This is if the impact of IT security issues on functional safety is
reasonably foreseeable and cannot be excluded by simple arguments (e. g. a system having no
connection to untrusted networks).
–– Measures addressing security will be recorded or referenced in the safety case (Section 4.5 of
the Technical Safety Report).
–– The Technical Safety Report will describe how IT security threats which have the potential to
affect safety-related functions have been evaluated and how protection against them has been
achieved.
In summary, this approach might be labelled as a “security-informed” safety case. In particular, the
safety process informs the IT security process about the safety-related functions or assets to be
protected. This information is to be documented and serves as an input for the IT security threat
risk analysis. Vice-versa, the IT security process needs to give a trustworthy confirmation (e. g. by a
certificate) that the IT security requirements are fulfilled and under which application conditions.
Although both EN 50129 and EN 50159 already cover general issues such as access protection,
answers are still missing when it comes to newly developing questions such as the relationship
between safety and IT security. It must be noted that safety and security may have competing
goals that cannot be easily reconciled. For example, from a safety perspective, an emergency
stop message needs to be transmitted and executed as fast as possible. But from a security
perspective it should be authenticated, otherwise fake emergency stop messages may lead to
unsatisfactory operational performance.
This calls for a necessary framework concept of how the international world of the standards
and terminology of IT security could be inserted into the existing railway application standards in
CENELEC. This applies to communication, signalling, and processing systems:
–– The framework needs to deal predominantly with IT security aspects that are relevant to safety
issues.
–– The certificates for IT security should be part of the safety assessment and approval.
–– The principles of risk analysis for safety issues could be adopted, such as the following:
• code of practice
• similar reference systems
• risk analysis
–– The system could be compartmentalised according to (IEC 62443) into zones and conduits.
–– IT security threats should be treated in analogy with systematic faults, for example software
faults, and are thus to be assessed purely qualitatively and not quantitatively.
–– The IT security risk analysis needs to take account of various parameters such as exposure of
the assets, the technical difficulty of the attack, or the possible safety impact.
–– Various different IT security profiles could be defined.
At the time of writing this work is ongoing, but it is clearly advisable to separate IT security
and safety issues as far as possible. They do need however to be coordinated adequately, in
order to decouple the different life cycles and the approval processes. Otherwise, each change
affecting the IT security of the system may trigger a new safety approval.
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 3.1 Historical Background

3 Railway Operation Processes

Jörn Pachl

3.1 Historical Background

Today, there is hardly any field of technology in which the differences between rules and
procedures in different countries are as great as in railway operation and signalling. Of course,
the very basic principles of how a railway works are the same everywhere. However, operating
procedures differ significantly between different countries or regions worldwide. There are
not only differences in some details but in fundamental terms, definitions, and procedures.
As a result, a lot of railway education and training concentrates on the national rules. The
same is true for knowledge presented in textbooks and other teaching materials. One of the
objectives of this textbook is to provide generic knowledge on railway signalling that does not
concentrate on the rules of a single country or region.
Despite the differences between the operating procedures of various national railway systems,
there are three basic operating philosophies in running a railway that have influenced railway
operation worldwide. These are:
–– British operating principles
–– German operating principles
–– North American operating principles
Some countries follow one of these three philosophies in a quite pure form, while other
countries use a specific mix of several systems, or added national peculiarities.
The British system is used in Great Britain and Ireland, in all countries of the Commonwealth with
the exception of Canada, and in several South American countries. The German system is used
in the German-speaking countries, in Luxembourg, in Eastern Europe, in the Balkan countries,
and in Turkey. The North American system is used in the USA, in Canada, and in Mexico. The
railways of these three countries have achieved a very high level of harmonisation. Today, the
whole of North America has a uniform railway system with a high degree of standardisation.
Typical ‘mixed systems’ are:
–– The railways of Western Europe, with the exception of Luxembourg, show influence both
from the British and from the German system. French railways also developed specific
characteristics that can only be found there. After World War II, the railways of the
Netherlands adopted selected principles from North American operation and signalling.
–– The railways in Scandinavia mainly follow German operating principles. The interlocking
systems developed in these countries show also some influence from British signalling
technology.
–– The South African railways were originally based on the British principles. However, in the
field of interlocking systems, South Africa has moved toward German principles.
–– The operating rules of the railways of the Russian Federation and of the countries of the
former Soviet Union are mainly influenced by German principles. However, in the field of
signalling, these railways adopted a lot of ideas from North America and Britain.
–– As part of the Commonwealth, the railways in Australia and New Zealand have followed the
British system. However, there is an increasing influence from North America.
–– The railways of China originally started with the British system. Later, they adopted a lot
of principles from the former Soviet railways but tried to combine them with traditional
British principles.

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3 Railway Operation Processes

Other mixed systems in any possible configuration can be found in many developing countries.
Regarding operating rules, North American railways differ significantly from the rest of
the world. This concerns both the lack of a distinction between tracks within station areas
and sections between stations, and the classification of movements with railway vehicles.
Regarding signalling principles, German railways developed specific interlocking and block
principles that cannot be found in countries that do not follow the German principles.
These differences, which influence railway operation and signalling significantly even today,
have their roots in the 19th century. With the construction of the first railway lines, a period of
experimenting started in which basic knowledge on the limits of the new system had to be
gained. This period, which ended at about 1870, was followed by a three decades known as
the ‘Founding Years of Railway Signalling’. During that time, with the exception of automatic
train protection, all basic principles of railway operation and signalling were developed. These
principles are still used today. However, that period was also the start of increasing separation
between the North American and the European railways. It was also the start of separate
development of the German railway signalling, which more and more departed from the British
signalling philosophy.
This development was closely connected to two fundamental inventions in railway signalling that
occurred at about same time. Those inventions were the track circuit (William Robinson 1871;
chapter 5.3) and the interlocked block instrument (Carl Frischen 1872). From this time on, the
development of German signalling was significantly influenced by the use of interlocked block
instruments (in German called Blockfeld). Block instruments of that type were not only used for
safe train separation with the positive locking of signals but also for irreversible electric route locking
(chapter 4.3.8.1) and other purposes. These instruments must not be confused with the British
block instruments (e. g. the instruments invented by Edward Tyer and others). They were never
used on railways that did not follow the German operating and signalling principles.
From this time on, German signalling was based on the principle that a locking produced at
one station cannot be released by that station, but only by electric action from an adjacent
station – or by automatic action of the moving train. Although these block instruments can
only be found in technology of a past era, that philosophy has influenced German signalling
ever since. Even in automatic systems, block signals are not only controlled by ‘track
clear’ detection technology; there is always an overlaid locking procedure. This follows the
principle that the signal at the entrance to a block section is kept locked in stop position
by the signal at the end of the block section. The locking will only release after the train
has passed the signal at the end of the block section. Since that principle does not work
on station tracks where trains may start or terminate, there is always a sharp distinction
between tracks in station areas and those on the open line (i. e. sections between stations).
Block instruments of a similar kind as used for block systems were also used as part of the
interlocking systems for electric route locking, and for electric interlocking between adjacent
interlocking stations.
As a big difference, the development of signalling technology in North America was mainly
driven by the invention of the track circuit. The introduction of automatic block systems had
already started in the 19th century; interlocked manual block systems with block instruments
were never used. In North American automatic block systems, block signals are directly
controlled by track circuits without an overlaid locking procedure. This even allowed the wiring
of automatic block systems through turnouts, in a way that throwing the points will reset the
protecting automatic block signal to stop but without locking the points by a cleared signal
(unidirectional locking chapter 4.2.3). These non-interlocked points on automatic block lines
require to follow specific rules to ensure safe train operations.

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 3.1 Historical Background

Beside automatic block systems, track circuits were used quite early on interlocking systems.
While in Europe visual track clear detection by the local operator was common practice and
can still be found today in old installations, track clear detection by track circuits became
a standard safety feature in North America from the beginning of the 20th century. Even in
mechanical interlocking systems, the need for visual track clear detection was abolished. Track
circuits were not only used for track clear detection when clearing a signal, they were also
used for electric route locking. Instead of the German philosophy of using block instruments
of a similar kind as developed for the interlocked manual block systems also for electric route
locking and release, electric route locking was effected by electric lever locks controlled by
track circuits. This led to the principle of approach locking, (chapters 4.3.8.2 and 4.3.8.3)
which became a standard feature of all interlocking systems in the English-speaking world.
When the first railways were built, sufficient means of communication for traffic control did not
exist. Traffic was controlled by the timetable, using the principle of time spacing (also called
time interval working) for train separation. This situation changed with the invention of the
electric telegraph. However, from this point, the development of the railways in Europe went
into a direction completely different from the railways in North America. In the early 1870s,
after the invention of the electric telegraph, train separation based on fixed block sections
became the standard form of operation on all European railways.
British railways were the first to introduce block working, and were followed shortly after by the
continental railways. The introduction of the fixed block system was combined with the use of
lineside signals for the control of train movements. From this time on, lineside signals became
an integral part of European railway operation. Since the block systems developed in the 19th
century were manually controlled by local operators, the same people also effected system
control. Later on, for lines with heavy traffic, traffic controllers were established to supervise
traffic on a longer stretch of line or within a terminal region. On some railways, they were called
dispatchers but with a quite different meaning from the dispatchers on North American railways.
A manually operated block system needs to have all stations staffed by a local operator. With
block lengths of between 1 km and 5 km, this requires a lot of local operating staff along the line.
In North America, with the exception of some lines in the East, this was simply impossible due
to the low population density. Consequently North American railways, even after the invention
of the electric telegraph, did not introduce fixed block operation. Signalled fixed block operation
became only possible after the invention of automatic block systems based on track circuits.
On the majority of North American railway lines, timetable-controlled operation with train
separation by time spacing remained in use. From the beginning, traffic on North American
railway lines was not controlled by local operators but by a dispatcher who worked in a central
office. The electric telegraph allowed the dispatcher to alter the timetable by issuing train orders.
The train orders were transmitted by telegraph to staffed train order stations, and delivered by
local operators to train crews. This led to the principle of Timetable & Train Order, which became
the standard procedure of North American railway operation and remained in use until the
1980s. Then, powerful radio systems became available that allowed the dispatcher to issue
movement authorities directly to train crews. A very short description of Timetable & Train Order
can be found in (Pachl 2018). In these operations, signals were used only at specific locations
that required a higher degree of protection, for instance at intersections or junctions of different
railway lines. These signals protected just the intersection or junction, and sometimes they
were not even interlocked. However, they did not provide movement authority for the following
sections of line. In (MacFarlane 2004), the author makes the very striking statement that the
difference from European operating practices was that signals in traditional North American
operations were an adjunct to the railway system, rather than an integrated part of it.

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3 Railway Operation Processes

The procedure of Timetable & Train Order was even used on most lines with automatic block
signals. Although time spacing was replaced by fixed block operation, the traffic was still
controlled by train orders. This allowed the railway to have non-interlocked hand-operated
points on automatic block lines. A signal-controlled operation in which trains are governed
directly by signal indications can only be found on lines with Centralised Traffic Control
(CTC). Although CTC is normally associated with remote control of interlocking stations, the
basic definition of CTC is that trains are governed by signal indication. This is a frequent
cause of misunderstandings between North American and European railway experts, since
governing trains by signal indication is the standard form on all European mainlines. This
applies even on lines controlled by old mechanical interlocking systems. Formally though,
any European line controlled by local mechanical interlocking stations meets the North
American definition of CTC.

3.2 Classification of Tracks, Stations and Signals

3.2.1 Classification of Tracks

In signalling and operating rules of many railways, a track is often referred to as a line. A
route consisting of just one track is called a single line, while a route with double track
operation, i. e., two parallel tracks and a specified direction for normal moves on both
tracks is called a double line. In North America, this use of term line is not so common.
For operational purposes, tracks are divided in two main classes, which have different
descriptions in the rule books of several railways. However, the basic idea is always
the same. First, there are tracks that can be used for regular train movements (for the
classification of movements with railway vehicles see chapter 3.4). Here, these tracks are
called main tracks. Another term mainly used in the British rules, is running lines (since in
the British terminology in operating and signalling rules, a track is often referred to as a
line). The tracks of the open line, i. e. the sections between stations and their continuation
through stations and interlockings, are always main tracks. Main tracks used for passing and
overtaking trains are called loops (figure 3.1).

Figure 3.1: Classification of tracks

In a signalled territory, main tracks are equipped with signalling appliances for train
movements. Points on main tracks are usually interlocked with signals. Sidings are all tracks
that must only be used for shunting movements. In shunting areas with hand-throw points and
in older interlocking systems that do not provide shunt routes, points in sidings are often not
interlocked. An arrangement of sidings for making up trains, storing equipment, and similar
purposes, is called a yard (figure 3.2).

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 3.2 Classification of Tracks, Stations and Signals

Figure 3.2: Yard

In the North American terminology, loops are called sidings. Whether or not a siding of that kind
is considered as a main track depends on the operating procedure of a particular railway. Even in
signalled territory, points in main tracks are not necessarily interlocked with signals (White 2003).

3.2.2 The Role of Lineside Signals

While being gradually replaced by advanced radio-based train control systems, lineside signals
are still the most common technology for controlling train movements. Concerning the control
philosophy, there are two different control principles to be found on individual railways:
a) railways on which signals just indicate if and under what conditions a movement may enter
the section beyond the signal independently from the kind of movement to be made
b) railways on which the signal aspects authorise a specific kind of movement
The principle a) is to be found on North American railways but also on some railways outside North
America (e. g., on the Dutch railways). The principle b) is the dominating principle outside North
America. It is typical for most railways where train movements are strongly separated from shunting
movements (see chapter 3.4). On these railways, there are two basic kinds of lineside signals:
–– main signals
–– shunting signals
Main signals authorise a train movement to enter a track section. This is typical for almost all
railways outside North America. In a fixed block territory with a signal-controlled operation, train
movements are authorised by signal indications. Apart from when the approach line has a low
maximum speed, a signal that authorises a train movement requires an approach aspect (also
called ‘warning aspect’ or ‘caution aspect’) at the braking distance. This is because the stopping
distance is generally greater than the distance the driver can see ahead. The approach aspect is
necessary for safe braking when approaching a stop signal.
In a territory where the distance between signals does not much exceed the braking distance,
the approach aspect is usually provided by the signal in rear. In a territory with very long
distances between main signals, distant signals are placed at the braking distance in approach
to a main signal (chapter 7.3.3). A distant signal warns; it can only provide an approach aspect
for the signal ahead. It cannot show a stop aspect.

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3 Railway Operation Processes

Shunting signals are used to authorise shunting movements and to protect train routes against
shunting movements. Main signals are not cleared for shunting movements. On tracks where
shunting movements may pass a main signal, a shunt aspect is also incorporated into the
main signal, so that shunting movements may be authorised to pass main signals showing
stop. For shunting signals, an approach aspect is not necessary, since drivers are expected to
be able to stop short of any vehicle or obstruction (driving on sight).
On North American railways, there is no differentiation between main and shunting signals
because of different operating rules for shunting movements. But at some places, a signal
may show a special aspect that is used only for shunting movements. Another characteristic
of North American railways is the general lack of distant signals. On signalled tracks, the
approach indication is always provided by the block signal in rear, regardless of block length.
Distant signals are only used in approach to an interlocking on a non-signalled track.
Concerning the control principle, signals may be divided in three classes:
–– controlled signals
–– automatic signals
–– semi-automatic signals
A controlled signal is one that is locally or remotely controlled by an operator. The working
of an automatic signal is effected automatically by the trains moving along the line. A semi-
automatic signal is a controlled signal that can be switched into an automatic mode. Beside
working signals, many railways use inoperable (or fixed) signals in specific layouts to suit their
individual operating rules. Such signals always display one indication only. Thus, fixed distant
signals may be used in situations where all trains must be prepared to stop at the home signal.
Inoperable main signals that always display a stop indication are used on tracks where trains,
after having stopped at the signal, may only proceed as a shunting movement.
In a territory with a fixed block system, the line is divided into block sections for the purpose of
safe train separation. A signal protecting a block section will only clear after the last train ahead
has left the section and is protected by a stop signal.

3.2.3 Definitions of Stations and Interlocking Areas

Generally, stations are all places designated in the timetable by name. Regarding the schedule,
stations are the points where time applies. On British railways, only places where trains stop
for load/unload passengers or freight are referred to as stations. In North American usage,
each station is designated by a station sign that designates the specific point at which an
instruction using only the name of the station applies.
On European railways, station signs are mainly used at passenger stations for the purpose of
passenger information. In extended and complex terminal areas, some railways place station
signs at interlockings outside passenger stations to support the driver in local orientation. But
this is usually only be done at places without a local interlocking station, so that the station
cannot be identified by the interlocking station’s ID. Some railways use the term station only for
places where trains have regular stops. The term station is not necessarily associated with the
term station track which is used by several railways to separate sections of main track where
station rules apply from the block sections of the open line. Rules on station tracks are closely
related to the interlocking rules of a specific railway.
An interlocking is an arrangement of points and signals interconnected in a way so that
each movement follows another in a proper and safe sequence. Signalled routes for trains on

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 3.2 Classification of Tracks, Stations and Signals

main tracks are usually interlocked. Signals that govern train movements through an interlocking are
called interlocking signals. An interlocking signal can also be a block signal. The points and signals
within interlocking limits are controlled either by a local interlocking station or from a remote control
centre. Local interlocking stations are called interlocking towers in North America, and signal boxes
or signal cabins on railways that follow British principles. The block signals between controlled
interlockings are often called intermediate block signals. In Britain, this term is used only in older
systems for a block signal that is controlled from the interlocking station in rear.
Concerning interlockings and stations, the railways designated different names and limits in
accordance with their individual operating practice. In particular, there is a big difference between
North American railways and those elsewhere. In North America, the block system that protects
train movements is not interrupted in interlocking areas. There is no station track separated from the
open line. Figure 3.3 demonstrates the essential difference at the example of a track arrangement
with several loop tracks. In North America, the point zones at both sides of the loop tracks would
form separate small interlockings. These are limited by opposing interlocking signals in a way that
each interlocking does normally not contain any consecutive interlocking signals. Station names
refer to these small interlockings but not to the entire loop track layout. In Europe and on other
railways outside North America, the entire loop track layout would be a station designated by name.
The tracks between the outer point zones are station tracks. On station tracks, train movements
are protected by interlocking signals. Train movements on these sections are protected by the
interlocking system but not by a block system. Thus, the entire layout that may even contain more
than just two point zones forms one interlocking area.

Figure 3.3: Different principles of assigning interlocking and station names to a track layout on
North American and European railways

Figure 3.4 gives a more detailed example of how interlocking limits are established on North
American railways. At each track that leads into interlocking limits, there is a signal that may
authorise train movements, even at tracks that are not used for regular train movements (this
is an essential difference from European signalling). These signals are called home signals.

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3 Railway Operation Processes

A speed indication at an interlocking signal applies until the train has passed the first
opposing interlocking signal, which is called the exit signal of that interlocking.

Figure 3.4: Interlocking limits (North American practice)

On European railways, there is still a difference between the traditional British practice and the
continental railways that followed more the German principles. In traditional British interlocking
systems, there are designated ‘station limits’. Station limits are the tracks between the
home signal and the last main signal of the same direction (the section, or starting signal),
controlled from the same signal box (interlocking station). The section signal permits trains to
leave the station limits and enter the next block section. There are different station limits for
each direction. In most British installations, this signal is placed beyond the last points of the
interlocking (then also called an advance signal or formerly an advanced starter signal), thus
usually requiring additional interlocking signals before the points (figure 3.5).

Figure 3.5: Station limits (older British practice)

In an essential difference from the German home signal limits explained below, British station
limits are not associated with a track layout but with a single interlocking station. In a track layout
that is controlled by more than one interlocking station, each has its own station limits. Station
limits are not designated in modern interlockings with a continuous track clear detection. In areas
controlled by modern control centres, there is just a difference between track sections on which
trains are protected by controlled interlocking signals, and track sections on which trains are
controlled by automatic block signals. In those areas, there are no longer any signals referred to
as home signals. For more information on modern British signalling practice see (IRSE 1980).
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 3.2 Classification of Tracks, Stations and Signals

Figure 3.6: Home signal limits of a station area (German practice and other)

On many other railways worldwide, a track layout with station tracks is limited by the
opposing home signals that protect the interlocking area. The main tracks outside the
home signal limits are called the open line (figure 3.6). This meets the traditional German
practice where such a station area is called a ‘Bahnhof’ (there is no suitable English
translation). In a difference from British station limits, home signal limits of that kind may
contain several interlocking stations.
The signals that govern train movements to leave the home signal limits for the open line are
called exit signals. Interlocking signals inside home signal limits that are neither home nor exit
signals are called intermediate interlocking signals (figure 3.7). Interlockings at junctions and
crossovers outside the home signal limits belong to the open line. The signals at these junctions
and crossovers are referred to as block signals, but not as home signals. Compared with
junctions and crossovers inside home signal limits, an interlocking on the open line is called a
junction station or a crossover station.

Figure 3.7: Home signal limits with intermediate interlocking signals

In areas controlled by control centres, several formerly separated station areas have
sometimes been combined into consolidated home signal limits, with a number of
consecutive intermediate interlocking signals. In such an extended station area, a train
may even have several scheduled stops without leaving the home signal limits. On some
railways, this development has led to a discussion on whether to abolish the traditional
distinction between station tracks and tracks of the open line in territories with a high
degree of centralisation.

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3 Railway Operation Processes

Despite the different limits defined in interlocking areas by the different railways,
interlocking main signals can be divided into four main classes (the terms in brackets are
suggested names to characterise these signals independently from the operational rules of
a specific railway):
–– interlocking signals that lead from a block section into a station track (station home signals)
–– interlocking signals that lead from a station track into a block section (station exit signals)
–– interlocking signals that lead from a block section into another block section (block home
signals)
–– interlocking signals that lead from a station track into another station track (intermediate
interlocking signals)
Some railways use all of these classes of interlocking signals, while others use a selection or
even just one of them.

3.2.4 Signal Arrangement for Double Track Operation

On double lines, there is usually a specified direction of traffic (in North America also called
the current of traffic) for each track. While right-track operation dominates slightly on a
worldwide basis, there are significant numbers of countries where left-track operation is
the standard form of operation on double lines. Left-track operation is used in the UK and
Ireland, in France, Italy, Belgium, Switzerland, Sweden, Portugal, in most African countries,
in Iran, Israel, Japan, China, India, Pakistan, Indonesia and some other countries in that
region, Australia and New Zealand, Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, and on broad gauge lines
in Brazil. Some countries have mixed systems. Typical examples in Europe are Austria and
Spain which use left-track operation on selected parts of their network only.
On lines not equipped with a bidirectional signalling system for two-way working, all
regular train movements have to be made with the direction of traffic. On such lines,
movements against the direction of traffic (also called ‘wrong line moves’ or ‘reverse
movements’) have to be authorised under staff responsibility by special instructions.
Before granting authority to proceed, the operator has to make sure that the entire
section between the limiting interlockings is clear of other trains and all signals governing
opposing moves to enter that section are secured in stop position. In case there is no
signal to limit the move against the normal direction, an order has to be issued to the
train driver to stop at a specified location where the train has to wait for authority to
proceed. If locked routes for the train to enter the relevant section or to leave that section
are not provided by the interlocking system, the routes must be protected under staff
responsibility by applying manual lockings at the point controls on the user interface.
On lines equipped with bidirectional signalling for two-way working, trains may be
governed through an opposing track at any time under full block protection without
activating a degraded mode procedure. The authority to enter the opposing track is
provided by a proceed aspect of a main signal. On some railways, that main signal has
a separate indicator telling the driver that the route leads into an opposing track. Some
railways prefer not to have intermediate block signals for movements against the current
of traffic, because on most lines reverse movements are not carried out frequently. Figure
3.8 shows typical examples of signal arrangements on double track lines. On railways that
follow German operating practice, a direction of traffic is only designated on main tracks
outside home signal limits.

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 3.3 Movements with Railway Vehicles

Figure 3.8: Signal arrangements for double track operation

3.3 Movements with Railway Vehicles

Movements of railway vehicles are divided in two classes which are called here train
movements and shunting movements. However, the names used for these movements differ
from railway to railway. On European railways, for both kinds of movements there are very
different rules in use. To a certain degree on North American railways, there are also train and
shunting movements, but the rules do not differ as significantly as in Europe. That is why North
American railways, as mentioned above, do not use shunting signals.

3.3.1 Train Movements

Train movements are movements of locomotives or self-propelled vehicles, alone or

coupled to one or more vehicles, with authority to occupy a section of line under operating
conditions specified in the working timetable. The timetable also contains the maximum
speed allowed in the sections along the line. Every train displays rear end markers to
enable the lineside staff to check the train completeness. All regular movements running
along the line from station to station are train movements. In Britain especially, train
movements are also called ‘running movements’.
The authorisation of a train movement has two elements:
–– A valid timetable as the authority to run through the network along a pre-defined route
under specified operating conditions (the 'timetable authority'),
–– A movement authority for every single section of track in the path of the train

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3 Railway Operation Processes

The movement authority to enter a section of track is issued by the operator who is in charge
of controlling train movements on that section of track. This way, a train is always under
the external guidance of an operator. In a signal-controlled territory, the authority for train
movements is given by:
–– a proceed indication of a main signal
–– a proceed indication of a cab signal
–– a calling-on signal permitting a train to pass a signal displaying a stop aspect under special
conditions
–– a written or verbal instruction permitting a train to pass a signal displaying a stop aspect
under special conditions
In non signal-controlled territory, the authority for train movements is given by:
–– timetable rules
–– verbal or written authorisation

3.3.2 Shunting Movements

Shunting movements are movements for making up trains, moving cars from one track to
another, and similar purposes. Shunting movements are accomplished under simplified
requirements at a very low speed that allows stopping short of any vehicle or obstruction.
Block rules are not in effect. Shunting units may enter occupied tracks. Movements in
industrial sidings are also carried out as shunting movements. On some railways, train
movements into an occupied track must be carried out in shunting mode. There are also
railways that use shunting movements as a fall-back level for regular train movements in
degraded mode operations.
The authority of shunting movements is given by:
–– a proceed indication of a shunting signal (may be combined with a main signal to authorise
a shunting unit to pass a main signal in stop position)
–– verbal permission
In the North American terminology, shunting movements are called ‘switching movements’ or
‘movements of yard engines’ and are authorised either by signal aspects or by yard limit rules (see
below) where signals do not authorize train movement. Where signals authorize train movement,
switching movements are authorized by signal. There is an understanding between the control
operator and the engine crew about the movement to be made before the signal for the movement
is given as discussed in 3.3.2.2.
Railways designate different limits for shunting movements on main tracks according to their
individual operating practices.

3.3.2.1 Shunting Limits (European Practice)

On European railways, with the exception of modern British rules, shunting units must not
enter main tracks outside the home signal limits. The area behind the home signal that may be
used for shunting is usually designated by limit of shunt boards (figure 3.9).
The distance between the home signal and the limit of shunt board equals the overlap of the
home signal. Shunts may pass the limit of shunt boards only with written permission from the
operator. Before issuing an authority to pass the board, the operator has to make sure that
there is no train approaching the home signal.

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 3.3 Movements with Railway Vehicles

In British practice, limit of shunt boards are always associated with station limits as used in traditional
interlocking systems. On modern lines, instead of boards, limit of shunt signals (inoperable shunting
signals permanently displaying a stop aspect) are used at places where no other shunt or main
signal exists. This prevents shunting movements from running against the signalled direction onto
an automatic block line without bidirectional working. On some other European railways, e. g.
Switzerland, shunting movements may leave the shunting limits under specified conditions. For this
purpose, the rules of those railways define a special class of shunting movements.

Figure 3.9: Shunting limits (German arrangement as example for typical European practice)

3.3.2.2 Yard Limits (North American Practice)

Yard limits are a speciality of railways following North American operating procedures.
Here, train movements are usually authorised by a dispatcher who works in a remote
office while the shunting is done by local staff. The purpose of yard limits is to simplify the
authorisation of shunting movements on main tracks in terminal areas and also to relief the
need for flag protection on unsignalled lines while working at small stations in dark territory
(see chapter 3.4.3). In areas designated as yard limits, shunting units may enter main tracks
without authorisation by the dispatcher. But at some places, local rules require dispatcher
permission to use main tracks for shunting to ensure some control over train movements.
Thus, shunting movements can be carried out by using main tracks in the ‘yard mode’. On
tracks where trains are protected by automatic block signals, yard limits are based on the
signalling principle that the automatic block system is wired through hand-thrown points.
At hand-thrown points equipped with an electric lock, the release of the electric lock can be
activated by an employee directly at the points after having the points mechanically unlocked.
The activation will cause the signals governing the block to display the most restrictive indication.
If the block in which the points are located is unoccupied or the points itself are occupied
(so that a train leaving the main track may unlock the points), the lock will open immediately
on activation. If the block is occupied but the points are not, the lock will release after a timer
operation of several minutes – enough for any approaching train to have passed. At hand-
thrown points without an electric lock, the signals governing the block go to their most restrictive
indication when the point is thrown after having it mechanically unlocked by the employee.
Within yard limits, trains that are not running under a clear aspect of a block signal have to move at
a reduced speed that allows them to stop short of any vehicle or obstruction, since there can be
shunting units at work on the main track. When a train is approaching, shunting units have to give
way by clearing the main track immediately. The beginning and the end of yard limits are marked by
special marker boards to be obeyed by the train crews (figure 3.10).

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Figure 3.10: Yard limits (North American practice)

Because on North American railways, train movements are not so sharply separated from shunting
movements, they may also be carried out by verbal authorisation within yard limits. On lines
operated under the rules of Centralised Traffic Control, yard limits are not used. On main tracks,
yard engines are governed by signal aspects in the same way as train movements. However, the
dispatcher can establish temporary shunting limits by issuing track and time authority to a train.
Within the given limits that are blocked for other trains, the train crew can do shunting work.
Remotely controlled points in such areas can be released for local control (dual control points).

3.4 Principles of Train Separation

In a steel wheel on steel rail system, the coefficient of adhesion is on average eight times less than
in road traffic. As a result, the maximum braking force that can be transmitted between wheel and
rail for a given weight is also eight times less. That leads to braking distances for railway vehicles
that may exceed the viewing range of the driver significantly. Thus, train separation by the sight of
the driver is only possible when running at a restricted speed. Usually speed limits between 15 and
30 km/h are applied. This is only acceptable for shunting movements and for train movements
in non-regular operation. For regular train movements, procedures of train separation are required
that work independently from the viewing range of the driver.
The principle used for safe train separation depends on the following criteria:
–– how movement authority is transmitted from track to train
–– how the track is released behind a train
If movement authority is only transmitted at discrete points, e. g. at lineside signals,
or by written or verbal orders, this will necessarily lead to train separation in fixed block
distance. Each movement authority has to cover the entire section up to the next point at
which further authority may be received. On lines where trains are governed continuously
by a cab signal system, this restriction does not exist. However, continuous transmission
of movement authority is not yet a sufficient criterion to abolish fixed block sections.
In addition, the train has to release the track not in fixed intervals but continuously. This
requiresa permanent train-borne checking of train completeness. Since for traditional railway
systemsa sufficient solution for that problem has not yet been found, train separation at a fixed
block distance is still the standard principle for safe train spacing on most railways worldwide.
The principle of train separation by time spacing is not covered in the following sections since
European railways replaced time spacing by fixed block sections in the 1870s. As mentioned

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 3.4 Principles of Train Separation

in 3.1, on unsignalled lines in North America, time spacing survived much longer as part of the
Timetable & Train Order procedure. However, today it is almost completely extinct. For a short
description of the basic idea, see (Pachl 2018).
Before explaining the different principles of train separation, another essential feature has
to be mentioned. The braking distance of a train does not mainly depend on the weight of
the train but on the percentage of the weight that is used to transmit braking force between
wheel and rail. Trains with the same braking ratio have generally the same braking distance.
For safe train separation, a train must always have a clear track ahead at least as long as the
braking distance. Thus, from the viewpoint of capacity, it makes sense to assemble vehicles
into trains. All vehicles that form a train do need just one common braking distance for the
entire consist (figure 3.11). This will significantly reduce the capacity consumption that is
produced by the long braking distances. This is why running whole trains instead of single
vehicles is one of the very basic characteristics of a railway system.

a) Single vehicles

b) Vehicles in a train consist

Figure 3.11: Influence of train length on the used capacity

3.4.1 Signalled Fixed Block Operation

On lines where train separation by block distances is used, the track is divided into block
sections. A block should be occupied exclusively by only one train. In a signalled fixed block
operation, the block sections are limited by signals, which provide movement authority to enter
the block section protected by the signals. To clear a signal for a train that is to enter a block
section, the following conditions must have been fulfilled:
–– The train ahead must have cleared the block section.
–– The train ahead must have cleared the overlap beyond the next signal (only on lines where
block overlaps are used).
–– The train ahead must be protected from following train movements by a stop signal.
–– The train must be protected against opposing movements.

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On railways where block overlaps are not required, the control length of a signal equals the
block section. Examples are mainline railways in North America and in Russia. Other railways
require a control length of a signal that is longer than the block section (figure 3.12).

a) Line without block overlaps

b) Line with block overlaps

Figure 3.12: Control length of signals in fixed block territory

The difference is called ‘overlap’ because in that area the control length of a signal overlaps
with the control length of the next signal. The main purpose of the overlap is to provide
additional safety in case the driver fails to brake adequately before a stop signal. A signal
may not be cleared until the full control length is clear. Thus, the clearing point beyond a
signal equals the end of the control length of the signal in rear. Block overlaps are used on
all European railways, many railways outside Europe, and also on almost all subways and
subway-like electric city railways worldwide.
On a line with a fixed block system, the minimum headway is the time interval between two
following trains, and depends on the so-called ‘blocking time’ (Hansen/Pachl 2014). The
blocking time (from the German term ‘Sperrzeit’) is the time interval in which a section
of track (usually a block section) is allocated exclusively to a train and therefore
blocked to other trains. So, the blocking time lasts from issuing a train its movement
authority (e. g. by clearing a signal) to the possibility of issuing a movement authority to
another train to enter that same section. The blocking time of a track element is usually
much longer than the time the train occupies the track element. In a territory with
lineside signals, for a train without a scheduled stop, the blocking time of a block section
consists of the following time intervals (figure 3.13):

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a) Train without Stop

b) Train with Stop

Figure 3.13: Blocking time of a block section

–– the time for clearing the signal

–– a certain time for the driver to view the clear aspect at the signal in rear that gives the
approach aspect to the signal at the entrance of the block section (this can be the block
signal in rear or a separate distant signal)
–– the approach time between the signal that provides the approach aspect and the signal at
the entrance of the block section
–– the time between the block signals
–– the clearing time to clear the block section and – if required – the overlap with the full length
of the train
–– the release time to ‘unlock’ the block system

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The approach time does not apply if the train has a scheduled stop at the signal at the entrance of
the block section. In such a case, the signal watching time applies at that signal. In a territory with
cab signalling, the approach time is the time the train takes to run through the braking distance that
is signalled by the cab signal system. Drawing the blocking times of all block sections a train passes
into a time-over-distance diagram leads to the so-called ‘blocking time stairway’ (figure 3.14). This
represents perfectly the operational use of a line by a train. With the blocking time stairway, it is
possible to determine the minimum headway of two trains. The blocking times directly establish the
signal headway as the minimum time interval between two following trains in each block section.

Figure 3.14: Blocking time ‘stairways’

3.4.2 Cab Signal Operation

On most of the railways that use cab signalling, it is combined with a continuous Automatic
Train Protection (ATP) system. However, on some railways, cab signalling is also used as a
pure signalling system without brake enforcement. On many railways, cab signal indications
are superior to lineside signals, so that trains are directly governed by cab signals. This
is typical for all advanced cab signal systems used on high speed lines. This allows the
infrastructure operator to remove lineside signals completely. However, some railways keep a
reduced number of lineside signals so that trains without operative cab signals can still be
governed by lineside signals.
On some railways, there are still older cab signal systems in use that work only as auxiliary
systems. On such lines, trains are still governed by lineside signals, but the cab signal indications
support the driver in watching the lineside signals.

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 3.4 Principles of Train Separation

3.4.2.1 Cab Signalling with Fixed Block Sections

The main reason for having fixed block sections on lines with cab signalling is the need for trackside
train completeness checking. The main difference from a fixed block system with lineside signals is
the independence from the approach distance of the lineside signal system, which is the distance
between the signal at the entrance of the block section and the signal in rear that provides the
approach indication. The approach time is no longer the running time between these two signals but
the running time within the real braking distance based on the supervision curves of the cab signal
system. The other elements of the blocking time do not differ from a system with lineside signals
(figure 3.15). Most railways use block marker boards to mark the block limits at places without
lineside signals. In some older cab signal systems that do not yet use a speed supervision curve, the
approach distance does not differ from the lineside signal system. However, since signal information
is continuously displayed at the driver’s desk, there is no need to watch the aspect of a lineside signal
that provides the approach information. For this reason, the signal watching time may be removed
from the blocking time diagram while the approach time will not change.

Figure 3.15: Blocking time of a block section with cab signalling

3.4.2.2 Cab Signalling with Moving Block

Although moving block does not yet exist in standard railway operations, it is a frequent point
of discussion. The improvement of line capacity possible by the introduction of moving block
is still often over-estimated. On a moving block line, the length of the block sections is reduced
to zero. That means that the running time between the block signals will be eliminated. But
all other components of the blocking time can also be found in moving block. On most lines,
the sum of these other components is much greater even than the part of the blocking time
that can be eliminated by moving block. That is why, compared with fixed block operation
with short block sections, moving block will just lead to a moderate improvement of capacity.
The difference from a line with fixed block sections is that only the ‘steps’ of the blocking time
stairway will be eliminated. The blocking time diagram will be transformed into a continuous
time channel (figure 3.16). On lines with mixed traffic of trains running at different speeds, the
possible improvement is almost negligible.

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Figure 3.16: Blocking time of moving block compared to fixed block

Moving block as explained above is also called train separation in absolute braking distance.
However, there is another moving block principle known as train separation in relative braking
distance. Relative braking distance means that the distance between two following trains equals
the difference of the braking distances of the trains plus an additional safety distance. Therefore,
the braking distances of both trains must be calculated with braking curves as a function of
speed. Train separation in relative braking distance leads to a maximum of line capacity.
But there is an essential problem. When running through an interlocking, it is not possible to
move points between two trains. When points are to be moved, the second train has to have
a full braking distance to the points until the points are locked in the new position. Another
problem is that in case of an accident to the first train, the second train has no chance of
stopping and is going to collide with the first train. For these problems, this principle has not
yet applied for train separation but is used by some freight railways for processing the coupling
and uncoupling of helper locomotives on the move.
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 3.5 Dispatching Principles

3.4.3 Non Signal-controlled Operation

Some railway lines with a very low density of traffic are operated without any signalling
system. On many railways, such lines are called ‘dark territory’. The movement authorities
are issued to the train drivers by the dispatcher in verbal form using radio or telephone. The
authority takes effect only after it has been repeated back to and then been verified by the
dispatcher. Train crews give information to the dispatcher about the actual location of the
train at certain intervals.
In its most simple form, the dispatcher relies completely on a handwritten trainsheet
of tabular or graphical design. In the more advanced systems, the dispatcher has a
computer-based workstation. Before issuing a movement authority to the train crew, it
has to be entered into the control system. The control system would refuse any case of
overlapping movement authorities. So, the dispatcher is protected from issuing conflicting
authorities (‘lap orders’).
Some lines operated by that principle may have a simplified signalling system as a safety
overlay. However, trains are not directly governed by these signals but by the verbal
movement authorities. Another solution to improve safety in dark territory is non-signalled
token working. To enter a section, the driver must be in possession of a token (either a
physical object, or an electronic code). Since only one token exists for each section, two
trains cannot legally enter a section at the same time.
Concerning the logic of how track sections are assigned to trains, there are two basic types
known as Track Warrant Control (TWC) and Direct Traffic Control (DTC). Originally, these
terms were introduced by North American railways but are today also used by railways
on other continents. In TWC, trains may occupy main tracks only on the basis of the
possession of a ‘track warrant’ covering a precisely defined track segment of any length.
The limit of movement authority may be any point designated in the track warrant. But
often, the limit of the movement authority assigned by the track warrant is the next meeting
point. In DTC territory, fixed block sections (marked by lineside block limit boards and often
extending from one passing loop to the next) are established. Train crews receive exclusive
authority to occupy one or more blocks. The limit of movement authority is always a block
limit board at the entrance of a block section the train has no authority to occupy. After
leaving the block, the crew releases it to the dispatcher.

3.5 Dispatching Principles

3.5.1 Decentralised Operation

In a decentralised operation, train movements are controlled by local interlocking stations.

The operators of neighbouring interlocking stations communicate to each other by means of
telecommunication, mostly by simple telephone connections (figure 3.17).
All communications between the local interlocking stations and all train movements are
manually recorded by the operators. On North American railways, all lines are controlled
by a dispatcher who works in a centralised office. On European railways, this applies only
on lines with a heavier traffic, while lines with low traffic are operated without a dispatcher.

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Figure 3.17: Decentralised operation

Because of the different operating procedures of North American and European railways, the
role of the dispatcher is also very different. Compared with European railways, in North American
practice the dispatcher has a much higher authority. The dispatcher is the person who issues
movement authorities to trains. The local operators are in some way only the ‘lengthened
arms’ of the dispatcher to set up routes, clear signals, and transmit orders in compliance with
the dispatcher’s instructions. On European railways, the movement authorities are issued by
the local operators. Because the local operator is the ‘authority person’, the dispatcher is only
responsible for watching the traffic and for solving scheduling conflicts to avoid delays and
congestion. Thus, the dispatcher supports the local operators in an efficient operation.
Since the dispatcher-controlled railway is a North American invention, the American term
‘dispatcher’ was directly adopted by many railways in non-English speaking countries. It is
even used in the Russian language. However, this term is not used in the UK. In British terms,
such a position is called a ‘controller’ or an ‘operator’, while the operator who authorises train
movements by clearing signals is called a ‘signaller’. For more information on British rail traffic
control see (IRSE 1991).

3.5.2 Centralised Traffic Control

In Centralised Traffic Control (CTC), all points and signals inside the controlled area are directly
controlled by the dispatcher (figure 3.18). On British railways, that position is called a ‘signaller’
like in decentralised operation. All train movements are governed by signal indications. The
local interlockings are remote-controlled without local staff. In CTC territory, all main tracks
must be equipped with track clear detection. CTC technology has a long tradition on railways
that operate long lines in territories with a very low population density and long distances
between stations. Typical examples are lines in North America and in Russia.
With the introduction of CTC, some of the essential differences between railways which follow
North American and European operating procedures partly disappeared. In some ways, CTC
brought the two worlds together. To the Europeans, CTC brought centralised control, to the
Americans it brought signal-controlled operation.

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 3.5 Dispatching Principles

Figure 3.18: Centralised Traffic Control

3.5.3 Control Centres

In the 1980s, computer based CTC systems became available. These allowed the railways to
reach a much higher degree of centralisation by establishing control centres that covered large
areas, sometime controlling traffic on several thousand route kilometres. In big control centres,
most railways follow the approach of separating CTC operation from traffic regulation (figure 3.19).

Figure 3.19: Structure of a control centre

Traffic controllers supervise train traffic of a whole line or a large terminal area. These employees
watch train moves and make decisions to solve scheduling and train path conflicts, to run
extra trains, and so on. They do not authorise train movements directly, however. The CTC

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3 Railway Operation Processes

operators are responsible for a safe movement authorisation, both in normal and in degraded
mode operations. Shunting on main tracks is also controlled by the CTC operators. Because the
CTC operators are relieved from traffic regulation, they can concentrate completely on safe train
control. In addition to the traffic regulators and CTC operators, there are usually workstations
for emergency and maintenance management, and for scheduling. The scheduling workstations
are not used for the normal scheduling process but for scheduling of extra trains and for
rescheduling in case of emergencies or failure of equipment. In modern control centres, the
workstations of the traffic regulators are both equipped with screens that show the location of all
trains in the track layout in a similar way as a CTC display and with screens that display a traffic
diagram with the time-distance graphs projected into the future (figure 3.20).

Figure 3.20: Principle of an online traffic diagram

3.5.4 Automation Technologies

In a highly centralised system, efficient train control requires automation technologies to relieve
traffic controllers and operators from manually collecting data and lining up routes and signals.
The key systems to achieve this are train describers and automatic route setting systems (ARS).
Train describers identify trains at their locations and display the train IDs on the control screens.
On the work stations of traffic controllers, the data provided by train describers is also used to
generate electronic traffic diagrams. Train describers also replace the telephone communication
otherwise used between the operators of adjacent control areas to inform each other about

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 3.6 Special Operating Situations

approaching train movements. When leaving a control area, the train ID is transmitted to the
adjacent control area. Inside the controlled area, the train ID is forwarded from section to section
using information about track occupations, which is provided by the signalling system.
Automatic route setting (ARS) systems relieve the operator from the need to line up routes
manually. When a train is approaching a signal, the ARS will select the route and issue the
control command to line up the route at a proper time. Route selection is usually effected by
a database that contains the routes for all train IDs. In an ARS system, there are two ways to
handle train path conflicts in case of delays:
–– timetable-based ARS
–– destination-based ARS
In a timetable-based ARS system, all routes are set up in compliance with the scheduled train
sequence. When a train path conflict occurs, a train would always wait for a delayed train that is
scheduled ahead of its own train path. A timetable-based ARS system requires a database that
contains not only the routes but also the timetable data of all trains. Train path conflicts can only
be solved by altering the timetable. For that, the ARS system has to be connected to a computer-
based dispatching system. When a decision to change the train sequence has been made, the
dispatching system would automatically create new timetable data for the ARS system.
A destination-based ARS system sets up routes automatically, regardless of the scheduled
train sequence. The database that is used for route selection contains either the routes of all
trains or a special destination code (e. g., a destination number) as a part of the train ID.

3.6 Special Operating Situations

3.6.1 Handling of Signal Failures

If a signal does not clear as expected, the cause is not necessarily a signal failure. So, before
activating procedures for degraded mode operations, the operator has to make sure that the
signal is not locked out by a conflicting route or train move. Otherwise, the operator might
cause a dangerous situation by bypassing safety functions of the block or interlocking system
unintentionally. After having made sure that the problem was caused by a signal failure, the
operator has to identify the last train that passed through the relevant section and the kind of
failure. There are two basic types of malfunction in a signalling system:
–– A track section or trackside element has not correctly released after having been cleared by
the last train that has passed through that section or element.
–– When setting up a route, a trackside element has either not reached the proper position or
is not safely locked in that position.
In the first case, the operator has to use a resetting command to release the relevant section or
element. In the second case, the operator has to check manually and lock the relevant elements.
In most cases this will also require the operator to authorise the train to pass the signal at danger. If
the operator cannot check that sections the train is authorised to pass through are clear, the train
driver has to be instructed to proceed through these sections at caution and on line of sight.
Some railways established the rule that the first train that is going to enter a section after a
signal failure has occurred must always be authorised to proceed through that section
cautiously on sight. Only if after the passage of this train is the clearance of the section
confirmed, other trains may follow normally. By this rule, the risk of human error by
misinterpreting the operational situation when handling the signal failure is significantly reduced.

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3.6.2 Temporary Track Closures

During a temporary track closure, normal train movements are prohibited to pass through the
closed section. Temporary track closures are established for the following reasons:
–– the track is interrupted
–– the track is blocked by an accident or another obstruction
–– to allow maintennance or construction work on the relevant track (engineering possessions)
–– to protect working crews on an adjacent track
Temporary track closures are established by the operator in charge of that section. After
having established the track closure, the operator has to apply manual locking and reminders
to prevent trains to accidently enter the closed section.
Track closures for maintennance and contructions are usually scheduled in advance, while
other reasons to close the track may arise on an ad-hoc basis. Temporary track closures
for maintennance and construction are also known as engineering possessions, since the
engineering staff temporarily ‘owns’ the closed sections.
Depending on the operating rules of an individual railway, two different kinds of engineering
possessions may exist:
–– engineering possessions in which the closed section remains under control of an operator
–– engineering possessions in which control is transferred to the engineering staff
In the first case, the operator remains in charge for train control within the possession limits.
Work trains may pass through the possession limits under authority of the operator. Fixed
block rules are not in effect within the possession limits. The operator may authorize more
than one train to occupy the same section. In such a case all trains but the first one must be
ordered to proceed through the section on sight. Also, the operator may allow trains to do
reverse moves. The operator has always to keep track of all train moves within the possession
limits. When having several trains operating within the possession limits, this may require a
lot of verbal communication between the operator and the train crews. For engineering
possessions with a lot of work trains, the workload for the operator will reach a level that may
harm a safe and efficient train control. That’s why, the second principle was developed.
In the second case, the closed sections are declared to be temporary out of service. All
movements within the possession limits are made in shunting mode under control of the
local engineering staff. Only the movements entering and leaving the possession limits need
authority from the operator. So, the operator is relieved from keeping track of the movements
within the possession limits. Since the movements within the possession limits are not
controlled by an operator, there is some risk that shunting moves could accidently leave the
possession limits. To prevent this, the possession limits are usually protected by installing
temporary derailing devices (derailers or trap points). Also, the points of all turnouts on which
vehicles may leave the possession limits are permanently kept locked (figure 3.21).
Before a track on which an engineering possession is in effect it returned to the operator, the
engineering person responsible for the possession has to confirm that the track is in a safe
state to be used for train movements. In case control was transferred to the engineering staff,
that person has also to confirm that the track is clear of any vehicles. In case control was not
transferred to the engineering staff, the operator is responsible to check the clearance of the
section by the records kept on train moves. On a track with axle counters, the operator must
not trust the track clear detection, because the counting contacts might have been temporarily
removed during the construction or maintenance works. On lines with track circuits, this
measure is not required, so the clearance may be checked by the track clear detection.

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 3.6 Special Operating Situations

Fig. 3.21: Protecting engineering possession limits with control transferred to engineering staff

3.6.3 Non-shunting Vehicles

Non-shunting vehicles are vehicles that are not safely detected by track clear detection
technology. While the term ‘non-shunting’ comes from track circuit technology (shunting not
in the sense of shunting moves but in the sense of electrical shunting the two rails of a track
circuit section), the term is in a broader sense also used for vehicles not safely detected by
axle counters. This applies to many vehicles used for track inspection, construction, and
maintenance. A typical example are rubber tired road vehicles equipped with retractable
guiding wheels allowing the road vehicle to be put on rails and run like a railway vehicle.
Track sections occupied by non-shunting vehicles must be blocked by applying manual
lockings and reminders on the user interface preventing the operator from accidently
clearing a signal for a train move into the section. In station areas, non-shunting vehicles
must only be moved in shunting mode. On the open line, some railways developed rules to
allow non-shunting vehicles to run at higher speeds within sections that are kept blocked for
regular train moves. The blocking must remain in effect until it was reported to the operator
that the non-shunting vehicles have safely left the relevant sections.

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 4.1 Overview

4 Interlocking Principles
Gregor Theeg, Ulrich Maschek with support from David Stratton, Jörn Pachl,
Oleg Nasedkin, Giorgio Mongardi, Heinz Tillmanns, Jochen Trinckauf, Thomas White

4.1 Overview

4.1.1 Introduction

Interlocking fulfils the function of ‘information processing’, as shown in figure 1.3 (the control
loop). Interlocking is the central function to ensure that trains move safely in technical terms.
To achieve this, the interlocking obtains information about track occupation (by rail vehicles
and other objects; chapter 5) and the position of movable track elements (chapter 6). It then
evaluates this information and permits movements via the signals (chapter 7). Amongst others,
two basic principles are enforced technically by interlocking functions:
–– A signal can only permit a train movement if all movable track elements are in proper
position and locked (dependence between points and signals), and the elements must
remain locked as long as they are being used by the train.
–– With train spacing by fixed block (chapter 3.4.1), a train can only be permitted to enter a section
which is clear of other rolling stock; and no other train may be permitted to enter that section.
Amongst the different interlocking systems (mechanical, relay, electronic), the same logical
principles of interlocking are applied to a large extent, though there are large variations of detail
between the countries and the technical systems.
This chapter 4 deals with the logical principles of interlocking, whereas chapter 9 describes
the technical solutions for route interlocking and chapter 10 those for line block systems. The
primary focus is on systems where safety is provided technically, although occasionally non-
technical systems also have to be considered. Within this, the focus of chapter 4 is further
systems using the ‘fixed block’ as a principle of train separation (chapter 3.4.1); those with
moving block or time intervals are not considered.
The interlocking principles are connected with the operating philosophies and, based upon
their historical development, can be devided roughly into those influenced by British, German
and North American principles respectively (chapter 3.1). For discussion on the geographical
distribution and mixed forms, see chapter 3.1. Concerning interlocking, there are larger
similarities between the British and North American principles, than there are with the German.
The following explanations will occasionally refer to these three basic groups.

4.1.2 Basic Principles of Safeguarding a Train’s Path

There are two basic principles regarding the methods of safeguarding the way, which can be
distinguished and defined as follows:
–– Route. The whole path including the positions of movable track elements and track clear
detection is only checked upon request, normally when setting the route before clearing
the signal (and it is then supervised until the train enters the route). The principle ‘route’
can provide almost all the protective functions of figure 1.2. Typically, these are following
train, opposing train and flank protection and safety at movable track elements, but it also
contributes to speed targeting at movable track elements. It can even incorporate level
crossings and obstacle detection.
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4 Interlocking Principles

–– Block Information. After a train has cleared the block section, the message confirming this is
generated and transmitted to the entry point of the section. There, this information is stored,
to permit the later entry of another train. The principle ‘block information’ can only provide
following and opposite protection. Therefore it is basically applicable to open line sections.
Historically, this difference emerged from track clear detection being by the observation of
the signaller: Within the control area of a signal box (an interlocking), the signallers who were
responsible for setting the routes proved the track clear directly by sight before clearing the
signal. In contrast, between two neighbouring signal boxes with a longer portion of line in
between which was not visible from either of them, this principle could not be applied and
other solutions had to be found. Here the clear status of the line section was concluded from
information about trains entering and completely leaving the section.
However, the difference between the principles ‘route’ and ‘block information’ lost much of
its operational importance with the introduction of continuous technical track clear detection.
With this, all block system functions can also be provided by routes. Thus in recent years the
principle of ‘block information’ has been superseded in some countries, with the principle of
‘route’ being used also on open lines.
In most countries where train and shunting movements are determined separately (chapter
3.3), shunting movements are restricted to particular areas (e. g. station areas). The principle
‘block information’ is basically applied to train movements. The principle ‘route’, in contrast,
can be applied to both train and shunting movements.

4.1.3 Protection of Trains by a Signal at Stop in Rear

A basic principle of the protection of following movements is that a train always has to be protected
by a stop signal in rear. In this sense, danger can occur when a signal remains in the clear position
behind the train erroneously, while another train follows (figure 4.1). To prevent this situation, if
trackside signals are used, the following strategies were developed and are applied additionally to
the normal route and block conditions:
1. Signal B turns to stop safely before the rear end of the train has cleared the end of the
supervised section of signal A. This solution requires additional technical efforts, e. g. the use
of type N relays (chapter 9.3.2.1) in relay technology and/or closing of the signal by redundant
information and detectors. It is widely applied in route locking systems with clearing the signal
before irreversible route locking (chapter 4.3.8.2) and in automatic block systems.
2. If safe placing of the signal at stop is not provided, logical solutions in the sequence of signal
control have to be defined. They are particularly important for railways influenced by German
interlocking principles. Variants are:
a) Two consecutive main signals must never show a proceed aspect at the same time. An
important disadvantage of this strategy is that in case of short block sections, the driver is
always shown caution aspects, which makes free running traffic impossible. However, this
strategy is applied in station tracks where no through-routes are required.
b) Signal A can only be cleared when signal B is in Stop position. However, this does not
prevent signal B from clearing while signal A shows a proceed aspect (unidirectional
dependence, see chapter 4.2.3). This solution requires a strict sequence of operation input
commands and is therefore difficult in practical terms, but it is used in several applications.
c) Signal A can only be cleared if since the last clearing of signal A, signal B has some time
been replaced to stop aspect by a train having passed it. This is a widely used strategy for
modern route interlocking and block systems following German principles. It is operationally
flexible, but requires more effort than solutions a) and b).

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 4.2 Element Dependences

These basic strategies are relevant for the principle “route” as well as for the principle “block
information”. Later in chapter 4, they will be referenced several times where they become relevant.

Figure 4.1: Dangerous situation caused by signal remaining open erroneously

4.2 Element Dependences

4.2.1 Classification

Dependences between individual elements are the simplest form of interlocking. Elements
which can be interlocked are:
–– movable track elements such as points, derailers and others (chapter 6.1)
–– signals
–– other elements such as level crossings
Element dependences can be distinguished by different criteria, one of which is the number of
elements to be locked:
–– interlocking between two elements
–– interlocking among three or more elements, also called ‘conditional locking’
According to the logical arrangements, element dependences can be devided into the
following elementary locking functions:
–– coupling of two or more elements (chapter 4.2.2)
–– unidirectional locking of two or more elements (chapter 4.2.3)
–– bidirectional locking:
• between two elements (‘simple locking’; chapter 4.2.4)
• with three (or more) elements (‘conditional locking’; chapter 4.2.5)
The principles are explained in the following section. By AND- and OR-combinations of several
of these elementary locking functions, complex route interlocking systems can be built up. This
is used particularly in British and North American influenced interlocking principles.

4.2.2 Coupled Elements

Coupled elements are operated by the same operational element and can only be switched
together in regular operation. The most typical case is that of two movable track elements
giving flank protection to each other, such as the two sets of points of a crossover (figure 4.2)
or a set of points and a derailer protecting that set of points.
This kind of locking is typical in British and North American influenced interlocking logic, but
not for the German. Often both coupled sets of points have the same identification number,
possibly distinguished by the suffixes A and B. A disadvantage is that if the detection of one
element fails, both cannot be switched by normal operation command. Another disadvantage
in mechanical interlocking is that the signaller must use twice as much effort to switch them.

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4 Interlocking Principles

Figure 4.2: Switching of two coupled elements

4.2.3 Unidirectional Locking

In unidirectional locking with two interlocked elements, one independent and one dependent
element exist. The independent element can be moved freely (unless locked by other functions).
The dependent element can only be set to a certain position if the independent element is also in
a certain position, and leaves this immediately when the independent element leaves its position.
With more than two interlocked elements, the position of the dependent element depends
on combinations of positions of the independent elements. In the following, the case of two
interlocked elements is described further, as it is the most frequent case.
The most typical case is the dependence between a main signal and its associated distant
signal (figure 4.3). As the ability to bring the main signal to Stop at any time must be preserved
for safety reasons, the main signal can be switched without considering the position of the
distant signal. The aspect of the distant signal, however, depends on the aspect of the main
signal. Only if the main signal shows a proceed aspect, the distant signal can show Clear.
However, it can also be kept at Caution by other locking functions. Reasons might be points in
the wrong position between the main and the distant signal, or another main signal located at
the same place as the distant signal being in Stop position. But if the main signal is returned to
Stop, the distant signal follows immediately.

Figure 4.3: Unidirectional dependence between main and distant signal

Figure 4.4: Unidirectional locking between points and signal

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 4.2 Element Dependences

In North American interlocking, the principle of unidirectional locking is also applied to the
dependences between points and signals in some situations with manually operated points
(figure 4.4, chapter 3.3.2.2). The signal can only show a proceed aspect if all the points in the
path are in their correct positions. But once the signal shows a proceed aspect, the points are
not locked by the signal. If the points leave their end position (meaning: the manual key lock
is unlocked), the signal is immediately returned to Stop. To ensure a certain level of safety if a
train is already approaching, this arrangement is related to the obligation to wait a defined time
between unlocking the points by the key and actually switching them.

4.2.4 Simple Bidirectional Locking

In bidirectional locking, two or more elements are interlocked that way so that one
combination of positions is impossible and each element is locked if the others are in these
respective position(s).
A typical example here is the most frequently used form of dependence between points and
signals (figure 4.5): The signal is locked in the Stop position if the points are diverging in the
example of figure 4.5, and the points are locked in the straight position if the signal shows a
proceed aspect. This means that a certain combination of positions (signal at Proceed and
points diverging) is impossible. The elements have to be switched in a defined sequence. First,
the points have to be straight, then the signal can be cleared. Thus this kind of locking is also
named ‘sequential locking’.

Figure 4.5: Sequential dependence between a set of points and a signal

The same principle is also applied to points and derailers (figure 4.6) or to two sets of points
offering flank protection to each other, particularly in German influenced interlocking logic.
The purpose is the same as for coupled switching (chapter 4.2.2) to ensure flank protection,
and systems differ in which of the two elements has to be switched first and which second.
In mechanical systems, sequential locking can be solved by manual key locks, with a key unlocking
either the one or the other element from the locked position, or by tappets (chapter 9.2.4.4).

Figure 4.6: Sequential dependence between a set of points and a derailer

4.2.5 Conditional Bidirectional Locking

Conditional bidirectional locking is similar to the simple, but for three or (rarely) more
interlocked elements.

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4 Interlocking Principles

In figure 4.7, signal 1 can only be cleared if there is a safe path ahead. One condition (not
considered further here) is that points 2 must be locked in either end position, which is in fact
an OR-combination of two simple locks, one for each end position. However, if points 2 are
straight, there is another safety condition: points 3 must also be locked straight. The commonly
used term in Western European countries ‘conditional locking’ (Retiveau 1987, Such 1956)
means in the example of figure 4.7: ‘If points 3 are in the diverging position, then signal 1 at
Proceed locks points 2 in the diverging position (and points 2 straight lock signal 1 at Stop)’.
This is equivalent to ‘Signal 1 at Proceed, points
2 straight and points 3 diverging cannot occur at
the same time’.
Combinations of several simple and conditional
locks form the basis for cascade route locking
(chapter 4.3.9) in British and North American
Figure 4.7: Conditional bidirectional locking influenced interlocking logic.

4.3 Routes

4.3.1 Introduction

4.3.1.1 Safety Functions Provided by Routes

Routes are a form of safeguarding a complete path of a train over the complete length over
which the movement is permitted. An important basis of a route is dependences between
elements, e. g. between points and signals (chapter 4.2), but also checking that the tracks are
clear before permitting the movement is an important precondition.
Routes can fulfil or contribute to the following protective functions (figure 1.2):
–– prevention of derailment on non-continuous guideway locations: Movable track elements
have to be in their proper positions
–– prevention of derailment on the continuous guideway by choice of the proper speed
according to the line geometry and radii at divergences
–– protection of following, opposing and flank movements
–– optional protection at level crossings if they are included in the route (chapter 13.4.4.1)
–– optional protection against obstacles, if these detection systems are included in the route
dependences (chapter 5.1.2)
These functions can also include a certain protection against human errors, such as overruns
of stop signals (chapter 4.3.6).

4.3.1.2 Definitions of Terms

When all the movable track elements are in proper positions so that a train can take a certain
direction, this way is called ‘path’.
Before a train movement is allowed to traverse the path, certain preconditions have to be
proved. The most important of these preconditions are:
–– The movable track elements of the path have to be in the correct positions and locked
against being switched while the train is passing over them.
–– The tracks have to be clear and conflicting movements at the same time prevented. The
objects to be detected can differ: Often the detection is only for rail vehicles, not for external
obstacles (which are actually not allowed to be in the tracks), leading to a certain loss of safety.
–– The route needs a distinct target, e. g. signal at Stop (chapter 4.1.3).
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 4.3 Routes

The path can be safeguarded either technically or non-technically under the responsibility of
staff. A technically safeguarded path with a defined entrance and exit point is called a ‘route’.
In countries where train and shunting movements are distinguished as different classes of
movements (chapter 3.3), routes can be distinguished as either train routes or shunting
routes. This refers mainly to countries which follow German or British operational principles.
Often (particularly in older systems following German principles) separate shunting routes
are not provided, but shunting is done completely under the responsibility of staff (‘free
shunting’). Where separate shunting routes are provided, their interlocking functions are often
less complex than these for train routes. For these reasons, in the following the interlocking
principles will be described primarily regarding train routes. Shunting routes are considered in
chapter 4.3.10.

4.3.1.3 Safeguarding of the Path by Human Operators

If paths are safeguarded fully or partly under the responsibility of staff, the responsible
persons can be one of the following, or both with shared responsibility:
–– The ground staff who have to prove all conditions before authorising a movement, must
not switch elements under or in front of a moving train. They must also ensure protection
against other movements.
–– The train driver whose movement authority is only valid with the restriction that he has to
check the tracks. The driver has to go slowly on sight, looking for other rail vehicles and
external obstacles, and be able to stop at any obstacle. In some cases, the driver even
has to check the position and locked status of each movable track element, which is
displayed to him by special point position indicators.
Until now, safeguarding the path with staff taking responsibility for safety is often applied in
situations with low speed or reduced safety requirements. Examples are:
–– For shunting. This applies also in countries where no distinction between train and
shunting movements is made (North American operational principles), for movements
fulfilling the same purposes. According to different definitions of the terms ‘train
movement’ (also called ‘running movement’) and ‘shunting movement’, this can also
include all movements into occupied tracks, even if they are defined as train movements.
–– In many countries on secondary lines and urban railways with reduced requirements due
to low speed and/or low traffic volume (non signal-controlled operation).
–– To maintain traffic in the case of equipment failure (degraded mode operation, chapter 4.5).

4.3.2 Extension of Routes and Related Speed Restrictions

4.3.2.1 Topological Extension

Each route has a defined start and a defined target position, usually called route entrance/
exit position. The entrance is at the signal permitting the movement, or a distinct point in
proximity to that signal. In case the route is signalled without trackside signals, e. g. by
cab signalling, it is a comparable point as ‘virtual signal’. The route exit can be one of the
following:
–– a main signal or another signal which can indicate a stop aspect
–– an end of a track (usually equipped with a fixed signal)
–– the end of the interlocking area; this can be the exit to the open line (whose exact location
is defined differently among the railways) or the entry into an unsupervised shunting area

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4 Interlocking Principles

4.3.2.2 Topological Parts of a Route

Parts of the route which have to be safeguarded are (figure 4.8):
–– The running path, which means the tracks which will regularly be occupied by the train during
its traverse of the route. It includes sections both with and without movable track elements.
–– An overlap which can extend over a short section to protect against a minor overrun of the
train caused by misjudgement of braking (chapter 4.3.6), or which can even accommodate
the whole braking distance from maximum speed to Stop.
–– The flank areas which protect the train against unauthorised movements from the flank
(chapter 4.3.5).
–– The end of the protected section, to protect against opposing movements (chapter 4.3.6).
–– The start section which is situated in rear of the route entrance signal, but either occupied
by the starting train or situated between the head of the starting train and the route
entrance signal (chapter 4.3.7).

Figure 4.8: Topological parts of a route

The practical consideration of these parts for interlocking differs between the railways. While
locking the running path is essential, there are large differences regarding the other parts:
–– Some railways do not provide overlaps, arguing that good train protection systems prevent
overruns safely.
–– Other railways do not provide particular flank protection, arguing that all movements
traverse routes, and therefore assume that flank movements cannot occur.
–– Front protection is considered to different extents.
–– Locking of the start section is of importance only if there are movable track elements within
this section.

4.3.2.3 Local Validity of Speed Restrictions

When using route signalling with trackside signals (chapter 7.6.4.2) or modern cab signalling
systems (chapters 8.3.5, 8.3.6), the speed limit can be individually adapted to each track
element. This is applied only in some of those systems. However, when using speed signalling
with trackside signals (chapter 7.6.4.2), which is the most frequent case, usually one speed
limit is assigned to the whole route. Particularly in stations with two or more consecutive main
signals, the regulations about the local validity of the speed limits differ much between the
­railways. There are two basic solutions, which for simplicity of explanation are described for
stations with entry and exit routes only and without intermediate signals (figure 4.9):
1. The speed indication of a station home signal is valid through the whole station until the
rear end of the train has cleared the last movable track element of the station (figure 4.9.1).
Therefore, at the station exit signal often no speed indication is given, but the indication of
the home signal in rear is still valid although only green is displayed on the station exit signal.
The advantage of this solution, which is applied in France, Russia and other countries, is less
effort for speed signalling and simpler operational rules, particularly in special cases like points
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 4.3 Routes

situated in the start section of an exit route (chapter 4.3.7). However, the task of informing a
driver who starts a train in the station track or has a longer stop there has to be considered.
Other difficulties occur if different speeds could be achieved for the entry and exit routes
(figure 4.10). For these cases, either the lower of both speeds is valid through the whole
station, or exceptionally solution 2 has to be used.

Figure 4.9: Local validity of speed restrictions in stations

2. Different speed restrictions are indicated for the entry and the exit route (figure 4.9, 2a–e).
This solution is applied by the majority of railways. The advantages are more flexibility in track
layout planning (no need to plan symmetrical stations), fewer difficulties in the case of non-
symmetrical train movements (figure 4.10) and greater safety (not forgetting the previous
speed indication). However, this is the more
complicated case, as it is necessary to define the
exact ‘border’ between these two speed limits.
Some solutions are described in the following:
• In the case 2a, each speed is valid from the
route entrance signal until the rear end of the
train has passed all movable track elements
belonging to the route. In the section
between, different definitions can be applied
(e. g. the higher of both speeds). An example
is in the Czech Republic.
• In the case 2b, each station throat is defined
as a separate interlocking area, limited by
the opposite home signals. In the section
between (defined as open line section),
a separate line speed is fixed. This is the
solution in North America.
• In the case 2c, the border between the two
speed restrictions is the regular stop position
Figure 4.10: Example for non-symmetrical
of a train. This is only applicable for trains that entry and exit routes
have a regular stop. An example is Germany.
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4 Interlocking Principles

For trains that do not stop, the rule of case 2d applies. This solution is easy to understand
for the train driver, but can cause additional difficulties as the scheduled stop position
receives safety importance.
• In the case 2d, the speed of the home signal is valid until the rear end of the train has
passed the next signal. However, this causes problems for the drivers, who have to
memorise the speed displayed at the signal in rear after a scheduled stop, or if the train
starts in the station track. This is the reason why in Germany, for trains which stop, the
rule of case 2c applies.
• In the case 2e, the speed of the station entry or intermediate signal is valid until the front
end has passed the next signal, with the same disadvantage as 2d.
In chapter 4.3.7, the solutions 2a–e of figure 4.9 are further analysed in a context where the
differences are particularly important.

4.3.3 Basic Route Locking Functions

4.3.3.1 Overview
To fulfil the safety requirements described in chapter 4.3.1 and other operational requirements,
the following functions of routes are to be considered:
–– Locking of movable track elements in the route (chapter 4.3.3.2). Besides points, movable
track elements include all other elements which disrupt the running rail or protrude into the
clearance profile, such as crossings, derailers, movable bridges, cranes etc. (chapter 6.1.1).
–– Interlocking of conflicting routes (chapter 4.3.3.3).
–– Track clear detection before permitting a movement. This refers to occupation by rail
vehicles (chapter 4.3.3.4), in some cases also external objects.
–– The route has to be proved to have a distinct target to ensure the local limitation of the
movement authority. Therefore, most railways prove the route exit signal to be illuminated
within the route locking functions (chapter 4.1.3).
–– In some cases, level crossings with roads are locked in the route in a similar way to
movable track elements (chapter 13.4.4.1).
–– In some cases other functions are included in route locking. Examples are preventing an
electric locomotive from entering a non-electrified track, or preventing a too long train from
entering a station track (chapter 4.3.3.5).
Over time, interlocking systems were continuously improved, and several new features were
developed independently in different countries. Later developments then had to be adapted
to the existing systems of each particular country. Besides, different priorities were set in the
conflict between safety and availability of the systems. This resulted in many variations, though
the basic principles are much the same.

4.3.3.2 Locking of Movable Track Elements

For protection at movable track elements, the following two functions of interlocking between
signals and moving trains on the one hand and movable track elements on the other side have
to be fulfilled:
–– Whenever a signal is cleared, the elements belonging to the route have to be locked and
proven in the correct position as long as the signal remains in a clear position (dependence
between points and signals). The elements included in the locking can differ, especially in
flank protection and overlap elements (chapters 4.3.5, 4.3.6).

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 4.3 Routes

–– After a signal has been cleared and a train enters the section, each element has to be
kept locked until the train has cleared this section, even if the signal has returned to Stop
position in the meantime (chapter 4.3.8).

4.3.3.3 Interlocking of Conflicting Routes

Conflicting routes are different routes which use a common piece of infrastructure. The following
two methods of interlocking two conflicting routes against each other can be used (figure 4.11):
–– Simple route interlocking (by track elements): Routes which require at least one movable
track element to be in a different position are interlocked against each other by the position of
this element and do not need to be interlocked separately. Such simple route interlockings are
accepted by most railways today, otherwise special interlocking has to be provided in all cases.
–– Special route interlocking: Conflicting routes which do not differ in the position of any
movable track element have to be interlocked against each other by special means. This
method requires additional effort in the interlocking logic.
The most important cases of special interlocking are (figure 4.11):
–– The opposing case: Unless moving on sight, opposing routes into the same track must
always be excluded. For shunting movements and train movements on sight, the requirements
differ among the countries and with the length of the track section. In some cases these
movements are excluded, whereas others aim to achieve faster operation when assembling
trains. One solution to fulfil this interlocking function is the individual locking of routes, another is
the use of separate locking of up and down direction in each movable track element.
–– The consecutive case: In some technical and operational situations, consecutive routes
need to be interlocked against each other to prevent through movements using a certain
track (chapter 4.1.3). The requirements also differ for a train route and a consecutive
shunting route. In some situations and by some railways, exclusion is required to prevent
a rail vehicle which entered as a train to continue without stop as a shunting movement. A
­typical example is a reception route for freight trains and, following from the same track, a
route for pushing wagons over the hump. In other cases, and for different reasons, a certain
sequence of setting the two routes is required.

Figure 4.11: Simple and special route interlocking

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4 Interlocking Principles

–– The crossing/overlapping of profile case: Even if the diamond crossing has no movable
parts, movements on both tracks at the same time have to be prevented. The same refers
to any situation where clearance profiles of neighbouring tracks overlap. This situation
can be handled either by special interlocking between individual routes or by defining the
crossing as a movable track element with two virtual end positions.

4.3.3.4 Track Clear Detection and Movement on Sight

To prove the tracks clear is a necessity before permitting a movement unless movement on
sight is commanded, in which case the train driver fulfils this function.
In most modern interlocking systems, track occupancy is supervised continuously by track
circuits (chapter 5.3) or axle counters (chapter 5.4). This is included in the route locking
conditions, at least on main tracks. In many older (mechanical and electro-mechanical)
interlocking systems, some of which are still in operation, no technical detection was used.
Instead, checking track occupancy before permitting a train movement was the responsibility
of the signaller, which is an important safety shortcoming of these systems, but can be
appropriate as a cheap solution for reduced requirements.
Where the driver is responsible for
track clear detection, two possibilities
of movement on sight can be
distinguished (figure 4.12):
–– movement to the full sighting
distance, if no opposing movement
is possible,
–– movement to half the sighting
distance, if opposing movements
have to be considered.
The cases can be distinguished by
different signal aspects or (in most
cases) by local or general regulations.
In some cases, the train is proven by Figure 4.12: Versions of movement on sight
track occupation to be stationary or
moving at a very low speed before on sight operation is permitted (IRSE 1999).

4.3.3.5 Other Locking Functions

Besides the above mentioned basic functions, several other locking functions are provided by
some railways and interlocking types. Some of them are safety related, others serve only to
prevent operational hindrances. They are described below.
Most railways use some form of prevention of premature release of routes due to errors
of track clear detection, which would result in dangerous consequences. This is particularly
important where track circuits are used, as the probability of false occupation is relatively high.
Different strategies are applied (figure 4.13):
1. The route can only be released after the sequential occupation and clearing of at least two
neighbouring sections of track, in an appropriate order.
2. A combination of a rail contact (which detects the occupation safely) with a short track
circuit (which detects the clearing safely) is used (chapter 5.2.3.2).

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 4.3 Routes

3. Time delays are applied between the passage

of the train and the release of the related
route section. This only prevents dangerous
consequences of detection error of short
duration, but not for longer enduring errors.
At borders between electrified and non-electrified
areas or between differently electrified areas, the
entry of an electric motive power unit into an
inappropriate area is not desirable. One solution
is additional route indicators at the wayside signal
which indicate the direction of the route to the
driver. If the signaller has set a wrong route by
error, the driver can recognise this error in time. Figure 4.13: Methods to prevent premature
Another measure is a special input command release of a route
required from the signaller to confirm that he is
aware of the non-electrification of the route target, and has checked that no unsuitable train is
approaching. Complete (non-safe) technical solutions can be found in connection with a train
describer system (chapter 4.3.11) which knows the category of an approaching train.
Preventing deadlock situations can be a reason for additional non-safety locking functions
(figure 4.14). A typical case is in installations where the principle ‘route’ is applied to open lines
to ensure that only trains travelling in the same direction can be on the block line between two
interlocking stations.

Figure 4.14: Examples of deadlock situations

Another useful feature is the prevention of entry into a too short track in stations, which would
also obstruct traffic. Train describer systems or special signal aspects can help to prevent that.
A third solution is length measurement of trains by track clear detection: Let us assume that in
figure 4.15 section E is already occupied by another train, D is clear and D has the same length
as B. Then an additional locking function can be provided which permits signal 1 to clear only
if section B is occupied and section A clear. As the train nevertheless has to enter the station
slowly (or even on sight) due to partial occupation of the target track, the loss of time by forcing
the train to stop at signal 1 is only slight. In Britain, this kind of control is called ‘Lime Street
Control’ from the name of the station in Liverpool where it was first applied (IRSE 1999).
In some cases, authorisation by special persons such as customs officers is required for certain
routes. This authorisation is given by a special operation element, e. g. by depressing a button
which is only accessible to these persons. Examples can be the authorisation of border police
forces to cross the border or the authorisation of maintenance staff to leave the workshop.

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Figure 4.15: Length measurement by track clear detection

4.3.3.6 Duration of Locking

The route must be locked before permitting a train on a route and remain locked either until
cleared by the train or until the trains has come to a stop. Although the route is usually set
up and locked as a whole, the release (unlocking) of the route takes place either as a whole
after the release conditions are fulfilled for the whole route or in sections when the release
conditions are fulfilled for the respective route section. With sectional route release, elements
which are no more required can quicker be used for another route, increasing the capacity of
the infrastructure. The release conditions are usually defined in the following ways (figure 4.16):
–– For elements in the running path. They have to remain locked until cleared by the train. For
the prevention of premature release, see chapter 4.3.3.5. A special situation in stations refers
to elements situated in the target track of the route, which remain occupied by the train
standing in the station. They can be released following the same principles as for the overlap.
–– For elements in the overlap (if they are included). They have to remain locked and checked
clear until the train is stationary in the target section of the route, or until it has travelled
further onto a continuation route beyond the route exit signal.
–– For flank protection. These have to be locked for as long as the corresponding running path
element or overlap element, to which they offer flank protection.
Obtaining the confirmation that a train is stationary, which is required for overlap release, offers
some difficulties: There are various solutions, the most important of which are:
–– The stop is observed visually by a person (mainly applied in old systems).
–– The stop is assumed after a defined time has elapsed since the train has completely
reached the target section (mainly applied in modern systems).
–– The stop information is transmitted from the train by an advanced train control system. Only
few modern systems (e. g. LZB, ETCS Level 2) can enable this (chapters 8.3.6, 8.4), but
even here this possibility is not used in all applications.

Figure 4.16: Duration of locking of elements

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4.3.4 Route Selection

In the operation of the interlocking, for setting up a route by the signaller, there are two principles:
–– Individual point operation. Each movable track element is set individually and if all movable
track elements are in the correct positions and locked, the route locking functions can
be applied. This method is used in mechanical interlocking technology but also in some,
especially older, relay interlocking systems. In other relay and electronic interlocking
systems it is applied in degraded mode operation.
–– Entrance-exit (NX) operation. The signaller selects the route by operating only the
entrance and exit elements. The movable track elements are then set automatically by
automatic point setting (chapter 4.3.11).

Figure 4.17: Alternative routes between the same entrance and exit

An interesting issue in entrance-exit operation is in case there is more than one route
available between an entrance and an exit (figure 4.17). Usually, one of the routes is
considered as the priority route, which will be set if possible and if no other selection has
been made. To select an alternative route, one of the following criteria can be employed
(figure 4.18):
–– If the priority route is not
available, the alternative route is
automatically chosen. Where more
than two alternative routes are
available, an order of preference
has to be defined.
–– Selection of the alternative route
by the signaller. Depending on
the interlocking system, this
can be achieved by pushing
an intermediate button, thus
selecting a sequence of partial
routes, or by individually setting
or locking one or more decisive
sets of points.
The selection of alternative overlaps
(chapter 4.3.6.5) for the same route
can be done in a similar way, with
the additional possibility of selection
Figure 4.18: Route selection in case of alternative routes
of direction by a continuing route. (with two possible routes only)

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4.3.5 Flank Protection

4.3.5.1 Methods of Flank Protection

Dangerous flank movements can originate from following types of activities:
–– trains and shunting movements on conflicting routes; this is excluded by interlocking logic
(chapter 4.3.3.3)
–– shunting without route
–– unsecured parked vehicles which then roll away
Most railways provide flank protection at least for train routes. The area between the running
path and the protective element is often proved clear. Flank protection can be given by the
following protective measures (figure 4.19):

Figure 4.19: Methods of flank protection

1. Movable track elements such as points, derailers and catch points (chapter 6.1.5) which
direct offending movements away from the route or derail them. This can be solved by
linking the points of a crossover (chapter 4.2.2) or by including the protective elements into
the route locking functions.

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2. Signals locked in the Stop position. To enable full protection, the red signal lamp has to be
proven alight. With reduced safety, some railways also accept a dark (unlit) signal as flank
protection (examples: Poland, Russia), as train driver is obligated to consider this extinct
signal as Stop.
3. Regulations which prevent flank movements. Such regulations can forbid shunting or
parking vehicles on certain tracks or even forbid free shunting (without shunting route) in
general (example for the latter: Netherlands).
Of these methods, (1) is the strongest, whereas the others are weaker because they depend
on people obeying the rules. Not all kinds of measures can protect against all kinds of
endangering movements (figure 4.19). Therefore, often a combination of two methods is used,
e. g. a signal and a prohibition on leaving vehicles on the track concerned.
The requirements for application and the chosen form of flank protection differ. An especially
controversial issue is whether to provide flank protection for the overlap or not, as this is only
relevant if two independent errors occur at the same time. These are the overrun of the train
and an unauthorised movement of other vehicles into the overlap, which is very unlikely.

4.3.5.2 Track Clear Detection of Flank Areas

The railways differ in whether to prove the flank areas, which are the tracks between route
points and corresponding protective elements (figure 4.8), technically clear or not. Under certain
circumstances, the requirement of proving the flank area clear can reduce the usable length of a
station track significantly (figure 4.20). On the other hand, renouncing this requirement ­decreases
safety and/or requires additional operational rules to ensure safety against vehicles rolling
away unintended. Such rules can forbid shunting or the parking of vehicles, or define special
requirements concerning the parking brakes and the supervision of parked vehicles.

Figure 4.20: Usable track length with and without the requirement of clear flank areas

4.3.5.3 Transferred and Branched Flank Protection

If the adjacent track element to that requiring flank protection is not able to give it, the request
is transferred to the next element, further away. Thus the flank area which has to be proven
clear becomes longer. Two typical cases are explained in the following:
1. Transferred (secondary) flank protection: In the case of figure 4.21, if the element which
should normally give flank protection cannot do so, it transfers the request to the next element
(in this case the signal). Application examples are dual protective requests (chapter 4.3.5.4) and
defective elements. If in this case also the signal is not operating properly, track section B may
give flank protection, which means it has to be clear. This is implemented in some situations. An
additional possibility is to transfer flank protection even in case an already active route the flank
protection element becomes disturbed.
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Figure 4.21: Transferred flank protection

2. Branched flank protection: In the case of figure 4.22, points 2 cannot give flank
protection for points 1 due to the track layout. Therefore, points 2 have to transfer the
flank protection request toward both trailing ends. In the one branch, points 3 can give
protection against a movement from track C, whereas in the other branch signal 4 can
give protection against movements from track B. The flank area extends, which means
that points 2 also have to be detected clear.

Figure 4.22: Branched flank protection

4.3.5.4 Dual Protection Requests

A particular case of transferred flank protection is conflicting requests by two routes (or by
the same route). Examples are shown in figure 4.23. Cases of conflicting requests by two
non-consecutive routes (figure 4.23a) can be solved as follows, when using the topological
principle (chapter 4.3.9):
1. The first requested route gets flank protection by the dual protective points.
2. The second requested route gets remote flank protection by another element further away
from the route to be protected.
3. When the first requested route (which means the partial route for which the dual protective
points give flank protection) has been released, the dual protective points can switch and
give flank protection for the other route. This feature is optional and its implementation
differs between the railways and systems.
Some interlocking systems offer the possibility of defining priorities between the two
conflicting flank protection requests. The prioritised route always gets flank protection from
the dual protective elements, whereas the other route gets flank protection by the dual
protective element only if no request from the priority route exists. Otherwise, it gets remote
protection from another element, further away. For this reason, the dual protective element
is not locked in the non-priority route. Thus it can be switched if a flank protection request is
issued by the priority route.

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Figure 4.23: Conflicting flank protection requests by two routes (left) and by the same route (right)

In the case of conflicting requests by the same route (figure 4.23b), two solutions (including
variants and mixed forms) are possible:
1. A priority is defined and the non-priority flank protection request gets remote protection.
The priority can be defined by different criteria, such as the length of the flank areas.
2. The situation is solved dynamically. Initially, the dual protective element protects the running
path element which is the first in the direction the train is moving. After the train has cleared
this part of the route, the dual protective element switches to give flank protection for the
other running path element until the train has cleared this also. As the time is usually short,
this solution is seldom applied.
In special cases, flank protection requests to a dual protective element can generally be
transferred to another element further behind (e. g. a signal) to avoid extremely frequent switching
of the element. This is particularly suitable if both flank protection requests occur very frequently
and usually alternately, e. g. for points in parking and reversing tracks between the main tracks
on metropolitan railways, with fixed interval timetables. This can be the case in figure 4.23a. In
metropolitan railways where no non-tractive vehicles are parked, but only fixed coupled units
with at least one tractive vehicle, the probability of rolling away is low and therefore the loss of
safety by giving flank protection by a signal instead of points is relatively slight.

4.3.6 Overlaps and Front Protection

4.3.6.1 Purpose
Overlaps are applied by most railways and give an additional protection against a minor error
by the driver in target braking. In some cases, they even accommodate the whole braking
distance of the train in case the driver doesn’t brake at all and the train protection system
can’t effectively prevent this. Besides, some railways include ideas of front protection against
opposing movements into their overlap locking functions. Railways also differ in whether or not
to provide flank protection for their overlaps (chapter 4.3.5.1).

4.3.6.2 Overlap Length

The required length of the overlap is determined by the following:
–– Kind of danger point: Distinction can be made according to the type of element to be
protected (e. g. facing points, fouling point of trailing points, standing rail vehicles etc.).
Another possibility is to distinguish between the kind of movement (train/shunting) beyond
the danger point to be protected.
–– Speed of the train. The faster the train approaches the braking target point, the higher the
probability of an overrun and the longer the expected length of the overrun is. Therefore,
many railways vary the length of the overlap by the approach speed.
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–– The kind of applied train protection system (chapter 8). A main purpose of train protection
systems is to prevent overruns or, in the case of an overrun, to limit its length. Some systems
are more effective than others in this respect. Therefore, several railways distinguish the length
of the overlap by presence or absence of train protection or by particular systems.
Based on these ideas, the railways have defined overlap lengths as being between nil and
400 metres for protection against minor overrun on conventional railways, or even up to a few
kilometres in some older high speed signalling systems. Some railways use constant length
overlaps, but others vary the overlap length by the above criteria. Some railways (e. g. the
Dutch) have abandoned overlaps in areas equipped with advanced train protection.

4.3.6.3 Locking of Movable Track Elements in the Overlap

Railways differ as to whether points in the overlap have to be locked with the route or not. In
some countries, all points in the overlap have to be locked. But in other railways, either facing
or trailing points in the overlap remain unlocked: Reasons for that are the following:
–– The issue of front protection. If an unauthorised movement in the opposite direction
enters the overlap, danger can be prevented by setting any trailing points in the overlap
away from the route (figure 4.24). Therefore, trailing points in the overlap can remain
unlocked to give the signaller who notices this danger the possibility of averting it. To
increase this protection, trailing points in the overlap or at the end of the overlap can even
be locked in the ‘wrong’ position (as done e. g. in Britain), accepting the damage this will
cause to a non-trailable point machine in the case of an overrun.

Figure 4.24: Front protection against unauthorised opposing movements

–– Possibility to change the overlaps of an active route: If overlaps can be changed while
a route is active, this offers more flexible operation and enables route setting by the
signaller in a progressive sequence without circuitous overlap selection commands. These
procedures, so-called swinging overlaps, are described in chapter 4.3.6.6.
–– Shared overlaps: As the probability of the overrunning of two trains occuring at the same
time is very low, it can be acceptable (and is accepted by some railways) for two different
routes to use the same portion of track for overlap (figure 4.25). There the trailing points
where both overlaps meet cannot be locked for both routes.

Figure 4.25: Shared overlaps

4.3.6.4 Radii in the Overlap

It can be assumed that in the case of an overrun, overlap elements are traversed at very low
speed. Therefore radii in the overlap usually have no influence on the speed of the route.

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 4.3 Routes

4.3.6.5 Selective Overlaps

Selective overlaps (figure 4.26) increase the flexibility of railway operation. Depending on
the operational situation, the signaller can choose between two or more overlaps. Selective
overlaps can be distinguished as follows:
–– Overlaps in different directions (e. g. cases a and b in figure 4.26) differ in the position of at
least one set of facing points. The motivation can be the choice of the continuation route or
conflicts with other routes.
–– Overlaps of different length in the same direction (e. g. cases a and c in figure 4.26) can permit
different speeds on the route. The shorter overlap can be selected when necessary due to
route conflicts, otherwise the longer overlap is selected to enable higher speed of the route.

Figure 4.26: Different overlaps for the same route

4.3.6.6 Alteration of the Overlap of an Active Route

In many cases, the possibility of changing the overlap while the route is effective can be helpful
for flexibility in railway operation:
–– When the reason for a conflict in the overlap of an effective route has ceased, but the train
has not yet entered the route, the overlap can be switched to a longer one to enable
higher speed.
–– On the other hand, a reduction of the overlap length of a route can enable another
movement to be made earlier.
–– The change of the direction (swinging) of the overlap of an effective route can help to
enable a continuing route for the same train, or a route for another train which is in conflict
with the old overlap.
On the other hand, changing the overlap of an effective route can cause a reduction in safety
in the case of an overrun in two situations:
–– In the case of a direction change of the overlap, if the points in the overlap do not reach
their new position in time. This causes additional requirements for the point machines to
reach the new end position or return to the old one safely.
–– In the case of shortening the overlap, should the driver be unable to reduce speed sufficiently.
This prevents reducing the length of the overlap if there is no possibility of informing the driver
of the reduced safe speed in time. With trackside signals, reducing the length of the overlap
is therefore equivalent to cancelling the route and setting a new route with a shorter overlap. It
follows that shortening the overlap of an active route is of no practical importance.
The following solutions regarding overlap alterations can therefore be found in practice (figure 4.27):
–– Static overlaps. Once the route has been set, the overlap cannot be changed.
–– Extendable overlaps. The overlap of an effective route can be lengthened if the reason for
limitation (usually a conflicting route) has ceased. But shortening of the overlap or changing its
direction is not possible. This solution is used in Germany in modern interlocking systems with
selective overlaps. An advantage which increases line capacity is that the route can be set when
the running path and the shortest overlap have been cleared by the previous movement, but
speed can be upgraded later as soon as the longer overlap becomes available. In an extreme
case, which is applied on some metropolitan railways if only following movements need to

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be protected, the route is first set without overlap and full speed is signalled, but the overlap
is locked few seconds later after the train beyond has cleared it (figure 4.28). This solution
takes into account that in the case of following movements, the probability that the previous
train comes to standstill in the overlap (far in rear of the signal beyond) is very low. Only a
combination of two improbable situations (the previous train stands in the overlap and the
following train overruns) can cause danger.

Figure 4.27: Overlap alterations

–– Swinging overlaps (applied in Britain). Facing points in the overlap are not locked and
the direction of the overlap can be changed, provided that the new overlap is clear. Another
precondition for swinging the overlap is that the train is not yet too close to the route exit signal
to make sure that the points reach the new end position in time. If the preconditions are fulfilled,
first the new overlap is reserved, then the decisive points are moved to the new position and
finally the old overlap released. The point machines as well as the processing units have to be
reliable enough to reach the new end position safely, or return to the old position before an
overrunning train can reach the points. An advantage of swinging overlaps is that the signaller
can set consecutive routes for the same train in the ‘correct’ sequence. Without swinging
overlaps, special action is needed to select the overlap before clearing the respective signal.

Figure 4.28: Extendable overlap in some metropolitan railways

4.3.7 Route Elements in the Start Section

In some cases, movable track elements which are situated in rear of the route entrance signal
in the start section have to be included into the route functions (figure 4.29). In particular, this

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occurs with station exit routes in situations where the train starts the route from a scheduled
stop, with the previous route of this train already released (chapter 4.3.3.6). Many railways
try to avoid such situations in track layout planning by not placing movable track elements in
tracks where trains will stop regularly. But particularly in areas with a restricted availability of
space, these situations cannot always be avoided.

Figure 4.29: Examples of route elements in the start section

In cases where the movable track element is already occupied by the starting train (figure 4.29a
and 29b), locking functions are already fulfilled by the track occupation: However, depending
on the interlocking system, additional locking of this element in the route can be applied. In
cases where the element can be situated between the train front end position and the route
entrance signal (figure 4.29c and 29d), this element must always be included in the route locking
functions. Additional special requirements in interlocking logic can occur to determine the exact
position of the starting train in this context, and in the case of converging tracks to determine the
track from which the train starts. The solutions are particular for the interlocking systems and are
not discussed in detail here.

Figure 4.30: Points of the start section influencing the route speed

A controversial problem of speed signalling occurs if the train uses an element in the start
section in the diverging track (figure 4.29b and 29d) and the speed permitted by this element
is lower than the speed the route would permit without this element (figure 4.30). The solutions
interfere with the regulations about the local validity of the speed indication of the signal in rear
and which speed has been signalled there (chapter 4.3.2.3). The case that the speed signalled
at the station home signal is valid through the whole station (figure 4.9, case 1) is the simpler
case in this context. In case of separate speed restrictions for each route (figure 4.9, cases
2a–e), particular attention has to be paid to the element of the start section concerning speed
regulation:

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–– In the case 2a, the driver is obliged to obey the speed restriction of the station entry route
until the rear end of the train has passed the last movable track element between the station
home and exit signals. This includes the element discussed. However, there is a danger of the
driver forgetting this speed restriction when starting the train after a stop, if a higher speed
restriction is displayed at the station exit signal. The same problem occurs with starting trains.
–– In case 2b, the problem does not occur, as diverging points in the route only appear in
interlocking areas. However, the case can occur that a train is in two interlocking areas at
the same time (in one with the front end and in the other with the rear end) and then has to
obey the lower of both speed restrictions.
–– In the cases 2c and 2e, the element has to be considered for speed selection of the
exit route. In unfavourable cases, the speed of the whole exit route is determined by an
element which is occupied only by the last wagon of a starting train. Considering different
train lengths, additional requirements regarding the detection and evaluation of the exact
position and length of the starting train can be necessary.
–– In the case 2d, the element only has to be considered in the exit route in cases of a train
starting in the station track, because here there is no speed of the entry route which would
be additionally valid until the exit signal is passed completely. However, the danger of the
driver forgetting can be a problem anyway.

4.3.8 Life Cycle of Routes

The content of this section is the process of setting up a route before a train can move, and of
releasing that route behind the train.

4.3.8.1 Steps in the Life Cycle of a Route

Generally, the following steps in the life cycle of a route can be distinguished (with some
variations in the sequence):
–– Route calling. The request for a certain route is identified and the route is searched in
the system. This is an especially interesting process in systems working with topological
principles (chapter 4.3.9).
–– Route checking (optional). The availability of the route is checked. The purpose is to avoid
the unnecessary switching of movable track elements and the obstruction of other routes in
case the route is not available.
–– Commanding of movable track elements into the required position and checking their
end position.
–– Route locking. All elements belonging to the route are locked in their proper positions and the
route itself is interlocked to prevent it from being released improperly and to protect other routes.
–– Checking of the clear status of the tracks.
–– Signal selection and control. Determined by route factors such as the radii of diverging
points, overlap length and occupation by other vehicles, the signal aspect is selected and
the main, distant and (if present) repeater signals are cleared. Before clearing the signal
and as long as the signal shows a proceed aspect, several safety conditions are checked.
–– Route supervision. During the time that the route entrance signal is cleared and/or a
train is traversing the route, the route is supervised permanently or on a cyclic basis.
If endangering occurrences such as flank movements, points leaving their positions,
overruns, failure of the route exit signal or other problems are detected, the signal must
be immediately put back to Stop. This often leads to the operation being continued in
degraded mode (chapter 4.5). Also, the signaller retains the possibility of placing the signal
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 4.3 Routes

to Stop. There are different views concerning whether after the loss of supervision due to a
technical failure of short duration, the route can be restored or not.
–– Signal returning to Stop. When the front end of the train has passed the signal, the signal
can be returned to Stop. This must not normally occur within the sight of the driver, even if
in some locomotives the driver’s cab is not at its front end. In some cases and interlocking
systems, releasing the signal not too late can have a safety importance, to prevent following
movements. One case is the situation described in chapter 4.1.3, another is splitting of a
train into two in the start section in rear of the signal (figure 4.31).
–– Route release. After the train has traversed the running path, the route is released.
­Release can either be done in one step by the train clearing the route or coming to a
halt on the target track, or sequentially for each route section which has been cleared
(sectional route release, chapter 4.3.3.6).
In old interlocking systems, each of these steps had to be performed manually by the signaller.
In electronic and most relay interlocking systems, steps are automatically initiated one after the
other following the entrance-exit settings of the signaller (chapter 4.3.4) and partly controlled
by the moving train.

Figure 4.31: Following protection after splitting of trains

Route locking divides into two functions and both are applied in parallel in modern interlocking
systems (figure 4.32):
1. Reversible route locking guarantees the dependence between points and signals.
This function ensures that the signal can only be cleared if all movable track elements
are in their proper positions, and the movable track elements remain in this position
as long as the signal shows a proceed aspect. It is called reversible here as it can be
manually released by the signaller without special safety precautions when the signal
is returned at Stop. Historically, reversible locking is the older form, but alone it is not
sufficient for safety: It can be released after returning the signal to Stop even if the train
is still traversing the route. Reversible locking can be effected either by direct element
dependences between movable track elements and signals (chapter 4.2; British and
North American interlocking principles) or by a particular route locking function (German
interlocking principles). The reasons for this difference are historical and the safety effect
of both solutions is the same.
2. Irreversible route locking or ‘holding the route’ is an additional function which maintains
the route locked even after signal release, until the route or route section has been cleared by
the moving train. It is called irreversible here as it can only be released either by the moving
train, or manually with special safety precautions such as time delay and/or registration.

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Figure 4.32: Reversible and irreversible route locking

4.3.8.2 Sequence of the Steps

The order in which the steps described in chapter 4.3.8.1 are performed differs between the
railways. The most important differences are:
–– The moment of proving track occupation. Some railways and interlocking systems prove
the complete route clear already before setting the points by automatic point setting. Others
check track clear detection only for those points which need to be switched, but prove the
complete route only immediately before clearing the signal.
–– The moment of searching and locking flank protection and commanding protective
elements into the required position. In some systems this is done together with the running
path elements; in other systems it takes place later in the process, when the running path
elements are already locked.
–– The moment of activation of level crossings, if they are integrated into the route (chapter
13.4.4.1). A simple solution, which was applied mainly in old interlocking systems, is to
close them together with movable track elements. However, short closing times for road
traffic are required today. Therefore, most modern interlocking systems activate level
crossings immediately before clearing the signal or even after clearing the signal when the
train has reached a particular approach point for the level crossing. The latter case requires
the safe, highly reliable activation of the level crossing.
–– The order of irreversible route locking and signal opening. This issue, which is more
complex, is now discussed.
Irreversible route locking can be achieved in two different ways (figure 4.33). Both solutions are
applied with different variations in several countries:
–– Irreversible locking before signal opening (German influenced interlocking principles).
Safety is ensured by the signal only being able to be cleared if the irreversible route locking
function has already been effected. A disadvantage from the point of operational flexibility
is that if the signal is returned to Stop without a train having passed it, it cannot be cleared
again and the route must be released by special, safety critical commands (chapter 4.5.3).
However, this can be avoided by delaying irreversible route locking and signal clearing until
the train approaches, which is performed in some relay and electronic interlocking systems
(chapter 4.3.11).
–– Irreversible route locking after signal opening (British and North American influenced
interlocking principles). The signal can be cleared when all the moveable track elements are
in their proper positions and the tracks are clear, but without irreversibly locking the route.

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 4.3 Routes

The cleared signal locks the route elements, but the signal can be repeatedly cleared and
restored to stop, thus locking and unlocking the route. Only when the train approaches the
route will it be irreversibly locked and remain locked until the train clears the route or the
respective route section. To ensure safety, the irreversible route locking function must safely
occur early enough that the driver can prepare for the stop. This increases the requirements
for the detection system and the locking function.
However, in both solutions the signal can be returned to danger by manual operation or
automatically at any time to prevent hazards. The difference is in the possibility of clearing it
again with normal operations.

Figure 4.33: Sequence of steps in the life cycle of a route

4.3.8.3 Example: British Signalling

In the following, the life cycle of a route in British signalling with irreversible locking after signal
opening is described briefly using the example shown in figure 4.34 in British relay interlocking.
The route to be referred to starts at signal 5 and reaches up to signal 7.
After bringing all movable track elements including flank protection and overlap to their
positions, the signal is cleared, which locks the movable track elements. Hereby, each partial
route (which means each track circuit in this example) is route locked. Up to this stage, as no
train is approaching, the route can be released manually without time delay.

Figure 4.34: Example for British approach locking and cascade release

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4 Interlocking Principles

The second step is approach locking, which is an irreversible lock. No later than when the train
has reached the sighting point of the first warning signal, which would be the occupation of track
circuit AB in three-aspect-signalling (chapter 7.6.3.2) and AA in four-aspect-signalling (chapter
7.6.3.4) in the example, the route is approach locked. As manual release of an approached
route is potentially dangerous, it is bound to a time delay of typically around two minutes for train
routes. If the train enters the approached and manually released route within this time, the lock
will be maintained, otherwise is will be released. To ensure safety, this requires special operational
rules for the driver in case of very slow running of the train. In this case, the driver cannot rely on
still having a locked route in front of him, even if he has passed a green signal.
When a train enters a locked route (which means it has passed the entrance signal), so-called
back locking as the second part of irreversible locking becomes effective. The route locking
is held by the track occupation until the respective section has been cleared. The logic of train
operated route release (TORR) is cascade-shaped, which means that the route locking of each
track section is held by the occupation of this section or by the section in rear being locked.
Following that, each track section releases individually behind the train in the appropriate
sequence and in case of a single detection error no dangerous situation can occur. In the
example, route release is performed as follows:
–– Section AD can release when the train has entered the route and track circuit AD is clear.
–– Section AE can release when AD has been released and track circuit AE is clear.
–– Section AF can release when AE has been released and track circuit AF is clear.
In relay technology, the route locking functions are solved by type N relays (chapter 9.3.2.1).
Circuits are designed that way so that the respective relays are dropped down in the locked
status and picked up in the unlocked status, ensuring a fail-safe working.
Another feature to be mentioned is the utilisation of swinging overlaps which are described in
chapter 4.3.6.6.
More information on the British example can be found in (Nock 1982, Hawkes 1969).

4.3.8.4 Example: German Signalling

In contrast to the British logic, in the German logic the reversible route locking is not
performed by direct element dependences between movable track elements and signals, but
via a particular route locking function which locks all elements belonging to the route in their
proper positions. In mechanical interlocking, this was performed by a particular route drawbar
(chapter 9.2.5.4). After reversible route locking, irreversible route locking has to be applied
before clearing the signal. The irreversible route locking is an electrical lock, even in mechanical
interlocking, because the detection of the train could not be performed mechanically.
A disadvantage for the flexibility of operation in comparison with the solution with irreversible
route locking after signal clearing can be that once a route has been locked, the signaller
cannot change it if the operational situation changes, although the train is still far in rear. To
improve the situation, some interlocking systems are provided with a form of approach locking
as an automation function (chapter 4.3.11).
In mechanical interlocking, sectional route release was not normally provided, which means that
the route could only be released as a whole. This causes a reduction of node capacity. In newer
systems with the tabular principle (chapter 4.3.9), partial routes are defined separately. In systems
with topological principles (chapter 4.3.9), naturally each section for track clear ­detection is a
partial route, defined by the relation to its predecessor and successor, and r­eleases individually
behind the train. Also here, route release is performed by the evaluation of occupation and
clearing of at least two track sections to ensure safety also in case of detection error.

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 4.3 Routes

4.3.9 Principles of Route Formation in the Track Layout

In this section, the principles that define which elements belong to a particular route are
discussed. There are three basic principles of route formation: the tabular, the cascade and the
topological, the latter often also called geographical principle. All three principles are applicable
for systems with irreversible route locking before and after signal clearing (chapter 4.3.8),
although not all combinations are of practical importance.
The cascade principle was the oldest principle in Britain and North American interlocking
logic in mechanical systems. Today, it can only be found in old installations with lever frame
machines. The basic principle is that each movable track element is locked by decisive
movable track elements or the signal in rear. Thus each element can usually be released
individually behind the train. Due to its low importance today, it is not described here in detail.
Cascade locking is described exactly in (Pachl 2018).
The tabular principle is the traditional form originating from mechanical interlocking in German-
influenced interlocking logic. One historical reason for its development was the necessity for free
shunting (without shunting signals and with freely switchable points) in Germany, which was not
possible with cascade locking. The tabular principle is still widely applied in mechanical, relay and
electronic interlocking worldwide. All possible routes are predefined in a matrix, indicating exactly
which elements belong to the respective route in which position. Figure 4.35 and table 4.1 show
an example. Routes which cannot be active at the same time are also predefined, distinguished
between simple and special route exclusions (chapter 4.3.3.3).

Figure 4.35: Layout plan for route locking matrix of table 4.1

Flank Prot.
Routes Conflicting Routes Points
Signals
A/1 A/2 N1 N2 P1 P2 F/1 F/2 1 2 3 N1 P1 P2
A/1 │ ││ │ ││ + +
A/2 │ │ ││ ││ ││ - - S
N1 ││ │ │ + +
N2 │ ││ │ ││ - - S
P1 │ ││ │ + S
P2 ││ │ │ ││ - S
F/1 ││ ││ │ │ + S
F/2 ││ ││ │ ││ │ - S
A/1 Route beginning at signal A into track 1
N1 Route beginning at signal N1 (if there is only one route from this signal)
+ Point in normal (here: straight) position
- Point in reverse (here: diverging) position
S Signal at Stop
│ Simple exclusion of routes by movable track element in different positions
││ Special exclusion of routes

Table 4.1: Route locking matrix (example)

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4 Interlocking Principles

The topological (geographical) principle, firstly appearing in Germany in the 1950s, was
developed for relay interlocking and, until today, it is used internationally for relay and
electronic interlocking on a large scale. The elements of the track layout are defined with
their neighbourhood relations to each other (figure 4.36). When a particular route is to be set,
the running path, overlap and flank protection are searched by these topological relations.
Therefore, all routes which are possible according to the track layout can be selected
automatically, unless they are deliberately suppressed.

Figure 4.36: Simplified relay set connection map for topological interlocking

As the characteristics, advantages and disadvantages of the topological and the tabular
principle become most obvious in relay interlocking, they will be compared first with relay
technology (table 4.2).
In topological relay interlocking systems, the relays are positioned in relay sets, each
representing a certain element in the track layout. The relay sets are standardised and can
be manufactured and tested automatically in the factory. This reduces the necessity of
wiring on the construction site to a minimum of connecting the relay sets by standardised
cables. This facilitates wiring and testing processes as well as the adaptation of the
interlocking to alterations in the track layout. This advantage over the tabular principle
grows, the more elements that are included in the interlocking area. On the other hand,
a disadvantage of the topological principle is the large amount of effort to be put into
the relay sets. The wiring within the sets is generally more complicated, and due to
standardised relay sets, a large number of relays which are not required for the particular
case have to be physically present.

tabular principle topological principle

efforts for relay system relatively low high
­development
relay equipment efforts once low high (central functions)
per interlocking area
relay equipment efforts for high relatively low
each additional switching unit
efforts for later changes in relatively high relatively low
relay interlocking
efforts for later changes in high high
­electronic interlocking
adaptability to seldom special mostly easy difficult
cases
efficient application for … small stations (relay) large stations (relay)
low number of applications of high number of applications of
the system (relay, electronic) the system (relay, electronic)

Table 4.2: Comparison of tabular and topological principle

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 4.3 Routes

Figure 4.37: Technical effort for tabular and topological principle in relay interlocking

Figure 4.37 illustrates the effort which is necessary for each principle in relay technology,
depending on the size of the station/junction to be interlocked. As can be seen, the tabular
principle is advantageous for smaller schemes, whereas the topological principle gains with
larger interlocking areas.
In electronic interlocking, some of the advantages and disadvantages of both principles lose
much of their importance (table 4.2). With advanced configuration tooling, also larger installations
with tabular principle become easier. Therefore, both principles are suitable for small and large
interlocking areas. A difference remains concerning the number of installations of a certain type in a
particular country: The adaptation of an interlocking type to country specific logic is more complex
with the topological principle, but once developed, engineering a new installation is simpler.
Altogether, both principles are applied in electronic interlocking, differentiated by manufacturers and
types of interlocking.

4.3.10 Shunting Routes

4.3.10.1 Interlocking Functions

Most railways, other than those following North American operational principles, distinguish
between at least two classes of movements. These are train movements and shunting
movements (chapter 3.3). The exact definitions of what constitutes a train or a shunting
movement differ, but generally shunting movements are performed at a lower speed (mostly
on sight) and without a timetable. Due to the lower requirements, shunting is often performed
on shunting routes with a reduced interlocking function or even by verbal permission without
interlocked routes. Nevertheless, the trend in modern technology is to provide even shunting
routes with advanced interlocking functions. Higher requirements are often set for areas where
shunting with occupied passenger coaches or dangerous goods occurs frequently. Where
shunting movements traverse routes, the main differences to train routes can be:
–– Omitting or reduction of track clear detection. As the purposes of shunting imply the entry
into occupied tracks for the joining up of rolling stock units, the permission for a shunting
movement cannot generally require the route to be clear. Therefore, either no detection is
provided at all, or all track sections except the target section are checked for being clear.
–– Omitting or reduction of the overlap. As shunting movements move slowly, the probability and
the expected length of an overrun is that much lower. Thus overlaps are not usually provided.
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4 Interlocking Principles

–– Omitting of flank protection. As vehicles without passengers are usually moved at low speed,
the expected severity of accidents is lower and the ability of the driver to prevent the danger is
that much greater. Therefore, flank protection is often not used for shunting routes.
–– Permission for opposing shunting movements. In some cases, the possibility of moving
vehicles onto the same track at the same time can be needed for efficient operation. An
example is a train where coaches are to be attached to the rear end and a locomotive to
the head at the same time. However, if opposing movements are permitted, they have to be
able to stop in half the range of vision (see figure 4.12). A solution to avoid this is to waive the
requirement for opposing locking only after the target track has been occupied for a specific
time. After that, the occupying vehicles can be assumed to be stationary. This is applied in
Britain, for example (Nock 1982).
Signals for shunting can show at least one stop and one proceed aspect. They can stand
alone or be part of main signals (chapter 7.6.6). As an option, different proceed aspects can
be displayed, depending on the safety conditions of the particular shunting route, e. g.:
–– movable track elements in the shunting route locked or unlocked
–– tracks clear or occupied
–– aspect of the next shunting signal

4.3.10.2 Shunting Areas under Dual (Central and Local) Control

To reduce the work load of the signaller, many railways permit shunting operations in defined
areas to be carried out under temporary local responsibility. In these cases, repeated shunting
movements are possible without any action by the signaller.
In European practice, this feature is assigned to certain areas with precisely defined
boundaries. The points for entering and leaving the locally operated area are locked and
shunting signals are permanently cleared, omitting the locking of opposing signals (figure 4.38).

Figure 4.38: Shunting areas under temporary local responsibility

North American interlockings are generally equipped with dual control points. In contrast to
European practice, where the manual operation of normally electrically controlled points is
usually only applied in the case of technical failure, in North America it fulfils the same purpose
as European local operation areas. The temporary permission to operate points by hand in the
case of repeated shunting movements can be given from the dispatcher to the local signaller
verbally or by written instruction.

4.3.10.3 Reversing Shunting Routes

A special problem of shunting routes is those which require reversal (figure 4.39). Suppose a
shunting unit moves consecutively on two shunting routes in opposite directions. Often it is not
helpful for the shunting unit to move until the end of the first route is reached and return there,
but it can return after passing the signal which permits the second route. As a result, a section
of the first route often remains unused (track circuits D and E in figure 4.39), so the rest of the
first shunting route does not release in the normal way.
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 4.3 Routes

Figure 4.39: Reversing shunting movement

To avoid the necessity of an emergency release of the remainder, specific interlocking

functions can be applied to release the remainder of the first route depending on the status
of the second shunting route. These functions have to be engineered for the particular case
on tracks where such situations are expected to occur frequently. One solution is that the
remainder of the first route is released together with the first section of the second route. By
this, it can be ensured that the shunting unit has actually reversed and does not continue on
the first route. Another solution is a time delayed release of the remainder.

4.3.11 Automation of Route Operation

To reduce the workload of the signaller, to relieve him from mundane tasks, to reduce the personal
efforts of ground staff and to quicken railway operation, several features have been developed to
automate the calling and setting of routes. They are applied differently by the railways.
Automatic point setting. This is a standard feature in most relay and electronic interlocking
technologies: The route is selected normally by entrance-exit operation (chapter 4.3.4), and all
movable track elements are automatically switched to the required positions. However, safety when
working in degraded mode operation (chapter 4.5) often requires the switching off of automatic
point setting for the whole interlocking area, for defined parts of it, or for an individual element.
Approach locking and signal clearing. This function is to be clearly distinguished from the
approach locking after signal clearing as described in chapter 4.3.8.2. It is an additional non-safety
automation function in systems with irreversible route locking before signal clearing. The route is
reversibly locked immediately after receiving the command from the signaller, but irreversible route
locking and signal clearing are postponed until short before the train driver can see the first warning
signal and is then done automatically (figure 4.40). This enables the signaller to cancel a route
which is not approached without safety critical commands if the operational situation so requires.

Figure 4.40: (Irreversible) approach locking as a safety function after signal clearing and as a non-
safety automation function before signal clearing

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4 Interlocking Principles

Long routes. The signaller is able to set two or more consecutive routes for the same train by
one entrance-exit-operation over the whole path (figure 4.41).

Figure 4.41: Long route

Route queuing. If a route which a signaller attempts to set up is not available, it is preselected and
will be set later when it has become available. However, the queuing of more than one route can
lead to the wrong route being set at the wrong time and therefore cause operational problems.
Fleeting and automatic route calling: With fleeting, after a route has been completely traversed
by the train, it remains locked and can be used by a following train. Automatic route calling
is similar to fleeting in its effect. However, here the route is released behind the train and will
be automatically called again, on the same path, when the next train approaches. Fleeting and
automatic route calling are especially useful in situations where the vast majority of trains traverse
the station on the same path, such as often occurs in night hours. In the case of fleeting, the
signals along the route can be used like permissive block signals (chapter 7.6.2) under certain
circumstances, whereas in automatic route calling the signals remain as absolute stop signals.
Automatic route setting/Automatic train routeing. Trains are routed through different tracks
based on stored information such as timetable data and on forwarding train numbers with the
moving train by a train describer system. Irregular situations usually have to be solved by staff.
Route commanding by train. The train itself, either by a command input from the driver or
automatically, sends a route calling command to the interlocking. Thereupon, the other steps
in the life cycle of the route (chapter 4.3.8.1) are performed by the interlocking system.

4.4 Block Dependences

4.4.1 Introduction

4.4.1.1 Safety Functions of Block Systems

Block dependences, in contrast to routes, can provide for only two safety functions (chapter 4.1.2):
–– protection of following movements
–– protection of opposing movements
Therefore, the principle ‘block information’ is applicable to open line sections only. The
principle ‘route’, in contrast, can be applied in interlocking areas and on open lines. When
applying it to open lines, only a part of the possible safety functions is needed.

4.4.1.2 Definitions
A block section is a section of an open line track outside station areas in which, unless
moving on sight, only one train is permitted at any one time. The block section is limited by
block signals as entrance and exit signals of the block section. Also, signals at stations and
junctions can serve as block signals for the adjacent open line sections.

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 4.4 Block Dependences

The block signal (if there are trackside signals) together with the related evaluation units for
block messages is called a block point. Block points can be staffed or unstaffed. Each block
point, in cooperation with the neighbouring block points, regulates following movements.
To avoid deadlock situations and also head-on collisions in permissive working, only these
locations are actively involved in opposing protection where the order of trains can be changed,
such as stations, loops, junctions and crossovers. These are the adjacent interlocking stations.
Protection of opposing movements is only regulated between neighbouring interlocking stations,
whereas intermediate block points only forward the related messages, are only informed about it
or are even not involved at all in these processes (figure 4.42).

Figure 4.42: Following and opposing protection in block areas

4.4.1.3 Systems of Non Signal-controlled Operation

As non-technical ancestors of block systems, the following – each with different variants – are
the most important forms (see also chapter 3.4.3):
–– Telephone block (applied mainly in countries following German operational principles): It
can be considered as the non-technical ancestor of tokenless block systems (chapters
4.4.4, 4.4.6). The line is divided into fixed block sections limited by trackside signals. A
section is blocked and released by telephone communication between locally staffed block
points at the entrance and the exit of the section. The communication is recorded in a
handwritten train record. The signaller at the entrance of the block section must not open
the signal for a following train before receiving the clearing message telephonically from the
signaller at the exit
–– Direct Traffic Control (DTC; applied in North America): It has certain similarities with
token block (chapters 4.4.4, 4.4.5). The line is divided into defined block sections marked
by block marker boards. A central dispatcher issues a permission to the train to enter a
section. After clearing the section, the train has to give the permission back. Likewise in
tele­phone block, the correspondence is noted in the protocol book.
–– Track Warrant Control (TWC). This originated from North America, but today is applied
worldwide in different versions. In Europe, derived versions may be found particularly on
secondary lines, for cost effectiveness. TWC has similarities with direct traffic control, but
any identifiable location can serve as an end of a movement authority. This enables the
system to handle the length of the block sections flexibly, enabling shorter headways,
though it includes an increased workload for the persons involved.
Such systems are still applied on lines with low requirements and in degraded mode operation in
case of failure of the technical block system.

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4 Interlocking Principles

4.4.2 Geographical Assignment of Block Sections

The supervised length of a block signal begins at that signal. The end of the supervised
length differs:
–– Some railways require no block overlaps. Here the supervised length of the signal equals
the block section. Examples are mainline railways in North America and in Russia.
–– Other railways require an additional portion of track in advance of the section exit signal to be
clear before the section entrance signal can be opened (figure 4.43). The difference is called
‘overlap’ because in that area the control length of a signal overlaps with the control length of
the next signal. Block overlaps are used on most European railways, many railways outside
Europe and also on almost all subways and subway-like electric city railways worldwide.
The clearing point beyond a signal equals the end of the control length of the signal in rear.

Figure 4.43: Control length of block signals

The main purpose of block overlap, likewise route overlaps (chapter 4.3.6) is to provide
additional safety in the case of driver’s failure in target braking. Those railways who don’t use
block overlaps, but do use overlaps for routes in interlocked areas, can argue that in case of
an overrun of a block signal, the probability and the severity of a possible accident would be
much lower: The accident would be a collision of the overrunning train which moves at low
speed with a standing train. Even this case is relatively improbable, unless the length of the
standing train equals the length of the block section in advance (figure 4.44).

Figure 4.44: Normal standing position of a train at a block signal

Some railways, for economic reasons, do not detect that the overlap is clear as a separate
exercise. Instead, they shift the borders of track clear detection by the length of the overlap
beyond the signal (figure 4.45). Then the distance immediately beyond the signal is not
supervised technically by this signal. However, the probability that it is occupied when the rest
of the block section is clear is very low. And even if it was occupied, no following train can
approach it without having entered an occupied block section beforehand.

Figure 4.45: Displaced detection borders in block systems

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 4.4 Block Dependences

4.4.3 Overlaying Block and Route Interlocking Systems

For the treatment of the block system in station areas, there are two basic possibilities (figure 4.46):
–– The station disrupts the block system. This means that for following protection in the block
system, the station is considered in the same way as a single block point, whereas the
station itself is safeguarded by route interlocking only. This principle is connected with a
sharp distinction between stations (‘Bahnhof’, chapter 3.2.3) and open line sections in
the operational rules. It is therefore applied mainly in countries influenced by German
operational and interlocking principles (e. g. Central and Eastern Europe).
–– The block system of the open line runs through the station and provides track clear detection
functions, whereas the route interlocking system locks the movable track elements. This
principle dominates in North America and some European countries. The block system
is either only applied to the main tracks straight through the station, or the block section
has more than one entrance or exit signal. The movement authority in station areas is the
sum of at least two different permissions, one from the route interlocking and one from the
block system. Whereas in modern systems, all permissions are usually combined into
the same signals, in older systems each permission is often given separately to the driver
(by signals or verbally) and the driver has to obey the most restrictive. French mechanical
signals, for example, provide the ‘Carre’ signal with absolute stop for route interlocking and
the ‘Semaphore’ signal with permissive stop for the block (chapter 7.6.2). Until now, this is
represented by two different stop aspects. The driver is allowed to move permissively (see
chapters 4.4.4 and 4.5.6) in a station if the route is locked, but tracks are occupied.

Figure 4.46: Line block in interlocking areas

4.4.4 Classification of Block Systems

Figure 4.47 shows a basic functional classification of systems for train separation on the open
line. As described in chapter 3.4, the principles ‘on sight’, ‘time interval’ and ‘space interval’
can be distinguished. The latter can further be distinguished into movement in fixed block,
absolute braking and relative braking distance. The principle of movement in time intervals
is almost extinct, absolute braking distance is now used only in a few instances and relative
braking distance has no practical importance at all for the railway safety function.
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4 Interlocking Principles

Figure 4.47: Classification of systems of train separation

The principle of fixed block distance is the regular principle for train movements and the basis for
the block systems described here, whereas movement on sight is applied in block systems in the
form of permissive driving and in case of technical failure.
The logical principle ‘block information’ has to be clearly distinguished from the principle
‘route’ (chapter 4.1.2). Systems using the principle “block information” can be roughly
classified into (figure 4.47):
–– Token block systems. In token block systems, the presence of the train in a defined block
section is permitted by the presence of a particular object, called a ‘token’ on the train. This
token can be a physical object, a person (so-called ‘pilotman’) or virtual information simulating
the physical object. It is handed over to the train driver before entering the block section and has
to be returned to another train or ground staff after clearing. Each token is assigned to one block
section and only one token for the same block section can be in circulation at any one time.
–– Tokenless manual and semi-automatic block systems. Blocking and unblocking
processes are regulated by information exchange between different trackside entities about
entering and leaving trains, without a physical token being employed. At least some of the
operations (usually at least the sending of the unblocking message after the line has been
cleared) is initiated by a person. When the train has left the block section, the complete
clearing of the block section is detected at the receiving block point and the section is
unblocked only in one moment after the train has cleared the section. These block systems
can be with or without continuous track clear detection on the open line.
–– In automatic block systems, all blocking processes, especially the unblocking after the
train has cleared the section, are processed automatically by the trackside. These systems
must have a continuous track clear detection on the open line. Further, these block
systems offer the possibility of continuous monitoring of the section. In most automatic
block systems, entry also of an unauthorised movement into a clear section leads to an
occupation of the block, which offers a certain safety gain.

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 4.4 Block Dependences

Figure 4.48: Absolute and permissive block

Automatic block systems can be further divided into absolute block systems where (other than
during technical disturbance) train operation is always maintained in fixed block intervals, and
permissive block systems where the most restrictive signal aspect is ‘Stop and Proceed’ (chapter
7.6.2). This permits any train to enter an occupied section on sight (figure 4.48). Permissive
block systems predominate in many countries following North American and British interlocking
principles, whereas absolute block systems predominate in countries following German principles
(except metropolitan and suburban railways, which mainly use permissive block).
Another criterion to classify block systems according to the management of opposing protection
is into those with neutral direction (symmetric normal position) and those with placed direction
(asymmetric normal position). In systems with neutral direction, in normal position (if the line is
clear) both adjacent interlocking stations have equal rights to send a train, whereas in systems
with placed direction, only one of them can send trains at any time. The functioning of these two
principles is described in chapter 4.4.6.2 and 4.4.6.3 and illustrated in figure 4.50. Block systems
with neutral direction are traditionally more used in Western Europe (British influenced interlocking
logic), but partly also in Eastern Europe. Block systems with placed direction are traditionally more
used in Central and Eastern Europe (German influenced interlocking logic). But there is no sharp
borderline, as in many countries different systems belonging to one or the other categories exist
to a different extent and there are also sub-variants of both. In the USA, traditionally opposing
protection is excluded from the block system and done centrally by the dispatcher (chapter 4.4.3)
in a logic similar to neutral direction.

4.4.5 Process of Block Working in Token Block Systems

In the simplest form, the one train staff system (table 4.3), only one token exists for each
block section, thereby exclusivity of the authority to enter is ensured. A major disadvantage of
the one train staff system is that trains can only move if the directions of trains alternate. This
limits flexibility in operation.
To overcome this disadvantage, in the train staff and ticket systems, consecutive
movements in the same direction are permitted by the additional rule that a driver is shown the
token but may be issued with a ticket (written permission). This allows him to enter the section.
In the version with pilotman, the pilotman issues the tickets. Another solution is the use of an
overlaying tokenless block system which can only handle following movements.
Both the one train staff and the train staff and ticket system follow the principle of placed
direction, as the token is present at one or other end of the block section unless it is on a train.
A disadvantage of both is that the token can only be moved to the other end of the section
by a train and this is the only means of changing the block direction. This reduces flexibility
in operation, particularly if the token is present at one end of the block section or on the way
there, and unexpectedly a train requests entry from the other end.

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4 Interlocking Principles

To overcome this disadvantage, the electric token block (chapter 10.3.2) was developed.
A stock of tokens is present on each station, but they are electrically interlocked in a way that
only one token can be out of the token instruments at a time. Thus in normal operation, each
station has equal rights to take out a token (neutral direction). A disadvantage remains that
in case of uneven movements all tokens gather at one end, and have to be redistributed by
maintenance staff.
A further development is the radio electronic token block (RETB) (chapter 10.6.3), where
no physical tokens are handed over, but the respective permissions (virtual tokens) are
transmitted by radio between the train and a central token processor and displayed in the
driver’s cab. RETB also works with neutral direction.
Table 4.3 compares the different forms of token block.

one train staff train staff and electric token radio electronic
system ticket system block token block
(RETB)
nature of the physical token physical token or physical token electronic
movement authority (unique per written permission (several information
­section) interlocked)
possibility of no yes yes yes
following trains
of same direction
possibility of no yes with additional yes
unequal number maintenance
of trains for both efforts
directions
flexibility regarding no no yes yes
train sequence

Table 4.3: Comparison of different forms of token block

4.4.6 Process of Block Working in Tokenless Block Systems

4.4.6.1 Following Protection

First the simple case is described, where the block system is only responsible for following
protection. This is applied on double lines with unidirectional signalling. The sequence of
actions is as follows (see figure 4.49):
–– When the train enters the section, the line is blocked, which means that it is reserved for
that train. The blocking message can either be transmitted from the entrance of the block
section to the exit and used there as a precondition for unblocking. Or it can be stored in
the entrance only (applied in some automatic block systems, especially in North America).
In both cases, the blocking immediately prevents another train from entering the section by
locking the signal in the entrance.
–– After the train has cleared the block section, the block system is unblocked by the
receiving end. Several preconditions have to be checked to permit unblocking (chapter
4.4.7). Then the block system returns to normal position. In manual and semi-automatic
block systems, the unblocking message is transmitted once upon arrival of the train
and checking of further criteria. In most automatic block systems it is transmitted
continuously as long as the block section is clear and other criteria are fulfilled.

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 4.4 Block Dependences

Figure 4.49: Sequence in a block system only for following protection

4.4.6.2 Systems with Neutral Direction (Symmetric Normal Position)

In the following, the sequence of actions in tokenless block systems for traffic in both
directions is described. Systems can be distinguished between those with neutral and those
with placed direction. In systems with neutral direction, the sequence of actions is basically
the following (figure 4.50):
–– In normal position, no train can enter the block line.
–– Acceptance of a train: The main function of acceptance is that only trains running in the
same direction can be within a block line at the same time. Each train has to be offered by
the sending interlocking station and, if certain preconditions are fulfilled, accepted by the
receiving one.
–– After acceptance, the block line is ready to be entered by one train. In some systems, the
acceptance can be cancelled as long as no train has entered.
–– While one or several trains are traversing the block line between two interlocking stations,
the blocking and unblocking actions are performed between the block points as described
in chapter 4.4.6.1. New acceptance actions in the block system can be necessary or not
for each individual train, depending on the system.
In special forms of neutral direction, each adjacent interlocking station can open a signal onto
the block section even without obtaining permission from the other side, and the signals for
the other direction are immediately locked in Red afterwards. However, measures have to be
installed to prevent signals at both ends from opening in exactly the same moment. In North
America, this procedure is used under the name "Tumble-down" principle. There, the whole
area is operated by a central dispatcher, this person is unable to do two operations within the
milliseconds a Type N relay needs to safely drop down.

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4 Interlocking Principles

4.4.6.3 Systems with Placed Direction (Assymmetric Normal Position)

In block systems with placed direction, the sequence of actions is principally the following
(figure 4.50):
–– In normal position, one adjacent interlocking station holds the direction permission and is
therefore able to send trains; the other is not.
–– In some systems, the interlocking station which wants to send a train onto the block line has
to offer the train telephonically to the receiving interlocking station and wait for acceptance. In
regular operation, this is not safety-critical, but serves for operational purposes.
–– Only if the whole block line is clear can the direction be reversed in normal operation.
Either the receiving interlocking station gives it or the sending one takes it, depending on
the arrangements of the system.
–– Following movements are regulated between neighbouring block points as described
in chapter 4.4.6.1. Several trains can traverse the block line without special technical
acceptance of each individual train.

Figure 4.50: Sequence in a block system including opposing protection

In several cases, automatic changing of the direction can be provided in systems with placed
direction. A typical example on double lines is to give the direction permission for contraflow
traffic for one train only and then shift it back automatically to the other direction as soon as
the whole block line is clear.

4.4.7 Locking Functions of Tokenless Block Systems

To achieve the block conditions described in chapter 3.4.1, several locking functions are used
in the block systems. While token block systems imply only simple interlocking functions and
rely more on the correct behaviour of people involved, tokenless systems imply more complex
functions, described here.
The technical interlocking functions between the block instruments and the signals differ
between the systems. In the earliest block systems in Britain with neutral direction, there was
no technical interlocking and the signaller was fully responsible for the correct order of actions.

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 4.4 Block Dependences

In modern systems, safety is assured by full technical interlocking. Some automatic block
systems are controlled directly by the track clear detection, whereas others use overlaying
interlocking functions (chapter 10.5).
Among those interlocking functions related to the sending of a train onto a section, the
following are the most important:
–– Locking of the interlocking signals leading onto the block line in stop position if the direction
permission is not present at the respective interlocking station (systems with placed
direction) or the train has not been accepted (systems with neutral direction).
–– Locking of the block signal in closed position if the block section ahead is occupied.
The other group of locking functions in the block system prevents the unblocking of the line in
certain circumstances. The most important of these functions are:
–– Before unblocking the line, it must have been occupied. This is checked in most block
systems, but not in all automatic block systems.
–– Before unblocking the line, the respective section including the overlap at the receiving
station (figure 4.43) must have been cleared by the train. To obtain this information, there
are different possibilities:
• With continuous track clear detection, this information can be obtained directly from the
detection system.
• With track clear detection in the interlocking areas, but not continuously on the open
line and without intermediate block points, the consecutive occupation and clearing
of two or more sections can be evaluated for this purpose (figure 4.51). Any wagons
which become detached from the train will not be detected, so staff are responsible
for observing the end of train marker, or it has to be detected by additional technical
measures (chapter 5.2.7).
• Without any technical track clear detection, a point at or beyond the end of the overlap has
to be proved to have been occupied and
cleared in this sequence. A frequently
used technical solution in old technology
in countries influenced by German
interlocking principles is a combination of
a short track circuit and a wheel detector
(figure 4.51). Also here, the end of train has
to be observed by staff.
• Another old solution with less effort is
the British berth track circuit. Technical
detection was not applied continuously,
but only on several metres in rear of the
signal (figure 4.51). This gives relatively
good protection against the most frequent
case of inappropriate unblocking when
a train is standing at the home signal.
However, the berth track circuit gives no
protection if the train is still moving inside
the block section. Berth track circuits are
also used in station tracks and prevent the
signaller from clearing a signal into a track
on which the berth track circuit of the next
signal is occupied. Figure 4.51: Line clearing conditions

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4 Interlocking Principles

–– Before unblocking the line, it has to be ensured that the block signal of the receiving station
has reverted to stop after the train has passed to always protect the train by a signal at stop
in rear. Different strategies to achieve this are described in chapter 4.1.3.
In most automatic block systems, the unblocking conditions are supervised continuously.
This means that if an unblocking condition, usually the clear status of the block section,
becomes violated, the entrance block signal is immediately restored to stop. In manual and
semi-automatic block systems, this can optionally be achieved by an additional alert status
in case of unauthorised entry into the block section. However, in most of these cases the
reason for a block signal at switching to stop is a technical defect, e. g. of signal lamps or track
circuits. Railways differ in whether in such situations the block signal will be cleared again,
automatically, if the unblocking conditions are fulfilled again, or if it can be cleared only by
special command, implying frequent working in degraded mode operation (chapter 4.5).

4.4.8 Returning Movements

In some situations, there is a need for a movement not to pass through the block section
completely, but to change direction inside the block section and return to whence it came
(figure 4.52). Reasons, among others, can be:
–– an industrial track branching from the open line has to be serviced
–– a train with a technical defect has to move back or be hauled back by another traction vehicle
–– an engineering train enters the line and leaves it in the opposite direction

Figure 4.52: Returning movement in a block section

To handle these cases, there are different possibilities, of which these are some:
–– The block section is closed for traffic and the movement is permitted by methods of
degraded mode operation (chapter 4.5). However, for regular movements, this is not a
realistic solution.
–– An extra interlocking station is defined within the section. This is only possible if trains
reverse regularly at exactly the same place and requires additional efforts.
–– Auxiliary reversing of the block direction is provided. This enables normal operation of the
blocking and unblocking functions. The location is variable. However, this option has to be
provided additionally in the block logic and is possible only in some block systems.
–– A special kind of permission is provided for the train to enter the block section and to
reverse. This can be issued to the train by an additional signal aspect or by a token. As long
as the train has the permission, the line is blocked for other trains.
Concerning the particular case of industrial tracks to be operated via the open line, locking of
movable track elements is not a genuine function of block systems (chapter 4.1.2), but has to
be built in additionally. Different solutions are possible. The most important are (figure 4.53):
1. The points are locked by a key lock. In normal operation, the key is locked in one of the
neighbouring interlocking stations and can only be unlocked by closing the line section to
normal operation. The driver who requires access to the industrial track obtains the key from

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 4.5 Degraded Mode Operation

the signaller and uses it to switch the points. After returning to the interlocking station, the
key is locked again and the block becomes operable. The disadvantage is that as long as the
industrial track is being served, the open line track cannot be used by any other train.
2. In addition to the above solution, the driver has the possibility to lock the key in a key lock
connected with the block system while serving the industrial track. This becomes possible
after returning the points and the flank protection device to normal position and enables
other trains to use the line.
3. For trains moving along the line, the industrial connection is safeguarded like a normal
junction with interlocked signals. Movements serving the industrial connection can open
the points by a key under certain restriction. Obtaining this key locks the signals in stop
position. While working on the industrial tracks, the key can be locked into the key lock and
the line can be used by other trains in the normal way.

Figure 4.53: Industrial sidings served from an open line section

4.5 Degraded Mode Operation

4.5.1 Purpose

Degraded mode operations in the sense this term is used here mean operating procedures
and technical fallback levels to maintain railway operation in case the normal signalling
or control functions are not fully available. Due to the lower safety level and operational
constraints, degraded mode operation shall be generally avoided. Reasons can be various:
–– Technical failure in the signalling equipment which causes a fail-safe reaction: The failure
can be in obtaining information about track occupation and positions of movable track
elements, in the information processing or in giving out commands to the train (signal
failure). Operation has to be maintained by bypassing the normal interlocking functions.
–– Operation of vehicles that are not safely detected by the signalling system. Special vehicles,
e. g. of the engineering fleet, may be not safely detectable due to their weight, axle and wheel
characteristics etc.
–– Special operational situations where the standard functions of the interlocking system are
not applicable: Economic considerations mean that a technical system cannot reasonably
be designed for any possible situation. Therefore, situations which occur only infrequently
often have to be handled manually by overriding the technical system. A frequent case of
such situations are temporary track closures requiring trains to take non-regular routes.
–– A train has to reverse, unplanned. Examples can be in case of technical failure of the train
or in emergency situations such as fires.

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4 Interlocking Principles

–– Operational reasons which require the cancellation of an already irreversibly locked route
without a train having traversed it. The restrictions under which emergency route release
for these purposes is permitted are defined differently between the railways. Railways using
the recording method (see chapter 4.5.3) for emergency commands tend to issue stricter
preconditions than railways using the time delay method.
For routes, the most important actions in degraded mode operation can be summarised
into the two groups of emergency release of routes or parts of routes (chapter 4.5.3) and
authorising movements by bypassing interlocking functions (chapter 4.5.4). Degraded mode
operation for block systems is described in chapters 4.5.5 and 4.5.6.

4.5.2 Safety in Degraded Mode Operation

Since many procedures that are applied in degraded mode operations would bypass
safety functions of block or interlocking systems under the responsibility of staff, safety
in the degraded mode depends significantly on compliance with operating rules. If, for
example, a signal does not clear as expected, the cause is not necessarily a signal failure.
So, before activating procedures for degraded mode operations, it has to be made
sure that the signal is not locked out by a conflicting route or train move. Otherwise, a
dangerous situation might be generated by bypassing safety functions of the block or
interlocking system unintentionally.
Nevertheless, due to the higher human error rate in comparison with technical systems,
the level of safety is generally lower. Therefore, degraded mode operation should be used
as seldom as possible. Several modern systems try to limit this loss of safety by leaving as
much of safety responsibility as possible at the technical system also in degraded mode
operation. For example, the signaller gets safety responsibility only for that route element
which is affected, but not the whole route. Another strategy is to involve several persons in
safety related actions, e. g. by the necessity to authorise a special command by a second
person.
Safety responsibility in degraded mode operation can be given to one of two groups of staff, or
shared between them:
–– train staff (e. g. drivers)
–– ground staff (e. g. signallers)
Giving safety responsibility to the driver enables a high grade of centralisation in operation,
whereas giving safety responsibility to the signaller causes difficulties in this respect. As some
preconditions can only be proved locally, additional communication between a centrally
located signaller and local ground staff or train drivers is necessary.
The railways differ in their preferences for giving this additional safety responsibility to the one
or the other group of staff. In countries following German interlocking principles, it is preferably
given to ground staff, whereas railways influenced by British or North American principles tend
more to the train staff.
The issue of safety responsibility of ground staff is connected with the safety of display and
command functions of the man-machine-interface (MMI): The more safety the MMI can offer,
the greater the opportunities for staff to take safety responsibility.

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 4.5 Degraded Mode Operation

4.5.3 Auxiliary Route Release

Sometimes, a need may arise to cancel a locked route without having a train passed.
Examples are:
–– A signal has been cleared for a train to depart from a station track but the train cannot
depart due to an engine problem. In such a case, the operator has to restore the signal and
to cancel the route.
–– A route has been set up wrongly. This may occur by mistake of the operator or by a
malfunction of the automatic route setting system.
–– After the train has traversed the route, due to technical disturbances (e. g. in the track
vacancy detection) the route does not release in the usual way.
Before releasing the route under staff responsibility, the operator has at first to reset the signal
to Stop (if the signal already or still shows a Proceed aspect). It must be possible to do this
immediately at any time, to prevent any danger which the signaller has perhaps recognised.
After releasing a signal of an irreversibly locked route (see chapter 4.3.8.2) without a train
having passed it, normal route release by the traversing train is not possible and the route has
to be released manually.
It is always safe to cancel a route as long as no train is approaching the signal that governs
the route. Otherwise, it has to be confirmed that the train either has safely come to a stop or
has traversed the route before the route can be unlocked. The safety procedure to perform
an emergency route release is dependent on the operating rules and interlocking principles of
individual railways:
–– Time delayed route release is used basically in those countries following British and North
American principles (chapter 3.1) including Russia, France and most countries in Southern
Europe and Scandinavia. A time delay is applied between the operation action and actual
route release to give the train enough time to leave the route or come to a halt. A special
form is the inhibition of any action in the respective interlocking area during the time period.
The time value (typically a few minutes) can vary by country, interlocking type, type of route,
local situations and the status of the route (train already entered or not). If the train occupies
the route during this time, the route continues to be locked. The time delay method implies
the passing of a part of the safety responsibility to the driver: If the train comes to a halt or
moves unusually slowly, the driver must not rely on still having a safe route, as it might have
been released in the meantime.
–– Protection by operational rules connected with automatic recording of the safety critical
action is used in most of those countries following German operational principles, mainly
in Central and Eastern Europe. The idea of this method, where the signaller gets full
safety responsibility, is to ensure that the signaller thinks properly about the action and all
necessary preconditions by forcing him to justify it, and thus to reduce the probability of
human error. Checklists are often provided to the signaller as to which circumstances have
to be proved before undertaking the safety critical action.
The following differences between the methods can be pointed out:
–– In the time delay method, other trains are held up until the time delay has elapsed, which
reduces capacity and affects punctuality. In the recording method, these effects are much
less, determined only by the additional time which is needed to prove the conditions and
carry out the safety critical actions.
–– The time delay method eliminates harmful consequences of human error. In contrast, the
registration method increases discipline and therefore reduces the probability of human
errors.

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4 Interlocking Principles

In some interlocking systems, especially modern electronic systems, both the time delay and
the recording methods are provided in parallel or as alternatives.
After auxiliary release, depending on the interlocking system, the equipment can go directly to
normal operation, which means that other routes can be set normally. Alternatively, there can
be certain restrictions which require the next train(s) to proceed on sight.

4.5.4 Bypassing Defective Elements when Setting a Route

If an interlocking signal doesn’t clear as expected, there are different possible causes: It can be
either because a precondition for clearing the signal is not fulfilled – or due to technical failure.
Before taking any action to bypass safety functions under staff responsibility, the operator has
to clearly analyse the situation and to identify the track elements that prevent the signal from
being cleared. Then, a safe route has to be established under staff responsibility. For this, there
are three different cases:
–– route locking is in effect and displayed on the user interface
–– route locking is not in effect but the position of all movable track elements is correctly
indicated on the user interface
–– route locking is not in effect and the position of movable track elements cannot be checked
on the user interface
If route locking is in effect and correctly shown on the user interface, the operator may trust
that all movable track elements are locked in the proper position. There is no need to apply
manual lockings for trackside elements at the user interface. Before authorising the train to
pass the interlocking signal in stop position, the operator has to check that the track is clear
or, if not possible, order the train to proceed through the route on sight.
If route locking is not in effect, the operator has to bring all movable track elements manually into
the proper position and secure them by applying manual lockings on the user interface. If route
locking is not in effect and the position of movable track elements cannot be checked on the
user interface, the relevant elements must be secured on site by applying mechanical key locks.
In centralised operations, this is usually done by a maintainer who has to report to the operator
that the elements have been secured in the proper position. The need for applying the lockings
on site may lead to severe delays. In all cases in which route locking is not in effect, automatic
point setting must be switched off before authorising the train to pass the interlocking signal in
stop position to prevent any points in the route to be moved unintentionally.
In all cases in which a train is authorised to pass an interlocking signal in stop position and
leading into a block section, besides the procedures described here, the operator has also to
apply the degraded mode procedures for the block system as described in chapters 4.5.5 and
4.5.6.
As the normal signal cannot be cleared due to missing preconditions, other methods have to
be used to authorise the movement. These might be a written instruction or an auxiliary signal
(chapter 7.7).
Different types of auxiliary signals can be defined by the railways. The exact regulations differ,
but the two basic groups are the one which requires movement on sight and the other which
does not. As the possibilities of displaying exact speed restrictions by the auxiliary signal
are limited, for the point zone the most restrictive of all possible speed restrictions has to be
obeyed by the signaller. The equipment of stations with auxiliary signals and with the one or
the other type of it varies between the railways and between locations.

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 4.5 Degraded Mode Operation

In older technology and in several railways until now, staff take full safety responsibility for the
whole route when using the auxiliary signal. However, the tendency in modern interlocking
systems is to provide as much safety as possible by using reduced interlocking functions even
when using the auxiliary signal to minimise the probability of creating danger by human error.
It can be achieved by particular interlocking functions which prove all conditions which can
be proved technically, giving safety responsibility to the signaller only for the defective element
(figure 4.54). The fact to be checked by the signaller can be, for example, the position of one
movable track element or the occupation of one track section.

Figure 4.54: Partial interlocking in case of failure of single elements

4.5.5 Degraded Mode Operation in Manual Block Systems

In a manual block system, the presence of local operators at each block point simplifies
degraded mode working significantly.
In case of a block system failure, the operator can no longer release the section by the normal
operation. Instead, the operator at the exit side has to confirm block release by a telephone
message to the operator who controls entrance to the block section (telephone block, see
chapter 4.4.1.3). That means, the basic block working procedure is continued under staff
responsibility but is no longer enforced by the technical block system.

4.5.6 Degraded Mode Operation in Automatic Block Systems

In automatic block systems, track clear detection is automatically effected by track circuits or axle
counters. Due to the absence of local operators, the manual block principle as described above
cannot be used for degraded mode working. Instead, two basic strategies exist to continue train
operations in case of an automatic block systems failure:
–– Permissive working (responsibility of train staff, see also chapter 4.4.4) is based on the idea
that the stop aspect on automatic block signals that do not protect a fixed danger point is
permissive. That means that a train, after having stopped at a signal that is displaying a stop
aspect or that is dark, may pass the signal without authority from the signaller and proceed
through the block section the signal governs cautiously on sight being prepared to stop short
of any vehicle or obstruction. Since the driver has no positive information whether the stop
aspect is displayed due to a signal failure or due to a train ahead that is still in the section,
the train may happen to pass a stop signal and to enter an occupied section even without
having a signal failure occurred. Therefore the train has to move on sight, as the only possible
dangerous situation is a train in the same direction in the block section. Even on lines with
permissive working, all interlocking signals are absolute, i. e. they must never be passed

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4 Interlocking Principles

without authority from the signaller. To prevent the train driver from misinterpreting signals,
all signals that may be passed in permissive mode must be clearly marked, e. g. by a marker
board or by different stop aspects (see chapter 7.6.2).
–– Auxiliary authorisation by ground staff. Safety functions of the block system can be
bypassed in case of failure and replaced by manual actions. The exact procedures differ
among the railways and block systems. Examples are auxiliary unblocking of a block
section from the exit block point if the section has not unblocked in the normal way, and
auxiliary change of direction in a falsely occupied block line. Also giving written instructions
and auxiliary signals to the train are safety critical actions by ground staff.
While some railways use one of these strategies exclusively, there are also railways, on which
both principles are used. Permissive driving is often applied in automatic block systems. It is a
favourable solution where no local ground staff is present due to high centralisation of operation
control (modern systems) or where communication links have low reliability (older systems).
Often, instead of permissive driving, the permission to pass a signal at Stop is bound to more
or less restrictive preconditions to avoid entering a track which really is occupied (chapter 7.6.2).
Advantages and disadvantages are listed in table 4.4 and analysed more detailed in (Pachl
2000). The railways differ in their preferences towards the one or the other method.

auxiliary authorisation by
permissive driving
ground staff
special requirements in no special requirements increased requirements for
system design ­communication link and
­presence of ground staff
line capacity high reduced
train speed sharply decreased slightly decreased
possibilities of accidents in too high speed (driver's error) inappropriate authorization
case of human error ­(signaller's error)
severity of accidents in case lower (low speed) higher (normal speed)
of human error

Table 4.4: Comparison of degraded mode operation in block systems

Besides the above solutions, to avoid degraded mode operation, some systems offer the
possibility of excluding a single block signal from block working and connecting two adjacent
block sections to work as one (figure 4.55). The signal between the two is switched out. Loss
in line capacity in the failure case is a result.

Figure 4.55: Extended block sections in case of signal failure

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 4.5 Degraded Mode Operation

4.5.7 Several Trains between Two Signals

Situations may occur where two trains can be situated in the same block section or route at
the same time. Some of these situations are:
–– permissive block systems (see chapters 4.5.6 and 7.6.2), after the driver has passed a
signal on sight
–– a train has been authorised by the signaller to pass a signal at stop in degraded mode
operation
–– a train has been split into two trains in a station track in accordance with the rules
Dangerous situations can occur where the driver of a train which moves in an occupied
section sees the ‘Proceed’ signal in front of him, but not the train between him and the
signal. An example where this can occur frequently is desert areas if the signal can be seen
over several kilometres and the first train consists of empty flat wagons. To prevent this
danger, in permissive driving the driver is obliged to drive on sight until the front end of the
train reaches the next signal.
But even after the train has reached the next signal, a possibly dangerous situation may
occur if that signal has not (yet) reset to Stop (figure 4.56). The driver sees the proceed
signal and accelerates, thinking the tracks ahead are clear. This can occur in the following
situations:
–– The position where the signal regularly goes to stop is planned too far beyond the signal
or time delays in signal replacement are too long, so that the first train can pass the signal
with its whole length before it goes to Stop.
–– The signal has remained at proceed due to technical failure. This situation can only
occur in systems without safe putting to stop of the signal (see chapter 4.1.3).

Figure 4.56: Safety problem caused by failure of automatic resetting a block signal to stop on a
permissive block line

To prevent the hazard that may result from the situation that the train ahead is not protected
by a stop signal, different solutions exist:
–– Placing the position where the signal regularly releases to stop sufficiently close beyond
the signal and restoring automatic block signals to Stop at a high reliability so that it
is not assumed that the automatic resetting of a block signal will ever fail (see chapter
4.1.3). This can be achieved by restoring signals by several independently working
appliances, e. g. a track circuit and a rail contact.

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4 Interlocking Principles

–– For permissive block: Establishing the rule that after having passed a stop signal in
permissive mode, the train has to run on sight through at least two block sections. That
means, when a train running in permissive mode is approaching an automatic block
signal displaying a proceed aspect, the driver has to ignore the signal indication and
to proceed on sight. Only after having passed two successive automatic block signals
showing a proceed aspect, the train may proceed at normal speed (figure 4.57). This
rule only applies to automatic block signals. A train approaching an interlocking signal
in permissive mode may end the on-sight running when having passed the interlocking
signal on a proceed aspect.
–– For regular splitting of trains: Establish additional operational rules that in addition to the
signal at Proceed, verbal permission has to be given from the signaller before the driver of
the second train is allowed to start.

Figure 4.57: Obligation to drive on sight over two block sections in permissive block

4.5.8 Clearance Check for Absolute Block and Station Areas

On automatic block lines with absolute block working, the stop aspect on automatic block
signals is absolute, i. e. it does not differ from the stop aspect on interlocking signals. A train
must not pass any signal in stop position without authority from the operator. In case of a
block system failure, the operator has to perform a clearance check for the relevant block
section. This clearance check is required in these cases:
–– A train is to be authorised to pass a signal that controls the entrance of a block section in
stop position. That signal can be either an automatic block signal or an interlocking signal.
–– A block section that has remained occupied or locked after the passage of a train has
to be reset by the operator. Since, in such a case, the signal governing entrance to that
section may clear even if it is not safe to proceed, safety has to be ensured under staff
responsibility.
For a clearance check of a block section, the operator has at first to make sure, which train
was the last train ahead that passed through the relevant block section. For that train, the
following criteria have to be confirmed:
–– The train has arrived at a station beyond the relevant block section.
–– The train must be protected by a stop signal. This includes, if required, the clearance of the
overlap beyond that signal.
–– The train must be complete. This is to be checked by a local operator or by the train crew.
On lines with bidirectional operation, before authorising a train to pass a stop signal to enter a
block section, the operator has also to confirm that on the entire section between the limiting
interlockings, no opposing train has authority to use the line and the opposing interlocking
signals protecting the section from the other side are secured in stop position.

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 4.5 Degraded Mode Operation

If train completeness of the last train ahead cannot be confirmed, the next train has to be
authorised to pass through the relevant section on sight. Different from permissive working,
the on sight running does not mean that a train may follow a train ahead on sight. The only
purpose of the on sight running is to protect the train against equipment the train ahead might
have lost. If, in a case in which train completeness cannot be confirmed, the operator is going
to reset a block section under staff responsibility, the order to proceed on sight must be issued
before the resetting command is executed. If the resetting fails, the operator has to secure the
signal protecting the relevant section in stop position. Then, the operator is required to perform
clearance checks for all following trains until a signal maintainer has reestablished normal
working of the block system.

4.5.9 Technical Failure of Short Duration

Failures considered here are technical problems of short duration which lead to fail-safe
reactions in the interlocking or block system (signal to Stop), but remove themselves without
action by a person after few seconds. Typical examples are loss of track clear detection
(particularly in track circuits) or of supervision of point positions for short duration. There are
different possibilities to deal with these problems:
–– The problem leads to a failure state of the interlocking/block system which has to be solved
by degraded mode operation. A disadvantage is that, especially for frequently occurring
failures, this can lead to frequent use of degraded mode operation with lower levels of safety
and reduced speed or capacity. But it is an appropriate solution in highly available systems.
–– The reaction to the problem comes only after a defined time. The disadvantage is that in
case of a really safety critical occurrence (e. g. actual occupation by a flank movement), the
danger increases. Therefore, the use of this solution is limited.
–– If the problem doesn’t endure longer than a defined time, the failure status can be ‘healed’,
which means that the signal returns to ‘Proceed’ after the technical problem has ceased,
and the previous status of the route or block system is restored.

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 5.1 Requirements and Methods of Detection

5 Detection
Michael Dieter Kunze, Dmitriy Chelobanov, Sergej Vlasenko, Martin Rosenberger,
Max Schubert, Gregor Theeg, Jörn Pachl

5.1 Requirements and Methods of Detection

5.1.1 Introduction

The general purpose of detection is to gain information about the positions of movable
objects and obstacles on the railway network. Detection systems include the reception of that
information, its transmission and its evaluation.
Chapter 5 describes detection as follows:
–– This chapter 5.1 contains some general classification and requirements of detection.
–– Chapter 5.2 describes the most important technical principles for detection of objects.
–– Track circuits and axle counters, which are the two most important solutions for track clear
detection, are described and compared in chapters 5.3 to 5.5.

5.1.2 Types of Objects

The following groups of objects can be identified:

–– Railway vehicles of all types. Rail guidance facilitates their detection.
–– Road users on crossings are people or objects not associated with the railway but
temporarily occupying jointly used areas. This refers mainly to persons, vehicles and
animals on level crossings.
–– Obstacles are all other objects, including persons and road vehicles, on railway property
which is not assigned for common use.
Road users on crossings and obstacles can also be summarised as external objects. The
main focus of detection in railway systems concentrates
on railway vehicles, but in many situations external
objects also become relevant.
When considering the detection of rail vehicles, the
following information can be relevant (figure 5.1):
1. A railway vehicle (train or shunting movement) has
reached a certain point with its front end.
2. A railway vehicle has passed a certain point with its
current rear end. This does not necessarily imply the
detection of train integrity, so any ‘lost’ wagons will not
be detected.
3. A particular track section is clear of railway vehicles Figure 5.1: Information content
of detection of rail vehicles
(figure 5.1).

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5 Detection

The following special cases are relevant to specific signalling systems (figure 5.2):
–– A train has a particular length.
–– There is a particular distance between train and a certain object (e. g. CBTC systems or
ETCS Level 3).
train has particular length

track sections

distance between train and certain object

Figure 5.2: Special cases of detection of railway vehicles

5.1.3 Safety Requirements

Important factors in determining the design and the technical efforts of a detection system are
the safety requirements. There are two groups:
–– Safety related purposes are those whose failure can cause accidents, either alone or
in combination with other technical failures or human mistakes. The requirements for
component reliability are very high to ensure safe working in all possible conditions such
as different speeds of trains, different weather conditions, mechanical or electromagnetic
influences etc. The safety related purposes can be further distinguished in terms of whether
• the erroneous non-detection (e. g. leading to untimely or missing activation of a safety
function) or
• the erroneous detection at the wrong time (e. g. leading to untimely deactivation of a
safety function)
can cause danger.
–– Not safety related purposes are those where errors can result in disadvantages such as
delays, wrong information to passengers and economic losses, but cannot lead to loss of
human lives, injuries or to damaged equipment.

5.1.4 Detection Purposes

There is a large variety of possible detection purposes, the most important of them being
classified in the following by the criteria of chapters 5.1.2 and 5.1.3.

5.1.4.1 Railway Vehicle Reaching a Certain Point

If a train reaching a certain point with its front end is to be detected from the trackside,
spot and short linear detectors are suitable (chapters 5.2.2 and 5.2.3). The most important
purposes are:

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 5.1 Requirements and Methods of Detection

–– Activation of a level crossing during the train’s approach to protect road users. This
detection is safety related; if no feedback information about the proper level crossing
activation is given before permitting the train movement over the level crossing (chapter
13.4.4.1), only in that case will the non-detection cause danger.
–– This issue is also valid for the activation of automatic track warning systems (ATWS)/gang
protection systems. That application is quite similar to level crossing activation.
–– Restoring a signal to Stop after the train has passed it. This issue is safety related
with the non-detection causing danger if the proper functioning of the signal is not
checked before clearing the signal in rear (chapter 4.5.7) or in particular situations
such as following the splitting of a train into two. Otherwise it is not safety related.
A sub-case for this purpose is restoring a signal to Stop if a conflicting train movement (due
to overrun) is detected within the interlocking area. In systems with cab signalling, the most
restrictive command (Stop) is applied if overrun is detected while a train is moving through
the interlocking area.
–– Irreversible route locking during train approach. If the signal has already been cleared before
irreversible locking (e. g. British logic), this detection is safety related with the non-detection
causing danger, otherwise (e. g. German logic) it is not, see chapter 4.3.8.
–– Approach control of signals (e. g. British junction signalling – chapter 7.8.3). In most cases, this
detection is safety related with the erroneous detection at a wrong time causing danger (too
early upgrading of signal aspect). A frequent North American item is approach lighting: For lamp
and energy conservation, the signal becomes illuminated only when a train is approaching.
–– Control of platform screen doors and vehicle doors in mass transit and light rail systems.
The detection of the correct train position is safety related with the erroneous detection at
the wrong time causing danger (wrong door-enable-command).
–– Control of dynamic passenger information, an automation function not related to safety.
–– Support of operational decisions, e. g. whether to wait for a delayed train for passenger
interchange, or not. This is not safety related.
–– Announcement of an approaching train to the signaller for the preparation of route setting.
This comfort/operational purpose is also not safety related.

5.1.4.2 Railway Vehicle Passing a Certain Point with its Rear End
The information that a particular railway vehicle has passed a certain point with its current rear
end contains two messages and their respective status to be monitored:
1. The railway vehicle has reached that point.
2. The railway vehicle has cleared that same point afterwards.
In the following, examples for this detection purpose are listed, all of which are safety related
with erroneous detection at the wrong time causing danger:
–– Deactivation of a level crossing when the train has cleared it.
–– Releasing a route after the train has cleared it.
–– Removing the block after the train has cleared the section.
–– Switching movable track elements after a train has cleared them.
For track-based detection with this purpose, one suitable solution is a combination of a spot
detector (chapter 5.2.2, detects the train has reached that position safely) with a short linear
detector (chapter 5.2.3, detects the clearing safely). In this combination (see figure 4.51) the
short linear detector has to be longer than the longest permitted distance between axles.
Another possible solution is an inductive detector for the wagon body that can detect both
issues safely (chapter 5.2.4.3).

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5 Detection

5.1.4.3 Track Clear Detection

The main purposes of track clear detection – often also called track occupancy detection,
track vacancy detection or train detection – are to prove the following:
–– The clearance profile of a track has to be confirmed before permitting a train movement.
–– Movable track elements such as points have to be clear of rail vehicles before being switched.
Track clear detection is always safety related. The safety philosophies of railways differ as
regard to whether external objects have to be included in track clear detection or not. As their
detection (chapters 5.2.4 and 5.2.5) is technically much more difficult than the detection of rail
vehicles, the presence of external objects is often only excluded in law and rules. This is done
by the prohibition of trespassing on railway property, which implies a certain loss of safety.
Nevertheless, in some situations, detection of external objects is required. Definitions vary, but
generally the most important situations are:
–– The probability of the presence of external objects is high. Examples are platform tracks with
high passenger volume on the platform or mountainous areas with a high risk of avalanches.
–– The severity of possible accidents is high. Therefore, high-speed lines are more often
equipped with obstacle detection than conventional lines.
–– The chances that in case of a hazard an accident can be prevented by the intervention of a
person is low. The unlikelihood of a driver being able to stop at an obstacle on a high-speed
line is the second reason for their preferred use there. In driverless or unattended systems,
detection of external objects is mandatory. For level crossings, some railways require the
detection of road users, but only in the case of full barriers (chapter 13.4.4.4).
If continuously applied, track clear detection devices for rail vehicles can also be applied for the
detection of trains reaching and passing a certain point (chapters 5.1.4.1 and 5.1.4.2). Therefore,
separate detectors for these purposes often become obsolete if continuous track clear detection
is used. Due to its high importance, track clear detection will form the largest part of this chapter.
Objects can be detected either directly or indirectly. Track circuits (chapter 5.3) are the most
used technology for direct detection of rail vehicles. With indirect detection, the presence of an
object is concluded from its entering and leaving the area concerned. Axle counters (chapter
5.4) are the most used technology here.
As an alternative to track clear detection, exclusion of conflicts can be mentioned in this
context. Examples are:
–– one-train-operation (exclusion of conflicts with other rail vehicles)
–– construction of the line without level crossings (exclusion of conflicts with road users)
–– fencing-off the railway line including overbridges and other structures (exclusion of conflicts
with obstacles), though this is never likely to be wholly successful

5.1.4.4 Train has a Particular Length

Train length measurements are used with the primary goals:
–– Identify the train length before allowing the train to proceed further. Length measurement
can be used to determine if a train can proceed to a short track section, especially in
stations (chapter 4.3.3.5) or
–– Prove that there are no non-communicating trains in front or behind a communicating train
before allowing it to enter Communication Based Train Control (CBTC) area (see chapter
8.5). This process is called sieving and it shall be maintained throughout the movement of a
train on a line, or a speed restriction will be applied.

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 5.2 Technical Means of Detection

5.1.4.5 Distance between Train and Certain Objects

Another purpose is the measurement of the distance between the train and a certain object:
–– This information is used for speed adjustment of a railway vehicle depending on the
distance to the end of a train being formed at a marshalling (classification) hump yard. In
this case distance between the end of the train being formed and wayside equipment is
measured constantly. It is used in determining the speed of the unit and the brake effort to
be applied at brake positions.
–– Another use of distance information can be found in moving block systems designed for some
suburban lines, e. g. in Tokyo (chapter 10.7). Here the permitted speed for a following train is
calculated, based on distance measurements between wayside equipment and the train ahead.
–– Distance in relation to wayside objects can be calculated in systems where train is
measuring its own relative position (chapter 5.2.6.3). Some communication-based systems
are capable of calculating distance between two moving objects (chapter 8.5).
–– Another example is the application of distance measuring between train positions for
Movement Authority calculation by the Radio Block Centre in ETCS Level 3 (chapter 8.4.2.4).
–– It is also possible to measure the distance between a train and a certain object by using
information from solutions based on fibre optic sensing, which allow continuous train
localisation along a monitored track (chapter 5.2.4.4).

5.2 Technical Means of Detection

5.2.1 Classification

Detection systems can be classified according to different criteria. For detectors of railway
vehicles, one important criterion is the specific object of detection. This object can be (figure
5.3):
–– Wheels of the rail vehicle.
–– Electrical connection between the rails via wheels, axles, bogies and/or others.
–– The body of the rail vehicle.
–– Other passive parts of the railway vehicle. Examples are the pantograph of a tram or bogies
of vehicles.
–– Acoustic waves or vibrations emerging from moving railway vehicles.
–– Particular active communication devices on the train. Systems using these can be further
divided into systems which know an ID number or other individual identification of the train,
and systems where the trains move anonymously in the network (figure 5.3).
The technical components for detection can be classified into:
–– Track-based detectors where installations in or near the track are the active element. This
category includes most of the detection systems.
–– Train-based detectors where installations on the train are the active element. This
category includes few systems, such as the positioning of trains by Global Navigation
Satellite Systems (GNSS, chapter 5.2.6) and to some extent the end of train detection
systems (chapter 5.2.7).
Detection systems can be further subdivided into:
–– spot detection,
–– linear detection (in some applications working as quasi-spot detection),
–– area detection and
–– three-dimensional detection.

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5 Detection

Detected Object
special active communication devices on the body of the railway vehicle
wheel/axle
vehicle parts railway vehicle external objects

Identification of the Object

anonymous individually known anonymous

Geometrical Assembly
linear/area, in some
spot/linear linear spot 3D 3D
applications quasi-spot

Example Technologies

pantograph track spot wheel technical end balises, radar, infrared, automatic image
GNSS
detection for circuit detectors of train system beacons laser, etc. processing
trams axle counter position report mech. clearance visual supervision
of train supervision and remote visual
fibre optic supervision
sensing intrusion detection
fibre optic sensing
Chapter in Book

- 5.2.3 5.2.2 5.2.7 5.2.6 5.2.4 5.2.5

Figure 5.3: Classification of detection systems

5.2.2 Spot Wheel Detectors

Spot rail contacts are a suitable solution when the passage of a railway vehicle at a certain
location is to be detected, but also for axle counting as an indirect track clear detection. They
use the guidance function in rail transport and are only capable of detecting railway vehicles,
not external objects.

5.2.2.1 Mechanical Detectors

Historically, mechanical detectors are the oldest form. In English speaking countries,
such detectors are also known as treadles. Usually an arm is mounted on the rail on the
inner or outer side (figures 5.4 and 5.5). When a wheel passes the detector, the arm is
depressed and therefore the wheel detected. As each wheel depresses the arm, this form
of mechanical detectors is capable of axle counting (chapter 5.4). If the arm is mounted in a
way that permits movements in two dimensions, the detector can distinguish the direction of
travel. Otherwise, second or third arms have to be installed if direction selectivity is required.
Another seldom used principle is the arm being touched by the body of the vehicle.

Figure 5.4: Principle of mechanical detector

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 5.2 Technical Means of Detection

Figure 5.5: Double mechanical detector with direction selectivity

Mechanical detectors were historically widely used, but due to high maintenance costs were
being replaced in many countries by the end of the 19th century. Due to their simplicity, the
main field of application today in these countries is temporary installations such as automatic
track warning systems (ATWS)/gang protection systems. However, in some countries they are
still used to a large extent for permanent installations. More recent systems with an oil dashpot
were developed only a few years ago.

5.2.2.2 Hydraulic and Pneumatic Detectors

Hydraulic and pneumatic detectors (Fenner/Naumann/Trinckauf 2004) are installed below the
rails and detect the slight bending of the rail caused by the presence of a large mass (figure
5.6). This force is amplified by a liquid or gas, which finally switches an electrical contact in the
evaluation installation.

Figure 5.6: Principle of hydraulic/pneumatic detector

Figure 5.7: Bending line of the rail if passed by a wheel

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5 Detection

Hydraulic and pneumatic detectors have some significant disadvantages:

–– Under unfavourable circumstances, extremely light vehicles are not detected.
–– The detectors have to be adjusted frequently, which increases the maintenance costs and
decreases the reliability.
–– Depending on which fluids are used, including the technology to transform the liquid/gas
flow into an electrical signal, problems of environmental pollution can occur (e. g. mercury).
–– As the rails are bent in the form of a wave under each axle, these detectors often detect
secondary amplitudes as well (figure 5.7).
The last-mentioned feature makes these detectors incapable of axle counting. However, an
advantage of hydraulic and pneumatic detectors for detecting whether a railway vehicle has
reached a certain point is the resistance against triggering by unauthorised persons. This is
much more satisfactory than for any other type of detector. Nevertheless, hydraulic and
pneumatic detectors are seldom used today.

5.2.2.3 Magnetic Detectors

Detectors using the magnetic principle (Fenner/Naumann/Trinckauf 2004) contain a magnetic
circuit formed by a permanent magnet with a gap at the rail (figure 5.8). This magnetic circuit
is adjusted that way so that if no wheel is present there is no magnetic flux at the electric
contact. This is therefore open. When a wheel enters the gap, the magnetic field is deformed
and thus switches the electric contact by magnetic force.

Figure 5.8: Principle of magnetic detector

5.2.2.4 Inductive Detectors

Most detectors for rail vehicles in new installations are based on electromagnetic induction.
Different products are on the market, using variations of the basic functional principle.
Inductive detectors use an electromagnetic field around the rail. Due to adjustable
sensitivity, inductive detectors are flexible and may be applied in different situations. As the
electromagnetic field is permanently applied in most products, these detectors provide a
continuous self-checking function.
Many inductive detectors are suitable for axle counting/track clear detection (chapters 5.1.4.3,
5.4) as well as for the detection of the train reaching a certain position (chapter 5.1.4.1).
Depending on the design, inductive detectors can also be capable of detecting the rear end
of a railway vehicle passing a certain point (chapter 5.1.4.2). In the following, out of the large
number of inductive detectors, three examples will be described.

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 5.2 Technical Means of Detection

The detectors AzL of Thales (figure 5.9) (Fenner/Naumann/Trinckauf 2004) consist of a sender
situated at the outer side of the rail and a receiver at the inner side. The sender emits a
magnetic field continuously. The presence of a wheel with its steel mass changes the lines of
magnetic force. The orthogonal line to the receiver coil and the tangent to the lines of magnetic
force cut in an angle which changes between positive and negative with the presence and
absence of a wheel. Therefore, the polarity of the voltage induced in the receiver coil changes.
The point where that voltage is zero is at a distance of about 20 cm between the wheel and
the sender-receiver-pair.

Figure 5.9: Principle of inductive detector (example AzL)

The detectors ZP 43 of Siemens (Siemens 2001) consist of pairs of corresponding resonant

circuits on both sides of the rail (figure 5.10). The inductivities of both resonant circuits are
coupled magnetically. With a wheel inside the sensing range of a detector, the magnetic
coupling between sender and receiver and therefore the amplitude of induced voltage on the
receiver side increases.

Figure 5.10: Principle of inductive detector (example ZP 43)

The detectors RSR123 of Frauscher (Pointner/Kalteis 2017) are using two sensor coils
which are placed in one line within one single housing (figure 5.11). These wheel sensors are
mounted on the inner side of the rail. Hence they detect the flange of a passing wheel, which
influences the magnetic field of both sensor coils.
The main field of application of these detectors is axle counters (chapter 5.4). With many
recent axle counter systems, additional information such as direction or speed can be
detected without requiring any active electronics near the track. The main methods of
installation of the detectors are by using a rail claw as well as by drilling holes in the rail.

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5 Detection

Figure 5.11: Principle of inductive detector (example RSR123)

Due to the increasing digitalisation of the whole railway sector, there is a trend towards
solutions that enable an evaluation of the measured signals within the sensor. Based on the
ability of providing a digital output, these sensors can be implemented in digital networks.

5.2.2.5 Fibre-optical Detectors

A recent detection principle for spot wheel detectors is based on optical sensor technology
that is in use for monitoring strain inside large structures (e. g. bridges, aircraft wings). They
use optical fibres with so called fibre bragg gratings (FBG) with a defined grating period L
inscribed in their core (Heyder/Arezki 2018). Using an optical input signal and a given grating,
a reflected bragg wavelength lB can be measured (figure 5.12). This wavelength depends on
the temperature and strain changes.

Figure 5.12: Principle of fibre bragg grating optical detection (Heyder/Arezki 2018)

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 5.2 Technical Means of Detection

The Lite4ce sensor (Thales) uses this principle with two FBG-placed 8 cm from each other
at 45-degree angle for the detection of railway vehicles. A pre-tensioned optical fibre is first
stretched (l↑) and then compressed (l↓) (other direction vice-versa), when a railway vehicle
passes the fibre sensor. Due to the angle, the algebraic signal changes during the passing
of train wheels. The sensor is installed by gluing it directly to the cleaned rail (figure 5.13).
The measured data from the sensor system is used to monitor the glue joint. In addition, any
breakaway of the sensor from the rail is detected by the pre-tensioned optical fibre.
Instead of induction coils, an optical laser is needed to send the signal through the sensors.
This signal is permanently on and modulated in intensity. The measurement of the reflected
wavelength is done by opto-electric chips, containing a photodiode and filter. The analogous
optical signal is digitised, considering the temperature characteristic for each chip. Afterwards,
digital signal processing is applied to generate the differential signal of the two sensors to
count passing axles (chapter 5.4.2). Besides axle counting and detection of direction, this
sensor technology allows measurement of train speeds and axle loads as well as detection of
wheel flats (Heyder/Arezki 2018).

Figure 5.13: Principle of optical wheel sensor (example Lite4ce) (Heyder/Arezki 2018)

The advantages of these optical detectors are that almost no copper is needed (protection
against cable thefts) and that there are no issues with electromagnetic interference/overvoltage
protection in case of lightning and traction return currents. Optical and conventional inductive
sensors can be combined within an interlocking area, so it is possible to extend existing
interlockings with optical detectors (Heyder/Arezki 2018).
Due to gluing the sensor directly to the rail it is not possible to de-install the sensor or change
the sensor location. In that case, a new sensor has to be attached to the rail. This is a
disadvantage, especially in the case of rail replacement.

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5 Detection

5.2.3 Linear Wheel and Axle Detectors

5.2.3.1 Mechanical Detection Bars

In mechanical signalling, mechanical detection bars (figure 5.14) are used by different railways.
It can be considered as a treadle as in 5.2.2.1, with a linear extension along the rail. The bar
is normally in the low position. It must rise in order to release the interlocked function, which is
prevented if a wheel is present.
In a typical application, it extends for several metres in the rear of a signal in mechanical
signal boxes and is used to detect the presence of a train standing at the signal. As the
signaller should be able to see the train, the device usually acts as a reminder. Another typical
application is the locking of points in the current position in case of occupation by a vehicle.

Figure 5.14: Mechanical detection bar preventing switching points under a railway vehicle

5.2.3.2 Galvanic Detector (Track Circuit)

Today, the most used linear detector is the track circuit. Caused by an electric shunt between
the rails formed by wheels and axle, the presence of vehicles in an isolated track section can
be detected (figure 5.15). The isolation can be solved either by cutting the rail and fitting an
isolating material, or by electrical means without physical disruption of the rails, the so-called
jointless track circuit (chapter 5.3.7.4).

Figure 5.15: Principle of electric (galvanic) detector

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The main field of application is track clear detection which is described in detail in chapter 5.3.
Another field of application is the use of a combination of a spot rail contact and a short
track circuit (which must be longer than the longest permitted distance between two axles)
to gain the information that a railway vehicle has cleared a certain point at the track after
reaching it (chapter 5.1.4.2). A route cannot be released, or a block section cleared before
this information has been obtained. However, this does not guarantee the train integrity.
Such combinations are applied in Europe but became obsolete with continuous track clear
detection.
Another historical application of track circuits were the first axle counters in Switzerland
without the capability of distinguishing direction. These systems used track circuits which
were shorter than the shortest distance between two axles to detect each individual axle
(Oehler 1981).

5.2.4 Area Detectors for Vehicles and External Objects

Area detectors detect objects which are present in or move through this area. In contrast to
the wheel and axle detectors described above, area detectors can detect not only railway
vehicles, but also external objects.

5.2.4.1 Active Electromagnetic Wave Systems

Systems of this group actively send electromagnetic waves in form of microwave radar, laser,
infrared or others and use the reflection or absorption by objects to detect objects with a
certain minimum size. Some typical examples are described here.
In one example, a net of several static (often parallel) rays is applied (figure 5.16). Each ray has
a transmitter on one and a detector on the other side. Objects are detected by one or more
rays being disrupted. The sensitivity of the system can be regulated by the density of barriers
and the number of neighbouring barriers which must be disrupted to cause an occupation
status as well as the trigger-time for disruption.

Figure 5.16: Net of electromagnetic barriers to detect obstacles

In another example, an area is supervised by a ray circulating along this area (figure 5.17).
Reference mirrors calibrate the position information. An object in the area partly reflects the
radiation back to the receiver. The resulting image is compared with an image of the clear
status and the object is thereby detected.

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5 Detection

Figure 5.17: Radar scanner

These technologies are mainly applied to detect occupancy of level crossings by road users
(chapter 13.4.4.4) and in other cases with increased probability of external objects occurring,
e. g. at platform tracks, particularly in automatic metropolitan railways.
In other applications, systems of this type are also suitable for indirect detection of occupancy
by trains. An example is the disruption of a ray with sender and receiver on opposite sides of
the track by each wagon of a train. The evaluation principle is similar to that for axle counters,
but wagons are counted instead of axles. This principle is applicable mainly to metropolitan
railways (Barwell 1983).
By using the Doppler effect, the speed of trains and – calculated from speed and occupation
time of a certain position – the train length can be measured.

5.2.4.2 Mechanical Technologies

Mechanical supervision of the limiting areas of the clearance profile is applied by some
railways. A net of wires or a single horizontal wire stretches outside the limits of the clearance
profile and carries a low voltage current (figure 5.18). If an object of not too small extension
breaks through this area with a certain minimum force, the wires break, disrupting the current.
This disruption of current is evaluated by the interlocking or block system which can hold
signals at stop in this case. As repairs are necessary after such events, this technology is only
useful to detect incidents which (hopefully) seldom occur. Examples are:
–– Detection of avalanches and landslides in mountainous areas.
–– Detection of road vehicles fallen from a bridge above a railway line, as applied on French
and Spanish high-speed lines.
–– In situations where a railway is situated in proximity of an airport, to protect against an
aircraft overshooting the runway and obstructing or destroying the railway line.
Another mechanical technology for intrusion detection are contact mats placed on and beside
the track to detect the presence of persons, vehicles or other objects by their weight (also
called obstacle detection system, see figure 5.19).
When the measured pressure exceeds the specified minimum contact pressure, the internal
contacts change their state. This sends an intrusion alert notification signal to a specified
location warning device. The definable threshold is set for a minimum weight threshold to
eliminate false alarms based on snow accumulation, fog, rain and other weather conditions.
One example is shown in figure 5.19.

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 5.2 Technical Means of Detection

Figure 5.18: Example of an installation to detect avalanches mechanically (France)

Some devices can alert pedestrians about approaching train via the use of bright LED strips
embedded into contact mats. LEDs flash at a configurable time interval, in case crossing the
tracks is not safe for pedestrians. This technology is applied on some automatic metropolitan
railways, e. g. in Vancouver.

Figure 5.19: Examples of intrusion detection by contact mats (photo: Cleveland Electric Laboratories)

5.2.4.3 Magnetic Inductive Loops

Such detectors consist of a resonant circuit with the inductivity situated in the track (figure
5.20). When a rail vehicle passes over the loop, the inductivity L changes due to the iron mass
1
of the vehicle. According to the formula of the resonant circuit (2p ∙ f)2 = (with f being
L∙C
the frequency, L the inductance of the coil and C the capacity of the capacitor), this changes
the frequency of the resonant circuit. This shift of frequency is evaluated to detect the vehicle.

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5 Detection

Figure 5.20: Inductive loop for vehicle detection

To compensate inductive effects of traction return currents in the rails, symmetrical double
loops are normally used (figure 5.20).
Using this technology, it is impossible to count axles, but detection of direction can be
provided by using two double loops. It is applied for initiating the activation and deactivation
of level crossings in some systems. It can also be used to detect road vehicles on level
crossings, with the disadvantage that due to lack of inducting material, pedestrians and
animals are not detected and cyclists rarely. In road traffic management, such loops are widely
used.

5.2.4.4 Fibre Optic Sensing (FOS)

Technologies based on fibre optic sensing provide a wide range of information by using a
trackside mounted sensing solution only. One kind of FOS is the so-called Distributed Acoustic
Sensing (DAS) technology. Such systems constantly monitor sounds and vibrations, e. g.
generated by the wheel-rail interaction. Initially, FOS has been used in applications in the oil
and gas business. The difference for railway application is that a greater range of sounds and
sources must be analysed and distinguished.
This enables continuous train tracking over wide distances from trackside. Other fields of
application are the condition monitoring of various infrastructure assets and assets on trains
and the detection of events related to safety and security. The data of FOS-detectors can be
combined with inputs from other systems (e. g. train number, route information) to process and
classify information for different railway applications.
The principle of FOS is based on the ability to detect changes in intensity of light reflections
caused by vibrations or sound waves radiating against a single-mode fibre optic cable (figure
5.21). A coherent laser is pulsed into this fibre at a set frequency. Natural impurities within
the fibre cause a small portion of light to be reflected to the source; this is called backscatter.
The intensity of the reflected Rayleigh backscatter is measured as a function of time after
transmission of the laser pulse, translating to physical changes in any given fibre section.
These changes can be caused by structure-borne sound and vibrations in the vicinity of the
fibre optic cable. Classification algorithms translate these measurable signatures into alerts
and reports for example about movements of vehicles, rail defects or footsteps of persons.

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 5.2 Technical Means of Detection

Figure 5.21: Functional principle of FOS/DAS-based detection systems

As the fibre in use becomes the sensor itself, the route taken by the pulse from its source to the cable
has a significant impact on the evaluation of the signal. The following issues have to be considered
for correct detection, depending on the detection purpose (Lancaster/Rosenberger 2018):
–– Intensity of the signal
The intensity of the original signal has a considerable influence on the fundamental
detectability. For example, footsteps will of course generate less intense sound waves and
vibrations than an approaching train.
–– Conditions of the transmission medium
The characteristics in the immediate surroundings of a glass fibre have an influence on the
type and extent of the signal reduction from the source to the glass fibre. While sand, for
example, represents a poor transfer medium, clayey subsoil has been proven to be a highly
effective transmitter for the corresponding signals.
–– Site and layout of cable routeing
Signals are attenuated depending on the distance of the acoustic source to the glass fibre. Ideal
results were obtained with cables laid in a cable trench made of concrete or laid as buried cable,
running approximately one to five metres away from the track (figure 5.22). Other methods, such
as attaching the cable directly to the foot of the rail or to items (fences, walls etc.) near the
track, might make it easier to detect specific acoustic sources. At the same time, the sensitivity
increases with regards to various other influences, such as wind or rain.
–– Cable quality and condition
Sensitivity is also influenced by the types of fibre optic cable. Whilst the quality and purity of
the glass fibres co-determine the range, the material, strength and condition of the sheath
can increase or reduce the sensitivity of the system.
–– Ambient noise and vibration sources
Since FOS enables the detection and classification of different incidents through their acoustic
signatures, all acoustic sources/vibrations in the vicinity of the track must be taken into
consideration. Depending on the application, static installations such as industrial plants, point
machines or compressors have to be considered. All these influences can be superimposed
on each other. In the signal evaluation, suitable filters can incorporate or mask fixed locations.
–– Signal signature classification
Fine tuning of the system is necessary to achieve automated signal identification and
classification by use of algorithms. Therefore, depending on the complexity of the application,
repeated tests with the same event to attune the algorithm have to be performed. Afterwards a
reference system or a data reference is used for comparing the FOS-data with reference data.
After successful implementation and testing of the algorithm, it is able to work as a stand-alone
system or in combination with other systems to reach a specific level of accuracy or reliability.

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5 Detection

Figure 5.22: FOS-modes are influenced by site and layout of cable routeing

Tests have shown that a single FOS/DAS unit (Frauscher) can cover up to 40 kilometres of
glass fibre, resulting in 80 kilometres in total when using two units at a certain location. On
that length, 2500 laser pulses are sent into the fibre per second. According to the Nyquist-
Shannon sampling theorem frequencies of up to 1.25 kHz can be identified. Information and
collected data are visualised in a path-time-amplitude diagram, a so-called waterfall diagram
(figure 5.23). Time can be seen on the y-axis, whereas distance is displayed on the x-axis.
Any single-mode fibre can be turned into a series of FOS/DAS sections by connecting one
end of the fibre to a FOS unit. Using spare capacity on existing fibre cables next to a track
allows adding various railway-specific applications, without any intrusion to the network or
disturbance of the signalling systems.

Figure 5.23: Waterfall diagram of five trains tracked by FOS

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 5.2 Technical Means of Detection

With FOS it is possible to locate all moving railway vehicles within a monitored track section
in real-time (detection of position, train parts as bogies or axles, front and rear end as well as
speed). In remote areas, this technology can provide a cost effective and efficient solution. For
non-safety-related applications, FOS can be used as a stand-alone solution. Integration of
conventional detection systems (axle-counter or track circuits) or combination with GNSS-
positioning/odometry data from the railway vehicles allows FOS-based real-time tracking to be
used for safety-relevant applications. Inputs from these systems can be combined in the Traffic
Control Centre (TCC) and be used for dispatching, capacity monitoring, platform announcement,
customer information, etc. (figure 5.24). Since no specific equipment needs to be fitted to the
vehicles, their design and origin are insignificant when using FOS-based solutions.

Figure 5.24: FOS/DAS-based detection systems can provide information for TCC

Using FOS for asset condition monitoring can supplement or reduce the equipment installed
trackside to detect the ongoing health of the rail, rail fastening, track bed and ballast.
Thereby, asset condition monitoring data generated by FOS-based solutions can support the
development of condition-based maintenance strategies.
FOS also enables the detection of people and animals on or in the vicinity of the track, which
allows various safety applications to be implemented, such as the detection of activities
associated with terrorism, vandalism or cable theft. Detected events can be used to generate
alarm messages or for recording asset conditions over time. Another possibility is using FOS
to inform and warn work crews with position information of approaching trains.
Due to the multiple number of applications available, various integration and interfacing models
must be considered. Based on experiences gathered so far, three possible models can be
described. In a first variant, information obtained from the FOS-system is used purely to activate
a function raising an alarm via XML feed, e-mail or SMS. A second option is to use a graphical
interface which displays information gathered by FOS-systems according to the applications
requirements. Thirdly it might be requested that information is directly transferred to the operator’s
central office or diagnostic system, where it can be implemented into individual processes.
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5 Detection

An example of a system for safety and non-safety applications was under testing in Germany
until 2018. In parallel, a series of further test installations has been implemented in various
countries by a network of suppliers and operators. This was to verify the direct benefits to the
operational network when FOS is used in daily operation.

5.2.5 Three-dimensional Detection

5.2.5.1 Visual Observation

The simplest and historically oldest form of detection is visual observation of the respective track
by staff. The ability of humans to evaluate also unexpected observations is the main advantage
over all technical systems. Disadvantages are the relatively high probability of human error and
the high costs of staffing. Therefore, the usage of visual observation is decreasing.
An alternative is remote visual observation via camera and monitor (closed-circuit television – CCTV,
see figure 5.25). The number of staff required for observation purpose can be significantly
reduced by this method. One objective of remote observation is to allow the staff to observe
visually areas that are out of sight from the position of the interlocking operator. Especially
when several track areas are difficult to differentiate one from another (e. g. visual track clear
detection in lever interlockings), remote observation can support the interlocking operator. It
can also be used in situations where not only rail vehicles have to be detected. Examples are
the level crossing intersections with roads, the tracks in platform areas, but also passenger
areas for security purposes.

Figure 5.25: Remote visual supervision by use of CCTV (photo: TU Dresden/Jens Buder)

The results of visual and remote visual observation can be used for all kinds of detection
purposes described in chapter 5.1.4 as well as for hazard alert purposes (chapter 14). For
track clear detection, both principles – direct and indirect – are used:
–– Direct track clear detection means that the track section concerned must be completely
observed from one or more observation points (which can be signal boxes).
–– Indirect track clear detection means that the end of train markers are observed. The clear
status of the track section is concluded from the facts that
• the last train was complete on leaving the section and
• no other train has entered.

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 5.2 Technical Means of Detection

5.2.5.2 Automatic Image Processing

An alternative to remote visual observation is automatic image processing. It is a development
of recent years, as it requires very high capacities for real-time data processing which can
only be solved by high-performance electronic computer systems. This is especially applicable
when objects other than rail vehicles need to be detected. Cameras can be placed at the
trackside or on the train.
The most common evaluation method is differential image processing, evaluating the
difference of the current image with a fixed reference image or with an image taken a short
time before, giving an alarm or automatically stopping trains in the case of critical results.
A disadvantage of the image processing method is that in certain circumstances optical
effects such as headlights of road vehicles or shadows of persons can be mistaken for an
obstacle on the track. One solution is the usage of stereo cameras: by observing the same
area using two cameras from different viewpoints. ‘Flat’ optical effects can be distinguished
from real objects, as has been developed for level crossings in Japan (Ohta 2005) and
Germany (Pelz 2011).
Three-dimensional laser radar (figure 5.26) is another example of active electromagnetic
wave system (chapter 5.2.4.1) that also pertains to automatic image processing systems.
This represents a way of detecting objects with just one device in comparison with previously
discussed method utilising multiple cameras.
Hereby, laser light is emitted within the measuring range, with multiple scans in horizontal
and vertical axis in very short time intervals to determine distances to points within the area.
Sizes and locations of objects are calculated based on the time-shift of the received reflected
laser light. The closer the object is to the laser emitter, the less time it will take to receive the
reflected light. A differential image processing software algorithm is used to track moving
objects. The output of the laser radar can be connected to a warning device to hold trains
back if an object is detected within the defined supervised area of track.

Figure 5.26: 3-D radar scanner (photo: Mermec Group)

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5.2.6 Systems with Active Reporting from the Train

5.2.6.1 Fields of Application

Several methods are applied and under development where the train reports its position actively
and is thereby in most cases known individually by the trackside equipment, e. g. by a train
number. There are many systems where this information is used for purposes of rolling stock
location, statistics etc. But the number of systems where such information is also evaluated for
safety purposes such as track clear detection is increasing in different parts of the world. This is
particularly the case for secondary lines. Such systems often appear in combination with train-
based end of train detection systems (chapter 5.2.7). In low-tech applications, the position report
is sent telephonically by the train driver. Modern systems can be divided into two categories:
–– Systems where the train is equipped with a sender or transponder and is thereby identified
by the trackside when passing fixed locations (chapter 5.2.6.2).
–– Systems where the train measures its position automatically and reports this to the trackside
(chapter 5.2.6.3). The position can be measured relatively, e. g. by odometry or Doppler radar, or
absolutely by use of Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS). Relative position measurement
has to be calibrated at certain intervals, e. g. by positioning balises or radio beacons.

5.2.6.2 Systems with Train Identification at Fixed Locations

In the following, systems are described where the train or its parts carry particular senders, for
example microwave senders, which send an ID number on passing interrogation sites. These
systems are widely used for the positioning of certain locomotives, wagons or cargos.
As an example without safety application, the Russian system SAIPS has interrogation sites on
the entry to and exit from stations. The approaching train is detected by a special track circuit or
axle counter, whereupon the interrogator sends a powerful signal. The train transponder uses this
power to emit back the ID-number of the vehicle (figure 5.27). The data is transmitted from the
interrogation sites to the dispatcher centre through Ethernet (Belov/Geršenzon/Kotlecov 2003).
Similar systems are in use in the USA (‘Automatic Equipment Identification’, see chapter 12.3.5)
and other countries.

Figure 5.27: Interrogator of SAIPS

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 5.2 Technical Means of Detection

In recent years, this detection principle has also been used for interlocking purposes. An
example is the Japanese system COMBAT (Computer and Microwave Balise-Aided Train
Control System). Interrogators – consisting of a transmitter/receiver unit and a responder – are
located at exit signals (figure 5.28). In the absence of a train, the transmitter/receiver sends
the signal to the responder and receives the answer to check if the system is effective. The
interrogator’s controller checks the service availability through two independent channels and
sends this data to the control centre. For direction selectivity the train has two transponders:
one at the front end and a second device situated at the rear end of the train. The latter serves
for end of train detection. Thanks to the train ID number, the route will be released after the
same train has cleared the route completely. Transmitted train data facilitates other dispatcher
operations in the control centre too (Nishibori/Sasaki/Hiraguri 2002).

Figure 5.28: Principle of train identification with COMBAT

5.2.6.3 Systems with Train Measuring its own Position

On the first railways, a rider on horseback galloped in front of the train, checked the track and
warned ground staff of its approach. This was quickly forgotten. But newer communication
systems enabled the train driver (or later automatic systems on the train) to send the position
of the train at certain locations on the way himself.
The method of intermittent manual position reports by the driver is suitable for low traffic
volumes and speeds (due to the high probability of human error), but it will not reveal any
unintended detachment of wagons. It becomes more suitable in combination with train-based
end of train detection systems (chapter 5.2.7). But this method may also be used on lines with
advanced track-based signalling equipment in degraded mode operation. Thus, telephones on
the trackside or mobile communication can be used.
Thanks to the development of data communication systems, today the train can transmit
its position in short intervals to a stationary block centre automatically, by digital radio
communication. Thereby, the train can determine its position:
–– relatively, e. g. by odometer or Doppler radar,
–– absolutely by trackside fixed locations (e. g. balises, beacons, crossings of cable loops,
track circuit borders or characteristics of the track itself) or
–– absolutely by satellite positioning with GNSS.
In relative systems, odometry measures the position through the number of wheel rotations or
with Doppler radar. Measurement errors (e. g. by the train slipping and sliding) can accumulate,
so the position has to be corrected at absolute control locations. The combination of relative
methods with the use of odometry and absolute methods with fixed control locations is widely

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5 Detection

used throughout the world in advanced train protection systems. It is also used in mass transit
systems equipped with CBTC (chapter 8.5). There it represents a primary train detection method,
while conventional technologies like track circuits or axle counters are only used if required as a
backup for degraded scenarios. In the USA, the relative method is used in transponder-based
Positive Train Control Systems (PTC) deployed on commuter railways, see chapter 8.6.
Absolute methods with trackside fixed locations are used in several advanced train
protection systems for braking curve calculation, e. g. in LZB (crossings of cable loop as
fixed locations; chapter 8.3.6), TVM 430, Japanese Digital ATC (track circuit borders as fixed
locations; chapter 8.3.6) and ETCS (balises as fixed locations; chapter 8.4.3). In several
cases, besides the pure train protection function by dynamic speed calculation, the position
information is sent to the trackside signalling equipment for different purposes. These include
the evaluation of standstill of the train for overlap release. In ETCS Level 3 it is intended to
use the combination of relative and absolute method for track clear detection too – similar to
existing CBTC systems.
Characteristics of the track itself can be measured by eddy current sensors on the vehicle in
connection with a track atlas. The eddy current sensor detects all metal parts along the track,
e. g. clips which attach the rails to the sleepers, or point frogs. It can only be used in limited
networks, for which the railway vehicle has a track atlas.
In systems based on GNSS positioning, the receiver on the train (figure 5.30) calculates the
train’s position without needing fixed control locations. The signals from satellites with their codes
form synchronised broadcasts to all earth receivers. Through signal codes – that contain orbital
data and precise time of broadcast – and the measured delay times (shifted phase of the signal),
the receiver determines the distance from each satellite. With signals from a minimum of four
different satellites received, the absolute position of the GNSS-receiver on the Earth can be
calculated. Such systems are tested on different railways (GSA 2017) and show a high detection
error (up to 30 m). This makes them unsuitable to distinguish on which of several parallel tracks a
train is standing.
The principle of Satellite Based Augmentation Systems (SBAS), e. g. Differential GPS (D-GPS),
uses special trackside reference locations to reduce this error. To enable safe track selective
detection, an error below 2 m is necessary. Russian Railways use the satellite positioning
data and digital track atlas by the locomotive (e. g. for calculation of the braking curve) and
by the interlocking as an additional safety level (system KLUB-UP, figure 5.29) (IRZ 2018,
OAO RZD 2017). In the USA the principle of satellite positioning for interlocking purposes is used
in several types of Positive Train Control (PTC) system deployed primarily on freight railways. The
same principle is at the core of Rio Tinto AutoHaul® project in Australia (Rio Tinto 2018).

Figure 5.29: Correction of train position by use of SBAS systems

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 5.2 Technical Means of Detection

There are several problems limiting the use of GNSS positioning for train spacing as a
replacement of trackside track clear detection by track circuits or axle counters. One is that all
trains in the network have to self-check their completeness (train integrity). However, this can
be easily solved on secondary lines where only short passenger trains/multiple units are used.
Another problem is that in case of disruption of communication with only one train, the whole
network would have to be considered as occupied. This makes such systems – likewise these
systems which employ a track atlas – particularly suitable for separated networks with a low
number of trains moving inside the network.

Figure 5.30: GPS-receiver on the wagon (photo: DB AG/Claus Weber)

5.2.7 End of Train (EOT) Detection Systems

The historically oldest form of end of train detection is the use of rear end marker as a vehicle signal
to be observed by staff (chapter 5.2.5.1). Every train must carry this signal, usually one, two or
three red lamps or a signal plate including the colour red, at the end of the last vehicle (figure 5.31).

Figure 5.31: Different forms of rear end markers

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5 Detection

Later, technical solutions for the detection of the rear end have been introduced on some
railways. They can be categorised as train-based or track-based solutions.
Train-based rear-end detection systems are widely used in countries following North American
operational principles, whereas track-based detection systems are to a decreasing extent
used in countries following German operational principles (chapter 3.1).
Train-based systems consist of a sending unit at the rear end (figure 5.32) and a receiving
unit in the driver’s cab, both working together as a matched pair. One solution is to measure
the distance between both units by radio waves. Another solution is to measure the pressure
of the air brake at the rear end and to transmit the data to the cab unit. There are different
possibilities for evaluating this information. Some of them are:
–– alarm in the cab to warn the driver in case of critical values together with special rules about
driver’s actions
–– automatic initiation of an emergency stop
–– transmission of the result to the interlocking system or the operator’s workplace and safety
measures there
–– refusing of unblocking in an electronic token block system (chapters 4.4.5, 10.6.3)

Figure 5.32: Rear-end device of a train-based EOT detection system in USA (photo: Reiner Decher)

Track-based systems consist of a receiving unit mounted in the track and a unit installed to
the coupling at the end of the train. To prevent dangerous mistakes by shunting staff (e. g. a
trainside end of train unit forgotten in the middle of the train), it is designed so that either this
unit or another wagon, but never both, can be attached at the same time.
In the applications, the contact is either mechanical or electrically inductive. Inductive train
side devices can either be provided with autonomous power supply or use the transponder
principle to use energy sent from the trackside. When the train side unit passes over the
trackside, this information is transmitted to the interlocking system, permitting release of the
respective track section for further traffic.

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 5.3 Track Circuits

The use of continuous track clear detection can be considered to make end of train detection
redundant. However, on most railways trains still carry optical rear end markers for the
following reasons:
1. in case they enter an area without technical track clear detection
2. for the benefit of staff other than the signallers (e. g. track workers can see that the train is
moving away from them, not towards them)
3. for degraded mode operation in case of technical failure

5.3 Track Circuits

5.3.1 Basic Structure and Function of Track Circuits

The basic functional principle of the track circuit, also called ‘rail circuit’, is described in chapter
5.2.3.2. The track circuit was applied for the first time in 1864 by William Robert Sykes in
England. The first track circuit had a source of current and a detection device at the same end
(figure 5.33). If the section is clear, the circuit is open and the relay dropped down. Therefore, it is
called ’normally open’ track circuit. Upon entry of a train the relay gets a current.
Advantages of this form of track circuit are simplicity and low costs. Another safety advantage
is that, as relays are usually faster in picking up than in dropping down, the occupation as
the more safety critical case will be detected faster. However, the decisive disadvantage is the
non-fail-safe behaviour: in the most frequent error cases (for example breakage of the circuit
or low voltage), a track circuit with a railway vehicle can falsely show track clear status. Due
to this disadvantage, this kind of track circuits is only applicable for purposes with low safety
requirements, e. g. at marshalling yards in some countries.

Figure 5.33: Normally open (non-fail-safe) track circuit

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5 Detection

Figure 5.34: Normally closed (fail-safe) track circuit

The first fail-safe track circuit was invented by the American civil engineer William Robinson
in 1872 (ARA 1922). In this normally closed track circuit (figure 5.34), the track relay is
connected with the power feed only via the rails. If no railway vehicle is present, the relay
is picked up, if a railway vehicle is on the section, the track relay is short-circuited and the
relay drops down.
However, this form of track circuit also has one important disadvantage: If the railway
vehicle has low axle loading or the rails are rusty or covered with sand or wet leaves
or similar, the detection of the railway vehicle can be lost. This is also known as ‘poor
shunting’ (‘failure to shunt’ in North America): The resistance between the rails if a railway
vehicle is on the section (so-called shunt) is too high, therefore the relay gets too much
feed and does not drop down. To prevent this, there are different solutions. In some
countries the sensitivity of track circuits is regularly checked with a normative shunt (for
example in Russia), in other countries there is a defined minimum time interval in which
the track has to be traversed by a railway vehicle (for example 24 hours in Germany),
otherwise the track circuit has to be taken out of the interlocking dependence and
considered as permanently occupied.
The advantages of the normally closed track circuit dominate: The most frequent error
cases lead to fail-safe reactions. Therefore, this type of track circuit became the basis for
further development and use. Occasionally some special forms are used (figure 5.35), with
worse safety behaviour than the standard normally closed arrangement.

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 5.3 Track Circuits

Figure 5.35: Special arrangements of track circuits (examples)

Regarding the form of current, track circuits can be classified into the following groups (table 5.1):
–– direct current (DC) track circuits
–– alternating current (AC) track circuits with low frequency
–– alternating current (AC) track circuits with high (audio) frequency, usually jointless
(chapter 5.3.7.4)
A special type is track circuits with high voltage impulses in which undesirable isolation
between the rail and the wheel is broken by short pulses of a high voltage (for example in
France and Britain; Bailey et al. 1995). According to the given classification, the track circuit
groups will be described in detail in chapter 5.3.7.
Track circuits can have either passive or active receivers. In the latter case the track circuits
carry only a weak signal which will be amplified by the receiver. The advantage is low power
consumption (up to some tens of Watts) in comparison with other types (up to some hundreds
of Watts), but the disadvantage is higher sensitivity to electromagnetic influences.
Both DC and AC track circuits can have steady or impulse detection signals. The impulse detection
signal is less susceptible to adverse effects caused by interference from other systems, power lines
and other sources of electromagnetic influence. It also reduces power consumption in comparison
with steady signals, increases the possible length of the supervised section of track and frequently
does not require additional circuits and equipment to produce ATP codes (chapter 8.3.4). However,
impulse track circuits have generally higher equipment cost and the cost difference between
a steady track circuit and an impulse one is greater for short sections. For these reasons, track
circuits with impulse detection signals are primarily used on open lines between interlockings.

5.3.2 Geometrical Assembly of Track Circuits

On open lines there are track circuits with one or two receivers. The reason for the application
of the latter, so-called centre-fed track circuits (figure 5.36), is that the distance between the
receiver and the transmitter is limited to about 1000 m to 1500 m because of rail impedance
and external electromagnetic influences. By using track circuits with one transmitter in the
middle and two receivers on both ends, the general length of a track circuit can be doubled.
In stations in some countries (e. g. Russia), branched track circuits with different receivers are
used, too (figure 5.37). If one of the relays has no current, the track circuit is considered as
occupied. Track circuits with many receivers are difficult to adjust. Therefore, one branched
track circuit, as a rule, has no more than three to four relays. If a branch is short, the relay
on this end can be absent. But if a rail connector (long jumper bond) is broken and a train is
on this part of the section, the track circuit is not safe. Therefore, for safety the short branch
without relay needs doubled long jumper bonds (figure 5.38).

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5 Detection

Some countries have regulations concerning branches of track circuits that are not equipped
with receivers. In Russia, that length is restricted to no more than 40 meters for audio
frequency track circuits and no more than 60 meters for low frequency track circuits (MPS
1999). In the USA, the track section branch will be equipped with receiver if the permitted
speed of travel through a turnout is greater than 45 miles per hour (FRA 2011).

Figure 5.36: Centre-fed track circuit

Figure 5.37: Track circuit with long branch

Figure 5.38: Track circuit with short branch

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 5.3 Track Circuits

In other countries (e. g. Britain, Germany) the station track circuit usually has only one
receiver, and the current flows to the relay through all branches (figure 5.39) (Nock 1982). A
disadvantage of these track circuit is that the railway vehicle is not detected in the case of the
other rail being broken (orange line), or of its connectors. However, not all railways use track
circuits for detection of broken rails anyway.

Figure 5.39: Typical series bonding of station track circuits with one relay

In certain locations the probability of derailment is exceptionally high (e. g. on catch and trap points).
To prevent an erroneous and dangerous clear detection due to complete derailment, track circuit
interrupters can be installed (figure 5.40). In the act of derailment or when a railway vehicle enters
a section that cannot be used for a permitted movement, the leading wheel breaks the interrupter.
This switches the track circuit to permanently occupied, by disconnecting the track circuit cable.

Figure 5.40: Track circuit interrupter at trap points (principle)

5.3.3 Treatment of Traction Return Currents

In electric traction areas an important problem is the treatment of traction return currents.
In some railways, the return path for electric currents from interior energy consumers in
passenger vehicles to the locomotive is via the rails. Two solutions are applied (table 5.1):
1. Only one rail carries the return currents. For this purpose, either one rail is constructed
without insulated rail joints and the other rail (the signal rail) with (figure 5.41a), or both
rails have isolated rail joints and are used alternately for return currents and connected by
diagonal connectors (figure 5.41b). The advantage of the latter is a higher level of safety in
case of overmilling of the insulated rail joint.
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5 Detection

These types of track circuits are called single rail track circuits. They represent a cost-
efficient way of providing a path for traction return currents in signalled territories. However,
they are more subject to the influence of return currents and therefore have restricted
lengths. Two methods can be employed to divert return currents from track circuit
equipment in case the return rail has high impedance:
• One method is to increase the impedance of the indoor equipment of the track circuit itself,
• the other is to allow the traction return current to bypass the receiver, in case it enters
the signalling path.
Single rail track circuits are more susceptible to ballast resistance fluctuations than the next
type of track circuits and generally have better shunting sensitivity. This term describes the
target resistance of the train axle, for which the track circuit is calculated. For this reason,
they are applied primarily at terminal locations, in yards, or on lesser used sidings.

Figure 5.41: Return of traction supply through single rail

2. Both rails carry the return currents in equal parts. In DC traction areas an impedance bond is
used in the form as drawn in figure 5.42a. This impedance bond connects the rails at each end
of every track circuit. The bonds offer high impedance to the AC track circuits and therefore
effectively isolate one rail from the other. The DC traction current, however, can flow through
the bonds to and from their centre points without hindrance (Nock 1982). Track circuits with
impedance bonds are called double rail track circuits. In AC traction areas of North America, a
capacitor is connected to the impedance bond. The resonant circuit LC of the impedance bond
with the capacitor has minimal impedance for the traction current and maximum impedance to
the track circuit, which has a higher frequency (IRSE 2008). However, impedance bonds can
still be seen as an additional load to the track circuit transmitter connected in parallel to the
receiver, which affects shunting sensitivity. Double rail track circuits are less susceptible to ballast
irregularities than single rail ones due to the presence of impedance bonds. For all (AC or DC)
traction supplies, there is a form of impedance bond with a transformer inside, which uses their
secondary side for the transmission and reception of the track circuit signal (figure 5.42b). This
solution is widely used in Europe and Asia.

Figure 5.42: Return of traction supply through double rail

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 direct current track circuits track circuits with high- alternating current track circuits audio frequency
voltage impulses jointless track circuits
return of through single rail (only for AC through single and through single rail and through double rail with through double rail
traction traction system) through double rail with impedance bond
supply impedance bond
track circuit continuous impulse only impulse impulse continuous modulated continuous
supply
onephase polyphase
relay relay
safety – decoder decoder scheme decoder frequency frequency modulation frequency
protection scheme scheme and and phase and
against frequency frequency
disturbance
by means of
provide own – pulse code – pulse code frequency – frequency code
information code
for cab
signalling
control of change of decoder decoder scheme decoder change of change of –
insulated poles scheme scheme phase phase

Table 5.1: Comparison of different types of track circuits

rail joints by
means of

receiver passive (relay) passive (relay) passive (relay) active (amplifier with
relay or with electronic

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detection device)
safety – high-voltage impulses – high-frequency current
measures if
the train has
low axle load

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155
5.3 Track Circuits
5 Detection

The traction return currents enter one coil of the impedance bond from opposite sides, and
the second (or signal) transformer side would get no influence due to the equality of current
in both rails (figure 5.43). But in practice there is no exact equality of currents in opposite rails;
their asymmetry is usually up to 10–12 percent (Dmitriev/Serganov 1988).
Therefore, to prevent influencing the track relay by traction return currents, the track circuits must
not have the same frequency as traction supply or its harmonics. Track circuits with frequencies of
25 Hz (Russia), 75 Hz (East Europe), 83 1/3 Hz or 125 Hz (Central and West Europe) and others
are used for AC 50 Hz traction supply; 91.6 Hz or 100 Hz frequencies are used for AC 60 Hz
traction supply (Germany, North America). The track circuits 42 or 125 Hz are usually used with
AC traction supply 16.7 Hz. All AC track circuits can be applied for the DC traction supply;
the track circuits 50 Hz and 60 Hz are mainly used here, depending on the country.

Figure 5.43: Two impedance bonds on the border of track circuits

The impedance bond must have low resistance (R < 1 Ω) and pass large currents (e. g. more
than 1000 A in a DC-traction area) (Dmitriev/Serganov 1988). The impedance bond can be in
the ground between the rails or stand away (figure 5.44). The two transformers belonging to
the same track circuit border can be mounted in one casing.

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 5.3 Track Circuits

Figure 5.44: Two impedance bonds and insulated rail joint in Netherlands

Neighbouring track circuits with different frequencies need no insulated joints and traction
return currents can use both rails without an impedance bond. Exceptions are cases where an
exact physical border between two track circuits is necessary (e. g. for short station sections).
Impedance bonds can also be installed to reduce the asymmetry of traction return currents, or
to provide current if any rail is broken.

5.3.4 Additional Functions of Track Circuits

Track circuits can be used not only for train detection, but also for one or several additional
functions:
–– to transmit information for cab signalling and train protection
–– to transmit signal information from the exit of the block section to its entrance
–– to detect some kinds of broken rail
The transmission of block information by coded track circuits helps to reduce costs for cabling.
The main types of track circuits used also for cab signalling and transmission of block information
are pulse coded and frequency coded. Almost all impulse track circuits give an impulse signal
depending on active routes and track occupation and are used together for detection and cab
signalling. Some types of AC track circuits with a continuous feed can change frequency and be
used simultaneously for detection and cab signalling. Other types of non-impulse AC track circuits
use only one frequency for detection. If a train is on the section, these track circuits give a second
signal (mainly impulse coded) used only for cab signalling and train protection (chapter 8).

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5 Detection

5.3.5 Immunity against Foreign Currents

The control of insulated rail joints between track circuits with the same frequency is necessary;
otherwise a feed of one circuit can come into the other one and cause dangerous detection
errors. For this purpose, various methods are used which are described in table 5.1. Besides,
it is necessary for each receiver to be protected against dangerous and disturbing influences
from foreign currents. The sensitivity to foreign influences is higher in track circuits with active
than with passive receivers (chapter 5.3.1). The AC impulse track circuits and track circuits
with polyphase relays have good immunity.

Figure 5.45: Double-element vane relay

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 5.3 Track Circuits

Impulse track circuits have a decoder scheme which can compare impulses in neighbouring
track circuits. If the same impulses are in both circuits at the same time, the scheme detects
the breakage of the insulated joints. If a continuous signal comes into the track circuit, the
scheme detects the disturbance and switches off the relay. The frequency filter in the receiver
provides additional protection against influences.
The polyphase (or vane) relay also guarantees high immunity to effects of false feeds and
leakage from the traction supply and neighbouring track circuits, by working in a frequency
and phase discriminating manner.
It is in effect an AC motor limited to a movement of one quarter of a revolution. It has an
armature (the “vane”) which rotates in special low-friction bearings about a horizontal axis
with its centre of gravity below the axis (figure 5.45). Gravity returns it to the ‘dropped down’
position in case of current failure.
Double-element vane relays have two coils. The local coil is energised by a local supply. The
other is the control coil. The vane relay will only operate if the energisation of the control coil
corresponds to that of the local coil in both frequency and phase.

5.3.6 Electrical Parameters and Dimensioning

Rails are a good conductor for electrical current. Therefore, the transfer of signal electricity
through the rail needs relatively small voltage. But signal wires between the interlocking and
the rail are much thinner. For that, the transfer of signal electricity through wires needs a higher
voltage. To increase its effectiveness, a transformer near the rails is used. A resistance at the
transmitter end is also necessary for two reasons:
1. protection of the track circuit equipment against a short circuit when a railway vehicle is on
the transmitter end
2. voltage adjustment to climatic conditions
Equipment like masts or casings for switching units in the field has a protection earthing through
the rail. In the case of an overload (lightning or short circuit of the traction supply), a short high-
voltage pulse acts in the track circuit. To protect the transmitter and the receiver of the track
circuit against the overload, protection elements are necessary. They filter out the high-voltage
pulse by short-circuiting through a voltage-depended resistor (varistor) or transfer it to the earth
by arrester. This makes the track circuit a complex device which has three parts (figure 5.46).

Figure 5.46: Scheme of AC track circuit

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5 Detection

The part ‘rail line’ has only rails, rail connectors and ballast, but is the most complex part of
track circuit (figure 5.47). The DC resistance of the rail R is very low, around 0,035 Ω/km,
although it is increased to approximately 0,25 Ω/km by the relatively higher resistance of
galvanised iron bonds in jointed track. The inductance of rail jvL can raise the overall
impedance per rail to approximately 0,3 Ω/km (50 Hz), 2,5 Ω/km (400 Hz) or 10 Ω/km (2 kHz)
(Railtrack 1998).

Figure 5.47: Physical sense of the rail line

1
The ballast resistance (with G the conductance in DC operation) is the resistance
G + jvC
between the two rails of a track and comprises of leakage between the rail fixing, sleepers and
earth. The value of this resistance is dependent upon the condition of insulations, cleanliness
of the ballast and the prevailing weather conditions. Changes of the ballast resistance (from
infinity down to less than 1 Ω ∙ km) and allowable voltage fluctuations must not prevent the
correct functioning of the track circuit.
There are therefore five basic operational situations to check the correct functioning of a track
circuit at the worst combinations of varying factors (table 5.2):
–– The scenario ‘clear’ means that the track circuit will show clear by the worst deviations from
these parameters.
–– The scenario ‘occupied’ means that the circuit will detect an occupation by all deviations
which are worst for this scenario.
–– The scenario ‘short circuit’ requires that the transmitter end will also function if the
resistance between rails is 0 Ω.
–– If the track circuit is used to detect broken rails, other worst conditions have to be
considered in the scenario ‘control’.
–– If the track circuit is used for train protection (scenario ‘cab signalling’), the current in the
rails must be enough for the locomotive receiver.
The shunt of each axle is normalised depending on country or railway or track circuit’s
type. The normative shunt (usually taken from 0,06 to 2,5 Ω) needs to determine the
worst permissible conditions, when the track circuit is still able to function correctly. A
dangerous situation occurs when the train shunt is higher than normative shunt, because
of imperfections such as films of rust, leaf residue, coal dust or sand between the rails and
the axle, other environmental impacts or characteristics of the vehicle (light vehicle, disk
brakes).

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 5.3 Track Circuits

scenario means the worst conditions required

result
ballast voltage rail other
resistance impedance
clear section is free min min max _ receiver is
energised
occupied section is max max min one train receiver is
occupied axle is on de-energised
the feed or
receiver end
control rail is broken at a special max min _ receiver is
rate de-energised
short train is on the _ max _ axle feed end is in
circuit feed end resistance is function
0Ω
cab current for min min max one train current
signalling cab signalling axle is on the through axle
receiver end is enough

Table 5.2: Calculation of operating scenarios of track circuits

Scenario control is also considering cross-bonding (potential equalisation between different

tracks) and grounding of impedance bonds in double track territories. The purpose of
cross-bonding is to reduce voltage drop in the circuits of traction return current by potential
equalisation. Excessive application of cross-bonding may compromise broken rail detection
by providing sneak paths for signalling current. Thus, careful consideration of cross-bonding
needs to be performed in a system-wide application of double rail track circuits with
impedance bonds. Many railways have restrictions on the spacing of various cross-bonding
connections and establish a certain sequence of their application between traction power
sub-stations.

5.3.7 Application of the Types of Track Circuits

5.3.7.1 Direct Current Track Circuits

The first track circuits were of the direct current (DC) type because at that time, the only
available reliable power supply was provided by batteries. High voltage interconnection lines
were not then in existence.
DC track circuits have been used in the USA since 1871 and in Europe since 1895. In
the USA from the beginning, track circuits were used to detect whole block sections
continuously. If a block section was longer than the maximum possible length of a track
circuit, several track circuits were used, with repeater relays in between. In Europe, initially
the track circuits had a length of only few tens of metres and detected the occupation of
a short section in rear of the signal (berth track circuit; chapter 4.4.7). DC track circuits for
continuous train detection were used later, e. g. in Germany since 1913 (Naumann/Pachl
2004). Today, some countries in Europe (Sweden, Norway, Switzerland, Denmark and
Britain), Asia and America apply DC track circuits with continuous supply. These are being
replaced by coded track circuits in some countries.

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5 Detection

Traditional DC coded track circuits deploy the code generator at the transmitter end
and a code following relay with decoding circuit as a receiver. The development of solid-
state devices and microprocessors allowed improvement of DC coded track circuits and
replacement of mechanical coding equipment with electronic one. Processor-based DC
coded track circuits are widely used on open lines in North America. These track circuits
are based on handshaking protocols between track circuit ends that allow synchronisation
in receiving data in both directions. The number of codes varies between different types of
coded track circuits from nine to 23 (Ansaldo STS 2013, Alstom 2016). Some codes have
reduced recognition time and are used for specific purposes like change of traffic direction
between interlockings. These track circuits are capable of transmitting both, safety related
vital information used for train separation and selection of signal aspects, as well as non-vital
information used to provide indication and alarm data to dispatcher. Track codes can be
unipolar or bipolar depending on the manufacturer and have specific voltage/current level as
well as timing parameters.
Track circuits are interfaced with rails via the use of inductors and filters that reduce the load
on transmitter/receiver equipment caused by the low impedance of the track, cab signalling
equipment and/or overlay track circuits. Reverse polarity in adjacent blocks provides
protection from inadvertently detecting codes in adjacent track circuit in the event of insulated
joints failure. Loss of track codes indicates the presence of railway vehicles or a broken rail.
Because the coding format is a low frequency AC signal, the length of such track circuits
can be up to 10.9 kilometres in non-electrified territories (Ansaldo STS 2013) and up to 1.8
kilometres in electrified territories depending on a minimum ballast value (Harmon Industries
1999). Amplitude modulation of coded signal with specific carrier signal frequency is used in
electrified areas. Separate equipment is used to provide cab signalling codes in track circuits.
Due to the length of code messages, these track circuits have generally slow reaction times on
occupancy detection.

5.3.7.2 Alternating Current Track Circuits with Low Frequency

Due to improved power networks and the ability to transform AC, the AC track circuits have
gained superiority over the DC track circuits and are used now in almost all countries. The
track circuit’s frequency must not be the same as the traction frequency, or its harmonics.
On open lines, the AC coded track circuits usually use one carrier frequency and some code
combinations for information transfer to cab signalling (example LS in Czech: signal frequency
75 Hz, from one to four impulses in a cycle depending on permitted speed). Track circuits
with a continuous supply transfer this information by a change of the circuit’s frequencies, e. g.
underground lines in Russia (chapter 8.3.4.2). The station AC continuous track circuits (with
polyphase relay, too) mostly have only one frequency; the cab signalling is transferred separately.
The protection from the detection of a signal from an adjacent track circuit is provided by applying
reverse momentary polarity on blocks sharing insulated joints. However, this principle cannot be
relied upon in case adjacent track circuits are fed from different power sources. Protection can
be provided by placing transmitter ends of such track circuits on both sides of insulated joints,
providing that the lengths of these track circuits are comparable. Other means can be use of
different frequencies or other type of track circuit in between. The need to provide the same source
of power to adjacent track circuits restricts application of power frequency track circuits with vane
relays mostly to interlocking locations (with a few exceptions in North America).
The AC track circuits with carrier frequency above 200–300 Hz are named audio frequency
jointless track circuits (chapter 5.3.7.4).

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 5.3 Track Circuits

5.3.7.3 Track Circuits with High Voltage Impulses

Track circuits with high voltage impulses HVI are similar to DC impulse track circuits. The
differences are as follows (example: type Jeumont) (Nock 1982, IRSE 1999):
–– very short impulse length (three milliseconds)
–– high voltage peak value (100 V)
–– the short impulse signal can be sent through a transformer similar to AC signal
–– the impulse recurrence frequency is constant (three impulse in one second) and cannot give
information for the cab signalling
–– broken rails can be detected by deformation or weakening of the pulse
This type of track circuit has been developed for situations where the rails have been little used or
where vehicles have been standing for a considerable time. Basically, these track circuits apply high
voltage pulses to the rails to break down the rust film. The receiver detects the specific asymmetric
waveform of the signal and operates the fail-safe relay (figure 5.48). The track circuits are insulated
from each other by insulated rail joints, their maximum length is 2000 m for all types of electrified
lines and 3500 m for non-electrified lines (Bailey et al. 1995). The track circuits with high voltage
impulses are available for short lengths up to 150 m, as an overlay track circuit, used mostly with
level crossing applications. These track circuits are centre fed.

Figure 5.48: Jeumont impulse track circuit

There are other types of HVI track circuits, e. g. Lucas type. The equipment operates from a
4 V DC supply and may be used with trickle-charged battery supply. The output is 20–40 V
pulses; the Lucas type is not suitable for electrified areas or for long track circuits.
HVI track circuits are used mainly in Britain and some other countries of the British
Commonwealth as well as in France.

5.3.7.4 Audio Frequency Jointless Track Circuits

Insulated rail joints and impedance bonds cause difficulties for railway operation. Modern
developments in electronics give the possibility of using track circuits without conflicts with traction.
When neighbouring track circuits use different frequencies and do not disturb each other,
insulated rail joints are not necessary for the separation of track circuits from each other. For this
purpose the band of audio frequencies can be used. At increase of frequency v (chapter 5.3.6),
the ballast resistance will decrease, but rail impedance will increase. This means that on high
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5 Detection

frequency the track circuit signal is attenuated more with the length. This has two advantages:
The physical border between track circuits is more precise and variation of weather conditions
(e. g. reduction of ballast resistance 1/G because of rain) is less relevant. A disadvantage is a
more severe limitation of the length of the track circuit: up to 1 km between feed and receiver for
frequencies of some hundred Hz and up to 100 m for frequencies higher than 20 kHz. Therefore,
almost all high frequency track circuits are centre-fed: one generator energises two lengths and
the track circuit is double length. The basic problem is to establish more exact borders between
jointless track circuits (JTC). For this purpose, there are various solutions (figure 5.49).

Figure 5.49: Solutions for the jointless track circuits

Current-operated receivers detect the presence of a current flowing through the rails. This
current will induce a voltage in the coil (figure 5.50). An example is JTC ‘Alstom’, working on
frequency band from few hundred Hz up to 10 kHz and with two receiver coils. If the section is
clear, current flows through the JTC and the ballast of the neighbouring track section. If a train is
between the feed and receiver ends, there is no current of the respective frequency in the coils and
the track circuit detects occupation. Reed JTC, as another example with frequency band 363–
384 Hz and eight frequency values, has a resonant shunt adjusted to the frequency of this track
circuit. If the section is clear, current flows through the rails and is read on the wire of the resonant
shunt (Nock 1982). Advantages of the latter type are big length of JTC and precise borders.

Figure 5.50: Current-operated ‘Alstom’ and Reed JTC

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 5.3 Track Circuits

Voltage-operated track circuits can have a physical border or be without it thanks to high
attenuation of audio frequency in the rails. The track circuit TI21 (old name) or EBI Track 200
(new name, Bombardier) is used without additional connection between rails (figure
5.51). It works with eight different frequencies in the band 1550–2600 Hz. The length of the
attenuation zone of each JTC depends on several factors (ballast conditions, shunt value etc.)
and is about 10–15 metres. Therefore, the feed/receiver points of neighbouring track circuits
are distanced by 20 metres. Each receiver transformer unit presents low impedance to the
frequency of the neighbouring JTC and therefore limits its effective length (Bombardier 2003).

Figure 5.51: Voltage-operated JTC without additional connection between rails

JTC TRC with receiver points of neighbouring track circuit at the same position
and without additional connection between rails (figure 5.51) is another example of a
JTC with voltage operated receiver. It has been designed by ‘Elteza’ and is used for new
installations in countries of the former Soviet Union. JTC TRC has no exact borders, and
the overlap is some tens of metres. However, the transfer of two receiver signals through a
common wire pair is an advantage. But because of non-exact borders between sections,
in stations this type of track circuit can be used only with insulated rail joints. There are
five frequencies (420, 480, 580, 720, 780 Hz); each frequency is modulated either 8 or 12 Hz
(Dmitriev/Minin 1992). TRC is an example of analogue JTC track circuit with amplitude
modulation.
In JTC with additional connection between rails, the precise border between circuits
is set by resonant shunt or jumper. In the French JTC Aster ‘Type U’, the transformers for
feed and relay end are located in the overlapping area of two adjacent track circuits (figure
5.52). Borders of JTC B are the two outermost resonant circuits, acting for frequency B
as short-circuit. JTC A and C have their own resonant shunts. The employed frequencies
are in the band from 1,7 to 2,6 kHz. JTC UM71 (‘Union Switch & Signal’) is similar and uses
four frequencies of the same band. The frequency of track circuit attenuates the track air-
core inductor (figure 5.52) and short-circuit in the transformer unit of the next JTC (Nock
1982, Retiveau 1987, Ansaldo 2002).

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5 Detection

Figure 5.52: Principle of JTC Aster ‘Type U’ and UM71

JTC FTGS (older product) and TCM100 (newer product) from Siemens use 12 frequencies of
two bands: from 4.75 to 6.25 kHz for the long and from 9.5 to 16.5 kHz for the short track
circuits. The bond between the rails is S-shaped (figure 5.54). This jumper bond has inductivity
and ensures the short overlapping zone thanks to the resonance circuit LC (figure 5.53). The
length of the S-bond and therewith the overlapping zone is 7 or 19 m, depending on the
frequency. Both types of Siemens track circuits have the same outdoor equipment, only the
evaluation units indoor are different. JTC Aster ‘Type 1 Watt’ has a similar principle and uses
six frequencies of the band 1,6–2,8 kHz (Nock 1982).

Figure 5.53: Principle of JTC FTGS and TCM100

Figure 5.54: S-shaped connector in FTGS (photo: Siemens)

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 5.3 Track Circuits

Some modern audio frequency track circuits use digital binary frequency shift keying
(BFSK) modulation as it allows the transmission of significant amounts of data between
railway vehicle and trackside. Such data can contain permitted speed, target distance,
direction of travel and other information required for the calculation of braking curves
as well as relevant information for the interlocking. Usually, such track circuits can be
configured as redundant, which further increases availability of the track section. This is in
addition to high immunity from ballast fluctuations, stray currents and influence of traction
return currents.
For example, AF-900 Series track circuit can be configured as two redundant subsystems to
control two track circuits (AF-902) or as four non-redundant subsystems to control four track
circuits (AF-904, see Ansaldo STS 2010). The AF-900 track circuit uses nine frequencies
between 9.5 and 16.5 kHz, with a maximum length of 305 meters. Track circuit equipment
is coupled to the rails via the use of track cables connected between the rails in “S” (figure
5.55, cables represented as inductors), “O” or “I” configuration, depending upon location, or
via direct connection to the rails in single rail track circuit territories.

Figure 5.55: Principle of AF-900 with S-bond connection

Any types of audio frequency track circuits, which do not have short circuit devices between
the rails, can be used in combination with other TC (usually DC or AC) as overlay track circuits
for different purposes, e. g. activation of level crossings. A special type of audio frequency
track circuit is the one with feed and receiver at the same end. The value of the current can
detect not only the presence of a train, but also the distance of the train from the source point.
This type of audio frequency track circuits is used in new electronic devices for level crossings
(Modern Railways 2004), tracks in marshalling yards (Šeluchin 2005) and for moving block
(Watanabe/Takashige 1989).

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5 Detection

With the development of electronics and microprocessors, track circuits are acquiring the
following properties:
–– Modular design. All indoor components are combined into one device;
–– Redundancy. Two independent modules are designed for one track section and configured
as a hot standby pair;
–– Diagnostics. Remote and local diagnostic via the use of embedded web interface that
provides information about recorded events and parameters of track circuit;
–– Reduced power consumption. Use of coded signals and electronic printed circuit boards
provides significant reductions in power consumption;
–– Reduced amount of cabling. Use of rails in processor-based track circuits for transmission
of data between locations; use of fibre-optic cable instead of copper cable;
–– Self-adjustment via the use of software algorithms and real-time measurement of main
parameters like ballast resistance and source voltage level.

5.4 Axle Counters

5.4.1 Basic Structure and Function of Axle Counters

The basic physical principles of axle counters are described in chapter 5.2.2.4 and
5.2.2.5. In contrast to the track circuit, axle counting systems use the indirect detection
principle. If at the beginning of a time period a track section has been clear, and during the
period the same number of axles entered and left this section, then it can be concluded
that the section is clear after this time period. If this condition is not fulfilled, the track
section is considered as occupied. Therefore, at the borders of the track section spot
detectors (so-called counting points) with the ability to detect axles and their movement
direction are applied.
Figure 5.56 shows the basic structure of a recent axle counting system in the simplest form
with one track section to be detected only:
–– A rail contact (figure 5.57) detects the passage of axles. For detection of direction, it
is doubled: either with two sensor systems in one housing, or two sensor systems in
two housings. The advantage of having the sensor system in one housing is that, due
to the exact distance between the sensor systems, there is no need for adjustment of
distance on site.
–– A digitiser or trackside connection box (figure 5.57) transforms the analogous signal
(electrical or optical) from the rail contact into digital information. Depending on the
system design, the digitiser is either situated close to the rail contact or to the evaluator.
The digitiser usually consists of different components for amplifying, filtering and
transforming functions.
–– An electronic evaluator calculates information such as ‘track clear’ or ‘track occupied’
from counting results. In recent systems, this is a safe, redundant microcomputer.
In some systems, such as FAdC (Frauscher) or ACM100 (Siemens), the digitiser and
the evaluator are combined in one module, for example the Advanced Evaluation
Board (AEB, figure 5.61). These modules are either placed close to the track or in an
interlocking room.

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 5.4 Axle Counters

Figure 5.56: Elements of a simple axle counting system

Figure 5.57: Rail contact and digitiser for axle counter produced by Thales

5.4.2 Rail Contact

In the early days of axle counting, mechanical and electrical galvanic detectors were used.
Recent axle counters follow mostly inductive principles with the wheel influencing an
electromagnetic field (chapter 5.2.2.4). The detailed functioning varies between different
manufacturers. Recent innovation shows also fibre-optical rail contacts as solution for axle-
counter systems (chapter 5.2.2.5).

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5 Detection

To make a detector useful for axle counting, special requirements have to be fulfilled:
–– The rail contact must be able to detect each axle individually.
–– The rail contact must be able to distinguish direction.
A detector which is suitable for axle counting can also be used to obtain information on a
railway vehicle having reached a certain position (chapter 5.1.4.1). Recent detectors are
able to perform a permanent self-check, which is necessary to ensure safe detection of the
occupation of a track section at any time.
The detection of direction is practiced by doubling the sensor system, with overlapping activation
locations of the two sensors (detector heads) (figure 5.58). This overlapping is necessary to
detect the direction clearly, especially in case of swinging (oscillating) wheels: The sequence of
actions of a wheel passing the detector from left to right (figure 5.58) is the following:
1. Sensor system 1 activated
2. Sensor system 2 activated
3. Sensor system 1 deactivated
4. Sensor system 2 deactivated

Figure 5.58: Detection principle with overlapping sensor systems

5.4.3 Digitiser and Evaluator

As displayed in figure 5.58 above, the analogous signal has to be digitised to compute the
staircase signal of both sensor systems of the rail contact. This is realised by logic thresholds
in the digitiser that convert the electrical or optical analogous signal into a digital signal.
Depending on the system, several filtering and transformation steps can be needed.
For example, in the evaluation unit for ZP 43 (chapter 5.2.2.4), amplitude changes of the
analogous signal and their sequence are evaluated (figure 5.59): After passing two amplifiers
and a noise filter, the received signal is transformed into a rectangular voltage whose
frequency depends on the voltage of the original signal. Finally, a band pass filter filters out
the frequency assigned to the activated condition, whereas the signal of the non-activated
condition passes the filter.

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 5.4 Axle Counters

Figure 5.59: Evaluation of axle counter signals in ZP 43 (Siemens)

As mentioned in chapter 5.2.2.4, there is a trend towards enabling multiple evaluation of the
signal within the sensors by equipping them with appropriate logics. Depending on the used
system, these sensors can provide vital digital output:
–– speed
–– direction of travel
–– number of axles
Furthermore, several non-vital pieces of information can be collected. Examples are:
–– wheel diameter
–– acceleration (vibrations/wheel flats)
–– temperature of sensor
–– temperature of rail
–– axle loads
The evaluation of the digital outputs (“counting of axles”) can be done either near the rail
contact in the field or after transmission of the digital signals within the interlocking.
When the counting points are designed as active devices, they can be connected one with
each other. This enables the usage of bus systems/serial interfaces, allowing the realisation
of ring architectures that can lead to a significant reduction of cabling (figure 5.60).

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5 Detection

interlocking

Figure 5.60: Counting points in ring architecture by use of network connection

The electronic components and data transmission

–– between the elements,
–– with neighbouring axle counting systems,
–– with the interlocking system and
–– with manual data input devices
are all highly safety relevant. This is often solved by using redundancy. If in doubt, the
section is considered as occupied instead of clear. The requirements of fail-safety include
in particular:
–– Each entering wheel detected must be evaluated as a line occupation.
–– If a partial failure of the rail contact has been detected (e. g. directions cannot be
distinguished), this must be evaluated as a permanent occupation of the adjacent axle
counter sections.
–– An axle counter section must only be evaluated as clear after axles having left in the same
number as having entered before.
–– No error is allowed to lead to a false clear evaluation.
–– The axle counter must be safe also in case of swinging (oscillating) axles.
–– The axle counter must be safe against foreign influences such as from traction return
currents or magnetic fields from traction vehicles and magnetic brakes.
In the simplest case, an axle counter is formed by two counting points with the
intermediate section of track to be proven clear. However, in most recent systems one
evaluation unit is connected with a larger number of rail contacts in geographical proximity
and serves for detecting several track sections (figure 5.60). The number of rail contacts
wired to one evaluator is different in each type, usually it is up to few tens of counting
points. Another example in figure 5.61 shows multiple evaluation units of several counting
points within a station.

interlocking

AEB AEB AEB AEB AEB AEB AEB AEB AEB AEB AEB

Figure 5.61: Axle counter FadC (Frauscher) for multiple sections of track clear detection

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 5.4 Axle Counters

To ensure continuous track clear detection at the borders between the areas of
responsibility of two evaluators, the following solutions are applied as alternatives:
–– double connection of one counting point to two evaluators by use of additional modules
in the digitiser or
–– information exchange between two or more evaluators.
For the connection of counting points to an interlocking of the same manufacturer,
proprietary (mostly protocol based) interfaces have been widely used. For connection to
an interlocking of various manufacturers and types, the majority of axle counter evaluators
provide a relay interface. In recent years, evaluators were equipped with network
interfaces using vital protocols to exchange information between evaluator and electronic
interlocking (e. g. via EULYNX interface, see chapter 8.4.1). The use of serial interfaces for
network connection between axle counters and interlocking allows the implementation of
decentralised architectures, as is displayed in figure 5.62.

interlocking

AEB AEB AEB AEB AEB AEB

Figure 5.62: Decentralised architectures enabled by network connections to the interlocking

5.4.4 Treatment of Counting Errors

5.4.4.1 Classification of Counting Errors

Reliability of axle counters is very high in recent technology and counting errors seldom
occur. Nevertheless, counting errors have to be considered. Typical error cases can be:
–– An axle which passes the counting point is not detected.
–– An axle is counted twice.
–– An axle which did not pass the counting point is counted.
–– An axle is counted for the wrong direction.
Electromagnetic brakes or other metallic objects are common sources of counting
errors. Specific control of wheel sensors can be used to cope with such electromagnetic
interference. Therefore, it is possible to set the wheel sensor to a type of standby mode
when the axle counter sections adjacent to a counting point are clear. In this mode, a
freely configurable number of unacceptable incidences of damping can be suppressed. No
occupied notification will be set and the reset control is omitted. Approaching trains switch
the standby mode off by occupying the adjacent axle counter section and are detected
safely (Grundnig/Pucher 2012).

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5 Detection

When counting errors occur, the fail-safe-principle requires the evaluation of the doubtful
sections as occupied (see chapter 5.4.3). Nevertheless, two simultaneous errors can result
in a dangerous situation, e. g. the axle counter counting out two axles in excess of the
real number, and the train loses the last wagon with two axles in the section. Due to the
high reliability of axle counters and the low probability of danger from two errors which
cancel each other out occurring at the same time, these undetected cases are sufficiently
improbable.
A second consequence is that operations have to be maintained after such a failure. This
usually requires human safety critical actions, which reduces the level of system safety.

5.4.4.2 Manual Reset of Axle Counter System

The most important method of failure correction is the manual reset of parts of the axle
counting system, usually an individual track section. As this action affects safety to a
large extent, erroneous resetting of an occupied track has to be prevented. Therefore,
the resetting action is limited by several restrictions and obligations which are regulated
differently in the operational and technical rules of the railway companies. Examples of
such restrictions and obligations are:
–– Only authorised staff are permitted to reset axle counters: These can be the signaller or
the maintainer, or even both acting together.
–– Resetting a section is technically possible only after axles leave, not after entering, the
respective section.
–– Before resetting, the person concerned is obliged to prove that the section is clear.
–– That action is recorded and has to be justified in writing by the person executing it.
–– After resetting the axle counter, no normal signal operation through the respective
section is possible. The first train after resetting has to proceed on sight.
Typically, axle counter products distinguish between two resetting functions, applicable
depending on the requirements set by the railway infrastructure company:
–– Immediate resetting function: The section is considered as clear immediately after the
reset command by the signaller. However, this input command is only possible if the
last counted axle related to the respective section left (and not entered). Otherwise,
additional registered safety critical commands are necessary.
–– Preparing resetting function: The number of axles is set to zero, but the section is still
considered as occupied until the passage of the next (one or more) railway vehicles. For
this passage, different requirements can be defined in branched sections. Either two
different counting points or all counting points limiting the respective section must be
passed, or exactly these two which were used for the last movement before the failure
occurred.

5.4.4.3 Automatic Error Correction

As an alternative to manual resetting, automatic correction procedures have been
developed (Fenner/Naumann/Trinckauf 2004). Functionalities to suppress faults in a first
place or to correct them automatically can help to minimise the effect on train operations.
By using such fault-tolerant and intelligent functionalities, highly available installations can
be realised without partial or full redundancies (Rosenberger/Pointner 2015). These are
based on the comparison of several consecutive counting points.
The function of automatic error corrections is based on building a virtual track section
(supervisory track section) combining the physical two sections into another one and

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 5.4 Axle Counters

automatically correcting some of the counting errors at wheel sensors of physical

sections. Each real section within a supervisor section compares itself with the status of
a supervisor section. The real section in case of miscounting will be reset if the supervisor
section is clear (Rosenberger/Pucher 2012). This typically results in losses of line capacity
but reduces the necessity of human intervention.

5.4.4.4 Operational Safety Issues of Axle Counter Reset

Depending on the type of the axle counter installation and on the existing block/
interlocking system, special handling of counting errors is required. For standard counting
sections a counting error will lead to a fail-safe occupation of the track section. However,
in degraded mode operation some special cases must be considered.

Example: Automatic Block System

One example is a counting error of an axle counting section on a line equipped with the
automatic block system. If an automatic block section remains occupied after the passage
of a railway vehicle(s), the degraded mode procedures described in chapter 4.5.6 have to
be applied.
In some situations, the operator cannot clearly identify the last train ahead, meaning that
a clearance check is not possible. In such a case, the next train has to be authorised
to pass through the relevant section on sight (see chapter 4.5.6), but it is highly safety
relevant, that the operator must not reset the block section. Without having confirmation
of the last train ahead, the operator cannot be sure whether a track occupation shown
on the operator’s control desk is caused by lost equipment obstructing the track, a track
clear detection failure, or by a ‘forgotten’ train that is still occupying the section. In the last
case, resetting the block section may lead to a hazard if the forgotten train unexpectedly
proceeds. The block system may fail to separate the trains correctly as shown in figure
5.63.
The example starts with situation a):
–– Train 1 has come to a non-regular stop due to some engine problem.
–– Train 2 stops at signal 13 since the section ahead is still occupied by train 1.
–– Train 1 und train 2 have the same number of axles, in this example 24.
This is not uncommon, since many passenger lines are operated by EMUs or DMUs of
the same type. In this situation, 24 axles are present in the section beyond signal 13.
Given correct working of the axle counter, the counting result is also 24.

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5 Detection

Figure 5.63: Safety problem with resetting of axle counters

When the driver of train 2 calls the control centre, it is assumed the operator cannot clearly
identify the last train ahead. The only information the operator has, is that the section beyond
signal 13 is occupied. When the operator now violates the rule stated above that resetting a
section is not allowed without having confirmed the last train ahead, this leads to situation b):
–– The operator orders train 2 to proceed on sight through the section beyond signal 13.
–– Then, the axle counter resetting command is executed by the operator, which will clear the
axle counting result of the section and enable signal 13 to clear for the passage of train 2.
–– The axle counter section contains 24 axles of the forgotten train, but the axle counter
section is reset to zero by resetting command.
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 5.5 Comparison of Track Circuits and Axle Counters

While train 2 is now entering an occupied section on a green signal, this is still safe, since train 2
is authorised to proceed on sight through that section, see situation c):
–– By entering the section, the 24 axles of train 2 will be counted in. The counting result is now
24, while the real number of axles present is 48.
–– Since the counting result is greater than zero, signal 13 is reset to stop and protects train 2.
–– Safety for train 1 is ensured by proceed on sight command for train 2.
A dangerous situation could arise, if train 1 unexpectedly leaves the section, see situation d):
–– Train 1 leaving the section leads to counting out 24 axles and counting result zero of the
axle counter section.
–– Now, signal 13 would clear behind train 2.
–– This allows the following train 3 to proceed into the section without being ordered to run on
sight. This may directly lead into a collision.

Example: Station Tracks

The safety problem with the resetting of axle counters may also arise on station tracks. In this
second case, before authorising another train to enter that section, the operator has to check
that the section is clear or, if not possible, order the next train to enter that station track on
sight. This process is described in chapter 4.5.8.
Some railways require the same procedure if the automatic route release fails after the
passage of a train. The release failure may also have been caused by a failure of the track clear
detection. If, during the passage of a train, a route section remains clear without detecting the
train, the automatic release of this route section will fail. So, after having released the route
under staff responsibility, the operator must not trust the clear indication of that section and
apply the same procedure as required for a section that remains occupied after the passage
of a train. Only after having checked the proper working of the relevant section during the
passage of the next train, may the operator continue with the normal procedure.
Special examination is needed, when shunting units move on station tracks. Here, a clear
identification of the last train that left the section is not yet sufficient proof that there are no
forgotten shunting moves occupying that track. If a forgotten shunting move proceeded
unexpectedly, it may lead to a similar hazard as demonstrated in figure 5.63. After having
ordered the next train to enter that track on sight, it is safe to reset the axle counter only if the
operator can confirm that no shunting move has been authorised to enter that track after the
last train that left the relevant section.

5.5 Comparison of Track Circuits and Axle Counters

5.5.1 Advantages and Disadvantages

Both technical systems have advantages and disadvantages (table 5.3). The preference of
railways for the one or the other solution for track clear detection varies. If railways wish to
make use of the additional capabilities of track circuits such as partial detection of broken
rails, transmission of block, cab signalling and train protection information, the usage of track
circuits is favourable. In other cases, axle counters are preferred in recent time due to the
lower frequency of failures and due to lower requirements regarding the railway superstructure,
the treatment of traction return currents and lower life cycle costs. They also provide more
flexibility to deal with complex track structures.

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5 Detection

track circuit axle counter

non-detection of railway completely derailed vehicles vehicles entering within the axle
vehicles counting section
detection of obstacles only in few cases no
detection of broken rails partly no
vehicle requirements electrically conducting wheels ferromagnetic wheels
and axles, minimum axle load
track requirements electrical isolation no special requirements
treatment of traction return special measures necessary electromagnetic compatibility
currents
excessive voltage problems present, due to earthing of many slight
(e. g. lightning) devices to the rails
sensitivity to climatic influences relatively high low
length of track sections electrically limited limited by cabling to interlocking
(up to 1000–1500 m) (up to several kilometres)
frequency of dangerous failure extremely low (if rust on rails is extremely low
prevented)
frequency of obstructive failure relatively high low
possibility of staff preventing stop trains by short-circuiting no equivalent possibility
danger the rails (simulating counted axle with
test plate leads to counting error)
power consumption relatively high, depending on low
type of track circuit
usability for other purposes detection of train reaching (in detection of train reaching or
combination also clearing) a clearing a certain point
certain point; transmission
of block information; train
protection + cab signalling
interfaces to interlocking relay, network relay, network
handling of traversing cycles approximately once per day or approximately once per year
per few days

Table 5.3: Comparison of track circuits and axle counters

5.5.2 Application

Historically, the older form of technical track clear detection is the track circuit, which until few
decades ago was used in the vast majority of cases. Today, the global trend is towards an
increasing usage of axle counters, although several countries still prefer track circuits.
The Swiss railways with a large percentage of steel sleepers used in their network were the
first to use axle counters, in the first half of 20th century. In the technical principles of the
detectors, mechanical and electric-galvanic solutions dominated (Oehler 1981).
Since the 1950s, usage of axle counters increased, beginning in Central Europe, but also in
many other parts of the world. As an example, Deutsche Bahn (DB) uses axle counters for
all newly built infrastructure, replacement and major refurbishment since around 1995, but in
their existing network the share of track circuits is still high. On the other hand, a large number
of railways, such as in Western Europe, Russia, the USA and Japan, still prefer track circuits.

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 5.5 Comparison of Track Circuits and Axle Counters

These railways, in the majority, use track circuits also for other purposes than track clear detection,
namely for transmission of block information and in their train protection and cab signalling
systems.
Nevertheless, several of those railways preferring track circuits do use axle counters in special
situations as on steel bridges or where there is low ballast resistance. For long block sections
(e. g. in Russia), axle counters can be considered favourably due to the unlimited extension of
an axle counting section.
Axle counters are becoming a technology of choice for auxiliary train detection systems
in CBTC applications, due to their simple design and reduced maintenance costs. Another
popular application is the use of axle counters instead of overlay track circuits for level
crossings, due to their low susceptibility to changes in climatic conditions and low power
consumption. A reduced footprint on the track even allows the use of axle counters for train
detection in street running areas of light rail systems.

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 6.1 Types of Movable Track Elements and their Geometry

6 Movable Track Elements

Andrej Lykov, Gregor Theeg

6.1 Types of Movable Track Elements and their Geometry

6.1.1 Overview

Movable track elements are those with movable parts, as follows:

–– Elements which interrupt the running rail. Examples of such elements are points in different
forms, turntables, traversers, catch points and movable bridges.
–– Objects which reach into the clearance profile. Examples are derailers, movable buffer
stops, gates and water cranes.
Other elements such as diamond crossings and gauntlet tracks do not always contain
movable parts, but if they do (e. g. crossing with movable frogs), the requirements and
methods of safeguarding are similar as for points. Therefore, crossings are also a topic of
this chapter.
The purpose of movable track elements can be, amongst others:
–– transfer of rolling stock units from one track to another
–– crossing of tracks
–– protection against unauthorised movements
–– protection of areas against weather conditions and unauthorised access (gates)
In the following, the most important kinds of movable track elements are described in detail.

6.1.2 Simple Points

6.1.2.1 Structure
The purpose of points is to split a single track into two or more different tracks, or to provide
connections between crossing tracks. The basic structure and functioning of points is similar
in almost all railways. Figure 6.1 shows the structure of a simple set of points comprised of
the blades area, the connecting rails and the frog area. The transfer of the trains from one
track to another is carried out by the blades (2) that are moved by the point machine (1). The
blades can be one of the following types:
–– pivoted type: The rail is rigid and has a hinged joint. Historically it is the older form, with
the disadvantage of low passenger comfort and of permitting only low speeds. Today
this type is little used and mainly for low requirement applications, e. g. in industrial and
mining railways.
–– elastic type: The rail bends. The disadvantage is the high force needed for switching.
However, this is the predominating type today.
The connection of tracks is provided by the stock rails (3) and connecting rails (4, 5). The
guard (or check) rails (6) ensure the guidance of wheel flanges in the area of discontinuous rail
between the frog core (8) and the wing rails (7) and therefore prevent accidents by derailment.
The fouling point is the intersection of the outer limits of the clearance profiles of both
tracks, which means that location up to which a vehicle can stand on the one track without
endangering a movement on the other track of the points. In most railways, it is marked by a
fouling point indicator (FPI) (9) which can have different shapes (figure 6.2).

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6 Movable Track Elements

Figure 6.1: Structure of a simple set of points

Figure 6.2: Different forms of fouling point indicators (left: Slovakia, middle: Germany, right: Italy)

6.1.2.2 Movements at Points

Points can be positioned in three ways: two of them are called end positions, the other one the
intermediate position. Traditionally, on most railways one of the two end positions is referred to
as normal (plus) position, the other one as reverse (minus) position, usually according to the
position in which the points are used more frequently and to the position of the point lever in
mechanical interlocking. It is thus incorrect to identify a point’s plus position always with the
straight position. Today in several countries the nomenclature ‘normal/reverse’ or ‘plus/minus’
is no longer used. Instead, a ‘left’ and a ‘right’ position is spoken of, seen from the facing end.
In the position shown in figure 6.1, the points enable traffic in the A ↔ B direction. The lower
blade is fitted to the stock rail, whereas the upper one is retracted from it to a suitable distance
that ensures the unimpeded passage of a wheel flange. To enable the movement in the A ↔ C
direction, the blades are shifted in such a way that the upper blade is fitted to, whereas the
lower one is held away from the stock rail.

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 6.1 Types of Movable Track Elements and their Geometry

A movement in the direction in which the tracks diverge at the points is called a facing move
(A → B/C). A movement in the direction in which they converge is called a trailing move (B/C → A).
A trailing move from the direction opposite to the one in which the points are set will cause
the blade to be moved by the wheel flanges of the train, i. e. the points will be trailed. With
some types of point drive or locking mechanisms the blades cannot be trailed, and a vehicle
attempting such a movement unauthorised would be derailed and/or point damage would
occur. Other point locking mechanisms are trailable to avoid derailment and damage.
Besides the unintended trailing, in some cases points and interlocking systems are
intentionally designed for the switching of the points by moving rolling stock. The main fields of
application are tramways, secondary lines and shunting areas. So-called spring points have
a defined normal position and a mechanism which automatically returns them to their normal
position if not occupied by rolling stock. They are particularly useful in applications such as a
passing loop with two tracks on a single line, which is only used for the crossing of trains.

6.1.2.3 Geometrical Parameters

Depending on the local situation, the traffic
density and the speed of the trains that is a
acceptable in the diverging track, different
points with different parameters are applied.
When a rail vehicle moves in the diverging
track of a set of points, the sequence
of geometrical elements to be passed
is in most cases: straight line → arc with
constant radius → straight line (figure 6.3). R
R
The speed in the diverging track is limited
by the radius of the arc, the so-called
turnout radius, for safety, maintenance
and comfort reasons. Besides, in some
situations, speed limits can also be caused R turnout radius
by the type of locking of the points. If the a point angle
turnout radius is the reason for the speed
limit, in most cases the limiting effect is a
the jerk (change of centrifugal force) and
thereby the change of curvature at the
ends of the arc. As the radius is related to
the length of the points and the turnout Figure 6.3: Main geometrical parameters of points
angle, regulations in some countries
consider the turnout angle (a in figure 6.3) as the limiting factor: The smaller that angle is, the
higher the acceptable movement speed usually becomes. Other parameters like the tangent
length are connected with the parameters mentioned above.
Most railways have defined standardised types of points which are used in their networks. For
example, on the Russian and North American railways, the inclination of tracks in the frog area is
considered as the defining parameter. In Russia, points with frog inclinations 1 : 9, 1 : 11 and in high
speed areas – 1 : 18 and 1 : 22 are defined. In North America each railroad has its own standard.
In Germany, as another example, the turnout radius and the inclination at the trailing end of the
points are considered as the defining parameters. To increase flexibility in planning the track
layout of a station, usually two or more different turnout radii are defined with the same inclination
and different length of the arc. For example, points 190-1 : 9 (with straight frog) permits speed up
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6 Movable Track Elements

to 40 km/h, whereas points 300-1 : 9 (with curved frog) permits speed up to 50 km/h. Altogether,
inclinations 1 : 7.5, 1 : 9, 1 : 14 and 1 : 18.5 and radii 190, 300, 500, 760 and 1200 m are defined
for turnout speed between 40 km/h and 100 km/h, not considering special high speed points.

6.1.2.4 Special Forms of Simple Points

For high speed points, the simple geometrical layout straight line → arc with constant radius →
straight line is not sufficient to provide high speed in combination with an acceptable length of the
point construction. Instead, segmental, clothoid or parabolic arches with changing radius are used
for speeds up to 220 km/h. Such points are particularly required where one high speed line splits
into two or for crossovers on high speed lines. The slimmest inclination in use is 1 : 65 in France.
Points can be used on curved lines. Two cases can be distinguished: when both the diverging
tracks curve in the same direction, and when they curve in opposite directions. In the second
case, if the arrangement is largely symmetrical and if the radii of curvature are similar, they may
be called wye points on account of their shape, Y. A typical application is in gravity marshalling
yards between the hump and the classification tracks (chapter 12.1).
In figure 6.1, it can be seen that between the wing rail and the frog core the tread of the
train wheel (or surface on which it runs) is interrupted. This increases the dynamic strain that
impacts upon the frog and decreases passenger comfort when the rolling-stock runs over
points. With higher movement speeds and lower turnout angles, this effect increases sharply.
To enable a smooth running at high velocity, points with an uninterrupted tread are to be used.
These points use a movable frog, requiring an additional point machine in the frog area. The
movable frog is adjusted tightly against the appropriate side verge of the wing rail, creating
thereby a continuous tread for the train wheels.

6.1.3 Other Solutions for Connection of Tracks

The summation of all the points placed at one station entrance is called the station throat.
For compact design of the pointwork in a station throat with a minimum use of land area, the
elements described below can be applied (figure 6.4).
A diamond crossing (figure 6.4a) is used for the crossing of two tracks and represents a
construction consisting of two sharp and two blunt crossing frogs. Diamond crossings can
have movable frogs or not, mainly depending on the crossing angle and the required speed. In
both cases, diamond crossings have to be route interlocked to prevent train collisions.
A slip crossing (figure 6.4c) combines the functions of a diamond crossing and points. There
are single slip crossings as well as double ones. A double slip crossing has eight blades, two
sharp and two blunt frogs and four guard rails. The two pairs of blades at the same end of the
slip crossing are switched together by one point machine. Slip crossings are somewhat difficult
in their construction and are therefore used restrictively by many railways, but are a compact
solution at stations whose area is restricted.
Double points, also called three-way-points (figure 6.4b), permit the branching of a single track
into three. It contains the two pairs of blades, five guidance rails and three frogs. The advantage of
this solution is the compactness in comparison with two simple sets of points, but disadvantages
are difficulties in the construction, problems pertaining to track circuits and the uneven running of
trains due to the presence of three frogs. Therefore, their use is widely avoided.
Where different gauges (e. g. standard and narrow gauge) meet, points with different gauges
can be required. Depending on the local arrangements, they can become rather complex in
construction. A simple example is shown in figure 6.4d.
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 6.1 Types of Movable Track Elements and their Geometry

Figure 6.4: Selected movable track elements

Interlacing of tracks (figure 6.4e) provides the transition to single-track movement without
the laying of points on short sections of the double line (for example, when repairing artificial
structures or significant damage of the roadbed on one of the tracks of the double-track
section, as well as when passing a double-track line through a single-track bridge, tunnel,
etc.). Interlacing of tracks can also be used to combine standard and narrow gauge. At the
intersection of the rail threads, the frogs are laid, the internal rail threads intersect with each
other, and the rail threads along the length of the interlacing are placed on common sleepers.
At entrances to locomotive depots, in case it is necessary to distribute the rolling-stock
from one or a few tracks to a large number of depot tracks, turntables can be used. They
represent a girder with a track on which a locomotive is placed to enable it to rotate in a
horizontal plane. Another purpose of turntables is to turn locomotives with a single cab.
A traverser is a similar device as a turntable. Here the movement is not a rotation, but
a translation. The traverser is a very compact device to connect parallel tracks, with the
disadvantage that the rail vehicle has to stop and that its length is limited. Traversers are
mainly used in depots and workshops.
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6.1.4 Arrangements of Several Movable Track Elements

In the following, typical forms of arrangements of several movable track elements are
described, which are used for a compact track layout (figure 6.5).

Figure 6.5: Typical arrangements of several movable track elements

A crossover (figure 6.5a) represents an arrangement of two simple sets of points. It is the
standard solution to connect two parallel tracks. The point positions in the routes are
interdependent and both provide flank protection for each other (chapter 4.3.5). Therefore in
many countries these points are coupled in their operation and control to ensure the safety of
train movements and reduce efforts in terms of facilities and cable maintenance.

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A double crossover, also known as a scissors crossing, (figure 6.5b) emerges when two
crossovers meet together. It is a more compact solution than two crossovers, but requires an
additional diamond crossing. As with the simple crossover, it enables independent movements
along the straight tracks, but transfers from each side of those tracks to the parallel track
exclude other movements.
A ladder (figure 6.5c) is an arrangement of different sets of points with the same point angle
to split up one track into three or more parallel tracks. The points are placed in a line which is
inclined by point angle towards the parallel tracks. Ladders are mainly used for the points in
the station throat and yard necks.

6.1.5 Derailing and Protective Devices

The purpose of derailing devices is to prevent accidents caused by unintended movements

of rolling stock by stopping these vehicles. Reasons for such unintended movements can be,
among others:
–– rolling away of parked vehicles from sidings, freight yard, warehouses or others due to error
of staff or technical defect
–– rolling back of vehicles after a train separation in a section with rising gradient
–– non-compliance of signals or other instructions by drivers
Such special derailing devices are double and single catch points and derailers. Application of
these devices is aimed to stop rolling-stock units forcibly by derailing them.
The double catch points represent a part of a simple set of points consisting of the
blades area and partly the connecting rails (figure 6.6a). The simple catch points are
simpler in their construction, although no less effective to prevent a spontaneous exit of
rolling stock onto the main tracks (figure 6.6b). In their normal position the catch points
are switched in the direction of dump, i. e. in the event of a spontaneous movement the
vehicle will be derailed and come to a halt. To enable the passage of a train or shunting
movement, the catch points are switched to the passing position and after the rail vehicle
has passed, they are returned to their initial position. Under interlocking conditions, when
the catch points are equipped with an electric point machine, the return operation is
carried out automatically after route release, i. e. the preferred position of the catch points
is the dump position.

Figure 6.6: Derailing devices (terms used in USA in brackets)

The derailer is somewhat different in the principle of its operation (figure 6.6c, figure 6.7).
This device does not disrupt the track, for it represents a bar of a special profile placed
from above onto the rail head. The protrusion at the bar provides for the derailing of the
rolling stock in a defined direction. In its normal position the derailer is placed upon the rail
and can be moved aside to enable a movement. Many railways do not permit the use of
derailers in main tracks, but only in secondary tracks.

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6 Movable Track Elements

An alternative to derailing devices are

so-called trap points. Trap points are
complete simple points with a short track
section attached to the diverging track
and with a buffer stop or a sand drag at
its end. Normally, the diverging track is
never intended to be driven onto by a rail
vehicle, but serves for protection only.
Trap points are preferably used where
vehicles occupied with passengers or with
dangerous goods or moving at relatively
high speed are expected to be stopped.
They are more expensive in installation and
Figure 6.7: Derailer (Spain)
require more space.
To prevent the rolling stock from spontaneously leaving the approach track, mechanised
devices are used – adjustable stops (figure 6.8). An adjustable stop is a structure mounted
on rails and transferred from the inoperative to the working position by a point machine. In
the off position, the brake pads are lowered and the unobstructed passage of the rolling
stock is ensured. To limit the movement of the train on the track the brake pads are raised.

Figure 6.8: Adjustable stop

6.2 Safety Requirements at Movable Track Elements

The safety requirements at movable track elements can be summarised as follows:

1. prevention of collision with other vehicles
2. prevention of derailment at interruptions of the rails or collision with parts of the movable
track element
3. prevention of derailment by excessive speed in the diverging branch
Safety requirement (1) is met by route locking functions (chapter 4) in connection with track
clear detection (chapter 5). Particular problems in this context occur with the occupation of
that track of a set of points or crossing which is not part of the running path for a certain
movement. These problems and solutions for them are described in chapter 6.3.
Safety requirement (2) is met by the following functions in the mechanism of the movable track
elements:
–– Switching of the movable track element, i. e. the moving of its movable parts to the required
position. Even if the points come to a standstill in the intermediate position by error, they
can be switched to an end position again.

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 6.3 Track Clear Detection at Points and Crossings

–– Locking of the movable parts in the required end position. Locking means in particular that
one point blade must be fitted to the stock rail with low tolerance to ensure a continuous
guideway, whereas the other point blade must be held away from the stock rail (with higher
tolerance) to ensure safe passing of the wheel flanges.
–– Supervision to ensure that the movable track element has reached the required end
position and remains there. This feedback information is a precondition for permitting a
movement over the movable track element.
An additional requirement particularly in areas with frequent shunting is the trailability of points,
which is required by many railways generally or in certain situations. This means that if a rail
vehicle erroneously passes the points from the trailing direction which does not correspond
with the current end position of the points, it must be able to proceed over the points without
derailment or damage by forcing the movable parts to the required position. However, the trailing
of the points must be detected and usually further use of the points be prevented until inspected.
The units which fulfil these functions are described in chapters 6.4 and 6.5.
Safety requirement (3) is fulfilled by selection of the proper signal aspect (chapters 4 and 7),
occasionally in combination with speed supervision (chapter 8).

6.3 Track Clear Detection at Points and Crossings

At the fouling point (chapter 6.1.2.1), the distance between the tracks varies between the
railways and with the turnout radius; usually it is around 3.50 or 4.00 m. When technical track
clear detection is used, the insulated rail joints (IRJ) or axle counters are placed at a certain
distance from the fouling point to take into consideration the overhang of the wagon beyond
the last axle (figure 6.9a) (Kononov/Lykov/Nikitin 2013; Sapožnikov et al. 2006). For example,
on Russian railways this distance is 3.50 m. In Germany, an additional protective length
against stretching of the standing train is provided and this distance increased to 6.00 m.

Figure 6.9: Safety against collision with other movements at points

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6 Movable Track Elements

In case it is impossible to comply with the dimensional requirements (e. g. the points 1, 3, 5 and 7
of the ladder arrangement in figure 6.9b) the adjacent track section on the other branch track must
also be proved clear to permit the movement. In these cases the IRJ are called oversize IRJ.
In contrast, for the points of a crossover this rule does not apply if the points always give
flank protection to each other, as the section between the points is short enough that
vehicles are assumed not to stand there. For example, points 6 in figure 6.9c are dual
protective points (chapter 4.3.5.4), giving flank protection to points 2 and 4. But in this
particular case, it is coupled with points 4, giving flank protection preferably to points 4 and
is therefore not locked for the diverging route over points 2. Therefore, the oversize rule
applies for the IRJ between points 2 and 6, but not the one between points 4 and 6.

6.4 Point Machines

6.4.1 Overview

There are three functions associated with moving points:

–– switching the points – applying a force to the blades to move them
–– locking the points – holding them in position after the drive force is switched off
–– supervision of points – reporting the actual current position of the blades (to the signaller
or signalling system).
When points were first motorised, these functions were provided by three separate pieces
of hardware. Nowadays combined machines are usually used, which perform all three
functions.
The switching of points, locking of the blades and supervision of their end positions are carried out
by the point operating gear (the point driving units) which may vary by the energy they use as well
as by the means of locking the blades, trailability, commutation in the motive and control circuitry
and also by the time required to switch a set of points from one end position to the other.
The following switching technologies can be distinguished according to the types of energy
they consume and the form this energy is transported and transformed:
–– Manual local (figure 6.10). The points are switched locally by the physical strength of a
person. The advantage of this solution is its simplicity in installation, the disadvantage the
high manpower effort in operation and the long time required due to the need for walking
to each set of points. Manual local point operation is widely used in shunting areas and
areas with low traffic, where points are switched by vehicle staff to relieve the signaller
from this work. Checking of point position can be made by key locks. Here, a key can
only be removed if the points are in the respective end position.
–– Manual remote. The point levers are centralised and force is transmitted by wires
or rods. This is the typical solution in mechanical interlocking systems and is used to
a decreasing extent. The person does not need to walk to each set of points, but the
possible length of the wires/rods and therefore the area of responsibility of one person is
small, requiring high manpower efforts.
–– Electro-pneumatic (figure 6.11). The blades are switched by compressed air energy.
Supervision is usually solved electrically. The advantages of these point driving units are
their small dimensions and simplicity of construction. One disadvantage is the necessity to
install compressors and an air pipe network. Besides, the compressed air used as a working
body requires to meet some stringent requirements pertaining to the acceptable levels of

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 6.4 Point Machines

moisture composition, since it may bring

about corrosion of pipelines (under high
temperature conditions), and glaciation
of choke joints (under low temperature
conditions). Modern forms, until today, are
frequently used in hump areas.
–– Electro-magnetic. Electric power is
transformed into mechanical power by
solenoid magnets. Such point machines
have relatively small dimensions if the Figure 6.10: Manual point drive with key locks
(Germany)
weight of blades is low and are simple
to operate and maintain. As the size
and weight of the blades increases, the
dimensions and energy intensity of such
units grow sharply.
–– Electro-mechanical (figure 6.12).
Electric power is transformed into
mechanical by means of AC or DC
motors and transmitted to the blades by
mechanical gear. Usually electric power
is also used to provide supervision
and control. Advantages are the high
efficiency of electric motors, higher
reliability, the opportunity of using the
same cable runs for supervision and Figure 6.11: Electro-pneumatic point machine
control and the stability of characteristics (USA) (photo: Jörn Pachl)
of electric current. For these reasons
electro-mechanical point machines are
among those most widely used.
–– Electro-hydraulic (figure 6.13). Modern
forms of electro-hydraulic point machines
work similarly to the electro-mechanical
ones, with the exception that the transfer
of the rotation of the motor to the
movement of the point drawbar is solved
by hydraulics. The motor operates pumps
Figure 6.12: Electro-mechanical point machine
which pump oil into a cylinder and move (Poland, manufacturer: Bombardier)
a piston there. Electro-hydraulic point
machines of this type are frequently used
in Western Europe and, together with
electro-mechanical machines, are the most
widely used modern point machines.
The most frequently used modern types
are the electro-mechanical and the electro-
hydraulic point machine. In the following,
they will be called Electric Point Machines
(EPM). In some new systems, they are
integrated into the sleeper to facilitate track Figure 6.13: Electro-hydraulic point machine
maintenance work with big machines. (manufacturer: MKE)

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6 Movable Track Elements

6.4.2 Electric Point Machines

Due to the high importance and complexity of EPM, they are described more detailed here.
The EPM may vary according to:
–– the time needed to switch the points: For normal interlocked points, the switching time
is between two and seven seconds. For special applications such as humps, rapidly
operating points with a switching time down to half a second are frequently used
(chapter 12.3.4).
–– the location in relation to the points: EPM are usually on one side of the track, but
they can also be between the rails, or even inside sleepers. The side of installation
of an external EPM can be determined by the available space between the tracks,
by convenience of maintenance and conditions for laying of cables and air pipes for
removal of snow. Usually an EPM is installed on the outer side of a double track or in
wide spaces between tracks.
–– the working point of the force onto the blades: Usually there is one working point at the
end of the blade. But for points which are designed for relatively high speed (high turnout
radius), often several working points are required, either connected with the same EPM (figure
6.14, right) or with several coordinated EPMs (figure 6.14, left). The difficulty is to adjust the
switching lengths at each working point exactly to the required bending line of the blade. If a
movable frog is required, at least one additional working point is necessary here.
–– the centralisation of operation: EPM can be operated centrally from an interlocking station
or locally. The local control in Europe is only applied on secondary lines and in shunting
areas, in the USA also on main lines. Here, the switching of the points can either be initiated
automatically by the approaching rail vehicle (usually from the trailing end) or by the driver,
e. g. by a pushbutton on the trackside or by an infra-red sender in the locomotive. Also dual
electrical/manual control is frequently used. Simple interlocking functions can be provided in
these systems, described in chapter 9.4.10.
–– construction of the reduction gear: In case of mechanical transmission, mostly tooth, worm
or screw gear arrangements are applied.
–– the type of treatment of trailing of points: Points can be made as trailable, equipped with a
device that provides specified resistance against the movements of the throw bar initiated
from outside the EPM. This prevents the ruin of the EPM if trailing of points happens. The
other type is non-trailable points that will become damaged when being trailed.

Figure 6.14: Point machines with several working points (photos: Siemens)

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 6.4 Point Machines

–– the types of locking: This can be internal locking with the locking mechanism inside the
point machine or external locking with the locking mechanism being located in the track.
In most cases, but not generally, internal locking mechanisms are not trailable, whereas
external locking mechanisms are. The use of one or other of the solutions differs mainly by
country. In central Europe, external locking mechanisms predominate, whereas in Russia,
Britain and the USA internal ones are mostly used.
–– the way of commutation of operational and supervision circuits: The contact mechanisms
are applied using mechanical contacts or contactless.
To meet the requirements of switching, locking and supervising, an EPM has three operational
modes:
1. Working. The mode whereby points are being switched.
2. Supervising. The mode ensuring that one blade is fitted tightly against the stock rail, while the
other is kept a safe distance from it. A particular requirement is resistance against dynamic
impact: The EPM and point fittings must be able to endure a dynamic impact induced upon
them by the moving rolling stock.
3. Trailed. This mode is active if the points have been forced open by an impact made by rolling
stock whereby the supervising mode becomes violated. There is no possibility for transfer into
working mode (if the EPM is not trailable) or it requires special actions to bring it into working
mode (if the EPM is trailable).
In spite of the above mentioned differences and of some differences in the construction ­details,
the working principles of most EPM are similar.
The generalised block diagram is shown in figure 6.15:
–– In an electro-mechanical point machine, electric power is transformed into mechanical by
means of an AC or DC electric motor M. The motor rotation is spread on to the reduction
gear R meant to strengthen the angular momentum and to reduce the rotary speed of
the motor. The motor is connected with reduction gear via branch sleeve which allows an
insignificant radial displacement of shafts while retaining a parallel position of their axes. To
protect the motor from overloads, e. g. if the blades do not reach their end position due to
an obstacle, and to ensure the braking of the revolving parts of the EPM after the end of
switching the points, a friction gear is inserted. The rotating movement is transferred into
the progressive motion of the throw bar TB in the last cascade of the reduction gear.
–– In an electro-hydraulic point machine, the electric motor M rotates the pump of the
hydraulic gear R. This pump pumps oil from one cylinder into another and causes a
relative movement between the cylinder and a piston. Either the cylinder or the piston is
mechanically connected with the throw bar TB, the other is fixed.

Figure 6.15: EPM block diagram (R is a mechanical gear in electro-mechanical and a hydraulic gear
in electro-hydraulic point machine)

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In both forms, the throw bar impacts upon the blades of the points through the point drive rod.
The detection contacts DC provide checking of point positions and commutate the electric
controlling circuits. Obtaining the checking signal about of point end position is only possible if
the position of the detection bars DB conforms to that of the throw bar.
An important factor for exchangeability of EPM of different manufacturers is compatibility of
two kinds:
–– Electrical compatibility of the EPM in the operation and supervision circuitry. An example for
a standard is the German four-wire point circuitry (chapter 6.6.3.1).
–– Mechanical compatibility at the interface between EPM and point drawbar, regarding
mechanical connections, switching length and others.
Often compatibility is provided in one country, but not internationally.
For degraded mode operation and for maintenance, EPM shall enable the possibility of
switching the points by the hand crank. During hand cranking, electrical movement must be
prevented for safety.
The EPM influences directly the safety of train movements, since is checks the actual
position of a set of points. The idea of supervision of point position is to verifiy the
conformity between the detection bars and the throw bar. In order to check point position,
one checking drawbar is attached to each blade. These drawbars are connected with the
detection bars which move inside the EPM.

6.4.3 Supervision of Point Position on the Example of SP-6

To illustrate the principle of proving the point position, let us examine the checking
block of the Russian EPM SP-6 (Reznikov 1985, Sapožnikov et al. 2008). According to
the classification given in chapters 6.4.1 and 6.4.2, this EPM is electro-mechanical with
possibility of using either AC or DC motors, with electrical supervision using mechanical
contacts. The tooth gear transmission is designed to be not trailable with internal locking.
EPM is designed to be installed on one side of the track.
The movements of the throw bar for the fixed distance and confirmation that the detection
bars are in this position are verified by the switching levers 5 and 9, and jointly with them
connecting levers 4 and 11 (figure 6.16). When the throw bar is located in its end position, the
roller of one of the switching levers sinks down into a notch of the collar 8 mounted upon the
main drive shaft of the reduction gear. The checking scheme is commutated with the detection
contacts 6, 10. These contacts are closed by the connecting levers. The closing is possible if
the beak-shaped end of the connecting lever is dropped into in the superimposed notches of
the detection bars 1 and 2.
Figure 6.16a shows the state of details of an EPM checking mechanism when the blades are
located in their end position, with the right blade fitted to the stock rail and the left blade free.
Herewith the operational contacts 3 (controlling a control circuit of an EPM) are connected with the
connecting lever 4, while the checking contacts 10 are connected with the connecting lever 11.
When the points are switched to the opposite position, the main drive shaft of the reduction gear
rotates in a clockwise direction. Firstly, the roller of the switching lever 9 rolls onto the surface
of the collar 8. That results in the following successive movements: The connecting lever 11
moves aside, disconnecting the checking contacts 10, and the operational contacts 12 become
connected. Henceforth the throw bar begins moving and the blades of the points do the same
together with it. This, consequently, provokes the movements of the detection bars 1 and 2.

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 6.4 Point Machines

At the moment of the final movement of the throw bar, the notch of the collar of the main drive
shaft becomes positioned under the roller of the switching lever 5, which causes it to move to
the right under the influence of the spring 7. That results in the connecting lever 4 disconnecting
the work contacts 3. If all elements of the EPM and the points are in working order, and therefore
the blades and detection bars have moved to their end positions, the beak-shaped end of the
connecting lever 4 drops into the superimposed notches of the detection bars. Owning to that,
the checking contacts 6 (figure 6.16b) become connected.

Figure 6.16: Checking of point position in SP-6

They will not be connected, however, if at least one of the detection bars does not move
for the specified distance, e. g. as a result of a breakage. In this case its notch will not be
positioned under the beak-shaped end of the connecting lever and it will be propped against
the surface of the detection bar (figure 6.16c). Neither the contacts 4 nor 6 will be connected.
In case of trailing of the points, the collar 8 and the main drive shaft do not revolve, but the
detection bars do move. The beak-shaped end of the connecting lever is pushed to the
surface of the detection bar by the splayed edge of the notch of this bar. In that case the
connecting lever occupies an intermediate position disconnecting the checking contacts.
At that time, the connecting and switching levers of the other blade do not change their
position, and the operational contacts remains to be connected.

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6.5 Point Locking Mechanisms

Under dynamic impact from passing rail vehicles, blades should be locked. As was already
pointed out earlier, their locking can be external or internal. Besides, locking of the blades
in the end position can be either form fitted (not trailable) or force fitted (trailable). In the
following, some examples for locking mechanisms are described.

6.5.1 External Locking Mechanism: Clamp Lock

In these countries which use external locking mechanisms, there is a large variety of locks.
However, the by far most widely used solution is the clamp lock. The clamp lock (figure
6.17) is trailable. Besides the clamp lock, in recent years modern optimised external locking
mechanisms have been developed by different manufacturers, which are optimised for low
friction and are therefore used for points which shall be switched very frequently. On high
speed lines, a problem of trailable points can be the danger of unintended switching by
dynamic impact. Therefore, special locks are often applied.
The drive rod is fixed to the point machine via the throwbar, but not to the blades. Instead, the
blades are mounted to special lock arms. When the blade is unlocked (right blade in figure
6.17), the so-called ‘swallow tail’ of the lock arm is hold tight in the groove of the drive rod by
the lock chamber and moves therefore together with the drive rod. In the locked position (left
blade in figure 6.17), the lock arm is fixed between the lock slide and the locking piece and
can therefore not move even if a strong force tries to push it away from the stock rail.
The switching process consists of three phases:
1. Unlocking phase. The open blade moves with the drive rod, whereas the closed blade is
being unlocked.
2. Moving phase. This phase begins when the groove of the drive rod has reached the
‘swallow tail’ of the lock arm. Now both blades move with the drive rod.
3. Locking phase. This phase begins when the formerly open blade has reached the stock rail.
Now this blade is being locked, whereas the formerly closed (now open) blade continues to
move with the drive rod until the end position.

Figure 6.17: Clamp lock

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 6.5 Point Locking Mechanisms

The trailing of points works as follows. When a force from the wheel of a rolling stock unit
pushes the open blade towards the stock rail, the same process as in normal switching starts,
with the difference that the force enters from the blade and not from the point machine. The
open blade is pushed against the stock rail, unlocking the closed blade and then pulling it
away from the stock rail to give the wheel flange the possibility to pass. When the formerly
open blade has reached the stock rail, it remains in unlocked position, i. e. the third phase of
the switching process (locking) is skipped. Therefore no end position will be detected and no
route can be set across the points. The slipping of the force-fitted coupling in the gear block
prevents further switching of the points until technical inspection.

6.5.2 Internal Locking Mechanism

The Russian point machine SP-6 may serve as an example of an EPM with the internal locking.
In contrast to the external clamp lock, the blades are rigidly connected with the drive rod.
The rotating motion of the motor is transformed into the progressive motion of the blades by
the tooth gear with the cam locking device. This device consists of the cog-wheel of the main
drive shaft 2 and the throw bar 1 (figure 6.18). The two outermost teeth 4 of the cog-wheel
have a special form. The matching form is at the two outermost teeth of the throw bar 3.
When the electric motor is switched on, the main drive shaft begins to rotate together with its cog-
wheel. At the beginning of rotation the crooked tooth 4 of the cog-wheel of the cam locking device
unlocks the throw bar and begins to move it by pressing against it with its side edge. Then cog-
wheel’s normal teeth start to engage in a lock with the teeth of the throw bar bringing it to its other
end position. At the end of the switching process the throw bar comes to a halt, while the cog-
wheel continues to rotate, making yet some turn, which consequently results in the crooked tooth
of the cog-wheel striking against the splayed tooth 3 of the throw bar. What happens as a result is
the creation of an adjustable stop, precluding the throw bar from moving. Blades appear switched
and locked against moving inside the track owing to rigid connection with the throw bar.

Figure 6.18: Cam locking device

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6 Movable Track Elements

In case of trailing, the parts of cam locking device do not move. Therefore, in the EPM and in its
fitting damage of various elements occurs. Often the damaged parts are the drive rod, front rod,
detection contacts or bearings of main drive shaft. Because some damage cannot be found by
visual survey, after trailing the EPM and fitting must be replaced.

6.5.3 Mechanical Key Lock

Mechanical key locks are used alone or in combination with other locking mechanisms like the
clamp lock. They perform two different functions:
–– As with the above mentioned mechanisms, locking of the points against dynamic mechanical
impact on site.
–– In contrast to the above, the interlocking of points and signals, other points etc.
Mechanical key locks are form-fitted and not trailable. They are basically used in three situations:
–– Permanent interlocking dependence between manually operated points (figure 6.10).
–– Temporary interlocking dependence between all kinds of points, e. g. during construction works.
–– Temporary fixation of disturbed points in a defined end position.
In each country, there is a large variety of locks in use, each suited for one of these three situations.
Whereas for permanent interlocking dependence, permanently mounted devices (figure 6.10) are
used, key locking devised for the two temporary purposes are mounted flexibly in accordance with
the situation.
In permanent installations (German example), a simple set of points is normally equipped with
two key locks: one for the plus and the other for the minus end position. The lock is mechanically
connected with the respective blade by an additional bar to prove that it is safely fitted to the stock
rail. Points can only be moved if both keys are present, and one key can only be removed if points
are in the respective end position. In this case, this key can be locked into another set of points
(for the logical possibilities, see chapter 4.2) or in the interlocking to transport the information that
points are in the respective position.
The main advantages of these locking mechanisms are simplicity of the construction, while one of
their disadvantages is the impossibility of remote control and a substantial amount of time required
to establish a route. Manual key locks were the historically oldest form of interlocking. At present
they are used mostly in shunting areas with low traffic, for temporary installations and in degraded
mode operation in case of technical failures.

6.6 Circuitry of Point Operation and Control in Relay Technology

6.6.1 General Overview

The EPM control schemes are ones of the most important in railway signalling, as safety of train
movement depends directly on their correct operation.
The three basic parts of the circuitry – managing, operational and supervision – can be
distinguished in any control scheme. All these circuits are built in accordance with the performance
specifications required for schemes with safety responsibility.
The purpose of the managing circuitry is intended to start EPM operation with checking the
safety requirements. It provides the following functions:
–– Switching points occupied by rolling stock must be impossible.

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–– Switching points locked in a route must be impossible.

–– In case of fault of track clear detection, switching the points with auxiliary commands must
be possible.
–– The EPM must start from a short impulse irrespective of duration of pressing of the
activation button.
–– In case a set of points becomes occupied by a vehicle while moving, it must complete the
operation already begun until reaching the end position.
–– Any malfunction of circuit should be found out not later than the next switching of points.
–– The switching must be reversible, which means that at any time during the switching process
the buttons can be pushed again and the switching of points changes its direction.
The operational circuitry is designed to transfer electric power from an energy supply to the
electromotor of the EPM. Depending on the location of the power supply for the operational
circuit in the interlocking rooms or in the field, two types of operational circuits with central and
local power supply can be distinguished. In similar manner, the circuits which are responsible for
reversion of the EPM can be located centrally or locally.
The operational circuitry shall provide:
–– double pole (multi pole) shutdown of the electric motor from the power supply when it is out
of service, which eliminates a spontaneous point switching from an extraneous feed that can
appear into the operational circuit in consequence of electric or electro-magnetic influence or
connection between cable cores;
–– automatic switching-off the motor by the detection contacts of the EPM when the points reach
their end position;
–– impossibility of the electric motor rotation from an energy source of the supervision circuitry, if
supervision circuitry uses the same wires as the operational circuitry;
–– impossibility of operating the electric motor if the EPM is being switched manually by the hand
crank or is open for maintenance work.
In the control schemes of EPM, electric motors of either DC or AC can be used, whose appropriate
choice is determined by performance specifications. The motors must:
–– have a sufficient starting torque to carry out the point operation, taking into consideration
resistance (inertia) of the mass of transferable parts and the atmospheric conditions
(hoarfrost, freezing, etc.);
–– provide an opportunity of changing the direction of the motor shaft rotation (reversibility);
–– be designed for remote control – their characteristics must not alter too abruptly if there are
changes of voltage caused by a line drop.
As indicated above, points can be set in three different positions: two of these are end ones
(called ‘plus/minus’, ‘normal/reverse’ or ‘right/left’) and another is intermediate. The EPM provides
checking of these positions due to a specific construction and an algorithm of the detection
contacts operation. The state of the detection contacts is constantly checked by the supervision
circuit, in some systems during operation by the operation circuit itself.
The supervision circuity takes into account the following requirements:
–– The circuit must be protected from mis-operation in the event of a short-circuit in a cable run or
of connection between cable cores.
–– Failure of any element must be detected immediately.
–– Failure of non-safe elements (e. g. diodes, capacitors, polarised armature of supervisory relays,
blowout of fuses) must lead to a fail-safe reaction.
–– Depending on the accepted rules in the particular country, supervision of point position
must not be influenced by repairing or maintenance of the EPM or must be switched off
during these works.
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6.6.2 Example with Type N Relays: Russian Five-wire Point Circuitry

6.6.2.1 Overview
As an example of the EPM control scheme with the three-phase AC motor and management and
supervision circuitry solved by type N (class 1) relays (chapter 9.3.2.1), let us regard a scheme that
is widespread all over Russia’s railroad network (Sapožnikov et al. 1997). It is called ‘the five-wire’
because of five cable wires installed from an interlocking tower to the EPM (­figure 6.19).

6.6.2.2 Supervision
The EPM supervision scheme applies an AC supervision circuit with polar selectivity whose
mode of functioning is based on the half-wave rectification of the AC. The supervision
scheme’s composition consists of the T4 transformer, the DC combined (chapter 9.3.2.4) relay
OK, the rectifying unit comprised of the VD7 diode and the R2 resistor, an integrating circuit –
the C1 capacitor, the R1 resistor – and the detection contacts.
Figure 6.20 illustrates the operational procedure of the supervision circuit. The AC arrives into
the circuit from the secondary winding of the T4 transformer. When the points are located in
their end position, one half-wavelength is bypassed by the VD7 diode due to lower resistance
in that path, whereas the other moves through the OK relay coil. As may be seen from the
oscillogram displayed in figure 6.20a the relay appears under action of impulses of current of
the identical polarity; therefore, the relay’s mono-stable system activates, while the bi-stable
one switches over into the position corresponding with this polarity. The point position is
registered by the supervising relays PS (plus position), MS (minus position). A contact of the
PPS relay is included in the scheme of PS and MS supervising relays to ensure that the actual
position of the points equals the target position determined by the PPS (chapter 6.6.2.3) relay
and that the contact of the bi-stable part of OK relay is not incidentally sealed.
During point switching the VD7 diode is shut off (figure 6.20b), and the OK relay is supplied with
both half-waves and therefore deactivated. There is no supervision of the point position. In point’s
opposite end position, the corresponding detection contacts close. The polarity of connection of
the VD7 diode is altered (figure 6.20c). The mono-stable system of the OK relay activates, and the
polarized one switches over. The point position is registered by the MS supervising relay.
Thus, the T4 transformer is a source of energy for the supervision circuit, while the VD7 rectifying
diode can be considered as the power source of the OK supervising relay. This achieves the
requirement of power delivery to the supervising devices from the detection contacts side.
Indeed, the OK relay is a DC relay and is not activated in the absence of the DC component
formed by the VD7 diode. Consequently, in the event of a short-circuit or abruption of the L1–L5
wires the supervision circuit is protected from a mis-operation to the dangerous side.
If the points are in their end position, electrical current circulates across all elements of the
supervision circuit; therefore, any failure they may have is discovered immediately. The circuit does
not interrupt if the lid of the EPM is open, because the lid contacts B1 and B2 are not included in it.

6.6.2.3 Initiation of Switching

The scheme’s managing circuit is built upon two activating relays: the mono-stable relay
NPS with two coils, each of them picking up the relay alternatively, and the bi-stable relay
PPS located in the interlocking room. The NPS relay determines the opportunity of a point
operation while the PPS relay defines the direction of point switching and memorises the
point’s current position.

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Figure 6.19: EPM control circuit

Figure 6.20: Working of supervision circuit

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6 Movable Track Elements

When a command to switch the points is issued (the SK point lever is rotated to the minus
position), the NPS relay picks up with the checking of safety requirements. The point switching
is possible if the track circuit is not occupied (the front contact of the SP relay is closed) and
the points are not locked in a route (the front contact of the Z relay is closed).
Back (break) contacts of the NPS relay switch off power of the supervision circuit, which
causes disappearance of supervision of the end position (contacts 23, 83) and flashing
of the red light on the console; they also plug in three phases of power supply to the
operational circuit (contacts 22, 82, 62); and close the circuit of the PPS relay (contact 42).
The electrical polarity of the PPS relay is now reversed in comparison with the previous
interconnection, therefore this relay switches over. The 111 and 141 contacts of the PPS
relay alter the order of the phases in the operational circuit and the motor begins to rotate.
The short duration of the activating influence on the managing circuit is provided by the
121 contact of the PPS relay, since it shuts off the circuit of the upper coil of the NPS relay.
However, in normal operation the operational circuit retains NPS relay picked up during the
whole time of the point switching by the lower coil.

6.6.2.4 Motor Operation

The operational circuit is comprised of the power supply source (the A, B, C phases),
fuses FU1–FU3, line wires L1–L5, detection contacts (11-12, 13-14, 15-16 and 41-42,
43-44, 45-46) and lid contacts B1, B2. (When the EPM opens, B1 and B2 interrupt the
operational circuit to prevent potential accidents and injuries to maintenance staff.) The
phase supervising block (PSB) consists of the three transformers T1–T3 and the rectifier
bridge collected on the VD3–VD6 diodes. It checks the actual closing of the operational
circuit along all three phases and retains the NPS relay in picked up position with the motor
current. The reason for that are effects of electro-magnetic saturation of the transformers
and therefore its non-sinusoidal behaviour.
When the switching is complete, the detection contacts 41-42 and 43-44 open, the current
through the motor stops; hence, the NPS relay drops down, providing with its contacts the
tripolar disconnection of line wires from the power supply and connecting the supervision
circuit to the power supply.

6.6.3 Example with Type C Relays: GS II DR (Germany)

6.6.3.1 Overview
In Germany, four-wire point circuitry is the interface used predominately between
interlocking and EPM. It uses type C (class 2) relays (chapter 9.3.2.1), resulting in simpler
relays, but more complex circuitry than in the example in chapter 6.6.2. Whereas the
four wires and the behaviour of the point machine is a standard for most applications
in Germany, the circuitry inside the interlocking differs between the interlocking types,
although the basic principles are similar. As an example, the point circuitry of GS II DR is
described in detail. GS II DR is a relay interlocking type manufactured by WSSB in GDR
and is still in operation to a large scale in East Germany. Adapted forms of GS II are also
applied in other countries.
Figure 6.21 shows the managing circuitry (simplified) and figure 6.22 the operational and
supervision circuitry. Table 6.1 explains the relays and other symbols. Unless stated otherwise,
all relays are simple mono-stable DC relays (Kusche 1984, Arnold et al. 1987).

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Figure 6.21: Managing circuitry of GS II DR (simplified); points in plus position

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Figure 6.22: Operation and supervision circuitry of GS II DR; points in plus position

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 6.6 Circuitry of Point Operation and Control in Relay Technology

Symbol Name used in the Text Explanation

R, S, T feeding of operational circuit (three phases)
Mp zero point of the operational circuit
current switching relay This relay switches the power supply between operation
U and supervision.

target position relay This relay (bistable, chapter 9.3.2.3) stores the target
+ 2
position on the points. In normal operation, this means
the actual position if the points are in their end position
or the position where it is commanded to during the
+ 1
switching process.

+
plus setting relay These relays initiate the switching process into the
respective direction.

-
minus setting relay

trailing supervision relay 1 These relays (both bistable, chapter 9.3.2.3) together
detect the trailing of a points by a rail vehicle.
trailing supervision relay 2

+
plus supervision relay These relays supervise the respective end position if
picked up.

-
minus supervision relay

auxiliary retarding relay These relays together control the time delayed
disconnection of the EPM if the end position is not
retarding relay achieved due to disturbance. This serves for protection of
V
the EPM.
auxiliary trigger relay This relay switches coil 2 of the trailing supervision relay
one in and out of the operation circuit and therefore helps
to stop point operation after the points have reached the
end position.
A+ A- EPM contacts These contacts are the equivalent to the detection
contacts in chapters 6.4.3 and 6.6.2. They detect the end
position of the point blades.
route1, route contacts These are contacts of the route circuitry whose purpose is
route2, to check if the points are locked in a route.
etc.
TC track clear detection contacts These are contacts of the track clear detection whose
purpose is to check if the points are clear.
attribute for a bistable relay

coil of bistable relay held in up position by the bistable

characteristics, although deenergised

Table 6.1: Relays and other symbols of point circuitry of GS II DR (names liberally translated)

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6.6.3.2 Supervision
Let us assume that the points are in plus position. The plus supervision relay is picked up
and the supervision current passes all four wires between the interlocking and the EPM (figure
6.22) to prove all wires in the point cable to be intact. The trailing supervision relay 1 does not
switch although its first magnetic system is passed by the supervision current. The reason is
that due to the plus supervision relay in series, the current is too weak to pick it up.
The minus position differs from the plus in the positions of the target position relay and of
the EPM contacts. Therefore the minus supervision relay is picked up by current path over
contacts 8.2, 8.3, 10.3, 10.5, 10.6, 9.9, 9.8, 9.6, 9.5, 9.3, 8.5, 8.6, 8.8, 11.3 and 12.1.

6.6.3.3 Normal Switching Process

Let us now assume that the points will be switched by an individual point operation action of
the signaller. Automatic point setting, however, is provided in this interlocking type, but the
related wires and contacts are not drawn in figure 6.21 for simplicity. According to German
requirements, all relays must switch at least once during the normal switching process in order
to detect failure of any relay. The sequence for switching from plus to minus is described in the
following text and depicted in figure 6.23.
Individual point setting is initiated by simultaneous pushing of the point button related to the
individual points and the master point button. The master point button serves for all points
in the interlocking area and its purpose is to meet the requirement that, for prevention of
unintended actions, in German interlocking always two buttons must be pushed to initiate an
action. If the points are clear and not locked in any route, the minus setting relay picks up,
initiating the switching process.
The minus setting relay activates the retarding circuit by closing contact 2.1. This circuit is adjusted
to a time delay of approximately six seconds and disconnects the EPM for its protection if it
doesn’t reach the other end position within this time. The retarding relay disrupts the supervision
current (figure 6.22, contacts 8.2) and therefore drops down the supervision relay.
Consequently, coil 1 of the trailing supervision relay 2 becomes energised by contacts 6.2
closing, causing the change of position of that relay. After this, coil 1 of the target position
relay becomes energised by contacts 5.2 closing, which leads to a change of position of
that relay. The target position of the points is now the minus. After that, trailing supervision
relay one switches by closing of contacts 10.3 (current path via contacts 8.1, 8.3, 10.3,
10.5, 10.7, 11.3 and 12.1).
After switching of the target position relay (or later), the signaller can release the buttons, as
contacts 5.3 and 7.4 do no longer need to be closed. This opens contacts 2.1 and therefore
starts the unloading of the capacitor of the retarding circuitry.
After switching the target position relay and the trailing supervision relay 1, the current switching
relay picks up via contacts 6.4 and 6.8 closed. It connects the operating current by contacts
9.1, 10.1 and 11.1 and disconnects the supervision current by contacts 8.3 and 12.1. In case of
failure, the safe position of this relay is the dropped down (operation current off).
Now the motor starts to rotate, but due to unlinked phases with low performance (figure 6.24,
left). The purpose for this smooth starting is to avoid jamming of the clamp lock (chapter 6.5.1)
while unlocking, which could occur when too high force is applied. As in the transformer of the
auxiliary trigger relay, both primary coils are passed by the same current in opposite directions,
this relay does not pick up and therefore coil 2 of trailing supervision relay 1 is excluded from
the circuit (contacts 12.2 and 12.3).

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 6.6 Circuitry of Point Operation and Control in Relay Technology

Figure 6.23: Switching sequence of relays during switching of points from plus to minus

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After the open point blade has moved a short distance and unlocking of the clamp lock
(chapter 6.5.1) has started, the EPM plus contacts (8.7 and 8.8) switch, causing the
linking of phases in star configuration and rotation of the point motor with full power
(figure 6.24, right). The auxiliary trigger relay picks up to enable switching back of trailing
supervision relay 1 later in the process (contacts 12.2 and 12.3).

Figure 6.24: Initial operation of EPM with reduced power (left) and operation with full power (right)

When the point blades approach the new (minus) end position, the EPM minus
contacts (10.6 and 10.7) change their positions. The phases of operational current are
now unlinked, providing for a smooth braking of the point machine. Thus, the trailing
supervision relay 1 switches by its coil 2 energised. This drops down the current switching
relay by opening contacts 6.8, which disconnects the operation current by opening
contacts 9.1, 10.1 and 11.1 and connects the supervision current by closing 8.3 and
12.1. For a short time, the supervision current energises coil 2 of trailing supervision relay 2 via
contacts 8.1, 8.3, 10.3, 10.5, 10.6, 9.9, 9.8, 9.7, 9.3, 8.5, 8.6, 8.8, 11.3 and 12.1. Trailing
supervision relay 2 therefore changes its position, disconnects itself by opening contacts
8.1 and 9.7 and closes contacts 9.6 to energise the minus supervision relay few steps
later. It also switches off the retarding circuitry by contacts 3.2 and 4.1. Now contacts 8.2
close and the supervision current energises the minus supervision relay (chapter 6.6.3.2).

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 6.7 Point Diagnostics

6.6.3.4 Reversing of Switching Direction

Reversing of switching direction is explained on the example in that this occurs while the
points are moving at full power from plus to minus (figure 6.24, right). However, reversing is
also possible in other stages of point operation as well as after time-delayed disconnection of
the EPM after not reaching the end position.
Pushing point and point master buttons energises the plus setting relay. This switches the
target position relay by contacts 4.2, while contacts 6.1, 6.2, 5.2 and 4.2 are already closed
before due to the normal switching process. By switching of contacts 8.4, 8.5, 10.3 and 10.4,
the direction of rotation of the EPM changes.

6.6.3.5 Trailing of the Points

Let us now assume that the points are trailed by a rail vehicle while being in plus position
(figure 6.22). Moving the point blades switches the EPM plus contacts. Now the current
path of the supervision current is via contacts 8.2, 8.3, 8.4, 8.6, 8.8, 11.3 and 12.1, which
drops down the plus supervision relay. Trailing supervision relay 1 now switches by its
coil 1 being energised by a higher current (compare chapter 6.6.3.2). This energises the
trailing alarm bell by contacts 7.1 closed to attract the signaller’s attention to the situation
(figure 6.21). Trailing supervision is therefore based on the principle that this combination
of positions of trailing supervision relays 1 and 2 does not occur in normal operation,
although both relays also switch there to test their proper functioning.
Pushing point and point master buttons would now lead to no reaction, as contacts 1.6 and
2.2 are both open. Therefore, the points cannot be operated normally.

6.7 Point Diagnostics

6.7.1 Purpose and Principle

Traditionally, the only technical supervision of points was the supervision current which
detects if the points are actually in their end position. This is necessary for safety of
operation. However, non-operational points cause obstruction and costly unplanned
maintenance actions: Maintenance staff have to go to the site of the incident for repair work.
With point diagnostics, upcoming failure of points can be detected before it leads to service failure.
This avoids obstruction of operation and enables better schedulable maintenance processes.
The typical diagnostic items can be, for example:
–– throwing time of the points
–– power consumed to throw the points
–– peak power consumed for locking the points
–– power consumed in case of sluggish movement of the locking mechanism
–– imbalance of current
–– power consumed during idle running of the point machine

6.7.2 Date Capturing

There are basically two technologies to capture point diagnostic data:

–– Data capturing directly at the points by various sensors
–– Electrical diagnostics by measuring current/voltage profile during switching process

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6 Movable Track Elements

With outdoor diagnostics directly at the points, possibilities for data to be measured are
(Fritz 2014), for example:
–– monitoring of the distance between blades and stock rail in closed/gap position
–– measuring of the displacement of mechanical parts in the point machine and locking
mechanisms
–– measuring forces during the switching process
–– measuring rail and ambient temperatures
Technical means of detection can be, for example, inductive or optical.
Figure 6.25 shows an example from Japan of a simple diagnostic to detect mechanical
displacement of movable parts in the point drive and locking mechanism. A fixed slit, a light
emitter and a light detector are mounted to the point machine and a slide slit is mounted
to the movable parts. As long as the displacement is within the norm, the light from the
emitters passes through the slits to the detector. When the displacement exceeds a defined
degree, the light is shielded and the displacement thereby detected (Igarashi/Siomi 2006).

Figure 6.25: Structure of lock warp detector in Japanese example (Igarashi/Siomi 2006)

In electrical diagnostics, the point machine itself is used as sensor, as the consumed power
is proportional to the force needed to throw the points. Electrical sensor modules are plugged
into the point operating circuit and measure the voltage and/or current profile during the
switching process of the point machine. By comparison with a profile of the initial state for the
individual set of points, disturbance, obstacles and wear of material are made detectable. An
example is the systems Sidis and Sidis Compact by Siemens (Körkemeier/Robbe 2011).

6.7.3 Data Evaluation

Analytic modules can be located in direct proximity or even in the same module as the sensor,
or centrally. On the one hand, data can be displayed locally directly at the module, e. g. by LED
indications. On the other hand, data can be centrally stored and being made available visually
to maintenance staff to facilitate precise adjustment and planning of maintenance work.
Limit values for alert can be defined based on the initial state to warn maintenance staff if
action becomes necessary. By comparison with these limit values and by trend analysis,
possible causes of faults can be deducted by the system:
–– sluggish movement due to foreign bodies in the system (sand, rust, etc.) or weather effects
–– blockage of the points
–– lubrication condition of the movable parts
–– fault in power supply

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 6.7 Point Diagnostics

Typically, three different states are indicated (locally by LEDs and/or in the maintenance system):
–– green: in order
–– yellow: maintenance needed soon
–– red: maintenance needed immediately, service failure probable

6.7.4 Example for Electrical Supervision of EPM

One of the possible ways to control the technical condition of the EPM is continuous
monitoring of the motor current. This is illustrated by the graphs of motor current versus time
shown in figure 6.26. The graph in figure 6.26a corresponds to the normal switching process.
It clearly shows the operation cycles of the EPM: starting the electric motor, free running,
unlocking of the throw bar, transferring the blades, locking the throw bar and stopping the
electric motor.
In case of disturbances, the graph changes. So, if a foreign object gets between the blade and
the stock rail and the EPM works on friction, the graph has the form shown in figure 6.26b.
As another example, malfunction of the electric motor (arcing of brushes) is displayed by the
graph in figure 6.26c. Thus, comparing and analysing the graphs, the technical condition of
the device and the forecast for its further operation can be concluded.
Such methods of diagnosis and monitoring contribute to the transition from the planned
preventive maintenance of EPMs to maintenance on the actual technical condition (Bochkarev/
Lykov 2013).

Figure 6.26: Graphs of motor current

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 7.1 Requirements and Basic Classification

7 Signals
Gregor Theeg, Dirk Zimmermann, Michael Dieter Kunze

7.1 Requirements and Basic Classification

The purpose of signals is to convey information and instructions to people, in this context
mainly to the driver of a railway vehicle, but also to ground staff or to workers on the track.
They are therefore an interface between the technical equipment and people. Examples of
information to be communicated to the driver are:
–– movement authorities (chapter 7.6.3)
–– permitted speed (chapter 7.6.4)
–– information about the direction of the route
–– readiness for departure
–– identification of vehicles and front/rear ends of trains
–– position of points
–– signals in yards related to actions on the hump
–– commands for brake test
–– signals for electric traction start/end
–– marking of mileage and particular positions (e. g. level crossing activation point) along the line
Signals have to meet the following general requirements:
–– The driver must be able to recognise easily the signal for what it is.
–– The driver must be able to understand the signal indication quickly.
–– The information given by the signal must be unambiguous.
–– The same information should always be given in the same way. The same signal aspects
should be applicable for different cases.
–– The driver must be able to memorise the information easily.
–– The information shall be given in good and proper time, which means not too late, but also
not too early, to prevent the driver from forgetting.
–– Fail safe design. In case of technical defect, the signal must never give a dangerous or
misleading indication. It can, however, show a more restrictive indication. This principle can
be translated into practice in two ways:
• Design of the signal system so that partial extinction always results in a more restrictive
or an undefined signal aspect (inherently fail-safe). The Dutch system is an example
(chapter 7.8.5); others are used in parts of the North American network. The advantage
of this type of fail-safe against reactive fail-safe is that it protects not only against
technical failure, but also against failure in the driver’s perception. Another example in
mechanical signalling is the use of upper quadrant semaphores rather than lower
quadrant (chapters 7.8.1, 7.8.2).
• Supervision of the signal and activation of a more restrictive aspect in case of failure
(reactive fail-safe). Most modern signal systems come into this category.
–– Reliability: Technical defects should be rare.
–– Economic efficiency which, for example, requires relatively few signal lamps.
With high speed operation, a safe perception of trackside signals by the driver cannot be
assumed due to the short time which is available for observing the signal. Therefore, railways
which use high speeds have defined a limit of speed above which cab signals are obligatory to
replace trackside signals. According to (UIC code 734), railway lines can be divided into three
classes according to speed and the related form of signalisation:

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7 Signals

1. Conventional lines: up to ca. 160 km/h; signalling by trackside signals possible.

2. Lines with speed: up to ca. 200 (220) km/h; trackside signals still possible and applied
in some countries in Western Europe, but adaptations necessary (chapters 7.6.3.3 and
7.6.3.4).
3. High speed lines: over 200 (220) km/h; only cab signalling possible.
This limit for trackside signals is usually defined around 160 km/h, in some railways in Western
Europe up to 220 km/h.
The speed restriction connected with movements on sight, e. g. for signalised entry into an
occupied track, for shunting movements and in certain cases of degraded mode operation,
varies. Usually it is between 15 and 30 km/h, but in special cases it can reach up to 100 km/h
(e. g. open line sections in Saudi Arabia).
Signals can be classified by different criteria. One is the human sense triggered by the signal. The
practically important kinds are:
–– Optical signals are suitable to give detailed information including the location of the
signal.
–– Audible signals are suitable to attract a person's attention independently, so they are suitable
to warn of potentially dangerous situations.
The second criterion is the location of the signal (figure 7.1):
–– Trackside signals are given from a position along the track.
–– Vehicle signals are given from vehicles to persons outside the vehicles.
–– Cab signals are given in the driver's cab to the driver.

Trackside signal: Cab Signal:

Vehicle signal:

Figure 7.1: Classification of signals according to the place where given from

In some situations, cab and trackside signals are used simultaneously, but the amount
of information which can be given differs. Cab signalling can be designed to provide less
information than the trackside signal (e. g. ALSN in Russia, chapter 8.3.4.1), but often it provides
additional information (e. g. BACC in Italy, LZB in Germany and Spain, chapters 8.3.4.3, 8.3.6).
If the signal indications do not conform, the priorities are regulated differently: In Russia, the
trackside signal has priority, but in Germany it is the LZB or ETCS cab signal, for example.
The means of giving the signal are (figure 7.2):
–– Hand signals, given manually by a person.
–– Mechanical signals, given by different position of objects.
–– Light signals, given by different light arrangements and use of different colours.
Signals can be further categorised into:
–– Positive signals give the information by the presence of an indication. This is the usual case
today.
–– Negative signals give the information by absence of an indication. Examples are an unlit light
signal and mechanical signals standing edgewise.

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 7.2 Signals with Filament Lamps

Figure 7.2: Classification of trackside signals according to technology

Switching between different aspects may or may not be possible:

–– Fixed signals (e. g. signal boards) always show the same indication.
–– Switchable (multiple aspect) signals can switch between different aspects.
As cab signalling is technically closely linked to train protection systems, it is described in more
detail in chapter 8. Optical switchable trackside light signals are among the most complex
form and are the focus of chapter 7.
The forms of switchable optical trackside light signals are shown as (figure 7.3):
–– Colour light signals with aspects identified by different colours.
–– Position light signals with aspects distinguished using different light formations of the
same colour.
–– Colour position light signals where aspects are shown by using different light formations
of different colours.

Figure 7.3: Examples for colour, position and colour position light signals

7.2 Signals with Filament Lamps

7.2.1 Structure of a Light Signal

Light signals can be mounted differently. Most common is a high signal post directly
beside the relevant track. The position of right or left usually reflects the normal direction
of traffic (chapter 3.2.4). If there is insufficient space, signal heads may also be mounted
on signal cantilevers or signal bridges. On some railways, signals may be constructed as
dwarf signals. They are often used particularly for shunting, in situations where all trains
stop in front of the signal or where no other solution is possible or practical.
Figure 7.4 shows a typical structure of a light signal with high signal post. Either several
signal units can be placed in front of the same background (practice in most European
countries, figure 7.5 left), or each signal unit has its own background (dominating practice
in North America, figure 7.5 right).

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7 Signals

Figure 7.4: Structure of a light signal Figure 7.5: Arrangement of signal backgrounds

7.2.2 Signal Units

Light signals today are designed with a filament lamp or with light emitting diodes (LED). Figure
7.6 shows the typical structure of a signal unit with filament lamp; LED signals are described in
chapter 7.3. The purpose of the converging lens system, usually solid or Fresnel lenses, is to
gather as much light as possible from the lamp and to form a parallel light beam. The quality
of light beam from a solid lens is higher, but in most cases a Fresnel lens is enough. The light
is filtered by the colour filter. To provide different light distributions, different lens versions or
additional distribution lenses are common.

Figure 7.6: Structure of a signal unit

The precise implementation varies. Often the colour filter function is included in the inner lens
of a Fresnel lens system. Frequently no separate distribution lenses are provided, but a simple
diffusing function is integrated into the converging lens system, meaning that this produces no
exact parallel beam.
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 7.2 Signals with Filament Lamps

To generate switchable signals in different colours, signals with a filament lamp can be
classified as follows (figure 7.7):
–– Multi-unit signals: A separate lamp is used for each colour.
–– Searchlight signals: Apertures are switched mechanically in front of a lamp, which is always lit.
–– In an intermediate form (e. g. as used in Italy), several lamps are mounted in the same signal
unit and the light from all lamps directed to the same exit by a lens, mirror and filter system.

Figure 7.7: Solutions to generate lights in different colours by filament lamp signals (principles)

An important difficulty in signals with filament lamp is the prevention of phantom lights.
These effects are usually caused by sunlight, which imitates a lit signal lamp. Either a bright
image of the sun is focussed on the filament of the lamp, or sunlight is reflected on the
surface of a lens or on a mirror (if this is used). To reduce this danger, a hood (figure 7.6) is
fitted, and all interior surfaces in the signal unit are painted matt black. For the same reason,
in multi-unit signals, mirrors are widely forbidden, although they can be used in searchlight
signals to increase optical efficiency. In order to prevent coloured phantom light the colour
filter is located as close as possible to the filament lamp.
The advantages of searchlight signals over multi-unit signals are the lower number of lamps
required, the impossibility of phantom lights and the more efficient optical system. The
disadvantage is mechanically moving parts for operation of the colour filters in a challenging
environment, resulting in higher maintenance costs. Today, most railways prefer multi-unit signals.
Given that trains are getting faster and more frequent, any reduction in the need for attention
of a trackside signal represents a safety benefit to the maintenance workforce.

7.2.3 Subsidiary Indicators

Technical solutions to form subsidiary indicators to display numbers, letters or geometrical

forms, among others are shown in figure 7.8:
–– A matrix of several lamps, which are selectively switched on depending on the aspect to be
displayed. This solution is expensive for signals with filament lamps, but practicable for LED
signals (see distributed LED in chapter 7.3.2).
–– Moving shades in front of one lamp, one shade for each aspect of the subsidiary signal.
The disadvantage is increased maintenance efforts due to moving mechanical parts.
–– One lamp with a shade in front of it for each aspect of the subsidiary signal.
–– A bundle of glass fibres for each aspect, beginning at a lamp and splitting up the light
to the desired form. This is the most modern, efficient and flexible solution for filament
lamp signals.

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7 Signals

matrix of lamps: different lamps and shades

movable shades: lamps with glass fibre cables:

Figure 7.8: Solutions to display numbers

7.2.4 Control and Supervision of Signal Lamps

Filament lamps survived in railway signalling for a long time, due to the lack of alternatives
for safe supervision: It can be assumed that light is emitted when a current flows through
the filament only. To increase the life span of the lamp, some railways, particularly in North
America, use approach lighting: The lamp illuminates only when a train approaches. Other
railways, particularly in Europe, operate the lamp at a lower current compared with the
design current, to achieve the same result.
Figure 7.9 shows the typical lamp circuit. Current is often transmitted to the signal at
higher voltage to minimise energy loss. It is transformed to lower voltage in the proximity
of the lamp. The cable can be modelled as a resistor with an inductive component. The
cable also contains a capacitive leak impedance between the wires. A supervising unit in
the interlocking, which is often a relay, detects the presence of a current continuously. This
can prove that the lamp illuminates. The following circuit behaviour must be ensured:
–– In the case of open circuit (e. g. filament broken), the current via the leak impedance
must not exceed a certain value, which would prevent the supervising relay from
dropping down. The longer the cable, the higher is the leak impedance and the
stronger this current.
–– In the case of a short circuit, the current must be high enough to blow the fuse or to
operate the automatic circuit breaker. Either will result in the disruption of the circuit and
dropping of the relay. The longer the cable, the weaker is the short circuit current.
The result of both conditions is the limitation of the length of the cable, depending on the
type of cable. Typical values are between 5 km and 10 km.

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 7.3 LED Signals

Figure 7.9: Lamp circuit for signal lamps

7.3 LED Signals

7.3.1 LED Development for Signalling

At the end of the 1990s a new light source technology became available, with enough
luminous intensity and offering the required colours for rail signalling, the Light Emitting
Diode (LED).
The overall advantage of the LED is the very long life compared with the filament lamp;
another is the potential for a reduction in power consumption.
However, conventional interlockings are firmly linked to the filament lamp. Thus:
1. The supervision of the correct function of the filament is based on the current flow
through the signalling circuit (signal controller, cable, signal unit). In other words, the
electrical design of the signalling circuit is based on the lamp current (see 7.2.4).
2. The signalling circuit is designed for the supply voltage of the filament lamp.
Adaptations to other voltages are not often planned.
3. To provide a dimming feature for night-time application, the interlockings use the
reduction of the supply voltage for the lamp. The difference between day and night
voltages is adapted to its behaviour.
4. The signalling circuits are designed to be immune to crosstalk, for example to other
energy sources in the same supply cable (point machine supply) or the power supply of
the trains among others.
5. To increase the availability of the filament lamp, versions with double filament are
used. The signalling circuits are designed to control such double filament lamps. This
functionality is mostly hardcoded and it is often impossible to switch it off.
The design of the signalling circuits to suit the filament lamp results in LED unit designs
which try to adapt to its behaviour. Such LED units can be used to replace signal units
with filament lamps. The electrical adaptation is provided by electrical driver circuits, the
optical one by an adapted optical design.
Nevertheless, the most efficient way to introduce the LED technology into signalling is
to implement them together with a new signalling circuit interfacing recent interlockings.
Here, the design of the signalling circuit is independent from the features of the light
source. But due to the long life-cycle of railway systems this option is used almost
exclusively for newly built interlockings.

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7 Signals

The optical systems for railway signals depend on the signalling type:
–– light point design, with just one (round) active optical surface or
–– indicator design, with several small active single optical surfaces for signalling symbols,
such as numbers, letters, etc.
For the design of the LED units for light points and indicators, two basic methods are known:
–– the distributed light source and
–– the concentrated light source.

7.3.2 Distributed Light Source

7.3.2.1 Architecture
LED units with a distributed light source consist of several LEDs (figure 7.10). Each LED provides a
share of the whole luminous intensity and light distribution of the LED unit.

Figure 7.10: Matrix LED unit LED 210 (Siemens)

The advantages of this design are that the adaptation to the optical power can be controlled by the
number of LEDs and the possible use of low power LEDs. For this low power LED provisions for
heat management is normally limited or even not necessary. For these reasons, most of the LED
units designed for railway application use this technology.
To control the number of LEDs, series connections, so-called clusters, are often used (figure
7.11). But without special provisions, a single fault of one component out of this cluster can
affect all LEDs of the cluster. This would have a direct impact on the availability of the whole unit.

Figure 7.11: LED unit with clusters

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 7.3 LED Signals

Figure 7.12: LED unit without clusters

The architecture of the LED unit is influenced fundamentally by the design targets. For an
architecture designed for optimising the availability of the overall LED unit, each LED has to
be controlled by its own driver circuit (figure 7.12). When the design focuses on minimising the
cost of the product, the optimum is to control all LED by only one driver circuit. The LED units
available on the market differ in this feature.

7.3.2.2 Safety
The provisions for safety depend on the number of clusters and number of LEDs.
The safety of units with a relatively high number of LEDs without clusters (means that each
LED is controlled by an own driver, figure 7.12) can be realised by overall availability. A precondition
is that the design of each LED and driver is independent from all the others. This means, that a
single fault of a part of a driver or LED does not affect the other LEDs or drivers of the unit at all.
Following this approach, the impact of faults of single components of such units is very limited. For
instance, in the case of 60 LEDs controlled by 60 drivers, the impact in lowering the luminance is
about 1.6 % (1/60 LEDs). Total hazard rates of 10-9 h-1 or better are achievable. The advantage is
the very high overall availability. The main disadvantage is that a limitation of the application time is
necessary to ensure overall availability, up to 15 years is currently commonplace.
The impact of faults of single components of LED units with clusters (figure 7.11)
depends on the number of controlled LEDs per cluster. For example, with five clusters, the
impact of a single fault will be at minimum 20 %. In other words, three single faults could
reduce the overall luminance to 40 % (100 % – 3 ∙ 20 %).
For a design with clusters, safety is realised with additional supervision features like
current or/and voltage monitoring of the LED unit. In most cases the supervision features
are electrical. As the optical power of the LED unit is proved by electrical parameters,
exceptions to assumed failures are always necessary. For instance, the assumption that
there will always be enough optical power of the LED if the electrical parameters of the LED
are in the specified range. The assumed exceptions and their acceptance differ, depending
on the suppliers and railway authorities.
All the additional supervision functions have a negative influence on the overall availability,
which contradicts the aim of increasing availability by using LED instead of filament lamps.
Today, it is well known that failures of LED units in most cases are failures of the electrical
driver or interface components and not LED failures.

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7 Signals

7.3.3 Concentrated Light Source

7.3.3.1 Architecture
The concentrated light source consists of at least one LED. This single LED provides the
whole luminous intensity of the LED unit. Essentially, this is the “LED filament” of a lamp, but in
combination with the advantages of the LED technology.
If more than one LED is used, an additional lens (condenser lens) concentrates the light beams of
the different LEDs onto one light beam. The difference to the distributed light source is that all light
of the unit is concentrated in one point or area.
Based on this design improvements are possible, such as
–– cost reduction due to reduction of components
–– smaller dimensions of the LED units
–– adaptation to existing filament based light units
–– optical proving by measuring the light output with an optical sensor
Today, just some of this potential is used by few suppliers.
Figure 7.13 shows the HLED 70 LED unit from Siemens. This unit uses a concentrated light
source together with the lens St70, that has already been applied together with filament units.

Figure 7.13: HLED 70 LED with concentrated light source

7.3.3.2 Safety
Based on a concentrated light source, the optical proving of the light output is feasible
because all light of the unit is concentrated at one point or area and can be measured by a
limited number of optical sensors. With optical supervision, lifetime limitation due to safety is
no longer necessary.
By contrast, ensuring availability of the unit by the use of a highly available design for
optical supervision along with the electrical LED driver and the interface to the signal
controller is challenging.

7.3.4 Multicolour LED

Using advanced LED technology provides new possibilities for the multicolour feature.
Complementing the options from figure 7.7, it is possible to introduce multicolour LED units.
They can be based on the design of the distributed light source, but will be more efficient on a
concentrated one.

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 7.3 LED Signals

The main advantage of the multicolour signal units is the more compact design of the
signals. Figure 7.14 shows a signal with two multicolour LED units installed at Melbourne
station, Australia. Each of these units provides the colours red, yellow and green. Without
multicolour units, a signal design with six units would be necessary, and the dimension of
the signal would increase significantly. In contrast with searchlight signals, no mechanically
switched components are needed.

Figure 7.14: Multicolour signal at Melbourne station

7.3.5 State of the Art and Outlook

Today, all major signalling suppliers deliver LED units for railway signals for new installations. In
most cases the signalling circuit is adapted to the new LED light source.
For existing installations like relay interlockings it is necessary to consider additional aspects for
replacement of the filament units. An adaptation of the signalling circuit to the behaviour of the
LED is normally not practicable. An adaptation of the LED unit to the behaviour of the filament
is the most practicable solution. A full adaptation (optical, electrical and mechanical) of the
behaviour is not possible due to different technologies.
Another aspect is that there is nearly no standardisation of the signal housings, with each
supplier using a different mechanical design. The bulb design together with the bulb holder of the
filament lamp itself is standardised, but the bulb holder is not designed to hold the weight and
dimension of the interface and driver electronic necessary for LED units.
The existing installations were based on the regulations (safety, EMC, etc.) of that time. Without
changing the signalling circuit, a permission based on today’s regulations is challenging.
This hinders the introduction of LED units for existing installations, by retrofitting filament lamps
with LED units.
The filament lamp for railway signals will exist in the future for many of the interlockings and
signalling circuits. In parallel, for new interlockings signals with LED units are commonplace and
LED units with multicolour features will result in more compact signal designs.
Due to LED technology improvements (efficiency, light output), the architecture of the LED
units for light points will change more and more to the concentrated light source.
For indicators (symbols, letters, etc.), the distributed light source will remain as standard.
Overall, the LED technology has positive effects on railway signalling, especially in raising
the availability of signals and in lowering maintenance costs.

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7 Signals

7.4 Optical Parameters

The optical range of a signal lamp is determined by its luminous intensity in the direction
concerned, the sensitivity of the eye of the viewer and the atmosphere conditions, the
latter depending on the weather. The black signal background provides for a good
contrast and therefore increases the range of vision. Designing the output of the lamps for
the worst case (the densest possible fog) would be very disadvantageous under normal
conditions due to the glare and high energy consumption of signal lamps. Therefore, their
output is usually designed to give good results in hazy weather, but not for the densest
fog. A typical requirement for the range of a main signal lamp is around 500 m under such
conditions.
The sighting distance, in contrast to the range of vision, is also limited by obstacles
between the signal and the viewer. However, obstruction of the signal for very short
distances (e. g. by masts for electric power supply) is accepted. Railways have defined,
albeit different, regulations concerning the minimum required sighting distance and so on.
The most typical are:
–– a constant distance, independent from the speed of the approaching train (typically
around 300 m)
–– a constant time over which the signal has to be visible from the train approaching at
maximum permitted speed (typically between six and nine seconds)
–– a combination of the above two rules
–– a distance value graded by the permitted line speed
If that minimum sighting distance cannot be achieved, several solutions may be applied:
–– installation of a repeating signal in rear of the signal
–– installation of a fixed signal board in rear of the signal to attract the driver's special
attention
–– repetition of the signal aspect in the driver's cab in several train protection systems
–– reduction of the maximum permitted speed

7.5 Retro-reflection of Passive Signal Boards

Signal boards are usually unlit. To use the headlights of the train to make signal boards
visible at night, retro-reflection is widely applied (figure 7.15). In contrast to disperse
reflection (e. g. white wall) and directed reflection (e. g. mirror), retro-reflection is not a
natural characteristic of a material surface, but is made artificially by multiple reflection
in spherical or prismatic structures. On railways, in contrast to roads, retro-reflecting
materials with high beaming are used. This is because longer sighting distances are
required for railways, while at the same time the front lights can be weaker on the vehicles.

Figure 7.15: Kinds of reflection

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 7.6 Principles of Signalling by Light Signals

7.6 Principles of Signalling by Light Signals

7.6.1 Utilisation of Signal Colours

Unless using mechanical signals, train movements are usually signalised by colour lights
and partly by colour position light signals (see chapter 7.1). In contrast with position light
signals, the advantage of colour light signals is visibility over longer distances. For shunting
movements, all kinds of light signals are in widespread use.
Historically, most railways used the following colours for signal flags and the night signals of
mechanical signals (figure 7.16):
–– red for ‘Stop’
–– green for ‘Caution’. The meaning of this signal aspect was something between ‘expect to
Stop at the next signal’ and ‘proceed slowly’
–– white for ‘Clear’
This use of colours conformed with the test results of the Chappé brothers, who tested the
visibility of colours for optical telegraphs in 1792. However, the utilisation of the white light for
‘Clear’ causes significant safety problems. In modern times, there are many white lights near
the railways, which might be mistaken for a signal showing ‘Clear’. Phantom lights caused
by sunlight are often white and also if the colour filter of a red or green light bursts, a ‘Clear’
aspect is displayed. The white light is only rarely found today. Instead, (UIC code 732) defines
the following colours:
–– red for ‘Stop’
–– yellow (orange) for ‘Caution’ (USA: ‘Approach’)
–– green for ‘Clear’
The shades for these colours, which are in wide use, are defined exactly. Sweden is the only
European country which still uses the white light for ‘Clear’ and the green light for ‘Caution’
(both flashing) at distant signals.

Figure 7.16: Visibility of colours according to test results by Chappé brothers in 1792 and use of
colours in railway signalling

White is often used to permit shunting movements and blue or violet to forbid them. Blue and violet
are characterised by low visibility. Therefore, they are only really suitable for shunting movements.

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7 Signals

While green and yellow lights are also combined to indicate reduced speed, a principle
among most railways is to use the red light for nothing else but stop aspects (chapter 7.3.2).
Exceptions are in North America and Italy, where red in combination with green and/or yellow
is used for speed signalling. In other cases, red with an additional indicator or flashing red
means to proceed slowly or on sight (without stopping first).

7.6.2 Stop Aspects

Most railways differentiate between two or more stop aspects connected with different rules.
The most common can be classified into these groups (figure 7.17):
–– Absolute Stop: A signal showing absolute stop is only allowed to be passed with special
permission (e. g. written instruction or auxiliary signal), where the signaller giving the
permission takes responsibility.
–– Permissive Stop (‘Stop and Proceed’): After stopping, passage of the signal on sight with
the driver taking responsibility is permitted.
–– Restrictive Permissive Stop: The passage of the stop signal with the driver being
responsible is restricted to certain cases where a technical failure can be assumed.
Indicators for such cases can be that the signal does not clear for a defined time and/or
attempts to contact the signaller have failed.

Figure 7.17: Examples for Absolute (top) and Permissive (bottom) Stop

The Absolute Stop exists in almost all railways and is mainly used for interlocking signals
where movable track elements and opposing movements have to be protected. Furthermore,
most railways use either the Permissive Stop or the Restrictive Permissive Stop for block
signals where only following movements are protected.

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 7.6 Principles of Signalling by Light Signals

Other stop aspects are applied in several railways. One of these is the ‘Advanced Stop’ in
France. Moreover, some railways apply additional train-selective signal aspects, to avoid heavy
freight trains with low acceleration stopping in locations with rising gradient.

7.6.3 Signalling of Movement Authorities

7.6.3.1 Main and Distant Signals

Usually the locations limiting a movement authority (MA) are equipped with a main signal. These
signals indicate if the train has to stop or is allowed to continue until the next main signal or
similar block limiting point (chapter 4.3.2). The movement authority in itself does not include the
order of departure for passenger trains, but it can contain an obligation to move on sight. In some
countries, particularly the USA, different safety preconditions (e. g. points in incorrect position,
opposing protection, following protection) are indicated by different signals, verbal permission or
written instructions. In these cases, only the sum of all permitting indications is the MA.
A main signal can be either related to one track, or in some countries, especially in the case of
converging tracks in a station, to a group of tracks. The choice of application for group signals
(figure 7.18) differs between the railways. Generally, they are likely to be applied for small
stations on secondary lines, where all train movements for the same direction are signalised
by the same signal, or for tracks used by freight trains in medium sized and large stations.
The tracks where the group signal is valid are often marked by additional signal boards or by
switchable indicators which relate the signal aspect to a certain track.

Figure 7.18: Group exit signal

With railways, in contrast to road traffic, the stopping distance is typically longer than the sighting
distance of the signal. In most cases, the main signal has to be preceded by a distant signal
(USA: ‘Approach Signal’) to enable the driver to decelerate in time. Distant signals are not
necessary if the train approaches the main signal at low speed. Examples of such cases are:
–– shunting signals
–– secondary lines with low speeds
–– where the speed has been reduced already by speed signalling (e. g. chapter 7.6.4)

7.6.3.2 Two- and Three-Aspect-Signalling

In two-aspect-signalling (figure 7.19) each signal is either a main or a distant signal and gives
information about the state of one block section beginning at the main signal and ending at the
next main signal.
When the distance between two consecutive main signals is reduced to almost the stopping
distance of trains, three-aspect-signalling (figure 7.19) makes sense. Here, the distant signal
is locally combined with the main signal in rear. The signal can show three aspects: ‘Stop’,
‘Caution’ (one free section; expect Stop at the next signal) and ‘Clear’ (two or more free
sections; no restrictions). Therefore, these signals are called combined signals.

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7 Signals

Two-Aspect-Signalling:

Three-Aspect-Signalling:

Figure 7.19: Two- and three-aspect-signalling

7.6.3.3 Distance between Main and Distant Signal

The proper warning distance and hence the positioning of the distant signal is determined by
the stopping distance of the train. However, this will vary, mainly depending on:
–– the speed of the train before starting to brake
–– the braking ratio of the train (chapter 3.4)
–– the gradient of the line
–– weather conditions
To bring the required braking distance of the train in line with the distance from distant to
main signal in trackside signalling, two problems have to be solved: The different stopping
distances of different train categories have to be adjusted to the fixed positions of the
signals, and the distance between distant and main signal will need to be adjusted to locally
different speeds and gradients.
To adjust the stopping distance of the trains to the warning distance determined by
trackside signals, often the permitted maximum speed of the train is graded by the
braking ratio (chapter 3.4), where, for example, freight trains have a lower speed limit than
passenger trains (figure 7.20).

Figure 7.20: Relation between initial speed and braking deceleration under fix braking length

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 7.6 Principles of Signalling by Light Signals

To adjust the warning distance to local parameters, the following solutions can be found in
pure or mixed form among the railways (figure 7.21):

Figure 7.21: Adjustment of warning distance and braking process to local specialities

a) The warning distance is fixed and the driver has to adjust the braking process to the known
warning distance.
b) The warning distance is varied with the stopping distance actually needed. Therefore, the
driver has to brake by a kind of standardised braking performance and can be sure to stop
at the correct position.
c) The driver has to start braking with a defined braking performance until a defined low
speed (e. g. 40 km/h) and then continue at this low speed until the main signal becomes
visible. In the interests of service speed and line capacity, the distance to be run at low
speed should be short.
Resulting from historical development, in each country there is a more or less uniform distance
between distant and main signal of approximately 1000 m to 1500 m on main lines in Europe
and up to 3000 m in North America. With modern vehicles, this distance is sufficient for
speeds up to approximately 160 km/h to stop within this ‘normal’ warning distance.

7.6.3.4 Braking over more than one Distance between Signals

Cases can occur where the distance between two consecutive main signals is shorter than the
stopping distance. Reasons can be:
–– Due to high capacity requirements, the distance between main signals has to be reduced
below the normal warning distance of approximately 1000 m to 1500 m (chapter 7.6.3.3).
However, by reducing the distance between signals to half the braking distance, line
capacity can only be increased by a factor 1.3 to 1.5.
–– Special situations in the track layout require a local reduction of distance between two main
signals.
–– High speeds over approximately 160 km/h and signalised by trackside signals, will make
the ‘normal’ warning distance (chapter 7.6.3.3) insufficient. This is done by some railways in
Western Europe (e. g. France up to 220 km/h).
–– Trains with very different braking characteristics have to be accommodated.
The following forms of signalling of such cases can be found among the railways in pure
or mixed form (figure 7.22). Often different solutions will be used by the same railway. The
suitability of the solutions for the above cases is different (table 7.1).

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7 Signals

Figure 7.22: Solutions for short distances between signals

Situation
Solution
No. High capacity High speed Special track Different braking
requirements layout characteristics
1 Conditioned Yes Yes No
2 No Yes Conditioned Yes
3 Yes No Yes No

Table 7.1: Suitability of different solutions for short distances between signals for reasons

1. The utilisation of speed signalling to reduce the permitted speed in two or more steps.
Here the driver is given an exact speed not to exceed when passing each signal
between the first speed warning and the stop signal.
2. Four-aspect-signalling with utilisation of the ‘Preliminary Caution’ aspect. Here, the signal
showing ‘Caution’ is announced by ‘Preliminary Caution’ (USA: ‘Advanced Approach’) at
the signal in rear. Some trains (those with high initial speed or low braking ratio) have to
start the braking process at the ‘Preliminary Caution’ signal to be able to stop at the stop
signal, whereas others can consider the ‘Preliminary Caution’ as ‘Clear’.
3. Extension of the warning distance over two sections between signals: ‘Caution’ is
shown by a signal at the proper stopping distance in rear of the stop signal, whereas
the intermediate signal shows ‘Repetition of Caution’ (3a) or is switched off and marked
by marker light (3b) or two consecutive caution aspects are used.
A special version of solution (1) is used on those conventional Japanese lines (chapter 7.8.7),
where no distant signals exist. The permitted speed from one main signal to the next is
reduced in small steps. The difference of permitted speeds at each signal is small enough
for the sighting distance of each signal to be the proper warning distance.

7.6.4 Signalling of Speed Reductions

7.6.4.1 Reasons for Speed Restriction

Various reasons can restrict the speed of trains:
–– The maximum speed of the train is restricted by constructive parameters of the vehicles.
–– The line speed is that for which the line is designed regarding curve radii, easement curves,
cants, visibility of signals and other parameters. The line speed is regulated in printed
documents in the driver's cab, but also to be memorised by the driver and in some systems
signalled by fixed boards.
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 7.6 Principles of Signalling by Light Signals

–– Permanent speed restrictions are locally restricted speeds below the line speed due to local
conditions. These are regulated by printed documents in the driver's cab, but also to be
memorised by the driver and indicated by fixed boards.
–– Temporary speed restrictions can often be found at work sites or as a result of
defective track. They have to be signalled to the driver, usually by signal boards. Often
more conspicuous or at least different types of signals are used for temporary speed
restrictions than for normal line speed.
–– Route determined speed restrictions depend on the characteristics of the current route,
such as radii of diverging points, reduced overlaps, occupied tracks etc.
–– Speed restrictions in degraded mode operation must be complied with in accordance with
written instructions, auxiliary signals etc (chapter 7.7).
The scheduled speed is not directly related to safety and can be varied. It is determined by the
timetable as a recommendation to optimise railway operation, passenger comfort and energy
consumption. The scheduled speed is usually indicated to the driver by printed timetables or
comparable electronic indications in the cab and not by trackside signals. It can vary between
train categories, e. g. for night passenger trains it is usually lower than for other passenger
trains for comfort reasons.
For tilting trains, where applicable, higher line speeds and higher speeds at permanent
speed restrictions can be achieved and have to be signalised to the driver either by
additional information on signal boards or by cab signalling. For route determined speed
restrictions, no increase can be achieved for tilting trains.
From these different speeds, the driver has to choose the lowest for the current situation.
To facilitate this, some railways integrate the signalisation of line speeds, permanent speed
restrictions and in some cases even route determined speed restrictions.

7.6.4.2 Route and Speed Signalling

For route determined speed restrictions, in the first step the permitted speed has to be
concluded from the route. In the second step, the speed at which the train is driven has to be
adjusted to that permitted. Two principles of signalling can be distinguished: the route principle
and the speed principle.
The route principle (route signalling) is the historically older form, used by almost all railways
until the beginning of the 20th century. It was already used in the middle of the 19th century
before interlocking was introduced, where the position of the mechanical signal also served as
an order to the levermen to set the points appropriately. Examples where the route principle is
still used are the British Commonwealth, Spain, Norway, China, Western USA and Mexico. The
driver is informed about the route the train is going to take. Working out the permitted speed is
his own responsibility, using signal boards or his knowledge of the line.
During the 20th century, many railways, among these most European railways as well as those in
Canada and Eastern USA, switched to the speed principle (speed signalling). Here the interlocking
determines the permitted speed and signalises it to the driver as a direct order. Often the signal
aspects of mechanical signals which were originally used for route signalling were now adapted to
speed signalling: The aspect for ‘Diverging Route’ got the meaning ‘Speed Reduction’. However,
besides the speed information, the direction the train is going to take can be indicated as
additional information to give the driver the means to confirm that the correct route has been set.
The route principle has the advantage of providing a way to adapt the speed individually to
each track element (figure 7.23), but it also depends on the attention and knowledge of the
driver. This can cause stress and it is easier to make mistakes. Railways are less flexible in

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7 Signals

allocating different drivers to different lines. Especially where there are large junctions with
many routes, difficulties can occur to signalising the routes clearly. This is particularly the
case in track layouts with many different speeds. Moreover, the adaptation of train protection
systems to speed signals is easier than to route signals.

Figure 7.23: Local validity of speed restrictions in route/cab and speed signalling

7.6.4.3 Speed Signal Aspects

A reduction of the permitted speed, in contrast to an increase, usually needs a preliminary
indication to prepare by braking. Therefore, for a permanent, temporary or route determined
speed restriction with two changes of the permitted speed, three basic signal indications are
required (figure 7.24):
–– Speed Restriction Warning: This signal shows the speed restriction and gives the order
to start braking. In most signal systems, the permitted speed has to be specified, although
in some signal systems, approximate values are accepted to reduce the range of different
signal aspects. In the case of a slight speed reduction, such signals can be unnecessary
as the sighting distance of the restriction signal is longer than the stopping distance. For
route determined speed reductions, the speed restriction warning and restriction signals
are usually combined with the signals for movement authority (chapter 7.6.3). A speed
restriction warning signal shows the reduction valid from the next signal. The exact
regulations concerning the details of the braking process connected with this aspect vary in
a similar way as for distant signals showing ’Caution’ (chapter 7.6.3).
–– Speed Restriction: After passing the signal, the respective speed must not be exceeded.
Some signal systems repeat the exact value of the speed to the driver, others do not, as the
driver has already been informed by the restriction warning signal. Some railways do even not
use restriction signals in selected cases, which are replaced by the regulation to brake as soon
as possible beginning at the restriction warning signal and then proceed at the indicated speed.
–– Speed Cancellation: The driver has to be informed about the end of the speed restriction.
Usually acceleration to line speed is allowed after the rear end of the train has passed the
termination point. For permanent and temporary speed restrictions, typically an additional

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 7.6 Principles of Signalling by Light Signals

signal board is used giving the information ‘End’ or displaying the line speed. For route
determined speed reductions, a second solution is to define the termination point solely by
regulations. Typical termination points are described in chapter 4.3.2.3.

Figure 7.24: Basic speed signal indications

In cases where one speed restriction gives way directly to another, the cancellation aspect
equals with the restriction aspect of the other speed limit. Restriction warning is only
necessary in case the new speed restriction is lower than the previous.

7.6.4.4 Forms of Signalisation of Different Speeds

Where speed signalling is applied, the following systems are those mostly used (figure 7.25):
–– Arrangement of colour lights (colours, quantity and geometrical formation): A
disadvantage of this principle is the low volume of possible speed aspects and the
large number of lights for the driver to observe. This principle is used in Central and
Northern Europe to a decreasing extent, but still predominates in the USA.
–– Flashing lights: Flashing and steady green and yellow lights may be used. A further
distinction can be made between slow and fast flashing and between two lights flashing
alternately or simultaneously.
–– Geometrical indicators: Stripes in different colours or other different geometrical forms
can be used to distinguish different speeds.
–– Numerical indicators. Usually a number multiplied by 10 indicates the speed. With
modern technology, these indications can be solved easily (chapter 7.2.3). The lower
visibility compared with colour lights can be a problem, especially in cases where the
numerical indicator degrades the ‘Clear’ aspect. However, this solution is increasingly
used among railways in modern signal systems.

Figure 7.25: Possibilities to signalise different speeds

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7 Signals

7.6.5 Combination of Main and Distant Signals

Signal systems with speed signalling can be classified into three groups, as follows (figure 7.26)
(Theeg/Maschek 2005):
–– Separate main and distant signals: Both signals may or may not be mounted on the
same post, but the signal aspects of the main and the distant signal are still separately
displayed one above the other. In most cases, these signal systems are directly derived
from the night light signals of the mechanical signals.
–– Combined signals of 1st grade: In case the main signal must display a speed restriction,
the aspects of the main and the distant signal are shown both above each other (figure
7.26, middle bottom). In contrast, if the main signal just shows ‘Clear’, the signal aspects
of the main and the distant signal are joined to a simplified aspect (in most cases the
green for ‘Clear’ is not displayed).
–– Combined signals of 2nd grade: In both cases, if the main signal indicates ‘Clear’ and if it
indicates ‘Speed Restriction Warning’, the aspects are joined to a simplified aspect with
fewer lights. Many newer systems use this principle to simplify the signal aspects to only
one spot light plus speed indicators.

Figure 7.26: Combination of main and distant signals

Systems with combined signals can be distinguished by the amount of speed information
given to the driver. If the speed information displayed at a main signal is valid until the next
signal, from which a different speed restriction is valid, then the possibilities are (figure 7.27):
1. Full information about the permitted speed in this and the next section is displayed.
2. The speed for this section is always displayed, the speed for the next section only in
case of a reduction when the driver needs this information to start braking in the proper
time.
3. The signal is equipped with only one speed indicator which displays the lower of both
speeds. When the speed restriction valid from the signal is not displayed, the driver has
to remember the speed that has been announced at the signal in rear.

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 7.7 Redundancy and Degraded Mode Operation

Figure 7.27: Different amount of information in speed signalling (fictive signal system examples)

7.6.6 Shunting Signals

Most railways distinguish between train and shunting movements (chapter 3.3) and signalise
shunting movements by other, simplified signals. As shunting movements are slow, neither
distant signals nor speed signalling for diverging routes are usually necessary. Besides, the
required sighting distances are also low. This makes smaller signals, position light signals and
other colours than for trains usable.
Shunting signals can either stand alone or be attached to a main signal as a subsidiary signal.
In the latter case, the ‘Proceed for shunting movements only’ aspect is displayed together with
the ‘Stop’ aspect of the main signal. Stand-alone shunting signals often have to be cleared or
unlit if a train passes this signal to avoid confusion of the train driver.
Basically, the range of signal aspects for shunting movements has to include at least one
‘Stop’ and one ‘Proceed’ aspect. Besides, several railways distinguish between different
‘Proceed’ aspects, e. g. for movements into a free or occupied track, for straight or diverging
movements etc. (chapter 4.3.10)
The following solutions for standalone shunting signals can be found:
–– Colour light signals: The ‘Proceed’ aspect is usually represented by white, whereas the
‘Stop’ aspect is represented either by red, blue or violet.
–– Position light signals: In most cases, the ‘Proceed’ aspect is represented by a vertical or
diagonal formation and the ‘Stop’ aspect by horizontal white lights.
–– Colour position light signals and other mixed forms: For example, ‘Stop’ and ‘Proceed’
are distinguished by colour, whereas different ‘Proceed’ aspects are distinguished by the
formation of white lights.

7.7 Redundancy and Degraded Mode Operation

As in most cases bulbs are used, failures by breakage of the filament occurs frequently.
Most railways provide redundancy in the optical system to ensure high safety and reliability,
by doubling either the lamp or the filament within the same lamp. Usually the extinction of

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7 Signals

the main lamp or filament is automatically reported by an alarm to the maintainer and
maintenance actions must be initiated. For the red lights, redundancy is especially important
for safety, whereas in the case of failure of a permitting aspect, a more restrictive aspect can
be automatically activated. In most cases this implies losses in travel time and line capacity.
Nevertheless, if a signal extinguishes, regulations apply which oblige the driver to assume the
most restrictive aspect. Besides, interlocking functions which actively set the signal in rear to
stop are often implemented.
Other frequent reasons for a signal not able to be cleared are technical failures in proving pre-
conditions for clearing the signal, such as the clear track, point position etc. The principle of
fail-safe requires that a technical failure has to lead to the safer condition, which means in
most cases, the stop aspect. Nevertheless, operation has to be maintained using methods
of degraded mode operation (chapter 4.5). Such methods can be permissive driving (chapter
7.6.2) or authorisation by ground staff to the driver by
–– Hand signals or verbal permission
–– Written instructions: forms to be filled and signed by the signaller and handed over or
dictated telephonically to the driver
–– Auxiliary signals to replace the written instruction. These are signals without any or with
reduced interlocking functions, formed by additional signal lamps. This saves the time filling
in and handing over the forms. The British calling-on signal fulfils the functions of both, the
auxiliary signal and the signalisation of regular movements on sight.
For the safety conditions related to the use of the auxiliary signal, see chapter 4.5.4.

7.8 Signal System Examples

In the following, some examples of signal systems are described. The examples are selected
to represent a large variety of signalling solutions. Where appropriate (in combined signal
systems with speed signalling), signal aspects are drawn in a table with the lines being the
speed limits to be obeyed when passing the respective signal and the columns the announced
speed for the next signal (figures 7.34, 7.35, 7.36, 7.38).

7.8.1 German Mechanical and ‘H/V’ Light Signals

The German mechanical signals (figure 7.28) are a good example to illustrate the historical
development of light signals from mechanical signals. They are still used in several existing
installations in Germany, though in declining numbers, and derived light signal systems are
applied in numerous countries.
The signals are separate main and distant signals (chapter 7.6.5). The mechanical main signals are
designed as semaphores with the upper arm to open and close the signal and the lower arm to
restrict the speed. The signals are upper-quadrant, which means that the semaphore arm has to
be raised, not lowered, to open the signal. For the main signal, three basic aspects are defined:
‘Stop’, ‘Clear’ and ‘Proceed slowly’ (40 km/h), the latter requiring a second signal arm. However, this
second arm is not fail-safe, as in its absence or invisibility a more permissive aspect (‘Clear’) appears.
A weak lamp behind colour filters below the semaphore arms provides signal indications at night.
The distant signals consist of a yellow disk. If the disk is displayed to the driver, it means prepare
to stop at the next signal. If it stands edgewise (negative signal), it announces ‘Proceed’. An
additional arm below the disk indicates a speed restriction if standing diagonal. On some

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 7.8 Signal System Examples

secondary lines with low speed, only the fixed board is used instead of a switchable distant
signal. This obliges the driver to expect ‘Stop’ in all cases until he can see the main signal.

Figure 7.28: German H/V signal system

The H/V light signal system is derived directly from the night signs of the mechanical signals
(figure 7.28). To indicate different speeds, additional numerical speed indicators were later introduced.
More information on this example can be found in (DB Netz 2006).
Similar mechanical and light signals were used to a large extent among railways in Central
and Eastern Europe. Today, the usage of these signal systems is decreasing, but they are
still in use on several railways.

7.8.2 Belgian Mechanical Signals

The Belgian signal system from 1919 is a good example of three-aspect-signalling (chapter 7.6.3.2)
by semaphores and the route principle solved with candelabra signals (figure 7.29). Similar
signalling principles were also applied in other countries such as Britain.
The signals consist of maximum two semaphore arms, with the upper in red and the lower in
yellow colour, also different in their geometrical shape. Four basic signal indications are defined:
‘Stop’, ‘Caution’, ‘Expect slow movement’ or ‘Preliminary Caution’ and ‘Clear’ (figure 7.29).
The signal system is designed such that most signals only need to be equipped with one
semaphore arm at each post (block signals and separate main signals only with the red,
separate distant signals only with the yellow arm). Only combined signals in interlocking areas
which have to be able to show both ‘Stop’ and ‘Expect slow movement’ need two arms.

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7 Signals

Signals protecting junctions have one post for each direction, with the semaphore arm at
the respective post to be raised to permit movement into the respective track (candelabra
signal). The highest post refers to the straight direction, and the others are situated to the
right and the left in the correct order (route signalling, chapter 7.6.4.2). To indicate other
speeds than 40 km/h for diverging movements, numeric signal boards are mounted below
the respective semaphore arm. In the derived today’s light signal system, speed signalling
with numerical speed indicators is used.
More information on this example can be found in (Sasse 1941).

Figure 7.29: Belgian mechanical signal system from 1919 and modern light signals for comparison

7.8.3 British Light Signals

The modern British signal system is a typical example

of route signalling by light signals. It is also widely
used in Commonwealth countries.
The movement authorities are signalised either
by three-aspect-signalling (chapter 7.6.3.2) with
the aspect sequence green g yellow g red or by
four-aspect-signalling (chapter 7.6.3.4) with the
sequence green g double yellow g yellow g red.
Signals protecting a junction are equipped with
route indicators. For the straight route, no route
indicator is displayed in Britain, but in South Africa
it is. For diverging movements, up to three route Figure 7.30: Lamp arrangement of British
indicators can be provided for the left and three for light signals (four-aspect-signalling and
the right side (figure 7.30). maximum of route indicators)

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 7.8 Signal System Examples

The warning of speed restrictions in many situations is effected by presenting a Stop indication
to the driver. Depending on the speed differential, the driver has to brake. The following signalling
arrangements are used (figure 7.31):
–– If the train arrives at a much higher speed and has to brake to a much lower speed for the
diverging route, a stop at the signal protecting the junction is displayed to the approaching
driver. When the train almost reaches this signal, it changes to ‘Proceed’ with route indicator
(Approach Control from Red).
–– If the train has to brake to a medium speed (approximately half of the line speed), a stop at
the next signal beyond the junction is presented to the driver before switching the signal which
protects the junction to ‘Proceed’ with route indicator (Approach Control from Yellow).
–– In recent times, trains with high braking ratios are in operation. This presents a new hazard in
connection with Approach Control from Yellow. The driver might start braking rather later, and pass
the junction at a too high a speed. This has given rise to Flashing Yellows announcing the junction.
–– For fast routes where the diverging speed is only a little lower than the line speed, the sighting
distance of the route indicator is regarded as sufficient, and no approach control is needed.
These are Uncontrolled Junctions.

Figure 7.31: Warning of junctions in British signalling

A dynamic solution similar to Approach Control from Red is used to reduce train speed in case
of a short overlap, so-called Delayed Yellow (figure 7.32). Here the route entrance signal is held
at red and changes to yellow shortly before the train reaches it.
More information on this example can be found in (RSSB 2004) and (Nock 1982).

Figure 7.32: ‘Delayed Yellow’ signalling

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7 Signals

7.8.4 OSŽD Signals

The OSŽD signal system is the result of efforts in the 1950s to provide a standard European
signal system. In the former socialist countries in Central and Eastern Europe and Asia
(member states of the OSŽD organisation), these attempts were partly successful. In the other
parts of Europe they mainly failed, apart from some standardised features of signal systems
like the colours (chapter 7.6.1).

Figure 7.33: Principle of OSŽD signal system

The system is based on the speed principle with combined signals of 1st grade according
to chapter 7.6.5. The signal aspect can be divided into the upper and the lower part
(figure 7.33). The lower part gives orders about the section beginning at the signal (main
signal function). The upper part gives information on the next section (distant signal
function) or the speed which is permitted after passing the points area (chapter 4.3.2.3).
The speed limit that is valid from the signal (main signal function) is specified by one or up
to two green and yellow stripes. The speed to be prepared for (distant signal function) is
displayed by flashing lights. If two flashing frequencies are used, they are made distinct by
a factor of approximately two, so the aspects can be distinguished clearly by the driver.
The advantage of the unlit lower part of the signal meaning ‘Proceed’ is that block signals
which do not protect any junction need to be equipped only with three lamps (one green,
one yellow and one red).
The speed steps v1–v4 are variable and are to be defined exactly in the signal regulations of
each railway. Not all four speed levels need to be used and the exact speed can vary. This
enables adaptation of the system to the different point radii in each country. Figure 7.34
shows the signal aspects in the Czech Republic and Slovakia using all four speed steps.
More information of the OSŽD signal system can be found in (Piastowski 1960).
On the railways of the former Soviet Union, a version of the OSŽD system with several
specialities is applied. Some were also adopted in PR China, where the OSŽD system is
combined with route signalling principles imported from Britain in former times.

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 7.8 Signal System Examples

Figure 7.34: Signalling cases in Czech Republic and Slovakia (České Dráhy 1998)

7.8.5 Modern Dutch Signal System

Modern Dutch signalling is a combined system of 2nd grade (chapter 7.6.5). It is the result
of basic reorganisation of signalling principles in the 1950s. The most important features:
–– The signal aspects are designed as inherently fail-safe. That means, if the driver fails to
perceive a part of the signal aspect or a part of the aspect extinguishes, always a more
restrictive or an undefined signal aspect is perceived.
–– The signal indications are locally connected as closely as possible with the actions of the
driver. Therefore, the ‘Expect Stop’ aspect got the meaning ‘Apply the brakes, beginning
at the signal, until you reach the speed 40 km/h. Then continue at 40 km/h until you
see the next signal ahead’. Similar regulations are connected with the speed restriction
warning aspect. Here the driver gets the order just before he has to carry it out.
–– No distinction is made between train and shunting movements in signalling.
The most important signal aspects are (Bailey et al. 1995):
–– red: Stop
–– yellow: Caution (Reduce speed to 40 km/h, then continue at 40 km/h and be prepared
to stop at a stop signal.)
–– yellow + number: Speed Restriction Warning (Reduce speed to the indicated value.)
–– flashing green: Speed Restriction (Proceed at 40 km/h.)
–– flashing green + number: Speed Restriction (Proceed at the indicated speed.)
–– green: Clear
Although the ideas of the signal system do not match fully into the scheme, for
comparison with other signal systems the signalling cases are shown in figure 7.35.
The signal system is inherently fail-safe. When the number is unlit by technical defect or the driver
fails to perceive it, a more restrictive aspect is assumed. The driver then brakes to 40 km/h and

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7 Signals

continues at that speed but ready to stop. If the red, yellow or green light is unlit, or an undefined
indication is shown, this obliges the driver to stop. If the driver by mistake sees a flashing instead of a
steady light (which, due to obstacles near the track, is more likely than the opposite case), the driver
perceives a lower speed information. The flashing itself, however, has to be monitored technically.

Figure 7.35: Signalling cases in modern Dutch signal system

7.8.6 German System ‘Ks’

The German system Ks (figure 7.36) introduced from the 1990s is another combined system
of 2nd grade with numerical speed indicators. The basic idea of the signal system is to
separate the signalling of movement authorities and signalling of speed restrictions into two
partial aspects. This would be particularly useful if in the same system signalling of different
track-determined speed restrictions (line speed, permanent, temporary and route determined
speed restrictions) were to be merged. This has not happened.
Movement authorities are signalised by the following three aspects:
–– red = Stop
–– yellow = Caution (one section free, expect to stop at the next signal)
–– green = Clear (two or more sections free)
The signals are equipped with two speed indicators, one for the restriction warning and one
for the restriction aspect. If a speed restriction warning is indicated, the green light flashes to
attract the driver's attention to the speed indicator. Figure 7.36 shows the signalling cases for
comparison with other systems.
More information of this example can be found in (DB Netz 2006).

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 7.8 Signal System Examples

Figure 7.36: Signalling cases in German system ‘Ks’

7.8.7 Signal System on Japanese Commuter Lines

On several Japanese suburban lines (narrow gauge) with high capacity requirements, signals
are situated very close together. No distant signals are used, but speed is reduced in small
steps between two consecutive signals and the sighting distance is sufficient to reduce the
speed. The speed is reduced cascade-shaped in several steps from the maximum speed of
(originally) 130 km/h to Stop (figure 7.37). In the 1990s, an additional ‘Proceed fast’ signal
aspect was introduced to enable an increase of line speed up to 160 km/h on selected lines.
The speed steps of figure 7.37, added by another ‘Restricted Speed’ aspect (double yellow;
25 km/h) are also used to signalise reduced speeds required by diverging routes.
More information on this example can be found in (Ugajin et al. 1999).

Figure 7.37: Japanese signal system for commuter lines

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7 Signals

7.8.8 NORAC Signals

NORAC (Northeast Operating Rules Advisory Committee) is a committee of different

railway companies in the Northeast of the USA founded in the 1980s. It standardised
operational rules and signal aspects for the participating companies without the necessity
of resignalling. The result was the reduction to some fundamental signal indications, each
expressed by different signal aspects. In addition, cab signals are used on some lines
which are not described here.
The same strategy for harmonisation would be more difficult in Europe, as here the
diversity of the operational rules behind the signal aspects is much higher, although the
diversity of the signal aspects themselves is lower.
NORAC operational regulations define the following speeds and kinds of movement (1 mile
= 1.609 km and mph = miles per hour):
–– Normal speed: maximum speed of the line
–– Limited speed: 45 mph for passenger and 40 mph for freight trains
–– Medium speed: 30 mph
–– Slow speed: 15 mph
–– Restricted speed: Move on sight at a speed which permits stopping within half the
sighting distance short of other rail vehicles, obstacles, movable track elements in the
wrong position and signals. The speed is limited to 15 mph within and 20 mph outside
interlocking limits. This is also the indication used for shunting.
–– Permissive stop (stop and proceed at restricted speed)
–– Stop
Based on these speed levels, the following signal aspects are defined:
–– ‘Clear’: Proceed at normal speed.
–– ‘Stop’
–– ‘Stop and Proceed’
–– ‘Restricting’: Move at restricted speed, in interlocking areas until clearing all points.
–– ‘Approach’: Caution; Prepare to stop at the next signal.
–– ‘Advanced Approach’: Preliminary Caution; Prepare to stop at the second signal in
advance.
–– ‘Limited/Medium/Slow Clear’: Speed Restriction; Proceed at limited/medium/slow speed
until the train has cleared all points; then proceed at normal speed.
–– ‘Medium Approach Medium’: Speed Restriction; Proceed at medium speed until the
next signal.
–– ‘Approach Limited/Medium/Slow’: Speed Restriction Warning; Prepare to approach the
next signal at limited/medium/slow speed.
–– ‘Medium/Slow Approach’: Speed Restriction + Caution; Drive at limited/medium/slow
speed; expect Stop at the next signal.
With the exception of ‘Medium Approach Medium’, no signal aspects are defined that
imply a speed restriction and a speed restriction warning at the same signal. Other
signal systems in the USA likewise in Europe provide a larger variety of such aspects.
NORAC regulations, which were simplified to accommodate the signal aspects of different
companies, assume that the range of vision of a main signal is sufficient to decelerate from
medium speed to stop within it. Therefore, caution aspects usually imply that the driver
does not need to reduce speed below medium until seeing the next signal.

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 7.8 Signal System Examples

Figure 7.38: Signalling cases in NORAC signal system (selection of aspects)

Each signal indication can be expressed by between two and 12 different aspects. Figure 7.38
shows a selection, each of them existing in different variations. The advance approach aspect,
which is not listed in figure 7.38, if existent, is always a variation of the approach aspect with
the yellow light(s) flashing.
The left example in each cell of figure 7.38 is a typical position light signal system. The lights
on the upper (round) signal background express
–– if the train can proceed at maximum speed (vertical),
–– if it has to stop at the signal or pass it with reduced speed (horizontal) or
–– if the train has to brake for a stop or a reduced speed (diagonal).
Speed restriction aspects are expressed by the stop aspect added by the lights of the lower
signal background, whereas speed restriction warning aspects are similarly specified based on
the caution (‘Approach’) aspect. Thus, the signal system is inherently fail-safe on the extinction
of any part of the lamps. The ‘Slow Clear’ aspect, when required in areas equipped with this
signal system, can only be expressed by the dwarf signal.
The example in the middle (figure 7.38) uses a completely different principle of colour position
light signals. It consists of three searchlight lamps. The number of red lights on top of the
signal expresses the speed limit which is valid when passing the signal: No red light on top
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7 Signals

means normal speed, one red light means medium or limited speed, two red lights slow or
restricted speed and three red lights Stop. Where necessary, limited speed is distinguished
from medium, and slow from restricted by the non-red-light flashing. The colours and positions
of the non-red lights express what has to be expected at the next signal, that means what
speed is valid after clearing the points:
–– green means normal speed,
–– yellow stop,
–– two yellows or yellow above green means slow speed.
The purpose of the lower red lights is to fill up the empty spaces.
In the right example of figure 7.38, the signalling of movement authority is separated from
the speed signalling like in the German Ks system (chapter 7.8.6). The movement authority
(or the clear status of the block section if no complete MA is signalised, depending on the
underlying rules) is signalised by red, yellow and green colour position light signals. Speed
limits (except of ‘Restricted Speed’) are signalised by the position and flashing or not flashing
of the additional white or yellow light.
More information on this example can be found in (NORAC 2018).

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 8.1 Requirements, Classification and Conditions for Application

8 Train Protection
Martin Sommer, Dmitriy Chelobanov, Gregor Theeg, Sergej Vlasenko, Andreas Schöbel

8.1 Requirements, Classification and Conditions for Application

8.1.1 General Overview

The human being is perhaps the weakest element in railway safety. To minimise the effects
of mistakes by signallers, points and signals have been interlocked whenever possible from
around 1870. It may thus be argued that the same approach is desirable for drivers.
Train protection systems to guard against driver error developed rather later to supervise the
actions of the driver and, if necessary, to enforce safety. Normally, train protection systems
protect only against errors, not wilful misconduct.
Many railways regard it desirable to supplement trackside signals with in-cab indications,
or dispense with trackside signals altogether. Cab signalling functions, as they are
technically strongly connected with train protection systems, are dealt with here rather
than in chapter 7.
Summarising, the functions of train protection/control systems can be classified into the three
groups of:
–– cab signalling functions
–– supervision functions
–– intervention functions
While most modern systems supply all of these functions, many older systems still in use are
less comprehensive.
For classification of train protection systems, the most used categories, especially in English
speaking countries, are ATS (Automatic Train Stop), ATP (Automatic Train Protection),
ATC (Automatic Train Control) and PTC (Positive Train Control). But as there is no common
definition of the meanings of these terms, they are not used in this book for classification.
Instead, another classification is developed in chapter 8.3.1.

8.1.2 Cab Signalling Functions

Cab signalling functions generally can be classified as follows:

–– non-selective warning signals
–– selective warning signals
–– visual repetition of trackside signals
–– continuous static speed information
–– dynamic speed information
Non-selective warning signals (mainly audible). Whenever the train passes a certain position,
e. g. the location of a distant signal, a warning tone sounds to direct the driver’s attention
to the trackside signals, independently from the signal aspect. No information connection
between the trackside signal and the train protection system needs to be provided for this
function which is applied in old train protection systems.

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8 Train Protection

Selective warning signals (again mainly audible). The audible signal is applied selectively
in cases which imply restrictions for the driver. Usually, the cab signal is connected to signal
aspects which require the start of a braking process, such as Caution (chapter 7.6.3) and
Speed Restriction Warning (chapter 7.6.4.3).
Visual repetition of trackside signals. The aspect of the trackside signal in advance (in
some cases in rear), is repeated in the cab during the train’s passage between two signals (the
signal section), or while the train is within a defined partial section in the vicinity of the trackside
signal. Under certain circumstances, this form of cab signalling can replace trackside signals,
but in many cases it is used additionally: The cab signal is visible in any weather conditions; it
gives the driver a positive reminder of the signal aspect, and in many cases gives information
to the driver earlier than does the trackside signal. However, the cab signal does not provide
any more information than the trackside signal and the driver is still responsible for undertaking
the braking process.
Continuous static speed information (figure 8.1). Not only are indications of trackside
signals repeated, but the permitted speed after consideration of all restrictions is always
displayed. In addition, speed restriction warning information can also be displayed, but the
driver is still responsible for estimating the braking curve. In several systems, this form of cab
signalling replaces trackside signals. In many modern systems, likewise in route signalling,
static speed profiles can be adjusted individually to each track element instead of imposing
one speed for the whole section between two trackside signals (figure 7.23).
Dynamic speed information (figure 8.1). Based on the static speed information, braking
patterns are calculated on the train and/or in the trackside equipment. The technical system
displays a guidance speed continously to the driver. This must not be exceeded momentarily
in order to comply with the next target speed. For this function, information about the distance
to the next braking target has to be present. This information can either be transmitted
individually for each track section, or standardised by the uniform length of the sections. The
latter case, due to its inflexibility, is suitable only for lines with almost uniform traffic, such as
pure high speed lines or suburban railways.

Figure 8.1: Static and dynamic speed profile

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 8.1 Requirements, Classification and Conditions for Application

8.1.3 Supervision Functions

The following supervision functions can be found among the systems:

–– check on driver ability
–– check on driver attentiveness
–– train stop function
–– braking supervision
–– compliance with speed limits
Check on driver ability. At regular intervals, independently from trackside information,
the driver has to use an alertness device to guard against falling asleep or similarly, the so-
called ‘dead-man’s handle’. The interval between depressing a handle, pushing a button,
or whatever is required, can be either time or distance measured. As an additional feature
in a few train protection systems, the interval is shortened while the driver has to brake.
Occasionally (e. g. USA), this device only needs to be handled if the driver did not undertake
any other operation on the locomotive during a defined time interval.
Check on driver attentiveness. In certain situations, e. g. after passing a signal showing
Caution, the driver has to acknowledge his attentiveness, e. g. by pushing a special button.
Thus the danger from a driver failing to perceive a signal can be reduced significantly.
However, many cases have occurred in which the driver pushed the button habitually and
without braking, which is potentially highly dangerous.
Train Stop function. The passing of a red signal is detected, which results in an immediate
emergency stop. A particular issue is permissive driving, driving on written instruction or on
an auxiliary signal. This is enabled either by additional override handles in the driver’s cab,
by generally permitting the passage of the signal at very low speed or by a combination of
these two methods. Except in cases with very low speeds, high braking performance or long
overlap, this protective function in itself or in combination with an attentiveness check is usually
not sufficient to stop the train within the overlap.

Figure 8.2: Forms of brake supervision curves in train protection systems

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8 Train Protection

As the above functions are not sufficient to bring the train to a halt before the point of conflict
in most cases, modern systems provide braking supervision: When the train has to brake
for a signal at danger or to comply with a speed restriction, the braking process is supervised
continuously or at certain points. A problem here is different braking ratios for different trains,
resulting in different braking curves (chapter 3.4). Different methods of braking supervision are
used among the systems (figure 8.2):
–– The brake supervision pattern is calculated individually for the train and the track layout.
One supervision curve is used for the whole braking process in rear of a Stop signal (one
step brake control). Advanced systems with digital data transmission mainly use this
method (chapters 8.3.5, 8.3.6).
–– A stock of standardised fragments of brake patterns, differentiated by the speed level,
proximity to the Stop signal and/or train category, is provided by the system. It is stored on
the train computer or in the trackside control centre. Initiated by a trackside transmitter, the
proper fragment is selected. This is the typical solution for systems with spot transmission
and with low data volume (chapter 8.3.3).
–– The supervision function has the shape of a staircase. This is the typical solution for
systems with continuous transmission of signal aspects by coded track circuits (chapter
8.3.4), where the same data input is valid during the whole length of a track circuit.
–– The speed is checked in the form of multiple spots. The supervision speed decreases from
one checkpoint to the next in approach to a Stop signal.
–– Instead of checking the speed, the application of the brakes can be checked intermittently
or continuously during the required braking process.
Some systems allow the driver to exit manually from the braking supervision if the signal has been
upgraded, if this information cannot be transmitted automatically by the train protection system.
Compliance with speed limits. In addition to the supervision of the braking process,
many systems provide for the checking of speed restrictions. These can be the maximum
speed of the line, local speed restrictions, restrictions on the vehicles themselves and
others.
For measuring the speed, two types of methods are used:
–– Vehicle-based methods, which measure the speed by odometry, Doppler radar or others
(chapter 5.2.6.3).
–– Track-based methods which measure the time the train needs to travel a defined distance.

8.1.4 Intervention Functions

When the supervision functions detect a problem in the behaviour of the vehicle, intervention
functions are activated. Most modern systems grade these. Possible levels of intervention are:
–– The weakest is to warn the driver of a problem, mostly by an audible warning tone, and to
demand correction.
–– The next step applied on some railways is to switch off the traction power automatically.
–– The next step is the service brake intervention.
–– The strongest intervention function is the emergency brake intervention.
In the case of exceeding speed restrictions or brake supervision patterns, some systems use
different intervention measures consecutively. These will be applied according to different
tolerance margins above the dynamic permitted speed (figure 8.3), and/or the duration of
excess speed. Other systems only use one of these measures, mostly the emergency brake.

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 8.1 Requirements, Classification and Conditions for Application

After passing a signal indicating ‘Stop’, the consequence in all systems which have this
supervision function is an immediate emergency stop.
The brakes can be applied either until the train comes to a standstill, or until speed has been
reduced below a safe limit. Many systems record problematic incidents.

Figure 8.3: Speed limits for activation of intervention functions (maximum case)

8.1.5 Role in the Railway Operation Process

According to the role in railway operation, systems can be divided into

–– Auxiliary systems. These systems provide additional safety, but do not substitute for the
trackside signals. In most systems, if trackside and cab signal do not agree, the driver has
to obey the trackside signal which is considered to be the safer.
–– Independent systems with continuous guidance function. These can replace the
trackside signals, whereas trackside signals often are still present for operation of non-
equipped trains and for degraded mode operation. If trackside and cab signals do not
agree, the driver has to obey the latter. This can often give more detailed information (e. g.
provide shorter block sections). These systems are especially required in high speed traffic,
where the train driver is not able to perceive the aspect of the trackside signal safely (see
chapter 7.1), and in some metropolitan railways with high capacity requirements.
Most modern systems are designed fail safe, which means that a technical failure in
transmission either leads to more restrictive commands or will be detected. Many older
systems are not fail safe, which means that the driver must not rely on their correct function.
Fail safe is therefore a precondition for the using of information for cab signalling as a primary
information source for the driver.

8.1.6 Automation of Train Operation

With a complete dynamic speed profile present on the train, train operation can in principle
be automated. However, reasons which obstruct automation are mainly the lack of ability

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8 Train Protection

of automated systems to react to unpredicted situations such as obstacles on the track.

Therefore, a further necessity for full automation of train operation is the continuous detection
of external objects, or their exclusion by barriers which cannot be passed either intentionally
or unintentionally. This is very expensive on extended networks, but is sometimes practicable
on metropolitan railways due to the limited extent of their networks and the high density of
traffic. These make the investment economically reasonable. In metro systems, where the
track is mainly in tunnels or elevated, the physical separation facilitates the automation of
train operation. Complete protection against very rare events, such as an object falling from a
passing aircraft onto the railway, is never possible.
The term autonomous driving, which is used in road transport, is unsuitable for the railway
domain. Trains will not decide autonomously where to go. Conflicts in the schedule caused by
delays are solved in the operations centre. The absence of such central operational functions
is a requirement for autonomous driving.
For urban guided transport CENELEC standard (IEC 62290-1) defines grades of automation,
based on different responsibilities for the functions needed to fulfil the desired operation (see
table 8.1):
GOA0 Manual driving on sight without any automation. The driver is fully responsible for
driving. This is the case without train protection systems; a typical application is trams running
in street traffic. Nevertheless, points and single-track lines might need to be protected.
GOA1 Non-automated train operation. This is the case of a train protection system
supervising the driver and enforcing safety in the case of driver’s error. Safe closing of the
doors and setting the train in motion are tasks of the driver.
GOA2 Semi-automated train operation. This is the case when acceleration and the
application of brakes are automated. Other tasks like the safe closing of doors and supervision
of the track are assigned to the driver. Examples are several modern systems which calculate
the dynamic speed profile, where the driver can select either manual or automatic driving
(chapter 8.3.6). Although automatic driving only would be technically possible in many
modern systems, it is rarely done for psychological reasons. A driver whose only task in
normal operations is watching the processes would not be able to act properly in emergency
situations, due to the lack of attentiveness and driving practice. This can be overcome
by giving the driver some positive tasks, as implemented on the Victoria Line of London
Underground in 1968.
GOA3 Driverless train operation. Here the train is normally driven automatically. There is
no driver permanently in the cab who would watch the track continuously. There is a train
attendant, who could be in charge of other tasks (such as selling tickets) and who can take
action in the case of danger or technical failure. The closing of doors can be done by the staff
or automatically.
GOA4 Unattended train operation. In these systems no driver is present on the train.
The closing of the doors, detection of objects caught in doors or between the train
and the platform, and setting the train in motion all have to be done automatically and
safely. Furthermore, the system has to detect dangerous events such as smoke or
fire, derailments, the breaking of couplings and emergency calls from passengers. In
those situations, it might be necessary to send staff to the train. Fully automatic driving
is currently applied on some separated metropolitan lines (e. g. Paris, Lille, London,
Vancouver, Copenhagen and Nuremberg) and trains for special purposes such as airport
shuttles.

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 8.2 Technical Solutions for Data Transmission

grade of GOA0 GOA1 GOA2 GOA3 GOA4

automation
NTO – non- STO – semi- DTO – UTO –
type of train TOS – train on
automated automated driverless unattended
operation sight
train operation train operation train operation train operation

supervision of
driver automatic automatic automatic automatic
speed

setting train in
driver driver automatic automatic automatic
motion

stopping train driver driver automatic automatic automatic

door closure driver driver driver train attendant automatic

operation
in event of driver driver driver train attendant automatic
disruption

Table 8.1: Grades of automation

The savings due to drivers not being needed in GOA4 can easily be overrated. The main
benefits of automation are greater flexibility, energy saving, a better balanced timetable, less
rolling stock needed due to shorter turnround times, greater line capacity due to more precise
driving and higher levels of safety due to the elimination of the human factor.

8.2 Technical Solutions for Data Transmission

8.2.1 Overview of Forms of Transmission

The forms of transmission from the operational aspect can be divided into (table 8.2):
–– intermittent transmission including
• spot transmission
• intermittent linear transmission
–– continuous transmission
In systems with continuous transmission there is – irrespective of possible short sections
without connection such as radio holes – basically a continuous data link between track
and train. However, data are usually transmitted by data telegrams in short time intervals. In
systems with intermittent transmission, transmission is possible only at selected locations,
determined by the trackside equipment. The technical solutions for continuous and interrupted
linear transmission are similar and are therefore described together in chapter 8.2.3.

intermittent continuous
spot linear
spot transmission intermittent linear transmission continuous transmission

Table 8.2: Forms of transmission in train protection systems

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8 Train Protection

8.2.2 Spot Transmission

8.2.2.1 Classification
For spot transmission there are various trackside devices which transfer the relevant data to
the train. Classification is offered according to the following parameters:
–– technical principle of transmission
–– type of power supply
–– uni- or bilateral transmission
–– switchability of data content
–– size of transmitted data
–– redundancy
–– longitudinal position along the track
–– lateral position in the track
Spot transmission is effected by the following technical principles:
–– mechanical
–– galvanic
–– optical
–– inductive
The first two solutions were already developed in the 19th century, but are still used in older
systems to a decreasing extent. The optical principle, after testing, did not gain relevant
importance. The inductive principle is the basis of almost all modern systems. In chapters
8.2.2.2 to 8.2.2.5, the technical principles will be described in more detail.
Type of power supply. In most cases, trackside devices need energy for the transfer of
information. They receive this energy constantly from a trackside power source or short time
from the passing train (e. g. transponder balises, chapter 8.3.5). There are also devices which
transfer the information without power (e. g. a permanent magnet).
Uni- or bilateral transfer of information. In the majority of systems, data are only transferred
from trackside to train. Some modern devices, e. g. balises, provide the possibility of bilateral
transfer with connection with the control centre. This possibility, however, is used only in a
minority of cases (chapter 8.3.5).
Switchability of data content. Transmitters can be classified into:
–– fixed data transmitters, which always transmit the same information content, and
–– switchable transmitters, whose information content can be switched by trackside input
information, e. g. signal aspects.
Often both types of transmitters are used in the same train protection system.
Size of transmitted data. Older trackside devices can only transfer one bit (e. g. Indusi,
chapter 8.3.3.1). If more bits are required, several such devices are installed. But modern
types can transfer detailed data by the same trackside transmitter (chapter 8.3.5).
Redundancy. The information can be supplemented by redundancy, or even completely
repeated during the transfer in order to detect and correct errors. Some systems use these
possibilities, others do not.
Longitudinal position. Installation localities of devices along the track vary. To fulfil the
attentiveness check function (chapter 8.1.3), a transmitter in proximity to the distant signal is
required, whereas the train stop function requires a transmitter in proximity to the main signal.
For braking supervision, additional transmitters between these two points are applied in some
systems, e. g. in PZB 90 (chapter 8.3.3.1) and ATS-S (chapter 8.3.3.2), and for continuous
speed profiles, information has to be upgraded in regular intervals along the whole line.
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 8.2 Technical Solutions for Data Transmission

Lateral position. Spot transmitters are installed mainly in the track, either centrally or in proximity
to the right or the left rail. There are also cases with transmitters above rail level. As information
depends on movement direction, the devices usually operate for one train direction only or
transmit different information content for each direction. Their location in proximity to the left or to
the right rail allows the train to detect the transmitter only for its direction. With transmitters located
in the middle, directions have to be determined in another manner, e. g. by suppression for one
direction or by the data contents containing direction information. Figure 8.4 shows an example
for the positions of trainside antennas for various systems on the bottom of the locomotive.

Figure 8.4: Positions of vehicle communication units for different train protection systems
(graphic: Jörn Pachl)

8.2.2.2 Mechanical Principle

In mechanical systems, information is transmitted by a movable mechanical arm on the
trackside which acts on a corresponding device on the train and therewith initiates reactions
such as emergency stop upon passing a red signal. In the first systems a glass tube
positioned on the roof of steam locomotives was connected to the pneumatic brake. Upon
passing a signal showing stop, the trackside trip arm would break the glass tube and stop the
train as a consequence (Theeg/Vincze 2007). An example (without glass tube) which is still
used is the mechanical train stop (chapter 8.3.2.1).

8.2.2.3 Galvanic (Electrical) Principle

In the galvanic principle, information is transmitted by electric current between touching parts on
the vehicle and on the trackside. A typical example is the French Crocodile (chapter 8.3.2.2).
The mechanical and galvanic principles were also used in combination. An example is the
system introduced in 1905 in the USA (Barwell 1983). Here the presence of a trackside
transmitter was indicated to the train mechanically, but the signalling information transmitted
fail safe to the train by electric current.

8.2.2.4 Optical Principle

In the optical principle, special mirrors with varying reflecting properties were used as the
trackside transmitters, whose position depended on signal aspects. A polarised beam was sent
from the train, reflected by the mirror and came back to the train photodetector. Its spectrum
contained the information about the mirror position and therefore the signal aspect. Due to
practical problems (e. g. keeping the mirrors clean), this principle did not gain much importance.
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8 Train Protection

8.2.2.5 Inductive Principle

The inductive principle of spot transmission, generally speaking, is based on electromagnetic
induction between parts on the trackside and on the train. According to the practically relevant
transmitters, it can be broken up into the following most important types:
–– resonant circuit method
–– moved DC magnetic method
–– transponder balise or beacon method
In the resonant circuit method, a permanently energised resonant circuit is on the locomotive.
The track has a passive resonant circuit adjusted to the frequency of the train circuit and the
information to be transmitted. If the leading vehicle passes above the passive resonant circuit,
the coils between both interact with each other by change of inductance. Therefore, changes
in the parameters of trainside resonant circuit (e. g. current, voltage, frequency) become
measurable. Examples are described in chapter 8.3.3.
The moved DC magnetic method uses the effect of a current being induced in an electrical
conductor which is moved in a magnetic field. The magnetic field can either be produced by
permanent magnets (fixed data), by DC electro-magnets (switchable) or by combination of
both. Permanent and electro-magnets can be used either together (with the one suppressing
the magnetic field of the other, figure 8.5) or in sequence along the track to specify information.
A disadvantage of this method is that its functioning is restricted to cases with a certain
minimum relative speed of the magnetic field and the conductor. This means a certain
minimum speed (this minimum varies, but is lower than 10 km/h) of the train, so very slow
moving vehicles get no information.
The most modern form of the spot inductive transmission is the transponder contact with short
range radio beacons or balises. This contact operates at high frequency and allows transmission
of complex telegrams. In most systems, the trackside equipment receives a power feed from the
locomotive and gives out data of some hundreds of bits. Balises and beacons can carry either
fixed or switchable data (chapter 8.2.2.1) or even provide bilateral transfer of information.
To perform safe data transmission, different solutions such as repetition of telegrams or
checksums can be used. Furthermore, trackside transmitters are logically linked in most
systems to detect of failure of one transmitter.

Figure 8.5: Permanent magnet with coil

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 8.2 Technical Solutions for Data Transmission

8.2.3 Linear Transmission

8.2.3.1 Classification
Linear transmission includes continuous as well as interrupted linear forms (chapter 8.2.1).
Classification of linear transmission systems should take into account the following basic criteria:
–– technical principle of transmission
–– uni- or bilateral transmission
–– size of transmitted data
–– length of transmission cycles
–– reaction time on new information
–– usage of technical additions
–– centralisation of information generation and therefore possibility of operative change of the
information
–– expenses for equipment
Technical principle. The technical principle for all practically important linear transmitters is
inductive. The information can be transferred through the following as the most important
technical media, which are described more detailed in chapter 8.2.3.2:
–– track circuit (figure 8.6a)
–– cable loop (figure 8.6b)
–– radio (figure 8.6c)

Figure 8.6: Technical devices for the linear transmission of information

Uni- or bilateral transmission. By bilateral data transfer, in addition to the train receiving data
about movement authorities, permitted speed and others, it can transfer back the information
about its current speed, position, condition of the brake system, train completeness etc. The
cab signalling through track circuits provides only for unilateral data transmission; the loop and
the radio can function in both directions.
The size of transmitted data depends on the channel capacity. Radio gives a wide frequency
band for information interchange. Cable loops can transfer the information on frequencies
up to 50 – 100 kHz. Channel capacity of track circuits is limited to 20 kHz. Thus the linear
transmission media can transfer data from few bits (e. g. three signal aspects in ALSN, chapter
8.3.4.1) up to detailed movement authority and profile data like in ETCS (chapters 8.4.4,
8.4.6), depending on frequency band.
The length of transmission cycle is also important, particularly for the transmission of urgent
messages (e. g. emergency stop order). High train speeds demand short cycles (less than one
second) to be possible, for low speeds cycles in several seconds can be acceptable.
Reaction time. The check of integrity of messages before decision-making is necessary. In some
systems this results in actions being carried out only after repeated reception. It results in a delayed
action. For example it can take up to three cycles or nearly five seconds in ALSN (chapter 8.3.4.1).
Technical additions. Track circuits in the area of isolated joints and radio in mountain areas
can not always guarantee a full coverage with trackside transmission. In these cases some
additional trackside antennas such as cable loops can become necessary.
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8 Train Protection

Centralisation. Systems with continuous transmission can be centralised or dispersed. The

centralised systems allow the easy changing of information by the operative. Examples are the
input of temporary speed restrictions, but also general emergency stop commands in case of
natural disasters such as earthquakes.
An important economic factor is the expense of transmission equipment. The use of already
existing track circuits does not demand significant investment. Cable loops demand relatively
high additional efforts for cables, and their arrangement hinders track works. Transmission
by radio between the train and the control centre is estimated to have a good perspective,
although today it demands much investment.

8.2.3.2 Technical Principles of Transmission

When data are transmitted through track circuits, information can be coded by (chapter 5.3.4):
–– constant signal frequency or
–– modulated signal.
The historically first transmission system through track circuits used various frequencies, each
frequency assigned to one particular information (system CSS in USA, chapter 8.3.4.2). But today,
different forms of impulse, frequency or phase modulation are applied in most modern systems.
Frequency and phase modulation allow higher volume of information than impulse modulation.
When cable loops are used, two types regarding the assembly are the most important in
practical terms (figure 8.7):
–– A cable loop, crossed periodically for positioning purposes: This form is used on some
metropolitan railway systems as well as in the system LZB (chapter 8.3.6, figure 8.8).
–– Cable with one conductor and return wire, stacked on the rail base. This type of loops is
optionally applied in ETCS L1 as infill loops (chapter 8.4.3, figure 8.9).
For radio communication, there is an European standard called GSM-R. Amongst other
applications, it is used in ETCS (chapter 8.4.1). It is also applied outside Europe in various
countries. Width of one channel is 200 kHz, carrier frequencies take zone 876 – 880 (Uplink)
and 921 – 925 (Downlink) MHz. However, there are also other digital systems of radio
communication which are being tested or used by railways for continuous data transmission.

Figure 8.7: Forms of cable loops

Figure 8.8: Loop LZB Figure 8.9: Euroloop

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 8.3 Particular Systems

8.3 Particular Systems

8.3.1 Classification of Systems

The train protection systems which are applied among the railways can be classified roughly
into five groups according to their functions and the type of transmission (table 8.3):
1. Systems with intermittent transmission and without braking supervision.
2. Systems with intermittent transmission at low data volume and with braking supervision.
3. Systems with continuous transmission of signal aspects by coded track circuits. As the
boundary between systems with and without braking supervision is fluent, 3a and 3b are
classified into the same group here.
4. Systems with intermittent transmission at high data volume and dynamic speed supervision.
5. Systems with continuous transmission at high data volume and dynamic speed supervision.
There is a tendency for the former systems the be the older ones and the latter the more advanced.

Table 8.3: Classification of train protection systems

Most systems work independently, but there are some which supplement other train
protection systems and can work only together with them. One example is the Russian
SAUT (chapter 8.3.5.3) as a supplement to ALSN (chapter 8.3.4.1) with improved supervision
functions. Another example is the German GNT (chapter 8.3.5.1) as a supplement to PZB 90
(chapter 8.3.3.1) to handle tilting trains for which speed limits are higher.

8.3.2 Group 1: Systems with Intermittent Transmission and without Braking Supervision

Systems without braking supervision (table 8.3) have basically two supervision functions:
They provide for an attentiveness check at the signals which can show ‘Caution’ (distant and
combined signals), and/or a train stop function (figure 8.10). The means of data transmission
of these systems are simple, but different. Four examples will be described briefly: the
mechanical train stop, the French Crocodile, the British AWS and the Swiss Signum.
The gain in safety resulting from the application of these train protection systems is limited.
This insufficiency will be demonstrated using the example of the historic Japanese ATS-S

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8 Train Protection

system, which only provided a check of attentiveness at signals which can show ‘Caution’,
independently from the current signal aspect: This system reduced the number of accidents
due to stop signal violation only by half, and 98 % of the remaining accidents occurred after
correct acknowledgement action by the driver (Kondo 1980). Even when it can be assumed
that selective acknowledgement check (only when the signal actually shows ‘Caution’) and
the additional train stop function increase the safety, in most cases these systems are not
sufficient for modern safety requirements. The train stop function without brake supervision
requires overlaps which are as long as the braking distance of the train. In most cases, these
cannot be provided.

speed Warning

position

Figure 8.10: Supervision functions of group 1 systems

8.3.2.1 Mechanical Train Stop

The mechanical train stop (figure 8.11) is a simple system with a mechanical contact at signals
which can show ‘Stop’ (main and combined signals) and the complementary contact on
vehicles. Depending on whether the signal shows a Stop or a Proceed aspect, the trackside
contact is switched effective or ineffective. Passing an effective contact causes an immediate
emergency stop. Besides the general safety disadvantages of systems of this group
mentioned in chapter 8.3.2, these systems have several disadvantages:
–– Movable mechanical parts cause wear and tear, which raise the maintenance costs.
–– Special attention has to be given on the clearance profile of vehicles.

Figure 8.11: Trackside device of mechanical train stop on Berlin S-Bahn

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 8.3 Particular Systems

These disadvantages restricted the applicability of these systems to suburban and

metropolitan railways with uniform vehicles, low speed and high braking performance.
Invented in Britain, various systems of this kind had been developed in the past. Various
mass rapid transit systems still use the mechanical train stop, but the number is decreasing.

8.3.2.2 French Crocodile

The Crocodile, which is applied in France, Belgium and
until few years ago Luxemborg, transmits the information
about the aspect of a distant or combined signal by a
galvanic contact between the rails (figure 8.12). The train
equipment consists of an electric contact on the bottom of
the locomotive which mechanically touches the trackside
transmitter, a conducting connection between that contact
and the wheels and a simple acting unit. Absence of a
voltage between the rail and the trackside transmitter
means that there is no restriction, 20 V DC depending on
its polarity warns of a speed restriction or a stop. When
passing a signal showing ‘Caution’ or ‘Speed Restriction
Warning’, in older versions only an acoustic warning tone
sounded in the driver’s cab shortly before passing the
Figure 8.12: Trackside device of
signal. Newer versions also use an attentiveness test.
Crocodile (photo: Dietmar Strobel)

8.3.2.3 British AWS

AWS (Automatic Warning System) is an old British train protection system. The trackside
transmission unit consists of two magnets between the rails in short sequence (figure 8.13), placed
shortly before any signal which can show ‘Caution’. The first is a permanent magnet with north
pole on the upper side, which initiates a warning tone. The second is a DC electro-magnet with
south pole on the upper side which resets the train equipment in case the signal shows ‘Proceed’.
This is in accordance with the fail-safe-principle. In any other case (Caution or Stop), the train
equipment has to be reset by the acknowledgement action of the driver, otherwise the train will be
emergency braked. To remind the driver, a simple cab signal (‘Sunflower’, figure 8.14) is displayed.
An important disadvantage is that the system does not distinguish between ‘Caution’ and ‘Stop’
aspects. For use on bidirectional tracks, the magnet has to be suppressed by an equally strong DC
magnetic field with opposite polarity. More information on AWS can be found in (IRSE 1999).

Figure 8.13: AWS electro-inductor and permanent magnet, installed on a passenger line in Britain
(photo: David Stratton)

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8 Train Protection

8.3.2.4 Swiss Integra Signum

Integra Signum was a Swiss train
protection system which combined
the train stop and the attentiveness
check function. By 2018, Signum was
completely replaced by ETCS. The data
transmission is inductive by direct current.
The powered coil is positioned centrally
at the bottom of the vehicle. When the
vehicle passes above the central track
coil, current is induced in the latter and Figure 8.14: AWS cab signal
induced back to the vehicle by the
outer left-sided coils (figure 8.15, figure
8.16). A certain minimum speed of the
train (approx. 5 km/h) is necessary for
transmission. The trackside transponder
can be switched ineffective by short-
circuiting in case of allowing signal. By
the positioning of the second pair of coils
on the one or the other rail, directions
are distinguished. The signal aspects
‘Caution’ and ‘Stop’ are distinguished
by the polarity of the left coil. ‘Caution’
requires an acknowledgement action,
whereas ‘Stop’ causes an immediate
emergency stop.
Figure 8.15: Trackside transmitters of Signum (middle
More information on Signum can be and right coils) in Switzerland. The left device is of the
found in (Oehler 1981). additional system ZUB (chapter 8.3.5) (photo: SBB)

Figure 8.16: Data transmission in Integra Signum

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 8.3 Particular Systems

8.3.3 Group 2: Systems with Intermittent Transmission at Low Data Volume and with
Braking Supervision

In these systems (table 8.3), in addition to the attentiveness check and train stop functions,
the braking process is supervised in different forms, but without calculating a dynamic speed
profile. For data transmission, resonant circuits are used in most cases. Each trackside
resonant circuit is adjusted to a certain frequency out of a stock of several defined frequencies,
with the frequency coding the information. The trackside resonant circuits can be switched
to effective or ineffective, or they can be switched between different active statuses (different
frequencies), depending on signal aspects.
A disadvantage of many of these systems is that the ineffective (permissive) status cannot
be distinguished from the absence of a trackside transmitter, which results in non-failsafe
behaviour of the system. Therefore, these systems are not suitable for cab signalling and have
to work in the background as long is the driver is operating the train correctly. The driver must
not be misled to rely on these systems.
Two examples, the German Indusi and the Japanese ATS-P, are described in detail in the following.

8.3.3.1 German Indusi/PZB 90

Indusi with its variations is the predominant train protection system in Germany, Austria and
the former Yugoslavia. It is used also in Romania and Turkey on few lines. The original Indusi,
developed in the 1930s, had very simple functions and was continuously improved via the West
German I60 and I60R and the East German PZ80 until PZB 90. The current version in Germany
is PZB 90, to be described in the following (DB Netz 2001). During the development process, the
complexity of the system increased, so that today’s PZB 90, among the train protection systems, is
unique for its complex supervision functions in combination with its simplicity in data transmission.

Figure 8.17: Indusi magnet

The trackside equipment consists of passive trackside magnets (figure 8.17) in the form of
resonant circuits. These have an information connection to the trackside signals, and can be
switched to effective or non-effective. There are three types of trackside magnets, which are
adjusted to the frequencies 500, 1000 and 2000 Hz.
The resonant circuits on the leading vehicle of the train permanently swing in these three
frequencies. When the vehicle passes over a trackside magnet, the trackside magnet, if
switched to effective, inductively removes energy from the trainside resonant circuit with the
respective frequency (figure 8.18). This loss of energy is evaluated by the on-board equipment.

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8 Train Protection

If the trackside magnet is switched to non-effective,

the resonant circuit on the vehicle is not influenced.
The trackside magnets are mounted to the right
rail and the vehicle magnets above this position,
distinguishing directions.
In approach to a signal showing ‘Stop’, the
magnets are places as follows (figure 8.19):
–– The 1000-Hz-magnet: at the distant signal,
effective when the signal is at ‘Caution’ or at
‘Speed Restriction Warning’ of relatively low
speed.
–– The 500-Hz-magnet: 250 (260) m in rear of the
main signal, effective when the signal is at ‘Stop’.
–– The 2000-Hz-magnet: at the main signal,
effective when the signal is at ‘Stop’.
To represent approximately the different braking
performance of trains, they are distinguished into three
categories. The following descriptions (figure 8.19) refer
to train category ‘O’, which are the fastest trains with
permitted speed up to 160 km/h; most passenger
trains belong to it. The other groups are distinguished
mainly by the speed values of the supervision curves.
The permitted speed of the vehicles (max. 160 km/h Figure 8.18: Data transmission in Indusi
plus a tolerance margin) is continuously supervised.

Figure 8.19: Braking supervision in PZB 90

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 8.3 Particular Systems

Upon input from the 1000-Hz-magnet, the train driver has to push the acknowledgement
button within four seconds. Then the supervision speed is steadily reduced from 165 to
85 km/h. As the distance from the distant to the related main signal can vary between 950
and 1500 m in Germany (normal value: 1000 m), the speed 85 km/h is supervised until
1250 m after the 1000-Hz-input (latest possible position of the 500-Hz-magnet). If within
this distance no 500-Hz-input follows, the systems assumes the signal having cleared in the
meantime and the supervision speed is released to the maximum of 165 km/h.
As this long speed supervision would be a great hindrance when the signal was cleared after
passing the distant signal, the driver can liberate himself from the 1000-Hz-supervision at
the earliest 700 m after the 1000-Hz-input (earliest position of the 500-Hz-magnet) if he sees
the ‘Proceed’ signal ahead.
Beginning at the 500-Hz-input, a further reduction of speed from initially 65 to later 45 km/h is
supervised. As the train is already close to the Stop signal, the driver has no possibility of liberation.
A 2000-Hz-input results in an immediate emergency stop. As speed supervision has been reduced
to maximum 45 km/h before, this is sufficient to stop the train within the overlap in most cases. To
pass a red signal in degraded mode operation, the cab is equipped with an override button.
Emergency brakes are applied until stop in case of failing to push the acknowledgement
button, in case of exceeding the supervision speed, passing an active 2000-Hz-magnet and
in several other cases of driver’s error.
In case the train has stopped or gone very slowly between distant and main signal, it
cannot be assumed that the overlap is still locked. Therefore, a more restrictive supervision
becomes active in this case.
More information on PZB 90 can be found in (DB Netz 2001).

8.3.3.2 Japanese ATS-P

The system was developed in the 1970s and replaced the old ATS-S system on Japanese
conventional lines. Whereas the old ATS-S system provided a check of attentiveness only (see
8.3.2), ATS-P provides advanced supervision functions including braking supervision which is
even adjusted to downhill grades of the line.
Likewise in Indusi, data transmission is based on resonant circuits, but not loss of energy
is measured, but the shift of frequency in the resonant circuit on the train, caused by the
trackside resonant circuit. Normally, the resonant circuit on the train oscillates at the frequency
74 kHz. When passing over an active trackside resonant circuit, this frequency increases to
one out of eight defined frequencies, depending on the trackside transmitter. The frequencies
are filtered by a band pass filter on the train.
The trains are divided into seven categories, according to their braking performance.
The trackside coils are positioned in defined distance in rear of the Stop signal. Each input
information initiates a related braking supervision (figure 8.20), differentiated by the train
category. When the train reaches a new trackside transmitter, the previous supervision
curve becomes ineffective. A fifth coil SS with another frequency marks the position of the
Stop signal and causes immediate emergency stop. Block signals have no SS coil to enable
permissive driving.
Other frequencies are used for following purposes:
–– Braking towards a speed restriction of 50, 85 or 90 km/h. Different speed restrictions are
identified by a sequence of two trackside coils with two frequencies.
–– Cancellation of brake patterns and speed restrictions.

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8 Train Protection

Figure 8.20: Supervision of Japanese ATS-P in approach to a signal at Stop

The system provides the possibility of adjustment to downhill slopes. In this case, the coils
initiating the brake patterns are situated further in advance to compensate the lower deceleration
(figure 8.21).
More information on ATS-P can be found in (Kondo 1980).

Figure 8.21: Adaptation of ATS-P to downhill gradient

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 8.3 Particular Systems

8.3.3.3 Other Systems

Some other systems belonging to this group may be mentioned briefly.
The Polish KHP provides braking supervision not based on braking curves, but in the form
of intermittently checking brake application during the required braking process. Data
transmission is by resonant circuits and by interrupted coded track circuits with an effective
length of about 700 m around each signal. During the length of these track circuits, the
indication of the trackside signal is repeated in the cab (Makowski 1992).
In the Spanish system ASFA (figure 8.22), the braking process is supervised intermittently
in one position only: 300 m in rear of the signal at Stop, a speed of 35, 50 or 60 km/h,
depending on the train category, must not be exceeded, otherwise the train will be emergency
braked. Besides this speed, the line speed is checked, an attentiveness check is done at a
signal at ‘Caution’ and a train stop function provided at a red signal. Data are transmitted by
resonant circuits with nine different frequencies (TSI CCS CR-Annex B).

Figure 8.22: ASFA trackside transmitter

TPWS, which is applied at selected locations in Britain, is a supplement to AWS (chapter

8.3.2.3) and uses the same means of data transmission. For braking supervision in approach
to a signal, one or more track-based speed traps are applied to check the speed in certain
positions. Besides, the acknowledgement function at signals at ‘Caution’ and the train stop
function at Stop signals are provided (TSI CCS CR-Annex B).

8.3.4 Group 3: Systems with Continuous Transmission of Signal Aspects by Coded

Track Circuits

Systems in the third category (table 8.3) transmit the aspect of the trackside signal ahead to the
train through the rails. They were first applied in the USA, and then the idea spread to Russia
and to different European countries, e. g. Italy, the Netherlands, Czech Republic, Slovakia and
Hungary. Also the oldest high speed signal systems in Japan and France match this category.
The required track circuits are mostly also used for track clear detection (chapter 5.3) and
transmission of block information (chapter 10.5). The signal aspect ahead is repeated in the
cab, often in simplified form. The supervision functions reach from simple acknowledgement
checks up to braking supervision with standardised fragments (figure 8.2). Basic advantages
of systems of this group are the following:

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8 Train Protection

1. In contrast to most systems of groups 1 and 2, these systems can be designed failsafe, so
malfunction of the equipment leads to a more restrictive indication in the cab.
2. The train continuously receives the newest information in each position of the way. This
prevents the driver from forgetting signal aspects and enables an immediate reaction of the
system if signal aspects change.
However, an important safety-reducing disadvantage is that, unless the length of the
track circuits is standardised or additional transmitters for length information are provided,
calculation of an adjusted braking curve is not possible. To improve this, some systems
with continuous transmission by coded track circuits are used together with intermittent
transmission systems (e. g. System SAUT, chapter 8.3.5.3).

8.3.4.1 ALSN of Former Soviet Union

ALSN is used on almost 100 thousand kilometres in the countries of former Soviet Union or
more than 10 percent of the world's railways. This system is installed on main lines but applied
basically as additional equipment which supplements, and not replaces trackside signals in
most cases. If there is a disagreement between trackside and cab signals, the driver has to
obey the trackside signal.
The system was developed in the 1930s in the Soviet Union with use of experience of the first
coded track circuits in the USA. In 1937 this system had received a medal at the International
exhibition in Paris, but its introduction has been interrupted by war and has proceeded only
after 1949 (Vlasenko 2006).
There are three codes displayed in the cab signal corresponding with the aspect of the
trackside signal ahead. In case of three-aspect-signalling (chapter 7.6.3.2), these codes are
(figure 8.23):
–– red signal ahead (results in cab signal red-yellow)
–– yellow signal ahead (results in cab signal yellow)
–– green signal ahead (results in cab signal green)

Figure 8.23: Code transmission from track circuits to the locomotive equipment

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 8.3 Particular Systems

The section beyond a signal at Stop is not coded, therefore the train will be emergency stopped
(cab signal red). This is in accordance with the fail-safe-principle. Passage of a Stop signal can
be authorised with driver’s special action at the maximum speed 20 km/h (figure 8.24).

Figure 8.24: Braking supervision in ALSN (example)

As the number of signal aspects in and near stations is usually higher than three, there is a
simple rule. If the train approximates a signal indicating the diverging route (the speed restriction
for which can be between 25 and 80 km/h depending on the geometry of movable track
elements (chapter 6.1.2.3)) or to a yellow signal (straight route, but only one block section is
clear, the speed restriction after the signal is 60 km/h), the train receives the code yellow and
driver has to select the proper speed according to the trackside signal. If two or more block
sections are clear and the first section has the straight route, the train receives the code green.
If the following signal is red or an auxiliary signal, the train receives the code red-yellow.
To distinguish the passage of a Stop signal from the entrance into a section without codes
(e. g. secondary tracks in stations or secondary lines), there is the memory function of the
previous code. No code after the code red-yellow is considered as passage of a red signal
and the emergency brake activated. No code after other codes results in a white cab signal
(ALSN is switched off) and requires only periodic acknowledgement action.
The period of the code transmitted by the track circuit is 1.60 or 1.86 seconds (figure 8.25).
The carrier frequency depends on traction power supply and is 50 Hz or 25 Hz. As external
influences with low frequency often occur, the reaction time of the system is three code
periods. This means that the new cab signal becomes effective five seconds after a code
change. This reaction time also applies if a train passed a Stop signal (Sapožnikov et al. 2006).
System ALSN itself (without the additional system SAUT, chapter 8.3.5.3) cannot transmit
information about distance to the signal ahead. The distance between signals varies from
1000 to 2600 meters depending on local conditions. Therefore the supervision curve in
system ALSN (without any additional transmission) is only staircase, but the frequency of
driver’s acknowledgement check by the codes yellow and red-yellow depends on train speed.
Moreover, the change of a cab signal to lower speed is accompanied by a bell and the driver
is obliged to confirm this by an acknowledgement. If the train receives the code red-yellow,
its speed is limited to 60 km/h. The speed limit of 60 km/h upon passing a signal at ‘Caution’
may appear very low to readers in Western European countries, but is appropriate for generally
lower speeds and long braking distances of heavy trains in this region. The maximum speed of
trains on lines equipped with ALSN is 160 km/h.
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8 Train Protection

Figure 8.25: Codes of ALSN

According to new technical requirements, stations and open lines will have high frequency
track circuits. This implies new functions for ALSN. When the track section is clear, the
track circuit carries no code and serves for track clear detection only. Only in these
sections where a train is detected or expected soon, the code is applied. On open
lines, jointless track circuits, whose areas of efficacy overlap by some tens of metres,
are used. When the train is in this overlapping area, the coding is shifted from one track
circuit to the next. Therefore, only one track circuit carries the coding at any given time.
But in stations, insulated rail joints are still applied and track circuits do not overlap. To
transfer the coding upon entering a new track could cause failures due to inertia of the
detectors and transmitters. Therefore in stations the codes are given in two track circuits
at the same time: the one which is currently occupied and the one ahead. As soon as the
train occupied a new section, the coding in the previous section is switched off. Likewise
generally in ALSN, only these station tracks which are provided for non-stop train passage
are coded.

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 8.3 Particular Systems

8.3.4.2 Other Systems for Conventional Traffic

Some countries in Europe and the USA use similar principles of cab signalling through track
circuits. The system LS (figure 8.26), as an example, is used in Czech Republic and Slovakia.
Its basic characteristics are the following (Mraz 1992, TSI CCS CR-Annex B):
–– Four codes in accordance with speed restriction at the signal beyond are distinguished:
5.4 Hz – line speed, 3.6 Hz – 100 km/h (signal beyond shows ‘Caution’ or ‘Speed
Restriction Warning’), 1.8 Hz – 40 km/h (if the route is diverging, also used for higher
branch speeds than 40 km/h), 0.9 Hz – Stop.
–– The carrier frequency of the track circuits depends on traction power supply and is 50 Hz
or 75 Hz.
–– Block sections differ in length; therefore the speed supervision is staircase without calculated
braking curves, but acknowledgement action is required if the actual speed is higher than the
target speed. The passage of a red signal causes immediate emergency stop.

Figure 8.26: Code generator and cab signal in LS

The system EVM is used in Hungary and has the following principles (Mandola 1992,
TSI CCS CR-Annex B):
–– Seven codes: 1, 2, 3, 4 impulses (0.26–0.3 s) in the period means approaching a signal
showing stop, 40, 80 km/h and max. speed. Four impulses with different impulse timing
means 120 km/h, one impulse in two periods permits a speed of 15 km/h, continuous
signal means clear line without speed information.
–– Carrier frequency is 75 Hz.
–– If speed reduction is required, the driver has to push the acknowledgement button at
shorter intervals than normally. Besides, the brake application is checked.
System ATB-EG with coded track circuits is the older out of two train protection system in the
Netherlands. Some characteristics are (Bailey et al. 1995, TSI CCS CR-Annex B):
–– Five speed steps (40, 60, 80, 130 and 140 km/h) are used.
–– Amplitude modulated speed codes on carrier frequency 75 Hz.
–– If speed reduction is required, the system requires a periodic acknowledgment action every
20 seconds and checks application of brakes.
–– The system does not distinguish between 40 km/h and stop.
In the USA, a cab signalling system with three aspects (CSS) is used since the 1920s. Its
basis is the track circuits transmitting the signal frequencies 3 Hz (180 min-1; unrestricted
speed), 2 Hz (120 min-1; speed restriction ahead) and 1,25 Hz (75 min-1; Stop signal ahead)
(Barwell 1983, Wikipedia).
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8 Train Protection

For higher speed (currently used up to 250 km/h) in Russia the system ALS-EN is designed.
The phase modulated signal 174,38 Hz with a noise-suppressing code comes to the locomotive
through track circuits. 48 cab signal aspects translate the data which show five block sections
(about 10 km) and speed limitations beyond. The system ALS-EN on the line Moscow – St.
Petersburg is not centralised: The equipment of each signal decodes the data, shapes the new
information and sends a code to the next track circuit. (Sapožnikov et al. 2006)
On underground lines in the countries CIS the system ‘Dnepr’ is mainly used. Signal
frequencies correspond to the velocity steps 40, 60, 70 and 80 km/h. Some underground
railways have two frequencies as information about velocity beyond two following signals. The
frequency band reaches from 75 up to 325 Hz. Cab signalling on new metro lines uses phase
modulated signals (Dmitriev/Minin 1992).

8.3.4.3 Italian BACC for Conventional and High Speed Traffic

On Italian conventional lines and lines for increased speed up to 200 km/h a cab signalling
system with four different aspects is applied. The signals on the carrier frequency 50 Hz are
frequency modulated with frequencies 4.5 Hz (270 min-1; green signal ahead), 3 Hz (180 min-1;
yellow signal ahead; reduce speed to 150 km/h), 2 Hz (120 min-1; speed restriction due to
diverging route ahead) and 1.25 Hz (75 min-1; Stop signal ahead). As track circuits have almost
equal length (1350 metres), it is possible to calculate and supervise the braking curve. A stop
is therefore announced 2700 m in rear of the stop position.

Figure 8.27: Braking supervision in BACC for conventional and high speed traffic

However, the braking distance is more than two track circuits if the train speed is higher than
200 km/h, therefore the system had been upgraded for the high speed line (figure 8.27). Also for
diverging routes, additional higher speeds 100 and 130 km/h are to be used. Therefore, on high
speed lines track circuits have an additional carrier frequency 178 Hz which in combination with
the codes based on 50 Hz gives nine speed steps for high speed trains (table 8.2). The system
is downwards compatible, which means that high speed trains can run on conventional lines and
conventional trains on high speed lines using only the 50 Hz code and at speed not higher than
200 km/h. This compatibility is necessary, as only one line (Rome – Florence) has been equipped
with BACC high speed system and trains continue onto the conventional network.
More information on BACC can be found in (Bianchi 1985). Today, new high speed lines in Italy
are equipped with ETCS.
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 8.3 Particular Systems

code with the with the meaning (related to the end of permitted speed next
name carrier carrier the track circuit) at the end of the trackside
frequency frequency TC [km/h] for signal
50 Hz 178 Hz trains with max
braking ratio
270** 4.5 Hz 2 Hz 5400 m are clear 260
270* 4.5 Hz 1.25 Hz 4050 m are clear 230
270 4.5 Hz – 2700 m are clear 205
180* 3 Hz 1.25 Hz 1350 m are clear, then 155
speed restriction 100 – 130 km/h
180 3 Hz – 1350 m are clear, then 125
speed restriction 30 – 60 km/h
or stop
120** 2 Hz 3 Hz speed restriction 130 km/h 135
on the next track circuit
120* 2 Hz 1.25 Hz speed restriction 100 km/h 105
on the next track circuit
120 2 Hz – speed restriction 30 – 60 km/h 65
on the next track circuit
75 1.25 Hz – next signal is closed 50

Table 8.4: Cab and trackside signal aspects of BACC, the speed values vary between the trains

8.3.4.4 Japanese ATC for High Speed Rail

The first Japanese high speed line opened in 1964, therefore the ATC system used on
Shinkansen lines is the oldest cab signal and train protection system for high speed rail in
the world. Today, on several lines the more modern so-called ‘Digital ATC’ is installed, which
matches group 5 (chapter 8.3.6).
The system is adapted to the requirements of a high speed network which is technically
and operationally separated from the conventional network. The capacity and availability
requirements are high and the required flexibility regarding different types of traffic and vehicles
is low, which makes a limited number of signal aspects sufficient.
The trains are driven semi-automatically: The safety related braking for a signalled stop is
controlled automatically, whereas processes unrelated to safety like acceleration or platform
stops are under the responsibility of the driver.
Information transmission from track to train is achieved by coded track circuits. Each
block section is covered by two track circuits. All track circuits belonging to the same
line have the same length, therefore the ends of the track circuits are used as fixed
intermediate points for speed reduction. The result is a multi-step cascade braking curve
(figure 8.28) in rear of a signalled stop. At higher speed levels, both track circuits of a
block section transmit the same speed information. In contrast, in the last block section
immediately in rear of the brake target both track circuits transmit different speed
commands and stop the train in two steps. When the train has reduced its speed to
30 km/h, the driver can push an override button which enables him to continue at 30 km/h
maximum speed for permissive driving. Otherwise, shortly in rear of the brake target point,
an induction loop brings the train to a stop.

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8 Train Protection

Figure 8.28: Brake control in Japanese ATC, example (Suwe 1988)

Figure 8.28 shows an example of the speed steps defined this way. The exact speed
values vary between different Shinkansen lines and the time. In contrast to many other train
protection systems, the staircase signalised speed is not a limit speed, but a target speed for
regulation which is exceeded regularly. For diverging tracks in stations, an additional speed
level of 70 km/h is defined.
To avoid interference between neighbouring track circuits, the track circuits of the same double
line use four different carrier frequencies: Thus in one track, the carrier frequency is alternately
720 Hz and 900 Hz and in the other track 840 Hz and 1020 Hz. The carrier frequency is
frequency-modulated by a modulation frequency corresponding with a certain speed limit.
Hereby, with only few different signal aspects, high speed traffic with high capacity is enabled.
More information on this system can be found in (Yamanouchi 1979, Suwe 1988).

8.3.4.5 French TVM 300

TVM 300 (figure 8.29) is installed on the older French high speed lines, the first of which
opened in 1981. Like in Japan, the high speed lines are regularly used by high speed trains
only, but these pass into the conventional railway network, too.

Figure 8.29: Brake control in French TVM 300

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 8.3 Particular Systems

Regarding the data transmission and the control, TVM 300 has large similarities with the
Japanese ATC. One main difference is that the driver regulates the braking process and
is supervised by the technical system. The staircase speed information is a limit speed for
supervision, and each block section is covered by exactly one track circuit. The length of the
block sections is adapted to the gradient. Resulting from the staircase supervision pattern, the
required overlap has the length of a complete block section.

8.3.5 Group 4: Systems with Intermittent Transmission at High Data Volume and
­Dynamic Speed Supervision

Systems of group 4 (table 8.3) are modern systems for intermittent transmission. Due to
the failsafe behaviour and the ability to supervise the complete dynamic speed profile, these
systems are a safe solution up to high speeds if the efforts for continuous transmission are
not considered as necessary. During recent decades, many systems of this category have
been developed. Although these national and manufacturer specific systems follow similiar
basic principles, they are incompatible with each other.
The main trackside transmission media are:
–– Transponder balises (figure 8.30) which work
without trackside power supply by using
energy sent from the vehicle unit to send data
telegrams back to the vehicle. Figure 8.31
shows the principle of data transmission on
the example of the system ZUB. In channel
1, the presence of a balise is detected by
the principle of resonant circuit. Thereupon,
channel 2 is switched on to send energy
from the train to the balise. The balise uses
this energy to transmit information back to
the train (channel 3) (Fenner/Naumann 1998).
–– Inductive loops with limited extension, which
are usually powered from the trackside. Figure 8.30: Balise and trainside antenna of
–– Locally limited radio transmission devices. ­system ZUB (photo: Siemens)

Figure 8.31: Transponder principle (example: ZUB)

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8 Train Protection

According to the data contents, transmission media can be divided into:

–– Static data transmission media whose information content is independent from trackside input
such as signal aspects. They can transmit only static data such as line speed, gradient etc.
–– Switchable transmission media whose information varies depending on the status of the
trackside, especially signal aspects.

8.3.5.1 Systems with Static Line Data Stored in the Trackside

The majority of systems with intermittent transmission at high data volume and dynamic speed
supervision store static line data in the trackside. These systems are suitable for large fleets
and extended networks, which are typical for national/international railway networks. Examples
are (TSI CCS CR-Annex B):
–– Ebicab (Scandinavia, Portugal, Bulgaria)
–– ATB-NG (Netherlands)
–– TBL (Belgium)
–– ZUB (Switzerland, Denmark)
–– KVB (France)
–– ETCS Level 1 (International)
Data are transmitted by transponder balises, loops and/or local radio units. The main transmission
medium is balises in most of these systems. Inductive loops and radio units of limited length
extension mainly serve for updating of signal aspects in approach to a main signal (Infill function).
Each data point consists of a single balise or a balise group transmitting data telegrams which
contain line information. Transmission of detailed data can be achieved by using several 1-bit-
transmitters in a line (French system KVB) or by each individual balise sending detailed data
telegrams (most other systems).
Additional important information to be transmitted in most systems is the distance to the next
data point, so-called linking information. If the train does not find the next data point at this
distance, a technical failure can be assumed and protective measures activated. It follows that
such systems are fail safe and are therefore suitable for detailed cab signalling.
The data telegrams include dynamic information about signal aspects and routes as well as
static line information such as length information and gradient profiles. In most cases, systems
supervise the complete dynamic speed profile continuously. Additionally, many systems
provide continuous cab signalling function including the dynamic speed information which can
replace the trackside signals. There is no principal speed restriction for the application of these
systems, but in most countries these systems, as information is transmitted intermittently only,
are restricted to conventional traffic up to around 160 km/h. In Sweden, even high speed
traffic up to 250 km/h is guided by Ebicab without use of trackside signals.
Some other systems with balises are used for special purposes. An example is the system
GNT in Germany which is used for tilting trains only. The system suppresses certain speed
control applications of Indusi and supervises particular (higher) speed limits instead.
ETCS Level 1 as the most modern and the internationally most important example of this
group is described in more detail in chapter 8.4.

8.3.5.2 Systems with Static Track Data Stored on the Vehicle

Systems with static line data stored on the train are mainly applicable to metropolitan,
suburban or local railway networks with a limited number of vehicles which are assigned
to a separate network. The system ZSL 90, which is applied on different local railways in

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 8.3 Particular Systems

Switzerland, is an example. But these systems are also applicable on main railway networks
where locomotives are assigned locally (partly in Russia).
Static track data are stored on the train and only dynamic data transmitted from trackside
transmitters. In the example of ZSL 90, cable loops are applied only in station areas and,
within these, continuously transmit dynamic data to the vehicle (Althaus 1994).

8.3.5.3 Example: SAUT

SAUT is an example of the combination of trackside and on train storage of line data. It is
a relatively new system on Russian main lines as a supplement to ALSN. The combined
system allows to know aspect of the signal ahead (owing to ALSN), and also distance to this
signal (owing to SAUT) and therefore to calculate and supervise a brake curve. The trackside
transmission media of SAUT are inductive loops with a defined length (figure 8.32). The system
SAUT is in continuous redevelopment; there are currently three versions.
SAUT-U. The generator is installed in the beginning of each block section and transmits a
high-frequency signal into the right rail. The length of the loop (section where this signal can
be detected by the train) is proportional to
distance to the following trackside signal.
The information is registered thanks to a
special locomotive antenna. But at the
entrance into a station the distance to
the following signal depends on a route.
Therefore, there are several loops at the
home signal which are selectively powered
depending on the route. Besides, an
additional loop is installed one block section
in rear of the station (at the distant signal)
which transmits the exact speed information
of the station home signal (because three
ALSN-codes are not enough to code all
speed steps; chapter 8.3.4).
SAUT-C (figure 8.33). The loops are only used
Figure 8.32: Several loops SAUT at the home signal in station areas, not on open lines. Distances,
gradient and other track data of open lines
are memorised in the locomotive computer; locomotives are assigned locally and move only
inside the network of the local railway division. One loop at the exit of the station transmits a code
number of the next line to the locomotive computer. The current locomotive position is determined
by odometer. Every new block section corrects the odometer data. Section limits are determined
by ALSN thanks to change of current in the track circuit: the current gradually increases at the
approximation to the trackside signal, but drops sharply after passing the signal.

Figure 8.33: Data from loops to train in the system SAUT-C

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8 Train Protection

SAUT-CM is a further development of system SAUT-C. Loops are only located in station areas.
The track data of the station are memorised in the locomotive computer. The code transmitted
at the home signal contains the number of the route for the train which proceeds into the
station. The length of the loop is no longer used for coding, therefore it is a uniform 10 m.
Besides, the driver receives voice messages if the factual train speed is higher than allowed or
the train approaches a Stop signal, a bridge, a tunnel or a level crossing.
For the future, the satellite positioning systems GPS and GLONASS are also intended to be
used for definition of distance between the train and the trackside signal. Hereby, a precision
of detection of two metres is reached thanks to reference stations. This solution is used in the
development of the new system for locomotive safety KLUB-U (OAO RZD 2007).

8.3.6 Group 5: Systems with Continuous Transmission at High Data Volume and
­Dynamic Speed Supervision

8.3.6.1 System Structure and Data Transmission

The basic difference between systems of this category and systems belonging to the former
category is continuous or quasi-continuous data link between track and train.
Among systems of this category, the following technical transmission media are applied:
–– Coded track circuits: Examples are the Digital ATC (Watanabe et al. 1999) in Japan and
TVM 430 (Guilloux 1990) which is applied on French and Belgian high speed lines and in
the Channel Tunnel.
–– Cable loops: An example is LZB which is applied in Germany, Austria and Spain, mainly on
high speed lines.
–– Radio transmission: The most important example is ETCS Level 2/3.
Figure 8.34 shows the generalised basic structure of such systems. In contrast to most systems
with intermittent transmission, information flow is centralised in most cases, using a lineside control
centre. The lineside control centre and the train computer are in most cases safe microprocessor
systems. The functions of the components can differ in detail between the systems.

Figure 8.34: Information structure of systems with continous transmission at high data volume
(Wenzel 2006)

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 8.3 Particular Systems

An important criterion to distinguish the

systems is whether they are used as the
only signal system on the respective lines
or if they are used mixed with trackside
signals. In the former case, system-
inherent fallback levels are provided, or
driving on sight is the only fallback level
for degraded mode operation. In the
latter case, the cab signal system often
enables shorter block sections (figure
8.35) and therefore higher line capacity
Figure 8.35: Block marker on ETCS line (Photo: SBB) than the trackside signals.
The assignment of functions to the
interlocking system or the train control system is basically defined as follows on lines for mixed
traffic (LZB and partly in ETCS L2):
–– The interlocking functions including track clear detection, which are needed for all
movements on the line, are assigned to the interlocking system.
–– The particular cab signalling and train protection functions, which are only applicable to
equipped trains, are assigned to the train control system. In some cases, additional auxiliary
functions for interlocking can also be carried out in the train control system, such as
detecting the halt of the train for route release.
Resulting from this assignment of functions, route information has to be transmitted from
the interlocking system to the trackside control centre (figure 8.34). For functions such as
sending the information about the halt of a train to the interlocking system, a bidirectional data
connection is necessary, otherwise a unidirectional connection suffices.
On pure high speed lines (systems TVM 430 in France and Digital ATC in Japan, partly also
ETCS L2), this assignment of functions can vary. For example, the track clear detection
outside stations can be carried out by the train control system.

8.3.6.2 Generation of Movement Authorities and Static Speed Profile

The main data required for the generation of the movement authorities and the static speed
profiles are:
–– Static data such as track topology, locations of points and signals, speed restrictions and
others. These data are mostly stored in the trackside control centre. Alternatively, in closed
networks where each train moves always on the same lines, they can be stored on the
train. This is applied in Japanese Digital ATC, for example.
–– Dynamic data such as routes, point positions, track occupancy and others. They change
dynamically and are transmitted from the interlocking system to the lineside control centre
or, in some cases for track occupancy, obtained by the train control system itself.
The movement authority and static speed profile is mostly generated in the lineside control
centre and transmitted to the train, but also the train can contribute, e. g. in Japanese Digital
ATC. Here the trackside control centre only transmits the number of accessible track sections,
but the length of these sections is stored on the train together with other geographical data
and the length of the movement authority calculated on the train.

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8 Train Protection

8.3.6.3 Dynamic Speed Profile and Speed Control

To calculate the dynamic speed profile, the following data are the most important:
–– static speed information
–– braking-related characteristics of the line, especially the gradient, which are stored together
with other geographical data in the trackside control centre or on the train
–– braking performance of the train which is stored on the train
–– momentary position of the train
The momentary position is detected roughly by reference positions and between two reference
positions calculated train-based e. g. by odometry or Doppler radar. Reference positions are
marked as follows:
–– Digital ATC: The boundaries of the track circuits
–– TVM 430: The boundaries of the track circuits
–– LZB: Every 100 m the cable loop is crossed, detectable as a 180° shift of the
electromagnetic field
–– ETCS Level 2: In regular intervals, Eurobalises with fixed data are placed between the rails
as location reference
From the data described above, the dynamic speed information can be generated train-based,
track-based or mixed:
–– In LZB as the historically oldest of these systems, the main limiting factor was the
processing performance (and therefore the size and weight) of the train computer.
Therefore, the brake curve is calculated in the trackside control centre and transmitted
to the train as a code number of a standardised brake curve segment. This reduces the
processes on the train computer, but increased the data transfer demand.
–– In those systems based on coded track circuits or radio transmission, the main limiting factor
is the data volume to be transmitted between track and train. Therefore, dynamic speed
information is generated completely on the train. Especially in ETCS L2, an additional purpose
of this assignment of functions is to define a clear interface in an interoperable system.
The static and dynamic speed information is displayed to the driver (figure 8.47). Using the
dynamic speed profile, fully automatic train operation would be possible. However, this is done
in only a few metropolitan railway systems (chapter 8.1.6).

8.4 ETCS

8.4.1 History and European Standardisation

On European main lines there have been a large variety of different train protection and train
control systems, in combination with different signal systems, as described earlier in this chapter
8. Besides the train protection systems, also in the other fields of railway signalling, operation,
communication, power supply, axle load, loading gauge, platform height etc., there are a large
variety of solutions.
The variety of technical solutions is an obstruction to technical interoperability, which
is the ability of a vehicle to operate in different networks. By the decision of the European
Commission, the Technical Specification for Interoperability (TSI) was released as a set
of specifications in different subjects. Issues of railway signalling are described in control
command and signalling (CCS) TSI. The TSI defines ETCS as the Class A train control system,
GSM-R as the Class A system for communication. For Class A systems, requirements for

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 8.4 ETCS

interfaces to other components are described, specifying methods for the transmission of data
from track to train and vice versa.
Class B systems are a limited set of train control systems not compatible with ETCS and in
operation before 2001.
Beside those technical differences, there are different operational rules, safety concepts
and standards for the admission, approval and certification of infrastructure and rolling
stock. Maritime and air traffic was historically always international, road traffic was regulated
by international treaties in the majority of states, while railways especially after World War I
were managed as public authorities, supporting the different development of standards as
described above. These were often fostered by military requirements.
These are some of the main reasons for substantial disadvantages in the competitiveness of
railways when compared with other means of transport.
On the other hand the strengthened economic relations within the European Economic Area and
predecessor organisations intensified the international flow of traffic. To sustain and to develop the
share of rail-bound traffic within Europe, the European Commission concluded legal frameworks to
establish a European railway system, with competition on the market for railway operators and the
market of railway suppliers. The main parts of the European railway system are:
–– rules regarding interoperability (TSI)
–– methods for risk analysis by operator (CSM)
–– the European railway network, formed by corridors described in Trans-European Networks
for Traffic (TEN-T)

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8 Train Protection

In the First Railway Package decided in 2001, the separation of railway undertakings and
infrastructure managers, while being independent from the state, was stated more precisely than
in the 1991 directive. With the Second Railway Package (2004), the structure of the regulation was
harmonised and the development of Common Safety Targets (CST) and Common Safety Methods
(CSM) started. These are now obligatory for changes to the railway system. As a consequence,
safety requirements of railway undertakings and infrastructure managers have to be converted
into a safety management system (SMS). To support the realisation and further development of
a Single European Railway Area (Sera) without borders, the European Railway Agency (ERA) was
founded, now named European Union Agency for Railways. In the Third Railway Package (2007),
in the recast of the First Railway Package (2012) and the Fourth Railway Package (2016) decisions
were bundled to push the European integration, replacing former national rules. The Fourth Railway
Package is the most ambitious, aiming to strengthen the competition by opening the domestic
markets on profitable routes to all open-access operators. By 2016, the over 11000 still existing
national rules are the main obstacle in interoperability. Consequently, the national rules are required
to be replaced by TSI-based rules. National rules are permitted only where the matter is not
regulated by TSI or the rule was reported to the ERA by 2020.
The ERA is solely responsible for:
–– issuing of safety certificates for international traffic (for national traffic: ERA or national safety
agency, by choice of the applicant)
–– admission of vehicles for international traffic (for national traffic: ERA or national safety
agency, by choice of the applicant)
–– operation of the “One-Stop-Shop” IT tool for applicants in the field of the two activities

ETCS for Engineers

The contents introduce to the European Train Control System
(ETCS), a description of how ETCS works and the levels at
which it may be employed; and explore the sub-systems,
processes and interfaces.

1st ed. 2011, Author: Peter Stanley, 312 pages,

Hardcover, ISBN 978-3-96245-034-2, Print € 68,-*
www.pmcmedia.com/etcseng

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 8.4 ETCS

mentioned above (“One-Stop-Shop” means, there will be just a single application needed
to get a certificate in contrast to the old process that required multiple applications at
authorities in different countries, leading to different or conflicting requirements)
–– interoperability of ERTMS infrastructure
ERTMS (European Rail Traffic Management System) is an industrial project established by
the European Union with the signalling and the GSM-R industry and railway stakeholders,
consisting of two parts:
–– European Train Control System (ETCS), for train control
–– GSM-R, for train communication
Besides GSM-R and ETCS, the European Traffic Management Layer (ETML) for disposition, without
safety-relevance used to be part of ERTMS, but it is not listed as part of ERTMS since the release
of ETCS in SRS version 3.3.0 on the ERA website. In the broader area of ERTMS there are two
more projects to be named: The main goal of the European project Integrated European Signalling
System (INESS) was to define a core of standardised functions for future interlocking systems.
EULYNX is a project focussed on standardisation of elements of the signalling system and interfaces
to use elements that aim to reduce life-cycle costs. This enables the separation of field elements
– life-cycle and manufacturer – from the interlocking. For example, it will be possible to replace an
interlocking system by a new type of a different manufacturer and reuse the field elements.
The history of ETCS began in 1989 in four phases (see figure 8.36):
1. 1989–1995 was the phase of studies, first concepts and drafts for specifications. The focus
was European high speed lines. Some basic decisions were made, such as the choice of
data transmission media (GSM-R/Eurobalise/Euroloop), the definition of the three levels and
the layout of the DMI. The first versions of the Functional Requirements Specification (FRS)
and the System Requirements Specification (SRS, UNISIG Subset-026) were written. ETCS
was foreseen for high speed lines.
2. 1996–2003 was the phase of mature specifications, tests and pilot projects on several
lines. During this phase, starting with a draft of TSI in 1996, the basic design was confirmed
and the specifications extended to individual components. In 2001, interoperability was
demanded for TEN-corridors, leading to the extension of ETCS to the conventional railway
network. The early applications showed, that different interpretations of the specification led
to incompatibilities between the same version of different suppliers.
3. 2004–2012 was the phase of increasing implementation. Besides the European Union
where equipment with ETCS is mandatory on high-speed lines and the TEN-corridors, this
extended to numerous countries outside Europe with ETCS equipped lines, mainly in Asia,
the Middle East and North Africa. For many years, SRS Release 2.3.0d was the basis for
implementation. Practical experience still showed some uncertainties, with incompatibilities
between the versions of different suppliers and the potential for optimisation in the
specifications. Therefore, the specifications were redeveloped to current Baseline 3, starting
with SRS version 3.0.0 as a copy of 2.3.0d.
4. 2013–today is the phase of commercial roll-out in several countries. With SRS version 3.3.0
as the first Baseline 3 version which is suitable for commercial use, compatibility issues
between different suppliers of rolling stock and infrastructure were eliminated. The further
development of ETCS (currently SRS Release 3.6.0) resolved some minor issues. While
there is still potential for improvements, e. g. regarding braking curves, some countries
started a nationwide migration process towards ETCS: Switzerland migrated the total
network by 2018 and Denmark plans to be in service in 2021. By 2018, 54 % of contracted
lines with ETCS were outside Europe (ERTMS 2019), resulting in the establishment of ETCS
as a worldwide standard, not driven by interoperability but a wide market of suppliers.

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8 Train Protection

Figure 8.36: Evolution of ETCS

The main agents in the development and implementation process of ETCS are:
–– The European Commission which has the overall responsibility for ETCS.
–– The ERA is responsible for standardisation of the detail, the redevelopment of the
specification and the change management.
–– The International Union of Railways (UIC), the Community of European Railways (CER) and
the ERTMS User Group are also involved as railway organisations.
–– UNISIG (UNIFE Signalling Group), a working group of the main companies of railway
signalling industry in Europe, do the main development and specification work for ETCS.
–– The Notified Bodies (NoBo Rail) assess the conformity of particular solutions and country
specific implementations with the ETCS specifications.
Problems in the introduction process are the high investment value in the existing national
systems due to their long life and the migration from the old national systems to ETCS
requiring the double-equipment of lines and/or vehicles. To facilitate the migration process,
specific adapted solutions, such as Limited Supervision (LS) were developed.
The following explanations on ETCS are based mainly on the UNISIG Specifications
Subset-026 for Baseline 2 (current version 2.3.0d) and Baseline 3.

8.4.2 Application Levels

8.4.2.1 Overview
The system requirements specification for ETCS is published in Subset-026. It is under
continuous development and is frequently updated.
In comparison to other train control systems, ETCS is different due to fundamental
reasons; the importance of software compared with older train protection systems

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 8.4 ETCS

has been raised in ETCS. This brings the diametrically opposed paradigms of software
development to the world of railways: The software developer, who aims to improve
the product, wants the user to use the latest release as soon as possible to reduce the
number of versions to be maintained at the same time. This relates in particular to known
bugs or security issues. In the railway, safety is reached through an elaborate approval
process that involves several experts and is time-consuming. The standard development
process of business software is not suitable for safety-relevant software. The definitions
in Subset-026 are written as text. By interpreting the text in specific ways, different
developers might produce incompatibilities.
Furthermore, ETCS gives the infrastructure manager the opportunity to granularly control
investments on the trackside by the definition of application levels. This affects the necessity
to provide lineside signals, GSM-R based data-communication and the update of interlocking
systems not economically compatible with ETCS.
Regarding the equipment of the lines and trains, ETCS specifies three application levels: 1, 2
and 3. Beside that there are two levels for situations, where ETCS is not available (0 and NTC)
and three types of equipment of lines developed after the finalisation of the basic structure of
the specification that might be represented as an independent level, but will be shown to the
driver as one of levels 1 to 3 (Limited Supervision, ERTMS regional and Level 2/3 Hybrid).
The components used track-side and on-board will be described in chapter 8.4.3.

8.4.2.2 Level 1
Level 1 (figure 8.37) in mode Full Supervision (see chapter 8.4.5) matches category 4
according to chapter 8.3.5. All relevant information for calculating the braking curves will
be transmitted from track to train at discrete points, facilitating continuous supervision. The
main transmission medium are Eurobalises which transmit, among other items, movement
authorities and profile data to the train when passing the balise. Balises can be fixed data or
switchable. The former store all data content in the balise itself (only static data) and need
therefore no trackside information connection, whereas for the latter, a Lineside Electronic
Unit (LEU) selects the data according to input information, e. g. signal aspects. Balises
are usually linked with each other, which means that most balise groups are announced
by a previous balise group, enabling the detection of faulty balises by trainside distance
measurement. The interlocking system uses track clear detection to set and release routes.
As there is no communication from train to track, the train is not individually known by the
trackside.

Figure 8.37: Data flow in ETCS Level 1 (Full Supervision)

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8 Train Protection

Besides the balises, linear infill devices can be used locally to transmit changes of signal
aspects beyond in time. These are Euroloops (cable loops in the rail) or radio infill units.
Alternatively, infill functions can also be fulfilled by placing several balise groups within a short
distance on the approach to the signal.
Based on the information received from the trackside and on the train data, which include
braking characteristics, the train computer calculates the dynamic speed profile which will be
signalised to the driver in the cab on the DMI and supervised by the EVC.
As Level 1 provides continuous guidance functions by movement authority, trackside signals
are optional, but still used in most cases. Although there is no general technical limitation of
speed, Level 1 is mainly used in conventional traffic for speeds up to 160 km/h. This limit
is set nationally, e. g. Denmark 180 km/h or France 200 km/h. Most countries demand a
continuous communication link between train and infrastructure for higher speeds.
If no infill devices are provided, trackside signals, at least in a simplified form, are necessary in
practice. Simple lights (so-called overrun lights) might be used to indicate to the driver, that there
is a movement authority available from the balise and the train will not be tripped when passing
the balise. Nevertheless, the signaller can set the signal to danger at any time.

Figure 8.38: Speed distance diagram for operational performance of ETCS Level 1, simulation by
OpenTrack

Figure 8.38 shows an investigation on operational performance under different assumptions

for the ETCS equipment in approach to a signal in Level 1. This kind of investigation is required
wherever there is a change of track speed (grey line in diagram) or next to stations where trains
are frequently overtaken.
–– Train 1 represents the scenario “Stop at signal” (black line).
For trains 2 to 6 the next main signal changes to green at the position with the green triangle.
Depending on the track layouts, a following train will receive the cleared signal aspect at
different locations:

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 8.4 ETCS

–– In the scenario of train 2, there is a release speed of 40 km/h to enable the train to reach
the signal balise group. Therefore, train 2 has to run at 40 km/h until it passes the signal
balise at the main signal. In this case safety is high, but operational performance is poor.
–– For comparison, in the scenario train 3, the train could accelerate again immediately
upon reaching the release speed of 40 km/h. This scenario is not compliant with ETCS
specifications, but is possible in some other balise based train protection systems.
–– Train 4 gets the information by an infill balise, which is situated at a defined distance in rear
of the main signal. Therefore, it only has to pass the location of the infill balise to receive the
upgraded signal aspect.
–– For train 5 a loop has been installed, therefore the train can accelerate immediately when
reaching the loop (or at any point inside the loop area as soon as the signal clears).
Typically, the business case is either to install a loop or infill balises.
–– In the case of train 6 three infill balises are installed in different distances in rear of the main
signal, where already the first one provides the upgraded signal aspect.

8.4.2.3 Level 2
Level 2 (figure 8.39) can be classified into category 5 according to chapter 8.3.6.
Information between track and train is continuously and bi-directionally transmitted by
Euroradio, a radio standard for data communication based on GSM-R (chapter 8.4.1).
The GSM-R link is theoretically continuous, but can be interrupted due to handovers from
one base transceiver station to the next or disruptions in general. A national value can be
set for the maximum time allowed to continue a train movement without a radio link and
the following reaction, when the time is exceeded (see national values in chapter 8.4.4.6).
These values are a compromise between safety and availability or equipment costs of the
GSM-R network and have a high impact on the capacity of the railway network.
The central trackside unit is the Radio Block Centre (RBC). It is responsible for the
control of a longer section of a line. It stores the track topology including the permitted
speed and gradient of track sections and obtains dynamic data like signal aspects and
point positions from the interlocking systems in the area. As in Level 1, the interlocking
systems are responsible for track clear detection and the setting of routes, but have to
be replaced when the connection to the RBC is economically not reasonable. This is the
case for mechanical interlockings and older types of relay interlockings where the number
of interlocking machines and the costs of certification will not justify the design of an
interface to the RBC.

Figure 8.39: Data flow in ETCS Level 2

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8 Train Protection

In contrast to Level 1, the trains are individually known in the RBC. The RBC sends an
updated Movement Authority to the RBC whenever available. Trains send position reports in
short time (e. g. every 6 seconds), after passing balises and upon request by RBC. Balises
are mainly needed for positioning the train, the error of the odometry rises with increased
distance from the last reference balise group (LRBG) up to 5 %. On open lines with long block
sections, the balises are normally installed every 1 to 2 km. Except in special situations like the
supervision of an autonomous level crossing (see chapter 13.4.1.1), only fixed data balises are
used. Level 2 is in operation and is being introduced continuously on several high speed and
conventional lines.
Figure 8.40 shows an ETCS Level 2 section between traditional signalling. The speed distance
and the acceleration distance diagram illustrate the differences in braking characteristics
outside ETCS compared to ETCS Level 2. Due to the more restrictive ETCS braking curve, in
the ETCS section the braking starts earlier, which leads to a lower maximum speed. Moreover,
the braking curve looks different in the ETCS section because of the specification. If ETCS
were to be simply rolled out on an existing signalling layout, running time will increase. To
increase the capacity, it is necessary to create a new block layout with shorter blocks than
existing ones (Eichenberger 2007). Upgrading of a line to ETCS will require a complete
redesign of the signalling layout.

Figure 8.40: Impact on the operational performance in an ETCS Level 2 model, simulation by
OpenTrack

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 8.4 ETCS

8.4.2.4 Level 3
Level 3 (figure 8.41) is like Level 2 classified as category 5 according to chapter 8.3.6 and
characterised by the same bi-directional communication as in Level 2.
The main difference between Levels 2 and 3 is that in Level 2 ETCS only takes the responsibility
for signal and train protection functions, whereas Level 3 shifts the track clear detection from the
interlocking to the train. By continuously checking train integrity on the train and transmitting this
information frequently to the RBC, trackside devices such as axle counters or track circuits can
be omitted. This may reduce costs of the infrastructure and simplify track maintenance. Based
on this, Level 3 offers the possibility of short virtual block sections, that may raise the capacity
of the line. The supervision of train integrity offers also the possibility to use the principle of
moving block operation (see chapters 3.4.2.2 and 10.7). In that case the protection of following
movements is no longer part of the interlocking, but the task of the RBC. Moving block operation
will raise the complexity of the train protection system, especially in degraded situations.

Figure 8.41: Data flow in ETCS Level 3

Level 1 Level 2 Level 3

data transmission –– intermittent –– continuous (GSM-R) –– continuous (GSM-R)
(Eurobalise) –– positioning: –– positioning:
–– partially linear Eurobalise Eurobalise
(Euroloop, Radio-Infill)
signalling trackside and/or cab cab cab
train detection conventional conventional on-board train integrity
system control
train separation fixed block fixed block or optimised optimised fixed block or
fixed block moving block
static infrastructure LEU* g Eurobalise RBC RBC
data
dynamic interlocking g (LEU*) interlocking g RBC interlocking g RBC
infrastructure data g Eurobalise
determination of LEU/Eurobalise (local) RBC (central) RBC (central)
movement authority
generation of dynamic onboard onboard onboard
speed profile
* In the case of new interlocking systems that are capable of controlling Eurobalises directly, LEUs are not needed
and data will go directly from interlocking to Eurobalise.

Table 8.5: Information flow in Levels 1, 2 and 3

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8 Train Protection

8.4.2.5 Level 0
Beside Levels 1 to 3 designated for operation of ETCS, there are two levels, where the train
part provides only limited functions: Level 0 and Level NTC/STM.
The term ETCS Level 0 (figure 8.42) describes the situation where a vehicle which is equipped
with ETCS moves in an unequipped area. The supervision functions are limited to supervision
of a speed limit, which is the minimum of both, a generally defined speed limit for Level 0 in
the country/region and the maximum permitted train speed. This limit is set within the national
values (see chapter 8.4.4.6). The defined region does not need to follow political boundaries.

Figure 8.42: Data flow in ETCS Level 0

8.4.2.6 Level NTC/STM

Level NTC (National Train Control – term in Baseline 3), as also called Level STM (Specific
Transmission Module – term in baseline 2) (see figure 8.43) is designed for situations where
a train which is equipped with ETCS moves on a line without ETCS, but with a national train
protection system. This level, more precisely different levels, one for each national system,
has been defined for the migration period. An additional module, the STM, is added to the
on-board equipment to translate between the respective national system and ETCS (chapter
8.4.5 Operation Modes). An individual STM for each national system is needed, an equipment
with multiple STMs will be economically disadvantageous, impeding safety and interoperability
advantages of ETCS. The functions of ETCS and the information shown on the DMI in mode
NTC are limited to the functions of the underlying train control system.

Figure 8.43: Data flow in ETCS Level NTC

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 8.4 ETCS

Level 0 Level NTC

–– intermittent (Eurobalise) for
intermittent (Eurobalise) for performing performing of level transitions
data transmission
of level transitions –– according to national system,
outside scope of ETCS
trackside or cab, depending on the
signalling trackside
national system
train detection
outside scope of ETCS outside scope of ETCS
system
train separation fixed block fixed block
static functionality depends on the national
none
infrastructure data system
dynamic functionality depends on the national
none
infrastructure data system
determination of functionality depends on the national
outside scope of ETCS
movement authority system

generation of none, only supervision of maximum

onboard, level of supervision depends
dynamic speed design speed of the train and maximum
on the national system
profile speed permitted in unfitted areas

Table 8.6: Information flow in Level 0 and NTC

8.4.2.7 Level 1 Limited Supervision

In the following, three types of equipment for lines are described. These are indicated to
the driver as one of levels 1 to 3, but differ from the system design described above. The
development of Level 1 mode Limited Supervision (LS) (figure 8.44) goes back to the
engagement of Swiss railways SBB at the beginning of the 21st century and offers braking
curve supervision only between distant signal and main signal and just a supervision of
maximum train speed outside those sections. One aim in the development process of ETCS
was to raise the safety level, which is the main reason why such equipment which could be
characterised as type 2 (chapter 8.3.3) was not specified in the SRS. On the other hand, a
lot of infrastructure managers are operating such train protection systems. This equipment
standard is designated for the easy migration of existing lines.
Eurobalises are placed on the track, in most cases close to existing devices of national
systems, imitating functions of the existing national system that can be chosen by national
values. It is possible to use standardised balises that need no linking information (see
Eurobalises in chapter 8.4.3). Lineside signals are mandatory and the DMI mainly shows the
actual speed of the train, but no permitted speed. The driver is responsible for obeying lineside
signals and national operation rules; ETCS will provide background supervision only, cab
signalling is not possible. Thus, LS is no full train control system, but a train protection system.
It will furthermore behave differently on various railway networks and provide no operational
interoperability, but facilitates the technical migration to ETCS.
Limited Supervision offers several advantages (Panten/Richard 2007):
–– Interlocking systems need no (early) upgrade.
–– Capacity and safety of the line will stay the same.
–– No complex planning process needed, as would be necessary for Level 1 or 2.
–– Old vehicles will not need full ETCS equipment.
–– ETCS-only for new vehicles is possible.

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8 Train Protection

The migration in Switzerland (Zünd/Heiz 2006) began with the equipment of rolling stock with
ETCS components, including a Eurobalise Transmission Module (ETM). In a second step,
the trackside SIGNUM and ZUB components were replaced by Eurobalises and sometimes
Euroloops, still holding SIGNUM and ZUB data. In this step the availability is already raised,
due to the paired installation of Eurobalises. When mode Limited Supervision was available, the
Eurobalises got a software update, adding ETCS information to the SIGNUM and ZUB data.
After completion of that phase in 2018, the whole network is compatible with ETCS, allowing
network access with ETCS only and reducing investments for new vehicles. In a next step,
Limited Supervision will be replaced by Level 2, depending on life cycle of interlockings or
capacity demands.

Figure 8.44: Data flow in ETCS Level 1 mode Limited Supervision

8.4.2.8 Level 2/3 Hybrid

Level 2/3 Hybrid (figure 8.45) brings the benefits of Level 3 to the conventional railway
network. In Level 3, trains may supervise their own integrity. While most passenger trains
comply with this requirement, there is no economically justifiable solution for freight train
available on the market. From Level 2 upwards, the train will send position reports to the RBC
when passing a balise. The RBC has to evaluate the integrity information supported with the
position report and calculate the cleared sections for the train detection system by considering
the safe train length. Compared with conventional and Level 3 operation, the information for
the train detection system will be merged from RBC and trackside components.

Figure 8.45: Data flow in ETCS Level 2/3 Hybrid

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 8.4 ETCS

To facilitate the operation of Level 2 trains, trackside train detection equipment is still needed, but
in limited quantity, e. g. only in stations. Block sections can be divided into virtual sub-sections
to raise the capacity of the line just by the installation of balises, forcing the train to send a new
position report to the RBC. For Level 3 trains the headway is determined by the virtual block
sections in a short distance. Level 2 trains without integrity monitoring have still access to those
lines, but in this case the headway is defined by the conventional block sections.
By that means, the capacity of the line can be raised with the existing or even reduced
equipment with train detection systems. The capacity will rise by the percentage of trains with
train integrity monitoring. ETCS Level 2/3 Hybrid will bring the advantages of Level 3 without the
need for redesign of interlocking systems, as would be required by the moving block principle.

8.4.2.9 ERTMS Regional

Originally, the aim of ETCS Level 3 was to increase capacity by shortening headways on lines with
very high traffic levels. ERTMS Regional (figure 8.46), in contrast, focusses on the minimisation
of infrastructure costs and is designed for application in rural areas or on secondary lines with low
traffic. The on-board part is identical to the installation used in Level 2, enabling easy movements
of trains to main lines with standard ETCS. The trackside equipment uses a different layout. Central
unit in ERTMS Regional is the Traffic Control Centre (TCC), combining functions of
–– interlocking system,
–– Radio Block Centre (RBC) and
–– Traffic Management System (TMS).
Thus safety relevant and non-safety relevant functions are handled by one operator and centralised
in one unit, recovering the idea of ERTMS as a system for both, technical and operational functions.
Trackside elements are connected to object controllers (OC), which can be linked to the
TCC either by cable or by GSM-R. Sections will be cleared, when a train has completely
left the section with its minimum safe rear end (see figure 8.51) and this is confirmed by the
train integrity monitoring system. For trains not equipped with ETCS, hand held terminals
are provided and in the interlocking a special route will be set. Block sections can be free,
occupied or restrictive. For trains with active integrity monitoring, sections can be free or
occupied, while block sections used by special routes will remain restrictive until the driver
states the integrity to the operator. In this design the risk of train separation is higher compared
with full trackside equipment. Until 2019, there was only one application of ERTMS Regional
on the Västerdalsbanan in Sweden and tests on three lines in Italy.

Figure 8.46: Data flow in ERTMS Regional

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Level 1 LS Level 2/3 Hybrid ERTMS Regional

–– intermittent
–– continuous (GSM-R) –– intermittent (GSM-R)
(Eurobalise)
data transmission –– positioning: –– positioning:
–– partially linear
Eurobalise Eurobalise
(Euroloop, Radio-Infill)
signalling trackside only cab cab
conventional for block
on-board train integrity
sections (Level 2 trains)
control or based on aural
train detection
conventional communication between
system on-board train integrity
driver an operator (trains
control for virtual sub-
without integrity control)
sections (Level 3 trains)
fixed block (Level 2) or
optimised fixed block or
train separation fixed block optimised fixed block
moving block
(Level 3)
static
none RBC TCC
infrastructure data
dynamic interlocking g (LEU) g
interlocking g RBC TCC
infrastructure data Eurobalise
determination of
LEU/Eurobalise (local) RBC (central) TCC (central)
movement authority
generation of
dynamic speed onboard onboard onboard
profile

Table 8.7: Information flow in Level 1 LS, Level 2/3 Hybrid and ERTMS Regional

8.4.3 Technical Components

In the following, the main technical components of ETCS are summarised, beginning with the
train equipment:
–– The European Vital Computer (EVC) is a fail-safe computer on the leading vehicle from
where the train is controlled. It conducts the ETCS-related coordination and calculation
functions on the train. Tasks are the calculation of the dynamic speed profile, the storing of
the train data, speed supervision, control of the operational modes and others.

Figure 8.47: ETCS DMI in Target Speed Monitoring with overspeed (orange) and brake intervention
(red) status (ERA ETCS DMI)

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 8.4 ETCS

–– The Driver Machine Interface (DMI) consists of the cab signalling display (figure 8.47), emitters
for acoustic signals and input devices such as that for starting the mission, overriding an end of
authority and input of train data. The cab signal displays the distance to the next braking target,
the speed which has to be obeyed there, the dynamically calculated current speed restriction
and the actual speed of the train. The planning area on the right side shows changes in the
permitted speed, the gradient of the line as well as orders and announcements. The left display
in figure 8.47 shows a current speed of 143 km/h with a target speed of 40 km/h in a distance
of 760 m. The current Level is Level 1, which is indicated by the number below the distance bar
on the left. The overspeed is presented in the circular speed gauge in orange, indication status in
yellow and normal status in grey. The planning area on the right shows the distance scale on the
left, the gradient profile in the middle and the planning area speed profile in light blue on the right
with the target speed of 40 km/h close to the gradient. On the right DMI a brake intervention is
shown with a target speed at zero in a distance of 290 m. By showing the current and permitted
speed and the planning area in one display, the driver gets all relevant information to control the
speed in one display, which is advantageous to train protection systems.
–– The Train Interface Unit (TIU) serves for communication with the train equipment such as
brakes or control of doors.
–– Transmission modules for Euroradio, Balises, and Euroloops communicate with the
trackside. The antenna for Eurobalises is part of the Balise Transmission Module (BTM) and
the antenna for Euroloop part of the optional Loop Transmission Module (LTM). Often both
modules BTM and LTM are combined in the same module.
–– The Odometry measures the travelled distance in relation to the Last Relevant Balise
Group (LRBG).
–– The Juridical Recording Unit (JRU) stores several events for evaluation of critical incidents.
–– One or several Specific Transmission Modules (STM) for communication with national
train protection systems can be applied as an option.
The main trackside components of ETCS are:
–– Eurobalises (figure 8.48) (used in Levels 1, 2 and 3) as spot transmitters are used
in the form of single balises (so-called ‘single balise group’) or in groups of up to
eight balises. The balises are working as transponders and need no lineside energy
supply to send information to the train. They are either fixed data balises without any
informational connection to other trackside devices or switchable balises with data
connection, e. g. from signals, via a Lineside Electronic Unit (LEU). There are balises
with integrated LEU available on the market. An alternative to LEU is direct control
of balises from the electronic interlocking together with the trackside signals (if these
are used). In both cases, the LEU or the interlocking will select a movement authority
according to the signal aspect.
As balises are mounted centrally in the track, they are read by trains travelling in both
directions. Data can be dedicated for one or for both directions. The train can identify the
orientation of the balise group either by the internal numbering of balises within the group
or by linking information from a balise group in rear. By linking information, the EVC knows
when the next balise is to be expected, facilitating the detection of faulty balises.
For balises different mounting principles apply, depending on the type of track and the
manufacturer. Balises can be attached to sleepers, the fastening of the rail or to the slab
bed. Balises can be distinguished in standard and reduced balises, the dimensions and
mass in each category are dependent on the manufacturer. A special requirement is
resistance against ice falling from passing trains.

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8 Train Protection

Figure 8.48: Eurobalises of different manufacturers (Germany, Siemens and Italy, Ansaldo)

–– Radio Block Centre (RBC) is the central trackside controlling unit in Levels 2 and 3. It is,
among others, responsible for storing static line data, for obtaining dynamic data from the
interlocking systems and for generating the movement authorities (MA) and profiles. The RBC
communicates with trains by the Euroradio based on GSM-R (figure 8.49). One RBC can
control a defined number of trains, e. g. 60 at the same time. Other limiting factors can be
the number of connected interlockings and neighbouring RBCs, as well as number of balises
and field equipment – tracks, signals, point machines. A typical value are a thousand field
elements per RBC, which equals about 50 km of double track line with smaller stations.

Figure 8.49: Trackside antenna of GSM-R (photo: DB AG/Hans-Joachim Kirsche)

–– Euroloops and Radio Infill Units (optional in Level 1 only) are linear transmitters of limited
extent for the transmission of infill information related to a position in advance, such as
upgrades of signal aspects.

8.4.4 Functional Concepts

8.4.4.1 Positioning of a Train

The train knows its position only in a linear form along the path. All positioning information is
linear and relative to a reference balise group in rear.

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 8.4 ETCS

Inexactness of the estimated location of the train has to be considered; therefore a confidence
interval is calculated. The width of the confidence interval is narrow (although not zero)
immediately after passing a reference balise group. It then increases linearly with the distance
from the balise group due to the inexactness of train-based relative length measurement (figure
8.50). At each reference balise group the position is corrected. Depending on the usage of the
position information, the following positions can be relevant (figure 8.51):
–– the estimated position
–– the maximum safe front end position
–– the minimum safe front end position
–– the maximum safe rear end position
–– the minimum safe rear end position
In Levels 2 and 3, the train periodically or at certain events (passing a balise, request from RBC)
reports its position including the confidence interval, the train speed and direction to the RBC.

Figure 8.50: Confidence interval of ETCS length measurement in relation to balise positions

Figure 8.51: Confidence interval for the train position

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8 Train Protection

8.4.4.2 Movement Authority (MA)

The Movement Authority (MA) is the permission for the train to pass a section of track with a
defined length. The MA is transmitted from the trackside to the train: in Level 1 by balises and in
Levels 2 and 3 by the RBC. The MA can be split into sections and for each section an optional
time-out value can be defined. Each MA is valid until new MA information reaches the train or the
time-out has expired. The purpose of the time-outs is to conform with the manual or automatic
time delayed release of routes, of the last route section and/or the overlap in some countries and
interlocking types (see chapters 4.3.3.6 and 4.5.3). An emergency stop command will be given
to the train, if the route is cancelled ahead of the train or another dangerous event (e. g. level
crossing or flank protection defect) is registered between the train and its target signal.
The End of Authority (EOA) (figure 8.54) is the position where the train is obliged to stop with its
max safe front end, comparable with a red signal. Beyond the EOA, a Supervised Location (SvL)
(figure 8.54) can be defined and calculated as the target for the emergency braking curve. The SvL is:
–– the end of the overlap if there is an overlap which has not yet expired
–– the danger point in advance of the EOA (e. g. fouling point of points) if there is no distinct
overlap or it has expired
–– the EOA if neither an end of overlap nor a danger point is applicable
Normally, each movement authority is replaced by a new movement authority, which normally
reaches to a position further beyond. There are, however, some situations of shortening a
movement authority in Levels 2 and 3:
–– Co-operative shortening is mainly used in cases where operational decisions require
manual cancellation of the route. The RBC sends a request for shortening to the train,
whereupon the EVC checks if the train can be stopped safely at the new EOA and accepts
or rejects the new MA.
–– An Unconditional Emergency Stop (UES) is sent to the train in certain emergency situations
or technical defects on the trackside. When receiving an unconditional emergency stop
message, the train has to be tripped (stopped by emergency brake) immediately.
–– A Conditional Emergency Stop (CES) is always sent with reference to a defined position. The
train only needs to be stopped if its min safe front end hasn’t yet reached that position, otherwise
the train will reject the CES. The CES can be used in dangerous situations which are connected
to a certain position. However, the most common use is to send a CES when a signal on the
route has changed to stop. In most cases, the reason for the signal to show a stop aspect was
that the train itself has passed the signal, so the train will reject the CES in most cases.
–– A MA Shortening is a shortening of the MA to a new position. It can be used for emergency
stopping a train as well as for preventing of the train to continue to move after a CES or UES.
The situations where the one or the other of these commands is used vary between countries.

8.4.4.3 Profiles
Different characteristics related to the path of the train are transmitted as profile data. Profile
data have the structure of a chain of values with the related beginning and ending positions on
the track (may depend on curves, points, bridges, tunnels, etc.) and are transmitted from the
trackside to the train. Examples for profiles are:
–– The static speed profile (SSP) includes the line speed, permanent speed restrictions and
route related speed restrictions. It is needed by the EVC to calculate the Most Restrictive
Speed Profile (MRSP). This is calculated as the minimum of all speed restrictions,
including also temporary speed restrictions, the permitted speed of the train, mode related
speed restrictions (chapter 8.4.5) and others.

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 8.4 ETCS

–– The gradient profile defines the gradient of the line and is needed by the train to calculate
the braking curve (dynamic speed profile). If the minimum value of longitudinal inclination
varies within a segment, the gradient value for that segment has to be considered to the
safe side (figure 8.52).
–– The track condition profile gives particular information related to electric traction, air
tightness (required for air conditioning in passenger vehicles), tunnels and bridges where
stopping is forbidden, radio holes and others.
–– The route suitability profile defines criteria a train has to fulfil to be allowed to enter certain
track sections regarding axle load, traction and others.

Figure 8.52: Definition of gradient profile

8.4.4.4 Supervision on the Train

The following explanations refer to the operation mode ‘Full Supervision’. For specialities of
other modes, see chapter 8.4.5. ETCS defines three types of supervision:
–– Ceiling speed monitoring is used for movements at constant speed without the need to
brake to a target.
–– Target speed monitoring is used in an area, where the driver needs to reduce the speed
towards a target.
–– Release speed monitoring is used in an area close to the EOA, where the train may run at
release speed to reach the target.
For ceiling speed monitoring, four different speed limits are relevant (from the lowest to the
highest), marking a tolerance margin above the permitted speed (figure 8.54):
–– The permitted speed (P) is displayed to the driver and shall not be exceeded.
–– If the driver exceeds the warning speed (W), a warning tone sounds.
–– If the service brake intervention speed (SBI) is exceeded, service brakes are
automatically triggered.
–– If the emergency brake intervention speed (EBI) is exceeded, the emergency brake
command is given.
The EBI is, depending on the speed, 5 to 15 km/h above the permitted speed. The SBI and
W shall be defined that way that reaching of the EBI is avoided and that the driver has a real
chance to react on the warning signals, considering reaction times.

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8 Train Protection

Figure 8.53: Simplified model for calculation of braking curves in ETCS in target speed monitoring

In Target speed monitoring, an additional Indication (I) curve is used to define the point where
the driver firstly gets an announcement, which indicates that he has to start braking soon.
Considering the time which passes until full braking power is reached after exceeding an SBI
limit, the train will brake along or below the Service Brake Deceleration (SBD) curve. The
same principle is used for the emergency brake where the train brakes along or below the
Emergency Brake Deceleration (EBD) curve until standstill.

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Whereas the curves I, P, W, SBI and SBD are calculated towards the EOA as braking target,
EBI and EBD can be calculated towards the SvL (Supervised Location), which takes into
consideration overlaps and danger points (figure 8.54).
The calculation of the curves (figure 8.53) is depending on infrastructure parameters, correction
factors and train parameters. After calculating the deceleration with emergency brake and
service brake, EBD and SBD are determined. Mainly with the safe time needed to apply each
type of brake, SBI1 and EBI will be calculated. To avoid the application of emergency brake,
SBI2 will be calculated from EBI curve with the time to apply the service brake. As SBI is defined
as the minimum of SBI1 and SBI2, usually the EBI curve should not be reached. The crossing of
EBD and SBD will lead to a discontinuity in the SBI. The P curve takes into account the reaction
time of the driver which is set as a fixed value of four seconds, the I curve is calculated from P.
The time between SBI and W is set as a fixed value of two seconds.
With the SvL situated a longer distance beyond the EOA, this helps to avoid an important
disadvantage: Although emergency brakes can usually use higher braking deceleration than
service brakes, only safe brakes can be considered for calculating the EBD which makes the
EBI and EBD curves comparatively flat. With the other curves below the EBI, an unfavourable
early start of the braking process would be required, which would lead to an undesired
reduction of the capacity of the line.
In release speed monitoring only the release speed and the curves I, SBD and EBD are
supervised. When passing EOA with minimum safe front end, the train will be tripped. To raise the
safety, balises are placed close to the signal that will reduce the confidence interval of the train.
Besides supervision of the static and dynamic speed profile, additional functions are used to prevent
unintended movements: Reverse Movement Protection, Standstill Supervision and Roll Away
Protection.
Regarding the release of brakes, two kinds of brake interventions are defined:
–– A Train Trip can be released only after the train has come to a standstill and after
acknowledgement of the driver. This form is applied for exceeding the EOA (chapter
8.4.4.2), unintended movements and various technical failure cases.
–– In contrast, after exceeding the speed, brakes can be released when reaching a safe speed again.

Figure 8.54: Braking curves in ETCS

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8.4.4.5 Text Messages

Text messages for the train driver can be automatically generated or typed by the signaller
or dispatcher. Besides the text itself, information about the time and location for displaying
the message, restriction to certain levels or operation modes and the necessity of
acknowledgement by the driver can be transmitted.

8.4.4.6 Values for Variables

Predefined values of variables can be defined in one of three forms:
–– Fixed values are general values which do not change from one application to the other.
Examples are:
• cycle for the train to request a movement authority unless received otherwise: 60
seconds
• assumed adhesion value for slippery rails: 70 %
–– National values are defined for a country or region and transmitted to the train as a
complete data packet by balises or RBC, when accessing an area or network of another
infrastructure manager. Examples are (with default value in brackets):
• modification of adhesion factor by the driver (not allowed)
• mode related speed restriction for shunting (30 km/h)
• distance for brake application in roll away protection, reverse movement protection and
standstill supervision (2 m)
• the waiting time T_NVCONTACT and the reaction of the train M_NVCONTACT after
expiry of the waiting time in case of loss of contact to the RBC. M_NVCONTACT can be
either trip or service brake or no reaction. T_NVCONTACT can be seen as a compromise
between safety and availability, while both parameters will have a high impact on the
capacity of the railway network.
–– Train data are entered by the driver or generated automatically on the train when starting
the train. Examples are:
• permitted speed of the train
• braking characteristics
• train length

8.4.5 Operation Modes

The mode describes the operational situation of the train. Altogether, 16 modes are defined in
the System Requirements Specifications, Baseline 2, and two additional modes, LS and PS,
are defined in Baseline 3. In the following, the modes will be classified into six groups. As first
groups, the modes for regular operation under supervision of ETCS are described:
–– Full Supervision (FS) is the ‘normal’ case with the train fully supervised by ETCS.
–– Limited Supervision (LS) is only defined for Level 1 and only from Baseline 3 and uses
reduced functions. The optical cab signalling is deactivated and the only supervised speed
is the EBI, therefore ETCS works in the background. An advantage of this mode is the
ability to start braking closer to the EOA (figure 8.54). This increases line capacity and, in
existing systems, reduces the demand to change positions of trackside distant signals
and therefore facilitates migration from national train protection systems to ETCS (chapter
8.4.2.7 Level 1 Limited Supervision).
–– In On Sight (OS) mode, the train proceeds on sight onto a track which can be occupied by
vehicles or obstacles. This mode is selected by this restriction being received from the trackside.
A mode related speed restriction is defined in national values (default value: 30 km/h).

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–– Shunting (SH) mode is used for shunting movements and can be selected by the driver or
the trackside. Train data are deleted when entering SH mode, as a main purpose of shunting
is assembling and splitting of trains. If selected by the driver, in Level 2 and 3 the permission
of the RBC to shunt in the respective area is necessary. Besides the mode related speed
restriction (national value, default 30 km/h), in all levels the shunting can be supervised by
balises with “stop if in shunting mode” information or by a list of expected balise groups which
may be passed. The train is tripped when passing a balise not in the list.
The second group is a mode for degraded mode operation under the responsibility of the
driver:
–– Staff Responsible (SR) mode is used to move the train under the responsibility of the
driver when no Movement Authority is available. One case is during and after an override
when the driver passes a red signal e. g. on written instruction. Another situation particularly
in Level 1 is after starting up the ETCS on-board equipment before reaching the first
balise group. A movement on auxiliary signal is no override, but a movement authority is
used, added by the related speed restrictions. In SR mode, the driver has to check track
occupancy and positions of movable track elements in his own responsibility.
The third group are modes for prevention of hazards in critical situations:
–– Trip (TR) mode is active during a trip. A train trip is only the emergency braking until stop,
but not the braking to a safe speed in case of excessive speed (chapter 8.4.4.4).
–– Post Trip (PT) mode is activated after acknowledgement action of the driver after a trip and
permits the train to continue. The driver can select Start of Mission, Override or Shunting.
When selecting start, the next mode is Staff Responsible in Level 1, whereas in Level 2/3 a
MA is requested from the RBC.
–– Reversing (RV) mode is used to move trains backwards in safety critical situations without
the need to change cabs beforehand. It can only be selected by the driver in a few,
especially marked, locations. The only known application example is in long tunnels where
in case of fire the danger of delayed or prevented evacuation by the driver changing cabs is
higher than the danger by a train running blindly backwards in the tunnel.
The fourth group is modes related to other than the leading locomotive, where there is more
than one, without further supervision functions:
–– Non Leading (NL) mode is selected by the driver if the locomotive is separately controlled.
–– Sleeping (SL) mode is selected automatically by train information if the locomotive is
remotely controlled by the leading locomotive.
–– Passive Shunting (PS) is firstly defined for Baseline 3 and is used for a non-leading engine
in a shunting consist.
The fifth group includes modes for movements on lines which are not equipped with ETCS.
–– STM European (SE) mode was foreseen in Level STM if the national system is able to
provide movement authorities, speed and gradient profiles. The vehicle antennae of the
national train protection system transmit data to ETCS and ETCS signalises to the driver
and supervises the movement. Because SE mode has never been used it is dropped in
Baseline 3 specifications.
–– STM National (SN) is the normal mode in Level STM. In SN mode, the national system
supervises the movement, but uses particular ETCS components (e. g. DMI, brakes and
odometry).
–– Unfitted (UN) mode is applied when the line is either equipped with a national system for
which no STM is available, or is not equipped with any train protection system. This mode
is only defined in Level 0. The only supervised speeds are temporary speed restrictions,
train speed and a particular mode related speed (national value; default: 100 km/h).
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The sixth group is modes related to different offline and disturbance statuses of the onboard
equipment:
–– Stand By (SB) mode is the initial mode after start-up of the onboard equipment. It includes
self-test functions and supervision of the train to be stationary.
–– No Power (NP) mode is automatically selected if the ETCS onboard equipment is not
powered. The train is immediately tripped.
–– System Failure (SF) mode is activated in case of a safety critical system failure of the
ETCS onboard equipment. The train is immediately tripped.
–– Isolated (IS) mode is active when the ETCS onboard equipment is isolated from the
other onboard equipment to continue operation in case of the above described failures.
Operation continues without supervision by ETCS.

8.4.6 Data Structure

The structure of data transmitted between track and train is described briefly here.
The smallest data unit is the variable which codes a single value.
Different variables are connected to a data packet. A packet has a header expressing the
identification (type of packet), the length of the packet, the direction for which it is valid (only for
packets from track to train), the scale for length variables (if applicable) and others. After the header,
the packet can contain several more variables, depending on the type of packet. Examples for
packets sent from track to train are a movement authority, a speed profile, a gradient profile, a
temporary speed restriction, linking information to following balise groups or a level transition
order. Examples for packets sent from train to RBC are position report, granting or rejection of
cooperative shortening request, initiation of a communication session, etc.
In communication from balise to train, a data telegram is the information content of one balise. In
communication with RBC, no telegrams exist. The telegram size is standardised: Short telegrams
have a length of 341 bits and long telegrams 1023 bits (830 user bits + safety attachment).
A message is a complete set of information in communication with balises or RBC. In
communication with balises, the data telegrams transmitted by all balises belonging to
the same balise group (1–8 balises) add to the message. A message contains several data
packets and possibly additional single variables.

8.5 CBTC

8.5.1 History of Development and Deployment

Traditional signalling systems rely almost exclusively on track circuits (chapter 5.3) or axle counters
(chapter 5.4) for detection of trains. The location of trains is determined based on the occupancy
information provided by these detectors in the form of block sections. If a train shunts a track circuit
(or if train traverses a wheel sensor), the whole block section is reported as occupied. The exact
position of the train within the block section is unknown as it can be occupied only by a fraction
of the train. Any following train has to stop by the border of the occupied block section ahead.
This approach serves well for safe train separation but does not provide maximum efficiency in
the utilisation of infrastructure, especially in mass transit. Increasing transportation demands in
large metropolitan areas require transit authorities to improve capacities of their lines, which,
in turn, are affected by minimum train separation (headway), dwell times, number of vehicles

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 8.5 CBTC

and the number of passengers in each. Improvements related to rolling stock can be expensive
and are restricted by lengths of platforms. The headway of any signalling system depends on
the separation safety factor – an equivalent to a number of braking distances separating trains.
Headway of a fixed-block signalling system can be optimised with the addition of extra block
sections in areas of constraint (platforms, junctions, turnback areas). However, this approach has
economic and practical limitations. The problem can be solved by the addition of virtual blocks in
these areas, which happened in the 1980s on RER line A in Paris. Système d’aide à la conduite,
à l’exploitation et à la maintenance (SACEM) or “Driver Assistance, Operation, and Maintenance
System”, a fixed-block overlay train control system is considered as an early Communication
Based Train Control system (CBTC) (JRC2018-6114). The original SACEM was based on the use
of beacons (transponders) and track circuits for the localisation of trains; beacons and inductive
loops for bi-directional communication between train and wayside and microprocessors as zone
controllers. The system allowed the use of mixed fleet; unequipped trains followed signal aspects
while equipped trains had to follow commands received from zone controllers. SACEM was an
interoperable system as it was created jointly by three different companies. However, all derivative
systems that were developed later based on SACEM lack this quality as they were adjusted to
reflect the needs of various customers. Other inductive loop based systems followed, including
installation at Vancouver SkyTrain, which used similar bi-directional communication and localisation
principles of LZB (section 8.3.6). Here, the loop transmits signals to and from antennae on the train,
while counting the transpositions determines location. This was one of the first CBTC systems that
corresponded to the highest Grade of Automation 4 – Unattended Train Operation (GOA), see
chapter 8.1.6 (IEC 62290-1). This allowed controlling of dwell times and decreasing operating and
maintenance costs. Multiple installations of CBTC systems from different suppliers followed, with
gradual replacement of inductive loops by radio frequency spectrum communication. Tachometers
with transponders became a standard technical solution for the localisation of trains. The other
important development was the introduction of the moving block concept into braking calculation,
which is based on the continuous monitoring of train positions instead of using the block principle.
The moving block concept is based on a continuous calculation of the safe distance ahead of each
train based on the target point, safe braking distance and safety margin.
During the past several decades CBTC has been applied by various suppliers throughout
the world in heavy metros, light rail and automated people movers in airports. However,
the system lacks interoperability as it has not been standardised prior to development as
was ERTMS. (IEEE 1474) standard was defined initially in 1999, almost twenty years after
technology has been developed. Although general system architecture is similar, components
of the major parts are not interchangeable.

8.5.2 Technical Components

CBTC is defined as a continuous Automatic Train Control (ATC) system utilising high resolution
train location determination, independent of track circuits; with continuous, high capacity,
bidirectional train to wayside data communications; and train-borne and wayside processors
capable of implementing safety related functions (IEEE 1474). CBTC consists of the
following primary components (figure 8.55): train-borne equipment, wayside equipment, data
communication equipment and Automatic Train Supervision (ATS) equipment.
Train-borne equipment consists of one or more processor-based controllers and train operator
display as well as speed and localisation sensors. Controllers have interfaces with train sub-
systems and wayside CBTC equipment. Wayside equipment consists of a series of processor-
based controllers that can be located centrally or locally, passive transponders and Auxiliary
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8 Train Protection

Wayside System (AWS) if required. ATS equipment is based on multiple industrial grade computers
and human-machine interface devices. A data communication sub-system serves as an interface
between the rest of the equipment and consists of ground-based and radio networks (figure 8.60).

Figure 8.55: Block diagram for a typical CBTC system

8.5.2.1 Train-borne Components

Train-borne equipment components of the system are:
–– Carborne Controller (CC) (figure 8.56) is a fail-safe processor that is responsible for the
following:
• train location determination
• the enforcement of permitted speed and movement authority limits
• management of operational modes and train configuration
• control of the train functions in Automatic Train Operation (ATO) mode if available
• driver assistance and providing operation and maintenance data
CC has interfaces with train power (batteries); physical and communication interface
with other train systems such as propulsion and braking, the train management system,
passenger information system and event recorder; train operator display; localisation
devices; data communication system devices.
–– Train Operator Display (TOD) is a processor based device that provides visual and audible
indications for all data required for a driver including permissive speed, current speed and
type of mode, train status and alarms. It also accepts commands from the driver. TOD is
interfaced with CC via communication-based connection and is supplied with reserved power.
–– Carborne Radio (CR) for communication-based interface with Zone Controller, Auxiliary
Wayside System (if required) and Automatic Train Supervision. It consists of a redundant set
of equipment that includes antennae, radios, network devices (i. e. Ethernet Switches) and
interconnections between them.
–– Tag (Transponder) Interrogator Antenna (TIA) as an interface point between wayside
transponders and CC. TIA provides power to passive transponders located along the track
and receives localisation information from them in return. This information is used to correct
accumulating localisation uncertainty.
–– Odometry Devices that provide constant localisation data to CC (figure 8.57).
Tachometers are used on the vast majority of CBTC systems. Tachometers measure
the rotation of a train’s axle. To compensate for wheel wear and to accommodate slip/
slide effects several sensors are installed on a train or free axle is used for installation.

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 8.5 CBTC

Also, accelerometers or Doppler radars are used for the independent detection of speed.
Some CBTC systems are utilising Optical Speed and Position Measurement System
(OSMES), which is independent of the wheel-rail interface. OSMES works by illuminating
the rail with a coherent light source (i. e. laser) and observing the speckle patterns
reflected from the rail as the train moves. A speckle pattern is a random granular pattern
produced by the reflection of a coherent light beam, e. g. laser, at a rough surface, such
as a metallic surface, a display screen, white paint, or a piece of paper. However, OSMES
requires a substantial maintenance effort and thus has a restricted application (FTA 2013).

Figure 8.56: Carborne Controller (Hitachi Rail STS)

Figure 8.57: Tachometer (top) and accelerometer (bottom)

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8.5.2.2 Wayside Components

Wayside equipment components of the system are:
–– Zone Controller (ZC) is a fail-safe processor that is responsible for the issuing of
Movement Authority Limits (MAL) to communicating trains based on the tracking of both
communicating trains (via CC) and non-communicating trains (via AWS) (figure 8.59).
It is responsible for the handover process of a train to an adjacent controller. ZC also
assists AWS in route management and provides the locations of trains to ATS. ZC has
communication-based interfaces with every CBTC train located within its zone including the
overlay, adjacent ZCs, AWS within its zone and ATS.
–– Transponders (Tags) are used to provide absolute location references that enable trains
to become and remain localised (figure 8.58). The data encoded in each transponder
represents line section, track segment and identifier within each track segment.
–– Auxiliary Wayside System (AWS) serves as a secondary train control system integrated
into primary CBTC system and provides often degraded train protection functions for
unequipped trains, trains with failed CBTC equipment or for sections of track with failed
wayside CBTC equipment. For CBTC systems without AWS, all traditional interlocking
functions are incorporated into ZC.

Figure 8.58: Examples of CBTC Wayside Transponder (Tag)

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 8.5 CBTC

Figure 8.59: Zone Controller (Hitachi Rail STS)

8.5.2.3 Data Communication System Components

The main components of Data Communication System (DCS) are:
–– Ground Based Network (GBN) serves as a communication media between network-based
components of the wayside CBTC sub-system (i. e. ZC, AWS) and ATS. It consists of network
devices such as Ethernet switches, terminal servers, routers that are connected between
each other via redundant fibre-optic rings. All devices are connected to both networks for
increased availability. Network management and security systems are innate parts of the DCS.
–– Radio Based Network (RBN) is a redundant radio frequency spectrum communication
medium for communication between trains and ZC as well as trains and ATS. Some CBTC
systems require direct communication between trains and AWS, often to interface with platform
screen door controllers. The majority of RBN systems rely on Wi-Fi wireless access technology
with some newer installations utilising Long Term Evolution (LTE) radio access technology.
Both provide high level of reliability and robustness for safety related applications required for
CBTC. RBN is also used for not safety related applications such as passenger information/
entertainment, remote diagnostics and onboard video surveillance (JRC2018-6116).

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8 Train Protection

Figure 8.60: Primary components of a typical CBTC system

8.5.2.4 ATS Components

ATS provides full functionality including commands, information and tools required for
dispatchers to supervise train movements: line display, automatic routeing of trains, trip
assignments to trains, regulation of train movements for schedule adherence, and subsystem
and equipment status (Ning 2010). It is configured in a redundant way with multiple servers for
each set. ATS can interface not only with other CBTC sub-systems but also with Supervisory
Control and Data Acquisition system (SCADA) to provide control and information about auxiliary
systems such as traction power sub-system, video surveillance, public address, ventilation etc.

8.5.3 Functional Concepts

Typical CBTC system is capable of providing Automatic Train Protection (ATP), ATO and ATS
functions. Some functions can be disabled to support lower Grade of Automation levels, if required.

8.5.3.1 ATP Functions

Train localisation is a fundamental function of a CBTC system. It allows high resolution train
location determination including the locations of the front and rear ends with a certain safety
margin that accounts for possible inaccuracies in position determination. Information received
from transponders is used to reduce the accumulating positioning error inherited from odometry.
The train gets localised once it passes two transponders, as orientation and direction become
available. Point position information is another input that is used in location determination.
CBTC can use localisation information received from AWS to track non-communicating or not
equipped trains. Sieving is another function that allows performing an accurate correlation
between localisation reports and block occupancy information provided by AWS. Once the
distance between the end of the communicating train and a boundary of a wayside block
section becomes less than the length of the shortest train operating on the line, the end of the
communicating train becomes sieved, which means that ZC can guarantee that there is no other
train or part of the other train directly in front or behind of the communicating train.

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 8.5 CBTC

Once a train is localised and sieved, it is ready to receive a Movement Authority Limit (MAL).
MAL represents an authorisation for a train to proceed up to a certain location where it has
to stop. It is calculated by ZC based on the positioning of trains, occupancy of the wayside
blocks, positions of points and other safety related and not safety related constraints on a
train’s movement originating in CC, ZC and AWS. MAL will be withdrawn in case of changed
conditions ahead such as loss of point correspondence. Among the possible limits of the
movement authority can be end of CBTC train ahead; wayside block boundary occupied by
non-communicating train or a train with inoperative cab equipment; end of track; entrance to
an interlocking without aligned and locked route etc.
Based on the static data such as information from track database including geographical data
and permanent speed limits, as well as dynamic data such as MAL, localisation and temporary
speed restrictions, CC constantly calculates ATP speed profile. The ATP speed profile is
based on a conservative safe braking model that is affected by multiple parameters including
worst-case latencies, system reaction times, geographical data, propulsion and braking
characteristics of a train as well as position uncertainties. Typical safe braking model is shown
in (IEEE 1474.1-2004). Safe train separation and overspeed protection are safely achieved
by the aforementioned functionalities. Typical speed profiles are depicted on figure 8.61. Brake
assurance is a part of CBTC system functionality. CC initiates service brake or emergency
brake application based on the operating conditions and ensures that ATP profile is followed.

Figure 8.61: Typical ATP and ATO speed profiles (simplified)

The amount of protection and system behaviour depends on the type of operating mode
selected either automatically by passing a border of a certain territory or manually by the
train operator. The operating mode is an internal status within CC. Modes can generally be
categorized into four categories:
–– automatic CBTC modes that provide full ATP and full or partial ATO functionality
(unattended or attended operation)
–– manual CBTC modes that provide full ATP but no ATO functionality (train operator is
responsible for ATO part)

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8 Train Protection

–– restricted CBTC modes that provide limited ATP functionality (Yard or Restricted Manual
mode that provide only overspeed and/or end of track protection and train operator is
responsible for safe train separation)
–– non-CBTC mode (Bypass, CBTC is disabled)
Among other ATP functions that CBTC provides are: rollback protection, coupling management,
departure test, AWS assistance, work zone protection and level crossing warning.

8.5.3.2 ATO Functions

Depending on the grade of automation (see chapter 8.1.6) and selected operating mode
CBTC can provide automatic train operation. ATO is based on target computation (either
limit of MAL from ATP or stopping point from ATS), speed profile computation (ATP and
ATO curves) and speed regulation. Automatic Speed Regulation facilitates automatic train
acceleration, maintaining of constant speed and deceleration within the range of established
parameters.
Automatic platform berthing and door control are two other major ATO functions. Door
control can include automatic closing, automatic opening or both. If platform screen doors
are used, they are synchronised with train doors via ZC or AWS. Door control function is
dependent on ATP functionality such as zero speed detection to provide safe exit and entry to
passengers.

8.5.3.3 ATS Functions

Monitoring and controlling CBTC line are main goals of the ATS. It provides indications received
from AWS, CC and ZC as well as sends controls to them. Typical indications include train
identification, train and wayside alarms, train and AWS status information, results of ATS command
execution such as temporary speed restrictions. Among major controls are AWS related object
controls and routeing, temporary speed restrictions (ZC controls), and CC related train regulation
controls such as platform hold, train stop and alarm acknowledge. Train Tracking is based on
location reports received from CC and block occupancy information received from AWS.
Train Routeing provides the means for automatic route setting that is based on schedule,
events reported from the field and pre-determined routeing rules. Manual routeing option
is also available. Routeing is based on a trip listed in the schedule. Trips are assigned to
trains either automatically or manually. Automatic routeing includes management of trains at
interlocking areas, turnback of trains, movement of trains from and to storage areas as well as
re-routeing of trains in the event of service disruptions.
Train Regulation optimises performance of trains by means of controlling station dwell times,
arrival and departure times and headway. Regulation can be based on prioritizing schedule or
headway. Other ATS functions are interface with passenger information and SCADA systems,
energy optimisation and event logging.

8.5.4 Challenges and Prospects

Extensive applications of CBTC systems and service experience over the last 30 years
show that CBTC provides many benefits in comparison with prior generations of ATC
systems including higher grades of automation, enhancements in safety and diagnostics,
optimised performance and improved levels of service (FTA 2013). Implementation
of CBTC system on the lines where existing ATC system is already in place has certain
challenges. Although CBTC testing can be performed in shadow mode, modifications of

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 8.6 PTC

existing rolling stock, train control system, data communication system and ATS as well as
possible introduction of new trains require a phasing approach. Another important subject
is necessity of separate AWS. It can be in a form of secondary train detection only or
secondary train detection and protection. Selection of type of secondary system depends
on various factors such as requirement of mixed mode of operations when both equipped
and non-equipped vehicles can operate on the line; failure recovery considerations
specifying possible degradation of service in the event of loss of communication; broken
rail detection; financial considerations.
Given the rate of technological changes, certain developments and enhancements to the
system are expected. The traditional “brick wall” concept may be improved to allow even
closer headways. However, the possible scenario of abrupt deceleration of a train ahead
needs to be considered. Functions of ZC may be moved into carborne controllers. On a more
limited level, improvements of individual components of the system have been happening
since its introduction.
On the lines where both metro and suburban/mainline traffic co-exist, interfaces between
CBTC and ETCS in Europe or CBTC and PTC in North America are possible. One example
is Crossrail in London where CBTC and ETCS territories will border each other (Mitchell
2013). ETCS can be used as an overlay system on CBTC lines for commuter operations.
An example of such applications is the Marmaray project in Istanbul (Siemens 2014). It
is likely that further convergence between both technologies will be possible with the
improvements in interoperability and standardisation of CBTC, application of high capacity
radio communications, introduction of the moving block principle and possibly ATO in
ETCS Level 3. In North America, convergence between the systems will require substantial
improvements of PTC technology from its current implementation as an overlay system in
North-East corridor.

8.6 PTC

8.6.1 System Overview

Positive Train Control (PTC) is a processor-based/communication-based train control system

designed to prevent train accidents on North American Railroads. PTC may be developed
voluntarily and implemented by a railroad following the requirements of Federal Regulations; or,
may be as mandated by the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (FRA 2018).
The origin of the PTC system can be traced back to 1992, when the Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA) mandated Amtrak to add enhanced protection functionality to its signalling
system in response to plans to increase maximum operating speed above 125 mph in the
North East Corridor (NEC) (FTA 2013). The existing ATC system allowed a train to proceed with
restricted speed past the interlocking home signal displaying a Stop aspect, which presented an
operational hazard. Thus the FRA required the following functions to be implemented:
–– positive stop enforcement at interlocking home signals
–– enforcement of all permanent speed restrictions
–– enforcement of all temporary speed restrictions (TSRs)
To address these requirements, transponder-based technology that became known as
Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System (ACSES) was created. However, none of the other
railroads had the need to install similar systems until the Rail Safety Improvement Act was
issued in 2008, following several major accidents.

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PTC is required to be installed on Class I railroad main lines (lines with over five million gross
tons annually) over which any poisonous- or toxic-by-inhalation hazardous materials are
transported; and, on any railroad’s main lines over which regularly scheduled passenger
intercity or commuter operations are conducted. PTC systems must prevent train-to-train
collisions, over-speed derailments, incursion into an established work zone, movement
through points in the improper position, and must provide interoperability for equipped
locomotives to traverse through PTC-equipped territories of other properties (FRA 2018).

8.6.2 Types of PTC Systems

Various types of PTC systems were developed and implemented to meet the requirements
of the Rail Safety Improvement Act. The capabilities of existing train control system and
its age, type of railroad and its geographical characteristics, implementation cost and
timeframe are among many factors that influenced the development of PTC systems in the
United States.

8.6.2.1 ACSES II
The primary focus of ACSES system was to enforce positive stop at interlocking home signals
and enforce geographical speed restrictions. The ACSES II version is an enhancement of
the original system that complies with provisions of the Rail Safety Improvement Act. The
enhanced version contains wayside, onboard, office and communication components and is
used as a safe overlay system in conjunction with existing ATC.
The wayside part of the system consists of passive transponders and Wayside Interface
Units (WIU, figure 8.62). The transponders are passive units placed between the rails at
specific locations and are loaded with static data. The onboard equipment of the vehicle
reads the transponder data, which includes infrastructure related information for civil speed
limits, location (trackside distance indicators, milepost, track and railroad line), distance to
home signal, distance to next transponder set, distance to permanent speed restriction,
length of the permanent speed restriction, and radio address and channel information for
the Base Communication Packages (BCP). Typically, transponders are grouped into two
to four devices and are placed approximately three to five metres apart, depending on the
track layout. The number of transponders at a location is dependent upon the amount of
information that has to be stored and transmitted to vehicles. Transponders are generally
placed at a distance before reaching signals or cut sections (track circuit border areas).
The purpose of WIU devices is to gather information regarding the state of interlocking,
such as signal status and point position. This information can be collected either via a
communication link with the interlocking processor or via a physical interface with the relay-
based plant. WIU connects to onboard computers of approaching vehicles via a radio-based
network and provides signal status information, interlocking entrance and exit tracks, speed,
distance and next interlocking information, if necessary.

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 8.6 PTC

Figure 8.62: Example of WIU (Hitachi Rail STS)

On-Board Computer (OBC) is a main component of the onboard segment of the system (figure
8.63). OBC has internal interfaces with transponder antenna that provides energy source and
scans/reads transponder data; speed sensors that are utilised for calculation of the distance
passed by a vehicle; Mobile Communications Package (MCP) that allows OBC to communicate
with wayside and office segments of the system; Aspect Display Unit (ADU) that serves as
primary interface point with the train driver (figure 8.64). OBC has external interfaces with existing
ATC system onboard devices, train battery, brake system, and event recorder. Localisation
information received from wayside transponders is used to correct accumulating distance error
from calculations based on speed sensor data, identifying the WIU responsible for the section of the
track in order to request specific data for the next route. OBC conducts braking curve calculations
based on the civil speed data received from wayside transponders, temporary speed restrictions
received from office segment or from temporary transponders, speed data received from WIU for a
particular route, and cab signalling speed received from the existing ATC system. The lowest speed
profile is chosen between ATC and PTC speed profiles. The selected speed limit is displayed on
the ADU for the train driver, along with status information of the ATC and PTC systems. The system
incorporates alert and braking curves to provide generated profile type braking characteristics.
When the train speed exceeds the OBC alert curve, an audible alarm sounds and the driver must
initiate a brake application within a pre-determined time to forestall a penalty brake application.
OBC automatically applies a train’s emergency brake if the driver fails to comply.

Figure 8.63: Example of OBC (Siemens)

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8 Train Protection

Figure 8.64: Example of ADU (Siemens)

The ACSES II communication subsystem is implemented as a number of Communication

Packages including on board MCP (TD-220 radio, cellular router, and rooftop antenna
array), wayside BCP (pole-mounted antenna, TD-220 radio, and GPS clocks), and Office
Communications Package (OCP, communications server), which is usually located beside
dispatch system equipment. The primary physical data link is an fibre-optic network that
covers the entire railroad under the ACSES overlay as well as all the control centres. The
primary data link for vehicle to wayside communications is a 220 MHz radio system. An
additional cellular radio link is used to allow remote software updates and diagnostics. Since
this segment is critical to system operation, network management system and network
security systems with advanced features such as bandwidth monitoring, message tracing, and
comprehensive event logging are often specified concurrently with fibre-optic and radio based
networks.
The ACSES II back office segment provides all the necessary hardware and software that
enables the PTC system to transmit temporary speed restrictions from the back offices to the
trains via data radio. This segment includes redundant Safety TSR Servers (STS) comprised
of two equipment racks: the Safety Nucleus (NS) and Alarm, Recording, Telecontrol (ART)
Computers (figure 8.65, NS and ART are specific terms to PTC system provided by Hitachi
Rail STS). Also, the back office includes the Diagnostic and Maintenance Computer (D&M).
The back office interfaces with the Central Traffic Control system of the railroad via Advanced
Rail Integrated Server (ARIS). The NS cabinet of the STS hosts the safety related logic that
validates the TSRs sent from the ARIS. The ARIS sends command messages and receives
status messages from the NS via the ART Computers.
ACSES II system has three operating modes:
–– Mode 1, normal operating mode with PTC cut-in and operational
–– Mode 2, outside PTC territory
–– Mode 3, PTC territory under construction

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PTC performs all functions in the normal mode. The passage of a transponder set allows the
system to initialise or change the mode. PTC enters Mode 2 when the train has left (or not
yet entered) an area with transponders. PTC will continue to provide overspeed protection
based on the line speed that is present when the PTC territory is exited or the maximum
vehicle speed if the system operates after power up condition. The system will continue in
Mode 2 until the PTC territory is re-entered, at which point normal operation will resume.
PTC enters Mode 3 when it reads a transponder that says the vehicle is entering the territory
under construction. Once in Mode 3, PTC will only respond to a temporary transponder
message that tells it that the territory under construction has ended.

Figure 8.65: Examples of STS (left) and ART (right) cabinets (Hitachi Rail STS)

8.6.2.2 Other PTC Systems

The other significant type of PTC systems was developed for Class 1 railroads and is called
Interoperable Electronic Train Management System (I-ETMS). It is an Interoperable Train
Control Committee compliant PTC system, which is a locomotive-centric train control system.
I-ETMS was designed to be overlaid on existing methods of operation and to provide a high
level of railroad safety through enforcement of a train’s authorised operating limits, including

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protection against train-to-train collisions, derailments due to overspeed, unauthorised

incursion into work zones, and operation through main track switches in an improper position
(AAR 2014). This is a safety related overlay system used in conjunction with other existing
methods of operations such as Automatic Block Signalling, Track Warrant Control and
Centralised Traffic Control (refer to chapters 3.4.3 and 4.4.1.3 and 10.5.5.2).
Similar to ACSES II system, I-ETMS is comprised of four major segments – Wayside,
Office, Communication and Onboard (FRA 2015). The back office segment consists of
one or more Back Office Server(s) and has communication-based interfaces with wayside
and onboard segments as well as railroad’s dispatch system. The primary function of the
back office system is the delivery of data received from the dispatch and other railroads’
information systems to PTC-equipped locomotives. Information that is sent from back
office to locomotive segment includes movement authorities and dispatcher messages
displayed as bulletin items to a crew. In addition, the back office segment receives
information from PTC-equipped locomotives, such as locomotive position reports and
enforcement notifications (AAR 2014).
Wayside segment consists of WIU units that are used to collect status information from
traditional signalling equipment located in the field such as point machines, point circuit
controllers (electro-mechanical devices that provide point indication in the absence of point
machine), track circuits, signals and track/route hazard detectors. The primary difference from
the ACSES system is that the I-ETMS is relying primarily on GPS data for train localisation with
an infrequent use of transponders for precision improvement.
The communications segment consists of ground-based and wireless networks that
interconnect equipment from three other segments. The same interoperable narrowband
220 MHz radio network standard is used in this system. I-ETMS system has a standardised
messaging system that provides interoperability between individual hardware components
provided by different manufacturers.
Onboard (locomotive) segment contains typical for PTC system components: Train
Management Computer (TMC), Computer Display Unit (CDU) and unique for this system
GPS receiver. TMC accepts temporary speed restrictions, train consist data and movement
authority limits from office segment, while point position and signal data can be sent directly
from WIU units along the line. This information is used for continuous calculation of warning
and braking curves. TMC interfaces with a number of locomotive control systems including
brake system, propulsion, cab signalling system and various sensors. If the locomotive is
equipped with a processor-based control system, TMC interfaces directly to the processor
instead of each control system.
As can be noted from descriptions of the two most widespread PTC systems in North
America, their overall system architectures are quite similar. Figure 8.66 represents the
simplified system architecture of both.
Both ACSES II and I-ETMS systems are applied by major passenger and freight railroads.
Providers of these systems are currently working on improvement of interoperability between
them. However, for some smaller railroad authorities in the US these systems were not
economically feasible and, therefore, other technological solutions were developed to meet
mandatory safety norms imposed by the FRA.

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 8.6 PTC

Figure 8.66: Typical system architecture of PTC system

Enhanced Automatic Train Control System (E-ATC) is a type of PTC system that relies on
existing cab signalling to transmit temporary and permanent speed restrictions. Existing track
circuit-based cab signalling systems are already configured to communicate the maximum
authorised speeds that reflect permanent speed restrictions. These systems were modified to
provide additional speed commands that are generated by interlocking based on messages
received from the Centralised Traffic Control system via the communication network containing
temporary speed restrictions. To facilitate operating efficiencies, Timed Code Change Points
(TCCPs) are commonly used as a tool in the enforcement of speed restrictions. A TCCP is
used to delay the downgrade of the cab codes that are transmitted by the wayside equipment
to each train as it enters a block. These time-delayed reductions in enforced speed are used
to optimise travel time though each block, while still providing sufficient braking distance for
the safe enforcement of speed restrictions (FRA 2016).
Communication Based Train Control (CBTC) systems were approved by the FRA for use on
railroads in place of PTC systems. CBTC (refer to CBTC chapter 8.5) meets all criteria of PTC
systems and is used as a stand-alone system that provides full range of functions including
safe train separation, traffic management and many others.
Due to the lack of technical standardisation and a wide variety of railroad properties required to
meet the Rail Safety Improvement Act, multiple variations of the aforementioned PTC systems
were developed and installed. Customisation of PTC systems is achieved by the modification
of a number of different variables that reflect individual railroad operations. However, the need
to operate rolling stock on different PTC territories leads to the development of interfaces that
can provide interoperable operations.

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 9.1 Classification

9 Interlocking Machines
Gregor Theeg, Nino Mukhigulashvili, Thomas Heinig, Ulrich Maschek, Michael Dieter Kunze1

9.1 Classification

This chapter describes the technical equipment needed to fulfil the route interlocking functions,
called interlocking machines. Over the years, the technical progression was as follows:
–– human or manual, without technical support
–– mechanical
–– (hydraulic/pneumatic)
–– electric
–– electronic
Basically, an interlocking system can be divided into three main functional levels:
–– The operation control level includes the interface to the signaller and may include different
non-safety functions of automatic operation control such as automatic train routeing etc.
–– The interlocking level includes the safety related functions to interlock signals, routes,
movable track elements, block applications etc. with each other.
–– The element control level includes functions of commanding, power and information
transmission to and from the field elements, such as signals, movable track elements, track
sections, level crossings etc.
Since a high degree of centralisation is applied, especially in electronic interlocking, the view
on these functions has changed: Today the interlocking system can be operated from different
local and central workplaces, which can be situated many kilometres apart from each other.
One interlocking area can be operated from any workplace, although not from two at the same
time. The operation can also be switched between different operation systems, which include
automatic systems such as automatic train routeing. Therefore, the operation control level
cannot be considered as an integral part of the interlocking. Instead, the operation control level
is often referred to as an external technical system. In the interlocking itself, a new functional
level called operation interface level is required. This forms the interface to the external
operation systems and validates input commands.
Theoretically, any combination of the three levels (operation control, interlocking and element
control) working with one of the above technical principles is possible, although not all of them
make practical sense.
There are four almost pure forms of interlocking technologies (table 9.1):
–– The human ‘interlocking’ is not a real interlocking, as no technical locks are provided. It
is a situation in which the human in the form of the signaller or the shunting staff is fully
responsible for checking the preconditions for clearing signals, switching points and for
transmitting information by walking from one to the other. Historically, this is the oldest
solution. For train movements it has been widely replaced by technical solutions for safety
reasons, but for shunting movements this method is still widely used.
–– In mechanical interlocking (chapter 9.2), the signaller operates mechanical levers which use
wires and rods, and are interlocked with each other.
–– In electric (relay) interlocking (chapter 9.3), the signaller operates buttons. The interlocking
functions are in relay technology and the field elements are operated and controlled

1 Parts of this chapter are based on the contributions of Oleg Nasedkin, David Stratton, Heinz Tillmanns, Thomas White
and Giorgio Mongardi to the 1st and 2nd edition of this book.

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9 Interlocking Machines

electrically. However, the term "electric interlocking" is ambiguous: Especially in English

speaking countries, historically also in Germany, the term ‘electric interlocking’ is used for
an interlocking with electric element control, but mechanical interlocking functions. This
use of this historic term, although inexact, originated before relay interlocking functions
were available. The term 'relay interlocking' (in some countries 'all-relay interlocking') is
commonly used for the type of interlocking meant here, therefore it is also used in this book.
–– The electronic interlocking (chapter 9.4) is a machine where all these functions are
performed electronically by hardware and software. The interlocking logic is usually defined
in the programmed software. Older electronic interlocking systems perform the element
control in electric (relay) technology.

operational level interlocking level element control level

human – human (to be reminded by human (walking between
‘interlocking’ the signaller) the elements)
mechanical mechanical levers mechanical mechanical
interlocking (lever frame) (wires or rods)
electric (relay) electric buttons and electric (relays) electric
interlocking illuminations
electronic electronic (monitor, mouse electronic electronic
interlocking or tablet, keyboard) (hardware/software)

Table 9.1: Basic interlocking technologies and technical application of the functions

Besides these ‘pure’ forms, several hybrid forms exist because the shift from mechanical to
electrical, as well as from electrical to electronic technology took place in several steps. Some
of these forms are described in chapter 9.5. Besides, in several installations the operation
of selected field elements is by other technical means than those for which the interlocking
system was originally designed. Examples are electrical replacers for mechanical signals in
mechanical interlocking and power operated mechanical signals in relay interlocking.

9.2 Mechanical Interlocking

9.2.1 Historical Development

In the first railways in the 19th century, the operation elements for points and signals were
distributed in the field without interlocking between them. Around 1860, the first mechanical
locking frames emerged in Britain. This concentrated the levers for element operation in a
central place and provided mechanical interlocking functions between the elements. The idea
of interlocking and centralisation of element operation was exported worldwide and different
systems were developed by different manufacturers. These were adapted to the operational
requirements of the respective countries. A great diversity of technologies was the result. In
Germany around 1900 there were about 20 manufacturers, each of them producing their own
type of interlocking. Later, concentration reduced the number of types in each country.

9.2.2 System Safety in Mechanical Interlocking

The safety of mechanical interlocking systems is ensured mainly by the strategy of elimination
of failures (chapter 2.3.1). Mechanical components are dimensioned in a way that technical
failures (e. g. the breaking of a lever or the loosening of a bolt) is (almost) impossible.
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 9.2 Mechanical Interlocking

9.2.3 Structure of Mechanical Interlocking Systems

Generally, a mechanical interlocking comprises the following:

–– The mechanism and operation elements for operating the movable track elements and
signals remotely, which represents the operational and the element control level in table 9.1.
–– The interlocking between the elements, which forms the main part of the interlocking level in
table 9.1.
–– The communication between different signal boxes, which forms an additional part of the
interlocking level in table 9.1 in some interlocking systems.
For the remote mechanical operation of field elements, basically two different technical
solutions are applied, of rigid connections (e. g. rods and pipes) and flexible connections
(wires). Both form a connection between the field element and the operation lever in the signal
box. The wires can be double wires, or single wires with a counterweight. Wires (figure 9.1)
and rods are used differently by the railways. German railways nearly always used only wires,
whereas in Britain and Russia wires and rods and in the USA pipes are/were used.

Figure 9.1: Wire connections with weight bar equipment for wire adjustment

In some railways, such as the German, each set of points is typically switched individually,
whereas in other railways, such as the British and the French, the two points of a crossover
are coupled and therefore moved together by the same point lever (chapter 4.2.2). This means
that the signaller needs the physical strength to switch both sets of points together. Besides
the force needed to set the points, there is also the friction of the wire or rod system to be
overcome by the muscle force of the signaller. This increases by distance and is higher for rigid
connections than for wires. This effect limits the possible distance of field elements from the
signal box. A second reason which limits the length is the stretching of wires by mechanical
force and the outside temperature, and of the rods by temperature.
The interlocking within the same signal box is mainly carried out mechanically by moving parts
which are interlocked with each other to prevent certain combinations of element positions. In
some interlocking technologies, these mechanical locking registers are aided by electrical devices
such as track circuits and wheel detectors for detecting the presence or passage of a train.
Communication between different signal boxes includes the line block system as well as
communication in cases where different signal boxes contribute to the same route. In the
oldest systems this was carried out without interlocking dependences. Here the signaller
was responsible for safety by sending the correct messages and carrying out the correct
procedures after receiving a message.

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9 Interlocking Machines

9.2.4 Example: British Origin Mechanical Interlocking

9.2.4.1 Overview
In the 19th century, there were several manufacturers of mechanical interlocking in Britain,
of which Saxby & Farmer was the most important. Their mechanical interlocking and
its derivates were widely used throughout Britain, other Western European countries
and the United States. Some of these machines still remain in service. In the USA, new
installations were constructed as late as 1950. The first design was patented in England
by John Saxby in 1856. With partner John Stinson Farmer, Saxby & Farmer became
the world’s first signalling manufacturer in 1860. There were other locking schemes, but
by the 1880s, the tappet locking invented by James Deakin of Stevens & Sons in 1870
became the most widely used. By 1875, the Saxby & Farmer interlocking had become
virtually the standard in the UK. Although the use of interlocking in England was already
well established, the first installation in the US did not occur until 1870.

9.2.4.2 Geographical Location of Signal Boxes

In traditional British interlocking, stations and open lines are not distinguished from each
other. Therefore, there is no hierarchical order between the signallers and signal boxes
like in Germany (chapter 9.2.5.2). One signal box typically controls an area smaller than
a station (e. g. a ‘station throat’), normally limited by home signals on the entry from each
track. The interlocking area is limited by the length of the rods for field element operation
and by the number of operations a signaller can handle in a certain time.

9.2.4.3 Operation of Field Elements

Points are operated by levers (figure 9.2). The levers have two end positions: The straight
position is ‘normal’ and the pulled position towards the signaller ‘reverse’. The lever is fixed in
each end position with a spring-loaded rod, the so-called catch rod at the back of the lever.
The catch rod is connected with a catch handle near the top of the lever. When this handle is
grasped, the catch rod moves up and the lever can be moved from its current end position.
The catch handle does not return to the locking position until the full throw of the lever.
For transmission of the motion to the field elements in Britain, rigid rods dominate for
points and single wires against a counterweight for signals. The reason is the greater
distance of signals from the interlocking. In the USA, rigid steel pipes are used.

Figure 9.2: Levers in mechanical interlocking Saxby & Farmer (USA)

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 9.2 Mechanical Interlocking

9.2.4.4 Interlocking
The elements are interlocked in a locking box which is usually located below the signaller's
floor. The method of interlocking most used is tappet interlocking, whose basics (only) are
described in the following.
Each lever is connected with one or several tappets, which are flat bars of steel. The tappet
is either connected with the lever itself or with the catch rod and moves, while switching,
longitudinally within a tappet way (figure 9.3). The tappet carries notches which are adjusted to
the form of the locks. The locks are placed in locking boxes. Each locking box can contain one
or several lock channels, depending on interlocking type. Several locking boxes can be placed
above each other in an interlocking system.

Figure 9.3: Principle of interlocking by tappets

In the following, some example solutions for locking functions will be described. Figure 9.4
shows a lock between two elements: When both levers are normal (A), either of them is free
to be reversed. But as soon as one lever is reverse (B), the other is locked normal. Figure
9.5 shows another example: If lever 2 is normal, lever 1 cannot be reversed, and if lever 1 is
reverse, lever 2 cannot be released to normal.

Figure 9.4: Example of tappet locking: 1 locks 2

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9 Interlocking Machines

Figure 9.5: Example of tappet locking: Figure 9.6: Example of tappet locking:
1 released by 2 1 locks 2 in either position

In the example of figure 9.6, lever 2 cannot be moved if lever 1 is reverse. This kind of locking
is called ‘1 locks 2 in either position’.
In many cases, locking between two elements is not sufficient, but three or more elements
have to be interlocked. An example of such ‘conditional locking’ (chapter 4.2.5) between three
elements is shown in figure 9.7: The elements here are signal 1 and points 2 and 3. If points
3 are reverse, signal 1 must lock points 2 reverse: That means that if points 3 are reverse and
signal 1 open, the points 2 must be reverse. To enable this, tappet 2 is narrower than the
normal width of a tappet, but moves in a normal tappet way (figure 9.7). Therefore, it can move
sideways within the tappet way. If 3 is reverse, the lock between 1 and 2 is effective. But if 3
is normal, tappet 2 can move to side and both levers 1 and 2 can be moved freely. (However,
signal 1 and points 2 need an additional lock ‘1 locks 2 in either position’, see figure 9.6.)
In the oldest version, points were protected against being switched under a train by
mechanical detector bars (chapter 5.2.3.1). Later, track circuit (chapter 5.3) detection was
connected to mechanical locking by way of forced drop electric locks mounted on the
interlocking machine and connected to the locking levers.
More information on this example can be found in (Such 1956).

Figure 9.7: Example for tappet locking: Conditional locking 1 locks 2 reverse if 3 is reverse

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 9.2 Mechanical Interlocking

9.2.4.5 Interlocking between Different Signal Boxes

As each signal box works independently, there are no order and affirmation dependences like in
Germany (chapter 9.2.5.5). Instead, each track between two interlocking areas, even if it is inside a
station with many parallel tracks, is considered as a line for the block system.
However, cases occur where the same signal requires control from two different signal boxes (so-
called slotted control), which is in effect an AND function. The most common case is a distant
signal at the post of a main signal which is controlled from another signal box. By a combination of
mechanical elements, the distant arm can move to the ‘expect clear’ position only if the main signal
arm of the same signal and the signal ahead both show ‘clear’.
Another case with dependence between different places is where industrial sidings branch from the
line halfway between the interlockings. Upon telephonic request, the signaller of one interlocking
gives an electrical release which allows the train driver or shunter to switch the points into the
siding. This release is interlocked with other relevant signalling functions in the usual way.

9.2.5 Example: German Type ‘Einheit’

9.2.5.1 Overview
Around 1910 in Germany, a unified form of mechanical interlocking was developed jointly by the
German railways and the interlocking manufacturers to replace around 20 different types used
previously. In the following years, the interlocking type ‘Einheit’ (figure 9.8) became the most used in
Germany and remained so until the introduction of relay interlocking.
Main technical characteristics of this form of mechanical interlocking are:
–– In contrast to British forms, the elements in a route are not interlocked element by element,
but a particular route drawbar (German: ‘Fahrstraßenschubstange’) interlocked with all
route elements is used. This means that, as long as no route is set, points can be moved
almost freely. This enables free shunting (unsignalled), which was typical for German
railways at that time.
–– Power is transmitted to all field elements by double wires.
–– Safe communication between different signal boxes is by safe block instruments.

Figure 9.8: Operation elements of mechanical interlocking type ‘Einheit’

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9 Interlocking Machines

9.2.5.2 Geographical Location of Signal Boxes

According to the German operation concept, the ‘Bahnhof’ (for which no exact English
translation exists, but which can be more or less translated by ‘station’, meaning the
whole area and not just the platform) is regarded as the unit in operation and interlocking
(chapter 3.1). The total length of a station is typically more than 1000 m. On the other
hand, the interlocking area controlled by one signal box is limited by the following factors:
–– As no technical track clear detection is usually provided in German mechanical
interlocking, the signaller has to observe the whole interlocking area assigned to the
signal box visually from the window of the signal box.
–– Before unblocking the open line section, end of train markers have to be observed. This
is only possible with a signaller working at each station throat.
–– The wire length of an element to be mechanically switched from the signal box is
limited to approximately 400 m for points and 1200 m for signals. However, the control
length could be extended by making the more distant points power operated and by
converting signals to colour lights.
–– As the grade of automation is low, the signaller has to carry out each step in route
setting and release manually, which leads to limitations in the number of train
movements a signaller can handle in a certain time.

Figure 9.9: Signal boxes in a station with two signal boxes

For these reasons, a station is usually equipped with at least two signal boxes, or more
in large stations with high traffic volumes, whereas for junctions one signal box is usually
sufficient. There is a hierarchy between the signal boxes belonging to one station: One is
the command signal box, staffed with the train director, whereas all others are dependent
signal boxes, staffed with one leverman each. This affects the technical communication
between the signal boxes: The leverman can only clear a signal for trains upon an
order from the train director, whereas shunting movements can be controlled under the
responsibility of the leverman.

9.2.5.3 Operation of Field Elements

In most cases, field elements are operated by characteristic levers which have to be turned
through 180°. There are basically two types of levers: Point levers (figure 9.10) which serve
also for derailers and additional point locks, and signal levers. The levers are equipped with
a catch handle. The catch handle is connected with the point bar in the locking box. If the
catch handle is grasped, the element can be moved and the respective element bar in the
interlocking box is in the medium position. The catch handle can only be released in an
end position of the lever, bringing the point bar to the upper or lower position. This gives
information about the end position of the points to the interlocking box.

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 9.2 Mechanical Interlocking

Figure 9.10: Point lever in German interlocking type ‘Einheit’ (illustration: TU Dresden)

The lever is connected with the field element by a double wire, making a quasi-rigid
connection between the lever and the field element. There are parts to guarantee the fail
safe behaviour of the rigid connection.
If trailable points are used and they are trailed by a vehicle, the coupling in the point lever
moves and prevents the points from being moved again by the signaller. It also makes
a noise during this action. The point bar in the locking box is then in the intermediate
position, inhibiting all routes over these points.

9.2.5.4 Interlocking
In German mechanical interlocking, there are two steps when locking a route (chapter 4.3.8):
1. mechanical (reversible) route locking
2. electrical (irreversible) route locking
Whereas the mechanical route locking serves for the dependence between the signal and the
movable track elements, the purpose of the electrical route locking is to maintain the route
locked after returning the signal to stop and until the train has cleared the route (chapter 4.3.8).
These two steps of route locking are logically still provided in current German relay and electronic
interlocking systems, although the technical reason for the distinction (the impossibility of
evaluating the passage of the train mechanically) has lost its importance in the meantime.

Figure 9.11: Interlocking pieces of mechanical interlocking register type ‘Einheit’

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9 Interlocking Machines

The mechanical (reversible) route locking is carried out by separate route drawbars in the
interlocking box (figure 9.11, figure 9.12). These route drawbars cross the interlocking box
in its whole length (usually several metres). From the normal position (no route locked), each
route drawbar can be moved longitudinally into two directions by a route lever, locking two
different routes. The route drawbar is interlocked with each movable track element belonging
to the route including flank protection and trailing overlap elements by locking pieces mounted
on the route drawbar. The route can only be set if the respective point bar is in the proper
end position, and then the point bar is held in that position for as long as the route is set.
Interlocking between the route drawbar and the signal is carried out in a similar way.
The electrical (irreversible) route locking is carried out by electro-mechanical route locking
instruments, which have some similarities with the block instruments used for the manual
block of Siemens & Halske (chapter 10.4.2). By pushing the button on top of the instrument,
a shaft enters into a notch of the route drawbar (figure 9.12, left) until this lock is released by a
pulse from the train which has cleared the route. To detect the train, a combination of a wheel
detector and a short track circuit is used to detect that the train has first entered and then
cleared the route release position (chapter 5.2.3.2).

Figure 9.12: Working of mechanical interlocking register type ‘Einheit’

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 9.2 Mechanical Interlocking

9.2.5.5 Interlocking between Different Signal Boxes

Interlocking between different signal boxes can be carried out either between signal boxes
belonging to the same station or between signal boxes belonging to different stations,
junctions or block points. Whereas the respective line block system for the latter case is
described in chapter 10.4.2, the dependences between signal boxes of the same station
are described in the following.
There are two reasons for interlocking between different signal boxes of the same stations:
–– A leverman must not be able to clear a signal without the permission of the train director.
–– For a route which leads into the interlocking area of a signal box other than the one
controlling the route entrance signal, conditions in its interlocking area have to be
proven. Therefore, permissions have to be exchanged between the signal boxes.
These procedures are solved technically by the same block instruments that are used for
the manual block of Siemens & Halske (chapter 10.4.2.1). An electrical lock between the route
drawbars connects the route drawbar of all signal boxes concerned that way. The route must be
built up from the exit to the entrance (figure 9.13). That means that this same route must be locked
also in the areas controlled by signal boxes beyond. Thereby, the locking of a certain route has
always to be initiated by the train director who gives the respective commands to the levermen.
More information on this example can be found in (Maschek/Lehne 2005).

Figure 9.13: Locking of routes over two signal boxes in mechanical ‘Einheit’

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9 Interlocking Machines

9.3 Relay Interlocking

9.3.1 Historical Development

The transition from mechanical to electrical technology in interlocking was a slow process.
As the first steps, the invention of the interlocked block instrument and of the track
circuit around 1870 can be considered (chapter 3.1). Both devices provided functions
which mechanical technology could not offer satisfactorily, and therefore supplement the
mechanical interlocking technology.
The next step, beginning around 1900, was the development of systems with partly
electrical and partly mechanical functions. Here, parts of the functions (usually the
movement and supervision of field elements) were done electrically, whereas others
(usually the interlocking functions) remained mechanical (chapter 9.5.1).
Between the two World Wars, the first so-called ‘all-electric’ signal boxes were developed
as the first relay interlocking systems and installed in various countries. In the two decades
after World War II, the relay interlocking was perfected and became the most widely used
technology in the world. These still form a large percentage of existing installations.
The relay interlocking enabled also bigger stations to be controlled by one signaller, and to
display the interlocking area clearly in a topological image.
A main focus of development in this period was modularisation of the relay installations,
which resulted in the partial replacement of the tabular interlocking logic inherited from
mechanical systems by a topological logic. This gives particular advantages in large
stations.

9.3.2 System Safety in Relay Interlocking

9.3.2.1 Characteristics and Classification of Signal Relays

Safety in relay interlocking is based on the use of special safe signalling relays. The
working principle of a relay is displayed in figure 9.14: An electric current energises a coil,
which attracts an armature that opens and closes electrical contacts. In contrast to relays
for non-safety purposes inside and outside the railway sector, signal relays need a number
of special characteristics:
–– They have a high operating threshold, so that the possibility of being erroneously
energised by electromagnetic influence must be prevented.
–– All contacts belonging to the same armature are rigidly joined together. This means that
if the position of one is known, the positions of the inverse contacts can also be known,
with certainty.
–– The contacts are made of materials that hardly become welded together.
–– The contacts of the relays are duplicated. The design of the relay ensures that should
one contact become welded then the armature takes up an intermediate position with
no contact closed.
–– When the relay changes its position, all contacts which will be opened by this switching
have to be open before any contact closes.
Based on these requirements, the relays used in railway signalling and automation can be
divided into three classes according to their safety characteristics:

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 9.3 Relay Interlocking

1. Signal relays of type N (non-controlled),

also called class 1 relays, can be used in
safety related circuitries without monitoring
of their dropping down. In particular, safe
dropping down of the relay can be assumed
due to the high mass of the anchor or by
a sufficiently strong spring force. Contacts
use materials (e. g. silver and carbon)
which cannot form a weld which is strong
enough to resist gravity or the spring
pressure. Other characteristics of type N
relays are high inductance, residual pin (to
prevent complete closure of the air gap
and therefore saturation of the magnetic
circuit) and protective shroud (for protection
against environmental impact).
2. Signal relays of type C (controlled), also
called class 2 relays, are also suitable for
safety related purposes, but their operation
must be checked by circuitry. In particular,
failure of the relay to drop down has to
be considered, although the probability is Figure 9.14: Working principle of a relay
much lower than for not picking up.
3. Non-signal-relays, also called class 3 relays, must not be used in safety related circuits
but can be used for operation control, diagnostics telecommunication and other
purposes.
The terms ‘type N’ and ‘type C’ are current official UIC terms, whereas the terms 'class 1/2/3'
are older terms which are still used in many countries.

Figure 9.15: Relays of type C (left) and type N (right)

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9 Interlocking Machines

Class 3 relays are used for non safety-related automation functions in railways throughout the
world. Their advantages are low costs and the usually faster acting of the relays. For safety
functions, railways have different preferences regarding the use of type N or type C relays.
Whereas type N relays are very expensive to manufacture and larger in size (figure 9.15),
with the use of type C relays the problem is the much more complex circuitry. Type N relays
are applied predominately in Western Europe, the USA and Russia, whereas type C relays
are mainly used in Central European countries. Several functions such as locking the route
irreversibly upon the approach of the train with the signal already being clear before (chapter
4.3.8) are only possible with type N relays.
Where type N relays are used, often safety functions and non-safety functions are separated in
different blocks for economic reasons (example: chapter 9.3.6). Type N relays are only used for
the safety functions in these cases, and class 3 relays for the non-safety functions.
Regarding the stable positions, relays can take the following forms:
–– Mono-stable relays have one stable position: When current is cut off, the relay always drops
down. They are used for most applications.
–– Bi-stable relays have two stable positions and are therefore applicable for storing a binary
status of the interlocking system safely. Application examples are the locked status of a
route and the required position of a set of points.
For safety reasons, the correct choice of contacts used in a circuit is important. Contacts can
be divided into:
–– Closers, also called front contacts: They are open when the relay is de-energised.
–– Openers, also called back contacts: They are closed when the relay is de-energised.
–– Two way contacts: In each end position, they close another circuit.

9.3.2.2 Forms of Mono-stable Relays

The simplest form of mono-stable relays is the simple signalling relay as shown in figure 9.14.
Special forms of mono-stable relays are (IRSE 1999):
–– AC immune relays: The relay operates with DC, but safely not with AC. This makes the
relay immune against AC electromagnetic influences.
–– Biased relays: The relay only operates if current passes through the coil in one direction,
but not in the opposite direction.
–– Relays fitted with contacts for high voltages and current. These are used for purposes
such as control of point machines.
–– Double wound relays: These contain two independent coils, either of which is able
to operate the relay. These coils can have identical or different parameters (such as
impedance, number of windings). They can be series-connected, parallel-connected or
connected independently in different electric circuits. Coils with low impedance are applied
to connect relays in series. Also, a coil with higher inductivity can be used to pick up, and a
coil with lower inductivity to hold the relay.
–– Slow pick up relays: These relays are magnetically designed in a way that they do not pick
up immediately when energised, but with a certain time delay.
–– Slow release relays: These relays are magnetically designed in a way that they do not drop
down immediately upon being de-energised, but with a certain time delay.
–– Vane relays: These relays work similarly to an AC motor and therefore provide frequency
and phase selectivity. Their main field of application is the track relay of track circuits.
Therefore, this type of relay is described in detail in chapter 5.3.5.

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 9.3 Relay Interlocking

9.3.2.3 Forms of Bi-stable Relays

There are different technical forms of relays with two stable positions which remain in the position
last set. These relays are used differently in the railways for safety and non-safety purposes:
–– A magnetic latching relay incorporates a permanent magnet. The relay is picked up by
energising the coil in the usual way. It is then held in the picked-up state by a permanent
magnet, even when power is removed from the coil. The relay drops down when the coil
is energised with reverse polarity (and remains dropped down when power is removed).
Alternatively the relay may have a second coil for this purpose.
–– A toggle relay (figure 9.16) contains two magnetic coils and one armature. When either coil
is energised, the armature is attracted to that coil. The force of a spring then holds it in that
position until such time as the other coil is energised.
–– A mechanically latching relay (figure 9.17) has two coils and two armatures. The
armatures interfere mechanically so that it is impossible for both to be dropped down at
the same time. Energising one coil causes the relay to go into the respective position.
When power is removed, the relay stays in the position last set.

Figure 9.16: Toggle relay Figure 9.17: Mechanically latching relay

9.3.2.4 Combined Relays

Combined relays (figure 9.18) are relays with mono-stable and bi-stable systems in the same
relay. Figure 9.18 shows an example. In this example, the mono-stable armature is energised
by current of any polarity proceeding through the winding. The bi-stable armature switches
if the polarity of the current is reverse to that of the last time it was energised. After being
de-energised, the mono-stable system drops down, whereas the bi-stable one stays in its
last position. An application example is the supervision relay in Russian point machine control
scheme (chapter 6.6.2.2).

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9 Interlocking Machines

Figure 9.18: Combined relay (example) (graphic: Andrej Lykov)

9.3.3 Design of Relay Interlocking Systems

9.3.3.1 Structure
In relay interlocking, the interlocking, element control and operation control functions are
realised by electrical circuits in relay technology. The relay racks (figure 9.19) are equipped with
plug boards, in which the relays are installed. The wiring is held in the plug board, so replacing
a relay does not require a change in the wiring.
Erroneous placing of a wrong relay to a wrong location could cause danger for railway operation.
To prevent this, each type of relay and the matching plug board are usually equipped with a pin
code which only permits the correct relay to be placed in the correct location.
There are two basic types of relay interlocking systems:
–– The free-wired type, following the tabular principle of route formation (chapter 4.3.9): All
relays are wired on site.
–– The topological block type, following the topological principle of route formation (chapter 4.3.9):
Standardised relay sets for each topological element are assembled and ready wired in the
factory, and on site they are connected by standardised cables according to the track layout.
With the free-wired type, the wiring and checking work on site requires much effort. In the
topological block type, the development of the interlocking type with all relay sets including
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 9.3 Relay Interlocking

those needed for certain central functions

is relatively complex, but the wiring and
checking on site as well as later changes
are relatively simple. Therefore, in
application (figure 4.37):
–– the free-wired type is most suitable for
small interlocking areas,
–– the topological block type is most
suitable for large interlocking areas.

9.3.3.2 Operation Functions

The operation is carried out by buttons
which are to be pushed, pulled or turned.
Whereas in Germany and North America,
pushbuttons are preferred (hence
the West-German name ‘pushbutton
interlocking’, in Britain, France and Russia
rotating switches are also used, especially
for movable track elements. Pushbuttons
are usually active as long as they are
pushed, requiring the related switching Figure 9.19: Relay racks
processes to be initiated in this short time.
Rotating switches, in contrast, have a medium normal position and one or two positions to the
left and the right.
To illustrate the difference, a good example is the buttons/switches for point setting. With
rotating switches, the medium position means that the points are able to be switched
by automatic point setting, whereas the left and the right position hold the points in that
position. Without automatic point setting, the switch has only two positions (figure 9.20). In
push- and pullbutton technology, points are set to both directions by the same operation.
The mobilisation and immobilisation of points for automatic point setting is often achieved by
additional master (group) point buttons. There are often several such master buttons. Each is
assigned a certain function and serves that same function for all related track elements.

Figure 9.20: Rotating switches for points in relay interlocking (Russian example)

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9 Interlocking Machines

Where automatic point setting is applied, the most frequent operation to set a route is the
entrance-exit (NX) operation. This means that a button/switch at the entrance location and
another at the exit location have to be activated simultaneously or consecutively.
Without automatic point setting, each movable track element has to be brought to its
position by a separate operation. To lock the route, there is either a separate button for
each route, or one button serves for several routes with the same entrance or exit, and the
route is selected by current point positions.
A frequent requirement is that at least two buttons always have to be activated for one
command input (e. g. point and point master button) to avoid erroneous actions. The order
of operations for a certain input command can be defined differently. These two buttons
can be operated simultaneously (mainly in German influenced interlocking, chapter 4.1.1)
or successively (mainly in British and North American influenced interlocking). Special
functions such as selective overlaps, if provided, can be solved differently, e. g. by a
separate exit button for each overlap.
Relay interlockings can be controlled locally or remotely. The operation control can be safe
or non-safe, with the safe being the more frequent case. If a safety critical operation is to
be recorded, this can be solved technically by sealed buttons and mechanical counters
connected to the respective button.

9.3.3.3 Display Functions

Various status information is displayed to the signaller by control lamps which can be lit in
different colours or unlit. Examples for such information are:
–– occupation of track sections
–– position of points
–– status of routes
–– status of line block
–– status of central automation functions such as automatic point setting (on/off)
In early relay interlockings, the panels were arranged without any reference to the
geography of the railway, but this soon changed to a more realistic representation in
topological arrangement. Only such buttons and control lamps which referred to the
general status of the whole interlocking are located separately. The aim is to simplify and
enhance the overview available to the signaller (figure 9.21).

Figure 9.21: Topographical operation table in relay interlocking (example from Poland)

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 9.3 Relay Interlocking

In large control areas, the choice is to mount several panels as a panoramic wall display,
with the signallers walking between them as necessary to reach the controls, or to use a
wall display visible to all, but with the signallers sitting at their own workstations. These are
equipped with a simplified set of controls.

9.3.4 Example: SGE 1958 (Britain)

9.3.4.1 Introduction
SGE 1958 is a frequently used British relay interlocking system. It is based on the tabular
principle (free-wired type). SGE 1958 is a typical example of British relay interlocking practice
and was widely used on British railways until the advent of SSI (chapters 9.4.1 and 9.4.5.1)
in the 1980s.

9.3.4.2 Operation
Routes are normally set by sequential entrance-exit-operation in the track layout panel: First a
key is turned to select the route entrance and then a button pushed for the exit. If the entrance
key is turned up, the train route will be selected, if it is turned down the shunting route.
To release the route, the key has to be turned back manually to its normal position. If a route
which has already been approached is released before the train has passed it completely, a
time delay applies (chapter 4.3.8.3).
Alternatively, points can be set individually. For this, three-position point keys outside the track
layout are used: The key in centre position means that points can be set by entrance-exit
operation. In left or right position the points are commanded to move to this position (providing
they are free to do so) and locked there.

9.3.4.3 Route Interlocking Circuitry

The circuitry for route commanding is derived directly from the interlocking matrix. This is
explained in the example of figure 9.22. Only the circuit for route No. 6, starting at signal 6 and
reaching up to signal 4 via points 23 reverse is shown in figure 9.22. Similar circuits exist for
each route.

Figure 9.22: Example: Track layout and simplified route interlocking circuit for one route in SGE 1958

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9 Interlocking Machines

The relays NLKR (normal) and RLKR (reverse) of the point interlocking circuitry are picked up if
the related points are in their respective positions or are able to move to that position. As can
be read from the circuit in figure 9.22, route 6 can only be selected if this refers to points 20
(normal), 21 (normal) and 23 (reverse).
Besides, there is a conditional lock (compare chapter 4.2.5) between signals 1 and 6 and
points 22: For reason of overlap beyond signal 3, signal 6 can only be opened if either signal
1 is closed (relay 1 NLR picked up) or points 22 are locked reverse (relay 22 RLR picked up).
The relay 6 RLR/NLR is a special form of electromagnetic latched relay (chapter 9.3.2.3) with
two coils to be energised. It is bi-stable to hold the route information in case of loss of power.
More information on SGE 1958 can be found in (Goldsbrough 1961).

9.3.5 Example: SpDrS 60 (Germany)

9.3.5.1 Introduction
SpDrS 60, manufactured by Siemens and developed around 1960, is the most frequently
used relay interlocking type in Germany. Besides Germany, adapted versions are also applied
in several other countries. SpDrS 60 is a typical application example for the topological
(geographical) principle (chapter 4.3.9) in relay interlocking: Relays belonging to the same
topological element are grouped to a relay set. These relay sets are produced and tested in
the factory and connected on site by standardised cables.

9.3.5.2 Relay Sets

There are three groups of relay sets (figure 9.23):
–– Topological sets each represent one element of the track layout and are connected to
each other by path cables representing the tracks between the elements.
–– Signal sets are connected in a
line to the route entrance/exit
sets, representing the different
indicators of a signal.
–– Central switching sets are
responsible for specific central
functions in the whole interlocking
area.
The following topological sets are
the most important:
–– Point sets include all relays for
point moving, route locking,
flank protection, supervision,
occupancy detection, release
and display functions related to
a particular set of points. A slip
crossing is represented by two
point sets and a derailer by a
point set without a track path
cable at the branching end.
Figure 9.23: Relay set of SpDrS 60

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 9.3 Relay Interlocking

–– Crossing sets have similar functions as point sets without the moving and supervision.
–– Train entrance/exit sets mark the entrance and exit positions of train routes and include
several route-related functions.
–– Shunting entrance/exit sets have the same functions for entrance/exit positions of
shunting routes only.
–– Overlap sets mark the end of overlaps.
–– Supervisory sets for intermediate sections are applied whenever a track section has
to be separately proved clear and this task cannot be assigned to any other topological
element. They are needed rather seldom.
–– Sets for different forms of line block.
Signal sets represent certain indicators of a signal. Their arrangement is closely related to
the German H/V signal system (chapter 7.8.1). There are signal sets for main signals, distant
signals, speed and route main and distant indicators, contraflow indicators, marker lights and
others. All signal sets related to the same signal location are connected by signal path cables
in a line, beginning at the respective train entrance/exit set. Shunting routes require no signal
sets, as signal control and supervision is included in the shunting entrance/exit sets.
Central switching sets are responsible for central switching functions. They are present once
in each interlocking area and contribute to many switching processes in the whole interlocking
area. Tasks of the central switching sets are for example:
–– processing of information from master buttons for points, signals, routes, line block and
others
–– calculation of the speed limit for a route
–– definition of priority when different track paths are possible between a route entrance and a
route exit position selected (chapter 4.3.4)
–– storing of routes for automatic route setting functions (chapter 4.3.11)
Figure 9.24 shows a simple example of a set connection map.

Figure 9.24: Set connection map of SpDrS 60 (example)

9.3.5.3 Structure, Positioning and Wiring of the Relay Sets

Each relay set consists of several relays. Resistors, capacitors, inductors and diodes are
added where necessary. The type C relay K50 is used in the following versions:
–– simple relay K50 (for most applications, figure 9.25)
–– bi-stable relay K50
–– relay K50 with contacts for heavy currents

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9 Interlocking Machines

Figure 9.25: Relay K50

The relay sets are mounted in relay racks and are connected electrically by standardised
cables. The following are the main types of cables:
–– Track path cables with 20 wires each connect topological sets according to the topology.
–– Loop cables connect all relay sets of the same type either in sequential or in parallel form
with a central switching set.
–– Cables for power supply.
In addition some relay sets take a configuration plug, which interconnects contacts within the
set to give specific characteristics.

9.3.5.4 Procedures for Route Setting and Release

In the following, the procedures for route setting and release are described briefly and
simplified at a functional level.
The first step after pushing the entrance and exit buttons simultaneously is searching for a
route and testing it for availability. This process is described in chapter 9.3.5.5.
The next step is to set the points belonging to the running path and the overlap (without flank
protection elements). For reason of power supply, the points have to be set sequentially. This
is controlled by a sequential ring loop, with each point set retarding the current flow to the next
set by a short time.
After this, the points and crossings are locked in the required position by switching the point
locking relay in each relay set.
Then the point and crossing sets
are route locked. In each point
or crossing set the route locking
relay switches. This is necessary
to release each route element
individually later, behind the train.
The next step is flank protection
search and supervision. Each point
or crossing relay set sends a flank
protection search current to each path
cable which is not in the running path. Figure 9.26: Flank protection search in SpDrS 60

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 9.3 Relay Interlocking

When the search current reaches an element which can give flank protection, this element is
set to the protecting position and locked and a respond current sent back to the searching
element (figure 9.26).
Now track elements are proved clear and if all elements are clear the route is locked
irreversibly in the entrance/exit sets. This route locking function cannot be cancelled manually
without special (registered) command (chapter 4.3.8.4).
Now signal selection is carried out. Each point and overlap set in the route sends the
information about its particular permitted speed to the signal selection set, a central switching
set. This set calculates the minimum and gives it to the signal sets as permitted speed for the
route. Then the main signal is cleared and after this the distant signal.

9.3.5.5 Route Search and Availability Testing

In this section, the processes of route search and availability testing are described in more
detail, as they are a good means of understanding the topological principle.
The signaller pushes the entrance and exit buttons simultaneously. From the entrance set, a
search current spreads into the related direction (figure 9.27). At this moment, the interlocking
cannot distinguish which is the entrance and which the exit button, so the search current also
spreads from the exit set but will not find a response.
Figure 9.28 shows the route
search and availability testing
circuitry in a point set. In each
point set on the path the relay
S1 or S2 picks up and current
is newly fed in to continue
along the route path. This is
necessary to limit the electrical
impedance in each circuit. In
each point set passed by the
search current, availability is
tested as follows:
–– If facing points are already
locked in one position, e. g.
as flank protection element
for another route, the
contact of relay L in figure
9.28 is open and search
current can continue only in
the available direction.
–– If facing points are not
locked for any route, the
contact of relay L is closed
and the search current
spreads into both directions.
–– If trailing points are locked
in the opposite position, the
contact of relay L is open and
the search current blocked. Figure 9.27: Route search and availability testing in SpDrS 60

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9 Interlocking Machines

–– If trailing points are not locked or locked in the proper position, the search current can
pass. Meanwhile, the points are marked in the required position by relay M+ or M- picking
up. Relay M+ or M- remains picked up during the whole route search and availability
testing process.
The entrance/exit and overlap sets laying in the path in opposite direction are responsible
for the interlocking of opposing movements: If they are already being used by a route in the
opposite direction, the search current is blocked and cannot continue along the path.
When the search current reaches the exit set (marked by the related route button pushed),
the overlap is also marked. At the overlap set, the current turns and flows back as respond
current (figure 9.27). The respond current passes facing points of the route (which are
reached by the respond current from the trailing end) in the same way as trailing points were
passed by the search current before. Therefore, all facing points in the running path and
overlap are now marked in the proper position by picking the relay M+ or M- up (figure 9.28).
As the trailing points have already been marked by the search current before, the respond
current finds its way back to the entrance set. An unambiguous path is now defined by
the marking of the points (M+/M- relays) and has been checked for availability, but track
occupancy has not yet been checked.

Figure 9.28: Route search and availability testing circuitry in a point set in SpDrS 60 (simplified and
with adapted names and symbols); Points are in + position

9.3.5.6 Modifications of SpDrS 60

In the 1970s, SpDrS 600 as an improvement of SpDrS 60 was developed, but was applied
only to a minor extent. However, the functional logic of SpDrS 600 formed the basis for the
development of Simis electronic interlocking (chapters 9.4.3 and 9.4.5).
More information on SpDrS 60 can be found in (Siemens 1978) and (Schmitz 1962).

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 9.3 Relay Interlocking

9.3.6 Example: UBRI (Russia)

9.3.6.1 Introduction
In Russia, the most widespread interlocking system is Unit-Block Relay Interlocking (UBRI,
figure 9.29), which also uses topological logic. Various modifications have been made since
1960, and it now controls more than 100000 sets of points in the Russian railway network.
The development of UBRI has involved experiences of engineering, implementation and
operation of previous relay interlocking systems.

Figure 9.29: Unit-block relay interlocking

UBRI, likewise SpDrS 60, is a highly modular interlocking system with the advantages of
significantly reduced efforts for engineering, installation and testing.

9.3.6.2 Relay Sets

Each relay set of the system includes relays that realise functions of the corresponding track
element: points, track section or signal. The connections between the relay sets are wired in
accordance with the topology of the track layout (figure 9.31a).
A special feature of UBRI is that separate relay sets are provided for the not safety related
selection functions and the safety related interlocking functions, both forming separate
systems of topological circuitry. By this, faster acting of the not safety related functions can be
achieved. The main functions of the non-safe route selection group of relays are:
–– registration of operator's actions for route setting
–– determination of the route direction (odd/even) and category (train/shunting)
–– determination of the path and commanding of point setting
–– checking of point setting along the path of the selected route
The main functions of the interlocking group of relays are:
–– checking of safety conditions along the path of the selected route
–– locking of the route
–– clearing of the signal with the checking of safety conditions
–– monitoring of a train passing via the route, releasing the route
–– manual releasing of the route
There are 16 types of relay sets of the interlocking group. These relay sets are linked with each
other by 8-wire connections according to the track layout. This group uses type N (class 1)
·
relays – relays of NMŠ type in old systems and REL type (figure 9.30) in newer systems.

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9 Interlocking Machines

·
Figure 9.30: Relay REL

In the route selection group, there are seven types of relay sets. These are linked with each
other by 4-wire connections according to the track layout. This group of relays consists of
KDRŠ relays (fast acting coded relays), which are non-safety relays.
Figure 9.31b shows an example of an UBRI system.

Figure 9.31: Partial relay set connection map of UBRI

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 9.3 Relay Interlocking

9.3.6.3 Non-safe Route Selection Group

Route selection group of relays consists of the following functional blocks (relay sets):
–– Signal sets define entrances and exits of routes and can be subdivided in accordance with
signal types (train/shunting) and function (entry signal, exit signal, intermediate signal).
–– Direction sets define type (train/shunt) and direction of a route.
–– Point sets define the required point positions in the route and command switching if
the actual position does not conform with that required. Point sets can be subdivided
according to the type of points (single set of points or two combined sets of points).
Each of the four wires connecting the relay sets can be assigned to a particular function:
1. The first wire (figure 9.31b) connects these relays which are intended for fixation of
the sequence of control button pressings. Any route is set up by sequential pushing
of entrance and exit buttons. If the route should be set up along an alternative path,
buttons for these deflection points are pushed after pushing the entrance button.
Pushing the entrance button fixes the type of route (i. e. train or shunting route) and the
direction of the movement. After pushing the exit button, the route is selected.
2. The second wire provides automatic joining of the elementary routes into a composite route.
3. The third wire provides task formation for point operation under control of the entrance
relay set on the whole length of the composite route.
4. The fourth wire serves for checking the correct positions of points after their operation.
After all points have been proved to be in their positions, the relays of the interlocking
group become active.

Figure 9.32: Circuitry for point commanding in UBRI

Figure 9.32 shows the circuitry for the commanding of points. Each simple point set contains
two relays for point commanding: PCR to command the points to plus position and MCR to
command them to minus position. Accordingly, each relay set for coupled points contains
three such relays: 1PCR, 2PCR and MCR. The circuit is formed in accordance with the track
layout between the entrance and the exit. In case the track layout permits more than one path
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9 Interlocking Machines

between entrance and exit, the preference variant of route (e. g. from entrance 1 via crossover
1/3 reverse instead of crossover 9/11 reverse in figure 9.32) is selected by contacts of the
angle button relay ABR. When pushing the route entrance button, a corresponding angle relay
in the point set picks up and electrical circuits for possible routes are formed. Then one out of
the possible routes is selected by pushing the exit button.

9.3.6.4 Safe Interlocking Group

Safe interlocking group of relays consists of following main blocks (sets):
–– Track section sets check the occupancy of main tracks and exclude opposing routes.
–– Track point sets check the occupancy of a track section with points inside it and fulfil
point locking.
–– Signal sets control the signals and determine the signal aspect. These sets can be
subdivided in accordance with the type of signal (entry signal, exit signal, intermediate signal).
–– Point sets provide the checking of point position and are arranged according to the
topology of a railway station.
–– Start sets control the points and indicate the point position.
The relay sets of the interlocking group are connected by cables with eight wires in
accordance with the track layout. The assignment of the wires to certain safety functions
is as follows:
1. The first wire connects the section checking relays of route under the stipulation that all
safety requirements are fulfilled. Such requirements include: proper position of the points,
clear track sections, proper control of flank protection and oversized sections and absence
of conflicting routes. The picking up of the relays locks the route sections and prepares the
circuits of train movement control (wires 3, 4 and 5).
2. The second wire is used for clearing the signal by picking up the signal relay by means
of corresponding control relays of the route sections. Simultaneously, locking of the route
sections is checked to make the selection of conflicting routes impossible. Additionally, the
fifth wire is used for selection of the signal aspects. Monitoring of signal lamps allows the
detection of filament fusing, and switching the signal to protected state.
The signal relay for a train signal is dropped down and the signal closed five seconds after a
train entry into the track circuit in advance of the signal, or when any supervised condition is
violated.
The signal relay for a shunting signal is dropped down when the shunting unit has
completely passed the signal.
3. Third, fourth and fifth wires are used by route relays for supervising train movement over the
route sections and for releasing the sections after the train has passed.
Each route section has two route relays; the first registers the train entry into the given
section under the precondition that the previous section has been occupied before. The
second route relay registers the clearing of the given section and entry of the train into the
following section. If these two conditions are fulfilled, the section is released.
As previously noted, the fifth wire is used for two different purposes:
• when the route is being set – for aspect selection of the signal in accordance with the
aspect of the signal ahead,
• when the route is released – for switching on the second route relay of the section.
4. The sixth wire is used for the unlocking of sections when an unused route is manually
cancelled. In this case, track occupancy is checked and protective time delays are taken
into account in accordance with the occupation of the approach section. This approach
section represents:
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 9.4 Electronic Interlocking

• for an entry route – the track section between the distant and the home signals,
• for an exit route – the departure track,
• for the exit part of a through route – the section between home and exit signals,
• for a shunting route – the section immediately in rear of the signal.
5. The seventh and eighth wires are used for an indication of the state of the corresponding
track sections (clear, occupied) on the operation table.
In addition to the connections with neighbouring relay sets according to the topology, the relay
sets have standardised connections with common equipment (comparable with the central
switching sets in SpDrS 60, chapter 9.3.5.2) and individual control circuits.
One purpose of these connections is the emergency release of route sections in the case
when they did not release automatically after the train passed. For this purpose, particular
relays are provided in the relay sets of track-point and track sections. This action is registered
and a time delay of three minutes applies.

9.3.6.5 Modifications of Unit-Block Relay Interlocking System

From the time of development (1960), UBRI was subject to various modifications.
1. Two variants of electronic blocks were designed in place of route selection relay sets:
• with the use of transistor based logical elements OR – NOT (Rezekne station, 1967 year)
• with the use of transistors and thyristors (Obukovo station, 1969 year)
2. An improved type of relay interlocking was developed in the 1970s to provide simplification
of design processes of non-standard circuitries and new relay sets. As the result, in the
1990s, the system of industrially mounted relay interlocking was developed. This system
is characterised by the use of new types of small-sized relays and an increased number
of relay sets and wires in the connecting cables (up to 31) with easy handling and
connections. New functions of this industrially mounted electrical interlocking include:
• the possibility of releasing a route not only one section after the other, but alternatively as
a whole
• the possibility of point locking along the path in the case of using auxiliary signal
• a new algorithm of train movement control
• the possibility of queuing of routes which cannot be set immediately due to route conflict
(chapter 4.3.11)
But the tendency for broadening of functional possibilities has led to an overcomplicated
circuitry, excessive expenditure for relays (about 100 relays for one set of points), and high
costs of the interlocking systems. As a result, electronic systems have gained in importance.
Various modifications of relay-electronic systems have been used on Russian railways since
the end of the 1990s. Any of them represents a combination of the safe interlocking group
of Unit-Block Relay Interlocking (safety functions) and the electronic non-safe operational
functions. This affected the workplace of a local or central signaller.

9.4 Electronic Interlocking

9.4.1 Historical Overview

The first electronic interlocking systems were installed in the 1980s and have since been
further developed. Various systems in different versions are offered by different manufacturers,
each being applied in one or more countries. Some manufacturers offer various systems

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9 Interlocking Machines

with different grade of complexity, such as the size of the interlocking area and adjustments
to special national requirements etc. However, there are/were two standardised forms in
national railways: SSI in Britain and SMILE in Japan. However, the British Rail SSI is no longer
produced, but successor products of different manufacturers are used for new installations.
So, the idea of standardised systems at a country level has not prevailed. This has been
superseded by innovation and competition between different manufacturers and products.
In contrast to relay interlocking, electronic interlocking can provide much more extensive and
flexible functions. Today, in most electronic interlocking types, various functions for maximum
safety are also provided for use in degraded mode operation in case of element failure. In the
ideal case, if an element fails, the signaller only needs to take safety responsibility for a single
defective element, not for the whole route.
In many applications, components of different manufacturers and types are combined. For
example, an operation control system of one manufacturer is used to control a relay or an
electronic interlocking system of another manufacturer. Or field elements of one manufacturer
are combined with interlocking controllers of other manufacturers.
The new trend is increased localisation of element control, in connection with centralisation
and flexibility in the logical interlocking functions. An example is that implemented by
Distributed Wayside Architecture, see chapter 9.4.4.

9.4.2 System Safety in Electronic Interlocking

In electronic interlocking, the functions are mainly defined in programmed software. Microelectronic
technology, in comparison with mechanical and relay technology, has several unfavourable safety
characteristics:
–– Due to the low voltages used, electronic components are highly sensitive to external influence.
–– Electronic components, in contrast to relays, have no preferred direction of failure, but the
way they fail cannot be predicted. Inherent fail-safe design is therefore impossible.
–– The characteristics of electronic components can change over time.
–– Due to high levels of complexity, the prevention of systematic errors in manufacturing is difficult.
–– Again due to high complexity, checking processes and changes in the equipment are difficult.

Figure 9.33: Computer configurations for safe installations

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 9.4 Electronic Interlocking

To overcome these deficits, hardware and software redundancy and diversity are used to
a different extent. Hardware redundancy means that the same functions are processed
in different hardware channels and the results compared. This mainly helps to exclude
spontaneous errors of the electronic system. Hardware redundancy is used in almost all
electronic interlocking systems.
The following system designs are applied:
–– 2 out of 2 (2oo2) system: In these systems, the safety functions are processed in two
independent channels and the final results are safely compared. If both results are equal,
the output is used; otherwise a fail-safe reaction leads the system into a safe (traffic-
hindering) state.
–– 2 out of 3 (2oo3) system: The functions are processed in three independent channels. If a
failure occurs in one channel, then that channel is isolated. The interlocking continues as a
2oo2 until the failure is repaired.
–– 2*(2oo2) system: One redundant 2oo2 subsystem is active and the other works in standby
mode. If a failure occurs in the active subsystem, it is isolated and processing is continued
by the standby subsystem.
In all these system designs, a comparator (symbol “&” in figure 9.33) is used to match two
independent channels. This can be implemented in either hardware or software, or both.
Depending on the type of comparator, the deactivation/shutdown principles for a detected
error differ. A software comparator switches off all logical interfaces of the faulty channel. With
a HW comparator, the physical interfaces will be de-energised. This can be realised e. g. by
disconnecting the power supply from the erroneous channel.
Therefore, all these systems provide safety, whereas the latter two systems provide additional
availability redundancy to maintain operation in case of an error and therefore reduce the
probability of a state which hinders operations.
Diversity helps to exclude systematic errors in design. An alternative or supplement to
diversity is a very strict checking process. Diversity can take different forms:
–– diverse hardware: different hardware products are used in both channels
–– diverse operation systems, e. g. Windows and Linux
–– diverse software, e. g. for the definition of interlocking functions and track layout data

9.4.3 Hardware Structure

Figure 9.34 shows the basic functional structure of an electronic interlocking. This does not
mean that one functional block is necessarily identical with a certain hardware component,
although in many systems it is.
The operation control level (see chapter 9.1) is often provided by external remote control systems
or by workplaces far away from the interlocking area. Consequently, the operation control level is
usually not considered as an integral part of the electronic interlocking system, but as a separate
system. However, interfaces between the operation control systems and the interlocking itself have
to be defined. These are occasionally known as ‘the operation interface level’.
The interlocking level and the element control level (see chapter 9.1) are integral parts of
the electronic interlocking system.
Train protection and train control systems (chapter 8) can interface with the element control level
(often in systems which obtain information from the trackside signals), or with the interlocking level
(often in systems with continuous transmission and centralised movement authority calculation).

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9 Interlocking Machines

Figure 9.34: Functional structure of electronic interlocking

Diagnostic functions provide checking of the state of components, failure detection and
deactivation of faulty components. Diagnostic functions are necessary in all three levels. Often
the collection and evaluation of diagnostic data are allocated in a separate hardware block.
In most electronic interlocking systems, each of the mentioned levels is represented by
dedicated hardware components. An exception is the interlocking Simis W of Siemens (figure
9.35), where the hardware components IIC/OMC and ACC are responsible for the interlocking
functions cooperatively, with IIC/OMC being comparable with the central switching sets of a
topological relay interlocking (chapter 9.3.5.2).

Figure 9.35: System structure of Simis W

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 9.4 Electronic Interlocking

Element controllers are modules designed for the control of one or several peripheral elements.
Types differ between interlocking products, but in general the main types of element controllers are:
–– element controllers for signals and/or balises of train protection systems
–– element controllers for points (also usable for derailers etc.)
–– element controllers for track circuits or axle counters
–– digital I/O elements for relay interfaces (e. g. block interfaces, level crossings or key locks)
Element controllers can be located in the interlocking building, as well as locally near the
element they control.

9.4.4 Geographical Distribution

According to the territorial distribution, most interlocking systems include central and local
interlocking stations (figure 9.36). The central stations include either parts or the whole of the
interlocking level, whereas the local stations include the element control level and, in some
cases, the remaining parts of the interlocking level.

Figure 9.36: Geographical assignment of electronic interlocking

The size of the area of responsibility of the central and local interlocking stations varies much
between the interlocking systems. In many, a central station is responsible for an area which
covers usually one station and possibly the neighbouring open line section, whereas one local
station is responsible for few (around 1–5) sets of points and/or signals. In other systems with

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9 Interlocking Machines

very large interlocking areas, one central interlocking station can control a line section of up to
around 100 km, with one local interlocking station being responsible for each (small) station.
The newest form of geographical distribution of electronic interlocking is Distributed Wayside
Architecture (DWA), also called “digital interlocking” (e. g. figure 9.38 or figure 9.52 right). Some
electronic interlocking systems (B950, Simis D and ZSB 2000) already include features of the
new concept today, in that integrated control components send commands to the wayside
field element controllers through a data bus (such as CAN) or ISDN/DSL.
The power supply is still a conventional central one. Hereby, the control of field elements is
distributed in wayside controllers in proximity to the elements to be controlled, whereas the
central functions of interlocking logic etc. can be very centrally located. In extreme cases, there
can even be one control centre for the whole country. The spatial separation of interlocking
and field elements is enabled by Ethernet, which enables practically unlimited control
distances. Also backup control centres are planned, e. g. a second control centre elsewhere in
the country. In the future, even solutions in the Cloud could become possible.
One characteristic of the network communication structure (figure 9.52) is that the element
controllers (ECs) are connected through rings of command control and safety (CCS) equipment
(Ethernet or optical fibre; “OF”) to the redundant fibre-optic network. The switching commands
are sent by the electronic interlocking central unit to the element controllers. Central units also
have redundant connections to the fibre-optic backbone. The element controllers switch the field
elements and send status reports to the electronic interlocking central unit.
At the point of service (PoS) industrial components are used, whereas especially robust railway
equipment is used for the element controllers in the CCS rings. Multiple element controllers
and single element controllers are planned for various applications (Kanis/Lisker/Mehlhorn
2014) (Hefti/Wagner 2014).
Data communication is secured by adequate measures (redundancy, cryptography, etc.).
Separating power supplies and data transmission requires the capture and feedback of the
energy state of the field elements.

9.4.5 Software Structure

Regarding the route formation, either the tabular or the topological principle is used
(chapter 4.3.9). However, the difference between these principles is not as obvious as in relay
interlocking and the advantages and disadvantages are fewer.
In the software structure, generally the following layers can be distinguished (see figure 9.37
with some variations between products, manufacturers and countries):
–– Platform (optional): Often the manufacturers use the same basis (a set of hardware
components including their system software which is needed for processing the electronic
hardware) for several of their products.
–– Generic Product: This is uniform within an interlocking type (product) and version.
–– Generic Application: These are additional generic functions for a particular shaping of
the product, e. g. the adaption to the operational rules of a particular country and country
specific interface solutions.
–– Specific Application: These are the specific data of the particular installation, including
track and signalling layout and all local specialities.
Each of these layers is capsuled by an own safety case, validation, application conditions,
assessment report etc. This approach helps to minimise the efforts for these activities in each
particular project.

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 9.4 Electronic Interlocking

Figure 9.37: Layers in the software structure

However, the interlocking types are different in the extent of these layers. Although defined
for electronic interlocking, the principle is also applicable in part to its ancestors in relay
technology. For example, in Simis W, the layers contain basically the following contents:
–– The platform is currently Simis ECC, which is also used for other interlocking products
of the same manufacturer, for RBC (see chapter 8.4), for axle counting systems (see
chapter 5.4) and for level crossing controllers.
–– The generic product is the interlocking Simis W itself with general rules of interlocking logic
which are applicable worldwide. In the ancestor product SpDrS 60, see chapter 9.3.5, this
would be comparable with the complete relay sets. These are the same over the whole world,
plus general rules on how to use and connect the relay sets.
–– The generic application is the configuration of the product, including engineering rules for a
specific country. In comparison with SpDrS 60, this would include these relay sets which are
country specific (e. g. relay sets for signals).
–– The specific application is the track layout of the particular installation. In comparison with
SpDrS 60, this would be the wiring between the relay sets and the neighbourhood relations.
The clear distinction between generic product and generic application can be shown, for
example, by the function "overlap". The generic product comprises all the functions of an
interlocking. As a part of them, the overlap function is also implemented in generic products.
If the operational rules in a country do not include the function "overlap", or if the operator has
not specified an overlap, this function will not be implemented in the generic application. But it
remains available in the generic product.
Other interlocking types use slimmer generic products and generic applications and compensate
this with a more extensive specific application. For example, tabular interlocking logic implies
more information to be defined in the specific application. Some generic products do not even
include any interlocking logic, but only the hardware and the system software.
Due to highly complex software, testing and later alterations cause additional difficulties.
For the checking of software, particularly for the specific application, many railways and
manufacturers use special simulators. These simulators replicate the behaviour of the field
elements, without the need to connect the interlocking to the real track layout. This reduces
obstruction to rail traffic during the construction, testing and commissioning phase of the
interlocking. Also, software tools for automatic generation and verification of the engineering
are widely used. The more extensive the specific application is, the greater the need for
automation in engineering and data checking processes.

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9 Interlocking Machines

9.4.5.1 Example: Data Language of British Rail SSI

Solid State Interlocking (SSI) originated as an open standard developed by British Railways in
collaboration with GEC (now Alstom) and Westinghouse (now Siemens). Development started
in the 1970s and the pilot scheme at Leamington Spa, a medium sized station in the English
Midlands, entered service in 1985. The system was then adopted as a standard for new work on
British Railways.
With adaptations for other national requirements, SSI has become one of the most widely used
interlocking systems, especially in Western Europe and countries of the British Commonwealth.
SSI was one of the earliest electronic interlockings to be put into service. The experience gained
during the process of validating the design fed directly into the CENELEC specifications (EN
50126/8/9) that were produced subsequently. Successor systems, such as Smartlock from
Alstom, have incorporated additional interfaces, notably a vital interface with the Radio Block
Centre for ETCS. Backwards compatibility with SSI is retained, for example to permit piecemeal
extensions to or replacement of existing installations.
The software is structured in two parts:
–– The fixed software, which includes the system software, does not change from one station
to another. It serves as an interpreter for the specific application data and carries out
system functions including communications and management of redundancy.
–– The specific application data express all interlocking functions. They are written in data
language designed specifically to be used by signal engineers. The internal structure of the
language is organised in terms of signalling functions.
This software structure gives the system high flexibility, while requiring a disciplined approach to
data preparation (e. g. use of approved data constructs). When adapting SSI for a new railway,
the fixed software is not changed, as the specific application data expresses both the railway's
signalling principles and the location data.
The SSI interlocking contains a memory called the ‘state of the railway’ which is updated
continuously. It includes memories for every route request, signal, points, track circuit and route
declared for the specific application, as well as various general-purpose functions (binary latches,
timers). The SSI data language provides tests for reading individual items in this memory, and
commands for writing to them. For example:
–– P101 cdn might be a test for 101 points controlled and detected in the Normal position
–– S23 set y might be a command to light the Yellow aspect of 23 signal.
Other statements are used to relate trackside functions to telegram bits in the trackside data link
system.
Logical constructs are built up from these tests and commands using IF … THEN … ELSE in the
usual way, e. g.:
if TAB c , TAD c , (TAE c or TBC c) , If AB, AD and either AE or BC track circuits
P101 dn are clear AND 101 points are detected in the
then L1234 l Normal position, then set the function L1234 to
else L1234 f “Locked,” otherwise set it to “Free”
\

The data for a specific application contains declarations of all the field elements (signals, points,
track circuits etc.) and of internal signalling functions associated with them such as routes and
sub-routes (route partitioned by train detection sections etc.). It also contains instructions for:
–– updating the states of objects in the memory using the information reported by the TFMs
–– processing inputs from the signaller (route requests, point controls)

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 9.4 Electronic Interlocking

–– sending commands to the TFMs to drive the external objects

–– if required, instructions for processing inputs from an NX Panel (to derive panel requests
from button and switch operations), and outputs to it (basically lamp drives)
The diagnostic system also uses data in order to give ‘intelligent’ fault messages (e. g. ‘Signal
X lamp Y failure’ rather than simply ‘error on message A byte B bit C.’ This data is derived
automatically from the other information by the application design tools.
Data is also created to permit simulation in the design office of the whole of the trackside part
of the signalling installation. This data too is generated automatically.

Examples of SSI Data Language: Stages in Setting Route R12(1M)

In response to a route request received from the signaller, the following commands are to be
carried out. (Obviously this only shows the main features, to illustrate the overall principle):

*QR12(1M) if conditions for accepting request for route R12(M): IF

R12(1M) a the route is available
P101 cnf the points 101 are in the correct position OR are free to be moved to that position
UBA f , UCA f … opposing sub-routes are not locked
then actions to be taken if the route is available: THEN
R12(1M) s lock the route
UBA l , UCA l … lock all the sub-routes in it
P101 cn command the points to the required position

The above is actually written

*QR12(1M) if R12(1M) a , P101 cnf , UBA f , UCA f , …
then R12(1M) s , UBA l , UCA l , … , P101 cn
\ .

Example of SSI Data Language: Signal Clearing Controls

if R12(1M) s if the route is set
S12 set stick in effect tests that the train has not yet passed through the route
TAB c , TAC c … track circuits proved clear
P101 cdn points proved in the correct position

Example of SSI Data Language: Signal Aspect Controls

The selection of signal aspects as a result from the aspect of the signal ahead and the route is
handled as follows:

S12 set rip command to light the route indicator (if any)
G s 7 \ This statement identifies the telegram bit to set if the Red aspect is to be
displayed.
S14 seq 4 , G s 7654 This statement identifies the signal ahead (signal 14), specifies a 4-aspect
sequence (red, yellow, double yellow, green) and identifies the telegram bit(s)
to to set if a Clear aspect is to be displayed.

(IRSE 1991)

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9 Interlocking Machines

9.4.6 Operation Control

Operation control is usually solved in a topological image. Input commands are given by
keyboard, tablet (older systems only) and/or mouse. Often different monitors are used with
different tasks, which can be more or less flexibly assigned to the particular monitors:
–– Area overview pictures give an overview over a larger area (e. g. a big station or
several stations). In some interlocking and operation control systems, the most frequent
commands can be input in the area overview pictures, whereas in others it serves only
for visualisation.
–– Zoom pictures show details of each track element. Either all operations have to be
input there or they are needed mainly for degraded mode operation or other less
frequent operation actions.
–– Alarm lists give out any possibly dangerous occurrences and actions or failure statuses
of elements.
–– Utilities like automatic train routeing are often managed in an additional monitor.
The grade of centralisation in operation control varies much between the railways (chapter
11). In decentralised operation control, typically one signaller is responsible for a certain
station. In highly centralised operation, signallers for a large area are concentrated in one
operation control centre. The latter gives high flexibility in adjusting the size of the area
of responsibility of one signaller to the current workload, but causes additional difficulties
in the case of technical problems when corrective action has to be carried out locally. In
most modern systems, the operation of a certain interlocking area can be assigned flexibly
between different central and local operation workplaces.
Operation control systems can be designed to different safety levels. In vital (safe) systems
safety-related commands, e. g. in degraded mode operation, can be input. In non-vital
systems, certain actions in degraded mode operation have to be achieved otherwise, e. g.
by a train driver in the field. Also mixed systems with vital and non-vital functions are
possible.

9.4.7 Communications

Transmission between the geographically separated components or field elements of

an interlocking system is solved by electrical cables, optical cables or radio information,
usually based on addressed data telegrams. Safety is provided by redundancy of the data
telegrams. For availability, redundancy of the physical data lines on different paths is often
also provided.

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 9.4 Electronic Interlocking

9.4.7.1 Network Architecture

An interlocking system consists of central components and of field elements, like signals,
points and track vacancy detection system. Also the operation control system and train
control systems need to exchange data with the interlocking. The central components and
field elements are interconnected via a physical network system.
But due to the geographical arrangement that the components are usually installed at one
location and the field elements are mounted along the track, all different subsystems of an
interlocking system are not interconnected via one (physical) network system. Depending
on which subsystems have to be linked, an interlocking system network can be divided
into two areas (see also figure 9.38):
–– local area network (Backbone)
–– field ring network

Figure 9.38: Network architecture between interlocking components and field elements

Local Area Network (Backbone)

The local area network is an exclusive, redundant and highly available backbone system to
ensure transport of messages over longer distances. In this context, backbone technologies
can be new or existing LWL, MPLS or SDH networks, which extend over longer distances.
The coupling points to the field ring network are provided via connection points (LAN access
points or router).

Field Ring Network

Two redundant stubs form the field ring network extending over short distances in contrast
to the wide and local area network. Both stubs are connected via a LAN access point or
router. They are used to connect the locally distributed field elements via switches. Each
stub outgoing from the redundant backbone supplies the same field elements completely
independently. The redundancy always remains and there is no ring closing in the network
of field rings (Kraft 2013).

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9 Interlocking Machines

9.4.7.2 Topologies for Field Ring Networks

There are four options to connect field elements of an interlocking system via a field ring
network to the LAN (Backbone). All options can be used concurrently.
Option 1 (figure 9.39) is to directly connect a field element to the field ring network.

Figure 9.39: Network topology – option 1

Option 2 (figure 9.40) is to form a line by connecting multiple field elements to a single access
point of the network system. For availability redundancy purposes, the line is started from two
separate access points at two different physical locations.

Figure 9.40: Network topology – option 2

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 9.4 Electronic Interlocking

In case both access points have to be at the same physical location, option 3 can be used.
One access point is connected to the nearest field element and the other access point is
connected to the field element furthest away. This way, in the case of a complete power loss
in one field element, at least one channel stays open for the other field elements in the chain.

Figure 9.41: Network topology – option 3

Option 4 is an extension of option 3 where the chains are closed to form two rings. This option
has the highest availability redundancy.

Figure 9.42: Network topology – option 4

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9 Interlocking Machines

9.4.7.3 Bus Systems and Data Transfer Protocols

Both areas of an interlocking system network LAN and field ring network are often
implemented by a serial bus system. The most common used bus systems are:
–– CAN-Bus
–– Ethernet
–– PROFIBUS
The preferred bus system for the LAN (Backbone) is given to Ethernet. The reasons to use
Ethernet are to offer high bitrates (up to some gigabits per second) and a long distance
range.
The favoured bus systems for the field ring network are the CAN-Bus or the PROFIBUS.
Both systems are characterised by good interference immunity, high data integrity and fast
latency and response time (e. g. the messages will be updated after 300 ms).
Regardless of the preferred bus system, two kinds of protocols are distinguished in data
transfer principles:
–– line switching
–– packet switching
Line switching is based on the principle that an exclusive communication line is connected
from the sender to the receiver for communication between two devices (switch or
router). A point to point connection will be established, which is set up as a dedicated line
between the two devices in the data transfer. Each communication line gets a bandwidth.
If the number of lines in the network will be larger, then the bandwidth per line will be
lower. If a higher bandwidth per line is needed, only the bundling of several communication
lines is possible. But this will reduce free communication lines in case of sudden additional
communication needs. The advantages of line switching are a low latency time and
a fixed bandwidth per line. The disadvantage is that a complete line is occupied per
communication between two devices.
In contrast, by packet switching the transmitted information will be divided into single
packets named datagrams and assigned via a network. Each single package contains
the transmitted information content named payload and the complete sender and
receiver addresses or ID, so that all packages can be transmitted autonomously in the
network. The network itself does not consist of a few central nodes but rather of small
and equitable nodes in the network system. An implemented intelligent routeing protocol
organises the data transfer in such a way that the received packages at each node will be
sent to the next node by the shortest route. If the shortest route to the next node fails, the
packages are forwarded to the receiver via an alternative route in the network system. The
route from the sender to the receiver is not predefined when the package will be sent over
the network system. Thus, in contrast to line switching, there is not one dedicated line for
a particular sender-receiver-connection. In the context of packet switching, the lines can
be defined as virtual lines.
The advantages of packet switching are that multiple communication partners (sender and
receiver) can share one line. Furthermore, it offers a high stability against the loss of nodes in
the network system. It is also more robust to high data transfer spikes than a line-switched
network with its bound bandwidths per communication line. The disadvantage of this protocol
type is long and fluctuating latency times due to the different distances of data transfer lines for
the single packages. An example of line switching is the PROFIBUS and of packet switching is
an IP based network system.

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 9.4 Electronic Interlocking

9.4.7.4 Open and Closed Networks

The communication between the components and field elements of an interlocking system is
usually via LAN (for example Ethernet). A distinction is made between open and closed networks.
Likewise in communication between ETCS and interlocking, closed networks have amongst others
the following safety measures to detect failures during the transfer (see also figure 9.43):
–– message type
–– sequence number
–– time stamp procedure and check with:
• sender time stamp
• last receiver time stamp
• time stamp at the last message reception
–– safety code

Figure 9.43: Structure of a message on application layer

For example, further safety measures can be a defined message length or the ID of the sender
and/or receiver in the message header.
If a communication between the components and field elements of an interlocking system takes
place via an open network (such as a public telephone network, internet or packet switched data
radio (GPRS)), further measures must be implemented in addition to the safety measures for closed
networks. To protect the messages against attacks, each of them gets an additional cryptographic
code to the existing message structure according to figure 9.43. The cryptographic block codes
are a kind of non-linear hash block code based on cryptographic algorithms. These are mainly
directed against unauthorised access and malicious attack to the network (UNISIG Subset-098).

9.4.7.5 Quality of Service (QoS)

QoS mechanisms need to be implemented because different types of services (data
telegrams/messages) are used simultaneously on the same physical network system (e. g. field
ring network). The used types of services can be classified into three different classes of traffic:
–– first class
–– second class
–– third class
The first class has the highest priority. It is the traffic vital to the railway operation (interlocking traffic)
like to switch points or a signal for a route. This also includes data sent between the controller of a
field element and their corresponding interlocking module. This class of traffic needs to be delivered
on time without any loss of packets. This means low delay and high reliability.
The second class is used for diagnosis traffic. Diagnosis information is exchanged between
the components or the controller of a field element of an interlocking system and maintenance
centre. This kind of traffic is less time-critical than interlocking traffic, but diagnosis traffic can
occur as a burst if, for example, a component is restarted (high throughput). Packet drops
must be avoided as well (high reliability).

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9 Interlocking Machines

Any other traffic is classified as third class traffic like Up- and Downloads of non-safety-related
firm-/software for a component or controller. The third class traffic has the lowest priority and
will be used when all priority bits are set to zero (means that no first or second class of traffic is
used in the network system currently).

9.4.8 Outdoor Cabling of Field Elements

This section considers the cabling of field elements (e. g. signals, points, track circuits, axle
counters, digital I/Os etc.) to the control units of an interlocking. There are generally two
options of connection (see figure 9.44):
–– Variant 1 is centralised control of field elements. Each field element is connected by control
and supervision cables directly to the control unit of the interlocking. This requires at least two
wires for each signal lamp, and the country specific number of wires for each point machine
to be laid between the interlocking and the field element. The control length is around 6.5 km
with standard cables and few kilometres more with special cables.
–– Variant 2 is decentralised control of field elements. Here, local field element controllers
are installed in direct proximity to or even inside the related field elements. The control
and supervision cable only needs to be laid on the length between the local field element
controller and the related field element(s), whereas information between the local controllers
and the interlocking can be transmitted by data communication (see chapter 9.4.7), and
electricity can be fed in locally by a ring line. This reduces expenses for copper cables,
but needs additional efforts for locally distributed logic. The control length between the
interlocking and the field element is practically unlimited.

Figure 9.44: Variants of cabling of field elements

The preference for the one or the other solution depends on economic considerations, the
track layout, the historical development of signalling in the country, the local availability of
power supply, environmental conditions etc.
Figure 9.45 shows the equivalent circuit diagram of a cable. There are four impedance
components inside the cable:
–– Longitudinal ohmic resistance: This is determined by the material, the sectional area and
the length of the cable and should be small to achieve a good control length of the cable
and to reduce energy consumption.

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–– Longitudinal inductance: This is determined by the spacing and angle between parallel
cable cores, the insulation material and the length of the cable and should be small to
achieve a good control length of the cable.
–– Leak resistance (ohmic) of the cable: This is determined by the insulation material and by
the length of the cable and should be high.
–– Cross capacity between cable cores: This is determined by the spacing between cable
cores, the permittivity of the insulation material, the distance and angle between the wires in
the cable and the length of the cable and should be low to achieve a good control length of
the cable.
Further, there is a possibility of electromagnetic induction by parallel cables with higher
voltages and currents, e. g. overhead wires in electric traction areas. These can be
avoided by keeping a certain distance to such cables and by only crossing them at right
angles.
The above factors, in particular the ohmic resistance, the capacitive coupling of wires in
the same cable and the voltage induced by overhead wires in electric traction areas lead to
a limitation of cable length. The traditional maximum length of a cable for control of signals,
points, external digital I/Os etc. is therefore about 6.5 km, with special cables this can be
increased up to around 10 km.

Figure 9.45: Quadrupole of a cable

A short circuit or foreign current in a

cable can lead to a dangerous system
reaction, e. g. the illumination of a signal
lamp which should be off. Therefore,
insulation of the wires against each
other and against the environment
is important. Figure 9.46 shows the
structure of a signal cable. The layers
from outside to inside are typically:
–– outer sheath
–– first armour
–– second armour
–– cable sheath
–– cable shield from aluminium,
connected by wires
–– copper wires, each of them isolated,
twisted (to minimise capacities)
Figure 9.46: Layers of a signal cable
(photos: Martin Bimmermann)

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9 Interlocking Machines

The purpose of the sheaths is to reduce inductivities induced from sources outside the
cable, whereas the purpose of the armour is mechanical protection.
Depending on the number of wires needed in a cable, different sizes of cables can be
used. The smallest practically used cables are those with four wires, as shown in figure
9.46. Cables with more wires (e. g. figure 9.47) are used to connect a larger number of field
elements to the interlocking.

Figure 9.47: Example of a thick cable with many wires (photo: Martin Bimmermann)

The typical cabling layout for a larger interlocking area is shown in figure 9.48. For economic
efficiency, thick cables with many wires are used in proximity to the interlocking controller. The
cables branch up into smaller cables towards the ends of the cable lines. Cable distribution
cabinets form the intermediate nodes of the cabling equipment.

Figure 9.48: Typical cabling layout (graphic: Martin Bimmermann)

A particular aspect is the use of different insulation materials of cables in tunnels. On the one
side, the cable is suitable to propagate an existing fire. On the other side, a burning cable can
produce poisonous liquids and gases. The railways follow different philosophies concerning
the dangers of burning cables:
–– Some countries (e. g. USA, France) prefer the use of cables with halogen (e. g. PVC)
because this is hardly inflammable.
–– Other countries (e. g. Germany, China) prefer the use of cables without halogen (e. g. PE)
because this material doesn’t produce poisonous substances when burning.
In some cases, it can even be required that the cable should continue to function for a defined
time even when burning. That means that e. g. a lamp which is controlled by this cable shall
remain on even if the cable is burning (see figure 9.49).

Figure 9.49: Cable under fire (graphic: Martin Bimmermann)

More information on cables and their optimisation can be found in (Bimmermann/Altmann 2012).

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 9.4 Electronic Interlocking

9.4.9 Energy Supply

9.4.9.1 Operating Conditions

The requirements for the energy supply of electronic interlockings are very high. As with relay
interlockings, due to the consistent centralisation of the safety logic and control of many
and distant elements, a reliable energy supply is necessary. Electronic interlockings have a
comparatively high connection power due to the high energy demand of many consumers.
The use of electronic computing technology requires a high quality of the energy supply in
terms of electrical properties. In particular, at no point should the energy supply of the computer
assemblies be interrupted, which means that power blackouts are not acceptable here. As this is
not guaranteed by the electric grid and the existing power supply systems, electronic interlockings
use systems for "uninterrupted power supply" (UPS). These deliver consistent quality at the UPS
busbar, in the case of grid supply, emergency supply and backup supply operation.

9.4.9.2 Architecture of the Energy Supply

A UPS system consists of a rectifier or several rectifier modules. This converts the incoming three-
phase alternating voltage from the mains or from the backup power supply into direct voltage.
This is followed by an inverter (or several inverter modules), which converts the direct voltage
into 3~ 400/230 V 50 Hz AC. In the intermediate circle between rectifier and inverter there is the
parallel interlocking battery. The intermediate circle voltage is usually 110 or 220 V DC.
Electronic control can ensure a consistently high quality of the output voltage. Spikes in
voltage and irregularities in the supply grid can be compensated. In the event of a power
failure, the battery forms a power buffer to feed the energy consumers via inverter until the
backup power supply is available.

Figure 9.50: Principle of electronic interlocking energy supply

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9 Interlocking Machines

In addition, the UPS has an electronically controlled bypass, so that the energy can be
taken directly from the grid if necessary, bypassing the UPS (standby operation). The
bypass also serves to protect the UPS from overload. A hand switching device (HSD) also
enables consumers to be supplied directly by the grid during maintenance/repair work on
the UPS. The typical structure of a power supply for electronic interlocking is shown in
figure 9.50.
Compared with a relay interlocking, all major consumers in the electronic interlocking are
supplied directly by the UPS busbar. DC consumers obtain their energy either by converters
from the UPS's DC intermediate circle or via converters from the UPS busbar (see figure
9.50). Static converters are used in electronic interlockings for inverters, DC converters and
frequency converters.

9.4.9.3 Constructive Design

Electronic interlocking power supply systems are characterised by control cabinets that
represent functional units like in the relay interlocking (figure 9.51). The core is the UPS
block with rectifier and inverter cabinets. Other equipment cabinets, cabinets for AC and DC
distribution as well as for additional converters or other devices complete the system.

Figure 9.51: UPS in the electronic interlocking

Due to a modular design, it is possible to increase the overall availability of the power supply
system by means of providing several electronic converters in parallel for example. This
redundancy can be used for important components like track circuits.

9.4.9.4 Power Bus for Network Interlocking

Up until the present, it has been necessary to operate complicated point-to-point-
connections from the central unit of the electronic interlocking system for the transmission
of power and data. With the use of modern communication systems, it is possible today
to concentrate data transmission on just a single line for numerous field elements. It is
therefore no longer necessary to have end-to-end multicore cabling right through to each
field element (figure 9.52).
With the network-oriented communication concept for electronic interlocking it will be
primarily the central technical locations that are to have their own power supplies with
dependable standby arrangements. There will also be a self-sufficient alternative to the

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 9.4 Electronic Interlocking

mains supply, and they will be connected through a network to the outdoor equipment
and its controllers. The electricity supply to the controlled elements is to be either separate
and self-sufficient or completely independent (Klein 2014).
It is possible to use a central power supply followed by energy distribution (“CPS”) using an
energy bus; the alternative is local or distributed power supply to the element controllers
(“LPS”). The layout of the power supply network (simple or redundant, ring or radial
configuration) will depend on local conditions (such as available power sources, amounts of
energy and load ratings) plus limiting factors of an economic nature.
In the newly introduced optional energy bus concept (figure 9.52), the element controllers and
the field elements are supplied with energy (750 V DC, tolerance range 500–900 V – outdoor
energy bus satisfying IEC 60038). It must be fed by at least two independent power sources
with independent feeds and must have the capacity for at least one peak-load storage. The
cabling is laid parallel to the track. The element controllers are to be protected from loss of
power for a short period of time by local accumulators. Points of power (PoP) are used for
connecting the loads (Moser 2013).
Central power supply is to be used at all central technical locations and major stations.
Basically, it amounts to a standby power supply incorporating a UPS (uninterruptible power
supply). The distributed supply may use either an energy bus (connected to the central power
supply) or its own local power sources.

Figure 9.52: Energy bus power supply in network interlocking

The energy concept for decentralised architecture introduces a standardised power supply with
defined interfaces for the command, control and safety systems as well as for telecommunications.
Depending on needs, the following voltages are supplied at the point of power:
–– 750 V DC (energy bus)
–– 3~ 400/230 V 50 Hz AC (for instance for point machines)
–– 24–120 V DC (loads belonging to command, control and safety systems on the element
controllers)
–– 48 V DC (telecommunication loads and network components)

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9 Interlocking Machines

9.4.10 Local-electrical Operated Point Switches (LOPS)

LOPS were developed firstly for industrial railways and the system has spread, in the
meantime, to several railways. They represent a decentralised form of electronic interlocking
for shunting areas, with simplified interlocking functions. LOPS are designed as modules and
can be used for single points as well as for large shunting areas. The advantages of LOPS,
which increase the efficiency of shunting, are:
–– In contrast to the usual electronic interlocking, the installation costs are much lower, and the
points can be set by train drivers or shunting staff. Thus ground staff for signalling are not
required.
–– In contrast to manually operated points with key locks, switching of the points can be done
much faster (e. g. without leaving the driving cab) and maintenance costs are reduced.
Essential components of a LOPS system are:
–– points with point machines
–– point signals to indicate the end position to the driver
–– decentralised electronic control equipment with simple interlocking functions
–– track clear detection
–– operation equipment
The interlocking functions prevent the switching of points which are currently occupied, or
up to which another shunting movement is approaching. They can also provide for simple
interlocking functions between points (chapter 4.2). Points are often designed with a preferred
position, to which they return whenever they are not being used. Spring points (chapter
6.1.2.2) are also often used.
Operation can be either by switching each set of points individually, or by entrance-exit
operation. In the latter case, the entrance is determined by the current position of the vehicle,
whereas the exit has to be selected by the driver or shunting staff.
For command input, either pushbuttons in different height (for a person on the trackside, on
the step of a wagon or in the driver's cab) or even complete panels with different pushbuttons
for different directions (figure 9.53) are used (German solution). Or points can be commanded
by a handheld using radio transmission (North American solution).

Figure 9.53: Local operation panel for LOPS (manufacturer: Tiefenbach)

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 9.5 Hybrid Technologies

9.5 Hybrid Technologies

9.5.1 Hybrid Mechanical and Electrical/Pneumatic/Hydraulic Forms

In such hybrid interlockings, the interlocking functions typically remain mechanical, but the
control of field elements is by electricity, pneumatics or hydraulics. In the US, the first power
interlocking with the pneumatic control of field elements was installed in 1876. From 1882,
George Westinghouse's company Union Switch and Signal installed the first interlocking with
hydraulics (using water in summer and a non-freezing solution in winter) and hydro-pneumatic
control of field elements. Development of the electro-pneumatic switch valve in 1891 was
followed immediately by installations of electro-pneumatic interlockings. The first interlocking
with electric control of field elements was installed in Central Europe by Siemens in 1898.
Figure 9.54 shows the later version E43.

Figure 9.54: Electro-mechanical interlocking E43

The early advent of track circuit detection for all interlockings in the US also generated
another, older hybrid. This hybrid was a conventional mechanical interlocking machine with
electrical contacts instead of mechanical connections for signal operation. This concept
was later expanded to electrical contacts instead of mechanical connections for some
or all of the points in an interlocking. The interface between the electric and mechanical
portions of the interlocking was found in electric locking of the mechanical switch locking
levers and sometimes in the addition of point circuit controllers for proof of point position.
At the time of their invention, these interlocking technologies were named electric interlocking,
pneumatic interlocking or hydraulic interlocking as appropriate, with power interlocking or
power frame as a summarised term. In English-speaking countries, this nomenclature survived
the introduction of relay (‘fully electric’) interlocking and is still used today. The term electro-
mechanical interlocking in Germany refers to the above described solutions with mechanical
and some electrical interlocking functions, but electric control of field elements. In the USA,
this refers to a mixed form with the interlocking functions in mechanics and the element control
in mechanics for some and by electricity for other field elements.
The main advantage of these hybrid forms over mechanical interlocking is the extended range
of element control, as the signaller does not need to use his muscles to expend the force
to operate the elements against the friction in the points itself and in the wire or rod system.
Another advantage is in the size of the interlocking machine. The levers and locking elements
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9 Interlocking Machines

could be much smaller than those of a mechanical interlocking. Thus, the interlocking tower
could be smaller for a given track arrangement than was possible with mechanical interlocking.
The practical importance of these advantages was the following:
–– In countries where track circuits were already used for track clear detection (e. g. USA), the
introduction of such interlocking helped to enlarge the area which could be operated from
one signal box. Thus they could reduce the need for staff and were widely used.
–– In countries where no track circuits were then used (e. g. Germany), the only important
advantage was that one signaller could operate more routes in the same time, but the
interlocking area of a signal box remained limited by the signaller having to prove visually
that all tracks under his responsibility were clear. As the technology was more expensive in
installation, electro-mechanical interlocking was limited to large nodes with dense rail traffic.
Hydraulic and pneumatic forms gained only very little importance in Europe.

9.5.2 Hybrid Relay and Electronic Forms

Another frequently used hybrid form is relay-electronic interlocking with interlocking function
in relay technology and operation control functions in safe or non-safe electronic technology.
Such systems have been used since the 1970s in different countries. Several interlocking
types were designed in this form originally, whereas in other cases this solution is the result of
integrating relay signal boxes into electronic operation control centres.
These hybrids to some extent combine the advantages of both, the relay and the electronic
technology:
–– The relay technology at the interlocking level enables good safety behaviour with limited
effort and the option for easy alterations. As the interlocking functions are comparatively
simple, the relay technology is able to manage these functions with acceptable effort.
–– The electronic technology in the operation control level enables flexible operation functions.
Especially in systems with non-safe man-machine-interface, the difficulties of electronics for
safe processing are not crucial, and these parts can be manufactured cheaply.
In many cases, these hybrid forms offer solutions which are economical in installation and
flexible in operation. Interlocking systems of this type are used in many countries, such as
France, Poland and Russia.
The North American concept of Centralised Traffic Control, developed in 1927, has developed
towards a similar hybrid. CTC involves a central interlocking machine operating a number of
remote control interlockings distributed along a railway line. The technological breakthrough
was the development of a way to send all control and indication functions through a single
pair of wires by using a signal of long and short pulses. The control machine would encode
the desired interlocking control movements when the operator pushed the start button. The
selected interlocking would respond, decode the message, and operate the interlocking
control circuits in the field. The control machine would continuously poll all the interlockings
for status. Any change in status (e. g. signal or point position changes, change in track circuit
status), would be encoded by the interlocking and transmitted to the control machine.
In order to use this technology, it was necessary for the control machine to be non-safe. This
arrangement made transition to an electronic/relay interlocking combination relatively easy.
The early installations of the 1980s used a solid state control machine employing a relay
code emulator to transmit and receive codes. Electronic interlocking is now well established
and current installations involve electronic non-vital control machines, data transmission by
microwave, radio, or fibre-optic cable, and electronic interlockings.

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 9.6 Technical Diagnostics

9.6 Technical Diagnostics

9.6.1 Methods of Maintenance

The reliability of the railway signalling equipment depends on the correct technologies and
service intervals. There are three main methods of maintenance.
According to the first method, manufacturers guarantee a certain time between failures of
their equipment based on the known and expected failure rates of individual components.
These will be replaced after that time or in case of failure. This method does not need
significant material or human resources, but can only be used in special conditions, e. g. if
components are highly reliable or if failures are not critical for railway operation.
The second method is service defined by time intervals (routine maintenance). This kind
of maintenance is quite expensive and is not always optimal. It requires authorities to
have qualified personnel and a maintenance plan that identifies the type of service and
its periodicity for each part used within a signalling system. Routine maintenance cannot
always prevent failures, while regular maintenance may be performed on properly functioning
components. This can cause unnecessary expense.
The third approach to maintenance is optimal, with servicing determined by the actual
technical state of the components. This method is relatively inexpensive and does not
require a large staff of maintenance personnel. For this, a continuous monitoring of the
system components is needed. The technical diagnostics provides this monitoring,
generates messages after critical deviation from parameters, and can connect automatically
a reserve unit if the primary one has failed.

9.6.2 Diagnostic Tasks

Each component can be in a different state – normal (all parameters correspond to

norms), operable (component works correctly, but non-critical parameters have deviations)
and disabled. Usually, the transition from the normal state to the disabled state occurs
gradually, and diagnostic systems can predict an inoperable (disabled) state by the
registration of critical parameter deviations. The warning information will be archived and
transmitted to the maintenance personnel. In case of fault occurrence, the diagnostic
system records the failure and automatically connects the reserve unit if it is available.
Additionally, diagnostic systems can assist maintenance personnel (with support
diagrams, archived data about all events in the chosen timeframe) for the search and
localisation of the failure.

9.6.3 Development Stages of Technical Diagnostics

The first systems for the electrical registration of failures and pre-failure states have been
known since the introduction of relay interlocking. In these, relays monitor the voltage level of
the main feeder and reserve power supply continuously. If the main feeder is failed, the relay
interlocking will automatically connect to the reserve. The dispatcher recognises a special
indication and informs the maintenance staff about the malfunction. There are usually no
diagnostic workstations for maintenance staff in such plants.

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9 Interlocking Machines

In the relay room, there are devices for the monitoring of field cable insulation as well as
alarm indication lamps on every rack and an acoustic signal, triggered by the circuit that
monitors integrity of fuses (figure 9.55). All critical deviations are displayed on the local
control panel in a form of visual indication. This is provided either by lamps/LEDs or as
amperage reading from an ammeter, which shows the motor current in the point machine
operating circuit (figure 9.56).

Figure 9.55: Common alarm indication lamp (left at the rack) monitoring integrity of fuses

Thus maintenance personnel can receive information about critical failure from the operator
of the local control panel. For more detailed information, maintenance personnel will analyse
the indication not only at the local control panel, but also in the relay room, but can also check
cable and wayside equipment. A defective signal lamp or the absence of a point position
confirmation are also indicated on the local control panel. The malfunctions of track detection
equipment and the occupancy of a track section are usually indicated in an identical manner.
Therefore, the information provided by various types of indicator on the local control panel
cannot be considered as sufficient for diagnostic tasks.

Figure 9.56: Ammeter showing the motor current in the point machine operating circuit

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 9.6 Technical Diagnostics

With the development of decentralised automatic block, it became important to obtain

information not only about the block section occupancy, but also about all equipment located
remotely. In the first versions of the decentralised ABK system (see table 10.3 and figure
10.14), the following diagnostic events are transmitted to the adjacent interlocking:
–– section is occupied, or transmission line has failed
–– main power supply has failed
–– reserve power supply has failed
–– red lamp in the block signal has failed
A special electronic diagnostic module was later developed. This can recognise and transmit
in a form of digital data up to 20 different local defects in the trackside case of the automatic
block location to the interlocking local control panel. But the use of centralised automatic
block systems without trackside cases on the open lines tended to exclude the further
development of such diagnostic systems.
With the new hybrid relay-electronic interlocking (see chapter 9.5.2), the first computer-
based workstations for maintenance staff were developed. With the introduction of such
systems, all alarms can be archived and analysed independently, without the use of local
control panels.
Electronic interlocking with embedded diagnostic functions in every electronic module as well
as digital data transmission for practically unlimited distance ensures a qualitatively new level
of diagnostic systems. In such systems, the dispatcher has a computer-based workstation
with the logs of events and alarms marked by time stamps. Maintenance staff have their
own diagnostic workstation, often portable, which collects information about alarms and
malfunctions as well as the latest repairs and corrective actions. Most electronic interlockings
have visual diagnostic indications on their modules (figure 9.57).

Figure 9.57: Electronic interlocking cabinet with visual diagnostic indication on the modules

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9 Interlocking Machines

Given that irregularities in modern electronic modules are rare and that such modules are
becoming increasingly complex, local repairs are not now necessary. Every failed component
can be replaced by maintenance personnel with the fault analysis conducted at the factory.
The diagnostic workstation can be located on a desk like the local control workstation, or it
can be integrated into the equipment cabinet (figure 9.58). In special cases, portable individual
laptops are used, which can be connected to the system and used to retrieve diagnostic data
from any location.
On secondary lines with fewer maintenance staff, malfunction notifications and alarms can be
sent automatically to portable communication devices such as smartphones or tablets. Some
railways prefer diagnostic data to be available on the Internet; their staff receives the access via
login and password from every computer in the open network. If needed, the same data can
be collected and analysed by manufacturers. External intervention into electronic interlocking
software should be technically excluded in such configurations.

Figure 9.58: Diagnostic workstation integrated into the interlocking cabinet

9.6.4 Modern Diagnostic of Railway Signalling Equipment

The main objects, methods and results of diagnostics of indoor and wayside equipment in
modern electronic interlocking are shown in the table 9.2.

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 9.6 Technical Diagnostics

N object to be which defect type can methods of analysis and transmitting action if defect was
diagnosed be detected diagnostic data recognised
1 central processor HW defects; SW internal CPU tests; comparison of disconnection or switching
unit (CPU) malfunctions results with other CPUs to reserve
2 cable between poor insulation between current measurements in object depends on deviation
interlocking and cable conductors and controllers/use of ground detectors and current leakage level:
field equipment earth as well as between from diagnostic warning
different conductors to disconnection of field
equipment
3 power supply bad quality of the output measurements of voltage, frequency switching to reserve feeder
signal or disconnection and phase parameters or to reserve power supply
of power supply or to battery or to diesel
generator depending on
the power distribution
architecture
4 filament lamp broken lamp filament in current measurements switching to reserve
the hot and cold states filament (if available) or
downgrading signal
aspect
5 LED lamp defective LED pixels in continuous current measurements; disconnection of defective
the hot and cold states internal photodetectors for monitoring LED lamp or (for certain
of burnt LEDs; visual inspection of the lamp types) switching to
number of serviceable LEDs; current reserve pixels in the same
measurement by short time pulses in LED lamp or downgrading
the cold state signal aspect
6 track circuit bad insulation between measuring of voltage and of voltage information for
rails or broken rail or phase shift on track circuit relay maintenance staff about
defective rail connectors; (Vlasenko 1997); monitoring of failure and (in special
failure of insulated rail impulse asynchrony in adjacent cases) about location
joints; failure of the coded track circuits; specific external and type of the failure; in
feed end or relay end devices for monitoring of insulated some modern interlocking
equipment rail joints (Mukhigulashvili 1991) types, switching to reserve
unit inside track circuit
equipment is possible
7 point machine high mechanical friction maximum current and time of stroke; information for
during movement of current oscillogram and its analysis; maintenance staff
points, failure of motor position sensors for indication rods; see
and circuit controller chapter 6.7
components; closure
of points with a gap
between stock rail and
point blade
8 level crossing failure of lamps, power measuring of current through lamp and information for
supply, barrier or motor; motor as well as of voltage provided maintenance staff; warning
external objects in the by power supply; digital information for train driver via signal
crossing area from mechanical devices for monitoring or station/level crossing
of barrier state; digital information operator (depends on
from external devices monitoring level national rules)
crossing area
9 Eurobalise defective/missed fixed per ETCS telegram from OBU to RBC; information for
data or switchable balise per IxL diagnostic data collected from maintenance staff and
control devices for switchable balises station operator/ETCS
dispatcher
10 coded or failure of coded track via data from cab event recorder information for
transmission circuit or OBU/RBC/ (analyzed in locomotive depots and maintenance staff and
equipment for GSM-R equipment transmitted to signalling departments); station operator/ETCS
continuous ATP per ETCS telegram from OBU to RBC dispatcher
via track circuit or
ETCS

Table 9.2: Main objects, methods and diagnostic results

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9 Interlocking Machines

9.6.5 Future Development of Diagnostic Systems

Diagnostic systems of old interlockings contained separate modules located mostly in the
interlocking buildings. They determined the state of the object via power signal connected to
field equipment. A new digital generation of electronic interlocking (Siemens 2016) assumes
the following changes:
–– intelligent, precise and digital devices will be placed very close to railway signalling
equipment and the power supply source
–– many types of diagnostic data can be taken directly at the point machine, signal, or other
field equipment and digitally transmitted into the interlocking via existing communication
lines
Therefore, diagnostic functions can also be integrated into digital control modules located
directly in wayside signalling equipment. The latest examples are LED signals with installed
light receivers (Trans-signal 2019), internal diagnostics of external power supply sources etc.,
see also chapter 7.3.
The existing trend of electronic technology getting cheaper and of labour costs rising will most
likely continue. In addition, most operators will experience a rise in costs per failure. Therefore,
diagnostic systems will be facing new tasks: not only to recognise different failures and pre-
failure states, but also to switch the system to reserve equipment or reserve connections and
to inform maintenance personnel about detected faults and transitions.
The technical complexity of devices is increasing. Therefore, defective equipment will be
repaired mainly by manufacturers and not by operators/transportation authorities. Because
of this, diagnostic tasks are switching from finding the failure cause to locating defective
modules. Maintenance personnel tasks are changing from repairing the device at the location
to identifying and replacing it.
ETCS and CBTC development with a new continuous digital data transmission channel from
trains to infrastructure ensures monitoring of both rolling stock and field signalling devices in
the following way: infrastructure objects g train g communication media g RBC g diagnostic
workstation. Currently this is used for the monitoring of such infrastructure objects as
Eurobalises and inductive loops.

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 10.1 Classification

10 Block Systems
Sergej Vlasenko, Gregor Theeg, Ulrich Maschek, Dmitriy Chelobanov, Rolf Natterer

10.1 Classification

This chapter describes the technical systems for safety on the open line, as opposed to that in
station areas. The logical principles on which these systems are based are described in chapter 4.4.
In contrast, the main focus of chapter 10 is to describe the technical solutions for block systems.
Block systems on both, single track lines and double track lines, are in scope of this chapter.
Table 10.1 gives an overview of the systems for safety on open lines, according to the criteria
which follow. The term ‘block point’ is used for the location where the end of a block or signal
section is located. Especially in older, manual technologies, this point is sometimes referred to
as a block post.
–– Technical or non-technical safety systems. The main focus of chapter 10 (and the whole
book) is technical systems. The non-technical systems are described briefly in chapter
4.4.1.3 and safety overlays for these systems in chapter 10.2.
–– Centralised or decentralised block system. In decentralised systems (chapters 10.3, 10.4
and 10.5), the block information of each block point is processed locally at the respective
block point and exchanged with the neighbouring block point. In centralised systems
(chapter 10.6), the information from several block points is processed centrally, which
requires longer information connections to the block signals and track clear detection.

safety provided by:

centralisation
persons obeying rules technical systems
decentralised e. g. telephone block; see table 10.2
chapter 4.4.1.3 (safety overlays: chapter 10.2)
centralised e. g. Track Warrant Control (TWC), Direct Traffic Control (DTC); chapter 10.6
chapter 4.4.1.3 (safety overlays: chapter 10.2)

Table 10.1: Classification of systems for safety on open lines regarding centralisation and technical
equipment

The classic block systems are technically decentralised systems. Table 10.2 classifies them further
by different criteria, excluding some special cases. As described in chapter 4.4.4, block systems can
firstly be divided into token block, tokenless manual and semi-automatic block and automatic block.

token tokenless manual and semi-automatic automatic block

block block
method to ensure presence of by by personal and by technical system
clear status of the a physical personal technical system
block section element on
the train
level of automation manual semi-automatic automatic
technical systems (electric) manual block relay block COMBAT automated automatic
(examples) token block RPB GTSS relay block block
described in 10.3 10.4 10.5–10.7

Table 10.2: Classification of block systems

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10 Block Systems

Further criteria to distinguish tokenless block systems are:

–– The method to ensure a clear status of the block section. Different solutions are possible, using
personnel (e. g. station or train operator), or technical systems, or both together.
–– The grade of automation. Manual, semi-automatic and automatic systems are different.
In manual systems, all blocking processes are done manually in regular operation. In semi-
automatic systems, some blocking processes (e. g. the blocking after a train has entered) are
done automatically, whereas others (e. g. unblocking after the train has completely cleared)
are actions needed by the operator or the driver. In automatic systems, all processes,
especially the unblocking of block sections are done automatically in regular operation.
Automatic block eliminates the need for visual observation of the end of train before
unblocking. Solutions can be continuous track clear detection (chapters 5.3, 5.4), or an end
of train detection system (chapter 5.2.7).
Chapter 10.7 describes briefly first experiences with moving block systems.

10.2 Safety Overlays for Systems with the Staff Responsible for Safety

Before the introduction of safe block systems, staff were responsible for safety in an operation
without control by signals. However, technical systems were used occasionally. These were
not safe systems in themselves, but they gave some support in reducing the risk of human
errors. Later, block systems were often developed from these systems.
In Europe, traditionally decentralised systems with safety responsibility in the hands of the staff
were used (telephone block). In North America, centralised systems of dispatcher-controlled
and unsignalled operation of DTC (Direct Traffic Control) and TWC (Track Warrant Control)
dominated until recently (chapters 4.4.1.3, 3.4.3). After World War II, centralised systems also
came into use in several European countries for secondary lines (e. g. ZLB: ‘Zugleitbetrieb’
in Germany) to reduce costs for decentralised operations in each station or for signalling
equipment (figure 10.1). In all these systems, safety is basically a staff responsibility.

Figure 10.1: Principle of dispatcher-controlled unsignalled operation

To improve safety, several systems were developed with additional overlays for the protection of
following or opposing movements. In contrast with a signalling system, these overlay systems
do not secure safety on their own, but they do help the operator and the drivers to reduce
the probability or the consequences of human errors. Safety responsibility in normal operation
basically remains that of the dispatcher, who issues the movement authorities verbally after the
driver has sent him the train position. Examples of such safety overlay systems are:

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 10.3 Token Block

–– The train itself recognises another train in its proximity and gives a warning signal to the
driver. Or it may initiate automatic emergency braking if two trains come too close. For the
detection of the relative position of the two trains, direct radio communication between
trains or satellite positioning based methods can be used.
–– The occupation of open line sections is detected by a track-based system. A train
protection system then stops a train that tries to enter. The cause may be driver error or an
impropriate movement authority given by the dispatcher.
–– In addition to issuing the movement authority verbally, the dispatcher has to reserve a path
for the train in a non-safe interlocking-like system. Reservation of sections for different
trains at the same time is refused, and trains trying to enter a non-reserved section are
emergency braked automatically. But in contrast to an interlocking system, these locking
functions work in the background and the movement is authorised only verbally.
Most of the systems, where the safety responsibility is with people, do not provide for point
control by the dispatcher. Points are operated locally by the train driver (generally in North
America) or spring points (chapter 6.1.2.2) are used.

10.3 Token Block

10.3.1 Overview

Token block systems originate from Britain. The authority to occupy a certain track section is
issued to a certain train by the ownership of a physical element. This element is traditionally a
staff, but can also be a disk, a paper with a defined text written on it or others. Occasionally it can
be a person (a pilotman) who has to be present on the train to permit entry. He fulfils the same
function. The functional processes in token block systems are described in chapter 4.4.4, whereas
this chapter 10 deals with the technical solutions. One train staff systems and train staff and ticket
systems are still used in several countries on secondary lines, but also in degraded mode operation
in case of failure of technical block systems. In some countries, the token includes the permission
to return to the point of entry e. g. after maintenance work on open lines.
The token block system can also be supplemented by a simple train protection system. For
example, the driver places the token into a device on the locomotive. With this information, the
trainstop intervention is suppressed, which would otherwise occur upon passing a trackside
resonant circuit at the exit from the station.
The following chapter 10.3.2 deals with Electric Token Block. Radio Electronic Token Block
(RETB), a centralised system which simulates the exchange of tokens electronically, is
discussed in chapter 10.6.3.

10.3.2 Electric Token Block

In electric token block (see also chapter 4.4.5), several tokens exist for each block section.
The tokens are interlocked in stationary token instruments (figure 10.2) on both ends of the
respective block sections to ensure that only one token can be removed from the instrument
at any one time. The tokens belonging to the same block sections are identical, but those
of neighbouring sections vary physically. This prevents the ‘wrong token’ problems (principle
of key and keyhole). The locking of the tokens is undertaken electrically. Different geometrical
forms of tokens and the related instruments are described detailed in (Doswell 1957).

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10 Block Systems

Figure 10.2: Stationary instruments of electric token block

Electric token block, likewise the other forms of token block, originated from Britain and had
a large historical distribution in different countries. Today it is little used. Figure 10.3 shows the
decline in usage of these systems in the Soviet Union.

Figure 10.3: Percentage of electric token block on open lines in Soviet Union (source: Railways
Museum St. Petersburg)

10.4 Tokenless Manual and Semi-automatic Block

10.4.1 Overview

This chapter describes tokenless systems where the unblocking information (setting the
status of the track section to ‘clear’) is only transmitted punctually after the train has cleared
the section. If later a rail vehicle enters the section unauthorised, the block system will not
recognise this occupation, unless a particular ‘alarm’ status is defined.

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 10.4 Tokenless Manual and Semi-automatic Block

The non-technical ancestor of these block forms is the telephone block. All messages (offering
of trains, report of departure and report of arrival) are done telephonically. A strictly regulated
wording is used and messages have to be repeated to avoid misunderstandings.
The historically oldest form of block instruments was used in Britain in the 19th century
(figure 10.4) for double lines. Both ends of the block section are equipped with those
instruments which simultaneously show ‘line clear’, ‘line blocked’ (meaning: reserved for
a certain train) and ‘train on line’ by a needle in the respective sector. One pair of block
instruments serves for each direction. The block instruments are operated by the signaller
at the exit of the block section and identical information is displayed at the entrance.
Those messages which originate from the entrance have to be transmitted to the exit by
an exchange of bell signals. However, these block instruments in most cases were not
technically interlocked with the signals and therefore served only for remembering the
status (IRSE 1999).

Figure 10.4: Historical British block instruments for double line

The oldest interlocked block instrument was invented in Germany in 1872 (chapter 3.1). The
most important block form which still uses these instruments is the manual block with three
block instruments, manufactured by Siemens & Halske (chapter 10.4.2). It is now only in
limited and declining use in countries of Central Europe.
With the introduction of relay technology, a large diversity of relay block systems was
developed, mainly in Europe including Russia. Their operation became partly or even fully
automated. For their development, an important requirement was often the compatibility with
the block systems of neighbouring older (mostly mechanical) signal boxes (chapter 10.4.3).

10.4.2 Manual Block Siemens & Halske

10.4.2.1 Block Instrument

In 1872, Carl Ludwig Frischen invented the interlocked block instrument, in German called
‘Blockfeld’, which became the basis of the manual block in several countries (figure 10.5).

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10 Block Systems

#
Figure 10.5: Block instrument (left: unblocked, right: blocked) (graphic: TU Dresden)

The block instrument is blocked by pushing the key lever on top of it. This action
pushes the locking shaft down, where it remains due to an internal lock inside the block
instrument. The locking shaft is interlocked mechanically with a particular drawbar for line
entrance/direction locking. This bar locks mechanically all signals onto the respective line
in stop position. While pushing the key lever, the signaller turns a hand crank belonging
to the inductor. This induces a block current (AC with low frequency) which moves a step
switchgear by one tooth in each period, together 12 teeth, and makes the red sector of
the “rake” visible to the signaller. The induced current flows to the corresponding block
instrument at the other end of the block section.
When a blocked block instrument is reached by the block current induced in the opposite
block inductor, the ‘rake’ is moved back towards the unblocked position and opens the
mechanical lock.
Summarised, this means that during the blocking process, one block instrument changes from
unblocked to blocked, operated by the signaller, whereas the other changes from blocked to
unblocked, operated by the block current.

10.4.2.2 Arrangement of Block Instruments

In the most used version with placed direction, each block instrument has exactly one partner,
which is a corresponding block instrument at the other end of the block section concerned.
There are three block instruments for each end of the block section (figure 10.6) with different
function, but the same technology (compare chapters 4.4.6.1, 4.4.6.3):
–– entrance instrument (German: Anfangsfeld): This instrument is blocked after a train has
entered the line section and locks all signals leading onto the respective line section in Stop.
The partner of the entrance instrument is the exit instrument of the neighbouring block.

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 10.4 Tokenless Manual and Semi-automatic Block

–– exit instrument (German: Endfeld): This instrument is in unblocked position when a train is
expected; in all other cases it is in blocked position. It doesn‘t lock the own signal. The
partner is the entrance instrument of the neighbouring block.
–– direction instrument (German: Erlaubnisfeld): This instrument is blocked when the
respective interlocking station doesn‘t have the permission to send trains to the line section.
It locks the same signals as the entrance instrument. The partner is the direction instrument
of the neighbouring interlocking station.

Figure 10.6: Block instruments for one line section

On a single line, each block point is equipped with entrance and exit instruments for each
direction. Only locations where the sequence of trains can be changed (e. g. stations,
junctions) own direction instruments (figure 10.7). Each block point, by a contact of its
entrance instrument, disrupts the line for the exchange of direction if the block section ahead
is occupied. On double lines, usually no direction instruments are provided, as signalised traffic
is only possible on the normally used track in this old technology.

Figure 10.7: Assignment of block instruments on a single line

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10 Block Systems

10.4.2.3 Process of Block Working

In this section, the processes in the block system are described (compare chapter 4.4.6.3).
The system works with placed direction. Changing the direction is only possible when the
section between neighbouring interlocking stations is clear and all signals leading onto this
section are locked in a closed position. Only the block point currently owning the direction
can change it by blocking the own direction instrument, which unblocks the corresponding
direction instrument.
With clearing the signal, a signal repetition lock is activated mechanically and safely by the
signal lever. After resetting the signal to stop, it will still lock all signals leading onto the same
line section, including the operated signal itself in closed position. Therefore, no dangerous
situation can occur if the signaller forgets to block the line afterwards.
After the train has entered the section and after resetting the signal to stop, the signaller blocks
the line by blocking the entrance instrument. This instrument fulfils the same locking functions
as the signal repetition lock, but additionally it transports the information to the block point in
advance and can only be released when the unblocking information is received from there.
To prevent erroneous unblocking of the line section when the train is still there, the train is
involved in the process. For this purpose, a combined detector consisting of a rail contact
(chapter 5.2.2) and a short track circuit (chapter 5.2.3.2) is applied in the end of the block
section. This combined detector and its evaluation circuitry prevents the exit instrument from
being blocked until the following conditions have been fulfilled in this sequence:
1. The train must have passed the rail contact.
2. The train must have cleared the short track circuit.
This detector does not replace the observation of the end of train markers by ground staff, as
it doesn’t detect wagons lost on the line section.
More information on this example can be found in (Maschek/Lehne 2005).

10.4.2.4 Variants
There are also other forms of manual block with these block instruments in different countries
with different principles of block working (chapter 4.4). For example, in Switzerland a version
adapted to neutral direction is applied (Oehler 1981). Here the dependences between
the block instruments in the corresponding block points and interlocking stations are more
complex, as the same block instrument corresponds with different partners.

10.4.3 Relay Block RB II 60

10.4.3.1 Overview
The relay block RB II 60, designed in East Germany by WSSB, is a good example of a
technical migration process. With the appearance of relay interlocking, the need for a block
interface to neighbouring mechanical interlockings arose. The relay block was so successful
that even today it still serves as an interface between electronic interlockings of different
manufacturers. The relay block RB II 60 is made upon two principles:
–– the idea that, instead of three in manual block, only one locking element is sufficient and
–– the adaption of the circuitry to compatibility with manual block.
Relay block RB II 60 is a semi-automatic block, applied in different grade of automation.

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 10.4 Tokenless Manual and Semi-automatic Block

10.4.3.2 Block Relay and Block Current

To enable communication also with neighbouring interlocking stations and block points which
are equipped with manual block (chapter 10.4.2), a generator is used to produce a similar
current as the hand crank and a special block relay to evaluate this current (approximately
60 V and 12 Hz).
The block relay, which is used by RB II 60 and other block forms, consists of three basic parts
(figure 10.8):
–– The magnetic system (figure 10.9) contains a turnable armature which switches in each half
wave of the block current. In the absence of a block current, it is fixed in its position by the
permanent magnet.
–– The step switchgear contains a cogwheel with 72 teeth. A full revolution of the cogwheel is
performed after three blocking and unblocking processes.
–– The contact equipment contains several isolated contact segments with three arms each.
These are rigidly connected with the cogwheel of the step switchgear.

Figure 10.8: Block relay of RB II 60 Figure 10.9: Magnetic system of RB II 60

10.4.3.3 Block Logic

Figure 10.10 shows the schematic block logic of RB II 60. The three block instruments of
manual block (chapter 10.4.2) could be reduced to only one block instrument for following
reasons:
–– As both, the entrance and the direction instruments, lock the same signals, they can be
summarised to one block relay.
–– As the exit instrument doesn‘t lock any signal in the own interlocking, it can be replaced by
a simple relay.
The information connection with the neighbouring interlocking stations and block points is
the same as in manual block, therefore either a station or block point with manual block or
another one with relay block can be the neighbouring. The information from the block relay
is directed either to the direction or to the entry lines, depending on the position of the signal
repetition lock, which meant whether the signal has shown ‘proceed’ before (and therefore a
train entered the block section) or not.
More information on this example can be found in (Kusche 1984) and (Maschek/Lehne 2005).

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10 Block Systems

Figure 10.10: Block circuit of RB II 60 (simplified)

10.4.4 Relay Block RPB GTSS

This block is applied in countries of the former Soviet Union, mainly on single lines without
intermediate block points between the interlocking stations. The system works with the
principle of neutral direction (chapter 4.4.6.2). The working algorithm consists of the
consecutive transfer of three messages:
1. permission from the receiving station: train may be sent,
2. blocking from the departure station when its exit signal is cleared,
3. unblocking from the arrival station after the train has come there and the end of train been seen.
After unblocking, the relay circuitry comes back to the initial condition. Now each interlocking
station can give permission for the next train upon telephonic request (neutral direction).
For the transfer of these messages, there are two wires which can be used also for telephone
connection (figure 10.11). In order to distinguish permission and unblocking messages, they
are transferred with different polarity.
The exit route from the station A can be set only after receipt of the permission from station B.
The permission relay P of station B sends positive polarity, control relay C of station A picks
up, but the current is too weak to pick up relay O of station B as well. After typical route
operations in the interlocking, the exit signal is cleared. Its clearing is accompanied by the
transfer of the blocking message through contacts of signal relay S from station A to station
B where the occupation relay O (line is blocked) picks up and remains in up position by a stick
circuit. The arrival of the train at station B is detected technically (usually through sequential
occupation and clearing of station track circuits). Then the signaller checks the completeness
of the train and confirms its arrival through the acknowledgement relay R. Control relay C of
station A, which is a bi-stable relay, switches due to contra polarity.

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 10.4 Tokenless Manual and Semi-automatic Block

Figure 10.11: Circuit of RPB GTSS

This system can also be applied with block points between stations. In this case, the two-wire
line is disrupted, and in the block point the similar devices are established for both sides. The
difference is that the signaller of the block point cannot give, but can only transfer the permission.
This system can be applied on double track lines, too. In this case stations are connected by
two two-wire cables, each of them being used for one direction only. Consequentially, the circuits
are not symmetric. Permission is not required as each track is used for one direction only.

10.4.5 Japanese Electronic Block for Secondary Lines (COMBAT)

Beginning in the 1980s, Japanese railways introduced an electronic block for secondary lines
with low traffic which is operated partly automatically and partly by the driver, but without
operational ground staff. Together with the related detection system (chapter 5.2.6.2) it got the
name ‘COMBAT’ (Computer and Microwave Balise-Aided Train Control System). Each train
is individually known by the block system and detection is by ID number at fixed locations
(chapter 5.2.6.2). The system is therefore only applicable to separated networks. The working
principles are as follows:
–– Each train carries an on-board unit for communication. This unit contains a unique
identification number of the train.
–– When the train is ready to depart, the driver pushes a starting button. The request including
the train ID is sent by short-range radio or optical wireless transmitter to the station
controller and from there via cable to the station controller of the neighbouring (receiving)
station (neutral direction).
–– After an affirmative answer, the signal can be cleared.
–– Train departure is detected by track circuits, which are present in the station, but not on
open line. The ‘train on line’ message is sent to the receiving station. The home signal of
the receiving station is time controlled and clears a defined time after train departure.

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10 Block Systems

–– The arriving train sends its ID to the station equipment. Trackside train completeness check is
not necessary due to the characteristics of the train. The receiving station then unblocks the line.
In each station a 2 out of 2 fail-safe computer is used for information processing. This
computer also fulfils interlocking functions inside the station. The communication between
stations is done via cable.
More information on this example can be found in (Sasaki 1986) and (Sasaki/Wakabayashi 1989).

10.5 Automatic Block

10.5.1 Overview

The ancestors of systems of this group were introduced in the end of 19th century following
the invention of the track circuit in the USA. The entrance to a block section permanently
receives the occupation information from the track circuit. This means that, in contrast to the
systems described in chapter 10.4, an unauthorised occupation will be detected immediately.
Train movements in these block systems can either be signalled by trackside signals or by cab
signals or by both simultaneously. With the latter, in case of disagreement between trackside
and cab signal, different regulations are defined about which has priority (chapter 7.1). Most
block systems of this group work with permissive block signals (chapter 7.6.2), which provides
for a high capacity (however, at low speed) even in case of failure of equipment. The basic
specifications of some widely used block systems are compared in table 10.3.

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 country name of electrical length detection frequency insulated passage of certain points of automatic block transmission
block system supply for of block of train by of rail joints of data
(or train traction section detection number train protection and cab signalling function trackside signal between
protection current of fully regulations signals
system which free block
a train

sections continuous speed limit intermittent speed limit related speed

includes block
messages
train control on the end of train control after passage trackside limit for
possibility for

function) section, km/h of track signal passage centralisation of

operators to stop

processing of block

element aspect the signal

Czech LS 3 kV DC 1000–1500 one track 50 Hz yes 2 and more FM 5.4 Hz 160 no – green 160 track circuit no no
Republic 25 kV AC m circuit 75 Hz
Slovakia 50 Hz per block
section 1 FM 3.6 Hz 120 yellow 120

0 FM 0.9 Hz stop red stop

(up to 30)
East AB70 15 kV AC about one track 42 or yes 2 and more no – no – green 160 cable no no
Germany 16.7 Hz 1000 m circuit 100 Hz (100
per block without train
section; 10 or 16 protection)
additionally kHz
short track 1 INDUSI 160 yellow 160
circuit or (100
(and) spot without train
wheel protection)
detectors 0 INDUSI emergency red stop
at block braking to stop
points
France TVM 300 1.5–3 about one track 1700 and no 5 and more FM 10.3–29 300 no – no – cable yes no
TVM 430 kV DC 2000 m circuit 2300 Hz for Hz in TVM 300
25 kV AC per block one track 4 270
50 Hz section with of a double 3 Data telegram 230
15 kV AC capacitors line; 2000 in TVM 430
16.7 Hz every and 2600 2 170
100 m Hz for the
other track 1 (up to 35) coded loop stop, if the
in front of stop next signal has
signal absolute means

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Italy BACC 3 kV DC 1350 m one track 50 and yes 4 and more FM 1.25–4.5 260 no – green 200 without track circuit no no
25 kV AC circuit 178 Hz Hz for every train
50 Hz per block track circuit protection
section frequency on the
frequency
178 Hz
3 230 green 200 without
train

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protection
on the
frequency
178 Hz
2 200 green 200
1 125 yellow 120
0 0 (up to 50) red stop

391
10.5 Automatic Block

▶
 Japan ATC 25 kV AC about two track 720 and no 4 Data telegram 260 no – no – cable yes yes

392
60 Hz 3000 m circuits 900 Hz for
per block one track 3 230
section of a double 2 170
line; 840
and 1020 1 120
Hz for the
other track ½ 30
0 0 coded loop in stop
front of stop
10 Block Systems

signal
Netherlands ATB-FG 1.5 kV DC 1000–1800 one track 75 Hz yes 2 and more FM 1.6 Hz 140 no – green 140 track circuit no no
m circuit
per block 1 FM 3.7 Hz 140 yellow 140
section 0 no code 0 (up to 40) red stop
Germany LZB 15 kV AC variable axle counter – no data telegram up to 300 INDUSI or ASFA brake and stop as reserve 160 or 180 cable yes yes
Austria 16.7 Hz or track 36 kHz to train depending on (as reserve) depending on the
Spain 25 kV AC circuits 56 kHz from track and train track
50 Hz train through
cable loop
North ABS various various track circuits DC or 60 yes 3 and more impulse code 64–129 no – Clear 64–129 track circuit no no
America (primarily (from Hz AC for 180 ppm
diesel for hundred DC traction;
freight; meters to 91.6 Hz,
600–750 several 100 Hz for
V DC or thousand AC traction 2 impulse code 48–64 Advance 48–64
25 kV AC meters 120 ppm Approach
60 Hz for
commuter/ 1 impulse code 48 Approach 48
transit 75 ppm
railroads)
0 no code 0 (up to 24) Stop Stop

Countries ABK 3 kV DC 1000–2600 one track 25 or 50 Hz yes 2 and more impulse code 140 no – green 140 track circuit no no
of former 25 kV AC m circuit green
USSR 50 Hz per block
section 1 impulse code 60 yellow 60
yellow

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0 impulse code 0 (up to 20) red stop
red-yellow
Russia ABTC 3 kV DC 1000–2600 3–6 track 420–780 no 2 and more impulse code 140 no – green 140 cable yes no
25 kV AC m circuits Hz green, if the
50 Hz per block train is coming
section
according to 1 impulse code 60 yellow 60

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length yellow, if the
train is coming
0 Impulse code 0 (up to 20) red stop
red, if the train
is coming

Table 10.3: Comparison of basic specifications for some block systems

 10.5 Automatic Block

10.5.2 Number of Tracks and Traffic Directions

Figure 10.12: Traffic direction in automatic block

Figure 10.12 presents principles of traffic directions on single and double lines. Most types of
automatic block can also be applied on lines with more than two tracks which, however,
are usually operated like several parallel single and double lines. With certain efforts and
compromises, each double line can allow contraflow traffic, at least on the principle ‘one train
between stations’ with telephonic messages. However, there are three possibilities for normal
operation on double lines (see also chapter 3.2.4):
–– Only one-way traffic is supported by the block system. Contraflow movements have to
be done by methods of degraded mode operation and are only foreseen for the case of
construction works in one track. It can need e. g. a special preparation of relays circuits in
decentralised block cabinets.
–– Bi-directional traffic is enabled, but one direction is preferred. One possibility of preference is
that traffic for one direction can be controlled via track and cab signalling, but for the other
direction only by the cab signal. Another version is that the length of block sections is shorter
for the preferred direction.
–– Both directions of traffic are supported equally.
The change of direction between two adjacent interlocking stations may only be done if no train
is on line. It is initiated through command from one or both interlocking operators. For the case
that the open line is clear but detection devices are defective, there is usually a special registered
command. It is given by dispatcher or simultaneously by both operators of neighbouring stations.

Figure 10.13: Automatic block signals in Russia

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10 Block Systems

10.5.3 Block Sections

Most automatic block systems use three-aspect-signalling, which means that the length of a block
section is in proximity of the braking distance and each signal works as distant signal for the signal
beyond (chapter 7.6.3.2). Block sections can have a constant or different length. Provided that
the train moves with constant speed and therefore has almost constant braking distance, each
block section can basically have the same length (in Europe typically between 1000 and 1500 m;
in spite of some variations due to local specialities). But train acceleration after stations, braking in
approach to stations and speed variations on the open line because of terrain gives an advantage
to systems in which the length of the block section is adapted to the speed. In the ideal case, time-
constant block sections can be achieved, where the occupation time of all block sections is the
same, providing an optimal allocation of resources for best line capacity.
On high-speed lines the braking distance is long, therefore it usually stretches over several
block sections with different speed indications in each block section in the approach to a stop.

10.5.4 Communication between Block Points and Interlockings

Figure 10.14: Principle of decentral automatic block

The working principle of automatic block is shown in figure 10.14. Each block point continuously
sends the aspect of its own signal to the block point in rear. There this information is combined with
the track occupancy information and the aspect of this signal is created. In the oldest systems,
the track circuit occupation and coding is the only information transmission, and information is
only transmitted between two neighbouring block sections against the direction of travel. Newer
systems often also imply other transmission functions, such as of the blocking information into the
direction of travel, and use additional lineside cables. From the adjacent interlocking stations, some
commands act simultaneously via common wires to all block points (e. g. for change of direction).
Some diagnostic information is sent from several block points to the nearest interlocking or control
centre by common wires. The main preconditions for a proceed signal are:
–– Block section is clear.
–– The proper direction is established.
–– The following signal is lit (checked in the majority of systems).
–– The overlap is clear (if this is required).
Transfer of the information between block units can be via:
–– cables
–– rails
–– combined via cables and rails

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 10.5 Automatic Block

Data transfer through the rails can pass with the use of pulse, frequency or phase attribute
or modulation. All kinds of modulation as well as pulse and frequency signal attributes allow
the information to be used simultaneously for cab signalling. The phase signal attribute is
seldom used because it requires in-phase feed of all block units, which is technically difficult to
implement. Several commuter railroads in the US are utilising this attribute in their centralised
block systems.
With the absence of ground staff at most block points, no signaller can influence the block signal
if it malfunctions; decentralised automatic block is mostly permissive. It means that the driver can
pass any red signal on sight, with that being his own responsibility (chapter 7.6.2). The normal
position of the block signals (if the line is clear and no train is approaching) is Proceed.
This decentralised principle requests electric feeds on the line (typically between 1 and 10 kV)
and transformers at each block point. To increase the availability of power supply, redundant
sources can be used, either by accumulators or by second external feed. On AC electrified
lines, electric feed for the block equipment is often taken from catenary via transformers.

10.5.5 Example: North American Automatic Block Signalling System

10.5.5.1 Overview
Automatic Block Signalling (ABS) system in North America is an original form of decentralised
block systems. ABS system is composed of a series of block signals that are controlled by
the state of track circuits that form the blocks. When a train occupies the block, the track
circuit in that block is shunted, causing the signal to display Stop aspect. When the track is
unoccupied, the signal will display one of the permissive aspects depending on the state of the
block ahead in the direction (current) of traffic. Automatic signals are typically used between
interlockings to provide adequate spacing of following trains. Automatic signals can be spaced
anywhere from several tenths of meters (mass transit application) to over several kilometres
apart (mainlines). Signal spacing is based on the required braking distance between ABS
signals. ABS systems can be equipped with train stops that enforce stops if a signal displaying
stop aspect is violated.

10.5.5.2 Types of Regulations

There are two major rulebooks that govern railroad operations and signalling in North America:
Northeast Operating Rules published by Northeast Operating Rules Advisory Committee
(NORAC 2018) (primarily used in Eastern US) and General Code of Operating Rules (GCOR
2015) (primarily Western US). Both specify regulations of train movements within various
territories including tracks equipped with ABS. The ABS system represents an added layer
of protection placed on the operation. In addition, other types of authority used to direct train
movements are applied in ABS territories including Track Warrant Control (TWC, see chapters
3.4.3, 4.4.1.3), Direct Traffic Control (DTC, chapters 3.4.3, 4.4.1.3) or Form D Control System
(DCS). The latter one is a variation of TWC adopted by railroads that are members of NORAC.
Both TWC and DTC are systems of verbal track authority where a dispatcher authorises train
movements via radio communication with the train operator. Under DTC, limits of the authority
are strictly defined by the blocks that are identified by trackside signs, while TWC uses flexible
limits that may be tailored to a specific train movement such as milepost of station locations.
Both systems have a set of requirements governing radio communication while TWC is
also based on the issuing of Track Warrant form. The form provides limits of the movement
authority, effective time and other specific instructions such as temporary speed restrictions.

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10 Block Systems

10.5.5.3 Types of ABS

The majority of the ABS systems are based on three-aspect-signalling for automatic signals with
green or green over red Clear aspect; yellow or yellow over red Approach aspect; and red or
red over red Stop aspect (chapters 7.6.3.2, 7.8.8). These three aspects have universal meaning
between both NORAC and GCOR railroads. Sometimes, a fourth aspect is added to the system
in order to increase the capacity of the line. Advance Approach aspect with flashing yellow or
flashing yellow over red is used to convey information that the train shall be prepared to stop
at the second signal (chapter 7.6.3.4). The use of such an aspect does not require additional
hardware, since both yellow and red are already part of the three-aspect system.
The traditional ABS system does not prohibit moves in the opposite directions on the same
track, as it is relying on operational rules and interference from the dispatcher. To counter
such a potentially unsafe situation, Automatic Permissive Block Signalling was developed.
This system is very similar to ABS, with the addition of tumble down signal, which is sent in
the current of traffic to prohibit the train movement in the opposite direction and changes all
opposing automatic signals to Stop. This system is primarily used on single track applications
with Centralised Traffic Control (CTC, chapter 3.5.2). CTC is a system that provides a technical
ability to control remotely multiple interlockings and ABS systems between them.
A typical block point of the ABS system might consist of track circuit equipment, power
distribution, signal control logic, distant signal control logic, cables along the line and signal
lighting circuits. Signal control logic provides safety checks while distant signal control logic
allows the selection of green and yellow aspects. Old systems used to employ relay-based
logic while modern installations are based on the use of microprocessors. Use of fibre-optic
cable and IP-based communication interfaces between block points and interlocking stations
allows the elimination of copper based line circuits. Processor based DC track circuits (chapter
5.3.7.1) are often fitted on lines with low capacity as they allow the lengths of the blocks to be
increased and the transmission of all necessary information via the rails.
Cab Signalling System (CSS) is frequently used in conjunction with ABS to provide constant
information to train operators about the aspect of next automatic signal in the field. The initial form
of CSS was developed by Union Switch & Signal in the early 20th century for the Pennsylvania
Railroad and is called pulsed code cab signalling. This form of CSS is still widely used by railroads
and is based on sending fixed pulses of a carrier signal of a certain frequency into a track circuit.
More information about the development of signalling in North America may be found in
(Solomon 2010).

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 10.6 Centralised Systems for Safety on Open Lines

10.6 Centralised Systems for Safety on Open Lines

10.6.1 Overview

In centralised block systems, the detection and train position data is sent to a central
controller, locking functions are performed there and the block signals are controlled from
the centre, too. This block centre can be an interlocking of a neighbouring station or a
separate block centre.

system main disadvantages

token block (chapter 10.3) slow processes; necessity to stop in each station
decentralised manual tokenless block (chapter 10.4) slow processes; high efforts for staff
decentralised automatic tokenless block (chapter 10.5) high effort for decentralised maintenance
centralised block systems (chapter 10.6) high effort for communication (cables or radio)

Table 10.4: Economic disadvantages of different kinds of block systems

These systems were developed historically from different origins in order to avoid certain
economic disadvantages of the decentralised block systems (table 10.4). However, the
more complicated communication between the centre and the trains emerged as a new
disadvantage of centralised systems. The historical origins of the systems are:
–– extension of the interlocking areas and usage of route locking functions also on the
open line (e. g. Germany)
–– concentration of the evaluation units of block points in a central place (e. g. French high
speed lines, Russia)
–– replacement of tokens by electronic information and their central processing (e. g.
Britain on secondary lines)
–– improvement of safety overlay systems for unsignalled operation (chapter 10.2) to a full
interlocking system (e. g. Germany)
–– development of new high speed systems with particular block systems (several
European countries)
Based on these different origins, the locking functions are solved logically in different ways
(compare chapters 4.1.2 and 10.1; figure 10.15):
–– token logic: Virtual tokens are generated and exchanged with the train to permit entry
of a particular section.
–– tokenless block logic: Within the central controller, block information is generated and
exchanged as in a tokenless block system.
–– route logic: The open line sections are controlled like station areas with route locking.
This is possible because all safety functions of block information can also be performed
by routes, and because with the presence of continuous track clear detection, the
reasons for sharp distinction of interlocking areas and open lines become obsolete
(chapter 4.1.2). Besides, using the route logic on open lines can imply a gain of safety
in certain cases of technical failure. Some countries (e. g. China and Russia) which are
not using the route logic on open lines are starting the implementation of a sequence
check principle into their autoblock logic after train accidents on high speed line in
China (Wenzhou 2011).

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10 Block Systems

Figure 10.15: Different forms of centralisation of block systems

When using route logic on the open line, the block signals are red in normal position (if
all sections are clear), whereas with block logic with automatic block, they are mostly at
green in normal position. As operational decisions are not necessary before route selection
on open lines, routes are usually set automatically when a train is approaching, or after an
exit route has been selected. Due to improved communication possibilities in the case of
technical failure, absolute instead of permissive stop signals are often used on the open line.

10.6.2 Centralised Block Systems for Secondary Lines

More recently, several centralised systems have been developed for secondary lines. The approach
was to reduce costs by implementing simplified functions and cheaper technologies. One solution
is so-called ‘Signalised Track Warrant Control’ (‘Signalisierter Zugleitbetrieb’ SZB) in Europe,
which originated as a further development of safety overlay systems (chapter 10.2) and has now
become a full electronic interlocking with route logic on the open line (chapter 10.6.4).
A trial performed around 2000 was Funkfahrbetrieb (FFB) in Germany, an electronic interlocking
where track clear detection is replaced by position messages from the train, with routes selected
by the train itself and cab signals instead of trackside signals. Data transmission between the
interlocking and the train was by radio. However, this system did not gain practical importance.
Another system is Radio Electronic Token Block.

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 10.6 Centralised Systems for Safety on Open Lines

10.6.3 Radio Electronic Token Block

Radio Electronic Token Block (RETB) originates from secondary lines in Scotland. It has its
name because it simulates the handing over of tokens (chapter 10.3). Instead of physical
tokens, virtual tokens are used in form of electronic messages and are centrally controlled
in an electronic token processor. An advantage is relatively low costs for trackside signalling
equipment combined with a high level of safety. A disadvantage is that the treatment of non-
equipped trains is difficult. Therefore, these systems are more suitable for networks with only a
limited exchange of vehicles. RETB, with differences in detail and partly with different names, is
used on several secondary lines distributed over the world.
The central component is a token processor for the whole network. This processor is a
redundant safe electronic system, comparable with an electronic interlocking. It can either work
automatically or be staffed. The token processor generates the tokens (movement authorities)
upon request by a train. It is responsible for the exclusivity of the token in one block section.
Communication is done by radio. The token information is signalised to the driver by cab
signalling and becomes valid as soon as the driver has checked and acknowledged it. After
clearing the section, the token is given back either by an operation action of the driver or, if track
clear detection or train position detection is applied, automatically.
Radio transmission between the token processor and the train is safety critical. Therefore, each
unit has on board a unique identification number and the data telegrams are redundantly coded
to ensure safe transmission. Continuous radio coverage is not necessary, but attention has to be
given to good radio coverage at locations where token messages are normally exchanged.
Fixed signal boards are placed along the line to mark locations where movement authorities
end and where tokens will be exchanged.
Regarding the safeguarding of points in RETB areas, different solutions can be applied:
–– Points are manually switched and locked by train or ground staff.
–– Route interlocking functions are included into the processor and points are set by machine
power.
–– Route functions are included and points are switched and locked manually. This requires
the application of key locks (chapter 6.5.3).
–– Automatic spring points (chapter 6.1.2.2) are used, and each station track is used in one
direction only.
The treatment of station tracks in the line block can be handled differently in the RETB systems
(compare also chapter 4.4.3):
a) The station is controlled by a separate interlocking system (preferable for bigger, complex
stations).
b) Each station track is considered as one block section to enable track selectivity of the
tokens (figure 10.16). This solution is particularly favourable for stations where trains cross
regularly.
c) Stations are excluded from the block system and trains there move generally on sight.
d) Some station tracks (e. g. the straight track) are included in the block system, whereas
others have to be used on sight.

Figure 10.16: Dividing of the line into token sections in RETB (example)

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10 Block Systems

Additionally, RETB systems can be equipped with track clear detection and/or a train
protection system to protect against human error.
More information on RETB can be found in (Wennrich 1997), (Jones 2008) and (Hall 2000).

10.6.4 Open Line Controlled from Neighbouring Interlockings

Beginning around 1980 with the appearing of electronic interlocking, several railways are
centralising the control of adjacent open line sections into the neighbouring interlockings
in new installations (figure 10.17). In most of these systems, on double lines both tracks
can be equally used for traffic into both directions. Whereas some railways (e. g. Austria,
Russia, France) maintain the concept of exchanging block messages between (virtual) block
points (whose evaluation units are concentrated in the same housing), others (e. g. Germany,
Switzerland) instead control open line sections based on route interlocking principles as with
stations.

Figure 10.17: Central automatic block for relatively short open line sections

The limited distance (today up to approximately 10 km) for the physical control of signals
and detection devices is a problem, particularly with longer distances between stations. To
increase the control length, amplification units (figure 10.18) can be used. Another solution is
to locate the element control of each signal on site and transmit only digital information (‘logic
control’) between the interlocking and the block signal control box and feed energy by a ring
line (figure 10.19 and figure 10.20). The advantages of the former solution are its usability for
all interlocking types and simple equipment on the open line. The advantage of the latter is a
notable reduction in cable expenditure.

Figure 10.18: Central automatic block with amplifier

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 10.6 Centralised Systems for Safety on Open Lines

Figure 10.19: Central automatic block with control units of electronic interlocking

Figure 10.20: Central automatic block with electronic interlocking or group control unit on the open line

10.6.5 Train Control Systems for High Speed Lines

Most train control systems for high speed, such as LZB in Germany, TVM in France, ATC in
Japan and ETCS Level 2 (8.3.4.4, 8.3.4.5, 8.3.6, 8.4), include a block system besides the train
protection and cab signalling functions. These block systems are mostly controlled centrally.
Each block centre is responsible for a longer line section of approximately 100 km or more.
Whereas some systems (e. g. TVM 300) exchange block messages within these block centres,
most systems (e. g. LZB, ETCS L2, TVM 430) use route logic.
Economically, block sections on these lines can be very short, as no trackside signals are
needed. In LZB and ETCS L2, on lines with mixed traffic, both block systems (the one of
the high speed train control systems and the one of conventional interlocking) are used in
parallel on the same tracks. In some cases, the high speed train control system provides
shorter block sections than the conventional (figure 10.21, figure 8.35). As mainly high speed
trains operate on these lines, high line capacity can be achieved for equipped trains, with
costs for trackside signals reduced (Behnsch/Reißaus 2017). The disadvantage is that in
degraded mode operation without cab signalling or when running unequipped trains, lower
capacity has to be accepted.

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10 Block Systems

Figure 10.21: Shortening of block sections with ETCS L2

The high achievable line capacity makes these systems useful also for lines with no high speed
traffic, but high performance requirements. Examples are some suburban and metropolitan
railways.

10.7 Moving Block Systems

High train movement intensity in peak-hour on some lines demands either additional lines
or increasing the line throughput. One of the problems is the accuracy of train detection: In
most systems, one metre of block sections is detected as occupation of the whole block
section. One solution is to reduce the length of fixed block sections to a minimum. Another
is to detect the front and rear end of trains exactly and reduce the distance between trains
even down to the braking distance (chapter 3.4.2.2). If the distance between trains is
more than stopping distance, the second train can move without restrictions. If the trains
are nearer, the second train must reduce its speed corresponding to its calculated braking
pattern.
The use of ‘moving block’ started at the end of 20th century on underground and metro
lines of Vancouver (1987) and London (1994). The train detection in the system SELTRAC
is realised according to the principle of LZB (chapter 8.3.6), with self-detection of the
trains. The crossings of cable loop as fixed points are projected every 25 metres and
a precision of detection of about 6 m is achieved. The metro train has a defined length
and its completeness is checked by electric wire between railcars. Therewith, the rear
end position can be calculated. The train can have reserve equipment for availability
redundancy. The moving block realises a time interval between trains of 1–2 min for
train speed up to 130 km/h. The use of trackside signals is impossible for moving block
systems and these lines usually function without drivers. If any person or large object falls
on the track, it will be detected immediately and the train automatically stopped (Friesen/
Uebel 1999).
Moving block is a core concept of Communication Based Train Control Systems (CBTC)
that followed initial installations in Vancouver and London. The cable loops for self-detection
of trains was primarily replaced by odometry and transponders for correction of position
uncertainty. Nowadays, CBTC is a primary system for urban metro lines with high performance
requirements (chapter 8.5).
The moving block system designed for some suburban lines of Tokyo has another
detection principle. High frequency track circuits 1 kHz with feed and receiver at the same
end can detect the distance between track equipment and the nearest train axle via the
resistance of the track and therewith the actual current with precision 20 metres (chapter
5.3.7.4). The permitted speed is calculated and transferred to the train via the same track
circuit through frequency 3 kHz (figure 10.22) (Watanabe/Takashige 1989). Checking of
train completeness is not necessary in this system thanks to track circuits.

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 10.7 Moving Block Systems

Figure 10.22: Moving block system on base of track circuits

Another moving block system is the block system of ETCS Level 3 (8.4.2.4) or ERTMS
Regional (8.4.2.9). Here the train reports its rear end position and therewith the clearing of a
certain portion of track via radio.
There are some applications of systems like ETCS Level 3 or ERTMS Regional in operational
service. The lines between Malung and Borlänge in Sweden and Uzen to Bolashak in
Kazakhstan are largely single lines with low traffic levels. Therefore, the application experience
until now is limited (Furness et al. 2017). In 2019, a derivate of ETCS Level 3 went into
operation on Wuppertal Suspension Railway in Germany. ETCS Level 3 can be installed on
lines with mixed traffic, too. In this case, additional technology must recognise trains on open
lines not equipped with ETCS and switch to a reserve level, e. g. semi-automatic block on an
axle counter basis. ETCS Level 3 can be used with virtual fixed block, too.
Other new detection systems can also enable train movements according to the principle
of ‘moving block’. The main requirement is to provide reliable detection and continuity of
information exchange.

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 11.1 The Objectives of Remote Control and Monitoring

11 Remote Control and Operation Technology

Artem Glybovskii, Carsten Sattler, Carsten Weber, Aleksandr Nikitin, Thomas White

11.1 The Objectives of Remote Control and Monitoring

When looking at today’s railway automation, monitoring and control systems, many things
have changed within the last decades.
On one hand, IT systems and software have more capabilities and performance. User interface
technology has become much better and different networking technologies were introduced to
railways as well.
On the other hand, railway control was centralised in many countries and one can see
modernisation attempts to meet enhanced requirements, which leads to Traffic Management
Systems (TMS).
From a historical perspective, the development of monitoring and control systems was driven
by:
–– increasing complexity of infrastructure
–– traffic optimisation
–– enhancing throughput
With the introduction of relay technology, rather large and complex control centres arose and,
with the evolution of micro-controller technologies, computer-controlled train supervision. The
control area was fixed by a local panel and limitation in control distance.
Concerning the control of the interlocking system, different grades of centralisation are:
–– control and setting of trackside equipment at a centralised interlocking system
–– control of the whole station by one operator
–– control of the remote zone at the big station
–– control of the neighbouring stations from the basic one
–– centralised control of the small stations along a line
–– centralised control of the stations in a larger area
The next evolutionary step with more enhancements occurred with the increasing miniaturisation
of computer techniques and introduction and broader usage of network technologies.
As a result, railway operators increasingly requested more optimisation potential. This led to
the development of larger control centres until the first decade of the 21st century.
Control centres are used by many railways and are known as CTC (Centralised Traffic Control).
Railways worldwide use CTC according to various requirements and operational regulations,
but for identical purposes. The objectives of CTC implementation are the following:
–– development of time schedule
–– train traffic management, including conflict resolution
–– coordination of the work of adjacent departments
–– control of cargo delivery
–– optimised utilisation of railway resources (infrastructure, rolling stock, etc.)
CTC can be organised in different ways, which are described in chapter 11.2. In general,
CTC consists of several controlling and information subsystems, that can provide the
following functionality:
–– centralised control and/or monitoring of interlocking systems
–– train schedule management

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11 Remote Control and Operation Technology

–– axle box overheating control

–– failures detection in the interlocking functions
–– control of cargo movement
After a long period of operational experience, the need of technical renewal is seen widely.
It is also seen as needing much more capability and expanded data integration from other
companies, which is summarised as multimodal transport.
The key drivers of this development are the significantly increased technological capabilities
in the IT domain combined with the ability to deal with large amounts of data and to correlate
them. This will result in significant improvements for operation and maintenance. The benefits
of CTC systems implementation are the following:
–– increase of train average speed up to 20 %
–– increase of traffic capacity up to 40 %
–– increase of job performance up to 70 %
–– reduction of workforce by 60 people for each 100 km (if interlocking is controlled by
dispatcher and signaller is not present at the station)

11.2 Remote Control and Monitoring

11.2.1 Types of Dispatcher Control/Monitoring

To keep railway operation under control, an overview of a node or a line is needed. This allows
conflicts in the use of the infrastructure to be detected and the appropriate reactions initiated.
It is important that the functions and the people are differentiated. Operational control has
to be divided into dispatching and signalling. A dispatcher is responsible for the preview of
the operational situation and conflict management. The signaller is the person who gives the
control commands to the interlocking system.
The information needed to detect the conflicts has to be given to the dispatcher, who is
responsible for the railway operation at a line or node. There are four variants usable to build
up an operation control system.
Variant 1. Each of the signallers works as dispatcher for his dedicated control area and has
no special equipment for dispatching (figure 11.1). Conflicts in dispatching are solved between
neighbouring signallers: For example, if there is only one track usable for the next train in
station B and stations A and C are both interested in sending a train to station B, a conflict will
arise. The operator in station B has to detect this problem and to find a solution to keep the
railway operation between A and C going. In the time the operator needs to think about the
conflict, he might not be able to handle other vehicle movements. The current trains can be
stopped, and new conflicts and delays can arise. This method is seldom used nowadays.

Figure 11.1: Variant 1 – Safety information (solid line) and operational information (dashed line)
exchanged between stations

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 11.2 Remote Control and Monitoring

Variant 2. If there are a lot of vehicle movements necessary in station B, it might be helpful to free
the local operator from the dispatching job, so that he can concentrate on the safety of the railway
operation. He is then called a signaller (figure 11.2) and an additional central dispatcher is employed.
For the arrangement of data exchange between those concerned, there are three possibilities:
–– The communication between the stations and the dispatcher is performed through
direct telephone calls between two persons. The dispatcher is an ordinary part of the
communication system.
–– The dispatcher works as a central node in the communication process. The received
information from one signaller is handled by the dispatcher and then is forwarded to the
next signaller. This process allows the dispatcher to have up to date information and
conflicts can be detected easily, but he also has to do a lot of communications work.
–– Only one communication channel is used as bus topology. Each of the participants can
hear every conversation. This decreases the workload of the dispatcher but loads each
signaller with the additional responsibility of listening to all the conversations and evaluating
what is addressed to him.

Figure 11.2: Variant 2 – Central dispatcher with only telephone communication with the stations

In variant 2, the dispatcher workplace is equipped only with communication facilities. It is used
on low-traffic lines equipped with simple automation systems (e. g. with manually operated
points, electric token system or semi-automatic block system). The train graph charting as a
time/route diagram with real train positions is carried out manually according to the reports of
the station dispatchers about the trains passing through time.
Variant 3. The dispatcher workplace is equipped with monitoring supervisory systems
(without control) to get necessary information about the train situation (figure 11.3). Trackside
equipment is assigned to control objects and information about them is transmitted to the
dispatcher via dedicated data transmission channels. On the symbolic train diagram of the line
(shown on monitors) the indication gives information to the dispatcher about the routes, signal
aspects and track vacancy. The dispatcher keeps the right to instruct the signallers via phone
line about the order of the trains passing in the area.

Figure 11.3: Variant 3 – Central dispatcher with remote supervision and telephone commanding

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11 Remote Control and Operation Technology

Variant 4. The signalling functions, which have been local up to variant 3, are now centralised.
The functions of both the signaller and dispatcher are performed by one person for large area.
In some cases, the signaller can remain, for example in case of big amount of shunting work
(figure 11.4). The dispatcher may directly send commands to the interlocking system, skipping
the signaller. According to operational rules, he can be allowed to do it regularly (e. g. in times
of low traffic) or is restricted in doing so to very special (dangerous) cases.

Figure 11.4: Variant 4 – Centralised signaller and dispatcher

11.2.2 Command Output

Different ways of command controls are possible. The types of command output are:
–– indirect – the commands are given verbally by the dispatcher to the signaller, independently of
the interlocking system
–– direct – the dispatcher has a panel to give commands directly to the interlocking system
The indirect system can be realised by direct dialogues between the dispatcher and the signaller
or using phone calls or news systems by Ethernet networks. The most important attribute is that
there is no connection between the dispatcher’s workplace and the interlocking. This way all
the commands to the interlocking system are given by the signaller, so that it is clear who gave
instructions to bypass any safety critical status.
In opposition to these systems, a direct connection to the interlocking system is helpful to avoid
time consuming discussions. To block illegal commands, the dispatcher could get a control
interface without safety critical commands.
To send commands to the interlocking system, there are three different ways possible:
–– individual – the dispatcher is able to change the element status e. g. throw the points individually
–– route – the dispatcher sets routes directly from his workplace
–– program – the dispatcher changes the program of automated route setting systems
There are different ways of setting program functions. The program can be taken from a table
similar to the timetable which combines train numbers and routes, or it can be given by the
dispatcher, who programs the whole route of the train. The first option is used in Germany and the
other option is typical for US systems.
The signaller, in some cases also the dispatcher, needs to control the whole interlocking machine.
In some cases, safety conditions cannot be checked due to the failed devices, and the signaller/
dispatcher has to take safety responsibility by special actions such as:
–– control of calling-on signal;
–– emergency release
–– emergency change of traffic direction on the block for single-track line
–– other similar degraded mode operations
For the safe transmission of emergency commands from CTC to interlocking, the coded
commands are sent in several time slots with several cycles. In some CTC (e. g. in Russia) the
execution of emergency commands is only possible when the signaller and dispatcher coordinate
their actions with each other.
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 11.3 Timetable Scheduling

11.3 Timetable Scheduling

11.3.1 Timetable Preparation

The basis of the process of organisation is the train schedule, which is a plan of operational
activities on the railway. It combines the work of all departments: stations, locomotive depots,
traction substations, track maintenance, rail automation, etc.
The schedule sets out the time of arrival, departure or non-stop passage of trains at each
operational point, time for passing on single track lines, time for stops at the stations. The
time for passing on single track lines is determined on the basis of traction calculations and
specified by test trips. The duration of stops at the stations is based on pathing needs and
traffic requirements (if any).
The schedule of trains is depicted in the coordinates "time – path", where the x-axis indicates
time, the y-axis operational points. Train movements between stations are indicated by
diagonal lines (figure 11.5), which correspond to constant movement, although the train moves
unevenly, with acceleration and deceleration. The length of the horizontal bar at the station
between the time of arrival and the time of departure corresponds to the duration of the train
stopping. Train numbers are indicated above the line movement (Sapožnikov 2006).

Figure. 11.5: Regulatory train schedule

In order to reduce the impact of seasonal unevenness of passenger traffic on freight traffic,
some passenger trains are indicated on the regulatory train schedule as “Used in case of
increasing passenger traffic”. The lines of these trains are dotted and can be provided for the
passage of freight trains.
To organise the operational work of the dispatcher, a planned schedule for the upcoming
working shift is being developed. It is made by adjusting the regulatory schedule to take
account of the work of service trains, changes in schedules, speed limits, or planned
maintenance operations for repair and construction work. If there are significant changes
in the regulatory schedule (for example, when the line is closed), a new, variant schedule is
developed, which will be regulatory for the dispatcher.
According to the times of actual arrival, departure and passage of trains at operational points,
a train movement sheet is generated. The coordinate grid of the graph is similar to the grid of

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11 Remote Control and Operation Technology

the regulatory schedule. The train movement sheet is used to control the train position on the
track, timely adoption of the schedule and subsequent analysis of operational activities. The
actual trains movement is shown on the sheet in different colours for passenger and freight
trains respectively. Also, in some countries there is an additional distinction of train categories.
Based on the regulatory schedule and considering the actual speed of movement, the
forecasted schedule is generated. The goal of this schedule is the reduction of losses in time
when deviations are occurring. Forecast schedules are plotted to the right of the current real-
time axis as a continuation of the train movement sheet by adjusting the regulatory schedule.

11.3.2 Timetable Optimisation

The main target of dispatching activities is, dependent on initially defined criteria, the resolution
of conflicts arising from technical problems and delays. This is done in such a way that the
priority of solution criteria leads to an optimum for customers and railway operators alike. The
main criteria are:
–– accuracy of train movement
–– trains connections
–– priority
–– energy efficiency
–– idle waiting time
–– penalties
The variety of decision criteria have in the past prevented the usage of automated systems for
conflict resolution.
Semi-automatic systems are mostly used nowadays. These suggest alternative solutions
with respect to different conflict resolution strategies. The dispatchers are free to follow these
suggestions, or use their own experience.

11.4 Technical Solutions for CTC

11.4.1 Basic Structure of CTC System

CTC centres are created due to the need to control multiple interlockings from a central site.
The starting point of this development was the transition from relay technique to computer-
based technologies and the usage of remote data transmission.
The aim was either remote control relay interlockings, or to integrate electronic and relay
interlockings within one user interface. The principal setup of a CTC is given in figure 11.6.
The connection of commands and messages is realised by I/O modules with an appropriate
connection circuit. All information is aggregated and updated cyclically in a telecontrol master
system. The master system is often a programmable logic controller (PLC) or other industrial
computer solution.

11.4.2 Types of Communication between CTC and Stations

Due to the control zone enlargement, remote data transmission is required in systems of
centralised traffic control. This information interchange in the dispatcher control systems
provides information and instructions transfer between the dispatcher office and remote

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 11.4 Technical Solutions for CTC

stations through the communication link. The possibility for such monitoring and its control
depends on the interlocking type (table 11.1).

interlocking type monitoring control

mechanical through special interface impossible
electromechanical through special interface impossible
relay through special interface through special interface
relay-electronic yes yes
electronic yes yes

Table 11.1: Possibilities for the communication between CTC and interlockings

In the two latter interlocking types, the data transfer between the interlocking and the related local
operation desk is realised by the electronic technology, and the dispatcher can use the same
data (figure 11.6). Because of large distances between CTC and stations, the line equipment can
have amplifiers. Moreover, the communication links are usually redundant. Thanks to network
functionality (e. g. Ethernet), the workplaces of dispatchers and signallers are flexible. So signaller
and dispatcher can control the area from different access points on the data network.
The communication link between dispatcher and mechanical or electro-mechanical
interlocking stations needs difficult interfaces, but it can only ensure monitoring and is
therefore little used. CTC for lines equipped with relay interlockings is often used. The
communication between dispatcher office and relay technology is described in the following
parts as examples of the special interface.

Figure 11.6: Basic structure of remote control system according to (Mücke 2002)

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11 Remote Control and Operation Technology

11.4.3 CTC Integration with Relay Interlockings

The communication link between the signaller’s desk and the relay appliances is usually
realised through many wires according to the number of control and monitoring elements.
If signaller and interlocking equipment are in the same building, it is not difficult. But for the
remote transfer of data, this solution is not suitable because of cable cost. Therefore, the
monitoring and control information is transmitted through two wires.
In many countries the CTC was created for the lines with existing relay interlockings, moreover
electronic equipment was not in use on the railway at that time. Therefore, special relay
interlocking coders/decoders (for every station) and electronic CTC connection devices were
developed (figure 11.7, figure 11.8). The communication order for this case is described below.

Figure 11.7: Communication between CTC and relay interlocking built on the relay technology

According to the method of data communication through one line, the types of data
transmission systems are:
–– sporadic – signals are transferred when appearing
–– cyclical – signals are transferred during the periods of time (cycles)
The first one aims to achieve the effective use of the communication channel capacity, while
the second one aims to correct data errors automatically at the next cycle of messages entry.
The control information is translated sporadically, whereas the monitoring information can
use both transmission types. The information consists of telegrams which contain bits for
synchronisation, station code and elements states (or command for one element). The
signalling element usually has one of two states (e. g. signal on/of, track circuit clear/occupied),
which can be translated as a bit. Impulse-built signals with different attributes are used for
the telegram preparation. The process of the signal parameters change is called modulation.
The conversion process is called manipulation if only two discrete values corresponding to
designations logical to ‘0’ or ‘1’ are used in the system of data transmission.

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 11.4 Technical Solutions for CTC

Figure 11.8: Equipment of central and local stations

The most widely used attributes for the telegram are amplitude, phase, pulse width, polarity
and frequency:
1. Amplitude attribute. The attribute is characterised by the current magnitude or by the pulse
voltage value (figure 11.9a). It is used likewise for AC and DC. However, the amplitude
attributes have low noise immunity compared with others.
2. Pulse-width attribute (figure 11.9b). Different pulse duration is the attribute in this case. The
time attributes are not only the pulses, but also the intervals separating the pulses. Type
of current is not important for the time (pulse-width) attribute and it allows the transfer of
pulses characterised by the time (pulse-width) attribute data through any communication
channel including the wireless one. Practically, two values are used for binary data transfer:
short and long pulses.
3. Polar attribute (figure 11.9c). The current polarity is used for the direct current impulses as
its attributes. The change of the current direction in the circuit provides high noise immunity
of the code sending. However, the use of this attribute is only possible with wires and not
radio communication.
4. Frequency attribute (figure 11.9d). The frequency of the current oscillation is used as an
attribute for the AC pulse forming.
5. Phase attribute (figure 11.9e). The change of phase shows the state of the next bit.

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11 Remote Control and Operation Technology

Figure 11.9: Forms of attributes for data coding

11.4.4 CTC Integration with Hybrid (Relay-electronic) Interlockings

In several countries, CTC was developed at the same time as electronic interlocking.
Therefore, the data transmission was initially adapted for communication between computers.
If there are relay interlockings, they can be connected to the existing net through the special
connector (figure 11.10).

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 11.4 Technical Solutions for CTC

Figure 11.10: Communication between CTC and relay interlocking built on the electronic technology

If the dispatcher is able to give safety critical commands and needs safe indication,
the relay-electronic connector has to be safe for the data transfer in both directions.
Therefore, it usually has two channels. The vital comparator controls the relay current; the
position of the relay is read from inverse contacts. With electronic equipment the data
exchange is usually faster than with relay equipment: Typical cycles of data exchange
are 4–5 seconds for relay technology and 1–2 seconds or below for electronics. The
maximum value of about 5 seconds results from the fact that the train shall not get lost
when passing through the shortest section of track clear detection. Moreover, electronic
technology is more flexible regarding the policy on how to deal with safety and availability.
For example, if a command or a message is safety-related, it can be foreseen that it will
only act after correct repetition.

11.4.5 CTC Integration with ETCS

The ways to integrate ETCS into operations control centres is heterogeneous. Background is
that the requirements and interface specifications between interlocking and RBC and between
RBC and operations control centres are subject of national regulations. Due to this fact and
partially existing national train control systems, one can see that there is a tendency to align
the ETCS user interface with the existing ones for national systems and so the control and
monitoring of ETCS is unfortunately very nationally oriented.
The integration of ETCS control and monitoring follows mostly two different approaches:
–– a separate ETCS user interface (corresponding to overviews and detailed views of the
interlockings)
–– enrichment of ETCS-relevant information into the interlocking user interfaces
The very basic functions are:
–– setting and removal of restrictions
–– lock and release of RBC

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11 Remote Control and Operation Technology

Depending on customer requirements further functions are:

–– display of ETCS relevant information with respect to trains and infrastructure (e. g.
supervision level, direction and length of movement authority, trusted areas)
–– transmission of text messages (is often required but the usage is not clear)
–– shortening of movement authority
–– commands for emergency train stop
Mechanisms for authorisation of ETCS monitoring and control are adopted from interlocking
models, because ETCS is an overlay system to the interlocking and interlocking information is
the primary source. Data modelling therefore requires appropriate mapping of the information
from ETCS and interlocking. Because of the increasing variety of concepts and interfaces the
European Railway Operators decided to form the EULYNX initiative to get more coordination
and standardisation on railway specific communication interfaces (see chapter 8.4.1). The
first proposals for communication interfaces were the interface between interlocking and
RBC (SCI-RBC) as well as the interface for monitoring and control of interlockings and RBC
(SCI-CC). The next years will show if there are more commonalities to be found, because the
operational rules of different railway operators evolved within decades. The standardisation will
occasionally take place with respect to data transmission procedures and definition of rough
data structures, rather than finding common operational rules. Similar experiences were made
during the interface standardisation for industrial control systems.

11.5 Examples for Operation Control Systems

11.5.1 Centralised Traffic Control in USA

11.5.1.1 Background
A central controlling authority has been the basis of North American railway operation since
1851. Original traffic control methods involved local station staff operating interlockings and/
or writing the dispatcher’s instructions to trains and delivering them when the train passed
or stopped. 76 years later, centralised traffic control changed the method of communicating
authority, but little else. Originally only new interlockings, with points formerly hand-operated
by train crews, were integrated into the CTC. The organisation and methods of railway
management remain much the same as they have for over 150 years, with some changes in
title for some functions and, of course, fewer personnel.

11.5.1.2 Organisation
A typical control centre in North America employs several train dispatchers; in some there
are more than one hundred. Each train dispatcher is assigned a territory that can range from
approximately 30 km of line of heavy traffic to 1600 km line of light traffic. A manager, generally
called the chief dispatcher, is assigned a territory that includes two or more train dispatchers.
Train dispatchers generally work autonomously, applying to the chief dispatcher for questions
of policy regarding train movement. The chief dispatcher also typically co-ordinates main
line and terminal operation, arranges planned maintenance of way possessions, and may
manage work assignments of train crews. The territory of several chief dispatchers is generally
supervised by a manager, often called corridor manager or some similar title (figure 11.11).
The corridor manager generally co-ordinates the operation of the chief dispatchers’ territories,
and issues instructions regarding traffic management policy or specific handling instructions for
individual trains when needed.

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 11.5 Examples for Operation Control Systems

A typical control centre also includes one or more locomotive distribution managers, one
or more maintenance of way possession planners, and possibly train and engine crew
personnel management positions. These positions are often parallel to, and not under the
control of, network traffic management managers. A control centre may also include several
commodity group managers. From the rail management point of view, traffic on a large North
American railroad is similar to traffic of several train operating companies on a privatised
national network. The handling of specific types of traffic, such as coal, grain, intermodal, and
automotive, is assigned to a management group that co-ordinates the activity of its own trains.
A commodity group manager will generally provide handling information and instructions for its
trains to the corridor manager, who issues instructions to the chief dispatchers after integrating
the commodity group’s handling instructions into the overall traffic management plan.

Figure 11.11: Structure of a typical North American control centre

11.5.1.3 Information Systems

Control centre management depends upon several, generally independent, data systems.
Train and railcar consistency and location information is often maintained in a separate
information system. Train location information is generally updated by manual entry at
terminals and by passing reports at Automatic Equipment Identification (AEI) readers
(chapter 12.3.5). These systems may also receive train location data from the traffic control
system. Locomotive management and crew management systems are often separate from
the train and railcar information system, receiving train location information from that system.
Maintenance of way planning generally involves only extended possessions in the future
and not day to day maintenance operations, so the system generally uses only schedule
information from the train and railcar data system. There may also be a separate system for
speed restriction and track condition information management.

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11 Remote Control and Operation Technology

11.5.1.4 Control Systems

There are almost no locally controlled interlockings left in North America. A very small number
of large interlocking plants remain, with plans for centralised operation in the future. Many of
these share the added centralisation complexity of including the tracks of two or more railway
companies crossing at grade, increasing the cost, involving potentially complicated cost-
sharing agreements, and present the complexity of integrating the different control systems
of the railway companies involved. Most of the remaining local interlockings generally control
movable bridges. In virtually all cases, the bridge interlocking has little or no association with
traffic management. Marine navigation has right of way over rail traffic, by law. Trains are
stopped for marine navigation or proceed without delay.
North American train dispatchers operate the CTC controls personally, and do not convey
instructions to a CTC operator. CTC installations virtually all use microprocessor control
stations. Traffic on a significant amount of the North American network is controlled by written
instructions issued by the dispatcher by radio and copied by the crew of the train. These
segments may have block signals, but not all do so. Generally, authority management software
ensures that no overlapping authority is issued. The train dispatcher enters the proposed
movement limits and the system generates an authority to read to the crew. These systems
are generally separate from the centralised traffic control system; however, they may be
presented to the train dispatcher in the same windowed display as the CTC system and the
train and car information system.
With very few exceptions (the local interlockings have not yet been centralised) there are no
station staff. At large freight terminals, the staff are engaged solely in yard management. For
traffic control purposes, most stations, other than major terminals, consist only of a main track
and a passing loop on a single track line, or crossovers between main tracks on a multiple
track line. On lines without CTC, points are manually operated by the train crew. These points
are not interlocked and generally not equipped with electric locking, but point position is
included in automatic block signal detection. In CTC territory, virtually all points that are not
used for traffic control purposes (e. g. industrial tracks and local industrial support yards)
are manually operated by train crews and are generally equipped with electric locking or an
automatic signal for entry into the main track. Trains typically remain on the main track when
stopped for work at these locations.

11.5.1.5 Communication
Virtually all train movement communication is conducted directly between the train dispatcher
and the train crew by radio. The exception is the written information the crew must receive
when they report for duty. Train dispatchers maintain the records of temporary speed
restrictions, tracks out of service, maintenance of way protection, and changes to the rules or
timetable that have not yet been published in permanent form. The train dispatcher transmits
the information to each train before the crew comes on duty. The information may be sent
directly to a remote computer network printer, to a fax machine, or to a data storage and
retrieval system. For the latter, the crew enters an identifying code and the documents are
printed. The crew will call the train dispatcher on the radio when ready to leave. If conditions
require changes to the restriction information received by the crew at the beginning of the trip,
the train dispatcher will issue the new information to each train by radio.
Train location information may be made available to terminal managers and the dispatchers
of adjoining districts by passive CTC displays. These displays are identical to the train
dispatcher’s display but have no input capability.

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 11.5 Examples for Operation Control Systems

11.5.1.6 Dispatching Procedures

North American railways are generally unscheduled, at least in the pure sense of the word.
North American trains generally have rail service plan schedules that provide the expected
times at terminals, or sometimes only the expected running time between terminals. The train
dispatching criterion is generally priority. Trains must generally not be delayed by trains of
lesser priority. Priority is established by the service plan schedules or by instructions of the
network managers. The train dispatcher performs all scheduling as trains are introduced, and
rescheduling when conditions change. Most of the scheduling process is achieved mentally.
Traffic planning software is just beginning to be introduced in North America.
North American train dispatchers also arrange daily track maintenance. When a maintenance
crew arrives at their jobsite, the foreman calls the dispatcher on the telephone or radio and
explains the required limits and time. If traffic allows, the dispatcher will transmit written
authority verbally to the foreman of the maintenance crew, describing exact track and time
limits. The train dispatcher is responsible for protecting the maintenance of way work. The
CTC control workstation has provisions for blocking signals to prevent train movement. This
feature may be connected to or a part of the authority issuing system to ensure that the work
limits are protected before authority can be issued.
Alternatively, for maintenance of way work that will occupy a single location or small area for an
entire workday, the dispatcher may issue a written instruction to be delivered to each train at
its initial station on that segment of the line. The written authority requires trains to stop short
of the maintenance of way activity and not proceed without specific authority of the foreman in
charge of the work. Under these conditions, trains are allowed through the work limits at the
convenience of the foreman in charge of the work. The train dispatcher performs rescheduling
as needed after trains are delayed by the maintenance work.

11.5.1.7 Decentralisation
The capabilities of current signal, communication and data processing systems may exceed
the limits of practical application. It is technologically possible to control 37000 km line of
railway from one room. It is also possible to develop system redundancy and backup to allow
continued operation if a segment of the technology becomes inoperative. Regardless of the
redundancy and backup, all of the skilled personnel are located in the same place, all subject
to the same risk of natural or man-made disaster. The logistics of covering all positions with
a qualified person every shift can be quite difficult. Providing the dispatchers with the ability
to see their territory personally and develop essential route knowledge is virtually impossible.
Railways in the US that developed large control centres for the entire system have split at
least parts of the territory into smaller regional dispatching offices. One North American railroad
never consolidated control functions into a system control centre, determining that smaller,
regional control centres were preferable.

11.5.1.8 Upcoming Development

The country wide coverage with Positive Train Control (PTC, see chapter 8.6) will be the next
evolution in the US Railway Network. A second evolution is the transition of freight railways
from a hub-and-spoke-system to a point-to-point one which is also called precision scheduled
railroading (PSR). The latter will further decrease crew size, increase train length and shorten
the time in terminal whereas the first one will enhance the density on the network. This leads to
some technical issues that have to be solved. The contribution of dispatching to PSR goals is
movement planning which in fact is the optimisation and balancing of:

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11 Remote Control and Operation Technology

–– network velocity
–– network capacity
–– punctuality
–– waiting time
Movement planning leads to a closer integration of operations control and dispatching. It
consists of an offline component for designing conflict free movements and an online component
(e. g. Vicos MP, see Thies 2006). This is based on real time data to automate conflict resolution
or showing suggestions to the dispatcher to avoid or resolve conflicts. Movement planning is an
optimisation task which is like classical dispatching. It incorporates usually the whole network
and much more data and to have a forecast window of hours up to days. Simulation techniques
are used to have the optimum meet and pass schedule. The database usually contains at least:
–– network topology
–– speed and slope profiles of the network
–– track situation
–– turn over times of switches
–– train data (e. g. maximum speed, brake profile etc.)
–– signals
–– stations
–– depots
–– restrictions
That means the most data which represent the current infrastructure, rolling stock and
operational situation, real time date and train positions, perturbations, etc. Additionally, other
data (e. g. data from fleet and crew planning systems) might be necessary to fulfil economic
objectives. The resulting movements will be sent to the automatic route setting component
of the dispatching or operations control systems. The combination of PTC and movement
planning will lead to a much higher network capacity and an increase of network speed.

11.5.2 Centralised Traffic Control in Germany

The development of operation control in Germany is quite different from the systems in the
USA or in Russia. One of the reasons is the base of the communication between stations.
The German system is traditionally based on blocking systems using electro-mechanical block
instruments (see chapters 10.4.2.1 and 10.4.2.2) in contrast to track circuits as used in the
USA or Russia. The traditional German manual block without technical track clear detection
on open lines requires staff along the line, especially to check the completeness of the train.
This caused a late start of centralisation in Germany, compared with the US and Russia. This
was also supported by the fact that in Germany the density of population and therefore the
availability of local staff is much higher. The most important step of centralisation in Germany is
the operation management centres, which were being introduced from the 1990s.
The first prototype of a centralised traffic control centre was set up in Magdeburg as a pilot
project for dispatching and controlling on one site. It was realised in different steps from 1995
until the end of 1998 and had integrated dispatching and control on approximately 100 km,
including semi-automatic conflict resolution. The total dispatching area of that prototype was
approximately 300 km with an average of 1000 trains per day. In parallel, the program to
setup the operation management centres was started in mid-1998 with a planned schedule
until 2001. It was planned first to integrate the core network and then to expand this to
whole German long-distance and urban network. Finally, seven management centres in core
network and one management centre for the Berlin metropolitan network were realised. The
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 11.5 Examples for Operation Control Systems

management centres contain all systems for dispatching trains as well as the control centres
of the connected control areas. The field elements of that architecture are the sub-control
centres with the connected interlockings and train control systems. Each management centre
consists of a dispatching centre with all central dispatching systems (e. g. central train tracking,
central route setting, timetable management, central track occupancy table) with between
100 and 150 dispatcher workplaces. Furthermore, each management centre has up to 10
operation control centres with up to 10 (or more) operator workplaces. Each control centre is
connected to at least 10 sub-control centres, which control one or more interlockings and if
connected one or more train control facilities (radio block centre, continuous train control).
The principal architecture is presented on the figure 11.12.

Figure 11.12: Principal architecture of German CTC system

Depending on the size of a specific control area the number of operators and dispatchers can
be adjusted. The connecting network between the control centres and the sub-control centres
is usually organised as a two-path redundant network which might be a dedicated network
or a public network. In case of a public network the wide area network is secured by security
gateways. The dispatching facilities and the control facilities belong to different security zones
called integrity level. Whereas the control areas belong to integrity level 1, the dispatching
systems belong to integrity level 2. The transition between the integrity levels is secured by a
security transgate which in principle is a procedure-protected application level gateway and
firewall. The command and monitoring interface protocol is standardised.
Nevertheless, from DB's point of view (see Bormet/Rausch 2017) this program has not met
the expectations and therefore was not finalised. Only the core network was integrated.
A closer integration of control and dispatching as well as greater synergies of a closer
cooperation of maintenance and operation personnel and other railway operators and station
management were not reached. Another point is that recruiting personnel in the urban centres
is becoming more difficult and thus more flexibility to control traffic from different locations,
depending on current traffic density is required.

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11 Remote Control and Operation Technology

Considering this, the DB approved a new Operations Strategy, where the operations control
centres will be stronger related to the maintenance areas, which means each maintenance area will
have at least one operations control centre. The new operations control centres will have typically
between 6 to 20 operator workplaces, which was proved to be the optimum size for operation.
These operator workplaces will be integrated ones which means integration of user interfaces for
interlocking control, train control, telecommunication control, control of other alarming or reporting
systems (e. g. hot wheel detection) and dispatching systems (e. g. train graph indicator). For all user
interfaces a unified usability and design concept is provided. The accomplished state will be 97
medium size operations control centres nearly equal distributed for the long-distance and urban
network and about 28 control centres for the regional network. The target map for the control
centres in the long-distance and urban network is shown in figure 11.13.

Figure 11.13: Target map for future centralised traffic control centres in Germany (derived from
Bormet/Rausch 2017)

The horizon to realise this strategic program ranges in the years to 2044. The technical architecture
is presented in figure 11.14. It becomes clear that this architecture leads to a closer integration of
different technical systems under a unified user interface. Necessary prerequisites are:
–– a central directory service to hold all users, roles, and authorisations
–– a standardised communication architecture
–– a unified safety procedure for specific commands and result checking

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 11.5 Examples for Operation Control Systems

Figure 11.14: Planned CTC system structure on the DB (derived from Bleicher 2017)

11.5.3 Centralised Traffic Control in Russia

The railway network in the Russian Federation is divided into 16 regions. Each region has its
own traffic control centre.
This section will consider the organisation of traffic management on the example of
Oktyabr'skaya railway region. The total length of the railway is more than 10000 km.
The largest node is St. Petersburg, where the control centre is. Also, in this centre is the
management of the high-speed line St. Petersburg – Moscow. Oktyabr'skaya railway is
divided into approximately 30 rings (regions) of controlling. Each ring consists of several
stations and neighbouring track lines, usually from 10 to 20 stations and 150–200 km in total
line distance. Each ring is controlled with one dispatcher. Also, there is one senior dispatcher,
who brings in line all the rings together.
One exception is the 800 km high-speed line St. Petersburg – Moscow. The control of this line
is performed by five dispatchers and one senior dispatcher. In order to facilitate the common
work of dispatchers of this line, a wall display panel was installed, which indicates the current
train situation on the entire line.
The CTC system consists of (figure 11.15):
–– terminal CTC subsystem
–– central control subsystem
–– CTC file server
–– CTC gateway
–– maintenance workplace
–– dispatcher workplace
–– wall display panel

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11 Remote Control and Operation Technology

The terminal CTC subsystem collects status information of trackside elements at the
station (signals, point machines, track circuits). In relay systems, free relay contacts
are used to obtain the state of the element. Additional relays are installed to control
the interlocking system (route setting, etc.), the name of relays contain the abbreviation
"DC" – dispatcher control. In microprocessor systems, a special interface is used for the
exchange of monitoring and controlling information.
For emergency command execution another subsystem is implemented. It uses the same
data transmission channel but has additional encryption equipment. The subsystem
consists of ID reader and special wireless ID tokens, each token is not personalised and
passed over between work shifts. If it is needed to send an emergency command, then
the dispatcher executes it in the workplace. After that the confirmation window appears
and dispatcher has to bring the token to the reader. If the token validity check was
successfully passed, the emergency command will be encrypted and sent to the terminal
subsystem.
Controlling and monitoring information are transmitted as telegrams via data transmission
channels, which are provided by the regional communication centre. This channel is made
with ring topology, so single failure (cable or equipment) will not affect the reliability of
communication.
Central control subsystem decodes received information and sends it in broadcasting mode
via NetBIOS protocol to the demilitarised local area network (LAN). The affiliation of information
to a particular station is made with special markers, which consists of station name.

Figure 11.15: CTC structure on Russian railways

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 11.5 Examples for Operation Control Systems

LAN network is made with TCP/IPv4 protocol. It is a redundant network with the usage of
different B class subnetworks, so all the equipment is duplicated (dispatcher workplaces,
routers) or has two Ethernet ports (CTC file server, CTC gateway). For safety and security
reasons all the interfaces to external systems are made via hardware firewall, which
prevents connection to the CTC system from external network.
CTC file server is used to archive all the controlling commands, status of all trackside
elements and trains running. The storage is made with RAID array. The regulatory time
for storing the archive is 10 days, then the archive will be overwritten using First In First
Out (FIFO) approach. Furthermore, file server is used for providing information to external
systems, which requires archives inspection for purposes of transportation process
analysis.
CTC gateway is used for real time data exchange with external systems, for example train
movement information system (TMIS). This system is used for automated train movement
sheet generation. Linking to automated TMIS is used in CTC systems to obtain information
about train numbers. On the other side, information about the location of the train is
transmitted to this system to form the executed schedule.
The second task of gateway is to execute additional instances for such subsystems as
“automatic dispatcher”. This system receives number and the current position of the train
and analyses regulatory train schedule, received from external information system. Based
on the received data, the system sends the commands to set the route for upcoming
trains. This development is used on the high-speed line St. Petersburg – Moscow.
Maintenance workplace is the system that displays all the information, which is received
by central control subsystem, in addition it has LAN monitoring software. This enables
maintenance staff to detect failures and malfunctions in the data transmission channels
and CTC equipment. Also, workplace provides a possibility to watch archive or real time
status of trackside elements and trains running.
Dispatcher workplace consists of one or two monitors with TMIS, but additionally
dispatcher is obliged to draw the train movement on paper (figure 11.16). Other monitors
are assigned to the controlling and monitoring. The quantity depends on the size of
the ring. One monitor shows information about chosen station, which is controlled by
dispatcher at the moment. Other monitors are displaying the rest of the line.

Figure 11.16: Dispatcher workplace (photo: Railways of the World — zdmira.com)

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 12.1 Principles of Marshalling of Trains

12 Safety and Control of Shunting and Marshalling

Thomas Berndt, Peter Márton, Dmitrij Shvalov, Thomas White

12.1 Principles of Marshalling of Trains

Trains are used to move passengers or goods from one place to another on the railway
network. In most cases, the trains consist of the same wagons from origin to destination.
Passengers often need to use several trains to reach their destinations, so they need to
change trains at specific places in the railway network. With the freight railway, goods
cannot simply change trains. It is not normally practicable to tranship goods between
trains. In the freight railway, the system is organised and known as “single wagon”. The
wagon is sent from its origin to destination and during its journey, it uses several trains that
connect at marshalling yards (in North America called classification yards). There, wagons
from several origins are combined to form one train. Thus the “first” train must be split up
and a new train formed.
To do this different shunting methods are in use. The most important shunting methods (based
on the physical process) are:
–– switching over (North America: switching)
–– pushing off (also fly shunting, throwing, kicking)
–– gravity shunting
In the national rules more detailed shunting methods can exist.
To switch over, the wagon or group of wagons will be coupled to a locomotive. After that the
locomotive moves the wagons to the target track. This shunting method is (relatively) safe and
can be used to move every kind of wagon (or other locomotive), but it is not efficient.
To push off, an uncoupled wagon or wagon group will be accelerated by a locomotive.
Then the locomotive stops and the wagons move freely into the target track. This shunting
method is more efficient. The safety level is lower because the wagons are free moving. The
wagons can be stopped by brake shoe (also called slipper or in North America skate) or by
other wagons, standing in the target track. Finding the proper speed for pushing off is not
easy. If the speed is too low, the wagon does not reach the target location. If the speed is
too high, damage to standing wagons is possible. Therefore this shunting method cannot be
used for every kind of wagon (forbidden for wagons loaded with dangerous goods).
For pushing off or switching over no special equipment is needed. Minimum is three tracks
connected with a set of points.
To use gravity shunting, a hump in a gravity yard is necessary. Additional technical facilities
(see chapter 12.3) help to get high shunting capacities. In general this shunting method
is more efficient than the others, but cannot be used in every case. Depending on above
mentioned technical facilities, it could be forbidden if dangerous or sensitive goods are
loaded in the wagons. In other cases technical parameters of wagons do not allow it (e. g.
too long a wheelbase). Most modern passenger carriages cannot to be hump shunted.
The most important places where the shunting methods are used in the railway network are:
–– collection and distribution of wagons in industrial sidings, ports, container terminals,
change-of-gauge stations and
–– exchange of wagons between trains in marshalling yards.
The following discussions concentrate on gravity shunting as the most complex form of shunting.

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12 Safety and Control of Shunting and Marshalling

12.2 Parts of Marshalling Yards and their Function

12.2.1 General Structure and Functioning

The technology of splitting up trains and reforming them by gravity shunting at marshalling
yards is based on specially designed yards. The main components are the receiving yard
(also called arrival or reception yard), the hump, the classification yard (North America: bowl
yard) and departure yard. Inbound trains will arrive on one or more receiving tracks. Then
the trains will be prepared to splitting up (in European countries with 1435 mm gauge, any
screw coupling are prepared for uncoupling or uncoupled, depending on local operating
rules, including inbound inspection and preparation of a hump list, again depending on
operating rules). After that trains will be humped and wagons run onto the classification tracks.
Outbound trains are assembled by moving classified wagons from the classification tracks,
placing them on one of the departure tracks. It can happen that the outbound train consists
of several blocks of wagons. In this case, wagon blocks are coupled on the departure track to
one train. Assembled trains receive an outbound inspection and brake test prior to departure.
Ideally, the hump is located sequentially between the receiving yard and the classification yard.
In this case the engine will proceed to the far end of the track and push the wagons (the cut)
over the hump for classification. An example of this kind of marshalling yard including work
routines is shown at figure 12.1.
Marshalling yards have to meet a number of special requirements. These requirements are
for example: efficiency of use, quiet operation of retarders and point drives, special sorting
regulations and limited access to the area. For this reason in detail a lot of differences exist in
–– construction form,
–– level of automation and
–– technical equipment.

Figure 12.1: Work routines in marshalling yards

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 12.2 Parts of Marshalling Yards and their Function

12.2.2 Layout Variants

Some criteria to distinguish construction forms of marshalling yard are shown at figure 12.2.
The differentiation according to height profile refers to the inclination of the various
components. Flat marshalling yards are established in the level area.
By contrast, almost the whole rail area of the marshalling yard on a continuous slope has a
falling gradient in the direction away from the hump. The gradients are different therefore from
flat marshalling yards, but the arrangements do not differ basically. In both cases the potential
energy of the wagons is used for the sorting of wagon groups.
In marshalling yards on a continuous slope, the wagons roll under gravity. Thus shunting
locomotives to push the wagons over the hump and close up the wagons in the classification
yard are not necessary. These advantages are compensated by the disadvantages of special
costs of construction and operation.
The most favourable arrangement is to place the yards in a line (extension in length, figure
12.1). Due to restrictions in the availability of land or due to very long trains, this is not always
possible. In these cases the track groups can also be arranged side by side (extension in
width, figure 12.3). A typical North American freight train is two to three km long, therefore
extension in width is often used here. In American marshalling yards often only arrival and
departure yards are long enough to accommodate whole trains. The classification yard is
shorter and contains only parts of the new train (block of wagons).
In marshalling yards with two yard systems all kinds of yards exist twice. Usually the yards
are arranged in opposite directions in both systems. It is possible to increase the efficiency, if
high capacities are needed.

Figure 12.2: Construction forms of the marshalling yards

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12 Safety and Control of Shunting and Marshalling

Figure 12.3: Marshalling yard – extension in width

The use of two hump tracks can achieve higher hump capacities.
The principles of regulating speeds of descent and track occupancy control can differ greatly
at marshalling yards in different countries. These differences can be explained by a number of
reasons, including:
–– traditions of developing automation systems
–– differences in methodology, theoretical approaches and control algorithms
–– application of different computer control complexes, field equipment and technical solutions
In general, the physical process of gravity shunting is very difficult because the wagons can
have very different running qualities and meteorological influences can change. Various wagon
types and their parameters (kind of wagon, whether it is full or empty, wagon length, wagon
construction, mass of wagon, number of axles, quality of axle bearing) is the cause of the wide
ranges of riding quality.

12.2.3 Automation

To make the complex process of gravity shunting more efficient, the aims are ease of control
and safety. Automation is the way to achieve this.
The lowest level (points operated by hand, use of brake shoes) is the technology of former
times. Control of the splitting process was very difficult at this level. Communication between
hump foreman, locomotive driver and other workers was based on a humping list and special
humping signals. Today this level can be accepted only where volumes are low. It is not only a
question of economy. The use of brake shoes is dangerous, slow and not easy to handle.
A lot of new solutions of technical equipment (voice radio communication, retarders, sensors,
points) and control systems are now available. The first level of automation is the
replacement of the use of brake shoes by retarders. Modern retarders are quick working, that
means they are more efficient and can have a lot of special features like
–– active and inactive position,
–– remote control and
–– brake force adaptation.
The principles of wagon braking are also very different. The choice of brake facilities is
influenced by several parameters. On this level the retarder is controlled by man or a feature of
the retarder itself. Point and retarder control is now concentrated on the hump signal box.

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 12.3 Control of Marshalling Yards

The second level of automation is that of retarder and point control by hump process
control systems. To do this a lot of information has to be processed. Today the most high
performance marshalling yards work on this level. The last steps on the way to fully automation
(third level of automation) are:
–– the use of automatically controlled hump locomotives,
–– closing the gaps in the information flow,
–– automatic detection of wagons and locomotives in the complete process, weigh-in-motion
scales at the crest of hump (in North America) and
–– last not least optimising the algorithms of control and the technical details of marshalling yard.
Examples and more details are shown in chapter 12.3.

12.3 Control of Marshalling Yards

12.3.1 Introduction

Control of gravity marshalling yards with a high level of automation is very complex and must
be based on hump process control systems. These systems are interacting with
–– shunting-technical facilities,
–– points and
–– sensors.
Shunting-technical facilities in marshalling yards are used
–– to brake (retarder/rail brakes),
–– to promote (handling systems) or
–– to detain (e. g. holding brakes, concealable/movable buffer stops).
Points must work very quickly and safely.
To get the necessary information, a lot of data must be collected, evaluated and transmitted
in real time using the following objects or influences (see figure 12.4):
–– data of arriving trains (number, kind and position of wagons, arrival time etc.),
–– data of wagons (technical parameters like height, width, number of axles),
–– data of environmental parameters (wind, rain, snow, temperature etc.),
–– wagon movement data (speed, position),
–– data of points (point control, point occupation),
–– data of retarders and other shunting technical facilities (working position and occupation),
–– data of tracks (track occupation)
and a lot more.
The data can be collected from different sources. There are
–– messages from neighbouring systems (like data of inbound trains),
–– data measured by sensors (meteorological data, track occupation etc.) and
–– data from data bases (technical parameters of wagons).
Today a lot of very different sensors are necessary and in use to get information out of the
process of gravity shunting. These sensors must have important parameters like quick
response, high reliability, resistance against hard environmental conditions and others.
All functions of operation and control are concentrated in hump information systems.

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12 Safety and Control of Shunting and Marshalling

Figure 12.4: Data exchange

12.3.2 Retarders

12.3.2.1 Kinds of Retarders

Retarders generate braking force which works on the wagon wheels. The braking force can
be generated in diverse ways. This allows the adaptation of brakes to individual demands of
operation and control (see figure 12.5). That is why there are several forms of retarder in use.

Figure 12.5: Physical principles of braking and kinds of retarders

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 12.3 Control of Marshalling Yards

Beam or clasp retarders consist of two

moveable beams on one (figure 12.6) or
both rails (figure 12.7). To generate brake
force, the beams will be pressed on the
flanks of wheel tyres of running wagons.
The brake force is controllable. The retarders
can have a working and a non working position.
In non working position the retarder can be
passed by vehicles including locomotives.
The retarder drive can be electrical, hydraulic
or pneumatic. The variation of important
parameters like length, time of reaction, brake
force and a possible maximum entry speed of Figure 12.6: Single-rail pneumatic beam retarder
wagons allows the adaption to special needs. in Zvolen (Slovakia) (photo: Peter Šoltys)
Electric-dynamic rail brakes are based on eddy current principles. The brake force is
controllable via electric power regulation. In the non working position (electric power off)
the retarder can be passed by most types of locomotives.

Figure 12.7: Two-rail hydraulic beam retarder in Mannheim (Germany)

In the area of elastic rail brakes the steel rails

are replaced by rubber brake elements (special
rubber vulcanised on metal sheets – see figure
12.8). Rubber parts are elastically deformed by
the wheel running over them. This transforms
kinetic energy into other forms of energy,
and therefore brakes the wagon. This kind of
retarder is not controllable directly. If the working
position is not changeable, locomotives cannot
pass over them.
Hydraulic spiral retarders brake the wagon(s)
to an exactly defined maximum. When a Figure 12.8: Elastic rail brake in Munich (Germany)
wagon passes over such a retarder the
wheel flange interacts with the cylinder spiral ledge (figure 12.9), the latter performing one turn-
over. If the wagon speed is lower than the one for which the retarder is adjusted, the retarder’s
valve doesn’t prevent liquid from flowing from one cavity into another. In this case braking
doesn’t take place. When the speed exceeds the adjusted one, the retarder produces maximum
braking effort. Some kinds of hydraulic spiral retarder allow alternative working positions (active
or inactive) In this case locomotives can pass this kind of retarders in the inactive position.

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12 Safety and Control of Shunting and Marshalling

Figure 12.9: Hydraulic spiral retarder in marshalling yard Košice (Slovakia) (photo: Peter Bado)

Piston retarders are based on oil-hydraulic or pneumatic principles. Their brake effect takes
place on wagon wheel flange running over the retarder’s piston fixed on the rail (figure 12.10).
The excess kinetic energy is reduced due to the piston travelling down when the wagon is
rolling over. Oil-hydraulic piston retarders do not work if the speed is lower than 1 m/s. Some
kinds of piston retarders are controllable and allow working or non working position.
There are two solutions used for a working and non working position. In Germany, several
piston retarders are installed as a group controlled by common control devices. In working
position, piston retarders are near to rail head, whereas in non working position, piston
retarders are near the sleepers. In China, pistons are controlled individually. The piston is up in
working position, or down in non working position.

Figure 12.10: Piston retarder in Harbin (China)

12.3.2.2 Use of Retarders

Criteria for the choice of the rail brakes are
–– brake force to be performed,
–– fulfilment of the requirements from the shunting-technical procedure,
–– conditions of the application place as well as
–– economic efficiency.
The arrangement of retarders in marshalling yards is a result of special retarding concepts.
The retarding concepts must be developed in connection with construction details of the
marshalling yard (especially gradient), retarder characteristics, quality and quantity of wagons

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 12.3 Control of Marshalling Yards

in operation and environmental conditions. Modern hump process control systems can be
adapted to control a special retarding concept. Basically two retarding concepts are known:
Continuous speed control methods based on piston retarders (for example in Austrian
marshalling yards near Vienna and Villach, several dozen thousands of non-controllable
piston retarders are used; see examples from China in chapter 12.3.7.4, too) or chain of short
(small) beam (clasp) retarders (for example in Slovakia, Žilina-Teplička – Ižvolt) (Bušovský et al.
2012) and target shooting methods in a wide range of variations based on other kinds of
retarders (see following examples). Target shooting method means that the wagons, leaving
the last retarder, have exactly that speed which is needed to stop at the right position in
the classification track. That means different speeds depending on the changing distances
between the last retarder and the target position. In general retarders can be used:
–– to hold wagons or groups of wagons (cuts) in a defined track (e. g. holding brakes in
marshalling yards on a continuous slope)
–– to guarantee speed limits in the point zone
–– to keep a sufficient distance between separate groups of wagons to enable the points to be
changed
–– to control the speed to achieve the right position of wagons in classification tracks
Combination of kinds of retarders (and handling systems) allows a lot of modifications of target
shooting method. In detail there are also differences in the braking positions and gradient ratio. In
Europe, retarders are normally at the positions shown at figure 12.11. Retarders can be called by
working principles (see chapter 12.3.2.1) or by function in use. The retarders at braking position
1 are called ‘ramp retarders’. Often two-rail hydraulic beam retarders are preferred there. The
retarders at position 2 are the hump or main retarder (in British English called king retarder and
in American English master retarder). The real target braking takes place in the classification
yard (position 3). These retarders are called secondary retarder or in UK queen retarder (North
America: group retarder). At this position single-rail hydraulic beam retarder, electric dynamic
retarder or elastic rail brakes are preferred. Piston retarders are also possible.

Figure 12.11: Braking positions and positions of handling systems in Western Europe

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12 Safety and Control of Shunting and Marshalling

Figure 12.12 shows an example according the national rules in Russia. In this case the retarder
at the first braking position ensures the required intervals between shunting units in the area
from the first braking position up to the second one. The retarder at second braking position
can realise the intervals between shunting units to avoid collisions and enable setting of points
during passing by vehicles. The purpose of the retarder at the third braking position is to
reduce the speed of shunting units if necessary. In the classification tracks the wagons must
achieve their position, considering the approach to standing wagons with the safe collision
speed. This speed on hump yards is low (e. g. Russia 5 km/h).

Figure 12.12: Gradient ratio and brake positions (example: Russia)

12.3.3 Handling Systems for Freight Wagons

After gravity shunting the wagons are standing in the classification yard and must be coupled
manually. But often coupling is not possible because there are small gaps between the wagons.
To eliminate the gaps, shunting locomotives or special handling systems can be used. Modern
marshalling yards with enormous marshalling operations are equipped with these systems.
Handling systems are located inside the track and move by means of automatically controlled ropes
(see figure 12.13). The systems can be installed at the end of classification tracks (called clearing
sweeper) and additionally at the beginning of classification tracks (called rope haulage sweeper).
Clearing sweeper helps to close the gaps between wagons or wagons groups on the end of
sorting tracks to enable coupling. Rope haulage sweeper can be necessary additionally to clear
up sorting tracks at the beginning, behind the points and last retarder. Both systems are different
in technical details. In general the use of handling systems is part of the retarding concept. So it is
possible to use the classification tracks more efficiently and locomotives are not needed in this yard.

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 12.3 Control of Marshalling Yards

Figure 12.13: Handling systems in Munich (Germany)

12.3.4 Points

Points influence the quality of the shunting process. Important parameters are throwing time,
point position control and kind of operation. There are point machines available for points in
shunting areas for normal and slow points up to very fast points. Short throwing times of very
fast points (0.5 secs throwing time) helps to get higher shunting quality. That’s why normally
very fast points are in use at the hump area. Points with lower throwing times are acceptable
in other areas of marshalling yards (arrival and departure yard) and in case of low performance
demands. Modern hump process control systems are able to control various point machines.
Point position control is also important for safety.
In the past, mostly interlocking controlled mechanical points were used. The application of
power switches in yards was generally limited to the entrance of arrival yards and the exit
of departure yards due to the too long distance for mechanical switching. The availability of
electrical points is the basis of new concepts of operation in shunting areas and the distance
is no longer a problem. Electric points can be operated by a control panel or by a pushbutton
mounted on a post adjacent to the points.
Control panels can be integrated into interlocking cabins or mounted in the field like the
pushbuttons. If the operating facilities are placed in the field, a member of the train crew or a
shunter would walk along, pushing the required buttons for the route.
This application, in comparison with centralised control from an interlocking, requires less
infrastructure (e. g. cabling, control panel). This technology is available and in use in Europe
and North America. It allows a high level of flexibility by scalable solutions from low level in
industrial sidings to high level in marshalling yards. For more details see chapter 9.4.10.

12.3.5 Sensors

Sensors are used to measure

–– static data of wagon (e. g. height, length, mass) and
–– dynamic data of wagon (e. g. speed, position), track elements (occupation, work position)
and weather (e. g. wind, temperature, humidity).
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12 Safety and Control of Shunting and Marshalling

The measurement takes place before or during the shunting process.

The area of the wagon where wind can act to retard the wagon speed is a result of length,
height and width of the wagon. The measurement of length is possible with Doppler radar
devices. To get height and width data, light grids (light curtains) can be installed. Additional
light grids are used for detecting the space between cuts. For speed detection Doppler
radar devices can be used.
Weather, especially wind, can influence the wagon speed dramatically. Real time weather
data capture (wind measurement, temperature, humidity) is an important factor to find out the
riding quality of wagons and to optimise control of gravity shunting.
The reduction of the necessity of measurements increases efficiency and helps to reduce
the complexity of systems. One way to do it is the implementation of automatic equipment
identification systems.
In general the identification of equipment (wagons and locomotives), often in combination
with databases, is very important to organise railway operation in different processes like
–– organisation of efficient use, maintenance and repair of equipment,
–– preparing splitting up of trains in marshalling yards and
–– customer information.
Technical solutions are:
–– manual identification by human (reading wagon numbers)
–– automatic local identification (infrared, video and others)
–– Automatic Equipment Identification (AEI) by tags
–– radio control by satellites
Manual solutions are expensive. Local identification by infrared, video or another method is
technically difficult. Technical solutions based on AEI and radio control by satellites are in use in
Europe. Wagons with dangerous goods or valuable freight are routinely equipped. Today most
of the railways use a mixed system of data messages and inspection. That means if trains are
leaving a station, the data messages are sent to the information system. From this information
system, the terminal marshalling yard of the train can download this data. Thanks to that,
cut lists can be generated before the train arrives. When the train arrives, inbound inspection
based on computer generated lists begins. This is necessary to check for changes (wagons
on other positions, wagons added or switched). Every kind of data change (status and location
of wagons) must be fed into computer systems or is a result of a computer program.
North American railways have developed a system, Automatic Equipment Identification (AEI)
that provides a direct connection between each wagon and the information systems. Each freight
wagon and locomotive is equipped with two AEI tags, affixed to the sides of the vehicle. The tag
is a specially created transponder and memory to store basic information about the wagon. In
North America, each wagon is identified by reporting marks (a combination of one to four alpha
characters representing the owner, also known as initials) and a number of one to six digits. Each
locomotive and freight wagon (including containers and highway truck trailers) in North America
has a distinct combination of reporting mark and number. Every piece of equipment is listed in a
database called UMLER (Universal Machine Language Equipment Register).
AEI readers are stationed along the tracks, generally on main lines near terminals and at other
places where train consists may change significantly. The tags are passive and the reader is
active. The reader can work properly at any normal freight train speed, so there is no speed
restriction associated with the process. As each vehicle passes the reader, the reporting
marks and number of each are accumulated into a list that is sent to the information system
that handles wagon movements. That system can associate its own internal destination and

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 12.3 Control of Marshalling Yards

blocking information with UMLER basic wagon data and produce accurate train lists that may
be used by yards and terminals for planning, train information queries, and electronic transfer
to computers handling hump yard automation, and to connecting railroads through a process
called Electronic Data Interchange (EDI).
AEI readers are generally located along the main tracks just after a train leaves a terminal,
where the accuracy of the train list generated by the yard computers may be checked, and
on the approach to terminals, to detect changes in consist since the train left the last terminal
(e. g. industry work, setting out defective wagons, picking up repaired wagons).
Not all systems use all kinds of sensors. The use of sensors is part of a construction concept
of every marshalling yard control system.

12.3.6 Track Clear Detection

The purpose of track clear detection in marshalling yards is to prove that a moveable track
element is clear of rail vehicles before being switched. Technical solutions to do it can be:
–– track circuits
–– infrared scanner
–– radar scanner
–– axle counter (induction loops)
Technical details of track clear detection are described in chapter 5.

12.3.7 Flange Lubricating Devices

Noise pollution nowadays is an unaccepted problem in railway operation and also in marshalling
yards. This problem is especially generated in track curves with low radius and in the braking
process. To achieve reduction of noise pollution the wheels can be lubricated. But there are
special lubrication materials and technologies needed to keep the brake function, preserve
wheels and reduce noise pollution (ELPA 2019). Technical solutions to solve these problems are
now available and in operation (examples see in Vienna and Nuremberg marshalling yard).

12.3.8 Yard Management Systems

12.3.8.1 Framework Conditions

Yard management systems control marshalling yards at high levels of automation. The heart of
these systems is computers and their specially developed software solutions. These systems
must be able to be adapted to various user demands like
–– construction forms of marshalling yards,
–– shunting qualities,
–– retarding concepts and
–– kinds of sensors and detectors.
Most of the known systems use the same principles. Differences exist in technical details,
flexibility in use and level of automation.
To control the work flow in marshalling yards, a huge volume of necessary information
must be processed in very short time precisely and reliably. The basis for control is the

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12 Safety and Control of Shunting and Marshalling

measurement values of the sensors as well as other relevant data received via data links
(e. g. preregistration data of running trains). Such control systems are integral components of
modern hump interlocking systems for gravity shunting. The essential task is the purposeful
influencing of the wagon cuts run from the hump into the sorting tracks. The following tasks
are to be undertaken:
–– the journey control for running off wagons
–– the tracking and tracing of the journey of the wagons across the whole yard
–– the control of the hump locomotives
–– the speed regulation of the wagon cuts
A description and demarcation of the yard management systems is difficult because
internationally very different products are in use. The variability results from
–– technological,
–– economic and
–– operational basic conditions.
Technological basic conditions are:
–– operational programs to be used (and with it brake programs)
–– specific technical requirements (e. g. climate suitability)
–– adaptation to available technical facilities and vehicles (yards, rail brake technology, vehicle
couplings etc.)
–– national and international standards, legal regulations etc.
Economic basic conditions can be:
–– economic characteristics of the respective railway company (e. g. available means for
investments, demanded return on investment of used means)
–– calculated useful life duration and efficiency of the whole yard
Operational basic conditions are:
–– operational standards/rules
–– operational concepts (e. g. production procedure)

12.3.8.2 Structure
In general yard management systems can be arranged from the following components:
–– the control system itself (hump process control system)
–– diagnosis systems
–– management information systems
Not all subsystems (beside the control system) are always part of a yard management
system. Besides, the names of the manufacturers differ for the systems and their
subsystems.
The Control System, which is actually an electronic interlocking with extensive automation
functions, serves for the optimum control of the hump process. Problems are
–– the protection of every wagon cut against the following and advance-running wagons,
–– the prevention of points moving under vehicles,
–– the possibility of bringing the wagons to an easy to couple position in the planned sorting
track and
–– to enable a very high performance.
Additional functions are often control of automatic hump locomotives, handling systems
and retarders.

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 12.3 Control of Marshalling Yards

The control systems often are complemented by Diagnostic Systems. With their help, the
following can be supervised:
–– infrastructure elements (points, signals)
–– shunting-technical facilities (retarders, handling systems, brake test facilities)
–– hump locomotives
–– information and communication systems
This supervision serves to guarantee operational safety. However, it can also be used for a
purposeful servicing and care of the concerning components to avoid technically caused
disturbances or possibly even failures.
Management Information Systems utilise information of the control and diagnosis systems.
They do not intervene actively into the cut process. Nevertheless, they also support the work
flow by the supply of information. The following belong to the possible tasks:
–– long-term planning and forecasting of future situations
–– handling of inbound trains (takeover of train data of the inbound trains from offshore
operating locations, data capture of inbound trains, generation of cut lists and their
transference to the control system)
–– handling of outbound trains (supply of documents for the train formation and the departure
operation of trains e. g. brake test, train accompanying documents, handed over by train data
of the outbound trains to the following operating locations and if necessary to the customers)
–– optimising and monitoring of all yard operation
–– operations management
–– personal deployment
–– production of compressed management information about the achievement assessment
(statistical evaluations)

12.3.8.3 Systems Developed in Europe

One of the systems with a high number of installations especially in Western Europe, is the
MSR 32 Microcomputer System of Siemens. Installations outside Western Europe are in Latvia
and Russian Federation (Nasonov et al. 2018). MSR 32 allows the integration of a complete
range of applications for the automation of marshalling yard. The system is scalable and modular.
The technical system consists of (see figure 12.14):
–– hump microprocessor,
–– sensors such as:
• low-cost wheel detectors for track clear detection and approach control,
• Doppler radar devices for speed and length measurement,
• Light grids (light curtains) for detection of wagon cuts and the space between,
• bending torque evaluation directly at the rail for weight measurement,
• weather data capture (wind, temperature, humidity),
–– point machines for different throwing times,
–– control of various retarders and of handling systems and
–– a lot of other features (e. g. interface to planning systems via LAN bridge, other interface
options, lightning and overvoltage protection, connection to radio clock).
For low performance demands the MSR 32 EOW Control System is available (compare chapter
9.4.10). This system can be used to control decentralised and centralised electric points. MSR 32
EOW also can be used in connection with MSR 32. In this case control of arrival yard and departure
yard is done by MSR 32 EOW and classification yard by MSR 32 (Fischer/Saremba 2001).

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12 Safety and Control of Shunting and Marshalling

Figure 12.14: MSR 32 – System architecture (graphic: Siemens)

In Europe a complete Automatic Equipment Identification (chapter 12.3.5; like the North
American system) is not in use. To get train and wagon information of arriving trains, data
messages and inbound inspections can be used. Additional information systems can support
the process of inbound inspections and generating of wagon data, e. g. the Automatic
Composition Checking System for Freight Transport (ARKOS) can be integrated in MSR 32
systems.
Another system for marshalling yard automation is installed in Scandinavia. It is called Alister
Cargo, a product of former Funkwerk today to Scheidt & Bachmann (Bahr 2015). This
electronic control system for marshalling yards is completely based on standard industrial
control components as PLC’s (Programmable Logic Controllers).
In former Czechoslovakia, a system for marshalling yard automation called KOMPAS was
developed. It is a product of AŽD Praha. It is a modular system. It is possible to apply it in
five different modes, according to capacity and size of marshalling yard. Typical difference
from other systems is the usage only of clasp retarders. In classification tracks three stages
of target brakes and one stage of holding brakes are used, for more details see (Hajek 2006).
Further development based on KOMPAS is realised by První signální. Name of the system is
MODEST MARSHAL, for more details see (Zářecký 2008).
Poland's own system ASR was developed by ZWUS Katowice. It was installed in several
marshalling yards in the 1980s. Nowadays, several companies are active in this field in Poland –
e. g. voestalpine SIGNALING Sopot with SARPO and TENSAN system and RAMATECH-INSTAL
company with PSR-1 system. The GE system (from the US) has already been installed in several
marshalling yards in former Yugoslavia in the 1970s.

12.3.8.4 Systems Developed in Former Soviet Union and Russia

In Russia the first version of the yard management system called KGM was developed in the
Rostov Institute of Railway Transport Engineers in 1983 and put into operation at Krasnyj Liman
marshalling yard. During the next few years, the complex was constantly being improved. Its
modifications were put into operation at more than 30 marshalling yards of Russia and CIS
countries. The structure of the latest version of the system is given in figure 12.15.
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 12.3 Control of Marshalling Yards

List of abbreviations

ACS – automated control system

AS DWH – application server and data ware house
ASR-TBS – automatic speed regulating with target braking subsystem
CCC – control computer complex
CCC HYT – control computer complex of hump yard top
CD CCC – check-diagnostic control computer complex
DBS – database server
DC – data converter
DN – data network of Open Joint-stock Company ‘Russian Railways’
HARCS – hump automatic radio cab signalling
HAI – hump automatic interlocking
HYT – hump yard top apparatus
IACS – integrated automated control system
IAS – information-analytical subsystem
LCN – local computer networks
LCN G – LCN’s gateway
LCN S – LCN’s switch
NP – network printer
PCA – points control apparatus
(R) – (reserve)
RLSD – radio-locating speed detectors
RCA – retarders control apparatus
RSFC – radiometric sensors for freeness checking of measuring sections
RSS – radiotechnical speed sensors
SMHE – subsystem for maintenance of hump equipment
TC – technological computer
TOCA – track occupancy control apparatus
TW – tensometric weighers
VCP – multiple-access visual control panel
WS – workstation
WS ED – WS of electrician on duty
WS’s HOS – WS’s of hump operation staff
WS HPD – WS of hump person on duty
WS RC – WS for remote checking

Figure 12.15: Control system for marshalling yard in Russia (RFNIIAS 2017)

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12 Safety and Control of Shunting and Marshalling

Figure 12.16: Profile of the upgrade speed control system Shenzhen (Xu Zhengli 2003)

The systems consist of all components of modern yard management and are designed for the
national rules and conditions (e. g. gradient, retarders, retarder control procedures and climatic
situation) of Russia. The system also provides for the data transmission to the Open Joint-
stock Company ‘Russian Railways’ through the data transmission network channels and the
dispatchers’ access to the branch automated control system of signalling division. For more
information see (Ivančenko et al. 2002, RFNIIAS 2017, UGPA 2017).

12.3.8.5 Systems in China

The China TDJ System Research Centre in Harbin created various applications of speed control
systems in marshalling yards based on piston retarders. Chinese marshalling yards are
equipped with this solution. The realised retarding concepts are qualified continuous speed control
methods. A special profile (see figure 12.16) and the integration of boosters are interesting parts
of this application. The ‘TDJ’ Boosters can accelerate wagons, if necessary. They are powered by
compressed air, separately controllable and may be combined with piston retarders (12.3.2.1). The
construction of boosters is similar to the piston retarders. A piston can be pressed out of a cylinder
by compressed air to give an impulse to a wheel after passing the booster.
The design for this system (called upgrade speed system) allows humping speed of
v0 = 6 km/h. The average coupling speed is 4.27 km/h and the coupling rate reaches 100 %.
In Chinese middle and small sized marshalling yards controllable retarders are the major speed
control equipment. In these applications boosters are not integrated. In Nancha marshalling
yard, an example of this kind of applications, 4610 TDJ control retarders are applied. The
piston retarders are installed in switching and tangent area of classification yard consisting of
16 tracks (Xu Zhengli 2003).
There are several installations of TDJ system in the US and Poland (for example Lazy
marshalling yard).

12.3.8.6 Systems in North America

In North America several systems are in use. Systems like Trainyard Tech, PROYARD III and
STAR NX support a wide range of demands. Differences to other systems are:
–– the automatic identification of wagons by tags (no more by wagon numbers) and
–– wireless yard control (e. g. STAR NX- System).
For more information on North American yard management systems see (Judge 2007).
To get more flexibility and scalability in automatization and control, new systems like
the Modular Yard Automation system (MYA) developed by Vossloh North America are
available. MYA makes it possible to implement scalable automated solutions to increase
safety, productivity, and efficiency. These rail yard applications offer a flexible communication
solution, providing wired or wireless controls. Control is possible from a centralized location
or from decentralized locations.

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 13.1 Requirements and Basic Classification

13 Level Crossings
Gregor Theeg, Dmitrij Shvalov, Eric Schöne

13.1 Requirements and Basic Classification

On level crossings between rail and road, the partly contradictory characteristics of both
transport systems meet (table 13.1). As a result, safety problems arise. The high kinetic
energy of a train and the impossibility of stopping on sight when seeing an obstacle meets
the relatively low safety discipline of road traffic. Accidents at level crossings typically cause
around one third of all fatalities in railway operation accidents. The vast majority are caused
by the inappropriate behaviour of road users. However, in relation to the total number of road
accidents, accidents on level crossings represent only a low percentage of the total (less than
1 %). Due to the high kinetic energy on railways, the average severity of an accident on a level
crossing, measured in killed and injured persons and damage to equipment, is much higher
than in other types of road accidents. It is mainly road users, but railway passengers and staff
are also endangered. Further dangers arise when dangerous goods are involved.

Criterion Rail Road

mass of vehicles high relatively low
acceleration and deceleration rates low relatively high
stopping distance long short
spacing method signalled (fixed block) on sight
driving style controlled individual

Table 13.1: Characteristics of rail and road traffic

To increase safety, many countries follow a strategy of closing level crossings and replacing
them with costly grade separation solutions on two levels (chapter 13.5). Nevertheless, a large
number of level crossings remain and that is likely to be the situation for the foreseeable future.
A result of the comparison of stopping distances of road and rail traffic is to give priority to rail
traffic, which should not be obstructed by the level crossing in normal operation. Therefore,
the road user must be warned about an approaching train and be able to stop at the level
crossing. This warning can be done either by direct optical or acoustical perception of the
train, or by special signals installed at the level crossing. If stopping is impossible because the
road user is already closer to the level crossing than his stopping distance, or he is already on
the level crossing, he must be able to pass over the level crossing completely without conflict.
Road users should always have the ability to escape from the area of conflict, which is that
area used in common by both rail and road traffic. If this is not possible, supervision to ensure
that the area of conflict is clear is obligatory in many, but not in all countries (chapter 13.4.4.4).
The installations must work safely, which means that in case of failure they have to be fail-
safe. To maintain operation in failure cases, solutions for degraded mode operation need to be
provided (chapter 13.4.5).
Last, but not least, neither rail nor road traffic should be obstructed more than necessary. Long
obstruction times for road traffic can even become safety critical, especially if road junctions are
obstructed, and as the discipline of road users decreases. On the other hand, the obstruction of
rail traffic impairs the capacity of the line and makes timetable operation more difficult.

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13 Level Crossings

A basic classification of level crossings by the ERA (European Union Agency for Railways)
is as follows:
–– Passive level crossings: These always appear to the road user in the same way,
irrespective of whether or not there is a train approaching. Therefore, the road user has to
look for trains himself.
–– Active level crossings: These indicate to the road user whether a train is approaching
or not.

13.2 Static Roadside Signs

The purpose of static roadside signs is to make the presence of a level crossing clearly
visible to road users and to attract their attention. The roadside signalling is mainly regulated
by the highway authorities of the country concerned. Although general road signs are widely
harmonised internationally, in the particular case of level crossings the situation is different. In
spite of some similarities, in each country the level crossing appears differently to the road user
and the rules for using the level crossing differ even more.
In some countries there is a general speed restriction on level crossings or even the general
obligation to stop on reaching them. In others there are no such restrictions, or the road user is
just obliged to slow down appropriately.
The most widely used sign to indicate the presence of a level crossing to road users is the
distinctive St. Andrew's cross. This strengthens its importance to give absolute priority to
rail traffic. In some countries, all level crossings are equipped with the St. Andrew's cross; in
others only those without barriers (Hahn 2006).
In all cases, the St. Andrew's cross obliges road users to give absolute priority to rail traffic
and forbids stopping on the level crossing. Besides, the St. Andrew’s cross marks the proper
(safe) stopping place in case the exit from the level crossing is obstructed. Often private roads,
footpaths, field paths and forest tracks do not have St. Andrew’s crosses, but the regulations
give absolute priority to rail traffic at these level crossings as well.
A basis for international standardisation of the St. Andrew’s cross was given by the Vienna
Convention on Road Signs and Signals in 1968. However, the design varies between
countries regarding its exact form, colour, use of text and degree of duplication (Hahn 2006)
(figure 13.1):
–– In most countries, a profiled St. Andrew's cross is obligatory to enable perception even
in unfavourable weather conditions (snow etc.). Only a minority of countries use the St.
Andrew's cross painted on a rectangular board.
–– In many European countries, a distinction is made by the number of tracks to be crossed
by the road user. In these countries, the St. Andrew's cross with two or more tracks to be
crossed is doubled. In other countries (e. g. USA), the number of tracks to be crossed is
stated by an additional number below the St. Andrew's cross.
–– In all European countries, but also others such as Canada, the St. Andrew's cross is
painted in colour, with red as one and white or yellow as the other colour, but without text.
In other countries such as the USA, Mexico, Australia, China and Saudi Arabia, the words
‘RAILROAD CROSSING’ (in the respective language) appear in black text on a single colour
(usually white) background.
–– The geometrical shape of the St. Andrew's cross is rectangular (most countries outside
Europe), with right and left acute angles (most European countries) or with upper and lower
acute angles (e. g. Germany).

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 13.3 Passive Level Crossings

Figure 13.1: Forms of St. Andrew's cross on level crossings (not to scale)

In addition to the St. Andrew's cross, in many cases other signals such as text boards are
installed immediately in front of the level crossing to warn the road users and give instructions.
In many countries, warnings of the approach to level crossings are given by road signs a few
hundred metres (usually 50 to 250 m, depending on local situation) in advance to give the road
user the time to prepare. In some cases, these signs distinguish between active and passive
level crossings or between level crossings with and without barriers. A frequently used form
is a triangular road sign with red rim and a steam locomotive or a modern train inside. In the
USA, it is a circular sign with a black rim and a black X inside. Frequently the distance between
the warning sign and the level crossing is measured by countdown markers with three stripes,
two and then one. An example is given in figure 13.2.
Besides road signs, the warning of level crossings is often supported by pavement design.

Figure 13.2: Road side warning signs and countdown markers (Sweden as example)

13.3 Passive Level Crossings

In passive level crossings, the road user is responsible for observing the railway line and
recognising an approaching train directly. The most important measure to ensure the
perception of the train is to keep the approach sight triangle clear of obstacles. The approach
sight triangle is formed as follows, primarily described for the case that the road user is
allowed to pass a clear level crossing without stopping or slowing down:
As described in chapter 13.1, the road user, when arriving at the permitted speed, must be
able to stop at the level crossing when recognising an approaching train. Or, if stopping is not
possible because he is already within the stopping distance from the level crossing, he must
be able to pass over the level crossing safely. The necessary sighting point A (figure 13.3) is
the latest point where the road user must decide whether to stop in front of or to pass over
the level crossing. It is determined by the stopping distance of the road user, which varies with
the initial speed, the braking deceleration and the reaction time of the driver and the vehicle.

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13 Level Crossings

The necessary sighting distance from the sighting point A to the stopping point, which is
usually at the St. Andrew's cross, can be calculated as follows:
lA = tr · v v + lb

and the complete clearing length as follows:

lC = tr · v v + lb + llclx + lv
with:
lb: braking distance of the road vehicle (speed-dependent)
llx: length from the stop position to the end of the area of conflict of the level crossing
lv: length of the road vehicle
tr: reaction time of driver and vehicle
vv: speed of the road vehicle
Accordingly, the clearing time can be calculated as follows:

lb + llclx + lv
t C = tr +
vv
The minimum approach time to avoid conflict is:

ta = tC + S
with:
S: safety margin [s]
The approach distance lB of the train is therefore as follows:
⎛ l +l +l ⎞
lB = v t ⋅ t a = v t ⋅ ⎜ tr + b lclx v + S⎟
with: ⎝ vv ⎠
vt: speed of the train
Typical value ranges of variables are shown in table 13.2.

Variable Typical value range

lb 5 to 100 m (depending on vehicle speed and brake deceleration)
llx 5 to 20 m (depending on number of tracks and crossing angle)
lv up to 25 m (depending on national upper limit for vehicle length)
tr 1 to 3 s
vv 1 to 30 m/s (depending on general or local speed restriction)
S 2 to 5 s

Table 13.2: Value ranges of variables

In some national cases or where special regulations apply, stopping is obligatory even if no
train is approaching. In this case, tr and lb can be set at zero, which means that the sighting
point A is the stopping point (the position of the St. Andrew’s cross). In this case the clearing
time tc must be higher because the acceleration of the road vehicle (starting up) must be
considered. Therefore the approach distance lB can also be longer.
For a real level crossing, particularly where stopping in front of the level crossing is not
mandatory if no train is approaching, the differing speeds of road users have to be considered:

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 13.3 Passive Level Crossings

Figure 13.3: Approach sight triangle

Whereas the sighting distance lA increases with increasing speed of the road user, for the approach
distance lB the situation is more complex. Faster road users need longer stopping distances and
therefore longer time for the braking process, but pass over the level crossing itself faster. In practice,
depending on the choice of the parameters, a function similar to that in figure 13.4 appears. From
this diagram and from testing with different parameters, the following can be concluded:
–– Among different kinds of road vehicles, the longest permitted vehicles are relevant.
–– For speeds higher than approximately 30 or 40 km/h, the required approach distance changes
only slightly, whereas it changes sharply for low speeds. Therefore, among road vehicles, the
slowest are usually those with the longest required approach distance on the rail side.
–– Pedestrians, although usually being the slowest road users, are not relevant for this
calculation in most cases thanks to their low ‘vehicle length’. However, they can become
relevant in special situations such as extreme lengths of the area of conflict, which can be
either much more than a double line to be crossed or a crossing at a very acute angle. They
can also be an important factor if volumes are unusually high, as can happen in town centres.

Figure 13.4: Connection between speed of the road user and required approach distance of the train
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13 Level Crossings

Therefore, for planning of the approach sight triangles of a level crossing, the longest
permitted road vehicle has to be assumed, with speed from the minimum assumable
(usually around 10 km/h) up to the permitted speed of the road, and the required approach
sight triangles to be added (figure 13.5). With very long areas of conflict, pedestrians also
have to be taken into consideration. They can be assumed without braking distance,
therefore observing the level crossing short distance from the St. Andrew's cross.

Figure 13.5: Addition of approach sight triangles

By reducing the permitted speed on the road or on the railway (figure 13.6) or even obliging
the road user to stop at the level crossing, the requirements according to the size of the
approach sight triangle can be reduced. This has the disadvantage of the extension of travel
times and the reduction of capacity of the affected transport system. Generally, the possibilities
of speed restriction are used as follows (example of figure 13.5 with deciding points A1/B1 for
the slowest road vehicle and A5/B5 for the fastest road vehicle):
–– When sight obstructions occur in triangle 0 – A5 – B5, it is necessary to limit the speed of
road traffic.
–– When sight obstructions occur in triangle 0 – A1 – B1, it is necessary to limit the speed of
rail traffic.
–– When sight obstructions occur in intersection between triangles 0 – A5 – B5 and 0 – A1 – B1,
both speeds have to be limited.
Additionally, in most countries road users are warned by audible signals given by the train
at defined locations in the approach to the level crossing. In some countries it is permitted
to warn road users only by audible signals without any visibility of the train, but only at
level crossings with low road traffic levels. This type of passive level crossing protection is
problematic from the safety point of view, because sound insulation of modern road vehicles
is absorbing the warning signal and also hearing-impared road users are not able to detect it.
Audible signals are also unpopular with nearby residents, particularly at night.

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 13.4 Active Level Crossings

To increase safety particularly for pedestrians and cyclists, special fences are often applied to
force persons to look in both directions and to reduce speed (figure 13.7).

Figure 13.6: Speed restrictions for rail and road traffic on level crossings

Figure 13.7: Pedestrian fences at passive level crossings (photo: DB AG/Stefan Klink)

13.4 Active Level Crossings

13.4.1 Overview

Active level crossings include all those which give different indications to the road user
depending on the approach of a train. This includes technical safeguarding with light signals,
barriers and others as well as manual safeguarding by hand signals of a level crossing post.
The following explanations concentrate mainly on technically safeguarded level crossings,
but many are also applicable to level crossings safeguarded by a person. Technically
safeguarded level crossings can be distinguished by multiple criteria. Some of them are:
–– the form of roadside safeguarding (e. g. light signal only, half barriers, full closure) (chapter 13.4.2)
–– the procedures of activation and deactivation (chapter 13.4.3)
–– the form of supervision (chapter 13.4.4)

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13 Level Crossings

13.4.2 Dynamic Roadside Safeguarding

13.4.2.1 Overview
In contrast to passive level crossing protection described in 13.3, the dynamic roadside
safeguarding of active level crossings gives signals to the road users or blocks the level
crossing mechanically depending on the approach of trains and the status of the level
crossing. Besides closing a crossing by the hand signals of a person, different technical
solutions (in different combinations) can be applied additionally or alternatively. There is a large
variety among the countries in the details of roadside signalling, which makes the orientation of
car drivers in another country often difficult. The most common devices are (figure 13.8):
–– Light signals (13.4.2.2) differ between the countries. They can have the form of a
steady red light, a red flashing light, two alternately flashing red lights or others, in some
countries also including yellow lights, for signalling Stop to the road user. The lamps are
usually placed inside, above or below the St. Andrew's cross.
–– Mechanical closure of the road. The most common solutions are half barriers and
full closure (either by full barriers or by two pairs of half barriers) (13.4.2.3). In some
countries also other mechanical obstacles such as road blockers which can be sunk
in the road are applied (13.4.2.4). Historically in Britain, when train speed was low,
swinging gates were applied to block alternately the road or the railway.
–– Additional audible signals, either given wayside or by the train. Wayside audible signals
can be giving either during the closing of the barriers or continuously until the train arrives.
–– A person who blocks the level crossing by defined hand signals, which are mainly
applied as a temporary solution or a supplement to technical warning devices.
An important issue for roadside signalling is the warning time. The warning time is defined as
the time from the appearance of the first signal which obliges the road user to stop until the train
reaches the level crossing. The warning time depends on the technical solution for activation,
proving and deactivation the level crossing. It must not be too long, as, besides obstructing the road
traffic, increased warning time reduces the discipline of the road users and therefore the safety. On
the other hand, train speeds will vary,
and the system has to cope with both
faster and slower trains. Approaches for
calculation are stated in chapter 13.4.4.5.
In most modern systems the optical
and audible signals are switched on a
defined time before starting to lower
the barrier arms to give road users
who are closer than stopping distance
to the level crossing the ability to
pass without being obstructed by the
barriers, see chapter 13.4.3.3.
The main advantage of full closure
over half barriers is that the discipline of
the road users is higher, as the entry of
vehicles by driving around the barriers
is completely prevented. On the other
hand, in installations with full closure
Figure 13.8: Example of a level crossing (Germany) the road user can be trapped. To avoid
(photo: DB AG/Christian Bedeschinski) this, there is usually a time gap between

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 13.4 Active Level Crossings

lowering the barrier arms on the entrance and on the exit side if the full closure is realised by two
barriers in both directions. Full closure also increases the necessity of a kind of supervision such as
closed circuit television in the area of conflict (chapter 13.4.4.4).
In some countries, level crossings can also indicate other signals than simple ‘Stop’ to the
road user: Some possibilities are:
–– A pre-indication comparable with the yellow signal at road traffic lights to indicate that red
will soon appear.
–– An active indication for the passable status and the proper working of the level crossing
(e. g. white light). If this active free signal is not alight, the road user has to behave as if on
a passive level crossing. This can cause problems if only some level crossings are thus
equipped in any given country.
–– An additional signal to specifically indicate a second train on a double line, after the first
train has passed (often used at active level crossings without barriers). The purpose is to
solve the additional problem of discipline with road users passing the level crossing after the
first train has left it, ignoring the possibility of a second train approaching immediately after.
The choice of one or other kind of roadside safeguarding depends on different factors, which
are variable from one country to the other. Such factors are mostly defined out based on
legislative rules. Typical criteria are:
–– type of road users (pedestrians, vehicles)
–– volume of rail and road traffic
–– speed of rail and road traffic
–– local requirements
In the interest of efficient allocation of resources, it is recommended to complement these rules
with quantitative or semi-quantitative approach as described by (Schöne 2013).
Figure 13.9 presents a Russian example of the allocation of equipment for a level crossing. In
figure 13.9 the following equipment is shown:
–– level crossing light signals with automatic barriers (A, B)
–– devices for blocking of level crossing (automatic road blockers) (AB1-AB4)
–– control units for level crossings and automatic road blockers placed into relay boxes or
transportable modules
–– battery box with a number of accumulators placed inside (BB)
–– devices for train detection, in this case track circuit equipment (TC)
–– supervision light signals for train driver (C1, C2)
–– barrier keeper’s lodge (KL)

Figure 13.9: Equipment plan of an active level crossing (example)

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13 Level Crossings

13.4.2.2 Road Light Signals

Level crossing light signals are mounted on a signal post. The following equipment is placed
on the signal post, if the level crossing is to be equipped with these items:
–– light signal heads with the required colours, usually red, in some cases also yellow and/or
white
–– signal background(s)
–– audible signal giving devices, e. g. a bell
–– static road signs such as the St. Andrew's cross
–– cable sleeves used for cable termination
Flashing road light signals must have defined lit and unlit times with a defined tolerance which
can differ between countries. For example, in Russia, both times are 0.75 seconds ± 20 %. The
signal optics must provide a defined sighting distance (optical range). In Russia, for example, this
is not less than 100 m on a straight road and not less than 50 m at curved sections of roads.
Light signal heads of two types are used, those with incandescent lamps and those with light-
emitting diodes (LED). With use of incandescent lamps as a signal source, many railways require
safety redundancy, particularly for those
lamps which are used to indicate Stop.
This is usually solved by lamps with
double filaments. In the case of primary
filament failure, the feed circuit switches
to the reserve filament automatically.

13.4.2.3 Barriers
Barriers can be placed in the same
location as level crossing light signals.
When placed in different locations, the
barrier is placed not further from the
railway than the light signal. Several
railways require a clear area between Figure 13.10: Escape way beside level crossing
­(photo: Carsten Weber)
the profile of the train and the barrier
arms as safe area for a possibly
trapped person. Another possibility is
a special escape route beside the level
crossing (figure 13.10).
Figure 13.11 presents an example for
the structure of an automatic barrier
with the following equipment:
–– electric drive placed on foundation
and pedestal
–– barrier arm with counterbalance
Barrier arms can contain warning lights
or retro-reflectors to improve visibility to
road users.
Some systems require the ability of
the barrier arms to be overrun by road
vehicles. This enables the escape Figure 13.11: Structure of barriers and road signals
of vehi­
cles from the space between (example from Czech Republic)

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 13.4 Active Level Crossings

the barriers, even if the barrier was lowered e. g. on the roof of a road vehicle or between a
tractor unit and its trailer. Besides, it reduces the material damage in the case of a road vehicle
colliding with the barrier arm. For this purpose, the barrier arm is fixed rotating with high friction
in carriage with the possibility to turn the barrier arm at right angles (90°) either upwards or to
the side in the case of automobile collision. Providing a predetermined breaking point on the
barrier arm is another possibility to avoid greater damage and dangerous situations.
Some systems also provide a detection of breakage of the barrier arm. For this purpose, a
breakable electrical loop is installed inside each barrier arm.
An electric motor or a hydraulic system controls the lowering and rising of the barrier arm.
For electric motors, AC mono-phase, AC three-phase or DC motors can be used. Usually
these machines are designed that way so that they can be powered by the public electric
supply ­network.
During barrier arm lowering, its potential energy is transformed into kinetic energy. This has
to be compensated in order that the barrier arm is not lowered too fast or even striking the
pavement. A hydraulic shock absorber as constituent of the electric drive is used to guarantee
a uniform rate of lowering and to provide a smooth stop at the end.
Modern types of barriers are equipped with systems which fix and/or supervise the barrier
arm in its extreme position. Special requirements on the bearing of barriers exist if they are
supposed to lower automatically in case of failure or breakdown of power supply.
The barrier arm must usually cover at least half the width of the road on the side of
approaching vehicular traffic. However, when half barriers are used, a certain minimum width
(e. g. 3 metres) of the road on the other side must be clear.

13.4.2.4 Automatic Road Blockers

In addition to light signals and barriers, the countries of the former Soviet Union use road
blockers to prevent the passage of a level crossing by road vehicles. These devices for blocking
of the level crossing consist of four covering lids which are placed in a bed (figure 13.12).

Ultrasonic vehicle detection

Lid

Counterbalance Electric drive Foundation

Figure 13.12: Mechanical road blockers

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13 Level Crossings

With a sunken lid, the road blocker does not obstruct road traffic. Upon the approach of a
train, the lids are raised, thereby preventing road vehicles from entering the level crossing. The
raising and sinking of lids is by electric drives.
Vehicles on the level crossing after the raising of lids are able to leave the level crossing, since
the lid sinks when a vehicle runs over it coming from the railway side and rises again under the
action of counterbalance when the vehicle has left it.
Ultrasonic vehicle detection sensors are used for a presence check of vehicles in lid zones. In
the case of appearance of a vehicle in the check zone of the sensor during the raising of the
lid, the electric drive is turned off and the movement is stopped until the vehicle has cleared
the check zone.
The road blockers, likewise barriers in Russia, are provided with the opportunity of dual control:
automatic control under approach zone occupation by train and manual control by buttons.

13.4.2.5 Safe Usage by the Road User

The regulations for road users whether or not they can rely on the proper working of the
safeguarding differ, and depend on the kind and quality of applied technical solutions. The
following principles can be found:
–– The road user must always check visually if no train is approaching before passing over
the level crossing. This means that signals and barriers are only an overlay system, but do
not ensure safety in itself. This solution was historically widely used, when the reliability
of the technical systems was low, speeds of rail and road traffic as well as the volume
of road traffic were relatively low and it was acceptable to let each road vehicle brake at
the level crossing. A problematic issue in these systems, as generally in safety overlay
systems which work with the view of users, is that the unlit signals and open barriers
tempt road users to rely on them erroneously.
–– The road user can rely on the technical safeguarding systems. This principle is widely used
today as on the one hand speed and traffic volume have increased and on the other hand
highly reliable systems for technical safeguarding are available today. This principle requires
that in cases of technical failure either the road has to be closed safely for road traffic or rail
traffic has to be stopped (chapter 13.4.5).
–– Distinction is made in roadside light signals between a status which guarantees the road
user that the level crossing can be safely crossed and a failure status where the road user
has to check that the railway is clear visually before crossing.

13.4.3 Activation and Deactivation of Level Crossings

13.4.3.1 Definition of Normal Position

Each level crossing has a defined normal position which can be either the open or the closed
status for road traffic. The choice of the one or the other is roughly made upon the criterion if
the volume of road traffic (measured in number of vehicles/pedestrians per unit time) is higher
or lower than rail traffic (measured in number of trains in the same time):
–– Level crossings which are open to road traffic in normal position and closed upon request
by an approaching train are the solution applied most frequently and the following
descriptions concentrate mainly on them.
–– Level crossings which are closed to road traffic in normal position and opened upon
request by a road user if no train is approaching are used in situations with very low road
traffic. A typical example is a private road crossing a railway with relatively high traffic
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 13.4 Active Level Crossings

volume. Such level crossings are avoided, but in some situations they are applied due to
lack of alternatives. This solution can only be used with barriers (full closure).
In both cases, priority is to be given to rail traffic, which means that trains will not be
obstructed at the level crossing unless an error occurs.

13.4.3.2 Basic Methods and Principles of Activation and Deactivation

Regarding the technology of activation and deactivation of the level crossing, the following
types can be distinguished:
–– Staff operated level crossings, which can be:
• manual by muscle power or
• machine operated under control of a person.
–– Automatically operated level crossings, where the operation is initiated automatically by the
approaching/clearing train or by route calling in an interlocking system.
For staff operated level crossings, the operator has to be informed about the train to be
expected. Depending on the situation, he either has to activate the level crossing immediately
upon receiving this information or after a certain time.
For automatic installations, the activation and deactivation is usually initiated by the train
entering or leaving the approach zone. Suitable detectors are different kinds of spot wheel
detectors (chapter 5.2.2), track circuits (chapter 5.2.3.2) and magnetic inductive loops
(chapter 5.2.4.3). To increase the reliability, the detectors are often doubled for redundancy.
In autonomous installations without feedback information to the train driver (chapter 13.4.4.1),
this redundancy is even an issue of safety. In these cases, the evaluation of the detection has
to be done as follows:
–– The level crossing must be activated whenever one of both redundant detectors has
detected an approaching vehicle.
–– The level crossing must only be deactivated if both redundant detectors have detected a
clearing vehicle.
For route dependent level crossings, activation of the level crossing is often not initiated
immediately when requesting the route, but later in the process in order to reduce blocking
time for road traffic. After requesting the route, a proper solution is first to bring all points to
the correct position, prove all other conditions and bring the signal into readiness to clear,
but to activate the level crossing and clear the signal later when the train reaches a special
approach point.

13.4.3.3 Algorithm of Activation and Deactivation

Figure 13.13 presents a Russian example of an algorithm of activation and deactivation of a
level crossing equipped with light signals, with white lights for the open position, automatic
barriers and automatic road blockers (13.4.2).
In normal state, when the approach zone is free from rail vehicles (figure 13.13, a), the
signalling equipment is in the following state: light signals unlit (white lights flash), barrier
arms in the up position.
The level crossing begins to activate at that time when the train is detected at a defined
distance from the level crossing. That distance named ‘effective length of approach zone’ or
‘approach distance’ must suffice so that
1. a road user who is too close to the level crossing for stopping will have enough time to
vacate the area of conflict of the level crossing before the train arrives, and

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13 Level Crossings

Figure 13.13: Algorithm of level crossing operation (Russian example)

2. depending on the kind of supervision, the train can be stopped in case the level crossing
fails to activate.
The calculation of the approach distance is described in chapter 13.4.4.5.
Upon approach zone occupation by the train (figure 13.13, b), light signals indicate ‘Stop!’
towards the road. At a defined time after that, the barrier arms begin to lower into the horizontal
position. This time is different in each country and depends on the properties of road traffic.
After the lowering of the barrier arms is complete, the automatic road blockers (if existing) rise
into the up position. The level crossing is now closed to road traffic and remains so during the
train movements which occupy its area (figure 13.13, c).
After clearing by the train (figure 13.13, d), first the automatic road blockers sink to their normal
position. Then barrier arms rise to up position and light signals switch off. The order of these
two actions differs: In some countries the lights switch off upon the barrier arms reaching the
up position, whereas in other countries they switch off together with the barrier arms starting
to rise. If white lights are used to indicate the deactivated position, they are switched on in the

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 13.4 Active Level Crossings

same moment or after the train has moved away from the level crossing for a specified distance
(e. g. 150 metres in Russia on open lines) to prevent dangerous situations caused by rolling back
of rail vehicles onto the level crossing. In some cases with more than one track to be crossed,
the deactivation of the level crossing is suppressed if a train is expected soon on another track.
This prevents extremely short open times, but it can also result in very long road closures due
to a third train approaching on the original track, for instance. This is a real problem on busy
suburban lines, for example.

13.4.3.4 Treatment of Scheduled Stops and Different Train Speeds

Where trains have a scheduled platform
stop in the approach to the level
crossing, which often occurs on
secondary lines, a suitable solution is
that train staff, when ready to depart,
initiate the activation of the level
crossing. This can be done by buttons to
be pushed on the platform or by special
radio transmitting devices to be operated
by the train driver (figure 13.14). In the
USA, motion sensors are used to detect
when a train starts moving from a stop,
and to activate the level crossing then.
On many secondary lines which are used
by one category of passenger trains only,
this can be solved rather easily. Either
there is a platform stopping point in the
approach to the level crossing or not.
Difficulties occur where some trains have
a scheduled stop at a platform in the
approach to the level crossing and others
do not. In unfavourable cases, automatically
closing the barriers before the train reaches Figure 13.14: Wayside infrared detector for activating
the platform would mean that passengers the level crossing by the train driver (on top of left
cannot get on their train which stands at post) with button for auxiliary operation below
the platform. Also, different speeds of trains
cause difficulties on lines with mixed traffic. The initiation point for activating the level crossing
would have to be adjusted to the fastest train, which means unnecessarily long waiting time for
road users in the case of slower trains.
A solution is to set the initiation point by train categories or to calculate it for each
individual train. This requires reliable information about the category or speed of an
approaching train. This distinction can either be made by local staff, train staff, or
automatically. An example of an automatic solution can be found in Sweden, where
normal activation positions are adjusted to a speed of 160 km/h, whereas for high speed
trains on the same line advanced activation applies, initiated by radio signals sent by
the train (Hagelin/Strindh 1997). With automatic train routeing systems and if these are
sufficiently safe, the train category can be used to distinguish the initiation points for level
crossings by train category. Even stopping and non stopping trains can be distinguished
automatically (Akuzawa 1982).

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13 Level Crossings

13.4.3.5 Power Supply

Although level crossings inside or near interlocking areas are usually supplied with power
together with the interlocking, most level crossings on the open line need autonomous power
supply. The high availability of power supply is very important, so most railways require
redundancy with two independent power sources − basic and reserve. Commonly as basic
sources high-voltage lines are used. As reserve power supply accumulator batteries are often
used. The battery system must be able to sustain the level crossing in operation for some
hours and to reload automatically when basic power supply is again available.

13.4.4 Supervision of Level Crossings

13.4.4.1 Basic Supervision Types

For many years, no feedback information about the closure of the barriers was usually given before
permitting the train movement. Thus safety depended on the correct and punctual actions of the
barrier keeper after being informed about the approaching train. This was a widely applied solution
until after World War II even in highly developed countries. With the increasing speed of trains and
road vehicles, this low level of safety resulted in a high number of accidents.
Therefore, the development of safer methods was urgently necessary. The first form of feedback
information was given in regulations saying that a signal for a train must not be cleared before all
level crossings until the next signal had been proved to be protected by the signaller or reported
from barrier keepers to the signaller. First, this method was applied for level crossings in station
areas, later also on the open line. Especially in long block sections, this solution resulted in
extremely long waiting times for road users.
Much later than moveable track elements and the clear status of tracks, level crossings were
brought into technical dependence with signals, which means that the signal can technically only
be cleared if the level crossing is protected.
For technically supervised level crossings, two basic categories, with certain variations, can be
found in almost all countries (figure 13.15):
–– Route-dependent level crossings are included in a route in an interlocking area. The main
signal can only be cleared if the level crossing is protected, after being activated by route
request or later by the approaching train (chapter 13.4.3.2).
–– Autonomous level crossings are supervised independently from the routes (but can also be
geographically located in interlocking areas).
Route-dependent level crossings are usually applied in situations where a main signal is
immediately in rear of the level crossing. This refers to level crossings which are situated in
or near station and junction areas, but also level crossings on the open line in proximity to
block signals. Autonomous level crossings predominate in all other cases. As lines with high
density of rail traffic and with short block sections usually do not have many level crossings,
autonomous level crossings are the most frequent case on the open line. Depending on the
local situation, some level crossings are supervised autonomously from one direction, but
route-dependently from the other direction.
Most autonomous level crossings indicate the protected status to the train driver by level crossing
supervision signals. Recently, some railways have introduced systems which, by redundancy,
are so highly reliable in closing the road that no supervision signals are required. As technical
problems are not revealed directly to the driver or a local person, these level crossings have to
be supervised remotely, usually from a signal box. If the diagnostic system detects an error which

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 13.4 Active Level Crossings

reduces safety (e. g. failure of one barrier arm), trains have to be stopped at the next main signal in
rear. Nevertheless a slight risk remains in that a train passes an unsafe level crossing in the (very
improbable) case of system failure. The main advantage of these systems is that the blocking time
of the road is minimised, as the level crossing has to be protected when the train reaches the level
crossing, not in the stopping distance before.
Combining this type of level crossing with different initiation points determined by train category
(13.4.4) causes additional difficulties, as the order in which the trains approach the crossing
becomes safety critical.
Few years ago a type of supervision was established, which combines the principle of remote
supervision with the principle of supervision signals. Here the supervision signals (situated in
stopping distance) do not indicate the activated status of level crossing but only the ability of
activation. If safety critical error occurs, the train is indicated to stop before level crossing. The
main advantage of this combination is that no signal box is needed for remote supervision,
what is a typical problem of centralisation.

Figure 13.15: Classification of active level crossings by the kind of supervision

13.4.4.2 Safety Criteria

Generally, signal lamps, barriers and other technical means can be supervised in their
functions. The railways differ as to what extent partial failure of the safety equipment, e. g.
the red lights lit, but the barriers open, can be tolerated and the level crossing can still be
considered as passable safely by the train. In the same sense, as activating a level crossing
especially with barriers is a process of some seconds in duration, the arrangements when a
level crossing is regarded as protected and the railway signals can be cleared differ between
countries. This is related to the closure time for road traffic, so the solutions found between
safety requirements and a desirable short closure time differ. Possible criteria for a level
crossing to be considered as ‘protected’ are:
–– The level crossing is considered as protected when all existing signals which indicate the
activated status are lit and all existing barriers are completely closed.
–– The level crossing is considered as protected when at least parts of the signals and barriers
are in activated position. This means that, for example, the level crossing can be regarded
as protected when the light signals are lit, but the barriers have not yet started to close, or
when the barrier arms have started but not completed the closing process. In such cases,
the level crossing can even be regarded as protected in cases of partial technical failure,
e. g. of the barriers.

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13 Level Crossings

–– The level crossing is considered as protected if it has the ability to activate. Using this
criterion minimises the blocking time for road traffic, but the system must be highly
reliable in activation to ensure safety, which is usually solved by redundancy. Here, in case
of detection of a road user on the level crossing, stopping the train in time is not possible.
This principle is used in modern systems without supervision signals (chapter 13.4.4.1).
In case of failure of the level crossing to close, some railways (particularly in Central and
Eastern Europe) distinguish between two types of failure, depending on the grade of
disturbance of roadside safety:
–– Major failure: The train must pass the level crossing only under very restrictive
conditions (e.g. on sight, after stopping and/or with audible signals).
–– Minor failure: The train may pass with only slight restrictions, e.g. slightly reduced speed.
In some countries, a level crossing is no longer considered safe if it has been closed
longer than a certain maximum time without the passing of a train, as the discipline of
road users decreases. This feature is provided by modern automatic level crossings and
leads to the quick revelation of malfunction with lowered barriers. The time can depend
on the type of level crossing, e. g. in Germany the maximum warning time for crossings
without barriers is 90 seconds, for crossings with half barriers 240 seconds.
Modern control and supervision units are either solved by relay or microelectronic
technology. If relay technology, safe signalling relays must be used at least for the
supervision functions. Electronic systems achieve safety (and often also availability) by
redundancy and checking functions.

13.4.4.3 Level Crossing Supervision Signals

For autonomous automatic level crossings, special supervision signals are used to indicate
the status to the train driver, who is obliged to stop at the level crossing or pass over it
on sight if no safe status is indicated. In most modern systems, the supervision signals
are controlled automatically by the closure of the level crossing. Any technical error is here
revealed to the train driver, who then informs the responsible staff. In some systems, a
person is involved who checks occupation by road users and then controls the supervision
signals, or has just the possibility to release it to Stop position in case of danger.
The level crossing supervision signals are, similarly to signals for train spacing, applied in
the form of main and/or distant supervision signals. The main supervision signal is situated
at the level crossing (often without providing an overlap or with short overlap), whereas
the distant supervision signal is situated at the stopping distance in rear of the main (figure
13.16). In many railways generally or in some cases only one of these is used, which is
usually the distant supervision signal, or in cases of very low speed the main.

Figure 13.16: Position of level crossing supervision signals

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 13.4 Active Level Crossings

Some signal instructions additionally provide repeater signals for topographical cases of bad
visibility. Also regular main and distant signals can be used to protect level crossings, too.
The signal aspects of the level crossing supervision signals are coded very differently between
the countries, using red, yellow, green or white colour and colour position light signals (figure
13.17). Also a dark lamp can have a different meaning depending on the country: Stop,
Proceed or slow speed.

Figure 13.17: Examples of supervision signals

13.4.4.4 Detection of the Area of Conflict

In different cases, the area of conflict has to be proved clear. This depends on the local
situation, the possibility of trapping road users (full closure or not) and the regulations of the
respective country. The following basic solutions are applied:
–– Visual proving by an operator. The person (often a signaller) proves the clear status of the
level crossing either directly or remotely via camera and screen (chapter 5.2.5.1).
–– Automatic proving by different technical solutions. These solutions can be divided into
intrusive systems (below the road surface) and non-intrusive systems (over the road
surface). An example of intrusive technologies is inductive loops, which react to the
ferromagnetic mass of vehicles (but not pedestrians). Other examples for intrusive
technologies are pneumatic road tubes and piezoelectric cables, reacting to the weight of
an object of not too low mass. Examples for non-intrusive technologies are radar (figure
13.18), infrared and video image processing.
In most cases where there is supervision of the area of conflict, there are the following
possibilities of evaluation of this information:
–– The clear status is a precondition for clearing the respective railway signal. In systems
with visual supervision, the clear status has to be acknowledged by a (safety critical)
operation action for this purpose. In cases with automatic supervision, a technical
dependence similar to interlocking functions applies.

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13 Level Crossings

–– The clear status is continuously

supervised as long as the train
movement is permitted, and the
train stopped in case of emergency.
In cases with visual supervision,
this can be done by an emergency
call to the train driver or by manual
emergency closing of the signal.
With automatic supervision, the
train is stopped by an alarm in the
cab signal or by automatic closing
of the signal.
–– Both above criteria combined.
If there is no technical or manual
supervision of the area of conflict, in
most countries the driver of a road Figure 13.18: Radar scanner for technical monitoring
of the area of conflict (manufacturer and graphic:
vehicle must be able to leave the area Honeywell)
of conflict at any time. This can be,
amongst others, ensured by using half barriers instead of full closure.

13.4.4.5 Warning Time and Approach Distance at Automatic Level Crossings

The warning time tW of an automatic level crossing is the time from the first warning of road
users (usually switching on of the warning light or, without light signals, the starting of the
barriers to close) until the appearance of the train at the level crossing. The approach distance
lA is the distance on the railway line which the train passes from initiation of the level crossing
until reaching the level crossing. The time delay from initiation until the occurrence of the first
warning signal is very low in automatic systems and can therefore be ignored. The relation
between warning time tW and approach distance lA is:
lA = v t ⋅ t W
with vt: speed of the train.
If train speeds differ in approach to a certain level crossing, either the fastest train has to be
considered or train categories be distinguished (chapter 13.4.3.4).
For calculation of the warning time and approach distance, two criteria must be fulfilled, the
maximum of both being the decisive one:
1. Road traffic must be warned early enough that a road user has the possibility of either
stopping safely in front of the level crossing or, if stopping is impossible, passing over it
completely. The longest and slowest road users and a certain safety margin have to be
considered. The calculation is done similarly as in 13.3 for passive level crossings and is
therefore not repeated here.
2. Depending on the type of supervision (chapter 13.4.4.1), the train will not be obstructed if
the level crossing works properly. This criterion usually results in longer warning times. It is
calculated as follows:
Based on the three supervision cases described in chapter 13.4.4.1 and figure 13.15, the
approach distance and warning time if no stop is scheduled in the approach to the level
crossing can be determined as follows (figure 13.19):
–– In autonomous level crossings without feedback information about the protected status, the
warning time equals the time needed to activate the level crossing. This means the time
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 13.4 Active Level Crossings

from initiation until full closure of the level crossing (chapter 13.4.3.3), if it is accepted that
the train appears on the level crossing as soon as the barriers have completely closed.
–– In autonomous level crossings with feedback information about the protected status to
the train, the approach distance is the sum of the following: the distance the train passes
during safeguarding of the level crossing, the sighting distance of the supervision signal
and the distance from the supervision signal to the level crossing (at least the braking
distance). If full closure of all barriers is required before switching on the supervision signal
(chapter 13.4.4.2), the safeguarding time equals the time needed for the activation process.
Otherwise, e. g. if the criterion is that road signals have to be on and barriers begun to
lower, this time component is shorter.
–– In route-dependent level crossings, the distance from the main signal to the level crossing
has to be added to the above case with level crossing supervision signal.
Therefore, as can be seen in figure 13.19, route dependent level crossings require the longest
warning time and level crossings without feedback information the shortest. However, this can
change towards the route-dependent level crossing as an advantageous solution if there is a
scheduled stop in approach to the level crossing.

Figure 13.19: Approach distance of level crossings with different kinds of supervision without
scheduled stop in approach to the level crossing

13.4.5 Possibilities of Degraded Mode Operation

Failure of the safeguarding of the level crossing in safe systems can be revealed primarily to
the following persons:
–– Revealing to the train driver by main signals, level crossing supervision signals or others.
This is the most frequently used method.
–– Revealing to ground staff, who are then responsible for stopping either rail or road traffic.

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13 Level Crossings

–– Revealing to the road users by particular roadside signalling or by permanent closure.

For this purpose, in some countries a special positive light signal indication (usually white
flashing) is used to indicate the proper working of the level crossing and the non-approach
of a train. The absence of any light indicates the disturbed status to the road user.
Procedures to maintain railway and road operation in these failure cases can allocate the
responsibilities for auxiliary safeguarding to following persons:
–– To local staff: Barrier keepers, signallers or other local staff are responsible for
safeguarding the level crossing by stopping the road traffic before permitting the train
driver to pass by written instruction, auxiliary signal or hand signals (figure 13.20),
usually at reduced speed. This solution is usually applied for staffed level crossings,
often also in those route-dependent level crossings in proximity to staffed signal boxes.
–– To train staff: The train driver has to move very slowly, warning the road users by
audible signal, ready to stop if conflicts occur. In other solutions, train staff members
leave the train and stop road traffic by hand signals or kinds of auxiliary barriers.
–– To the road user: In systems where the failure is revealed to the road user by roadside
signals, the road user can be
obliged by highway regulations
to use the level crossing like a
passive one, often combined with
a speed restriction for the trains.
This requires a certain area of sight
for road traffic, similar to passive
level crossings (chapter 13.3).
–– An alternative, which is only
acceptable for roads with minor
importance and with possibility of
diversion, is to maintain permanent
closure of the road until repair.
On level crossings with very simple Figure 13.20: Protecting level crossing by hand signals
circumstances (low road and rail (photo: Martin Hahn)
traffic, slow speed of rail vehicles) the aforementioned measures can be used permanently
as regular protection. This can be found often on feeder lines or on industrial railways.

13.4.6 Combination with Road Junctions

13.4.6.1 Identification of the Problem

Special safety issues occur when a level crossing is situated in the neighbourhood of a road
junction, especially if the distance between the areas of conflict of the level crossing and
the road junction is shorter than the longest vehicle permitted on the respective road. In this
situation, it is possible that a road vehicle which has to wait at the road junction cannot leave
the level crossing immediately, causing the danger of collision with a train. Likewise, the road
junction could be overcongested by road vehicles waiting at the level crossing.
In other situations, the distance between the areas of conflict is long enough to accommodate
the longest road vehicle, but the probability of the level crossing being overcongested by road
vehicles waiting at the road junction is high. Although road users are obliged not to enter the
level crossing if they cannot quickly pass completely over it, due to low discipline this often
occurs and endangers traffic.

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 13.4 Active Level Crossings

13.4.6.2 Solutions for Road Junctions not Controlled by Traffic Light Signals
For uncontrolled road junctions, the simplest solution is to make the road with the level
crossing the priority road at the junction and, if necessary, forbid left turns (in Britain and some
other countries right turns). But this is not always desirable from the point of road traffic. Also
the problem of overcongesting the road junction with vehicles waiting at the level crossing
cannot be solved by this.
Another solution is to stop the road traffic on the priority road by advanced light signals
when the level crossing is being activated to enable traffic of the minor road to clear the level
crossing safely (figure 13.21).

Figure 13.21: Advanced road signals for level Figure 13.22: Problem of signalized road junction
crossings in proximity to a road junction in the neighbourhood of a level crossing

13.4.6.3 Solutions for Road Junctions Controlled by Traffic Light Signals

The solution for signal-controlled road junctions (figure 13.22) is coordination between
the level crossing and the road junction to prevent the described dangerous situations.
To enable vehicles to escape from the section between the road junction and the level
crossing, the entry has to be closed a defined time before the exit and remain closed
until the exit is free again. This, however, can result in longer activation times of the level
crossing (figure 13.23).
As road traffic light signals usually do not meet the safety requirements of railway
installations, the case of failure of the road traffic signals has to be considered. If the level
crossing is situated in the minor road of the road junction, an additional emergency red
analogous to the advanced road signals in figure 13.21 will need to be provided.

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13 Level Crossings

Figure 13.23: Function of level crossing combined with road traffic light signals

13.5 Removal of Level Crossings

Many countries have started initiatives and programs to remove level crossings. In spite of
modern technologies to protect level crossings, they remain a dangerous point within the
railway system. Furthermore the road capacity for road traffic is considerably affected by
frequent and/or long closing of level crossings with high railway traffic.
In many countries, new places where road and rail are to cross have to be planned and realised as
grade-separated crossings (under- or overbridges). Exceptions can be made for low use crossings.
To reduce the number of existing level crossings as well, there are different possibilities:
–– removing level crossing without substitution, if other ways can be used (only for very low
use level crossings, e. g. those used for agriculture, but beware of much increased use at
harvest time;
–– concentrating the road traffic of several level crossings at one level crossing (only for low
use level crossings, often a means of reducing costs when automating manually operated
level crossings);
–– substitution of level crossing by grade separation (which is often difficult in densely built up
areas);
–– combination of aforementioned possibilities, e. g. concentration of road traffic at one
remaining level crossing and substitution of level crossings by pedestrian bridges because
of the higher sensitivity of pedestrians to detours.
As a result of high expenses for constructing grade separated crossings and other extensive
building measures, many existing level crossings will remain for the foreseeable future. The
target for these level crossings must be an improvement of safety by technical, organisational
and educational measures.

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 14 Hazard Alert Systems

14 Hazard Alert Systems

Andreas Schöbel, Jelena Arndt

Although railways are considered to be one of the safest transport systems, hazards are still
present due to complex operational processes. Safety is guaranteed during the life cycle of
each component, when measures in terms of appropriate design and regular maintenance is
undertaken. Nevertheless, dangerous situations do occur as a result of imperfections in the
railway machinery itself and the influences of human factors. In other words, safety is defined
as free from unacceptable risk (EN 50126).
Formal definition of the term risk is difficult, because it represents a product of both probability
and severity combined. Even if a suitable definition can be devised, the bigger problem is the
acquisition of significant statistical data of past events. As a result, a definition of risk is of
essential value for practical work. For the sake of completeness, a distinction between terms
has to be made – in contrast to the term safety, security is used exclusively for man-made,
deliberate hazards like terrorism, vandalism and other crimes.
Until the specific hazard is identified, a purposeful and effective design of measures against
it cannot be started. There is a difference between the development of new components for
monitoring hazards and long used inspection systems for already well-known hazards. New
components must be designed using state-of-the-art rules, although some of the existing
technologies that proved to be working well were developed without following modern
principles.
Due to the diversity of the responsibilities present within national railway companies, safety
is related to a large number of different disciplines. This issue becomes especially relevant if
the business organisation is due to be changed on a national scale as a result of international
standard harmonisation. Another important aspect is the volume of international traffic on a
national railway network, due to its influences on the strategy of national railway companies. In
general, a high proportion of international traffic leads to increased investment in infrastructure
measures. Fundamental risk reducing measures can be divided by functionality (Brux 2002):
–– event-avoiding
–– damage-reducing
–– rescue-supporting
Event-avoiding measures aim to prevent hazardous events. The coordination of the
responsibilities between railway undertakings and infrastructure managers is of high
importance in this case. Nevertheless, reaching sufficient protection by preventative measures
solely is not achievable, due to those not being financially feasible. In order to minimize losses
in the case of accidents, damage-reducing measures must be incorporated.
The rescue measures are the result of an accident, due to their important Function of keeping
people safe. Hazard alert systems are related to the event-avoiding and damage-reducing
functionalities of risk reducing measures. From the beginning, the main aim of technical
measures was to improve safety and reduce costs. The disappearance of mechanical
signalling meant a reduction of locations for the supervision of trains, with technological
progress and managerial initiatives further accelerating this trend. Thus the importance of an
effective and comprehensive use of hazard alarm systems has constantly been increasing.

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14 Hazard Alert Systems

14.1 Hazard in Railway Systems

According to an ontology based approach, there are a number of dependencies between

different fault states within the railway system. Generally, one fault state can lead to another
fault state, usually being much worse than the one before. Thus, in an abstract view, fault
states can be interpreted as causes and the resulting fault states can be interpreted as
consequences (figure 14.1).

Figure 14.1: Cause-consequence-chain

If there are no means of monitoring to recognise them, the final consequence of many fault
states is a derailment. Therefore, it is necessary to prevent the long-lasting occurrences of
all critical fault states. The majority of relevant fault states cannot be directly observed due to
trains running at speed. Thus, on-board or wayside monitoring systems can provide a number
of measurements that can indicate a fault state (Schöbel/Maly 2012).
Generally the estimation of risk is a difficult task, because an accident data base only provides
indicators. Dangerous situations during operations which did not lead to an accident are
normally not stored in an accident data base, although these situations are important for the
risk estimation. To compensate for this missing information, the judgement of operational
experts is very important. Of course, the first task is always to have a closer look at the
accident data base if there are reliable values available for the risk estimation. Therefore
it is necessary to know details about the history of an accident. Sometimes a predefined
categorisation is not suitable for a specific accident. On the other hand, the accident data
base gives a first indicator of the potential risk. The specific view on the accident data base is
given by this aspect if it is possible to recognise one fault state by some wayside monitoring
system. So the fault states which are in the focus of such an analysis must be vehicle related
and appear for a certain time to be measured by some detector.
The calibrated risk matrix can be used to put in the vehicle related fault states which may
seriously damage the infrastructure. Therefore it is necessary to check that all well-known
fault states have been considered. For each fault state, an analysis based upon the national
accident data base can be carried out for the infrastructure manager to estimate the risk
caused by each fault state. Risk is always defined as a product of probability and severity.

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 14.1 Hazard in Railway Systems

The usage of the risk matrix in signalling issues is state-of-the-art. For the operational
application, the qualitative descriptions of probability and severity must be quantified. The
calibrated matrix must cover the range of operational scope (Schöbel/Vek 2012).

Figure 14.2: Risk matrix for demand analysis of hazard monitoring in million € per year

14.1.1 Safety Related Hazards

In terms of derailment prevention, the following causes are be observed:

–– blocked brakes or wheels
Continuous braking may lead to a derailment of a wheelset due to additional longitudinal
forces resulting from certain non-ideal movements of the train, such as acceleration,
movement around curves, or an unsuitable combination of wagons by their relative weights.
Moreover, the thermal stress on the wheels and axles may lead to the displacement of one
or both wheels on the axle and thus causing an increased derailment risk. Furthermore, due
to the massive frictional heat generated, blocked brakes can lead to temperature increase
of axle boxes. Finally, they can cause fires in the bogie construction, the sparks which might
cause lineside fires.
–– broken axle shaft
If the rigid link between left and right wheel is missing, each of the wheels will be guided by
only one axle box, which can again lead to derailment.
–– broken axle stub
In case of a broken stub shaft, the vertical forces cannot be contained by the axle box. This
can lead to the wheel being displaced from the axle, leading to a derailment.
–– broken wheel
A broken wheel cannot guide the train, resulting in a high possibility of derailment.
–– faulty flange of wheel and flat spots
In case of the increased wear of the wheel flange the rail-wheel interaction will be more
intensive, which may lead to a derailment under special operational conditions. If parts of
the wheel flange are broken, the guidance will be missed completely and the wagon could
derail.

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14 Hazard Alert Systems

–– faulty suspension
A faulty suspension may cause a loss of contact between wheel and rail. Furthermore, due
to the reduced absorption capability of faulty suspensions, the vehicle body may oscillate.
Both may lead to a possible derailment.
–– faulty frame
Unbalanced wheel loads can be a result of a faulty frame. The reduced lateral guidance of
unloaded wheels might lead under certain non-ideal running conditions (curves, etc.) to a
derailment.
–– imbalance (in motion)
Unloaded wheels do not provide lateral guidance. This might lead to a derailment under
certain non-ideal conditions (curve, etc.).
–– violation of clearance gauge
If the vehicle fouls the structure gauge, contact with wayside assets (e. g. signal masts,
power supply masts) can occur. In extreme cases, this might lead to a derailment. Also
loose load fastening straps might reach the contact wire, resulting in a flashover or fire.
–– faulty buffer
If there are cracks on the buffer head, their ability to slide against other buffers will be
hindered. This can cause derailments or overriding buffers. If the buffer head fails, one
buffer might break off and fall on the track.
–– overriding of buffers
Due to an overriding of buffers it is not possible for buffer discs to slide causing an axle to
be pressed out of the track.
–– objects within the clearance gauge
If external objects protrude into the clearance profile, a collision with parts of a moving
vehicle might occur. Depending on the object, such events might lead to a derailment. This
applies also to objects lying on the infrastructure.
–– variation of width of the track gauge
The width of the track gauge, being either too large or too small, by distortion or otherwise,
can be the cause of a derailment.
–– track distortion
Too large track gauge might lead to a derailment.
–– broken rail
A breakage with a damaged rail head might cause a loss of the guidance, leading to a
derailment. If there is a vertical rail break, the rail will move laterally under stress, also
causing a derailment.
–– insufficient track bed
Wear of ballast causes subsidence which can result in failures of the track. Therefore, the
proportion of Y and Q forces might be higher, causing a derailment. Moreover, a reduced edge
of ballast might reduce the lateral resistance and track distortion might be the consequence.
If these causes are not recognised in time, a derailment will result. Additionally, the following
hazards need to be monitored:
–– hot (damaged) boxes
The dangers caused by hot axle boxes are well known, especially derailment, and usually
in conjunction with the irregular distributions of loads within vehicles. The best indicator for
damaged boxes is the temperature of the box itself. Monitoring of the axle box temperature
can prevent breakage of the axle shaft or axle stub.
–– displaced cargo
If loads are inadequately or incorrectly secured, they may foul the clearance gauge or even
completely displaced from the wagon.

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 14.1 Hazard in Railway Systems

–– exceeding the vehicle profile or clearance profile

The risky situation caused by exceeding the vehicle or clearance profile can have a number
of consequences:
• collision with masts for overhead electrification systems, signal posts or other railway
infrastructure, like tunnels
• collision with other trains
• collision with passengers on platforms, especially by swinging doors
If overhead line equipment is damaged by the objects exceeding the clearance profile, it
may result in flashovers from the contact wire.
The design of the monitoring system for the vehicle or clearance gauge must determine
what items would exceed the clearance profile. Examples are displaced loads, loose
fastening of cargo or even whole wagons due to derailment.
Another specific problem of clearance gauge violation represents truck antennae on low-
loader wagons. Such wagons offer the transport of trucks on railways, particularly in the
Alpine regions of Austria and Switzerland. In this case, in order to gain good reception,
radio antennae extend automatically during their passage on the low-loader wagons. Given
that overhead contact wires are lowered in tunnels, the possibility of flashovers is increased
significantly.
–– open doors
Doors on passenger cars are sometimes not fully closed, even if an automatic door closing
system is installed. This leads to the possibility of passengers being sucked out while
standing next to an open door. On the other hand, open doors on freight trains could not only
lead to a loss of possibly valuable goods but also endanger the environment. There are also
some special cargo cars where open doors can lead to exceeding the clearance profile.
–– fires
As previously mentioned, fires can be the consequence of hot boxes or blocked brakes.
Inside the car, interior decoration or goods may burn. Although fires are considered to be
rare in railway operation, fires in tunnels represent an important issue especially with newly
built lines. These can not only result in the loss of vehicles, but more importantly, fatalities
and loss of integrity of the tunnel structure itself. The rapid temperature rise and smoke
generation lead to conditions which are, unfortunately, not controllable by conventional
firefighting measures. Upon arrival of the fire-brigade at the tunnel portal, these conditions
are likely to deter them from accessing the scene of the accident within the tunnel.
There are some other characteristics which seem to be more difficult to monitor, but are also
necessary for an overall train inspection to support the maintenance of vehicles:
–– Lateral horizontal forces (Y) are the dominant parameter of the side wear of rails and are
linked to corrugation development.
–– Wheel load (Q) per axle and bogie conditions. Combined Q&Y forces are responsible
for rolling contact fatigue damage and related degradation of rail head gauge corner.
The percentage of Y and Q forces per wheel allows the calculation of the probability of
derailment by the criteria of Nadal (Y/Q < 1.2).
–– Profile of running surface of wheels (eccentricity, rewilding, spalling). These properties are
relevant for the maintenance of the infrastructure.
–– Uneven running of wheels. Uneven running wheels can damage the rail and should not be
therefore be in use.
–– Emissions from dangerous goods. If cars are not sufficiently leak proof, the environment can
be polluted.
–– Contact pressure (between pantograph and contact wire). Incorrectly adjusted contact
pressure leads to unusually high abrasion of both the pantograph and the contact wire.

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14 Hazard Alert Systems

For optimising the lifecycle of both components, monitoring of the contact pressure is
necessary.
–– Broken pantograph contact strip. Broken pantographs need to be recognised as soon as
possible, as otherwise the contact wire will be destroyed.
–– Natural hazards (flooding, mudslide, rock fall, avalanche and earthquake). These have to be
included in the list of safety related hazards. Railway lines often follow rivers, because this is
a comparatively cheap option under difficult topographic conditions. Consequently, extreme
precipitation can be a hazard situation for railway infrastructure (flooding, mudslide, rock
fall and avalanche). For populated areas, there are often means of warning the inhabitants,
but railways are mostly not informed directly. Thus, it is necessary to specify the critical
conditions for railway lines.

14.1.2 Security Related Hazards

Security related hazards can be described as wilful damage of infrastructure, rail cars,
goods or persons. Terrorism and vandalism are subsumed under this topic, but also crime
in passenger trains (theft, aggression, personal injury). This is often prevented by video
surveillance in rail cars or on platforms. Another related subject is the illegal transport of
dangerous (radioactive, explosive, polluting, harmful) goods on rail cars which are often
not declared as required. Furthermore, in recent years, the illegal transport of persons has
increased, causing security related hazards for both the persons transported and other
passengers, as well as infrastructure and trains.

14.2 Solutions for Hazard Detection

The implementation of possible solutions for hazard detection is generally influenced by

several interests. Beside monetary matters, the legal situation must be considered. A national
regulation introduced by a national infrastructure manager can be easily voided by the national
rail regulator, based on the free access to the railway market. The need for international
harmonisation and standardisation is present in this type of market, which must be established
by an international consortium like UIC. This approach is suitable only for the longer term.
Originally, station inspectors were not the only employees who had to deal with train
supervision. Signallers and/or level-crossing attendants also monitored the condition of the
rolling stock. This enabled train supervision to be carried out on both sides of the track. As a
result of staff reductions due to continuous automation, this has been disappearing.
In future, visual train supervision will be reduced in many European countries. The effects can
be mitigated by the introduction of technical solutions, resulting in less labour-intensive and
more efficient processes. Traditional train supervision can be split into diverse challenges of
train inspection. Technical solutions, currently available on the market, were designed in a
similar way. They have been developed as imitation of the human senses used by the train
supervisor when monitoring passing trains. An example would be the visual inspection of hot
axle boxes. Thus one all-in solution for train inspection is still not provided; it is still a number
of individual tasks. This means the replacement of one station inspector by one special
hazard alert system is not possible. Therefore, sophisticated strategies for a demand-oriented
application of these systems have to be adopted.

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 14.2 Solutions for Hazard Detection

14.2.1 Ways of Inspection

There are three possible ways for rolling stock hazard monitoring:
–– on-board
–– wayside
–– combined inspection (on-board and wayside)
Theoretically, on-board monitoring has the advantage of the possibility of retrieving sensor data
from almost everywhere on the vehicle for optimal indication of hazards. Unfortunately, this is
not possible due to economic reasons. Only on special rail cars it is justifiable economically to
install specific on-board facilities (e. g. rail cars which are used for the transport of hazardous
materials are often equipped with derailment detectors). As a rule, on-board systems are only
used if there is already a power supply on board. Powered cars are common in passenger
traffic but not in freight. Only special freight cars offer the availability of power supply.
On-board measurement information has to be made available either at the vehicle level or
at an operational control centre. An easy way of such integration on the vehicle side is the
combination of detectors with the braking system. In the case of a recognised alarm, the
car can be stopped immediately. Because of the direct manipulation of the braking system,
additional wiring involving further rail cars is avoided. Another approach consists of the
combination of telematics applications, which are suitable for reasons of practical functionality.
On-board generated measuring data will be sent in the course of an alarm to an operational
control centre.
Wayside monitoring is generally applied in cases when measurement categories do not
change rapidly. Another argument for this approach preference is if a lot of railway cars in
different ownership have to be checked by an infrastructure company. Such a situation is
typical for railway traffic in Central European countries. Technical systems for automatic train
supervision are able to check both sides of the train at the same time, unlike humans, and
their locations can be varied, resulting in fewer locations needed in total.
In addition, technical solutions are able to detect certain faulty conditions of the rolling stock
that usually cannot be discovered even by well-trained station inspectors. Therefore, these
systems are important for prevention or at least for early accident identification and are
expected to bring higher productivity. Many wayside monitoring systems use an axle-oriented
data structure for storing information. After passing a wayside system, the outcome is axle
related; however, optimal operational handling requires the wagon number. Therefore, the
automatic wagon identification is of great importance to guarantee that the monitoring results
can be allocated to single wagons. Furthermore, for predictive maintenance of vehicles all
measurement data must be allocated to the right vehicle and the right axle by identification
even of the orientation of each single rail car.
Another classification for the monitored parameters is given by the differentiation of the time
of determination of wagon parameters. Some (mostly with static character) must be collected
before a train starts (or soon after) and other parameters are only ascertainable during the
progress of a train (e. g. bearing temperatures). This is analogous to the task of train
observation being shared between the examiner and the movement inspector.
For high speed traffic, vehicle side and wayside measures are often combined to achieve the
safety targets and to optimise the costs for maintenance in consideration of the availability of
rail cars (Maly et al. 2001).

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14 Hazard Alert Systems

14.2.2 Fault States to Monitor

By using sensor systems – available on the market – the following fault conditions with static
character can be checked:
–– one-sided loading
–– displacement of the load
–– flat spots
–– open doors (doors not closed or not fully closed before departure)
–– axle load, load per metre (overload)
For prevention, a reasonable approach is to check trains at a location where many start or end
their journeys. This kind of inspection can also be required at national borders or where there
is a change in infrastructure operator. Furthermore, there are some other hazards resulting
from the following rail car characteristics, which can only be monitored with high investment
and technical effort – still they are important for estimation of the derailment risk of the vehicle:
–– buckling of vehicles
–– rolling of vehicles
–– torsional moment
–– instability
–– maximum load before track displaces sideways
–– wheel geometry
–– kinematic gauge
Additionally, during the running of one train the following rail car properties have to be
monitored for safety reasons:
–– defective axle-bearings
–– displaced cargoes
–– already derailed wheelsets
–– temperature of axles and brakes
–– flat spots
–– broken bearing surface
–– axle breakages
–– blocked and defective wheels
–– open doors (doors opened during the journey)
–– fires
Depending on the possible consequences of a fault state, different types of action must
be taken. The lowest level is sending collected information to a maintenance centre. Next
level can be defined as ‘warning’ when a monitored fault state leads to a train stopping at
a predefined point. In case of an emergency the level of ‘alarm’ is reached, so a train has
to be stopped immediately to prevent further damage. These three levels of fault state and
consequential actions can be defined differently by every infrastructure manager according to
the specific operations processes.

14.2.3 Integrated Approach of Inspection

Checkpoints (Sünder et al. 2006) can be defined as trackside locations containing an

accumulation of technical systems, which are required to enable the substitution of the
traditional train supervision. Each sensor system is used for the supervision of one or several
train conditions.

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The significance of a single measurement can be increased by the consideration of other

collected data. The average temperature of an intact wheel bearing is, for instance, related to
the wheel load. In the case of a wheel load being high, a higher average temperature of the
bearing and/or a faster rise in temperature has to be assumed. To avoid misjudgements of the
actual bearing’s condition and the unnecessary stopping of the train with the reduction in overall
network capacity, this physical correlation can be shown by calculating and evaluating a weight-
compensated bearing’s temperature. This means that stricter limits will be applied to bearings
with low wheel loads. Consequently, the contrary will be carried out if the wheel load is high. For
this to be achieved, the sensors have to “communicate” with each other in real time.

Figure 14.3: Checkpoint at Oberaich, Austria (photo: voestalpine SIGNALING)

Another example is the vibration frequency detected by the dragging equipment detection that can
be caused by a wheel defect. The comparison with the frequencies which have been measured at
an adjacent dynamic weighing and wheel defect system enables the dragging equipment detection
system to suppress false alarms. This it does by identifying reference patterns, in order to be able
to distinguish between geometric wheel defects and the impacts from dragging equipment.
The core of each checkpoint is the so-called data concentrator. Every measurement is time
stamped in milliseconds, enabling the data to be allocated to the right train and/or part of the
train, such as an axle or a wagon. Data, which are transmitted from sensor components to the
data concentrator after passage of a train, are converted into a uniform format. If necessary,
additional sensor and/or environmental information are added.
After generating abstract data objects and combining them with location, information is
displayed on the train model, serving as the basis for data conjunction. By referencing the results
to the previously defined thresholds, a problematic situation can be identified. In the case of a
threshold being exceeded, actions defined by the infrastructure manager have to be applied.

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14 Hazard Alert Systems

These measures range from a short message to the owner of the rolling stock to a stop order on
the train to detach one or more vehicles. Assuming that a single sensor registers the exceeding
of a threshold, the whole procedure will be shortened by an immediate initiation of necessary
measures.
In contrast to interlocking, not all sensor components achieve the necessary safety values.
This shortcoming can be compensated by redundant or diverse measurements. An increase
in data quality and an early detection of faulty conditions can be achieved by enabling
communication between various checkpoints.
In this case, all data concentrators are directly linked to the checkpoint centre. There,
important data on trains is analysed and stored. Here, current and already finalised train routes
are also stored. The advantages of networked checkpoints are numerous but the costs for
a checkpoint centre and all the required sensors can be high. Therefore, the business case
should not only focus on operational safety but also take into consideration the predictive
maintenance of vehicles.
There are several features of an integrated system which may bring some added value for
overall train safety:
–– The technical concept is designed on a modular basis. Using cost-benefit considerations,
the range of sensor components can vary from one wayside location to another. Therefore,
new or additional sensors can be integrated into an already existing structure. The same
applies to data of virtual sensors. Assuming that one location does not have a dynamic
scale, data previously collected can be transmitted to the data concentrator via the wayside
monitoring centre. This feature is limited to values not subject to changes or at least not
more than small changes (e. g. the weight of the rolling-stock).
–– Trend analysis is another feature of networked wayside monitoring. On the one hand, critical
situations can be detected at an early stage. This target can be achieved by supervising
the development of important measured characteristics of a train while passing a number
of wayside locations. On the other hand, these analyses enable a check to be made of the
plausibility of data by comparing single measurements with the appropriate series.
–– In contrast to decentralised single systems, networking wayside monitoring systems
offer a further advantage. The status of all data concentrators and their connected
sensor components is permanently supervised. In case of troubles and/or failures, short
messages can be generated and automatically sent from the monitoring centre to the
central operational trouble management system. The latter is responsible for arranging and
managing all measures, which are required for the removal of the problems.

14.2.4 Extract of Available Technologies and Products

For a better understanding of hazard alert systems, some systems in use are explained in this
chapter. If different products are currently available against one hazard, the description is only
a summary of the basic principles.

14.2.4.1 Detection of Illegal Goods

Illegal transport of dangerous (radioactive, explosive, polluting, harmful) goods on rail cars
can be discovered by x-ray scanners which are able to check the interior of rail cars. Using
a high-energy electron linear accelerator as its radiation source and with specially designed
fast sampling and speed self-adaption technology, this kind of system is an ideal solution. It

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 14.2 Solutions for Hazard Detection

provides nonintrusive and rapid inspection of railway vehicles at fixed locations in the railway
systems e. g. railway stations, border crossings (Nuctech 2017).

14.2.4.2 Hot Box and Blocked Brake Detection

Since 1980s, hot box detectors and fixed brake detectors are used by most European railway
infrastructure companies (Eisenbrand 2001, Mironov et al. 2002, Mironov 2006, Rottensteiner
2003, Schöbel et al. 2006, Shvalov et al. 2005). As a proxy for the risky situations, the
temperatures of the axle bearing and the brake disc are measured.
The temperature measurement for hot box and hot wheel detection is based on contactless
infrared technology. Based on the level of warmth, each body having the temperature higher
that 0 Kelvin (–273.15 °C) emits electromagnetic radiation that can be detected and measured
by special radiation thermometers. This technology was used as basis for the development of
the very fast radiation thermometers specialised for the extreme railway environment. These
so-called quantum detectors convert the thermal radiation of the target into electric signals,
which are then displayed as absolute temperatures (Eisenbrand 2011).
Standardisations for temperature measurements are performed regularly in the field because
the relationship between the signal and the object temperature can change over time. The
internal standardisation process corrects regularly the temperature measurements. This
process calibrates the detector signal and the target temperature with a reference heater in
the sensor, such that the infrared signal measurements from passing trains can be converted
directly into temperature measurements. This is achieved by measuring the signal due to
infrared radiation emitted from an internal reference heater with a built-in temperature sensor.
During this standardisation process, the reference heater is positioned in front of the optical
entrance of the sensor.
As infrared sensors are easily available, there are many different manufacturers. The varieties
can be found in the sensor geometry used for measuring and the consequential ascertainable
types of bogie constructions.
A wayside hot box detection system generally consists of the functional elements:
–– data acquisition by sensors (incl. axle counters)
–– evaluation, control and alarm generating
–– data transmission
–– visualisation of results and alarms
Typically, two hot box detection sensors, one provided on each side of the track, measure the
axle boxes. Simultaneously, a further infrared sensor measures the temperature of the brake
disc for fixed brake detection and a hot wheel detection sensor measures the temperature of
the wheel flange to detect critical temperatures of blocked brakes. A combination of two hot
wheel detection (HWD) scanners can be found in a hot wheel detection (HWD SB) split-beam
scanner. With this scanner, brake discs and wheels can be monitored at the same time. In
most cases axle counters are used to allocate measurements to individual axles. Visualisation
of the results from measurements is often done by a customary PC, but it can also be web
based. Moreover, all data transmitted from trackside equipment, can be stored in a centre and
if necessary exchanged with other systems.

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14 Hazard Alert Systems

Figure 14.4: Hot box and hot wheel scanners with a rail contact installed in Slovenia
(photo: voestalpine SIGNALING)

Due to the wide European usage of hot box detection systems, the differences between
various systems of one category are discussed below (Eisenbrand 2011):
–– Measurement principles: the infrared measuring systems on the market can be divided into
the following three categories based on the number of scanning points:
• Single beam systems: all infrared scanners of this system type have one scanning point.
The whole system can consist of several infrared scanners with one scanning point
each. Some examples are HOA50 (Hitachi Rail, previously Ansaldo STS), Servo Systems
(formerly Harmon Industries, now Progress Rail).
• Dual beam systems: this system type incorporates infrared scanners with two
independent scanning points for axle bearing measurement. The infrared scanners
measuring the wheel and brake disc temperatures each have one scanning point.
• This system type consists of two infrared sensors per axle bearing scanner on the left/
right side, thus two measuring points each. An example for this category is TK99 (ÖBB).
• Multi beam systems: Every infrared scanner in the system has several scanning points
(line sensor with several pixels, rectangular to the travelling direction of the train). The
complete system may consist of several infrared scanners each with several scanning
points. Systems with line sensors provide in conjunction with modern software extensive
possibilities for suitably evaluating the bearing temperatures. With a further widening of
the scanned area the risk of detecting hot parts which are not allocable to a bearing is
rising. Some examples are FUES (formerly GETS, now Progress Rail) equipped with a
4-pixel IR line detector, PHOENIXMDS HBD/HWD (formerly SST GmbH, now voestalpine
SIGNALING) equipped with an 8-pixel IR line detector and HOA 400 (VAE) equipped with
a 1-pixel line detector and an oscillating mirror.
–– Consideration of ambient temperature: some systems take into account the ambient
temperature for the evaluation of the measured bearing temperature, while others do not.
–– Different measurement geometry: depending on the bearing types and/or construction type
of bogies of operating vehicles the measurement geometry will be designed accordingly. For
instance, a patented measuring geometry is used by ÖBB, which is particularly adapted to
Austrian requirements (RoLa – intermodal transport, bogies of type “Schlieren”, Y25 bogies).

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In addition, the FUES II EPOS has an alternative measuring geometries enabling to detect
blocked brakes and further reducing the false alarm rate.
Furthermore, PHOENIXMDS HWD is able to detect sliding wheels causing HOT alarms as well
as damage to infrastructure.
In case of an alarm the operator informs the driver of a train that a wayside hot box detection
system has recognised a temperature exceeding a warning limit. It is also possible to define
two sets of thresholds, one for “warm” temperature warning and another one triggering an
alarm. Furthermore, a differentiation alarm is also possible, warning that the temperatures
measured for both boxes of one axle exceed the set threshold. Important for the braking
process is the normal use of brake power without emergency braking because the forces
involved could cause a derailment.
A visual inspection of the axle is required by either technical inspectors, if available, or by the
driver of the train. A train driver can ascertain visually if an axle journal is broken, an axle-
bearing is glowing, or an axle-box case is deformed. Even if none of these indicators can be
found, the train will continue its journey at a reduced maximum speed to the next location
where a technical inspector is available. Otherwise – if the driver verifies the defect – the
wagon has to be removed even when the alarm has been generated by the locomotive itself.

14.2.4.3 Acoustic Monitoring System

If the hot box detection system is considered to be damage reducing system, the acoustic
bearing monitoring system can be considered to be event avoidance system. The main
function of this system is to recognise the acoustic pattern of the failure in the bearing, before
it leads to the increase of the temperature and, consequently, an alarm. This leads us back
to the previously mentioned abstract approach that fault states can be interpreted as causes
and the resulting fault states can be interpreted as consequences. In this case, the cause of
the hot boxes is the failure of the box. By identifying the failure of the box early in the stage of
its degradation, the consequence of the hot box alarm and stopping the train can be avoided.

Figure 14.5: Installation of an acoustic monitoring system in Germany (photo: voestalpine SIGNALING)

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14 Hazard Alert Systems

As trains pass the detector, the acoustic signatures of the roller bearings are captured and
analysed. Due to the fact that the failure of different bearing parts sound differently, the
algorithm can be trained to recognise which part of the bearing is causing the problem.
The failure of specific bearing parts can be identified, such as inner race defects, outer race
defects, roller defects, and multiple defects or large area spalling.

Figure 14.6: An example of outer race defect (cup) and its analysis (photo: voestalpine SIGNALING)

Due to the fact that failure of different bearing parts sound different, the algorithm can be
trained to recognise which part of the bearing is causing the problem. Furthermore, based on
the trending analysis a decision about the maintenance schedule for the wagon can be made
and the root causes of the failures can be understood.

14.2.4.4 Derailment Detection

Independent from the effective cause of a derailment, an already derailed axle can be reliably
recognised by its exceeding the clearance gauge located between the rails. An overriding of
buffers, in other words, the loss of contact between the buffer heads, is an exception for this
definition; although this too is classified as a derailment.
Assuming a derailed axle, it is very improbable that there is no derailed wheel between the
rails. If one wheel of a derailed axle is lost, the remaining wheel will always run between the
rails which can be explained in a technical way by the forces that act on the axle. Accordingly,
monitoring this area is appropriate for reliable wayside derailment detection. After a detected
derailment, the mechanical cage has to be replaced because of plastic deformation by the
derailed axle. In case of a positive detection by closing or opening an electric circuit at a
mechanical cage, a notification has to be sent to an operations control centre to be able to
stop that train immediately (Stadlbauer et al. 2007, Inteletrack 2017). The example shown
in the picture (figure 14.7) is an industrialised prototype at ÖBB. The market offers other
solutions that function in the same principle. In case of a derailment, the system will be overrun
interrupting the electric circuit, opening the relay and triggering the alarm.
Multi-use wayside derailment detectors are suitable for use on railways. After a detected
derailment, the mechanical cage of this detection is not destroyed. Derailment detection can
also be combined with dragging equipment, such as hanging couplings or brake hoses,
detection, which primarily represents a protection measure for Eurobalises, which are an
integral part of the ETCS (European Train Control System).

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 14.2 Solutions for Hazard Detection

Figure 14.7: Prototype at ÖBB (photo: ÖBB)

Another example of the principle for the dragging equipment detection is by using acceleration
sensors measuring the acceleration of the impact. The integration of the sensors inside a
u-beam mounted on a steel sleeper and the avoidance of moving mechanical parts increases
the endurance of the system. Up to four special acceleration sensors which detect external
vibrations can be mounted on one sleeper measuring shock values of up to 500 g; this
includes two between the rails and one on each side of the rail. The vibrations trigger a seismic
mass inside the sensor. The force effect on the piezoelectric material generates a voltage
at the connected electrodes which is proportional to the acceleration. This signal is then
transmitted via a 4 – 20 mA interface to the concentrator after amplification and conditioning.
The system can be equipped additionally with a camera and an infrared flash for the visual
validation of the results.

Figure 14.8: Installation of the dragging equipment detection and derailment detection at ÖBB
(photo: voestalpine SIGNALING)

In contrast, for vehicle side detection the standard deviation of acceleration on-board is a
common criterion (Hecht/Schirmer 2001). This must be integrated into the braking system of
one car (figure 14.9). So in case of a derailment, one brake valve has to be opened to stop the
train immediately. Usually this dependency is realised in a simple mechanical way.

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14 Hazard Alert Systems

Figure 14.9: On-board derailment detection (photo: Knorr-Bremse)

14.2.4.5 Dynamic Weighing and Flat Spot Detection (Axle Load Checkpoints)
The weight of the load is one of the most important values to be observed. Axle overload damages
both the rolling stock and the rail. Load asymmetries (caused by skidding cargo) can lead to tilting
of the whole wagon. Such effects must be recognised in time to carry out the necessary cargo
rearrangement. Manual inspection of these effects is mostly impractical, due to the complexity
of the examination (closed freight cars, etc.). Today’s fully automatic scales perform these kinds
of measurement effectively. But it has to be stated that there are considerable qualitative and
functional differences among them which are also influencing the price. For instance, most of
dynamic weighing systems are also able to detect flat spots by interpreting force vertex as an
indicator for flat spots. Moreover some systems provide additional information to estimate further
wheel characteristics, such as polygonisation and out-of-roundness. Generally the length of the
measuring section depends onto the demands of the functionality and the achievable quality of the
output; a minimum of the wheel rotation over the sensors should be two.
In view of free network access it is becoming more and more important for an infrastructure
manager to check the wheel-rail contact (loading, driving stability, out-of-roundness of wheels)
of the trains running on a network. Using wayside equipment installed on transit tracks, data
which is needed for the evaluation of every single vehicle can be collected with respect to
the mandatory regulations. The installation effort of weighing systems varies. Some need no
special adaptation of the track and for others even part of the infrastructure has to be changed
during the installation (sleepers, ballast bed). Most systems use strain gauges located on the
web of the rail and/or at the base of rail (Mittermayr et al. 2005). Additionally or alternatively,
the sleepers may be equipped with force measuring strain gauges.
Another example is the use of fibre optic technology. The light is emitted from the module in
the cabinet along a fibre optic cable to 12 clamped sensors and reflected back into the fibre.
Any strain on the rail caused by a passing train changes the light reflection. Variations in the
light intensity are measured to continuously monitor the wheelset quality and the vehicle weight.
The function is able to designate the weight with a deviation of up to ± 3 % at speeds of up to
500 km/h, while at the same time analysing any geometrical defects on the wheel surfaces.
The wheel defect detection analyses the dynamic forces which are caused by the wheel-rail
interaction during the train’s passage. The values of the dynamic forces can be assigned to
each wheel by combining the signals from each of the twelve sensors, thereby allowing the
exact allocation of any wheel defects and the optimisation of the maintenance process.

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 14.2 Solutions for Hazard Detection

Figure 14.10: Fibre optic sensors clammed under the track foot (photo: voestalpine SIGNALING)

Weighing in motion derives different types of quantity values (e. g. wheel and axle loads,
total vehicle weights and load distributions) from the measurement of quasistatic forces. The
system recognizes any overloading or unbalanced loads and thereby offers infrastructure
managers the opportunity to avoid any possible risk to the infrastructure and at the same
time to monetize any excess loads. The condition of every single wheel can be evaluated
by analysing the dynamic and dynamic peak forces, because any in consistencies on
the wheel surface will result in spikes in the wheel-rail interaction forces. Given that the
sensors are exposed to more than one wheel rotation, the number of impact peaks can
be evaluated for a single wheel and labelled as a single repetitively identified wheel defect.
Whereas specific fluctuations in the sensor signal indicate different defect categories, such
as out-of-roundness and polygonisation, values in excess of certain thresholds indicate the
severity of the defect. Additionally, the most dominant type of defect can also be indicated.
For example, the wavelength of the defects can be calculated by analysing the aspect
ratio (width/height) of the dynamic force impact peaks. Short wavelength defects, such as
wheel flats, are characterized by a low aspect ratio caused by a relatively high amplitude in
combination with a short impact duration. On the other hand, a long wavelength defect is
indicated by a high aspect ratio, for example out-of-roundness (voestalpine SIGNALING).
Beside evaluation of wheel loads of the trains travelling at operating speed, the systems often
acquire the whole dynamic condition of the wheel. The flawless state of wheels is an especially
important factor in rail traffic because rail surface is destroyed by unbalanced Y and Q forces.
Equally with overloaded wheels, irregularities on the running surface lead also to damages at
vehicles and stress the track and the rails excessively. Another aspect of flat spot detection
is the acoustic emission, because the noise factor is gaining more and more importance in
European railways. For train observation by station inspectors, the sound of running rail cars is
also a criterion for recognition of flat spots. This mode of measurement by acoustics can also
be realised in a technical way (Witt 2017).

14.2.4.6 Profile Validation Systems

Before the detection of the clearance gauge being exceeded can be discussed, the difference
between a clearance gauge and the structure gauge must be made clear. Whereas the
clearance gauge defines the maximum size of the rolling stock, the structure gauge defines
the minimum infrastructure space that must be available for the train due to its wobbling.
In other words, defined distances for the platforms, signalling systems, overhead lines, etc.
Profile Validation System has been developed as a response to the possibility of infrastructure
or personal damage caused by the movement of a load, or incorrect loading, on the vehicles.
A unique example is in Switzerland on the SIM corridor (old Lötschberg line), where freight
trains are running on a predefined path which allows the transport of large containers.

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14 Hazard Alert Systems

Technical implementation included two profile lateral measuring scanners per track for the train
profile, as well as wagon identification laser scanners. The antenna detection system consists
of two transmitter/receiver pairs per track. The transmitter,is an infrared laser diode and a lens
for speeding the beam, plus a receiver consisting of a high-speed line scan camera and lens
matching the transmitter (Vouillamoz/Munter 2011).
One solution for the profile measurement includes the use of optical measuring principles for
the detection of loads exceeding the clearance gauge. That is the principal use for evaluation
and validation of the pictures, which have to be taken with equipment of sufficient quality. A
subsequent analysis of the 2D pictures allows an estimate, if there is any, excess (ASE 2017).

Figure 14.11: Wayside profile measuring system (photo: ASE)

Another system uses a three-dimensional profile subsystem with laser scanner technology
to acquire an accurate and detailed 3D profile of rail vehicles. It automatically detects a series of
possible defects and conditions that could lead to sideways on train collisions (shifted loads on open
wagons, open doors and hatches, abnormal tilt from suspensions failures, etc. (Ansaldo STS 2014).
Further principle for detecting violations of the profile uses laser distance sensors, arranged
around the borders of the clearance gauge, which incorporate the Time-of-Flight (TOF) principle.
The travelled distance is calculated in reference to the speed of light on the basis of the time
measured between the emission and receipt of the laser beam impulse. This process enables
the exact calculation of the object position without the need for the placement of any additional
sensors on the track. Protruding objects with a diameter ranging from 4 cm (6 cm) perpendicular
to the train’s direction of travel are recorded at a maximum train speed of 160 km/h (250 km/h).
For the increased accuracy of the alarms, a combination of redundant laser sensors and optical
cameras for the validation is a recommended configuration (voestalpine SIGNALING, ASE 2017).

14.2.4.7 Fire Recognition System

Thermographic scanners are able to provide high-definition thermographic maps of the vehicle
body (sides and upper parts) and automatically detect overheated parts or a possible fire on
board (Ansaldo STS 2014). These scanners can be installed both inside and outside tunnels.

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A possibility for fire recognition in tunnels is a linear heat detection system based on fibre-
optic sensors (figure 14.12). Due to its measuring characteristics, the fibre sensor becomes
especially suitable for the protection of objects (installations, buildings, constructions) against
fire or exposure to massive heat. Physical quantities such as temperature or pressure and
tensile force have influence on the silica fibre. In detail, they locally change the characteristics
of the light waveguide. As a result, the light in the silica fibres is scattered. This effect allows
the determination of the location and the quantity of the external physical influence, which
enables the waveguide to be used as a simple linear sensor (Siemens 2017).

Plastic tube
Sensor fiber Cable sheath

Aramid yarn

Figure 14.12: Optical fibre sensor cable (graphic: Siemens)

Natural convection in long railway tunnels may hinder the system to recognise small or
medium fires. Also, airflow of moving trains is critical for measuring. So only the case of a
single train standing in a tunnel without any heavy natural convection offers good boundary
conditions for reliable fire recognition at an early stage of a fire. Outside a tunnel it is much
more difficult to recognise a fire due to weather (sun, wind, rain or snow). This kind of system
is often used in combination with a fire-fighting system, by activating the firefighting system
when passing predefined temperature levels.

Figure 14.13: Relationship between tunnel cross-section and maximum speed; possible combinations
of train speed and tunnel cross-section for reliable fire detection of 0.5 MW with 5 % CO
(graphic: Koller/Schlatter 2011)

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14 Hazard Alert Systems

A solution which is able to detect fires when the train is in a tunnel is a so-called Fire and
Chemicals Detection system (FCD).The system is infrastructure based and able to detect
changes in fire detection parameters, CO2 and CO, concentrations. It is essential for the
measurement of slight concentration changes to be conducted in a stable environment,
without any interference from the outside. That is why the ideal location for the installation
is at least 300 m away from the tunnel entrance. The system is able to detect CO changes
of 0.5 ppm within 30 seconds. However, in order for the risk of a false alarm to be
reduced, two identical measuring units are installed. Only if the second unit also triggers
an alarm for the increased concentration changes, a fire alarm will be triggered. Another
condition for the reduction of false alarms is the relationship between the maximum speed
and the tunnel cross-section. The graph in figure 14.13 indicates the combination of train
speed and tunnel cross-section at which the fire can be reliably detected. Of course,
the reduction in train speed and cross-section results in improved fire and smaller fire
detection (Koller/Schlatter 2011).

14.2.4.8 Firefighting Systems

With a stationary firefighting system (figure 14.14) within the tunnel, a fire cannot be prevented
at all but the effects of the fire can be reduced significantly.
The principle of water mist technology is based upon many tiny water droplets, equally
distributed at the scene of the fire (Aquasys 2017). Contrary to conventional sprinkler systems,
water mist utilises the physical phenomenon of evaporation of water for the benefit of fire
suppression. This evaporation is responsible for two of the three main advantages of water
mist for fire suppression purposes:
–– The vast cooling effect: water, when evaporated, requires external energy, which has to be
taken from thermal energy of the fire.
–– Oxygen depletion: evaporation of water particles leads to a considerable extension of the
volume and thus to a reduced ratio of oxygen.

Figure 14.14: Functionality of a stationary firefighting system (graphic: Bioversal)

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The third decisive advantage of water mist technique is achieved by many tiny droplets
distributed in the ambience of a fire and acting as reflectors. The result is to confine the
heat to the area of the flames. Remarkably, water mist systems are using pure water as a
fire suppression agent, which is harmless to persons and environmentally friendly. Thus, water
mist systems can be activated immediately upon detection and do not require any delay for
evacuating the affected area or facility. This advantage contributes considerably to the overall
loss prevention philosophy in case of a fire. Another type of firefighting systems is working
with water under high pressure (Marioff 2017). This offers the possibility to extinguish a fire in a
short time and to save water.

14.2.4.9 Wind Measuring System

For reasons of tunnel safety or for reducing the risk of derailment at exposed positions (e. g.
bridges crossing deep valleys) a wind and airflow measuring system (voestalpine SIGNALING
2017) can be installed. It is based on ultrasonic sensor technology without any mechanically
moving components. The wind measuring system is equipped with four ultrasonic transducers
and the time elapsing between ultrasonic signals is ascertained along the measured distance.
Through the use of two measured distances set radially apart by 90°, it is not only possible
to determine the speed of the wind, but also its direction. On the other hand, sensors for the
airflow system use only one measured distance, because for the tunnels, only speed of flow (in
either direction) has to be measured (Kilian/Kuhn 2010).
In case of a fire the identification of the direction of escape is essential for survival. Also for fire
brigade and other rescue workers the information about wind conditions (direction, strength)
influences the rescue strategy. At exposed positions the risk of derailment can be increased
if back pressure caused by strong wind influences the ratio of Y and Q forces. So the track
speed limit must be adapted to the wind speed for the critical section.

14.2.4.10 Earthquake Detection

For railway lines in areas which are tectonically active, a detection of earthquakes can be
useful. This needs to be integrated into operations control. In the case of an earthquake, the
speed of all affected trains must be reduced or even brought to a halt.

14.2.4.11 Flood Warning

For flood warnings there is either an existing hydrological and/or hydraulic forecasting system
or prognosis system. As a result of railway lines and rivers running more or less parallel, it
is recommended to link the forecasting organisation to the railway infrastructure manager. Of
course, it is helpful to check existing hydrological forecasting instruments for their applicability
to warn the railway (Nester at al. 2007). The local accuracy will not be high enough to mark
safe areas, but it will be possible to inform responsible employees to check their lines. If there
is no existing forecasting system along a river, there are other alternatives. Different events are
categorised by discharge and outflow. Based on the analysis some kind of scenario catalogue
is created which is provided to the infrastructure manager to help him in his decision process
as to whether or not to close a line.

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14 Hazard Alert Systems

14.3 Aspects of Application

Wayside measures cannot be located at every place where once an accident occurred or will
possibly happen. After the event, it is quite simple to design the optimal position for detection
and minimising loss in this specific case. But this empirical method will not fulfil economic
limiting conditions and technical location pre-requirements for the system installation.
Therefore, a risk based demand analysis has to be carried out which takes into consideration
the accident data base.
Generally, there are two different points of view, the line-oriented and the network-oriented.
The line-oriented view allows the calculation of the nearest position to have enough time
for stopping a train at a predefined position for further investigation. For the specification of
these points where the train has to stop the network-oriented view is helpful. So there is the
requirement to define all risky elements in a railway network which should not be passed by a
train with irregularities. Furthermore, the combination of measures depends on the strategy of
an infrastructure manager, which can be described as a mix of event-avoiding systems and
damage-reducing components.
With regard to their future locations, there are two fundamental concepts:
–– Whenever traditional train supervision is to be replaced, a technical equivalent has to be
installed.
–– The number of locations and/or systems necessary for conducting train supervision can be
optimised, provided that they are based on cost-benefit considerations. This should reduce,
the number of locations.
Due to economic reasons only the second approach (Schöbel 2005) is practical and
discussed in the following section.

14.3.1 Network Oriented Positioning of Wayside Train Monitoring Systems (WTMS)

The choice of location for wayside train monitoring depends on the elements of infrastructure
that must be protected from hazard situations. Therefore, it is necessary to define risky
elements in a railway network. For the classification process, the following elements have to be
specified by individual parameters:
–– bridge
–– sequence of curves
–– points (slip crossings)
–– gradient
–– tunnel
–– highly curved section
–– changes in superstructure
Bridges have two interesting aspects for this definition: one, the height and the length which can
be combined into a product that represents one risk parameter. This specification contains, on
the one hand, the short bridge over a deep valley but also, on the other hand, a long section
on arches. The second criterion is the type of construction. If the running track is the same as
before and after the bridge, there is no dynamic influence on the train; otherwise, the dynamic
forces can lead to a derailment. In general, for hazard prevention, the clearance profile should be
checked and for damage reduction, a derailment detector should be installed.
A sequence of curves with different orientation can lead to derailments. The rail car properties
which are indicators for this kind of risk should be examined before being taken into operation.

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 14.3 Aspects of Application

The recommendation is to test it in shunting yards or when the trains enter the network.
Points are necessary for building railway networks. For the derivation of measures, it is
necessary to distinguish between the locations of one element. Points in shunting yards will
not be protected by derailment sensors, but points on high-speed lines are a good example of
a risky element of infrastructure which should not be passed with a derailed axle.
A gradient section is an additional stress for brakes. Depending on its severity, the stress for
brakes will vary. Because of the increased braking, the probability of blocked brakes will be
higher in such sections than in plain sections. For avoiding this fault state, graduated braking
of heavy freight trains is usual. Moreover the temperature of brakes can be monitored by
wayside hot brake detection.
If a line is adapted for higher speed in many regions of Europe, the percentage of tunnel
sections will increase. In comparison with other parts of a railway network the probability for
an accident is lower. This is because operation is much simpler (e. g. no shunting), although
the severity is higher should an accident occur. There is a tradition in Europe for tunnel safety
concepts which also include hazard alert systems. For the calculation of tunnel risk, the
density of rail traffic, the mix of trains (passenger or freight) and many other parameters are
taken into account. Without an expert´s report on tunnel safety, it is unwise to start operation.
So for each tunnel a couple of specific arrangements have to be evaluated taking into accout
the costs and benefits.
Highly curved sections can be defined as sections with over 10 % of curves with a radius
below 300 metres. The rail car properties which can cause trouble on such sections will
undergo preventative checks at the shunting yard or when entering the network.
Changes in superstructure are discontinuities of the stiffness of superstructure, which may
lead to dynamic movements of the train in longitudinal direction. Rail cars with instabilities
should also be checked next to a shunting yard or to a border of an infrastructure manager.
So if one train is prepared at a shunting yard, the first possibility for checking this train is in
departure sidings of the shunting yard. Trains entering the yard should also be checked, so
it would be possible to stop damaged cars. For economic reasons the number of locations
should be a minimum and must therefore have regard to the local situation of a shunting yard.
The same ideas must be taken into account for network borders.

14.3.2 Operational Handling Options

When a WTMS detects a condition on a vehicle, several options are theoretically possible:
–– immediate stop
–– stop at next station/side track
–– stop at next maintenance site or border station
–– continue under observation
–– mark for later maintenance
–– no action
Which option must be applied in the specific case depends on a series of factors:
–– severity of the alarm (hot versus warm axle box)
–– applied thresholds and rule set/operations manual
–– intervention options (availability of side track)
–– type and configuration of the WTMS
–– remaining distance to travel
–– decision-making process (simple, algorithmic, human)

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14 Hazard Alert Systems

Several possible concepts for intervention can thus be derived, with each having different
requirements and consequences:
1. immediate train stop, then decision taking
This concept is the easiest to implement and defaults to a safe behaviour, i.e. stopping
of a potentially unsafe vehicle. The main drawback is the false positive problem. Not
every train stopped presents a problem. Since every immediate stopping, be it a false
or true positive, blocks not only the train, but also the track, operational pressure will
immediately ensure to restore at least the track to normal operations. The decision-
making will thus occur under time pressure, and it cannot be guaranteed that a train
with a serious defect will not be allowed to continue if the problem is not readily
apparent. The key question is the way of decision-making. The only person immediately
on site is usually the train driver that would need to take this decision, which may not
be in the infrastructure managers interests. If an inspector needs to be dispatched
on site, this process can be prolonged dramatically. If the equipment is networked
and alerts are processed in a central facility, more efficient and safe decision-making
could be implemented there. In general, it is highly undesirable to halt trains in
tunnels, on viaducts, on high embankments in deep cuttings or across busy junctions,
unless absolutely essential. The ability of external help to access the train may be of
considerable importance.
2. case-by-case decision-making e. g. by operations centre, intervention centre,
algorithms
This case poses more requirements on the WTMS side. The usual implementation would
be in a networked environment with a central decision-making facility (either by human
or by algorithmic decision making processes), but decentral algorithmic are theoretically
possible. The first possible problem is that a condition may be detected, but no action
taken, since the system does not default to a safe action. Cross checks between
individuals, clear business rules and logging are actions to remedy this problem.
The main difficulty with case-by-case decisions lies in inconsistencies between
individual cases, or ensuring a united decision making process. This should be
addressed with a set of business rules that are submitted for authorisation to the
relevant authorities. These rule sets will describe in the minimum possible detected
conditions and the action(s) to be taken.
The key benefits are the reduction of obvious false positives, e. g. due to faulty sensors,
and the ability of tailoring actions to the situation at hand. A train that is only kilometres
from a repair yard could be allowed to continue to that destination without stopping
under surveillance, while a train with a marginally unsafe condition could be stopped
before entering a long tunnel.
3. no immediate decision making (only maintenance)
This concept proposes no immediate decision making. This allows targeted
maintenance optimization, but the safety benefits are much lower. Trains in an unsafe
or dangerous state will be allowed to run and potentially derail, causing damage to
infrastructure and vehicles. Despite its apparent simplicity, implementing such a system
is not trivial, since vehicle identification is a must to target maintenance activities on
a given vehicle. Axle counters and databases may help in many cases, but quality in
these databases is not optimal, especially where the vehicles concerned have also
been badly maintained.
If traffic disruption is not too great, a speed reduction will help, not to exceed intervention
thresholds.

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 14.3 Aspects of Application

14.3.3 Cost-benefit Analysis of Wayside Train Monitoring Systems

The probability of a derailment is the first input parameter of a cost-benefit-analysis and

can be estimated from the accident data base of an infrastructure manager. From the total
quantity of derailments, only those which can be avoided by trackside monitoring system
are relevant.

Figure 14.15: Quantitative benefit function

The benefit of using monitoring systems results from the saving of costs for repair of
infrastructure and vehicles. The likelihood of derailments and their average costs can be
compared with the total savings if preventative measures are taken. Afterwards, with a
variation of the number of detectors used, a similar calculation can consider the variation of
probability for detection of fault states before derailments happen. Figure 14.15 shows the
resulting benefit function quantitatively.
The cost-analysis focuses on the investment in trackside monitoring systems, which increase
linearly with the number of installed sensors. Before first installing a monitoring system, it is
also necessary to ensure the operational integration of all collected data. Thus, basic costs
must be also taken into account.
Figure 14.15 shows three different cost functions. Function 1 illustrates low basic costs
but high costs per unit. This leads to a comparatively fast increase in the total costs. In
contrast, function 2 represents high basic costs and low detector prices per unit. Due
to these constraints, both functions are located above the benefit function. Thus, in both
these scenarios the costs will be always higher than the investment and therefore the
introduction of a unit is not economically viable. Cost function 3 shows the combination
of low basic costs and low unit costs. Here an economically feasible zone can be found,
which should be reached with the implementation of trackside monitoring systems. As
suggested in figure 14.15 there will be a significant area of optimal benefit, where the
difference of costs and benefit has a global maximum. From an economic point of view,
an infrastructure manager should ensure that the number of installed detectors is in this
range.

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14 Hazard Alert Systems

14.3.4 Demand for a Generic Approach for Data Exchange

From a European perspective today’s monitoring systems, even for the same monitoring
target, vary with regards to their measurement capabilities, quality of results, interfaces and
data representation, calculation and processing time, etc. The main reasons are:
–– Different requirements of different infrastructure managers. In general, national monitoring
concepts are based upon national standards. Moreover, the national safety authority (NSA) as
well as the infrastructure managers has different strategies for monitoring trains in the overall
network (e. g. level of automation, level of centralisation and integration – see figure 14.16).
–– Different requirements within one infrastructure manager. Depending on the number of
departments interested in the results of monitoring systems, the requirements on the
location, quantity and accuracy of systems will differ.
–– Different development approaches of different manufacturers. Even for the same fault state
of vehicles, different indicators are used for the design of a monitoring system. Moreover,
different measurement principles often exist for the observation of an indicator.

Figure 14.16: Different integration levels of monitoring systems in Europe

As a consequence of measurement geometry and measurement principle, different hot box

detection systems measure different regions of the bearing housing which has a typical thermal
gradient. Thus, the results from such systems will be different, even if they measure the same
bearing with the same temperature (Eisenbrand 2011). Therefore results from European hot
box detection systems cannot be directly compared. Another example for the usage of diverse
monitoring systems in Europe can be found in axle load checkpoints (UIC 2011).
The conceptual design of a generic approach for data exchange aims basically at the
exchange and interpretation of data without detailed knowledge of sensor system properties.
Generally the data should be available for different parties (infrastructure managers, railway
undertakings, vehicle owners, etc.). For compatibility with the legal constraints on European
infrastructure managers or other data users, the concept should also provide configurable
access rights and the masking of vehicle IDs.
For high acceptance, there should be no changes in relevant safety alarm procedures of
infrastructure managers (just forwarding and listening). Furthermore, the application of user-
definable thresholds should be possible, to fulfil national recommendations, infrastructure
manager requirements, etc. For high flexibility, even the evaluation algorithm has to be
modifiable by the data users and depend on provided data.

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 14.3 Aspects of Application

The approach should allow the inclusion of as many sensor systems as possible for
comprehensive trend analysis. Thereby, a universal framework can be offered for data
representation and functionality. It is important to mention that the concept is not a change
request for suppliers regarding standardised evaluation of content, but providing already
existing output data in a different (unified) way.
In general, the following guiding principles have to be considered in the conceptual design:
–– use of existing monitoring systems (almost) independent of their output
–– open for integration of future systems
–– if data is available in different levels of detail, prefer the more detailed level
–– infrastructure managers are responsible for data provision
–– data users are responsible for the interpretation of data

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 15.1 Today’s Situation

15 Future of Signalling
Jochen Trinckauf, Daria Menzel

15.1 Today’s Situation

Consideration of the future of signalling needs also to look at the past, and earlier chapters of
this book in particular. Thus chapter 1 says: “During the 20th century, mechanical technologies
in railway signalling were replaced progressively by electricity, and later by micro-electronics.
Additional and sophisticated functions were added over time, but the principles of railway
signalling and interlocking remained unchanged from those established in the early years.”
There have been found to be three key requirements in a signalling system:
1. the interdependence between points and signals
2. the need for both flank and opposing protection
3. the need to keep trains separated from each other
These requirements may be described as requests of first magnitude, which must be
extended by requests of second magnitude as follows:
–– the need for speed supervision,
–– the detection of train integrity,
–– adequacy of level crossing protection
and others.
In a monograph (Bachurina 2018) the author has proved this thesis.
The performance of a classic interlocking can be reduced to the contemplation of a set of
points. All further needs are grouped around those points. For that the idiom “Tripol” has been
created, see figure 15.1.

Figure 15.1: The Tripol, representing a set of points

The Tripol can be applied on every route element as track, points, crossings, derailer, etc.
The new safety logic of Safeguarding Vehicle Movements (see chapter 15.6) is set up on
the following basics: With all route elements indicated as Tripol, and a route itself will be

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15 Future of Signalling

composed of a chain of related Tripols, with a standardised interface between all of them. Only
one standardised functional module for every Tripol will manage the safeguarding of vehicle
movements.
Applications as ETCS Level 2 (see chapter 8.4) without signals and CBTC (see chapter 8.5)
show that onboard train components more or less replace the use of traditional lineside
signalling.
Besides the development of signalling technology, other technologies such as microelectronic,
data communication, cloud stored data, energy management, artificial intelligence (and others)
made and make success. Ideas which have been dismissed as impracticable for signalling
technology reappear in new industry solutions and in their applications by the railways.
The following sections describe those ideas which will become the future reality, or are on their
way to do so soon.

15.2 Decentralised Interlocking

Current State of Technology

Chapter 9.4 of this book describes electronic interlocking. Since the hardware is electronic, the
software processes digital data for control and supervision of elements, as well as the internal
logic and the man-machine interface.
The idea behind decentralised interlocking1 is one which uses IP addressing to link all
elements for the data communication. This enables cabling to be reduced to a modest
number of wires (only two in theory), which can be laid out as one ring. This connects the
interlocking central unit with the element controllers, as well as multiple interlocking central
units, to the central traffic control centre (figure 9.52). In the case of interruption to the ring
(because of construction or assembling works), there will be no impact on the system’s
operation, and the availability will not be affected.
The communication between the interlocking central unit and the element controllers may
be replaced by radio. The wire based communication between interlocking central units
and central traffic control centres must not be set by cables along the railway line but may
be carried by remote networks. The advantages are of course cost reduction, but more
importantly to make cables obsolete and avoid criminal offences by assaults and theft.
The interfaces between the interlocking central unit and the element controllers will be
standardised for independence of delivery if the railway network operator takes responsibility
for the interfaces.
The energy delivery is separated from the data link. It does not matter if the delivery comes
from a public source or from a railway owned unit, such as the overhead electric traction line.
Solar panels and battery supported delivery are even possible, as well as hydrogen.
Another feature of the decentralised interlocking is the cloud based interlocking central unit.
This performs the interlocking logic and does not need any housing and hardware on site.
All features discussed so far are at a higher level of development. The requirement
specifications are not fixed, or otherwise under trial in single test applications.

1 In Germany the term digital interlocking is used as the opposite to electronic interlocking.

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 15.5 Maintenance

System Solution
Together with the advancing state of technology, some extension of performance should result
in an acceptable specific application in the field.
As the assembling of a new decentralised interlocking often takes place in an existing
environment of railway tracks and train operation, the migration must be practicable without
interrupting operations. Such modifications will be integrated into the system solution.
The associated design and approval procedure will be developed with new databased
processes. The IP addressing enables elements to and off the interlocking to be connected
and disconnected during a logic second. Of course, a safety related handling will need to be
established for such an innovation.

15.3 Signals
Though decentralised interlockings will become more common, the established relay and
electronic interlockings will remain in use for many years to come. So a number of approaches
may be used.
Lineside signals will become obsolete if ETCS Level 2 is installed. Where lineside signals are
necessary, the multiple colour LED signal will be substituted for signals with incandescent
bulbs and multiple optics, with different colours for each of them. Signal systems like for
example the German Ks which shows only a single colour light for any aspect will need only
one multiple colour optic.

15.4 Track Clear Detection Substituted by Train Integrity

Track clear detection as provided by track circuits, axle counters and other methods will
become obsolete as the result of train positioning in accordance with train integrity detection.
Today, the unintended parting of a passenger train is highly unlikely, but if it occurs a broken
electrical connection would give warning and the broken brake pipe would activate the brakes
in both parts of the train. The result with a freight train could fail because of the lack of an
electric connection between the wagons and the low sensibility of losing air pressure in the
braking pipe. Of course, the train characteristics are not a prime matter for signalling, but the
concept of ETCS Level 3 is available under the condition of train integrity.

15.5 Maintenance
Maintenance is undoubtedly necessary for a signalling system to be operated safely. Future
maintenance regimes need to consider the following:
–– Predictive maintenance avoids the breakdown of components, as well as reducing life cycle
costs.
–– Diagnostic systems collect data from the components and send them to the maintenance
operation centre.
The maintenance operation centre will use local organisations to do repairs as necessary, or it
may a remote repair itself.

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15 Future of Signalling

15.6 New Concept of Safeguarding Vehicle Movements

Based on major research and development, a new concept of Safeguarding Vehicle
Movements has successfully passed its early tests. This innovation has the aim of reactivating
secondary railways, or improving their economic efficiency (see figure 15.2).

Figure 15.2: Innovative concept of train-based safeguarding of routes

The concept is based on the following main items:

–– The position of the train is confirmed by a global navigation satellite system.
–– Trains travelling in opposite directions on a single line are in correspondence with each
other by radio link or by wireless LAN hotspot, and negotiate the line occupation and the
passing place to be used. Only one of the trains gets the clearance.
–– The point machines get an order in advance to lock themselves and in return send the
clearance message to the train.
It is obvious that the concept of Safeguarding Vehicle Movements does not need interlocking
in the classic style. The interlocking logic is in the onboard unit of the train. There will be a
backup system in the cloud which holds the actual vital data. This will refresh the onboard
units after shutdown, or in the case of a fall back method of operation.

15.7 Security
The impact of security is important in signalling systems, since they use open or half open
communication networks, with data storage in the cloud. The establishment of appropriate
Rules and Regulations are in their early stages.

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 References

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(Wenzel 2006) Wenzel, B.: Vergleich des Aufbaus, der Funktionen und der
Datenverarbeitungsvorgänge zwischen LZB mit CIR-ELKE und ETCS Level 2. Seminary Wort
at TU Dresden, 2006
(Wenzhou 2011): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wenzhou_train_collision
(White 2003) White, T.: Elements of Train Dispatching – Vol. 1. VTD Rail Publishing, Mountlake
Terrace (USA) 2003
(Wikipedia) www.wikipedia.de
(Witt 2017) https://witt-solutions.de/index.php/de/witt-solutions-com/
(Xu Zhengli 2003) Xu Zhengli: The Application of the Controllable Retarders and the Boosters
for the Speed Control in Marshalling Yard. Conference ZEL 2003, Zilina 2003
(Yamanouchi 1979) Yamanouchi, S.: Safety and ATC of Shinkansen. In: Japanese Railway
Engineering 2/1979
(Zářecký 2008) Zářecký, S.: The Newest Trends in Marshalling yards automation. In: Transport
Problems – Problemy Transportu, Tom 3 Volume 4 Part 1, 2008
(Zünd/Heiz 2006) Zünd, A.; Heiz, H.-P.: Die netzweite Umsetzung von ETCS in der Schweiz.
In: Signal+Draht 7+8/2006

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 Glossary

Glossary

Railway terms often vary between countries. For this book, the authors have tried to find terms
and definitions which are internationally understandable and appropriate. Here, the terms used
in this book are explained. They might deviate from those with which the reader is familiar.
Words in italics refer to a separate entry in the Glossary.

A
Absolute block system Form of fixed block system where, under normal operation, not
more than one train is permitted in any one block section at
any one time.
Absolute stop The stop aspect of a signal, which must not be passed by the
train without special permission from the signaller. It is used
where movable track elements have to be protected and in
absolute block systems.
Acceptance In the context of a line block system with neutral direction, this
is the permission given from one interlocking station to another
to send a train.
Activation of level crossing See Level crossing activation.
Active level crossing A level crossing where stationary technical equipment or
persons actively signal the road user if a train/shunting
movement is approaching.
Alternative routes If for an entrance-exit (NX) operation two or more routes are
possible between the same entrance and exit points, these
are referred to as alternative routes. One of these is usually a
priority (preferred) route. Depending on the technology, route
selection may be manual or designed to default automatically
to the priority route.
Approach aspect North American term for caution aspect.
Approach control This is a British dynamic form of speed restriction warning.
Signals show restrictive aspects (e. g. to Stop or Caution) to
instruct the driver to brake, and are then cleared when the train
has reached a defined approach point.
Approach locking Performing irreversible route locking automatically upon
detection of the approaching train.
Approach sight triangle At a passive level crossing, the area which must be clear of
obstacles to enable road users to see an approaching train/
shunting movement in time, taking into account the defined
speed of each.
Approach time 1. The time a signal has to be cleared ahead of a train to prevent
this train to pass a caution aspect at the signal in rear.
2. At a level crossing, the time from the train being visible
to the road user (passive level crossing) or from the first
warning of the road user (active level crossing) until the train
reaches the level crossing.

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Approach to A position along the track which is reached by the train before
a defined item of equipment, such as a signal. An alternative
term is ‘in rear of’.
Area detector A detector, mainly used for external objects, which detects
objects in a two-dimensional (area) form. The mainly used
technical principles are electromagnetic waves, alarm wires,
induction and fibre optic sensing.
Area of conflict The areas where the clearance profiles of two tracks, or at a
level crossing of the railway and the road, overlap and which
can only be assigned exclusively to one of them at any one time.
Aspect See Signal aspect.
ATC Abbreviation for Automatic Train Control.
ATO Abbreviation for Automatic Train Operation.
ATP Abbreviation for Automatic Train Protection.
Attentiveness check A function of train protection systems where, in certain
situations (e. g. when passing a distant signal at caution), the
driver is required to confirm his attentiveness and that he is
ready to undertake the required actions (e. g. braking).
Automatic Equipment AEI provides a direct data connection between vehicles
Identification (AEI) (waggons, locomotives) or loading units (containers, swap
bodies) and the information systems. With that, the objects
can be identified in the network and detailed information
forwarded.
Automatic block system A line block system where blocking and unblocking (upon
clearing) are done automatically.
Automatic point setting A feature which automatically commands all required movable
track elements to take up their appropriate positions when a
route has been selected.
Automatic route calling An automation function which allows the consecutive passing
of several trains through the same route by automatically
repeated calling of the same route for each train.
Automatic route setting An automation functions where trains are routed into different
tracks according to stored information such as timetables,
priority and alternative routes.
Automatic signal A signal, usually a block signal, which is controlled
automatically by the passage of trains and does not need any
action by the signaller to set or restore it.
Automatic system A system (e. g. for line block, route interlocking or train driving)
where defined processes can be operated without the active
involvement of a person.
Automatic Train Operation An advanced form of train control where in normal operation
the train can be driven automatically without the active
involvement of a driver.
Automatic Train Routeing Another term for Automatic route setting.

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Autonomous level crossing An active level crossing which, in contrast to the route
dependent level crossing, is controlled and supervised
independently from routes.
Auxiliary signal Signal to issue a Movement Authority in degraded mode
operation which is used to substitute a written instruction in case
the normal signal cannot be cleared. There are two main types:
those which require movement on sight and those which do not.
Availability The ability of an item to be in a state to perform a required
function under given conditions, either at a given instant of
time or over a given time interval, assuming that the required
external resources are provided.
Availability redundancy A principle where the same components are provided in
duplicate (or more) to enable the continuation of that function
in the case of failure.
Axle counter A device for track clear detection, based on the counting of
axles entering and leaving a defined portion of track and
comparing these values.

B
Balise A trackside spot element used in train protection and cab
signalling systems that transmits information to passing trains,
using the transponder principle.
Beyond A position along the track which is reached by the train after a
defined point such as a trackside signal. An alternative term is
‘in advance’.
Bi-stable relay A relay with two stable positions which remains in the latest
position if deenergised.
Block information Logical principle in line block systems which is based on the
exchange of arrival and departure messages. Also a term for
the messages exchanged between block points.
Block line The section between two neighbouring interlocking stations, within
which the sequence of trains cannot be changed, and only trains
proceeding in the same direction are permitted at the same time.
Block point A signal that governs train movements into a block section.
Block section A section of track in a fixed block system which a train may
enter only when it is not occupied by other trains or vehicles.
Block signal A signal, usually on the open line, which controls only following
movements.
Block station An evaluation unit including the related signals which limits
block sections.
Block system A short term for line block system.
Blocking In a tokenless block system, the reservation of a section of line
for a certain train.
Blocking time The time interval in which a section of track is allocated
exclusively to one train and is therefore blocked to other trains.
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Glossary

C
Cab signalling A signalling system that displays signal indications on the
driver’s console.
Call(ing) on signal A signal in Britain and some other countries which is used for
two functions:
1. as auxiliary signal
2. to authorise a movement on sight by a train in regular
operation, such as joining two parts of a train.
Cascade interlocking Logical principle and the related form of interlocking machine
where a route is built up on the principle that each element of
the route locks the element beyond.
Catch points A movable track element that is designed as an incomplete
set of points. The purpose is to protect route(s) in advance by
derailing any unauthorised movement that would otherwise
conflict with those route(s). For the protected route(s), this
would be mainly classed as flank protection.
Caution aspect A signal aspect for trains, in most countries indicated by yellow
or double yellow, that informs the driver that he is at or within
service braking distance of the stop aspect ahead and hence
requires him to start braking if he is not already doing so.
CBTC See Communication Based Train Control System.
Centralised block system A line block system in which the block information for several
block points is processed in a central place.
Centralised Traffic An operation control system in which the local interlockings are
Control (CTC) remotely controlled from a central place.
Class 1 relay Ancient term for type N relay.
Class 2 relay Ancient term for type C relay.
Clear a signal Alternative term for ‘open a signal’.
Clear aspect See Proceed aspect.
Clearance profile The space around a track which must be free from obstruction
to enable the safe movement of a rail vehicle on that track.
Different clearance profiles may be required for different types
of rolling stock and railway categories, and such profiles can
differ between railway nets and countries.
Clearing point A point beyond a signal which a train must have cleared
completely before the signal in rear be opened (cleared).
Close a signal Switching process to restore a signal to its most restrictive aspect.
Colour light signal A light signal which displays the aspects by different colours.
Colour position light signal A light signal which displays the aspects by different light
formations of different colours.
Combined signal Combination of main and distant signal functions in one
trackside signal.

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Communication Based A Railway signalling system with continuous bidirectional

Train Control System (CBTC) track–train data communications on the basis of moving block
used in city mass transit (e. g. underground and light metro).
Composite fail-safety Strategy to achieve fail-safety by processing the safety-related
action in at least two redundant channels and comparing the
results.
Conflicting area See Area of conflict.
Consecutive routes Routes in the same direction which can be used by the same
train/shunting movement in sequence without stopping, with the
exit from the one route being the entrance to the other. In some
cases this has to be prohibited by special route interlocking.
Continuous speed control A retarding concept with permanent or frequently repeated
method control and influence on the speed of free running wagons (or
groups of wagons) during the gravity shunting process.
Control length of a signal The length of track beyond a trackside signal that must be
clear before the signal can be cleared for a train movement.
Controlled signal A signal that is locally or remotely controlled by an operator
or by an external automation system (e. g. automatic route
setting, Automatic Train Routeing). It is the opposite of
an automatic signal. A controlled signal which can be set
by the signaller to automatic mode is known as a semi-
automatic signal.

D
Deactivation of level crossing See Level crossing deactivation.
Decentralised block system A line block system in which the block information of
each block point is processed locally and exchanged with
neighbouring block points.
Degraded mode operation Alternative technical or procedural methods of safety in case
the normal technical equipment or procedures cannot be used
due to a technical defect or non-applicability to the particular
case. Degraded mode operation often implies a lower level of
safety and/or operational disadvantages.
Departure signal Alternative term for station exit signal.
Derail North American term for derailer (called ‘block derail’) or catch
points (called ‘split point derail’).
Derailer A movable track element which is designed as a block
to be set on one or both rails. The purpose is to derail an
unintendedly moving rail vehicle. The main use is flank
protection for another authorised movement.
Destination signal An interlocking signal at the exit of an interlocked route. It is
also called the exit or target signal of that route.

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Diagnostic system A system or sub-system that supervises other technical systems

like field elements (points, signals), interlocking systems,
shunting technical facilities (retarders, handling systems, brake
test facilities), information and communication systems. It
detects and records faults and gives appropriate messages to
support maintenance.
Diamond crossing A piece of infrastructure where two tracks cross without any
ability for rail vehicles to transfer from one to the other track.
Some diamond crossings have movable parts, in which case
they belong to movable track elements.
Dispatcher An employee who supervises train movements on a line or
within a certain area. In centralised operation, the dispatcher
can be the same person as the operator and/or signaller.
Distant signal A signal that provides a caution aspect to a main signal ahead.
A distant signal does not define a block section.
Disturbance Deviation from the specified performance of a system due to
external influences.
Dual protective points Points which momentarily are requested for flank protection
from both trailing ends at the same time but can give flank
protection only to one side.
Dynamic speed profile Based on the static speed profile, a continuous definition of
the possible speed. This considers also the necessary braking
processes for a required stop or a reduced speed in advance.

E
Electric interlocking 1. Alternative (mainly Eastern European) term for relay interlocking.
2. Alternative (North American) term for a certain kind of
electro-mechanical interlocking.
Electric token block system A line block system where several tokens exist for each block
section. The tokens are electrically interlocked in stationary
token instruments on both ends of the respective block
section to ensure that only one token can be out of the
instrument at the same time.
Electro-mechanical interlocking An interlocking machine where the functions of interlocking
and field element control are performed partly by mechanical
and partly by electrical functions
Electro-pneumatic interlocking An interlocking machine that controls field elements pneumatically.
Electronic interlocking Interlocking machine where the interlocking function is
performed by electronic logic circuits respectively by the
software processed by these.
Element control All functions of control and supervision of field elements (e. g.
movable track elements, track clear detection, signals) below
the interlocking level.

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End of Authority The position where a Movement Authority ends. In trackside

signalling, it is marked by a main signal displaying a stop
aspect or comparable devices.
End of train detection system A system, either train-based or track-based, which automatically
detects the presence of the end of the train to prove train
completeness.
Entrance signal A signal at the entrance of an interlocked route or a block section.
Entrance-exit (NX) operation Frequently used form of operation control in relay and electronic
interlocking. A route is selected and automatically set when the
signaller operates two elements, one representing the entrance
(start), the other the exit (target) of the route.
Entry signal Alternative term for the home signal of a station area.
Error Deviation from the intended design which could result in
unintended system behaviour or failure.
European Train Control A standardised European system for train protection and cab
System (ETCS) signalling.
Exit signal 1. An interlocking signal that governs train movements to leave
a station track and enter the open line. It is also called a
station exit signal.
2. North American term for the opposing interlocking signal a
train passes when leaving interlocking limits.
3. An interlocking signal at the exit from an interlocked route. It
is also called a destination or target signal.
External object All objects except rail vehicles which might (legitimately or
otherwise) be inside the clearance profile of the railway.

F
Facing move(ment) Movement over points in the direction in which the tracks diverge.
Fail-safe principle, Fail-safety A basic principle of safe systems, in which any kind of
assumable failure must lead to a safe situation. This may result
in severe traffic disruption or other inconveniences.
Failure Deviation from specified performance. A failure is the
consequence of a fault or error in a system.
Fallback level A particular level of degraded mode operation.
Fault Abnormal condition that could lead to an error or a failure in a
system. A fault can be random or systematic.
Fibre optic sensing Detection principle based on the signal changes in fibre optic
cables. It can be used for spot detection and area detection
purposes.
Field element Summary term for all signalling devices which are connected
with the interlocking machine and are situated outside of it,
e. g. points, signals, track circuits and axle counters.
Fixed block system Form of movement in space intervals in which the track behind
a train is cleared sequentially in the form of fixed block sections.

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Flank area The portion of track which is situated between an element

which gives flank protection to the route and the route itself.
Flank protection Protection of a train against a sideways collision movement.
Fleeting An automation function which allows the passing of several
consecutive trains through the same route without intervention
from the signaller. The signals are used like automatic block
signals. It is also known as auto-working facility.
Following protection Protection of a train against collision from another movement
in the same direction.
Fouling point That location at points, diamond crossing, slip crossing or
other track element with two overlapping tracks, up to which
a rail vehicle can stand on the one track without being foul of a
movement on the other track.
Free shunting A method of shunting without interlocked shunting routes,
where the staff have full responsibility for safety.
Front protection A feature of route interlocking that is provided by some
railways to prevent any unauthorised opposing movement
affecting that route. It is analogous to flank protection.

G
Gradient The rate at which the track is inclined up (+) or down (–).
Gravity shunting A shunting method in which wagons run down a gradient
driven by gravity (usually down a hump) into their target tracks.
Ground staff Summary term for all railway employees whose workplace is
on the trackside, e. g. signallers, dispatchers, gatekeepers and
train observers.

H
Hand signal Signal that is given manually by a person.
Hazard alert system Track-based and/or vehicle-based equipment for the monitoring
of faults on the train or trackside to avoid dangerous events or
to reduce the damage caused by such an event.
Headway The time interval between two successive trains.
Home signal 1. A signal governing the entrance to an interlocking area.
2. A signal governing the entrance to a station area.
Hump process control system Control system for a hump yard, which is actually an electronic
interlocking with extensive automation functions and serves for
the optimum control of the hump process.

I
In advance Alternative term for ‘beyond’.
In rear of Alternative term for ‘approach to’.

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Inherent fail-safety Strategy to achieve fail-safety by the characteristics of

materials. The probability of dangerous failure of the
components is extremely low and does therefore not need to
be assumed.
Insulated rail joint (IRJ) A joint of two sections of rails with insulation between. It is
used as a boundary for track circuits.
Interlocking An arrangement of points and signals interconnected in a way
that the switching of these elements can only be performed in
a proper and safe sequence.
Interlocking area The area of control of one interlocking machine.
Interlocking machine A machine which performs interlocking in a specific installation.
Interlocking plant North American term for interlocking area.
Interlocking signal A signal that governs a train route inside an interlocking area.
Intermediate interlocking/ An interlocking signal that is neither a home signal nor a station
station signal exit signal.
Intervention A function of train protection systems where safe behaviour is
enforced by the technical system, e. g. braking the train in the
case of excessive speed. Intervention requires supervision as a
precondition.
IRJ/IJ See Insulated rail joint.
Irreversible route locking Step of route locking which, for the prevention of route release
under a moving train, can only be cancelled by the detection
of the train’s position, unless methods of degraded mode
operation are used.

L
Leaving signal North American term for a signal that governs train movements
to leave a siding, yard, or branch line onto a main line.
Level crossing A crossing of the railway and a road at grade.
Level crossing activation Function of an active level crossing that leads to switching
warning lights on and lowering the barriers. The road user is
warned of approaching train/shunting movements.
Level crossing deactivation Function of an Active Level Crossing that leads to switching
warning lights off and raising the barriers. The road user is no
longer warned of approaching train/shunting movements.
Light signal A form of optical trackside signal where signal aspects are
indicated by lights in different colours (colour light signals) and/or
geometrical arrangements (position light signals). Optionally, this
can be combined with the selective blinking of one or more lights.
Limit of shunt board/signal A fixed sign or a signal that marks the shunting limit.
Linear wheel and axle detector Detectors that are used for linear detection of wheels/axles of
railway vehicle in a certain area. Most important example are
track circuits.

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Glossary

Line block Summary term for all technical safety systems on open lines
for following and opposing protection.
Local operation area A shunting area which can be selectively controlled either
centrally from the interlocking or locally, e. g. by the driver or
the shunting staff.
Local-electrical Operated An arrangement of electric points control in marshalling yards.
Point Switches (LOPS) This includes simplified interlocking functions where the path
is selected by the shunting vehicles or by shunting staff. The
term is used in North America, but similar arrangements are
also used in Europe.
Locking of a route See Route locking.
Loop A main track for passing and overtaking trains.
LOPS Abbreviation for Local-electrical Operated Point Switches.

M
Main signal A signal that authorises the movement of a train to enter a
given section of track.
Main track A track used for regular train movements.
Maintainability Ability (of an item) to be retained in, or restored to, a state
to perform as required, under given conditions of use and
maintenance.
Management Information A system or process that provides the information necessary
System (MIS) to manage an organisation effectively (in this context a railway
company or a business unit like a marshalling yard). This
system and the information it generates, together with financial
information, are generally considered essential components of
business decisions.
Mechanical interlocking Interlocking machine based on the use of mechanical locks
and mechanical connections to field elements.
Mechanical signal Signal that is given by different position of objects.
Mono-stable relay A relay with one stable position which is taken by the relay if
deenergised.
Movable point crossing North American term for a diamond crossing with movable frogs.
Movable track element A piece of infrastructure with moving parts which interrupts the
continuous rail on which trains run, or which protrudes into the
clearance profiles of the track. Therefore, it needs particular
safeguards.
Movement Authority The permission given to a train to move up to a defined
position. This position is called End of Authority.
Movement in space intervals A principle of operation in which trains are separated by
dividing the track into portions, such that one portion can only
be occupied by one train at the same time.

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Movement in time intervals A principle of operation in which trains are separated

by a defined time interval between the departure of two
consecutive trains.
Movement on sight A principle of operation in which the driver must be able to
stop at any time within the track length he/she can observe,
and therefore must not exceed an appropriate speed. Versions
are movement to half the sighting distance and movement to
the full sighting distance.
Movement to half A form of movement on sight where the train driver must
the sighting distance assume an opposing movement approaching at the same
speed and must therefore be able to stop at any time within
the half length of the track he can observe.
Movement to the full sighting A form of movement on sight where the train driver does not
distance need to assume an opposing movement but must be able to
stop at any standing obstacle appearing in his sight.
Moving block system A form of movement in space intervals where the required
space in front of a train is not defined by fixed track locations
but is moving with the train. The faster the train is moving, the
greater the distance (and hence the time) it needs to stop.
Thus, the length of the space interval depends on the speed
of the train.

N
Negative signal Signal that gives information by absence of an indication.
Neutral direction Logical principle of opposing protection in block systems
where in normal position no train can enter the block line, and
each movement has to be agreed between the neighbouring
interlocking stations.
Non signal-controlled An operating procedure in which the traffic is controlled by
operation verbal or written authority (a non-technical safety system).
Also known as an unsignalled or hand signalled move. A non
signal- controlled operation may be combined with a signalling
system as a safety overlay.
Non-technical safety system A system where safety is achieved non-technically, e. g. by
persons obeying rules.
Normal position Originally the position of a lever e. g. in mechanical
interlocking where the lever rests in the machine and the
function attached to it is currently not activated. In the wider
sense (in which it is used in the book) that position of points
to which the points are usually returned if unused. Also, in
more modern technologies, the initial position of a function
when no train is in proximity.
NX-operation Abbreviation for Entrance-exit (NX) operation.

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O
Open a signal Switching process to switch a signal from its most restrictive to
a less restrictive aspect; also called ‘to clear a signal’.
Open line Main tracks outside station areas (not used in North American
and British signalling).
Operation control The functions above the interlocking level for the selection of
routes or other command input by the signaller/operator, or by
automatic systems.
Operator A staff member who controls train movements. Summarized
term for signaller and dispatcher.
Opposing protection The protection of a train/shunting movement against collision
with a movement from the opposite direction.
Opposing routes Routes from opposite directions which lead into the same
track, and which require special route interlocking to achieve
opposing protection.
Overlap A certain length of track beyond a signal that must be clear
for a train movement to be given a Movement Authority up to
that signal, and which must remain locked whenever such a
Movement Authority has been given.

P
Passive level crossing A level crossing which always appears to the road user in the
same way, without any indication of whether a rail vehicle is
approaching or not. The road user must therefore take full
responsibility for the safe use of the crossing.
Path A way the train or shunting movement unit can take according
to the positions of movable track elements.
Permissive block system A method of working of a line block system which allows a train
movement into an occupied block section if it moves on sight.
Permissive stop A stop aspect of a signal which may be passed by the driver
on sight after stopping. It is used in permissive block systems.
Phantom light Physical effect caused by sunlight imitating a lit signal lamp in
light signals due to reflection or bright image focussed on the
filament of the lamp.
Placed direction The logical principle of opposing protection in block systems,
where at any one time either of the two neighbouring interlocking
stations has the permission to send trains into the block line and
thus the other has not. That direction can be exchanged.
Point machine A machine in the field equipment for the physical operation,
locking and detection of points or other movable track elements.
Point zone The zone beyond an interlocking signal where, due to movable
track elements located there, a speed restriction displayed at
the signal is valid.

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Points An assembly of rails, movable point blades and a frog, which

effect the tangential branching of tracks and allows trains or
vehicles to run over one track or another. Points are probably
the most frequently found movable track element. In North
America, the term ‘switch’ is used for the whole, whereas
‘points’ mean the blades only.
Position light signal A light signal which displays the aspects by different light
formations of the same colour.
Positive signal Signal that gives information by presence of an indication.
Positive Train Control (PTC) Processor-/communication-based train control system
specified in the USA to prevent train-to-train collisions,
derailments caused by excessive speeds, unauthorized train
movements in work zones and the movement of trains through
points left in the wrong position.
Preliminary caution aspect A signal aspect which warns of a caution aspect at the next
signal and therefore requires the train to start braking under
certain circumstances.
Priority route If after an entrance-exit operation two or more alternative
routes are possible between the same entrance and exit, the
priority route is that given preference in selection.
Proceed aspect Any aspect which allows to a driver to pass the signal.
PTC See Positive Train Control.

R
Rail vehicle Any rolling stock which is designed to move on a railway and
has permission or is licensed to do so.
Range of vision 1. In context with optical trackside signals, the distance over
which, based on optical parameters, the signal is visible to
the driver from a defined direction.
2. The distance in front of a train or shunting movement which
is visible to the driver.
Either of these may need to take into account the effects of
darkness, fog and falling snow.
Reactive fail-safety Strategy to achieve fail-safety by supervision of components
and active switching to a safe state in case of failure.
Redundancy A principle in which each process is calculated at least twice,
and the results compared. It is found particularly in electronic
systems. It can serve for safety or availability or both. If used
for safety, the resulting action is only performed in case
of agreement, otherwise the system goes to a safe (often
obstructing) state.
Registration method A method where safety critical occurrences, in many cases also
special commands in degraded mode operation, are registered
to ensure the appropriate behaviour of those responsible.

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Glossary

Relay interlocking Interlocking machine where the interlocking function is

performed by relay logic circuits.
Relay set In some types of relay interlocking (mainly topological
interlocking): A standardised and pre-manufactured group of
relays and other electrical elements which represent a defined
kind of element in the track layout.
Reliability Ability (of an item) to perform as required, without failure, for a
given time interval, under given conditions.
Replace a signal Alternative term for ‘close a signal’.
Restore a signal North American term for ‘close a signal’.
Restrictive permissive stop An intermediate solution between absolute and permissive
stop where the driver is permitted to pass the signal in own
responsibility only in certain defined cases.
Retarding concept Arrangements of trackside braking to make gravity shunting
processes at marshalling yards safe and efficient. Parts of this
concept are the optimisation of choice and arrangement of
retarders. The two basic retarding concepts are the continuous
speed control method and the target shooting method.
Retro-reflection Multiple reflection in spherical or prismatic structures on
artificial material surfaces used for signal boards.
Reverse position End position of points that is not the normal position.
Reversible route locking The step of route locking which simply provides a dependence
between movable track elements and signals and can be
cancelled by the signaller without using methods of degraded
mode operation if the signal is at stop.
Risk Product of the frequency, or probability, and the consequence
of a specified hazardous event.
Route A locked path for a safe train and/or shunting movement.
Route conflict A conflict between two called routes (e. g. points required in
different positions) which prevents both from being set at the
same time.
Route dependent level An active level crossing which is included in a route that way
crossing that a main signal at Proceed guarantees to the train driver
that the level crossing is safely closed or is ready to close
safely for road traffic.
Route locking A route can become locked if all elements which belong to the
route (including overlap, flank protection and start section, if
required) are locked in the proper positions. It is a precondition
to issue a Movement Authority. Route locking is typically
performed in two sequential steps: reversible route locking and
irreversible route locking.
Route queuing An automation function which, if a requested route is currently
not available due to a route conflict, automatically repeats the
route request until the route becomes available.

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 Glossary

Route release Unlocking of a route, in normal operation after the train/shunting

movement has passed the route or the respective route section.
This is the counterpart to route locking. In degraded mode
operation, route release can also be performed manually by the
signaller, also if the train has not (yet) used the route.
Route section See Sectional route release.
Route signalling A signal system, the signal indications of which display
only information about the path to be taken through the
interlocking, with no direct information about the maximum
speed permitted.
Running path That part of a route which is legitimately traversed by the train
or shunting movement.

S
Safe system/component See Vital system/component.
Safety Functional safety within the system that protects against
hazardous consequences caused by technical failure and/or
human error.
Safety functions Summary of all functions which are responsible for safety
and have therefore to fulfil strict requirements regarding their
correct functioning (e. g. fail-safety).
Safety overlay An additional technical support in a non-technical safety
system which reduces the probability or the consequences of
dangerous human error. In contrast to technical safety systems,
the safety responsibility basically remains that of the human.
Secondary tracks Tracks which are not used for regular train movements, only
for shunting.
Sectional route release The splitting of a route into two or more sections, with each
section being individually released behind the train/shunting
movement.
Security Protection against hazardous consequences caused by
wilful unreasonable human actions, e. g. crime, terrorism or
vandalism, but also wilful careless actions.
Semi-automatic block system A line block system where blocking/unblocking are done partly
manually and partly automatically.
Shunt(ing) signals A fixed signal that authorises shunting movements.
Shunting limits A position along the track, usually demarcated by some form
of signing, which limits an area where shunting is permitted and
which therefore must not be passed by shunting movements.
Shunting movement All movements with rail vehicles other than train movements.
Shunting movements are undertaken at low speed and over
short distances.
Siding 1. A track that may not be used for regular train movements.
2. North American term for a loop.

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Glossary

Sighting distance The distance, measured along the path of the train, from the
sighting point to the trackside signal. In contrast to the range
of vision, this takes into account obstructions such as bridges
and track curvature.
Sighting point The furthermost point on the approach to a trackside signal
from where the driver can reliably read the signal aspect
including its associated subsidiary aspects. This needs to
consider also obstructions to vision such as bridges and track
curvature.
Signal aspect Any valid display of a trackside signal.
Signal box Building that houses the interlocking and operational
equipment, mainly in old technologies.
Signal clearing/opening See Clear a signal.
Signal dependence Basic logical principle of interlocking whereby a main signal
must not be cleared unless the movable track elements
beyond the signal are locked in safe positions.
Signal indication The information content that is connected with a signal aspect
by operational rules.
Signal release Returning a signal to stop after the front end of the train/
shunting movement has passed it and the driver can no longer
see it; to protect the train from a following movement.
Signal-controlled operation A form of operation in which train movements are governed by
signal indication.
Signaller An employee who operates signalling apparatus. The signaller
can also be operator and/or dispatcher.
Simple route interlocking The locking of two routes against each other as a direct result
of a movable track element being required in different positions
by these two routes.
Slip See Slip crossing.
Slip crossing A movable track element where two tracks cross and where, in
contrast to diamond crossings, rail vehicles can transfer from one
track to the other. A further distinction is whether that transfer can
take place on both sides (double slip) or one side only (single slip).
Special command All command inputs by staff in the operation of an interlocking
system, which can be potentially dangerous. Special
commands are often used in degraded mode operation, but
also in other situations where safety critical actions of staff
cannot be completely eliminated. Special safety precautions
apply for the input of these commands, such as registration
method and/or time delay method.
Special route interlocking The locking of two routes against each other which do not need
any movable track element in a different position. Examples are
opposing and, in some cases, consecutive routes.

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 Glossary

Speed restriction aspect A signal aspect which defines a speed restriction which must
not be exceeded when passing the trackside signal.
Speed restriction warning A signal aspect which defines a speed restriction aspect
aspect beyond and requires the driver to slow down appropriately.
Speed signalling A signal system, the indications of which convey information
about the maximum speed through the interlocking and not
necessarily the route to be taken.
Splitting of trains An operational method where one train is split into two or
more trains.
Spot wheel detector Rail contact used for spot detection of wheels/axles of railway
vehicles. They can be used with different principles (e. g.
mechanical, hydraulic/pneumatic, magnetic, inductive).
Spring points Special form of trailable points which have a preferred end
position, are regularly opened by the wheels of trains and
return automatically to the preferred position in the absence
of a rail vehicle. The return can be performed by a spring, or
electrically in combination with track clear detection.
Sprung points See Spring points.
Staff See Train staff and Ground staff.
Start section/zone That portion of a route which lies in rear of the route entrance
signal, but is occupied by a train waiting at that signal, or will
become occupied by moving from the waiting place to the
signal. In some cases, elements in the start zone have to be
considered for route interlocking and speed control.
Static speed profile A profile which continuously defines the permitted speed of a
train over the whole length of its path. The permitted speed
at a defined location is the minimum of all possible speed
restrictions at that location.
Station 1. A place designated in the timetable, by name.
2. A place with a platform stop for passenger trains.
3. A short term for a station area (not used in North American
or British signalling).
Station area An arrangement of station tracks limited by opposing home
signals (not used in North American or British signalling).
Station exit signal An interlocking signal that governs train movements to leave a
station track onto the open line.
Station throat Area at one end of a typical station where the open line tracks
branch out into the station tracks.
Station track A track protected by interlocking signals on which trains
may originate, terminate, pass and turn (not used in North
American or British signalling).
Stop aspect Any signal aspect which requires the driver to stop at the signal.
In most countries it is displayed by one or two red lights.

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Glossary

Supervision 1. In the context of train protection systems, this is a function

in which certain parameters of the moving train/shunting
(particularly the speed) are supervised and compared with a
permitted value.
2. In the context of movable track elements, supervision is
the detection of the current position of the element and
evaluation of this information for interlocking purposes.
Switch North American term for points.

T
Tabular interlocking Logical principle and the related form of interlocking machine,
where all routes are pre-defined in a route locking matrix,
including the information about which elements have to be
locked for the route.
Target section Last portion of tracks of the running path of a route which
remains occupied if the train/shunting has to stop at the route
exit signal, even if the route has already been released.
Target shooting method A retarding concept of gravity shunting where the wagon,
after leaving the last retarder, has exactly the proper speed
to achieve the desired position in classification track. That
means different speeds depending on the changing distances
between last retarder and target position.
Target signal Another term for Exit or Destination signal.
Technical safety system A system where safety is achieved by technology.
Three-dimensional detection Detection principle using visual observation or automatic
image processing technology for the detection of objects in a
certain track area.
Time delay method A frequently used method, particular in degraded mode
operation and for other special commands, where a time
delay is applied between commanding a function and
its actual performance. This assumes that a present or
approaching train has left the dangerous area, has come to
a stop, or has shown its presence by occupying more track
sections during this time.
Token block system A safety system for open lines using block information, based
on the principle that the exclusive right to enter a defined
section is given by the presence of a dedicated physical object
on the train. See also Train staff.
Tokenless block system A safety system for open lines using block information, where
the right to enter a defined block section is managed without
physical objects, but by exchange of block information
between neighbouring block points and interlocking stations.

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 Glossary

Topological interlocking Logical principle and the related form of interlocking

machine where routes are defined based on neighbourhood
connections in the track layout, and each route is searched
anew in the track layout upon request.
Track circuit A frequently used device for track clear detection, based on the
detection of a current flowing between the rails via the axles.
Track clear detection Summary term for all technical equipment and procedures
which serve to prove the tracks clear.
Track occupancy detection Another term for track clear detection.
Trackside signal A signal that stands at the trackside and displays information
to drivers or other persons.
Trailable points Points which can be forced to open by a trailing movement
without damage to the point structure, point machine or vehicle.
Trailing move(ment) Movement over points in the direction in which the tracks
converge.
Train control system A common term for difference system functions as train
protection, supervision, operation etc.
Train movement A locomotive or self-propelled vehicle, alone or coupled to one
or more vehicles, with authority to operate on a main track in
accordance to rules specified for train movements.
Train protection system A technical safety system or safety overlay system which
supervises the driver and enforces compliance with the rules,
particularly stopping at an End of Authority and obeying speed
restrictions.
Train staff 1. Summary term for all railway employees whose normal
workplace is on the train e. g. drivers, co-drivers,
conductors etc.
2. In a token block system a device (a staff) that authorises the
entrance into an assigned block section.
Train stop Trackside device in train protection systems used to implement
the Train Trip function.
Train Trip An intervention function which is used to apply brakes to the train
with the maximum available braking force until a complete stop is
achieved. The term is used particularly in context with ETCS.
Transferred flank protection If an element is requested for flank protection, but cannot give it at
present, it forwards the request to another element further beyond.
Trap points Points with short diverging track which ends at a buffer stop
or in a sand drag. The main use is flank protection; in some
cases it is also used for opposing protection.
Type C (proved) relay A relay for which the safety conditions are guaranteed by
control of operations in the circuit (UIC Code 736).
Type N (non-proved) relay A relay that itself fulfills all the safety conditions without the
aid of other relays or without control of operations in the
circuit (UIC Code 736).

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Glossary

U
UMLER North America only. The Universal Machine Language
Equipment Register (UMLER) is a database which contains
a distinct combination of the reporting mark and number of
each locomotive and freight wagon (including containers and
highway truck trailers). This system cooperates with Automatic
Equipment Identification.
Unblocking In a tokenless block system, this is the technical clearing of the
block after the train has cleared the related section.

V
Vehicle signal A signal that is attached to a rail vehicle and gives information
to drivers of other rail vehicles, ground staff and other persons.
Vital system/component A system or component whose purpose is to fulfil safety
functions in the railway system and which therefore has to be
designed to fulfil particular requirements, e. g. fail-safety.

W
Warning In the context of train protection systems, a function where a
signal is given to the driver in a selected, possibly dangerous
situation (e. g. excessive speed) to direct his attention.
Warning time At a level crossing, the advance warning time for the road user
before a train reaches the crossing.
Wayside signal North American term for trackside signal.

Y
Yard An arrangement of secondary tracks used for making up
trains, storing cars and trains and other purposes.
Yard limits North American close equivalent for shunting limits.
Yard management system A system which controls a marshalling yard at high levels of
automation. It consists of hump process control systems,
diagnostic systems and management information systems.

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 Explanation of Symbols in Track Layout Schemes

Explanation of Symbols in Track Layout Schemes

The symbols which are used in track layout plans differ much between the countries.
The authors of the book have agreed on common symbols which are valid only for this
book. In the following they are listed.

track (general)
track with a route set on it
signal for trains (general)

signal at ‘Clear’, green light

signal at ‘Caution’, yellow light

signal at ‘Stop’, red light

signal, white light

signal, flashing light

signal, speed restriction aspect

signal, speed restriction warning aspect

shunting signal

points (general)

points in straight position

points in branching position

single slip crossing

double slip crossing

derailer (general)

derailer in passing position

derailer in derailing position

insulated rail joint (track circuit on one side)

▶

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Explanation of Symbols in Track Layout Schemes

insulated rail joint (track circuits on both sides)

axle counter

spot wheel detector (no axle counter)

balise
other spot transmitter of train protection system

platform

buffer stop

level crossing

train
parked rail vehicle

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 The Authors

The Editors
Dr.-Ing. Gregor Theeg

© Claudia Taylor/TAYLOR Photography

Studied Transport Engineering at Technische Universität Dresden
(Germany). From 2004, he was a scientific staff member at
TU Dresden on the Chair of Railway Signalling and Transport Safety
Technology, where he worked on research projects and teaching.
After a short time with Ansaldo STS, since 2010 he has been
working for Siemens in System Engineering and Safety Management
for mainline projects in interlocking and ETCS worldwide. He also
teaches at St. Pölten University of Applied Sciences (Austria) and
Wilhelm Büchner University of Applied Sciences (Germany).

Dr.-Ing. Sergej Vlasenko

Studied Railway Infrastructure at the State Transport University
in Omsk (Russia). In 1992 – 1995 he was a manager in the
infrastructure servicing department of the Astana region of the
railways of Kazakhstan. From 1995 to 1997, he was a researcher
at the State Transport University in St. Petersburg. After graduation
as Doctor of Engineering, he has occupied the chair of Railway
Automation and Telemechanics at the Omsk State Transport
University. From 2007 he has been working at the Rail Automation
division of Siemens in Brunswick (Germany).

The Authors
Dr.-Ing. Enrico Anders
Studied Transport Engineering at the Technische Universität
Dresden (Germany). In 2001–2006 he was a scientific staff
member at the Technische Universität Dresden, focussing on safety
analysis research. In 2006, he began work for Thales, specialising
on specifying the requirements for electronic interlocking. Since
2008 he has been a member of Thales safety assessment centre
and since 2013 he is certified by the National Safety Authority
(Eisenbahn-Bundesamt) and works as an expert for Thales
interlocking. Since 2018 he is also Head of Safety of Thales in
Ditzingen.

Jelena Arndt, MA
Studied Logistics and Transport Management at Fachhochschule
des bfi in Vienna, Austria. For four years, she has worked in the
rail sector of the Austrian Federal Ministry of Transport, Innovation
and Technology, with a focus on national projects for people with
disabilities. She was working for OpenTrack Railway Technology
GmbH in Vienna, Austria for two years, before moving to
voestalpine SIGNALING Siershahn GmbH, where she is currently
employed as a Regional Account Manager in the field of wayside
train monitoring systems.

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The Authors

Prof. Dr.-Ing. Thomas Berndt

Studied Transportation Systems Engineering at ‘Friedrich List’ University
of Transport and Communications in Dresden. From 1981 to 1985 he
was a researcher and in 1985 graduated as Doctor of Engineering at
'Friedrich List' University of Transport and Communications. From
1986 to 1991 he worked as an engineer in the electronics industry.
From 1991 to 1996, he was Senior Consultant at Computer Sciences
Corp., specialising in consulting and software development for railway
business information systems. Since 1996, he has been Professor of
Railway Engineering at Erfurt University of Applied Sciences.

Prof. Dr. rer. nat. Jens Braband

Studied Mathematics at TU Braunschweig (Germany). After a PhD
in Stochastics, he joined Siemens Verkehrstechnik in 1993. From
2001 he lectured on Safety and Risk Analysis at the Institute of
Railway Systems Engineering and Traffic Safety of TU Braunschweig
and was appointed Honorary Professor in 2004. Today he is the
Key Principal Expert for RAMSS at Siemens Mobility GmbH and is
also accredited as Independent Safety Assessor.

Dipl.-Ing. Dmitriy Chelobanov

Dmitriy Chelobanov is a Senior Signalling Design Engineer at
Hitachi Rail STS office located in Pittsburgh, USA. He graduated
from Omsk State Transport University (Russia) in 2008 with a major
in railway signalling. Between 2008 and 2012, he was a Senior
Signalling Engineer at Russian Railways. Since 2012, he has been
working for Ansaldo STS, which later became Hitachi Rail STS,
in Wayside Engineering group with a focus on the application
of processor-based interlocking solutions as part of CBTC and
conventional train control systems.

Dipl.-Ing. Artem Glybovskii

Studied Rail Automation at St. Petersburg State Transport
University. After his graduation in 2016, he has worked as CTC
maintenance engineer in the traffic control centre of Oktyabr'skaya
railway. In 2017–2019 he held the position of the head of local
engineering department at Russian Railways. The main focus was
on the improvement of currently operated rail automation systems,
as well as commissioning of system installations. From 2019,
he is working at Siemens Mobility GmbH as System Engineer for
worldwide main line projects.

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 The Authors

Dipl.-Math. Stephan Griebel

Stephan Griebel graduated in 2001 from the University of
Wuerzburg, Germany, with a Diploma in Mathematics and a Degree
in Mathematics and Physics for secondary education (Gymnasium).
He is working for the Siemens Mobility GmbH, Railway Signalling, as
a RAMSS expert with focus on Functional Safety and Mathematical
Modelling and as a project leader for a risk analysis of electronic
interlockings with a German Railway Operator. He is the head of the
Technical Regulations and Standards Management for the Siemens
Railway Signalling area.

Dipl.-Ing. Thomas Heinig

Studied Transport Engineering at the Technische Universität
Dresden (Germany). Since 2012, he has been working for Thales
Transportations Systems (formerly part of Alcatel) in safety
management. Thereby, first focussing on safety analysis for relay
interlocking and afterwards on safety management for application
projects in electronic interlocking in Europe.

Dr.-Ing. Michael Dieter Kunze

Studied Transport Engineering in the field of transportation
telematics at the Technische Universität Dresden (Germany). From
2009 to 2015 he was a scientific staff member at the Technische
Universität Dresden Railway Signalling Department. He has worked
on projects such as studies on train protection systems, interlocking
power supplies and safety analysis for platform screen doors.
Graduating as PhD in 2015, he has since been working as Chief
Engineer at CERSS. He is also lecturer at Technische Universität
Dresden, Wilhelm Büchner Hochschule, Thales University, DB
Training and Dresden International University.

Dr. Eng. Andrej Lykov

Graduated from Petersburg State Transport University in 1993 with a
diploma in Railway Signal Engineering and Communications. In 1997
he began teaching at the Railway Automation and Telemechanics
Department of Petersburg State Transport University. Since 2002 he
has been deputy chief of the department. He earned his Doctorate in
2006. He is an associate professor, specialising in interlocking systems
and technical diagnostics.

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The Authors

Doc. Ing. Peter Márton, PhD.

Graduated in Operation and Economy of Railway Transport at the
University of Žilina (UNIZA). He completed his dissertation at UNIZA
in 2004 and qualified in 2016. In 2001 and in 2007 he had short term
research stays at the TU Dresden. Since 2002 he has been lecturer at
the Faculty of Management Science and Informatics, UNIZA. Participant
of several 7FP and H2020 (incl. Shift2Rail) projects as researcher and
UNIZA coordinator. He specialises in the operation of freight railways and
is co-author of a simulation tool of transport terminals operation, and
several simulation studies in Slovakia, Germany, Switzerland and China.

PD Dr.-Ing. habil. Ulrich Maschek

Apprenticed as a Signal Maintainer, he studied Electrical Engineering
at the Technische Universität Dresden. From 1996 he worked as
layout engineer for signalling systems and from 1998 worked as a
researcher at the Technische Universität Braunschweig. He graduated
as PhD in 2002 on Data Modelling for the Planning of Interlockings.
Since 2002, he has been Senior Academic Assistant at the Chair of
Railway Signalling and Transport Safety Technology at the Technische
Universität Dresden. He is also Director of Studies in Railway Signalling
at the Wilhelm Büchner Hochschule and trainer of the Siemens Rail
Automation Academy, Thales University, DB Training and Dresden
International University. He became an Associate Professor in 2018.

Dr.-Ing. Daria Menzel

Studied Transport Engineering in the field of automatics, telemechanics
and communications at the Moscow State University of Railway
Engineering (MIIT, Russia). In 2018 she finished her doctorate in the field
of railway signalling at the Technische Universität Dresden (Germany).
From 2011 to 2012 she worked in the department of new developments
at the Bombardier Transportation (Signal) in Moscow. Since 2012 she is
working as project manager at CERSS in the field of railway signalling
focussed on interlocking systems. She is also lecturer at Technische
Universität Dresden.

Dr. Eng. Nino Mukhigulashvili

She has more than 40 years of experience in railway and education
fields. Her investigation focus is on diagnostic and maintenance
service of railway automation. She graduated from Georgian Technical
University in 1978 and her postgraduate study was in the Rostov-on-
Don Institute of Railway Transport Engineers (Russia) in 1991. She
defended her dissertation in the St. Petersburg Institute of Railway
Transport Engineers (Russia) in 1992. She was Engineer at the
Georgian Railways in 1978–1980, Assistant Professor 1980–1994 and
has been Associated Professor of Georgian Technical University since
1994.

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 The Authors

Rolf Natterer
He is working for SEL/Alcatel/Thales since 1976. His main fields of
work are specification, development and testing of block interface
adaptations of relay interlocking and electronic interlocking to existing
block technologies in different countries. Since 2013 he has been
safety assessor in the Thales assessment centre, certified by German
National Safety Authority (Eisenbahn-Bundesamt).

Prof. Dr.-Ing. Jörn Pachl, FIRSE

Studied Transportation Systems Engineering at the Dresden ‘Friedrich
List’ University of Transport and Communications. From 1989 to 1991
he was researcher at that university followed by a management position
in the infrastructure planning department of the Hamburg region of
German Railways from 1991 to 1996. In 1993 he received a doctor’s
degree in engineering from Technische Universität Braunschweig. From
1996 he has been Professor at that university and head of the Institute
of Railway Systems Engineering and Traffic Safety. Prof. Pachl is author
and co-author of several textbooks on railway operation and signalling.

Dipl.-Ing. (FH) Martin Rosenberger, MSc

Martin Rosenberger, Chief Technology Officer Frauscher Sensor
Technology, has 20 years of experience within the field of railways
and signalling technologies. He graduated in mechatronics, business
and plant construction at the University of Applied Sciences in Wels,
Austria. In 1998, he started as an R&D engineer in Frauscher. In 2011
he became Product Management Director, taking on the role as Chief
Technology Officer in 2018. He was elected a Fellow of the Institution of
Railway Signal Engineers in 2013.

Dipl.-Phys. Carsten Sattler

Studied Physics at the Technical University in Chemnitz and the
Humboldt-University Berlin. After graduation in Theoretical Physics he
has worked as a Researcher in Physical Oceanography at the Institute
for Baltic Sea Research in Warnemünde. Since 1999 he has worked in
different projects in the Siemens Railway Automation unit, where he is
currently a system engineer in the German sales department. Besides
project work he also deals with the integration of safety processes with
IT security processes.

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The Authors

PD Dr. Andreas Schöbel

Joined the Institute for Railway Engineering, Traffic Economics and
Ropeways at Technische Universität Wien in May 2002 as a graduate
civil engineer. Since 2003 he has worked on the implementation of
wayside train monitoring systems and their integration into interlocking
systems. He presented his PhD thesis in 2005 on the positioning of
wayside train monitoring systems in a railway network. He is a lecturer
on the simulation of railway operation. In 2011 he received the venia
docendi for railway operation from the Vienna University of Technology.
Since 2011 he is CEO of OpenTrack Railway Technology GmbH in
Vienna, Austria.

Dr.-Ing. Eric Schöne

Studied Transport Engineering at Technische Universität Dresden.
From 2006 to 2013, he worked as a member of academic staff at
the Institute of Railway Systems and Public Transport of Technische
Universität Dresden, focussing on research into railway safety. In 2013,
he received his PhD degree with a dissertation on level crossing safety.
Currently he is working as expert and consultant in this field.

Dipl.-Ing. Max Schubert

Max Schubert is Head of System Architecture LST/TK/ATO at DB Netz
AG. Before taking on this role, he has held several positions within DB
Netz AG, as Head of Level Crossings, Signals, Power Supply LST,
Team Leader and Technical Coordinator for power supply, signals,
cables and tunnels. He graduated in Electrical Engineering at the
University of Applied Science in Zittau/Görlitz, Germany and achieved
his Diploma at the Conseil Européen pour la Recherche Nucléaire
(CERN) in Geneva.

Dr. Eng. Dmitrij Shvalov

In 1991 he graduated from the State Transport University in Rostov-on-
Don (Russia). In 2001 he completed his doctoral thesis in the field of
technical diagnostics. From 1989 to 1991 he was an engineer at the
research laboratory Railway Traffic Control Systems. From 1992 to
2000 he was assistant lecturer and since 2001 associate professor,
vice-Head of the Railway Automation and Telemechanics Department
at the State Transport University in Rostov-on-Don.

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 The Authors

Dipl.-Ing. Martin Sommer

Studied Architecture and Transport Engineering with the major field
of study in intelligent transportation systems at Technische Universität
Dresden. Since 2013 he is working as project manager at CERSS
in the field of railway signalling focussed on ETCS and interlocking
systems. From 2015 until 2018 he was a member of the scientific staff
at the Chair of Railway Signalling and Transport Safety Technology at
the Technische Universität Dresden. He was managing international
education projects and is also a lecturer at Technische Universität
Dresden, Dresden International University and University of Transport
and Communications in Hanoi.

Prof. Dr.-Ing. Jochen Trinckauf, FIRSE

Studied Transport System Engineering at ‘Friedrich List’ University of
Transport and Communications in Dresden. After a period of scientific
research, he graduated with a PhD (Doctor of Engineering) in 1984.
Since then he has been employed by a lignite mining railway and
different industrial and engineering companies. From 1998 he joined
the Technische Universität Dresden as Full Professor. In 2007 he
founded CERSS Ltd Kompetenzzentrum Bahnsicherungstechnik as an
assessment and consulting company.

Dipl.-Ing. Dirk Zimmermann

Studied Automatisation Technology at ‘Friedrich List’ University of
Transport and Communications in Dresden. In 1991 he started work
as an engineer in the research and development department for track
vacancy systems for the WSSB Company (from 1993 part of Siemens)
in Berlin, Germany. From 1997 to 2003 he was development engineer
of LED signals and since 2003 product manager for railway signals.

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 Persönliches Exemplar für tres-4b@yandex.ru
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 Index

Index

Symbole Assymmetric normal position g Placed

direction
2*(2oo2) system 351
Aster ‘Type U’ 165 f
2 out of 2 (2oo2) system 351
ATB-EG 271
2 out of 3 (2oo3) system 351
ATB-NG 276
A ATC g Automatic Train Control
ATC (Japan) 273 f, 401
Absolute block 107
ATO g Automatic Train Operation
Absolute stop 226
ATP g Automatic Train Protection
AC immune relay 334
ATS g Automatic Train Stop
Acceptance 109
ATS g Automatic Train Supervision
Acoustic monitoring system 481 f
ATS-P 265 f
ACSES II 314 ff
ATS-S 259 f, 265
Active level crossing 446, 451 ff
Attentiveness check 249
Adjustable stop 188
Audible signal 214, 247
Advanced approach 230
Audio frequency track circuit 163 ff
AF-900 167
Automatic block 42 ff, 106, 117 f, 380, 390 ff,
Alarm indication 374
395 f
ALS-EN 272
Automatic dispatcher 425
ALSN 268 ff Automatic error correction 174 f
Alternating current track circuit 162 Automatic image processing 143
Alternative route 83 Automatic point setting 101, 337 f
Amplitude attribute 413 Automatic route calling 102
Approach control 239 Automatic route setting 65, 102
Approach distance 448 f, 464 f Automatic signal 46, 395 f
Approach locking 96, 101 Automatic Train Control (ATC) 247 ff, 415
Approach sight triangle 447 ff Automatic Train Operation (ATO) 251 f, 311
Approach signal 227 Automatic Train Protection (ATP) 247 ff, 311
Approach time 57 f, 448 Automatic Train Routeing 102, 312
Approach zone 457 f Automatic Train Stop (ATS) 247 ff
Area overview picture 358 Automatic Train Supervision (ATS) 305 f,
ASFA 267 308 ff, 312
Aspect Display Unit 315 Automatic Warning System (AWS) 261
Assessment Body 34 Autonomous level crossing 460, 464 f
Asset condition monitoring 141 Auxiliary route release 115

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Index

Auxiliary signal 116 f, 236 Broken axle stub 471

Auxiliary Wayside System (CBTC) 308 Broken rail 157, 160, 177, 472
Availability 24 Broken wheel 471
Availability redundancy 351, 358 BTM g Balise Transmission Module
AWS g Automatic Warning System
Axle counter 130 ff, 168 ff C

Axle load checkpoint 484 f Cab signalling 52, 58 f, 157, 214, 247 f, 295,
AzL 131 396
Cable 364 ff
B Cable loop 258
Calling-on signal 236
BACC 272 f
CAN-Bus 362
Back contact g Opener
Carborne Controller 306
Back locking 96
Cascade route formation 97
Backbone 359
Catch points 187
Backup power supply 367
Caution aspect 45, 225, 227
Balise 256, 275 f, 295
CBTC g Communication Based Train Control
Balise Transmission Module (BTM) 295
CCTV g Closed-circuit television
Ballast resistance 160
Central power supply 369
Barrier 452 f, 454 f
Central site 410
Beacon 256, 305
Centralised block 396 ff
Berth track circuit 111
Centralised control 405
Biased relay 334
Centralised Traffic Control (CTC) 44, 62 ff,
Bidirectional locking 73 f 405 f, 410 ff, 498
Bi-stable relay 335 CES g Conditional Emergency Stop
Block 70, 102 ff, 379 ff Checklist 30, 36, 115
Block instrument 17, 42 f, 383 ff Checkpoint 476 ff
Block point 103 Clamp lock 196
Block relay 387 Class 1 relay g Type N relay
Block section 55, 102 Class 2 relay g Type C relay
Block signal 47, 49, 102, 226 Class 3 relay g Non-signal-relay
Blocked brake (detection) 471, 479 Class A system 280
Blocked wheel 471 Class B system 281
Blocking 108 f Clear aspect 52, 225, 227
Blocking time 56 ff Clearance check 120 f
Blocking time stairway 58 Clearance profile 126, 473
Braking distance 18, 54, 55, 228 Clearing point 104
Braking supervision 250, 263 Clearing time 448
Branched flank protection 86 Closed network 363
Broken axle shaft 471 Closed-circuit television (CCTV) 142

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 Index

Closer 334 DAS unit 140

Cloud interlocking 498, 500 Data communication 412
Cluster LED 220 f Deadlock 81
Colour light signal 215, 225, 235 Dead-man’s handle 249
Colour position light signal 215, 225, 235 Decentralisation 419
COMBAT 145, 389 f Decentralised interlocking 354, 498 f
Combined relay 335 f Decentralised operation 61 f
Combined signal 234 Degraded mode operation 19, 113 ff, 235 f,
Common Safety Methods (CSM) 282 465 f
Common Safety Targets (CST) 282 Dependence between points and signals 69,
Communication Based Train Control (CBTC) 78, 93
304 ff, 402 Derailer 187 f
Comparator 351 Derailment detection 153, 482 f
Composite fail safety 28, 30 Detection 123 ff
Concentrated light source 222 Diagnostic workstation 375 f
Conditional Emergency Stop (CES) 298 Diagnostics 209 ff, 373 ff
Conditional locking 71, 73 Diamond crossing 184
Conflicting routes 79 Differential GPS 146
Consecutive routes 79 Digital ATC (Japan) 146, 278 f
Control centre 63 f, 405 ff, 498 Digital interlocking g Decentralised
Control length 56, 104, 364 interlocking
Control loop 20 f Direct current track circuit 161 f
Control command and signalling (CCS) TSI Direct Traffic Control (DTC) 61, 103, 380,
280 395
Controlled signal 46 Direction permission 110
Co-operative shortening 298 Dispatcher 61 ff, 406 ff
Cost-benefit analysis 493 Dispatching procedures 419
Countdown marker 447 Displaced cargo 472
Counting point 168 ff Distant signal 45, 227, 234
Coupled elements 71 Distributed acoustic sensing (DAS) 138 ff
Crocodile 261 Distributed light source 220 f
Crossover 186 f Distributed Wayside Architecture (DWA) g
CSM g Common Safety Methods Decentralised Interlocking
CSS 271, 396 Diversity 351
CST g Common Safety Targets DMI g Driver Machine Interface
CTC g Centralised Traffic Control Doppler radar 145
Double crossover 187
D Double line 44
Dark territory 61 Double points 184
DAS g Distributed acoustic sensing Double Track Operation 50 f

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Index

Double wound relay 334 ETCS Level 3 278, 289, 403, 499
Driver Machine Interface (DMI) 295 ETCS Level NTC 290
DTC g Direct Traffic Control ETCS Level STM g ETCS Level NTC
Dual control points 54, 100 ETCS monitoring 416
Dual protective points 86 f Ethernet 362
Dynamic speed profile 248, 280, 286, 289, ETML g European Traffic Management Layer
294, 299 EULYNX 283
Eurobalise 295
E
Euroloop 296
E-ATC g Enhanced Automatic Train Control European Railway Agency (ERA) g European
System Union Agency for Railways
Earthquake detection 489 European Traffic Management Layer (ETML)
Ebicab 276 283
EBI g Emergency brake intervention European Union Agency for Railways 282,
EBI Track 200 165 446
Electric interlocking 321 f, 371 European Vital Computer (EVC) 294
Electric Point Machine (EPM) 191, 192 ff Euroradio g GSM-R
Electric token block 108, 381 f EVC g European Vital Computer
Electro-mechanical interlocking 371 f EVM 271
Electronic interlocking 322, 349 ff Exceeding the vehicle profile 473
Electro-pneumatic interlocking 371 Exclusion of conflicts 126
Element controller 353, 354, 498 Exit signal 48, 49
Element dependence 71 ff Extendable overlap 89
Emergency brake intervention (EBI) 250, 299 External object 123, 126, 135
End of Authority (EOA) 298 External point locking 193, 196
End of train detection 147 ff
End position of points 182 F

Energy supply 367 ff Facing move at points 183

Engineering possession 66 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
Enhanced Automatic Train Control System 35 ff
(E-ATC) 319 Fault states 476
Entrance-exit (NX) operation 83, 338, 370 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 35 ff
EOA g End of Authority Faulty buffer 472
ERA g European Union Agency for Railways Faulty flange of wheel 471
ERTMS Regional 293, 403 Faulty frame 472
ETCS 280 ff Faulty suspension 472
ETCS Level 0 290 Fibre-optic network 354
ETCS Level 1 276, 285 ff Fibre optic sensing (FOS) 138 ff
ETCS Level 2 278, 287 f, 401 Fibre-optical detector 132
ETCS Level 2/3 Hybrid 292 f Field ring network 359 ff

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 Index

Filament lamp 215 ff Generic Product Safety Case 33

Fire 366 f, 473 Geographical route formation g Topological
Fire recognition system 486 f route formation
Firefighting system 488 f Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) g
Satellite positioning
Fixed block 55, 59, 106
GLONASS g Satellite positioning
Flank areas 76, 85
GNSS positioning g Satellite positioning
Flank movement 84
GNT 276
Flank protection 84 ff
GOA g Grade of automation
Flank protection search 342
GPS g Satellite positioning
Flat spot 471, 484
Grade of automation (GOA) 252 f
Fleeting 102
Gradient profile 299
Flood warning 489
GSM-R 280, 283, 287, 296
FMEA g Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
Guidance 18
Forecasted schedule 410
Guidance speed 248
FOS g Fibre optic sensing
Fouling point 181 f, 189 H
Fouling point indicator 181 f
Half barriers 452
Four-aspect-signalling 230
Hand signal 214, 236, 466
Four-wire point circuitry 202 ff
Headway 56, 58
Free-wired interlocking 336 f, 339 f
High speed points 184, 192
Frequency attribute 413
Holding the route 93
Fresnel lens 216
Home signal 47
Frog inclination 183
Home signal limits 49
Front contact g Closer
Hot box (detection) 472, 479 ff
Front protection 88
H/V signal 236 f
FTA g Fault Tree Analysis
Hydraulic detector 129 f
FTGS 166
Hydraulic interlocking 371
Full barriers 452
Full Supervision mode 302 I
Funkfahrbetrieb (FFB) 398 I-ETMS g Interoperable Electronic Train
Management System
G Imbalance (in motion) 472
Galileo g Satellite positioning Impedance bond 154 ff
Gauntlet track 181 Impulse track circuit 159, 163
General Code of Operating Rules 395 Independent Safety Assessor (ISA) 34
Generic application 354, 355 Indicator 217, 220, 233
Generic Application Safety Case 33 Inductive detector 130 ff, 137 ff
Generic approach 494 Inductive loop 137 f
Generic product 354, 355 Indusi 263 ff

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Index

INESS g Integrated European Signalling L

System
Ladder 187
Infill 286 f, 296
Lamp circuit 218
Infrared detector 135 Laser detector 135
Inherent fail safety 28 f LED signal 219 ff, 499
Insufficient track bed 472 LED unit 219 ff
Integrated European Signalling System LEU g Lineside Electronic Unit
(INESS) 283
Level crossing (LX) 19, 445 ff
Integration of ETCS 415
Light Emitting Diode (LED) 219 ff
Interlacing of tracks 185
Light signal 214 ff
Interlocking 46, 69 ff, 321 ff
Lime Street Control 81
Interlocking area 47 ff
Limit of shunt board 52
Interlocking central unit 354, 498 Limit of shunt signal 53
Interlocking limits 47 Limited Supervision (LS) 291 f, 302
Interlocking signal 47, 50 Linear detector 134 ff
Intermediate interlocking signal 49 Linear transmission 257 f
Internal point locking 193, 197 Line Block g Block
Interoperability 280 Line switching 362
Interoperable Electronic Train Management Lineside Electronic Unit (LEU) 295
System (I-ETMS) 317 f
Lineside signal g Trackside signal
Intervention function 250
Lite4ce 133
IP addressing 362, 498 Local area network 359
Irreversible route locking 93 ff, 329 Local operation area 100
IT security 39 f Local power supply 369
Local-electrical Operated Point Switches
J
(LOPS) 370
Jointless track circuit 163 ff Locking mechanism 196 ff
JRU g Juridical Recording Unit Locking of points 190
Jumper bond 151 ff Loop 44
Junction indicator g Route indicator Loop Transmission Module (LTM) 295
Juridical Recording Unit (JRU) 295 LOPS g Local-electrical Operated Point
Switches
K
LS 271
K50 relay 341 LTM g Loop Transmission Module
Key lock 198 LZB 278 ff, 401
KHP 267
KLUB-U 278 M
Ks signal system 242 MA g Movement Authority
KVB 276 Magnetic detector 130

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 Index

Magnetic latching relay 335 Network architecture 359

Main signal 45, 52, 227, 234 Neutral direction 107 f, 109
Main track 44 ff NoBo Rail 284
Maintainability 25 Non-shunting vehicle 67
Maintenance 373 Non-signal-relay 333
Maintenance operation centre 499 Non-trailable points 192
Management centre 421 NORAC g Northeast Operating Rules
Manual block 380, 382, 383 NORAC signals 22, 244 ff
Marshalling yard 428 ff Normally closed track circuit 150
Marshalling yard automation 430, 442
Normally open track circuit 149
Marshalling yard control 431 ff
Northeast Operating Rules 244 ff, 395 f
Marshalling yard functioning 428
Marshalling yard layout variants 429 O
Marshalling yard structure 428 Objects within the clearance gauge 472
Matrix LED unit 220 Obstacle 123, 135 ff
Mechanical detector 128, 134 Odometry 145, 295, 306
Mechanical interlocking 321, 322 ff On-Board Computer (PTC) 315
Mechanical signal 214, 237 ff On Sight mode 302
Mechanically latching relay 335 One train staff system 107, 381
M_NVCONTACT 302 Open doors 473
Mono-stable relay 334
Open line 44, 49, 102, 379
Most Restrictive Speed Profile (MRSP) 298
Open network 363
Movable bridge 181
Opener 334
Movable frog 184
Operating principles 41
Movable track element 78, 181 ff
Operation control 358, 405 ff
Moved DC magnet 256
Operational handling of hazard alerts 491
Movement authority 51, 54, 227, 298, 311
Operations Strategy 422
Movement in space interval 105
Operator 61 ff, 406 ff
Movement in time interval 105
Opposing routes 79
Movement on sight 80, 105, 302
Opposing shunting movements 100
Movement to half the sighting distance 80
Movement to the full sighting distance 80 Optical range 224

Moving block 59 f, 402 f Optical signal 214

MRSP g Most Restrictive Speed Profile Optical Speed and Position Measurement
System (OSMES) 307
Multicolour LED 222 f, 499
OSMES g Optical Speed and Position
Multi-unit signal 217
Measurement System
N OSŽD signals 22, 240 f
National values 302 Overlap 56, 76, 87 ff, 104
Negative signal 214 Overriding of buffers 472

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Index

P R
Packet switching 362 Radar detector 135
Passive level crossing 446, 447 ff Radio Block Centre (RBC) 287 ff, 296
Path 74 f Radio communication 258
Permissive block 107, 117 Radio Electronic Token Block (RETB) 108,
Permissive stop 226 399
Phantom light 217 Radio Infill 296
Phase attribute 413 Rail circuit g Track circuit
Pilotman 106, 107, 381 Rail claw 131
Placed direction 107, 110, 386 Rail contact 128, 130 ff, 168 ff
Planned schedule 409 RAM 26
Pneumatic detector 129 f RAMS 25 f
Pneumatic interlocking 371 RAMS(S) 26 f
Point lever 324, 328 Range of vision 224
Point machine 190 ff RB II 60 386 f
Points 181 ff RBC g Radio Block Centre
Polar attribute 413 Reactive fail safety 28, 30
Polyphase relay 158 Rear end marker 51, 147
Position light signal 215, 235, 245 Recording 115, 174
Positive signal 214 Redundancy 235, 351, 358
Positive Train Control (PTC) 313 ff Reed JTC 164
Post Trip mode 303 Regulatory pyramid 23
Power bus 368 Regulatory schedule 409 f
Power failure 367 Relay block 386 ff
Precision scheduled railroading (PSR) 419 Relay interlocking 321 f, 332 ff
Preliminary caution aspect 230 Relay set 340 f
Priority route 83 Relay-electronic interlocking 372
Proceed indication g Clear aspect Release speed 287, 299, 301
PROFIBUS 362 Reliability 24
Profile validation systems 485 f Remote control 405 ff
PSR g Presicion scheduled railroading Remote flank protection 86
PTC g Positive Train Control RER 305
Pulse-width attribute 413 Reset of axle counter 174
Pushbutton interlocking 337 Resonant circuit 131, 137, 256, 263 ff
PZB 90 263 ff RETB g Radio Electronic Token Block
Returning movements 112 f
Q Reversible route locking 93 ff, 329 f
QoS g Quality of Service Reversing mode 303
Quality of Service (QoS) 363 Reversing shunting routes 100 f

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 Index

Road junction 466 f Section signal 48

Road user 123, 445 ff Sectional route release 82, 96
Route 69, 74 Security 25, 39 f, 474, 500
Route calling 92 Selective overlaps 89
Route checking 92 SELTRAC 402
Route drawbar 327, 330 Semi-automatic block 380, 382 ff, 386 f
Route indicator 81, 238 f Semi-automatic signal 46
Route interlocking 79 Sensor 130 ff, 168, 209, 437, 476 ff
Route locking 78, 92 ff Service brake intervention (SBI) 250, 299
Route queuing 102 SGE 1958 339 f
Route release 93 Shared overlaps 88
Route search 343 Shinkansen 273 f
Route signalling 231, 238 f Short track 81
Route supervision 92 Shunting limits 52 f
Route-dependent level crossing 460 Shunting mode 303
RPB GTSS 388 f Shunting movement 45 f, 52, 75, 99 ff, 235
RSR123 131 Shunting route 75, 99 ff
Running line 44 Shunting signal 46, 52, 235
Running movement g Train movement Sieving 310
Running path 76 Sighting distance 18, 80, 224, 448 f
Sighting point 447 f
S Signal board 215, 224
SACEM 305 Signal box 17, 48, 323 f
Safeguarding Vehicle Movements 500 Signal failure 65
Safe state 25, 28 Signal lever 328
Safety 25 Signal relay 332 ff
Safety assessment 34 Signal selection 92, 343
Safety case 32 ff, 40 Signalisierter Zugleitbetrieb (SZB) 398
Safety integrity level 31 Signaller 62, 406 ff
SAIPS 144 Signum 262
Satellite positioning 146 f, 381, 438, 500 Simis W 352, 355
SAUT 277 f Simple route interlocking 79
Saxby & Farmer 324 Single line 44
SBI g Service brake intervention SkyTrain 305
Scheduled speed 231 Slip crossing 184
Scissors crossing g Double crossover Slotted control 327
Searchlight signal 217 Slow pick up relay 334
Secondary line/railway 293, 380 f, 389, 398 f, Slow release relay 334
500 SMILE 350

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Index

Solid State Interlocking (SSI) 350, 356 f T

SP-6 194, 197 Tabular route formation 97 ff, 339
SpDrS 60 340 ff Tappet interlocking 325 f
Special route interlocking 79 Target speed 248, 274, 295, 299
Specific application 354, 355 TBL 276
Specific Application Safety Case 33 TCM100 166
Specific Transmission Module (STM) 290, Technical Safety Report (TSR) 34 f
295, 303
Telephone block 103, 117, 380, 383
Speed cancellation 232 TEN-T g Trans-European Networks for Traffic
Speed restriction 76 f, 230 ff, 250 Three-aspect-signalling 227 f
Speed restriction warning 232 Three-way-points g Double points
Speed signalling 231 ff TI21 165
Spot transmission 254 ff Tilting train 231
Spot wheel detector 128 ff Time delay 93, 96, 115
Spring points 183 Time spacing 43, 55
SSI g Solid State Interlocking Time-distance graph 64
SSP g Static speed profile Timetable 51, 409 f
St. Andrew's cross 446 f Timetable & Train Order 43
Staff Responsible mode 303 Timetable authority 51
Start section 76, 90 ff TIU g Train Interface Unit
Static speed profile 248, 279, 298 T_NVCONTACT 302
Station 46 Toggle relay 335
Station limits 48 Token block 106, 107 f, 381
Station track 47 Tokenless block 106, 110, 382 ff
STM g Specific Transmission Module Tolerable Functional Failure Rate (TFFR) 31
Stop aspect 226 Tolerable hazard rates 30
Sub-control centres 421 Topological block interlocking 336 ff, 340 ff
Supervised Location (SvL) 298 Topological route formation 98 f, 340 ff
Supervision of points 190 TPWS 267
Supervision of train movement 249 f Track circuit 17, 42, 149 ff, 257 f
Supervision signal 460, 462 f Track circuit interrupter 153
Supervisory system 407 Track clear detection 126, 149 ff, 168 ff
Supervisory track section 175 Track closure 66
SvL g Supervised Location Track distortion 472
Swinging overlaps 90 Track vacancy detection g Track clear
Switching movement 52 detection
Switching of points 190 Track Warrant Control (TWC) 61, 103, 380
Symmetric normal position g Neutral Trackside signal 45, 214 ff
direction Traction return current 153 f

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 Index

Traffic diagram 64 Two way contact 334

Traffic Management Systems (TMS) 405 Type C relay 202, 333 f
Traffic optimisation 405 Type N relay 200, 333 f
Trailable points 192, 196
Trailing move at points 183 U
Trailing of points 183 UBRI g Unit-Block Relay Interlocking
Train describer 64, 102 UES g Unconditional Emergency Stop
Train integrity detection 123, 135, 147, 289, Unblocking 108 f
293, 499 Unconditional Emergency Stop (UES) 298
Train Interface Unit (TIU) 295 Unidirectional locking 72
Train localisation (CBTC) 310 Unidirectional signalling 108
Train movement 51, 75
UNIFE 284
Train movement information system (TMIS)
Uninterrupted power supply (UPS) 367 ff
425
UNISIG 284
Train number 409
Unit-Block Relay Interlocking (UBRI) 345 ff
Train operated route release (TORR) 96
UPS g Uninterrupted power supply
Train Operator Display 306
UPS busbar 368
Train protection 247 ff
Train Regulation (CBTC) 312
V
Train route 75 ff
Vane relay 158 f, 334
Train schedule 409
Variation of width of the track gauge 472
Train separation 54
Vehicle signal 214
Train staff and ticket system 107, 381
Violation of clearance gauge 472
Train stop 249, 260, 267
Virtual track section 174
Train supervision 405
Train Trip 301, 303
W
Trans-European Networks for Traffic (TEN-T)
281 Warning distance 229
Transferred flank protection 85 f Warning tone/signal 247 f
Transponder 256, 275, 305, 306, 308, 314 ff Warning time 452, 464 f
Trap points 188 Wayside Interface Unit 314
Traverser 185 Wheel sensor g Rail contact
Trip mode g Train Trip Wind measuring system 489
Tripol 497 f Wireless LAN hotspot 500
Tumble down signal 396 Written instruction 236
Turntable 185 Wye points 184
TVM 300 274 f, 401
TVM 430 278 ff, 401 Y
TWC g Track Warrant Control Yard limits 53
Two-aspect-signalling 227 Yard management system 439 ff

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Advertisements

Z
ZLB g Zugleitbetrieb
Zone Controller 308
Zoom picture 358
ZP 43 131, 171
ZSL 90 276
ZUB 275, 276
Zugleitbetrieb (ZLB) 380

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 Persönliches Exemplar für tres-4b@yandex.ru
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As a standard work on Railway Signalling and Interlocking, this book
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