Bahawa sesungguhnya saya, CHE MUHAMAD DANIEL BIN CHE RAFIDI No.

Matrik:
A167713 bersetuju untuk mematuhi segala peraturan yang ditetapkan berkaitan dengan
integriti mahasiswa UKM dalam Akta Universiti dan Kolej Universiti 1971 P.U. (A)
209/1999 dan Kaedah-Kaedah UKM (Tatatertib Pelajar-Pelajar) 1999, khususnya Kaedah 6
dan Kaedah 8 berhubung dengan plagiarisme dan kelakuan pelajar dalam peperiksaan.

QUESTION 1
A person without a contractual relationship might seek compensation from another for
personal harm or property damage caused by the defective product. Any claim for this
defective product, whether for making good or replacement, is a claim for pure economic
loss. In other words, pure economic loss is a an economic loss which does not include a
damage to the property or the body but rather a loss that is merely financial in nature, loss in
investment, defective products as were cited in the case of Dr. Abdul Hamid Abdul Rashid
& Anor v. Jurusan Malaysia Consultants & Ors [1997]. The presiding rule is that pure
economic loss is not recoverable as it cannot be directly traced back to harm to a person or
property. The rule is to distinguish between the claim for a damage to person or property to a
claim for the defective product itself which the latter is defined as a pure economic loss.

In the early stages of the claim for tort in court, one can only claim for pure economic
loss should the parties be contracting with each other as cited in the case Cattle v Stockton
Waterworks Co [1874]. For instance, a contractual relationship exists between a seller and a
buyer or between a developer and the purchaser. However, a claim for defective product or
building that is not inclusive of any harm to the property or to any person can only be done
under the contract. In British Celanese Ltd. v. AH Hunt (Capacitors) Ltd. [1969], generally,
the common law permits a claim for economic loss that arises from a harm to a person or
property. It was also affirmed in the case of SCM (United Kingdom) Ltd. v. WJ Whittal &
Sons Ltd. [1971] two years later. Alas, the English courts do not share the same view on the
claim for pure economic loss as they are bound by the decision in Donoghue v Stevenson
[1932] which specifically highlights that a claim for economic loss can only be done upon a
damage to a person or a property. The same principle and standing is referred to by the
Malaysian courts as it adopts the Common Law. Lord Denning in Spartan Steel & Alloys
Ltd. v. Martin & Co. Ltd ([1937], held that the recognition of pure economic loss has not
been positive because it raised the spectre of opening the floodgates litigation due to the
potential for indeterminate liability.
 The development of the recognition towards the claim for pure economic loss has
significantly grown in both English and Malaysian courts throughout the time. In the early
stages up to the 1970s, the courts have refused to allow a claim for pure economic loss in
which no liability will be imposed for this claim as analysed in the case of Cattle v Stockton
Waterworks Co [1875] and Spartan Steel &Alloys Ltd v MarTin & Co. Ltd. [1937]. It was
later in 1972 where Lord Denning took a different approach than these two cited cases. In
Dutton v. Bognor Regis Urban District Council [1972], a claim for pure economic loss was
recognised whereby he quoted that there is no distinction in economic loss and pure
economic loss, both however can be claimed. The principle was then affirmed in the case of
Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1978]. The similarity in both cases is that both
claims were made against the local council. Lord Wilberforce held that it is therefore
permissible for a claim to be made if the claim is solely on the defective building with no
harm towards a person or property is included whereby the negligence speaks for itself. The
decision in Anns was later followed in another leading case, Junior Books Ltd. v. Veitchi
Co. Ltd [1983] but the claim was made to the subcontractor in which it was allowed by the
courts as the subcontractor owes a duty of reasonable care to the plaintiff in avoiding a pure
economic loss from happening.

Departing from the recognition towards a claim for pure economic loss, Lord Bridge
in D & F Estates Ltd. v. Church Commissioners for England & Ors [1989], had dismissed
the claim made by the plaintiff for pure economic loss by distinguishing the facts of both
cases as he referred to the principle decided in Hedley Byrne v Heller [1963]. The principle
in the latter case mentions that for a defendant to be liable, there has to be a reliance by the
plaintiff on the defendant for a claim on pure economic loss to be permissible. The Privy
Council in Candlewood Navigation Corporation Ltd. v. Mitsui OSK Lines Ltd [1985] is of
opinion that a limitation mechanisme has to be imposed on claims for pure economic loss by
referring back to the early case of Cattle v Stockton Waterworks. In 1990, the House of Lords
in Murphy v. Brentwood District Council [1990], has also highlighted that a liability can
only arise from a contractual relationship since a defect on a product or building is considered
a defect in the quality which can be claimed under the contract warranty. As long as there is
no harm towards the property or the person, there is no liability. A crucial turning point was
then made in the case of Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] for a claim on pure
economic loss. The loss that was suffered by the plaintiff however was caused by a
misstatement and not from negligence. However, the principle in this case was accepted in all
claims for negligence be it for pure economic loss or economic loss due to physical harm to a
person or property. The Caparo test has set out 3 rules to determine the existence of duty of
care, which are; the loss suffered by the plaintiff is foreseeable, whether there is a proximity
between the plaintiff and the defendant and whether it is just, fair and reasonable to impose
such duty of care in the situation. If yes, then a duty of care exists for a person to be liable.

The decisions in the English courts have given sort of an impact to the application in
Malaysian courts. Up until the early 90s, the Malaysian courts have been depending on the
decision in the Murphy case as can be seen in the case of Kerajaan Malaysia v. Cheah
Foong Chiew & Ors [1993] where the court had not allow for a claim on pure economic
loss as Wan Mohamed J held that the third defendant was not held liable under the law of tort
for the loss suffered by the plaintiff as it is a pure economic loss and no one or any property
was harmed due to the defendant’s act or omission. He also held that the decision in the
Murphy case stands and should be relevant at all times. The same decision was made in Teh
Khem On & Ors & Anor v. Teoh & Wu Development Sdn. Bhd. & Ors [1995] where the
plaintiff made a claim against the defendant on defective property. Both cases were made
against an architect and engineer on pure economic loss. The court held that both the
professionals are not held liable since no contract was bound to exist between them and the
plaintiff. Again, referring to the traditional principle of contractual duties for a person to be
held liable. However, the decision given out by his Lordship was criticised as it was made
based on the reference to the English common law and not in the Malaysian context. He was
said to fail in considering the provision of section 3(1)(a) Civil Law Act 1956 that
specifically upholds the law to only be bound by the English courts before or on 7 April 1956
only. Hence, it is not relevant to follow the English common law even in the 90s. The
Malaysian courts should have a firm stand departing from the views of the English courts as
our culture and situation are different although Peh Swee Chin J is of the opinion that it is not
for the court to change the law principles but that is for the Parliament to observe.

However, the significance in the development of claim for pure economic loss has
found its way in the case Dr. Abdul Hamid Abdul Rashid & Anor v. Jurusan Malaysia
Consultants & Ors [1997] where James Foong J had departed from all the rulings and
decided that a pure economic loss is claimable. The decision made by his Lordship is based
on the foreseeability of the damage as decided in an Australian case, Bryan v Maloney
[1995]. He also referred to a New Zealand case, Winnipeg Condominium Corp. No. 36 v.
Bird Construction Co. Ltd. & Ors [1995] whereby the principle in the D & F Estates case is
considered unjust by leaving subsequent purchasers with no remedy against the contractor if
a claim for pure economic loss is not permissible. His Lordship also highlights that the claim
for pure economic loss is not limited to only defective buildings as the limitation might cause
injustice. The same decision was made in the later case of Steven Phoa Cheng Loon v.
Highland Properties Sdn. Bhd [2004] or better known as the Highland Tower case.
Furthermore, the fourth defendant in this case had appealed to the court in the case of Majlis
Perbandaran Ampang Jaya v Steven Phoa Cheng Loon & Ors [2006] and court held that
although the defendant is protected under section 95(2) of the Street, Drainage and
Building Act 1974 but the immunity provided was broad enough to encompass the alleged
danger imposed by MPAJ and/or its predecessor. So the protection under section 95(2)
cannot be allowed as that section does not give local authorities any power to act negligently.

Steven Shim LP is of the opinion that the duty of care principle in Donoghue v
Stevenson is to be taken seriously by following the Caparo test. As long as the 3 rules in
Caparo are followed, the plaintiff can claim for pure economic loss. He also stated that the
English court has taken two kinds of approach namely; approach by categorisation and open
approach. The first approach is for the court to consider if the defendant is liable under any
recognised liability from the tortious act whereas the second approach is by looking at the
facts of the case. His Lordship however affirms his stand by stating that the duty of care
principle must be proven before making a decision. However, Abdul Hamid Mohamad LP in
Nepline Sdn. Bhd. v. Jones Lang Wootten [1995], held that although a pure economic loss is
claimable, it is not just for liability to be imposed on the local authority for the loss suffered
by the plaintiff. He stated that the local authority has limited resources and even if they can
bear the cost, it is not just to the public to be utilising the taxpayers money to pay off an
individual debt. His decision is made based on public policy by considering both the
implication on the local authority and the public. This decision was then followed in another
case, UDA Holdings Bhd v Koperasi Pasaraya (M) Bhd and Other Appeals [2009] where
the claim was again made to a local authority.

However, in a later case of Loh Chiak Eong & Anor v Lok Kok Beng & 49 Ors
[2013], the court is of the opinion that foreseeability is not the only test to allow for a claim
on pure economic loss. It is not just to impose a duty of care on the architect to ensure that
the CFO is obtained without delay. The loss suffered by the plaintiff is purely financial and
no harm was done towards any person or property. Even though it was affirmed that a pure
economic loss can be claimable in Dr Abdul Hamid’s case, the duty of care principle set out
in Donoghue v Stevenson must not be overlooked. The case was then appealed in 2015
where in Lok Kok Beng & 49 Ors v Loh Chiak Eong & Anor [2015], although the local
authority should not be held liable for pure economic loss on a public policy basis, but the
claim was not extended to any private bodies, agencies or professional body that gives out
services. In a more recent case, Tenaga Nasional Malaysia v Batu Kemas Industri Sdn Bhd
and another appeal [2018], the Court of Appeal failed to properly consider whether it was
fair and reasonable to impose liability for economic loss, and to consider that the Electricity
Supply Act 1990 (“the Act”) did not impose liability on the second defendant for economic
loss. The second defendant was recognised as a public body. The Act does not impose
liability for economic loss whereby Section 17 of the Act only imposes liability for
negligence, which is limited to damage to any person or property caused by negligence of
persons employed by the second defendant and or its agents or servants. The said provision
excludes economic loss caused by parties not under the control of the second defendant.
Under the Act and on general policy grounds, the second defendant should be protected
against claims for economic loss. Otherwise, it would open a floodgate of claims which
would result in increases in electricity tariffs.
In conclusion, in order to analyse the approach taken by both English and Malaysian
courts, one has to analyse the principle that was set out in each of the precedents and how the
common law has influenced the application in both courts. In the Malaysian context, the law
was very much influenced by the decision made in English but it was later departed in the
late 90s where in cases like the Dr. Abdul Hamid case and the Highland Tower case, judges
like James Foong J had taken a different approach by setting out a new precedent. It shows
that the Malaysian court has its own standing and is free from the shackles of the English law.
The above discussion demonstrates that there has never been consistency or simplicity in the
judicial approach to pure economic damage caused by substandard constructions. The courts'
jurisdiction have shifted over the previous years from non-liability to liability to non-liability
to liability to non-liability to liability to non-liability. In England, economic loss caused by
substandard structures is not claimable under tort law. However, it appears that the Malaysian
judiciary's approach is pragmatic and practical. It is necessary to empower the judiciary to
play an unrestricted role in addressing such concerns in light of foreseeability, closeness, and
the 'just, fair, and reasonable' features of duty of care.
QUESTION 2
Kejutan saraf boleh berlaku secara sengaja ataupun secara tidak sengaja, dimana
sekiranya berlaku secara sengaja, prinsip kes Wilkinson v Downton [1897] 2 QB 57 akan
digunapakai oleh mahkamah. Namun begitu, kebanyakkan kes kejutan saraf berlaku secara
tidak sengaja dimana kejadian dahsyat yang berlaku memberikan kesan yang mendalam
kepada kesihatan mental plaintiff sehingga menyebabkan plaintiff mendapat penyakit
psikiatrik hasil daripada kejutan saraf yang diterima. Namun, mahkamah sangat berhati-hati
dalam meletakkan atau menentukan tugas berhati-hati dalam kes kejutan saraf kerana
kesukaran dalam menentukan jumlah ganti rugi yang perlu dibayar dan sama ada tuntutan
yang dibawa oleh plaintiff boleh dipercayai. Ianya juga dikhuatir akan membuka pintu
kepada tuntutan yang tiada merit. Oleh yang demikian, mahkamah telah menetapkan prinsip
ketat dalam menentukan kes berkaitan dengan kejutan saraf.

Prinsip yang digunapakai ketika ini adalah berdasarkan kes Alcock v Chief Constable
of South Yorkshire Police [1992] 1 AC 310 dimana sebuah stadium runtuh akibat daripada
tindakan cuai defendan yang membenarkan ramai penonton untuk memasuki satu ruang
stadium yang kecil sehinggakan menyebabkan lantai ruang tersebut runtuh. Plaintif yang
membawa tindakan ini adalah tunang kepada seorang masa yang mati dalam kejadian
tersebut. House of Lords dalam kes ini telah meletakkan beberapa prinsip yang perlu
dipenuhi sebelum kejutan saraf boleh ditubuhkan. Pertama ianya dapat dijangka secara
munasabah bahawa kejadian yang berlaku boleh mendatangkan kejutan saraf kepada plaintif
dan jangkaan ini bergantung kepada hubungan antara mangsa dan plaintif yang mana perlu
mempunyai hubungan yang berbentuk kasih sayang dan cinta yang kuat serta mendalam.
Kedua ialah, kejutan saraf yang dialami, perlulah dirasai atau dilihat oleh plaintif melalui
pancaindera plaintif sendiri. Namun yang paling penting adalah, penyakit psikiatrik yang
dialami akibat daripada kejutan saraf yang berlaku perlu diiktiraf dari aspek perubatan.

Kejutan saraf bukan hanya terhad kepada kematian orang yang disayangi, namun
boleh juga berlaku dalam keadaan lain. Dalam kes Mohd Ridzwan bin Abdul Razak v
Asmah binti Hj Mohd Nor [2015] 4 CLJ 295, mahkamah mengiktiraf gangguan seksual
boleh membawa bahaya dan kesan psikologi kepada mangsa iaitu jatuh sebagai kesalahan tort
kejutan saraf. Dalam kes gangguan seksual, mangsa-mangsa gangguan seksual boleh memilih
mana-mana tort yang dirasakan bersesuaian dengan situasi yang dialami seperti kecuaian,
kejutan saraf, serangan dan hentaman, tanggungan beralih dan juga tort gangguan. Selain itu,
tuntutan saman gangguan seksual boleh terjatuh di bawah tort kejutan saraf sekiranya berjaya
dibuktikan bahawa perbuatan defendan telah menyebabkan plaintif mengalami penyakit
psikiatri yang diiktiraf, iaitu bukan sekadar ketakutan, kejutan atau tekanan mental semata-
mata. Dalam erti kata lain, gangguan seksual yang dilakukan terhadap plaintif itu benar-benar
mempengaruhi kesihatan mental plaintif. Kes ini merupakan kes pemula bagi suatu kausa
tindakan yang sah dalam tuntutan saman gangguan seksual di Malaysia. Di peringkat rayuan,
mahkamah telah mengambilkira bahawa gangguan seksual yang dikenakan terhadap mangsa
adalah bersifat melampau sehingga menyebabkan kemerosotan mental dan fizikal kepada
mangsa dan jelas menunjukkan ia adalah satu bentuk kemudaratan dari segi penyakit
psikiatri. Bukti kecederaan yang telah dialami oleh mangsi ini telah membolehkan mahkamah
menerimanya sebagai tort kejutan saraf bagi memberikan remedi yang adil kepada mangsa.
Selain itu, mahkamah telah mengaitkan dan membuat satu relevansi antara gangguan seksual
dan keadaan mental mangsa dan mencadangkan kepentingan pelaksanaan tort kejutan saraf di
Malaysia terutamanya dalam tuntutan saman gangguan seksual. Di peringkat Mahkamah
Persekutuan, para hakim telah bersepakat untuk memperuntukkan ganti rugi substantial
kepada responden atas ketidakselesaan yang dialami dan juga ganti rugi teruk berdasarkan
motif yang dikenalpasti dalam perbuatan pelaku.

Seterusnya, dalam kes Dato' Othman bin Hashim v KKW Auto Centre [2012] 5
MLJ 756, defendan telah menuntut untuk kerugian bagi gantirugi untuk ketidakselesaan
(inconvenience), kebimbangan (anxiety) dan kejutan keras/saraf (severe/nervous shock) dan
berjaya dalam tuntutannya kerana plaintif telah didapati memberikan kesulitan kepada
Defendan. Dalam kes Jennifer Anne Harper (Mendakwa untuk Sendirinya & Sebagai Wali
Estet Bernard Alfred Harper, Simati) V Timothy Theseira [2009] 7 MLJ 711, hakim
Mahkamah Sesyen telah memutuskan bahawa responden bertanggungan 100% ke atas
kemalangan yang berlaku dan memperuntukkan perayu dengan gantirugi sebanyak
RM150,000.00 bagi penderitaan dan kesakitan yang dialami, RM10,000.00 bagi kejutan saraf
serta ganti rugi khas berjumlah RM37,365.00.

Marjan Petrovski v Datuk Seri Utama Ir Haji Idris Bin Hj Haron (Presiden
Persatuan Bola Melaka) [2021] MLJU 2035, mahkamah berpendapat bahawa plaintif
dibenarkan untuk melakukan tuntutan bagi kejutan saraf ke atas pelaku tort. Dalam kes ini,
plaintif telah membawa tuntutan ke atas defendan sebagai dependan kepada si mati. Dengan
merujuk kes sebelum ini iaitu Jub’il bin Mohamad Taib Taral v Sunway Lagoon Sdn Bhd
[2001] dan McLoughlin v O’Brien [1982], terdapat perbezaan dalam fakta kes bagi
membolehkan tuntutan untuk kejutan saraf terpakai. Dalam kes Jubi’il v Sunway Lagoon,
tuntutan dibuat oleh suami dan anak si mati di mana mereka dikira sebagai dependan.
Mahkamah oleh itu telah telah memberikan ganti rugi sebanyak RM5000.00 kepada plaintif-
plaintif. Walaupun begitu, dalam kes McLoughlin v O’Brien, plaintif yang merupakan balu
kepada suaminya yang telah meninggal serta ibu kepada anaknya yang juga meninggal.
Namun, dia telah membuat tuntutan peribadi untuk dirinya sendiri ke atas pelaku tort yang
dengan cuai telah menyebabkan kematian anak dan suaminya. Mahkamah memperlihatkan
beberapa persoalan undang-undang bagi menentukan hala tuju kes ini iaitu samada terdapat
liabiliti ke atas pelaku tort yang telah dengan cuai membunuh atau menyebabkan kecederaan
fizikal ke atas A untuk membayar ganti rugi kepada B bagi rawatan psiakatri berpunca
daripada kematian atau kecederaan A. Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa plaintif dibenarkan
untuk membuat tuntutan kejutan saraf ke atas pelaku tort tersebut. Oleh itu, dapat
disimpulkan disini bahawa dependan kepada si mati boleh membuat tuntutan bagi kejutan
saraf samada dalam tuntutan peribadi atau bersekali dengan tuntutan atas
kematian/kecederaan.

Dalam satu kes yang lebih awal iaitu Thiruvannamali a/l Alagirisami Pillai v Diners
Club (M) Sdn Bhd [2007], isteri kepada plaintif iaitu seorang suri rumah tangga telah
menerima satu surat ucap takziah atas kematian suaminya. Isterinya amat terkejut dan telah
melakukan satu panggilan telefon ke pejabat plaintif untuk memastikan fakta tersebut.
Plaintif menjelaskan bahawa berita tersebut tidak benar dan telah menyaman defendan atas
pemberian surat tersebut. Meskipun defendan telah menjelaskan bahawa pemberian surat
tersebut adalah satu salah faham, plaintif tetap memfailkan tindakan terhadap defendan untuk
ganti rugi kerana mengalami kejutan (shock), ketakutan (fear) serta penderitaan mental
(mental anguish) bagi dirinya dan bagi pihak isteri dan anak-anaknya yang mana isteri dan
anak-anaknya bukanlah pihak dalam tuntutan ini. Mahkamah dalam keputusannya menolak
permohonan tersebut dengan alasan bahawa plaintif tidak mempunyai kausa tindakan yang
munasabah kerana dakwaannya mengalami kejutan, shock, fear dan mental anguish adalah
semata-mata perasaan plaintif yang tidak puas hati atau marah dengan surat takziah tersebut
kerana beliau masih hidup. Plaintif merupakan seorang doktor perubatan yang mempunyai
pengalaman luas dalam menangani situasi yang lebih teruk dari apa yang dinyatakan dalam
surat takziah tersebut. Perasaan marah yang dialami oleh plaintif adalah patut namun
bukanlah satu tindakan undang-undang yang relevan untuk mendapatkan ganti rugi.
Mengikut prinsip undang-undang, tiada liabiliti dikenakan atas perasaan marah, ketakutan,
tekanan mental, perasaan cemas dan sebagainya seperti yang dialami oleh plaintif. Malah
dalam pliding, plaintif tidak menyatakan bahawa beliau mengalami kejutan saraf yang
menyebabkan penyakit psikiatri. Plaintif telah melakukan satu kesilapan dengan menyatakan
bahawa beliau hanya mengalami kejutan dan bukanlah kejutan saraf dalam plidingnya. Oleh
itu, defendan adalah tidak bertanggungan.

Merujuk kepada alasan penghakiman dan prinsip dalam kes Page v Smith [1996] di
mana House of Lords memutuskan bahawa adalah penting bagi mahkamah menggariskan
definisi kejutan saraf untuk membolehkan pampasan diberikan. Kes-kes yang telah
diputuskan menyatakan bahawa kejutan saraf ditafsirkan sebagai impak terus dan mengerikan
yang membawa kepada penyakit psikiatri yang boleh dikenalpasti. Perlu wujudnya
kekacauan mental yang serius diluar jangkaan manusia biasa dan bukan semata-mata
mempunyai perasaan gelisah, duka atau gentar. Seperti yang telah dinyatakan dalam kes
Alcork & Ors v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1992], walaupun kejutan saraf
dan penyakit mental yang berlaku akibat daripada kejutan saraf adalah boleh dijangkakan,
namun ia perlu diterima umum bahawa ganti rugi boleh diberikan semata-mata kerana
perkara yang diberitahu, dibaca atau didengari mengenai sesuatu kejadian adalah tidak boleh
dipulihkan. Penyakit mental yang dihadapi akibat daripada mempunyai pengetahuan
mengenai sesuatu fakta yang memberi kegelisahan semata-mata adalah tidak boleh dipampas,
ia haruslah disekalikan dengan persepsi yang dialami oleh plaintif mengenai fenomena yang
memberi tekanan kepadanya.

Secara kesimpulannya, tuntutan bagi kejutan saraf tidak akan dibenarkan oleh
mahkamah dengan mudah seperti melihat kepada perasaan yang dialami oleh plaintif. Prinsip
utama adalah dengan memastikan bahawa kejutan saraf yang dialami adalah pengalamannya
sendiri atau oleh dependan. Kedua, ia haruslah membawa kepada penyakit mental yang boleh
dikenalpasti bagi mengukur tahap kejutan saraf itu berlaku. Ketiga, impak daripada kejutan
saraf itu haruslah serius dan bukan semata-mata perasaan marah, gelisah atau sedih.
Walaubagaimanapun, tuntutan kejutan saraf di Malaysia masih perlu dikaji dan diberikan
definisi yang luas kerana generasi akan datang lebih peka akan kesedaran penyakit mental.
Dengan pelbagai tekanan faktor luaran yang sedia ada, seseorang individu boleh mengalami
kejutan saraf yang membawa kepada penyakit mental seperti kemurungan, kegelisahan dan
juga bipolar. Evolusi penyakit mental zaman kini adalah lebih serius dan perlu
dipertimbangkan dengan wajar oleh mahkamah dengan mengambilkira pendapat pakar.
Orang yang menuntut juga tidak sewajarnya membuat tuntutan tanpa mendapat laporan pakar
mengenai keadaan dirinya untuk mengelakkan ketidakadilan berlaku dalam situasi-situasi
yang tidak disengajakan.
QUESTION 3(a)
The case Stephen v Myers [1830] 2 All ER 1 outlined one of the elements that
established the tortious act of assault. Lord Goff in Collins v Wilcock [1984] 3 All ER 374
defined assault as a form of trespass to a person, where there is an act that causes another
person to apprehend the infliction of immediate, unlawful, force on his person. In Letang v
Cooper [1964] 2 All ER 929, Lord Denning explained that the plaintiff in the case of assault
must show that the defendant had done it either intentionally or negligently. If it is the
former, it can be assault or battery. If it is the latter, it is negligence. Thus intention by the
defendant to commit the act is paramount to establish liability and can be shown by the
defendant through words or conduct. However, they must be seen within the context of the
word used and the act conducted. For example, in the case of R v Wilson [1955] 1 All ER
744, the word “get out your knives” constituted assault. The case of R v Ireland [1998] AC
147 stated that words can also introduce a reasonable fear.

Both assault and battery needed intention before these tortious acts can be established.
It starts to differ however, when it comes to the effect of these acts towards the plaintiff. For
assault, the plaintiff must feel reasonable fear and apprehension that physical violence may
ensue upon himself. This can also be caused by mere words as stated previously. In addition,
in the case of R v Constanza 1997 Crim LR 576, it was held that even words can cause the
victim to apprehend harm. The court explained the logic by stating as such;
“If a plaintiff turns a corner to be confronted by a motionless robber who with a gun in hand
commands hands up, why should not this be an assault?”

In this case, it is clear that if the victim feared violence at some time in the immediate future,
it can be constituted an assault. Considering further the close proximity between man’s house
and the victim’s, fear in an immediate future is also present. In the case of R v St George
[1840] 9 C & P 483, the court held that when a gun is pointed at a person, it is reasonable to
apprehend that some form of violence is about to impact upon him. Reasonable apprehension
can still be felt when the other person knew or was aware that there is a possibility that the
force will be inflicted on him is imminent or very soon. The awareness must have been
reasonable. The court explained;

“If a person presents a pistol, purporting to be a loaded pistol, at another, and so near as to
have been dangerous to life, if the pistol had gone off, semble, that it is an assault, even
though the pistol were, in fact not loaded.”
It was also held that if any person who is in the plaintiff’s position would react or think the
same, it is reasonable. An objective test was conducted here to establish, where the court
asks, whether a reasonable man, when put in the same situation as the plaintiff, would feel the
same fear and apprehension. If the answer is yes, only that assault can be established and vice
versa. Therefore, from these cases, assault only affected the mental condition of the plaintiff
rather than the physical one.

The same cannot be said with battery, as physical contact is a needed element. Physical
contact that can constitute battery must be physically connected to the plaintiff’s body and
such contact gives rise to insult or indignity of the plaintiff by the said contact. This element
depends heavily on the facts of each case. For an instant, in the case of Pursell v Horn
[1838] 112 ER 966, there is no physical contact between defendant’s and the claimant’s body
as the defendant only threw water to the claimant’s cloth, wetting the claimant’s body in the
process. However, the court held that such an act can still be considered a battery as the act of
direct contact between the water thrown and the claimant’s body constituted a battery. In
Collins v Wilcock [1984] 3 All ER 374, the officer had acted beyond the generally acceptable
conduct by grabbing the appellant’s left hand and so her act constituted a battery. The court
however also underlined the exception for this rule, stating that a physical contact such as
tapping onto someone’s shoulder to gain their attention does not amount to battery. In another
case of Wilson v Pringle [1986] All ER 440, the court held that only hostile physical contact
can amount to battery and itt does not have to be the obvious violence act such as punching or
shooting someone. Thus it can be concluded that, depending on the circumstances and fact of
the case, hostile physical contact in the ambit of giving insult or indignity to the plaintiff is
the go to rule in establishing battery.

Referring back to the case of Stephen v Myers, this case introduces the element of
capability of the defendant to carrying out his threat. This element is connected to the element
of reasonable fear and apprehension. In my opinion both logically cannot exist without
another. As such, the same objective test was put to answer whether a reasonable man, when
put in the same shoes as the plaintiff, experiences the same fear and apprehension that the
defendant can carry out his threat. Tindall CJ in Stephens v Myers looked at the facts of the
case, where there was quite a distance between the plaintiff and the defendant. Even though
the defendant showed a gesture of a clenched fist to the plaintiff, he was stopped by third
parties before he could advance to the plaintiff. Hence, the defendant had no means of
carrying the threat into effect.
 Scott J in the case of Thomas and others v National Union of Mineworkers (South
Wales Area) and others [1985] 2 All ER 1, explained that because the working miners were
in vehicles, and the pickets who were threatening them were held back by the police, the
working miners evidently know that the pickets had no capability to carry out the threats
immediately to the working miners. The court explained;

“an overt act indicating an immediate intention to commit a battery, coupled with the
capacity to carry that intention into effect’. The tort of assault is not, in my view, committed,
unless the capacity in question is present at the time the overt act is committed.”

Both of these cases show that the plaintiff needs to prove that the defendant not only had
threatened him, but the defendant also had the capacity and means of carrying out the threat
in question into effect. Then what about the case where there is almost a similar situation but
different facts? The case of Blake v Barnard [1840] 9 C & P 626 can be distinguished from
the case R v St George where in the former, the court held that a gun must first be loaded
before assault can be established as opposed to the latter where even pointing a blank gun can
amount to assault. The answer lies on whether the plaintiff in that particular moment knew
that the weapon that was pointed at him was essentially useless and was not close to even
harm to him. However, it is hard to imagine that in such a tense situation, a reasonable man
would know whether a gun is loaded or not as it would be more realistic and reasonable to
believe that every gun pointed at you can cause harm unless you are protected in some ways
to deflect such beliefs.

Additionally, positive body movement is also an important element to establish assault.

Would you feel fear and apprehension if an incapasitated man threatened to hit you? The act
of moving toward the defendant with a clenched fist in Stephen v Myers without a doubt
amounts to positive body movement. In contrast to the case of Innes v Wylie [1844] 1 C & K
257 where the police passively stood in front of a door to prevent the plaintiff from entering.
To conclude, the case of Stephen v Myers can easily become a battery case if the scenario
were different than that of the original. Let say that the defendant was not stopped by a third
party, then such action by the defendant can be constituted as an assault because of the simple
fact that the defendant can realise the reason for advancing with a clenched fist. Or, if the
defendant walks to the plaintiff casually without clenching his fist and smacks him on the
head with his fist. Both of these new facts can amount to battery. From our discussion it is
easy to see the difference between assault and battery. With the former dealt with the
protection of mental wellbeing will the latter, physical wellbeing.