Cold War in Africa
Cold War in Africa
Question: Elucidate The Impacts Of The Cold War On The Economy And
Politics Of African States
CONTENT
1. Introduction
2. The brewing and triggering of the cold war
3. The cold war in africa
4. The United States, Soviet Union, China and Cuba as actors in Africa
5. The cold war in Congo (Case Study)
6. The cold war in Angola (Case Study)
7. The Cold war in Egypt (Case Study)
8. The Cold War in Ghana (Case Study)
9. Political Impacts of the cold war on Africa
10. Economic Impacts of the Cold war on Africa
11. Conclusion
12.
Question: Elucidate The Impacts Of The Cold War On The Economy And Politics Of
African States
INTRODUCTION
Since the dawn of time, conflict between human nations have been regarded as one of
the greatest agents of worldwide change. But for a change of that magnitude to take
place, the conflict in question must be a war, such as the French Revolutionary and
Napoleonic Wars, the Two World Wars and the Cold War. Just as the French
Revolutionary war led to the collapse of the Feudal System in Europe and the
introduction of civil laws, the two World Wars would led to a change in the global
world order, dismantling the British empire and leading to the rise of the World’s first
Superpowers. The cold war, which would last for 40 years would led to the
polarization of the international stage into two Blocs, and pit the two most popular
economic and political systems, Capitalism and Communism, against each other.
The origin of the Cold War(1947-1991) could be traced to the aftermaths of the
second World War. At the end of the war, the United States and the USSR emerged
victorous on the same side. However, differences between these new superpowers
would germinate based on ideological differences and differing post-war goals. This
was only natural, considering that fact that both countries only joined hands to fight
the greater evils facing them at the time (Germany and Japan). After the war, the
United States, a Capitalist democratic State had almost nothing in common with the
the USSR, which was a communist state. A host of failed conferences, such as the
Yalta conference, and passive aggressive events, such as the Berlin Blockade and the
US adoption of the Containment Policy would light the fuse to start the war. The Cold
War was fought, not only in these two countries but across the continents of Europe,
Africa, Asia, North America and Latin America.
These conflicts marked the start of the Cold War between the United States and the
Soviet Union. A cold war is a struggle over political differences carried on by means
short of military action or war. Beginning in 1949, the superpowers used spying,
propaganda, diplomacy, and secret operations in their dealings with each other. Much
of the world allied with one side or the other. In fact, until the Soviet Union finally
broke up in 1991, the Cold War dictated not only U.S. and Soviet foreign policy, but
influenced world alliances as well.
The Cold War in Africa has been described as a reedition of the Global Powers
previous manipulation of Africa for their greater good. Africa, as a continent, at that
time, was made up of mostly underdeveloped and developing countries, most of
which wanted nothing to do with the Cold War. However, despite the fact that most, if
not all, African countries were a member of the Non-Alignment Movement, they still
found themselves caught up in the rivalry between the Eastern and the Western Blocs.
The United States provided support to African leaders who were seen as being
sympathetic to free market ideas. On the other hand, USSR, and to some extent, China
and Cuba provided different forms of aids to African nationalists who were
sympathetic to communism. It was in pursuit of these ideological battle that USSR
extended assistance to nationalist movements in Algeria, Angola, Congo, Ghana,
Guinea, Kenya, Mali and Mozambique, among others.
The hunt of allies and power could been said to have influenced the US, USSR, China
and Cuba’s interest in the barely independent Africa countries. The cold war occurred
at a time when African countries were only beginning to become independent. The
global powers, therefore, preyed on the vulnerability of these new countries,
broadened inter state rivalries and turned African states against each other. The
African continent is still plagued with the consequences of its participation in the
Cold Conflict.
The purpose of this work, therefore, is to give a brief summary of what the Cold War
was, examine the global powers and their roles in the conflict in Africa, analyze the
means by which the conflict played out in African States(Case Studies), and the
impacts of the Cold War on the economy and politics of these states.
Despite agreement at Yalta and their presence on the United Nations Security
Council, the United States and the Soviet Union split sharply after the war. The war
had affected them very differently. The United States, the world’s richest and most
powerful country, suffered 400,000 deaths. But its cities and factories remained intact.
The Soviet Union had at least 50 times as many fatalities. One in four Soviets was
wounded or killed. Also, many Soviet cities were demolished. These contrasting
situations, as well as political and economic differences, affected the two countries’
post-war goals.
The Cold War is said to have been triggered by events such as the Yalta and Potsdam
conference, in which the world leader’s could not agree on the postwar division and
management of Europe, the USSR’s imposition of Communist governments in its
Satellite States in Western Europe and the US foreign Policy, called the Containment
Plan. But the most important cause of the Cold War was the differing US and Soviet
Goals in a post-war world, which is stated below.
As European nations lost their empires after the war, the United States hoped to gain
access to the raw materials and markets previously controlled by the colonial powers.
Washington also saw a chance to promote American political and economic
ideologies in the newly established nations. Although Europe, Asia, and Latin
America were more central to American policy concerns, Africa received
considerable attention from successive presidential administrations.
Because the balance of forces changes over time and according to circumstances, the
United States has pursued contradictory Africa policies. On the one hand, as an early
proponent of decolonization, which would open the door to American influence, the
U.S. government rhetorically championed freedom, democracy, and self
determination. On the other hand, factions in the government have sympathized with
the concerns of white settlers, and at times, their voices were dominant. Pervasive
anticommunism in some quarters often led to a misunderstanding of nationalist
movements. Radical nationalism was frequently confused with communism – or
viewed as an equal threat to Western interests. Fear of communism – real or imagined
– led the U.S. government to support many unsavory dictatorships. Although the
dictatorships were pro-Western and anticommunist, they did not promote the freedom
and democracy that Washington claimed to endorse.
In the case of Southern Africa, a region valued for its strategic location and minerals
and home to a significant population of white settlers, conflicting American interests
led the United States to reinforce, rather than oppose, colonialism and white minority
rule.
None of these regimes was communist. In the Horn, Moscow was motivated as much
by strategic as by ideological concerns when it came to the aid of Marxist Ethiopia,
which was threatened by socialist Somalia.
the Soviets had four distinctive advantages in their relations with Africa:
(1) Africans agreed with the Soviets about the connection
between capitalism and imperialism. They believed that the two were linked, and
both were worthy of elimination
(2) Africans and Soviets had a common enemy. The former colonial powers were also
anti-communist
(3) No communist nation had ever been a colonial power in Africa
(4) Africans admired the rapid development in the Soviet Union and saw it as a model
for their own development.
Nevertheless, the Soviets felt frustrated in their attempts to realize this ideological
opportunity. Indeed, the realities of African politics failed to fit in the limited
conceptions of either the Soviet Union or the United States.
The People’s Republic of China and Africa During the Cold War
The third Cold War actor in Africa was the People’s Republic of China. Like the
Soviet Union, China saw the African continent as an arena in which to challenge
imperialism. However, during most of the Cold War, China and the Soviet Union
supported rivals in the struggle for power. Despite Soviet support for the Chinese
Communist Party during China’s 1945–49 civil war, and the friendship treaty that
provided Beijing with critical Soviet technology and economic assistance, the two
countries struggled over both ideology and policy and competed for allegiances in the
Third World.
Between 1959 and 1965, the alliance broke apart as the Soviets criticized Mao
Zedong’s leadership and policies while Mao decried Khrushchev’s goal of “peaceful
coexistence” with the West as counterrevolutionary and challenged Soviet political
and economic models. In 1959, Khrushchev abrogated an agreement to provide China
with modern military technology. In 1960, he recalled more than 1,000 Soviet
scientists and industrial specialists from China, while Beijing declared its
independence from Soviet international and domestic policies and sought new allies
among emerging Third World nations. By 1965, the Soviet Union openly considered
Chinese activities in Africa and Asia to be a threat to its interests, and China publicly
declared its independence in both domestic and international affairs. The Sino-Soviet
split was complete, and the scramble for allies began.
Rivalry with China, as well as the United States, became an important stimulus for
Soviet involvement in Africa. During the anticolonial struggles of the 1960s–1980s,
the Soviet Union and China generally supported competing movements. After the
Nixon administration’s rapprochement with China in 1972, the United States and
China often assisted the same faction, finding common cause in their mutual
opposition to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union aided the struggle of the Zimbabwe
African People’s Union (ZAPU) against white-minority rule in Rhodesia, while China
assisted ZANU’s breakaway movement.
In Angola, the Soviet Union supported the Popular Movement for the Liberation of
Angola (MPLA), while China and the United States supported the National Front for
the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence
of Angola (UNITA).
Cuba’s subsequent involvement in Africa was very much in keeping with the
revolutionary vision articulated at the Tricontinental Conference. Although Cuba’s
African focus stemmed from the belief, shared by all the Cold War powers, that
decolonization provided a new arena for the struggle between socialism and
capitalism, this was not the whole story. Like African Americans in the United States,
Cuba also had an emotional link to Africa. Approximately one-third of all Cubans
could boast some African blood. Many were inspired by the desire to liberate their
African brothers and sisters from colonialism and imperialism and to share the fruits
of the Cuban Revolution with them. In consequence, tens of thousands of Cuban
health, education, and construction workers, and tens of thousands of Cuban soldiers,
served in more than a dozen African countries during the periods of decolonization
and the Cold War – all expenses paid by the Cuban government. Africans were
generally impressed by Cuba’s willingness to donate military, medical, and
educational assistance without expectation of future reward.
The Congo Crisis And Its Cold War Impacts On Economy And Politics Of The
Region
Of all the European possessions in Africa, one of the most exploited was the Belgian
Congo. Belgium had ruthlessly plundered the colony’s rich resources of rubber and
copper. In addition, Belgian officials ruled with a harsh hand and provided the
population with no social services. They also had made no attempt to prepare the
people for independence. Not surprisingly, Belgium’s granting of independence in
1960 to the Congo (known as Zaire from 1971 to 1997) resulted in upheaval.
There were about 150 different ethnic groups, which would have made the Congo
difficult to hold together even with experienced administrators. Violent and chaotic
elections were held in which the Congolese National Movement (MNC), led by a
former post-office clerk, Patrice Lumumba, emerged as the dominant party; but there
were over 50 different groups. Agreement of any sort was going to be difficult;
nevertheless the Belgians handed power over to a coalition government with
Lumumba as prime minister, and Joseph Kasavubu, the leader of another group, as
president.
A mutiny broke out in the Congolese army (July 1960) only a few days after
independence. This was in protest against the fact that all officers were Belgians,
whereas the Africans expected instant promotion. Lumumba was deprived of the
means of keeping law and order, and tribal violence began to spread. The south-
eastern province of Katanga, which had rich copper deposits, was encouraged by the
Belgian company (Union Minière) which still controlled the copper-mining industry,
to declare itself independent under Moïse Tshombe. This was the wealthiest part of
the Congo, which the new state could not afford to lose. Lumumba, unable to rely on
his mutinous army, appealed to the UN to help him preserve Congolese unity, and a
3000-strong peacekeeping force soon arrived.
Lumumba wanted to use UN troops to force Katanga back into the Congo, but the
situation was complex. The president had already made himself unpopular with the
Americans and British because of his outspoken socialism; the Americans in
particular regarded him as a dangerous communist who would align the Congo on the
side of the USSR in the Cold War. Many Belgians preferred an independent Katanga,
which would be easier for them to influence, and they wanted to continue their control
of the copper mining. Faced with all these pressures, the UN secretary-general, Dag
Hammarskjöld, refused to allow a UN attack on Katanga, though at the same time he
refused to recognize Katangese independence. In disgust Lumumba appealed for help
to the Russians, but this horrified Kasavubu, who, supported by General Joseph
Mobutu and encouraged by the Americans and Belgians, had Lumumba arrested; he
and two former ministers in his government were later badly beaten and then
murdered by Belgian troops. As the chaos continued, Hammarskjöld realized that
more decisive UN action was needed, and although he was killed in an air crash while
flying to Katanga to see Tshombe, his successor, U Thant, followed the same line. By
mid-1961 there were 20 000 UN troops in the Congo; in September they invaded
Katanga and in December 1962 the province admitted failure and ended its secession;
Tshombe went into exile.
Though successful, UN operations had been expensive, and within a few months all
their troops were withdrawn. Tribal rivalries aggravated by unemployment caused
disorders to break out again almost immediately, and calm was not restored until 1965
when General Mobutu of the Congolese army, using white mercenaries and backed by
the USA and Belgium, crushed all resistance and took over the government himself.
It was probably inevitable that if the Congo, with its many problems (an under-
developed economy, tribal divisions and a shortage of educated people), was to stay
united, a strong authoritarian government was required. Mobutu provided exactly that.
There was a gradual improvement in conditions as the Congolese gained experience
of administration, and the economy began to look healthier after most of the
European-owned mines were nationalized. However, in the late 1970s there were
more troubles. In 1977 Katanga (now known as Shaba) was invaded by troops from
Angola, apparently encouraged by the Angolan government, which resented
Mobutu’s earlier intervention in its affairs (see Section 24.6(d)), and by the USSR,
which resented American support for Mobutu. This was a way for the USSR to
make a gesture against the Americans, and yet another extension of the Cold
War. Having survived that problem, Zaire (as the country had been called since 1971)
found itself in economic difficulties, mainly because of declining world copper prices,
and drought which made expensive food imports necessary.
Mobutu successfully withstood several armed rebellions. He was finally overthrown
in 1997 by rebel leader Laurent Kabila after months of civil war. Shortly thereafter,
the country was renamed the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Alarm bells immediately rang in the USA, which did not like the look of the Marxist
MPLA. The Americans therefore decided to back the FNLA (which was also
supported by President Mobutu of Zaire), providing advisers, cash and armaments,
and encouraged it to attack the MPLA. UNITA also launched an offensive against the
MPLA. Cuba sent troops to help the MPLA, while South African troops, supporting
the other two groups, invaded Angola via neighbouring Namibia in the south. General
Mobutu also sent troops in from Zaire to the north-east of Angola. No doubt there
would have been fighting and bloodshed anyway, but outside interference and the
extension of the Cold War to Angola certainly made the conflict much worse.
The problem of Namibia also complicated the situation. Lying between Angola and
South Africa, Namibia (formerly German South West Africa) had been handed to
South Africa in 1919 at the end of the First World War, to be prepared for
independence. The white South African government had ignored UN orders and
delayed handing Namibia over to black majority rule as long as possible. The
Namibian liberation movement, SWAPO (South West Africa People’s Organization),
and its leader, Sam Nujoma, began a guerrilla campaign against South Africa. After
1975 the MPLA allowed SWAPO to have bases in southern Angola, so it was not
surprising that the South African government was so hostile to the MPLA.
The civil war dragged on right through the 1980s until changing international
circumstances brought the possibility of peace. In December 1988 the UN managed to
arrange a peace settlement, in which South Africa agreed to withdraw from Namibia
provided that the 50 000 Cuban troops left Angola. This agreement went ahead:
Namibia became independent under the leadership of Sam Nujoma (1990). The end of
the Cold War and of communist rule in eastern Europe meant that all communist
support for the MPLA ceased, all Cuban troops had gone home by June 1991, and
South Africa was ready to end her involvement. The UN, the Organization of African
Unity (OAU), the USA and Russia all played a part in setting up peace talks between
the MPLA government of Angola and UNITA in Lisbon (the capital of Portugal). It
was agreed that there should be a ceasefire followed by elections, to be monitored by
the UN.
The Lisbon Peace Talks failed after UNITA’s refusal to accept the decisive victory of
MPLA in the elections. Even though the elections had been monitored by over 400
UN officials, MPLA claimed that there had been fraud. Tragically UNITA, instead of
accepting defeat gracefully, renewed the civil war, which was fought with increasing
bitterness. By the end of January 1994 the UN reported that there were 3.3 million
refugees and that an average of a thousand people a day, mainly civilians, were dying.
The UN had too few personnel in Angola to bring the fighting to an end. This time the
outside world could not be blamed for the civil war: this was clearly the fault of
UNITA.
However, many observers blamed the USA for encouraging UNITA:shortly before
the Lisbon agreement, President Reagan had officially met Savimbi in the USA,
which made him seem like an equal with the MPLA government instead of a rebel
leader. At the same time the USA had not officially recognized the MPLA as the legal
government of Angola, even after the elections; it was not until May 1993, six months
after UNITA had resumed the war, that the USA finally gave recognition to the
MPLA government.
Savimbi who was the leader of UNITA was killed in an ambush in 2002. His death
changed the situation dramatically Almost immediately the new leaders of UNITA
showed a willingness to negotiate. In April 2002 a ceasefire was signed, and the two
sides promised to keep the terms of the 1994 agreement. The Angolan National
Assembly voted in favour of extending an amnesty to all UNITA members, including
fighters and civilians. The whole agreement was to be monitored by the UN. At last,
with Savimbi no longer on the scene, there seemed to be a genuine chance for peace
and reconstruction in Angola.
The Americans were outraged at this, since it meant that the West no longer
controlled arms supplies to Egypt. Egypt now became part of the Cold War: any
country which was not part of the Western alliance and which bought arms from
Eastern Europe was, in American eyes, just as bad as a communist country. It was
seen as a sinister plot by the Russians to ‘move into’ the Middle East. The Americans
therefore canceled a promised grant of $46 million towards the building of a dam at
Aswan (July 1956). Their intention was to force Nasser to abandon his new links with
the communists. Crisis point was reached when Nasser immediately retaliated by
nationalizing the Suez Canal, intending to use the income from it to finance the dam.
Shareholders in the canal, the majority of whom were British and French, were
promised compensation.
He believed that Nasser was on the way to forming a united Arabia under Egyptian
control and communist influence, which could cut off Europe’s oil supplies at will.
He viewed Nasser as another Hitler or Mussolini. Secret talks took place between the
British, French and Israelis and a plan was hatched: Israel would invade Egypt across
the Sinai peninsula, whereupon British and French troops would occupy the canal
zone on the pretext that they were protecting it from damage in the fighting. Anglo-
French control of the canal would be restored, and the defeat, it was hoped, would
topple Nasser from power.
With air support provided by their European allies, the Israelis marched on the Suez
Canal and quickly defeated the Egyptians. However, pressure from the world
community, including the United States and the Soviet Union, forced Israel and the
Europeans to withdraw from Egypt. This left Egypt in charge of the canal
and thus ended the Suez Crisis. The outcome of the war ended in complete
humiliation for Britain and France, who achieved none of their aims, and it was a
triumph for President Nasser.
On receiving its independence in 1957, the Gold Coast took the name Ghana. This
name honored a famous West African kingdom of the past. Nkrumah became
Ghana’s first prime minister and later its president-for-life. Nkrumah pushed through
new roads, new schools, and expanded health facilities. These costly projects soon
crippled the country. His programs for industrialization, health and welfare, and
expanded educational facilities showed good intentions. However, the expense of the
programs undermined the economy and strengthened his opposition. At the same time
Nkrumah forged links with the USSR, East Germany and China.
In addition, Nkrumah was often criticized for spending too much time on Pan-African
efforts and neglecting economic problems in his own country. He dreamed of a
“United States of Africa.” He was also opposed due to his he gradual abandonment of
the parliamentary government in favour of a one-party state and personal dictatorship.
He justified this on the grounds that the opposition parties, which were based on tribal
differences, were not constructive and merely wanted more power in their own areas.
They had no experience of working a parliamentary system, and as Nkrumah himself
wrote: ‘Even a system based on a democratic constitution may need backing up in the
period following independence by emergency measures of a totalitarian kind.’
In 1966, while Nkrumah was in China, the army and police in Ghana seized power.
The American CIA gave the coup its full backing, because the USA disapproved of
Nkrumah’s links with communist states. The military government promised a return
to democracy as soon as a new constitution could be drawn up, complete with
safeguards against a return to dictatorship. The constitution was ready in 1969 and the
elections returned Dr Kofi Busia, leader of the Progressive Party, as the new prime
Minister (October 1969). Since then, the country has shifted back and forth between
civilian and military rule and has struggled for economic stability. In 2000, Ghana
held its first open elections.
POLITICAL IMPACTS
And while the in-state conflicts were bad enough as they were, the superpowers
interference would make them substantially worse. As each side got the upper hand
interchangeably, their would be a rapid change in government. The government of the
countries were usually in the hands of totalitarian leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah
and the countries were often ravaged by civil wars such as the Angola Civil War,
which raged for 27 years between 1975 - 2002, with fragile periods of peace. During
the war, the Russians backed the MPLA (People’s Movement for the Liberation of
Angola), which was a Marxist-style party and was in the majority. The Americans on
the other hand backed the UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of
Angola), which was the minority group headed by Jonas Savimbi.
3. Military buildup
The superpowers provided aid to their African Allies in terms of military aid and
support, which included millions of dollars in arms and ammunition. This fueled the
fire of the arms race in Africa to the detriment of the continent as a whole. Advanced
weaponry is synonymous to both political and military power, and unfortunately, this
weapons were usually in the wrongs hands. This led to authoritarian governments and
severe abuses of human rights in the states.
Also, a common strategy of the United States was to supply heavy ammunition to a
minority but militant group, so has to unseat the current government for their own
benefit. This was what occurred in the Congo when General Mobutu was supported
by the Americans, and he was able to take the power for himself.
5. Non-Alignment Movement
Just as the Warsaw Pact existed as a organization allied for communism, and the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization existed for Capitalism, there was the Non-
Alignment Movement whose aim was to remain neutral. The movement was made up
of developing and underdeveloped countries in Asia and Africa who were referred to
as Third World Countries. It was made up of 120 countries not formerly aligned with
or against any major power bloc. After the United Nations, it is the largest grouping
of states worldwide.
ECONOMIC IMPACTS
CONCLUSION
As earlier stated, while the Second World War might have the end of global warfare
for a time, it simply brought the underlining issues between the World’s superpowers
to light, which resulted in the Cold War. And while, the Cold War might not have
been a shooting war, that is, a war fought between two opposing countries with their
respective armies and allies, it involved just as much manipulation, hostility and
disagreements as the other 20th Century wars.
The Cold War in Africa one of the most impactful foreign interventions that the
continent had ever seen, along the lines of the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade and
Colonialism. Apart from the economic and political effects listed above, the cold war
in Africa has served to further tie the continent’s development and future to the global
powers. During a time when the Africans should have been developing and
solidifying a much needed continental identity and moving past their differences
towards a brighter future, they were once again torn apart by the handiwork on the
imperial powers. Neo-colonialism and globalization are by products of the age-long
hold that the World’s greatest powers has on Africans. Unfortunately, some proxy
wars, which began in the 20th century are still ongoing such as the Ethiopian Civil
War.
REFERENCES
1. Elizabeth Schimdt, “Foreign Intervention in Africa: From the Cold War to the War
on Terror,” Cambridge University Press, New York, 2013, ISBN 978-0-521-70903-3
4. Raico, Ralph. “Great Wars and Great Leaders.” Ludwig von Mises Institute,
Auburn, Alabama, 2010.