Case of Accounting Irregularities and Corporate Culture
Case of Accounting Irregularities and Corporate Culture
Researchers:
Ang, Archie James A.
Concepcion, Darlene Kaye P.
Galvez, Kim Fritzie M.
Department of Accountancy
The accounting scandal involving the Olympus Company was one of several
high-profile corporate scandals reported in Japan in 2011. The renowned Japanese
company Olympus Corporation, one of the biggest producers of optical and medical
equipment, originated back in 1919, holding about 70% of the current endoscope
market. However, it became well-known in 2011 after a massive public scandal
(Smith, 2020). The CEO and other senior executives were among the prominent
figures in the scandal as they were discovered to have been involved in fraudulent
activities for over a decade. When the organization's former CEO, Michael
Woodford, raised awareness of the massive accounting cover-up, the scandal was
made public. It was discovered that Olympus had been concealing losses totaling
more than $1.7 billion through shell companies and false accounting practices. A
panel appointed by Olympus Corp to prove the accounting scandal engulfing the
Japanese firm estimates that Olympus hid investment losses totaling 130 billion yen
($1.7 billion) at the peak of the cover-up (Staff, 2011).
The Olympus Scandal included several key individuals and executives. One
of them was Toshiro Shimoyama, who was the Olympus president and CEO from
1984 to 1993 (Tabuchi, 2011). He revealed that the company invested in financial
derivatives and other risky ventures to try and make some cash, and fortunately for
Olympus, the Tokyo economic bubble burst in early 1990, so their financial
engineering plan did not work out so well. Shimoyama decided to develop an
aggressive financial assets management unit within the Accounting Department
headed by Hideo Yamada. Yamada was in charge of speculative investments with
his subordinate, Hisashi Mori. Hideo Yamada was the Former Executive Vice
President of Olympus Corporation (Bloomberg, 2023). Hideo Yamada was a high-
ranking executive at Olympus who played a significant role in the accounting fraud
scandal. He was involved in the cover-up of the fraudulent activities at the company.
Yamada resigned in October 2011 after the scandal: Hisashi Mori, former President
and Director of Olympus Corporation. Hisashi Mori, the President of Olympus, was
also a key player in the scandal (Reuters, 2011). He was involved in the accounting
irregularities and the cover-up of financial misdeeds. Mori resigned from his position
in October 2011. Tsuyoshi Kikukawa, managing director, president, and chairman of
Japanese camera maker Olympus in 1993, hid $1.7 Billion of losses in the firm
(Partridge, 2019). Shuichi Takayama succeeded Kikukawa as chairman, president,
and CEO (Tabuchi, 2011).
Olympus has an external auditor, KPMG AZSA, and Ernst & Young
ShinNihon LLC. KPMG disagreed with the vastly overvalued goodwill ascribed. Then
Olympus removed KPMG AZSA as its group auditor in 2009 (Uranaka, 2011)—Ernst
& Young ShinNihon LLC, which took over as Olympus auditor in 2009. Ernst &
Young ShinNihon is Japan's largest auditor, with more than 4,000 clients and 3,000
certified public accountants; declined to comment, citing client confidentiality
(Uranaka, 2011).
In 2011, Michael C. Woodford, a British executive who had a long history with
Olympus, was appointed as the company's CEO. His tenure marked the beginning of
an investigation into the company's financial records, where he whistleblowed the
company's fraudulent activities. He raised concerns about suspicious payments
made in acquisitions.
ANALYSIS
In the 1980s, several Japanese firms had financial difficulties as they relied on
investments to boost their declining business viability. The country's exports dropped
because of the strength of its currency relative to other currencies, notably the U.S.
Dollar. One of the worst casualties of Japan's economic crisis was Olympus. The
company was struggling with its business operation, so it employed financial
engineering, or "zaitech," a Japanese concept, to try to turn things around. In Japan,
when a company buys valuable paintings and objects to hide the profits it has made.
Many Japanese corporate collectors appear to have used high-priced art for tax
purposes, a practice known here as 'zaitech' (Powell, 2011). To increase its
revenues, the company consequently chose to invest in risky ventures and financial
derivatives. However, in the early 1990s, the economic endeavors resulted in
enormous losses of roughly 2.1 billion Yen.
Banks and other investors operated under bank deposit pledges or bonds
financed their receiver funds. Utilizing the SG Bond Plus Fund in Singapore, the LGT
Bank in Europe, and L.P. to carry out the plan in Japan (Lorsch et al., 2020).
According to the PwC Report, approximately 96 billion Yen has been diverted to
those receiver funds by Olympus through its loss operation scheme. Olympus
purchased shares from the target companies with the funds it received as the
receiver. Olympus would then purchase the shares at inflated prices from the
receiver funds. Profits were consequently transferred to the receiver funds. The
business employed the same tactic to acquire Gyrus Group Plc for $2 billion.
Olympus Corporation paid almost 60 percent more than the total market value for
British medical equipment maker Gyrus Group PLC, according to a report by a
foreign-affiliated auditing company. Several of the questionable acquisition deals
were recorded as goodwill. The main objective of doing all this was to conceal the
losses from the shareholders and the public.
C. Fraud Triangle
C.1. Pressure
Regarding the Olympus scandal, internal pressure within the company played
a big part in driving people to commit fraud. The term "pressure" refers to a
situation's impact on an individual's decision to commit fraud, which is one of the
fraud triangle's three components (Kniepmann, 2020).
The pressure in the Olympus scandal was substantial and multifaceted. It was
not limited to financial pressure but also encompassed the need to preserve the
company's image and the personal and professional consequences for those
involved in the fraud. This pressure, along with the opportunity and rationalization
elements, contributed to the perpetration of fraudulent activities within Olympus
Corporation.
C.2. Opportunity
Olympus had the opportunity to commit fraud due to several factors. The
company's complex corporate structure, which included numerous subsidiaries and
affiliated companies, allowed for the concealment of fraudulent transactions. The
lack of strong internal controls and oversight created opportunities for executives to
manipulate the financial statements and engage in accounting irregularities. The
element of "opportunity" from the Fraud Triangle refers to the conditions and
circumstances that allowed for the accounting fraud and cover-up to take place
(Kniepmann, 2020).
C.3. Rationalization
Those involved in the Olympus scandal may have believed that their
fraudulent actions were justified somehow. They might have convinced themselves
that hiding losses and manipulating financial statements were necessary to protect
the company, its employees, and shareholders from the potential consequences of
disclosing the actual financial situation. This rationalization is rooted in believing the
fraudulent actions were for the greater good. There may have been significant
pressure on executives to meet financial targets and market expectations. In this
high-pressure environment, some individuals could have rationalized their actions by
thinking they had to do whatever it took to meet these expectations, even if it
involved fraudulent accounting practices. They may have perceived this as their only
option to avoid severe consequences. Some individuals involved in the scandal
might have rationalized their actions out of fear of retaliation or repercussions. They
may have believed that refusing to participate in the fraudulent activities would result
in their termination or harm to their career. This fear could have led them to
rationalize their involvement as a form of self-preservation.
On top of that, this moral strategy would have maintained the corporation's
standing as a reliable and transparent company while simultaneously demonstrating
its dedication to integrity. To have been transparent, Olympus would have to publish
its investment losses on time and with accuracy. This would have required thorough
details about the kind and scope of the losses and the underlying causes.
Shareholders and investors would have been able to make educated investment
decisions and evaluate the company's prospects with such open communication.
Furthermore, Olympus might have shown its dedication to moral conduct and
corporate governance by openly admitting its errors and accepting responsibility for
them.
One moral choice that may have been looked at to provide the firm with the
much-needed short-term financial relief was debt restructuring, together with the
strategic sale of non-core assets. Debt restructuring is the process of bargaining with
creditors to change the conditions of an existing loan, including the interest rate, the
repayment plan, and perhaps even the principal amount. Olympus might have
started talks with its creditors to find solutions that benefited both parties. By
engaging in open and honest dialogue, the company could have sought to
restructure its debt in a way that made repayment more manageable, given the
challenging circumstances it faced (Nicholls, 2012). A debt restructuring plan may
have included reducing interest rates, extending loan terms, or, in some situations,
approving brief suspensions of debt repayment. Such actions may have given
Olympus some breathing room and a less onerous financial strain, lessening the
urgent need to engage in fraudulent operations.
Olympus might have carefully chosen non-core assets in its portfolio for sale
in addition to debt restructuring. Assets that are not essential to the business's core
activities are referred to as non-core assets. Selling these assets would have
produced the cash required to deal with the current financial difficulties. These
assets may have included surplus property, underperforming business divisions, or
investments in projects inconsistent with the company's primary goal. Selling assets
may be an excellent way to inject money into a company rapidly. The proceeds from
these sales could have been directed toward debt reduction, operational
stabilization, or necessary investments to restore the company's financial health
(Deloitte, 2020).
Olympus would have to engage closely with creditors and potential bidders to
find answers through the debt restructuring and asset sales strategy. Regarding the
debt restructuring, creditors would have been amenable to discussions that would
have safeguarded their interests and allowed Olympus to restore its financial stability
if they had recognized the long-term benefits of keeping the business intact. The
simultaneous sale of assets would have required finding purchasers ready to
purchase non-core assets for fair market value. A well-executed strategy would have
aimed at maximizing the value of these assets, providing Olympus with the liquidity it
needed to address immediate financial challenges (Bats, J & Houben, A., 2017).
E. Stakeholders Protection
CONCLUSION
The Olympus scandal led to calls for corporate governance reforms in Japan.
The Japanese government and regulatory bodies initiated efforts to strengthen
governance rules and practices within Japanese corporations. Reforms included
enhancing the independence of boards of directors and improving internal controls.
In the wake of the scandal, Olympus underwent significant leadership changes. Key
figures implicated in the fraud, including the CEO and other top executives, resigned
or were removed from their positions.
Fraud affected the trust of the shareholders in the company. Initially, the
company's shareholders believed that the company was making huge profits.
However, the fraud changed their perception of the organization. The existing
investors also pulled out their resources from the company, and this reduced the
financial capacity of Olympus. Coupled with the losses hidden in the past, Olympus
lost its competitive advantage in its market segments. Fraud allegations always have
a direct negative impact on the image of a company as well as its ability to maintain
its market shares. The scandal had a lasting impact on Olympus's share price and
market capitalization. Shareholder value has been eroded, and the company needs
help regaining market confidence.
The company also lost its brand name, which it had established
internationally. Olympus was a known brand in the major European markets, and
customers adored its products and services. The emergence of fraud hindered its
reputation and the perception of its customers about the products and services it
offers. The major print media discussed the hidden scandal (Lorsch et al. 8). The
information reached the market immediately. As a result, Olympus lost some of its
potential customer bases.
The Olympus scandal provides lessons on the significance of corporate
culture and its role in shaping an organization's behavior. The secretive and non-
transparent culture at Olympus was seen as a contributing factor to the perpetuation
of the fraud, highlighting the need for cultural shifts toward openness, accountability,
and ethical conduct.
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