Appraising The Secretaries at Sweetwater U Session 8 Que
Appraising The Secretaries at Sweetwater U Session 8 Que
But the current university budget simply did not include enough money to fund
another “maximum” annual raise for every staffer. Furthermore, Sweetwater’s
president felt that the custom of providing invalid feedback to each secretary on
his or her year’s performance was not productive, so he had asked the new vice
president to revise the system. In October, Rob sent a memo to all
administrators, telling them that in the future no more than half the secretaries
reporting to any particular administrator could be appraised as “excellent.” This
move, in effect, forced each supervisor to begin ranking his or her secretaries for
quality of performance. The vice president’s memo met widespread resistance
immediately—from administrators, who were afraid that many of their
secretaries would begin leaving for more lucrative jobs, and from secretaries,
who felt that the new system was unfair and reduced each secretary’s chance of
receiving a maximum salary increase. A handful of secretaries had begun
picketing outside the president’s home on the university campus. The picketing,
caustic remarks by disgruntled administrators, and rumors of an impending
slowdown by the secretaries (there were about 250 on campus) made Rob
Winchester wonder whether he had made the right decision by setting up forced
ranking. He knew, however, that there were a few performance appraisal experts
in the School of Business, so he decided to set up an appointment with them to
discuss the matter.
He met with them the next morning. He explained the situation as he had found
it: The current appraisal system had been set up when the university first opened
10 years earlier. A committee of secretaries had developed it. Under that system,
Sweetwater’s administrators filled out forms. This once-a-year appraisal (in
March) had run into problems almost immediately because it was apparent from
the start that administrators varied widely in their interpretations of job
standards, as well as in how conscientiously they filled out the forms and
supervised their secretaries. Moreover, at the end of the first year it became
obvious to everyone that each secretary’s salary increase was tied directly to the
March appraisal. For example, those rated “excellent” received the maximum
increases, those rated “good” rated “excellent” received the maximum
increases, those rated “good” the standard across-the-board cost-of-living
increase. Because universities in general—and Sweetwater, in particular—have
paid secretaries somewhat lower salaries than those prevailing in private
industry, some secretaries left in a huff that first year. From that time on, most
administrators simply rated all secretaries excellent in order to reduce staff
turnover, thus ensuring each a maximum increase. In the process, they also
avoided the hard feelings aroused by the significant performance differences
otherwise highlighted by administrators.
Two Sweetwater experts agreed to consider the problem, and in 2 weeks they
came back to the vice president with the following recommendations. First, the
form used to rate the secretaries was grossly insufficient. It was unclear what
“excellent” or “quality of work” meant, for example. They recommended instead
a form. In addition, they recommended that the vice president rescind his earlier
memo and no longer attempt to force university administrators to arbitrarily rate
at least half their secretaries as something less than excellent. The two
consultants pointed out that this was unfair, since it was quite possible that any
particular administrator might have staffers who were all or virtually all
excellent—or conceivably, although less likely, all below standard. The experts
said that the way to get all the administrators to take the appraisal process more
seriously was to stop tying it to salary increases. In other words, they
recommended that every administrator fill out a form for each secretary at least
once a year and then use this form as the basis of a counseling session. Salary
increases would have to be made on some basis other than the performance
appraisal, so that administrators would no longer hesitate to fill out the rating
forms honestly.
Rob thanked the two experts and went back to his office to ponder their
recommendations. Some of the recommendations (such as substituting the new
rating form for the old) seemed to make sense. Nevertheless, he still had serious
doubts as to the efficacy of any graphic rating form, particularly compared with
his original, preferred forced ranking approach. The experts’ second
recommendation—to stop tying the appraisals to automatic salary increases—
made sense but raised at least one very practical problem: If salary increases
were not to be based on performance appraisals, on what were they to be
based? He began wondering whether the experts’ recommendations weren’t
simply based on ivory tower theorizing.
Questions: