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Security in NFC Readers Public

This document discusses security considerations for near field communication (NFC) readers. It covers: 1) NFC technology basics and the different modes of NFC communication. 2) Enhancing security in NFC architectures through cryptographic techniques and access control to protect devices and stored data from unauthorized access. 3) Use cases for NFC security including access control systems and internet gateways.

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Thuy Vu
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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
30 views36 pages

Security in NFC Readers Public

This document discusses security considerations for near field communication (NFC) readers. It covers: 1) NFC technology basics and the different modes of NFC communication. 2) Enhancing security in NFC architectures through cryptographic techniques and access control to protect devices and stored data from unauthorized access. 3) Use cases for NFC security including access control systems and internet gateways.

Uploaded by

Thuy Vu
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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Training

Security in NFC Readers


Public
Content

► NFC and security


 NFC, a different kind of wireless
 Under the hood of NFC based systems
 Enhancing the security of an NFC architecture
► Secure data exchange
 Information security goals
 Cryptographic techniques
 Secure Access Module
► Unauthorized access protection
 Remote access
 NFC interface access

► Use cases
 Access control system
 Internet gateway
► NFC security cookbook and conclusions

Training
2
NFC AND SECURITY

3
NFC, a different kind of wireless

NFC at a glance:

 Contactless proximity technology


 Standardized under ISO/IEC18092 and ISO/IEC 21481
 Operating range: 10 cm (4 in)
 Easy, simple and convenient data exchange between Standardized, interoperable and
devices simple data exchange between
 Open and interoperable data following NFC Forum devices
specifications
 Privacy and security inherent to short range

Training
4
The three modes of NFC: A tap is all it takes

Read/Write Mode Peer-to-Peer Mode Card Emulation Mode

• Interacts with an • Establishes two-way • System behaves as


NFC-enabled device communication contactless smartcard*
between NFC-
• Reads data in from • Makes NFC-enabled
enabled devices
device or writes data systems compatible
out • Each device serves with contactless cards
as an endpoint

Get information or Passive and active Ticketing, payments,


initiate an action communication access control, transit…
* ISO/IEC 14443-compliant smartcard

Training
5
NFC connected devices
Market update - some key figures

► 1.2 billion smartphones shipped in 2014 11.0B+ NFC-enabled devices shipping 2013-2018

► Smartphone’s share expected to continue growing from


67% in 2014 to > 80% or even higher in coming years
► 850 million NFC handsets shipped between 2012 and
2014
► 3 in 4 mobile phones to come with NFC by 2018
► > 5 billion NFC handsets will be shipped between 2013
and 2018
► NFC-enabled CE devices and tags growing
exponentially, IoT wave coming.

* Updated list of NFC phones and tablets available in the market:


http://www.nfcworld.com/nfc-phones-list/

Sources: ABI Research, Sep’14

Training
6
The Internet of Things Revolution
Ingredients for security challenges

► The Internet of Things (IoT) is the interconnection


of uniquely identifiable embedded computing
devices within the existing Internet infrastructure
(wikipedia)

► Distributed communications

► Large number of heterogeneous devices

► It is about
- sensing, collecting and sharing data;
- control, actuation, automation.

Training
7
Under the hood of NFC based devices

Adding an NFC reader IC: Adding an NFC Connected tag:


► Full/partial NFC capabilities ► Behaves as a tag
► Active NFC device ► Connected to an active device

NFC
Connected uC
NFC tag

uC Reader
IC
Adding an NFC tag:
NFC tag ► Behaves as a tag
► No additional electronics

NFC INHERENTLY SECURE DUE TO ITS PROXIMITY

Training
8
Enhancing the security of an NFC-based architecture

Adding an NFC reader IC: Adding an NFC Connected tag:


► Full NFC capabilities PROTECT THE DEVICE FROM ► Behaves as a tag
► Active NFC device
UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS
► Connected to an active device
SECURE DATA EXCHANGE
NFC
Connected uC
NFC tag

uC Reader
IC
Adding an NFC tag:

PROTECT DATA STORED IN NFC tag ► Behaves as a tag


TAG ► No additional electronics

DATA SECURITY
UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS PROTECTION
Training
9
Security need: Secure data exchange

► NFC systems are interoperable and open by default.


► Securing data exchanged through RF channel through
cryptographic methods.
► Using cryptography implies the usage of cryptographic
Key Key
keys on both sides of the communication.
► Data is now protected through cryptographic means, NFC NFC
system is not open/interoperable anymore. uC Reader
IC
► Cryptographic methods can be:
 Dynamic
 Static
► Cryptographic algorithms and keys can be:
 Symmetric
 Assymetric

► Key management and cryptographic implementation


needs to be considered.

Training
10
Security need: Protection from unauthorized access

► Any device connected to the “cloud” is subject to be


compromised and attacked if not properly protected.
► This has a negative impact on consumers, infrastructure
owners and equipment manufacturers alike.
NFC
► Need to implement security mechanisms to: uC Reader
 Grant access to authorized servers IC
 Prevent exposure of user related data (privacy)
 Secure communications between device and backend
 Ensure system integrity
 Protection of credentials
► Above objectives can be ensured through:
NFC
 Cryptographic methods Connected uC
 Hardware based security tag

► EEPROM of NFC tag can be modified through NFC


interface.

Training
11
Security… a big word!

► Security is a state of mind


 Lack of objective approach towards security

► Securing the information and process on NFC based


devices requires the combination of techniques and
protocols
► Cryptography as inter-disciplinary science to achieve
information security goals
► Compromise between security and risk
 What do I need to protect?
 Trade-off between benefit vs cost for an attacker

► Your system is as secure as your weakest link


► Perfect security does not exist!

Training
12
SECURE DATA EXCHANGE

13
What do we want to protect?

► Remember: NFC by default is open and interoperable,


data exchange is inherently secure due to its proximity. A B
► We want to secure the information exchanged through the
NFC interface between A and B.
Threat
► Information security goals
 Confidentiality Information Security goal
 Integrity
 Authenticity Mechanism

► Cryptography as a means to achieve information Algorithm


security goals.

Training
14
Information Security goals
Security goal Description Mechanism Algorithm

Guarantee that data cannot be


Confidentiality read by an unauthorized entity
Encryption/Decryption

Guarantee that data cannot be


Integrity changed by an unauthorized CMAC and Digital Signatures TDES, AES,
entity RSA, ECC
Guarantee mutual identification Static (password, PIN,…)
Authentication of two parties entering into a Dynamic (challenge-response
communication protocol)

► Using cryptographic algorithms implies usage of secret keys.


► Cryptographic algorithms:
 Symmetric: Same key on both sides. TDES, AES. Secret key

Public key
 Asymmetric: Public/private key pair. RSA, ECC.
Private key

Training
15
Cryptographic mechanisms summary
Symmetric Asymmetric

Confidentiality

Integrity

Authentication

Secret Keys need to be protected and securely distributed

Training
16
Secret Key management

► How are the secret keys loaded into the NFC Reader?
Key

► Where are the keys located in the NFC Reader? NFC


 Microcontroller not designed to protect secret keys
uC Reader
IC

Adding a SAM to the Reader


OK
allows us to securely store
and protect the cryptographic
Key keys
► Using NXP’s Secure Access Modules:
 Highest level of protection for cryptographic keys
 Secure remote management of key storage tables
 Additional support for MIFARE products’ cryptography NFC
uC Reader
IC

Training
Secure Access Modules (SAMs)

►Supports MIFARE DESFIRE EV1, MIFARE Plus, MIFARE Classic and


MIFARE Ultralight C
►Can be used for generic cryptography (symmetric and asymmetric)
►Supports TDES, AES, RSA and Crypto1 cryptographic algorithms
►128 key entries
►ISO/IEC 7816 contact interface, with a communication speed up to 1.5 Mbps
MIFARE SAM AV2 ►Can work in X-mode
►Hardware Common Criteria EAL 5+ certified

Training 18
Data protection for NFC tags

► To ensure confidentiality of the written data in the tag:


 Data stored are encrypted.
 Secret key to decrypt it stored in SAM in the NFC device.

► To ensure data integrity and authenticity of the written data in the tag:
 Digital signature added to data stored.
 Secret key to verify digital signature stored in SAM in the NFC device.

Data stored can be:


- Encrypted
Key
- Digitally signed

NFC
uC Reader NFC tag
IC

Training
19
Secure data exchange summary

► Objective: secure data being exchanged through RF


interface or available in EEPROM of NFC tag.

► Use cryptographic mechanisms to achieve information


security goals:
 Confidentiality
 Integrity
 Authenticity

► Cryptography implies the usage of keys: how are keys


securely distributed and stored?

► NXP Secure Access Modules (SAM) to ensure


highest level of protection in your NFC device.

Training
20
PROTECTION FROM
UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS

21
NFC device access considerations

Remote Access protection:


► A device that is connected to the cloud is subject to be
compromised and attacked if not properly protected NFC
uC Reader
IC

NFC Interface Access protection:


► An NFC Connected tag is inherently secure due to NFC
proximity, however to avoid unauthorized modifications of
Connected uC
tag
data through NFC interface it needs to be properly
configured.

Training
22
Remote access protection

► Need to implement security mechanisms to:




Grant access to authorized servers
Prevent exposure of user related data (privacy)
A-Series Security ICs
 Secure communications between device and backend
 Ensure system integrity ADAPT TO ANY TYPE OF µC
 Protection of credentials
► Above objectives can be ensured through:
 Cryptographic methods
A-
 Hardware based security Series
IC
► A-Series ICs from NXP are HW Security Module for
IoT Devices
NFC
 Supporting wide variety of use cases and targeting multiple uC
applications Reader
Host SW
 Off-the-shelf solutions offering key injection service, on chip IC
application SW and host library with a high level API.

Training
23
NFC Access protection

► Ensure that data written in EEPROM from NFC tag


cannot be modified.

► NFC tags from NXP offer several features to protect


EEPROM:

 All NTAG Lock bits for read-only EEPROM

 NTAG21xF Password protection mechanism

 NTAG I2C no WRITE Access from the NFC side


through configuration registers

Training
24
USE CASES

25
Access control systems
NFC Readers Credentials

► What do we want to achieve in Access Control systems?


 Secure system with optimized cost
 Intuitive and fast access
 Simple and flexible management

► NFC Technology fully covers the above requirements.

► Credentials designed to securely store and protect


cryptographic keys.

► NFC Readers shall be designed to offer the same level NFC


of protection. uC Reader
IC

Training
26
Security design in NFC access control systems
Cryptographic keys

NFC
Key Key
uC Reader
IC

Microcontrollers do not NOK OK


ensure the secure storage Credentials are designed to
and protection of securely store and protect
cryptographic keys cryptographic keys

Training
27.
Security design in NFC access control systems
SAM ensures protection in overall system

► Secure Access Module (SAM) in the NFC Reader:


 Ensure data exchange protection over NFC interface
 Protect remote access to the NFC reader

OK
Adding a SAM to the Reader
allows us to securely store
and protect the cryptographic
keys

Remote management NFC interface


Key
access protected access protected

NFC
uC Reader
IC

Training
28.
Internet gateway

► As homes become “smarter”, the number of IoT


devices continues to expand. The router is truly
the heart of the “Smart Home”.

► Router acts as a home Gateway, providing NFC


Reader
internet access to all devices.

► A-Series to ensure security towards the internet.

► NFC Reader for confidential commissioning.

A-
Series
IC

Training
29
Internet Gateway
Secure cloud access use case
Router
Sign
Use Case: Authentication A- digitally
Series data;
IC
Verify
DCC Insecure digitally
Cloud or NFC
uC signed data
Reader
network Host SW
IC

Router
Use Case: Secure Channel Setup
A-
Series
Secure
fad%&SH28sjdksjdf Jdef87$6sdf!s IC channel;
DCC Encrypt/
NFC Decrypt
uC
Reader
Host SW
IC

Training 30
Internet Gateway
Confidential commissioning use case

► IoT devices obtain access to home network through


an NFC tap.

► Confidential mode: ROUTER


1. Router writes Network key in NTAG,
2. IoT Device reads key through I2C bus,
3. IoT Device deletes key in NTAG I2C.
NFC Connected Tag NFC Reader

Training
31
CONCLUSION

32
NFC Security Cookbook
The use of NFC Connected Tag
- NTAGF
Active NFC device required? NO - NTAG I2C
CAN PROTECT EEPROM
CONTENT FROM UNAUTHORIZED
YES UPDATES

NFC device will be connected to the cloud? NO NFC application based on MIFARE?

YES YES

The use of A-Series HW security module The use of SAM devices CAN
CAN PROTECT ACCESS TO THE SECURE DATA EXCHANGE
DEVICE THROUGH NFC INTERFACE

Training
33
Summary and Conclusion

► NFC enabled devices are growing exponentially.

► Security enhancements for NFC enabled devices:


 Secure data exchange
 Unauthorized access protection

► Secure data exchange


 Information security goals: confidentiality, integrity and authentication
 Cryptographic mechanisms: encryption, MAC/Digital Signature, 3 pass mutual
authentication
 Symmetric and assymetric cryptography
 SAM for secure key storage

► Unauthorized access protection


 Remote access protection through A-Series HW security module
 NFC access protection features in Connected tags

Training
34
Need More? NXP - NFC Reader Solutions

Reference material & documentation:


 NFC Everywhere
http://www.nxp.com/nfc

 NFC Everywhere support page:


http://www.nxp.com/techzones/nfc-
zone/community.html

 Reader forum:
http://www.mifare.net/en/micommunity/forum/mif
are-and-nfc-reader-ics

For other questions or further support,


please contact: nfc.readers@nxp.com

Training 35
MobileKnowledge
Thank you for your attention
www.themobileknowledge.com

► We are a global competence team of hardware and


software technical experts in all areas related to contactless
technologies and applications.

► Our services include:


 Application and system Design Engineering support
 Project Management
 Technological Consulting
 Advanced Technical Training services

► We address all the exploding identification technologies that


include NFC, secure micro-controllers for smart cards and
mobile applications, reader ICs, smart tags and
labels, MIFARE family and authentication devices. For more information

Eric Leroux
eric.leroux@themobileknowledge.com
+34 629 54 45 52

Training
36

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