ENRIQUE U. BETOY v.

THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, NATIONAL POWER

CORPORATION
G.R. Nos. 156556-57, October 04, 2011

Facts: On June 8, 2001, the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA)
was enacted by Congress with the goal of restructuring the electric power industry
and privatization of the assets of the National Power Corporation (NPC). Pursuant to
Section 48 of the EPIRA, a new National Power Board of Directors (NPB) was
created. The NPB passed a Resolution which resolved that all NPC personnel shall
be legally terminated and as a result, petitioner Enrique U. Betoy, together with
thousands of his co-employees from the NPC were terminated. Hence, the petitioner
challenged the validity and constitutionality of Sections 11, 48, and 52 of RA 9136
(EPIRA) contending that it violates Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue: WON the designation of the concerned members of the Cabinet as BOD and
ex-officio members are valid and constitutional.

Discussion: The EPIRA clearly shows that the policy toward privatization would
involve financial, budgetary and environmental concerns as well as coordination with
local government units. The restructuring of the electric power industry inherently
involves the participation of various government agencies. In the case of Civil
Liberties, the Court explained that mandating additional duties and functions to
Cabinet members which are not inconsistent with those already prescribed by their
offices or appointments by virtue of their special knowledge, expertise and skill in
their respective executive offices, is a practice long-recognized in many jurisdictions.
It is a practice justified by the demands of efficiency, policy direction, continuity and
coordination among the different offices in the Executive Branch in the discharge of
its multifarious tasks of executing and implementing laws affecting national interest
and general welfare and delivering basic services to the people. The production and
supply of energy is undoubtedly one of national interest and is a basic commodity
expected by the people.

Ruling: Yes. The Court finds the designation of the respective members of the
Cabinet, as ex-officio members of the NPB, valid. The designation of the members of
the Cabinet to form the NPB does not violate the prohibition contained in our
Constitution as the privatization and restructuring of the electric power industry
involves the close coordination and policy determination of various government
agencies. Likewise, the delegation of the said officials to the respective Board of
Directors were designation by Congress of additional functions and duties to the
officials concerned, i.e., they were designated as members of the Board of Directors.
Designation connotes an imposition of additional duties, usually by law, upon a
person already in the public service by virtue of an earlier appointment. Hence,
Congress specifically intended that the position of member of the Board of NPB shall
be ex-officio or automatically attached to the respective offices of the members
composing the board. It is clear from the wordings of the law that it was the intention
of Congress that the subject posts will be adjunct to the respective offices of the
official designated to such posts.

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST, et. al vs. HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, et. al

G.R. No. 166715 August 14, 2008

From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers
Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional.

Facts: Republic Act 9335 (Attrition Act of 2005) was enacted to optimize the
revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and
the Bureau of Customs. The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and
employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and
sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue
Performance Evaluation Board. A Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA
9335 was created for the purpose of approving the implementing rules and
regulations formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22,
2006, it approved the said IRR. From then on, it became functus officio and ceased
to exist.

One of the issues presented by the petitioners in their petition for prohibition seeking
to prevent respondents from implementing is the creation of a congressional
oversight committee. They argued that it violates the doctrine of separation of
powers. While the legislative function is deemed accomplished and completed upon
the enactment and approval of the law, the creation of the congressional oversight
committee permits legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of
the law.

Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General asserted that the creation of
the congressional oversight committee under the law enhances, rather than violates,
separation of powers. It ensures the fulfillment of the legislative policy and serves as
a check to any over-accumulation of power on the part of the executive and the
implementing agencies.

Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of separation of powers has been violated by the
creation of Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335? Or Whether or not
the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 unconstitutional?

Ruling: Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement

and interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law and
are entitled to respect. Such rules and regulations partake of the nature of a statute
and are just as binding as if they have been written in the statute itself. As such, they
have the force and effect of law and enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and
legality until they are set aside with finality in an appropriate case by a competent
court. Congress, in the guise of assuming the role of an overseer, may not pass
upon their legality by subjecting them to its stamp of approval without disturbing the
calculated balance of powers established by the Constitution. In exercising discretion
to approve or disapprove the IRR based on a determination of whether or not they
conformed with the provisions of RA 9335, Congress arrogated judicial power unto
itself, a power exclusively vested in this Court by the Constitution.
From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers
Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional. Under this principle, a provision that requires Congress or its
members to approve the implementing rules of a law after it has already taken effect
shall be unconstitutional, as is a provision that allows Congress or its members to
overturn any directive or ruling made by the members of the executive branch
charged with the implementation of the law. Following this rationale, Section 12 of
RA 9335 should be struck down as unconstitutional.

DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA, et.al vs. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, et. al
G.R. No. 196271 October 18, 2011

Facts:

On June 30, 2011, Republic Act (RA) No. 10153, entitled An Act Providing for the
Synchronization of the Elections in the ARMM with the National and Local Elections
and for Other Purposes was enacted. The law reset the ARMM elections from the
8th of August 2011, to the second Monday of May 2013 and every three (3) years
thereafter, to coincide with the country’s regular national and local elections. The law
as well granted the President the power to appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of
the Regional Governor, the Regional Vice-Governor, and the Members of the
Regional Legislative Assembly, who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said
offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified
and assumed office.

The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 assert that
these laws amend RA No. 9054 and thus, have to comply with the supermajority
vote and plebiscite requirements prescribed under Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of
RA No. 9094 in order to become effective.

The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further maintain that it is unconstitutional for its
failure to comply with the three-reading requirement of Section 26(2), Article VI of the
Constitution.

Issues:

1. Whether or not RA No. RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 are amendments to
RA No. 9054.
2. Whether or not the supermajority voting requirement required under Section
1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 is unconstitutional for giving it a character of an
irrepealable law.
3. Whether or not RA No. 10153 is unconstitutional for its failure to comply with
the three-reading requirement of the constitution.

Ruling:
 1. No. Neither RA No. 9333 nor RA No. 10153 amends RA No. 9054. As an
examination of these laws will show, RA No. 9054 only provides for the
schedule of the first ARMM elections and does not fix the date of the regular
elections. A need therefore existed for the Congress to fix the date of the
subsequent ARMM regular elections, which it did by enacting RA No. 9333
and thereafter, RA No. 10153. Obviously, these subsequent laws RA No.
9333 and RA No. 10153 cannot be considered amendments to RA No. 9054
as they did not change or revise any provision in the latter law; they merely
filled in a gap in RA No. 9054 or supplemented the law by providing the date
of the subsequent regular elections. We see the clear intention of Congress to
treat the laws which fix the date of the subsequent ARMM elections as
separate and distinct from the Organic Acts. Congress only acted consistently
with this intent when it passed RA No. 10153 without requiring compliance
with the amendment prerequisites embodied in Section 1 and Section 3,
Article XVII of RA No. 9054.

2. The Constitution provides that a majority of each House shall constitute a

quorum to do business. Clearly, the 2/3 voting requirement is higher than
what the Constitution requires for the passage of bills, and served to restrain
the plenary powers of Congress to amend, revise or repeal the laws it had
passed. While a supermajority is not a total ban against a repeal, it is a
limitation in excess of what the Constitution requires on the passage of bills
and is constitutionally obnoxious because it significantly constricts the future
legislators room for action and flexibility.

3. No. The records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law
synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local elections.
Following the ruling in Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance, the President’s
certification exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply
with the three separate readings requirement.

RA No. 6734 - An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao

RA No. 9054 – An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act
No. 6734, entitled An Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,
as Amended

RA No. 9140 – resets the first regular elections originally scheduled under RA No.
9054, to November 26, 2001.

RA No. 9333 - resets the ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of August
2005, and on the same date every 3 years thereafter.

Unlike RA No. 6734 and RA No. 9054, RA No. 9333 was not ratified in a plebiscite.
RA No. 10153 - resets the ARMM elections to May 2013 to coincide with the regular
national and local elections of the country.

Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers

Doctrine:
Executive Privilege is not a personal privilege, but one that adheres to the
Office of the President. It exists to protect public interests, not to benefit a particular
public official.

Facts:
On September 26, 2007, Romulo L. Neri, the head of the National Economic
and Development Authority (NEDA) appeared before the Senate Committees to
testify on matters concerning the National Broadband (NBN) Project. The project
was awarded by the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) to
Zhing Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) in the amount of approximately 16
Billion Pesos to be financed by the People’s Republic of China. In a previous
hearing, Jose De Venecia III testified that several executive officials and power
brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the
NEDA. In this present hearing, Neri was interrogated for eleven (11) hours where he
admitted that the Comelec Chairman, Benjamin Abalos tried to bribe him in the
amount of 200 Million pesos for his approval on NBN Project, which he relays to the
then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo who also ordered the latter not to accept the
bribe.
On a probe, the petitioner was asked three (3) questions where he invoked
the Executive Privilege, the questions are:
1) Whether or not President Arroyo followed up NBN Project;
2) Whether or not she directed him to prioritize it; and
3) Whether or not she directed him to approve it.

Issue:
Whether or not the three (3) questions which the petitioner refused to answer
are covered by the Executive Privilege.

Ruling:
The three (3) questions are covered by the Executive Privilege/Presidential
Communications Privilege.
 The elements of an Executive Privilege/Presidential Communications
Privilege are:
1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential”
communication privilege;
2) The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a close
advisor of the President or the President himself. The advisor must be in operational
proximity of the president; and
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that
may overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that information sought likely
contains important evidence and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by
an appropriate investigating authority.
In the case at hand, the three (3) questions involved were qualified in the
above considerations for an Executive Privilege, therefore, making the petitioner’s
invokaed Executive Privilege valid.
As to the contention of the respondents to the violation to the constitutional
provisions on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, the
court argued that, petitioner in appearing before the Senate Committees is a
compliance already to that right which is not absolute and subject to certain
limitations also like the Executive Privilege.
Therefore, respondent’s motion for reconsideration dated April 8, 2008 is
hereby denied.

Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 83896 | 1991-02-22

Subject:
Constitutional Prohibition on Holding Multiple Offices; Positions held in Ex-Officio
capacity; De Facto Officers; Statutory Construction of Constitutional Prohibitions

Facts:

(Former) President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284, allowing
appointive officials of the Executive Department (members of the Cabinet, their
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries) to hold, in addition to his primary
position, not more than two positions in the government and government
corporations and receive the corresponding compensation therefor.

The constitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 is being challenged by petitioners

on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Section 13, Article VII other
than those provided in the Constitution.

Petitioners further argue that the exception to the prohibition in Section 7, par. (2),
Article IX-B on the Civil Service Commission applies to officers and employees of the
Civil Service in general and that said exceptions do not apply and cannot be
extended to Section 13, Article VII which applies specifically to the President, Vice-
President, Members of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants.

Issue:
Whether or not EO No. 284 is valid or constitutional.

Held:

Constitutionality of EO 284

1. By ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members,

undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary
position to not more than two positions in the government and government
corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in
direct contravention to the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987
Constitution itself.

Constitutional Prohibition on Holding Multiple Offices

2. The prohibition imposed on the President and his official family is all-embracing
and covers both public and private office and employment.

3. It is quite notable that in all Constitutional provisions on disqualifications to hold

other office or employment, the prohibition pertains to an office or employment in the
government and government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
In striking contrast is the wording of Section 13, Article VII which states that “(T) he
President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other
office or employment during their tenure.”

4. These sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on the President and his

official family, which prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other public officials or
employees such as the Members of Congress, members of the civil service in
general and members of the armed forces, are proof of the intent of the 1987
Constitution to treat the President and his official family as a class by itself and to
impose upon said class stricter prohibitions.

5. While all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other
office or employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by
law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the
Constitution itself.

6. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule
applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section
13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-
President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.

Exception to Prohibition on Multiple Offices

7. The prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is not to be interpreted as covering
positions held without additional compensation in ex-officio capacities as provided by
law and as required by the primary functions of the concerned official's office,
namely:
(a)the Vice-President being appointed as a member of the Cabinet under Section 3,
par. (2), Article VII; or

(b) the Vice-President acting as President in those instances provided under Section
7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VII;

(c) the Secretary of Justice being ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council
by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
8. The term ex-officio means "from office; by virtue of office." It refers to an "authority
derived from official character merely, not expressly conferred upon the individual
character, but rather annexed to the official position."

9. An ex-officio member of a board is one who is a member by virtue of his title to a

certain office, and without further warrant or appointment. To illustrate, by express
provision of law, the Secretary of Transportation and Communications is the ex-
officio Chairman of the Board of the Philippine Ports Authority, and the Light Rail
Transit Authority.

De Facto Officers

10. During their tenure in the questioned positions, respondents may be considered
de facto officers and as such entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered.

11. It has been held that “in cases where there is no de jure, officer, a de facto
officer, who, in good faith has had possession of the office and has discharged the
duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the emoluments of the office, and may
in an appropriate action recover the salary, fees and other compensations attached
to the office.

12. This doctrine is, undoubtedly, supported on equitable grounds since it seems
unjust that the public should benefit by the services of an officer de facto and then be
freed from all liability to pay any one for such services.

13. Any per diem, allowances or other emoluments received by the respondents by
virtue of actual services rendered in the questioned positions may therefore be
retained by them.

AKBAYAN CITIZENS ACTION PARTY VS. THOMAS G. AQUINO ( In his capacity

as Under Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry)

FACTS:

Petition for mandamus and prohibition was filed by the petitioners, as

congresspersons, citizens and taxpayers, requesting respondents to submit to them
the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA).

Petitioner emphasize that the refusal of the government to disclose the said
agreement violates their right to information on matters of public concern and of
public interest. And contravenes the constitutional provisions on transparency, such
as that on the policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public
interest. That the non-disclosure of the same documents undermines their right to
effective and reasonable participation in all levels of social, political and economic
decision making.

Respondent herein invoke executive privilege. They relied on the ground that the
matter sought involves a diplomatic negotiation then in progress, thus constituting an
exception to the right to information and the policy of full disclosure of matters that
are of public concern like the JPEPA. That diplomatic negotiation are covered by the
doctrine of executive privilege.

Issue:

Whether or not the petition has been entirely rendered moot and academic because
of the subsequent event that occurred?

Whether the information sought by the petitioners are of public concern and are still
covered by the doctrine of executive privilege?

Held:

On the first issue, the Supreme Court ruled that the principal relief petitioners are
praying for is the disclosure of the contents of the JPEPA prior to its finalization
between the two States parties, the demand to be furnished a copy of the full text of
the JPEPA has become moot and academic , it having been made accessible to
public since September 11, 2006. The petition is not entirely moot, however,
because petitioners seek to obtain, not merely the text of the JPEPA, but also the
Philippine and Japanese offers in the course of the negotiations. As for the demand
for copies of Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the JPEPA
negotiations, the same was denied, the claim of executive privilege by the
Respondents was valid.

Moving on to the second issue, The Supreme Court Ruled that Diplomatic
negotiations, therefore, are recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction, the JPEPA
negotiations constituting no exception. It bears emphasis, however, that such
privilege is only presumptive. For as Senate v. Ermita holds, recognizing a type of
information as privileged does not mean that it will be considered privileged in all
instances. Only after a consideration of the context in which the claim is made may it
be determined if there is a public interest that calls for the disclosure of the desired
information, strong enough to overcome its traditionally privileged status.

The court adopted also the doctrine in PMPF v. Manglapus, Wherein petitioners
were seeking information from the President’s representatives on the state of the
then on-going negotiations of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement. The Court
denied the petition, stressing that “secrecy of negotiations with foreign countries is
not violative of the constitutional provisions of freedom of speech or of the press nor
of the freedom of access to information.
REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH
SOCORRO B. TAN, Respondents.

G.R. No. 207264 June 25, 2013

Facts:

This is a dissenting opinion of Supreme Court Associate Justice Arturo Brion against the decision
of majority of the SC En Banc for outright dismissal of instant Petition for Certiorari alleging grave
abuse of discretion against COMELEC for cancelling petitioner Regina Ongsiako Reyes'
(petitioner or Reyes) Certificate of Candidacy ( COC) for the position of Representative in the
lone district of Marinduque.

Petitioner Reyes filed her COC for the position of Representative for the lone district of
Marinduque. Subsequently, Tan filed with the COMELEC a petition to deny due course or to
cancel Reyes’ CoC. Tan alleged that Reyes committed material misrepresentations in her COC,
specifically: (1) that she is a resident of Brgy. Lupac, Boac Marinduque when in truth she is a
resident of 135 J.P. Rizal, Brgy. Milagrosa Quezon City or Bauan Batangas following the
residence of her husband; (2) that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen; (3) that she is not a
permanent resident of, or an immigrant to, a foreign country; (4) that her date of birth is July 3,
1964, when in truth it is July 3, 1958; (5) that her civil status is single; and (6) that she is eligible
for the office she seeks to be elected to.

On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution granting the petition and
cancelling Reyes’ CoC. On the alleged misrepresentations in Reyes’ CoC with respect to her
citizenship and residency.

Thereafter, On May 14, 2013, the COMELEC en banc promulgated its Resolution denying
Reyes’ motion for reconsideration and affirming the ruling of the COMELEC First Division on the
ground that the former’s motion was a mere rehash of the arguments she raised against the First
Division ruling.

Notably, after the COMELEC en banc issued the May 14, 2013 Resolution or on May 18, 2013,
the Marinduque PBOC proclaimed Reyes as the duly elected member of the House of
Representatives for Marinduque and on June 7, 2013, Reyes took her oath of office before
House Speaker Rep. Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr.

In view of the above subsequent events, the COMELEC is ousted of jurisdiction over the petition,
questioning Reyes’ qualification, who is a duly proclaimed winner and who has already taken her
oath of office for the position of Member, House of Representatives?

Issue:

Is petitioner Reyes’ proclamation divested the COMELEC of jurisdiction over her qualifications in
favor of the HRET

Ruling:

The matter of jurisdiction between the COMELEC and the HRET has always constituted a
dichotomy; the relationship between the COMELEC and the HRET in terms of jurisdiction is not
an appellate one but is mutually exclusive.

This mutually exclusive jurisdictional relationship is, as a rule, sequential. This means that the
COMELEC’s jurisdiction ends when the HRET’s jurisdiction begins. Thus, there is no point in
time, when a vacuum in jurisdiction would exist involving congressional candidates. This
jurisdiction, of course, refers to jurisdiction over the subject matter, which no less than the
Philippine Constitution governs. Under Section 17, Article VI, the subject matter of HRET’s
jurisdiction is the "election, returns, and qualifications of Members of the House of
Representatives."

Associate Justice Brion submits that the proclamation of the winning candidate is the operative
fact that triggers the jurisdiction of the HRET over election contests relating to the winning
candidate’s election, return and qualifications. In other words, the proclamation of a winning
candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of
the proclamation and the party questioning the qualifications of the winning candidate should
now present his or her case in a proper proceeding (i.e. quo warranto) before the HRET who, by
constitutional mandate, has the sole jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving the election,
returns and qualification of members of the House of Representatives, citing Limkaichong v.
Comelec and Jalosjos, Jr. v Commission on Elections.

Based on these considerations, it appears clear that any ruling from the Supreme Court – as the
majority ruled – that the COMELEC retains jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the proclaimed representative who has been proclaimed but not yet
assumed office is a major retrogressive jurisprudential development, in fact, a complete
turnaround from the Court’s prevailing jurisprudence on the matter; such rule – if it becomes
established – can very well emasculate the HRET.

Associate Justice Brion’s holding on the COMELEC’s jurisdiction vis-à-vis the HRET is
inconsistent with the HRET Rules

The view that the proclamation of the winning candidate is the operative fact that triggers the
jurisdiction of the HRET is also supported by the HRET Rules. They state:

RULE 14. Jurisdiction. – The Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives.

RULE 15. How Initiated. – An election contest is initiated by the filing of a verified petition of
protest or a verified petition for quo warranto against a Member of the House of Representatives.
An election protest shall not include a petition for quo warranto. Neither shall a petition for quo
warranto include an election protest.

RULE 16. Election Protest. – A verified petition contesting the election or returns of any Member
of the House of Representatives shall be filed by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of
candidacy and has been voted for the same office, within fifteen (15) days after the proclamation
of the winner. The party filing the protest shall be designated as the protestant while the adverse
party shall be known as the protestee. x x x

RULE 17. Quo Warranto. – A verified petition for quo warranto contesting the election of a
Member of the House of Representatives on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the
Republic of the Philippines shall be filed by any registered voter of the district concerned within
fifteen (15) days from the date of the proclamation of the winner. The party filing the petition shall
be designated as the petitioner while the adverse party shall be known as the respondent.

Based on the above Rules, it appears clear that as far as the HRET is concerned, the
proclamation of the winner in the congressional elections serves as the reckoning point as well
as the trigger that brings any contests relating to his or her election, return and qualifications
within its sole and exclusive jurisdiction.

In the context of the present case, by holding that the COMELEC retained jurisdiction (because
Reyes, although a proclaimed winner, has not yet assumed office), the majority effectively
undermines the HRET of its jurisdiction as it allows the filing of an election protest or a petition for
quo warranto only after the assumption to office by the candidate (i.e, on June 30 in the usual
case). To illustrate using the dates of the present case, any election protest or a petition for quo
warranto filed after June 30 or more than fifteen (15) days from Reyes’ proclamation on May 18,
2013, shall certainly be dismissed outright by the HRET for having been filed out of time under
the HRET rules.
ANGELES UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION, Petitioner, vs. CITY OF ANGELES, JULIET G.
QUINSAAT, in her capacity as Treasurer of Angeles City and ENGR. DONATO N. DIZON, in
his capacity as Acting Angeles City Building Official, Respondents.

G.R. No. 189999 June 27, 2012

Facts:

Petitioner Angeles University Foundation (AUF) is an educational institution converted into a non-
stock, non-profit education foundation under the provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6055.
Thus, in letters addressed to respondents City Treasurer Juliet G. Quinsaat and Acting City
Building Official Donato N. Dizon, petitioner claimed that it is exempt from the payment of the
building permit and locational clearance fees for the construction of its 11-storey building. The
said claim was even supported by legal opinions rendered by the Department of Justice (DOJ).
Petitioner also reminded the respondents that they have previously issued building permits
acknowledging such exemption from payment of building permit fees on the construction of
petitioner’s 4-storey AUF Information Technology Center building and the AUF Professional
Schools building.

Petitioner wrote the respondents reiterating its request to reverse the disputed assessments and
invoking the DOJ legal opinions. Despite petitioner’s plea, however, respondents refused to issue
the building permits for the construction of the AUF Medical Center in the main campus and
renovation of a school building located at Marisol Village. Petitioner then appealed the matter to
City Mayor Carmelo F. Lazatin but no written response was received by petitioner. Consequently,
petitioner paid under protest.

Petitioners request for reversal and refund was eventually denied by respondent City Treasurer.
Hence, they filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court seeking the refund of P826,662.99 plus
interest at the rate of 12% per annum, and also praying for the award of attorney’s fees in the
amount of P300,000.00 and litigation expenses. The said complaint was granted by the RTC but
reversed by the Court of Appeals, on appeal.

Issues:

(1) Whether petitioner is exempt from the payment of building permit and related fees imposed
under the National Building Code; and

(2) whether the parcel of land owned by petitioner which has been assessed for real property tax
is likewise exempt

Ruling:

The petition was denied.

R.A. No. 6055 granted tax exemptions to educational institutions like petitioner which converted
to non-stock, non-profit educational foundations. Section 8 of said law provides “The Foundation
shall be exempt from the payment of all taxes, import duties, assessments, and other charges
imposed by the Government on all income derived from or property, real or personal, used
exclusively for the educational activities of the Foundation.”

On February 19, 1977, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1096 was issued adopting the National
Building Code of the Philippines. The said Code requires every person, firm or corporation,
including any agency or instrumentality of the government to obtain a building permit for any
construction, alteration or repair of any building or structure. Under the said law, those who are
exempted from the payment of building permit fees are: (1) public buildings and (2) traditional
indigenous family dwellings. Not being expressly included in the enumeration of structures to
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which the building permit fees do not apply, petitioner’s claim for exemption rests solely on its
interpretation of the term "other charges imposed by the National Government" in the tax
exemption clause of R.A. No. 6055.
Petitioner’s claim is unmeritorious. A building permit fee is a regulatory imposition, highlighted by
the fact that in processing an application for a building permit, the Building Official shall see to it
that the applicant satisfies and conforms with approved standard requirements on zoning and
land use, lines and grades, structural design, sanitary and sewerage, environmental health,
electrical and mechanical safety as well as with other rules and regulations implementing the
National Building Code. Building permit fees are not impositions on property but on the activity
subject of government regulation. While it may be argued that the fees relate to particular
properties, i.e., buildings and structures, they are actually imposed on certain activities the owner
may conduct either to build such structures or to repair, alter, renovate or demolish the same.

Since building permit fees are not charges on property, they are not impositions from which
petitioner is exempt.

Furthermore, in Lung Center of the Philippines v. Quezon City, the Supreme Court held that only
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portions of the hospital ACTUALLY, DIRECTLY and EXCLUSIVELY used for charitable
purposes are exempt from real property taxes, while those portions leased to private entities and
individuals are not exempt from such taxes. i1

What is meant by actual, direct and exclusive use of the property for charitable purposes is the
direct and immediate and actual application of the property itself to the purposes for which the
charitable institution is organized. It is not the use of the income from the real property that is
determinative of whether the property is used for tax-exempt purposes.

Petitioner failed to discharge its burden to prove that its real property is actually, directly and
exclusively used for educational purposes. While there is no allegation or proof that petitioner
leases the land to its present occupants, still there is no compliance with the constitutional and
statutory requirement that said real property is actually, directly and exclusively used for
educational purposes. The respondents correctly assessed the land for real property taxes for
the taxable period during which the land is not being devoted solely to petitioner’s educational
activities. Accordingly, the CA did not err in ruling that petitioner is likewise not entitled to a
refund of the real property tax it paid under protest.