G.R. No.

191618 November 23, 2010 The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), as directed in our Resolution dated April 6, 2010, filed a
Comment5 thereon. At the outset, the OSG points out that the petition filed by Atty. Macalintal is
unspecified and without statutory basis; "the liberal approach in its preparation x x x is a violation
ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, Petitioner, of the well known rules of practice and pleading in this jurisdiction."
vs.
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, Respondent.
In all, the OSG crystallizes the following issues for resolution of the Court:

DECISION
I

NACHURA, J.:
WHETHER x x x PETITIONER HAS LOCUS STANDI TO FILE THE INSTANT PETITION.

Confronting us is an undesignated petition1 filed by Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal (Atty. Macalintal),

that questions the constitution of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) as an illegal and II
unauthorized progeny of Section 4,2 Article VII of the Constitution:

WHETHER x x x THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL IS

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING A VIOLATION OF PARAGRAPH 7, SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE
returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
purpose.

III
While petitioner concedes that the Supreme Court is "authorized to promulgate its rules for the
purpose," he chafes at the creation of a purportedly "separate tribunal" complemented by a budget
allocation, a seal, a set of personnel and confidential employees, to effect the constitutional WHETHER x x x THE DESIGNATION OF MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME COURT AS
mandate. Petitioner’s averment is supposedly supported by the provisions of the 2005 Rules of the MEMBERS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (2005 PET Rules),3 specifically: BEING A VIOLATION OF SECTION 12, ARTICLE VIII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.6

(1) Rule 3 which provides for membership of the PET wherein the Chief Justice and the In his Reply,7 petitioner maintains that:
Associate Justices are designated as "Chairman and Members," respectively;
1. He has legal standing to file the petition given his averment of transcendental
(2) Rule 8(e) which authorizes the Chairman of the PET to appoint employees and importance of the issues raised therein;
confidential employees of every member thereof;
2. The creation of the PET, a separate tribunal from the Supreme Court, violates
(3) Rule 9 which provides for a separate "Administrative Staff of the Tribunal" with the Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution; and
appointment of a Clerk and a Deputy Clerk of the Tribunal who, at the discretion of the
PET, may designate the Clerk of Court (en banc) as the Clerk of the Tribunal; and
3. The PET, being a separate tribunal, exercises quasi-judicial functions contrary to
Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution.
(4) Rule 11 which provides for a "seal" separate and distinct from the Supreme Court
seal.
We winnow the meanderings of petitioner into the singular issue of whether the constitution of the
PET, composed of the Members of this Court, is unconstitutional, and violates Section 4, Article VII
Grudgingly, petitioner throws us a bone by acknowledging that the invoked constitutional provision and Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution.
does allow the "appointment of additional personnel."
But first, we dispose of the procedural issue of whether petitioner has standing to file the present
Further, petitioner highlights our decision in Buac v. COMELEC4 which peripherally declared that petition.
"contests involving the President and the Vice-President fall within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the PET, x x x in the exercise of quasi-judicial power." On this point, petitioner
The issue of locus standi is derived from the following requisites of a judicial inquiry:
reiterates that the constitution of the PET, with the designation of the Members of the Court as
Chairman and Members thereof, contravenes Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution, which
prohibits the designation of Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law 1. There must be an actual case or controversy;
to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.

2. The question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party;

 3. The constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the cases decided by this Court.
Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided
that the following requirements are met:
4. The decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination
of the case itself.8
(1) cases involve constitutional issues;

On more than one occasion we have characterized a proper party as one who has sustained or is
in immediate danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act complained of. 9 The dust has long (2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that
settled on the test laid down in Baker v. Carr:10 "whether the party has alleged such a personal the tax measure is unconstitutional;
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens
the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
questions."11 Until and unless such actual or threatened injury is established, the complainant is (3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election
not clothed with legal personality to raise the constitutional question. law in question;

Our pronouncements in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo12 illuminate: (4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of
transcendental importance which must be settled early; and

The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a
"public right" in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the (5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes
general public. He may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person. He could upon their prerogatives as legislators.
be suing as a "stranger," or in the category of a "citizen," or "taxpayer." In either case, he has to
adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out a
Contrary to the well-settled actual and direct injury test, petitioner has simply alleged a generalized
sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a" citizen" or
interest in the outcome of this case, and succeeds only in muddling the issues. Paragraph 2 of the
"taxpayer."
petition reads:

xxxx
2. x x x Since the creation and continued operation of the PET involves the use of public funds and
the issue raised herein is of transcendental importance, it is petitioner’s humble submission that,
However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference in any official policy as a citizen, a taxpayer and a member of the BAR, he has the legal standing to file this petition.
or act with which he disagreed with, and thus hinders the activities of governmental agencies
engaged in public service, the United States Supreme Court laid down the more stringent "direct
But even if his submission is valid, petitioner’s standing is still imperiled by the white elephant in
injury" test in Ex Parte Levitt, later reaffirmed in Tileston v. Ullman. The same Court ruled that for a
the petition, i.e., his appearance as counsel for former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of an executive or legislative
(Macapagal-Arroyo) in the election protest filed by 2004 presidential candidate Fernando Poe, Jr.
action, he must show that he has sustained a direct injury as a result of that action, and it is not
before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal,13 because judicial inquiry, as mentioned above, requires
sufficient that he has a general interest common to all members of the public.
that the constitutional question be raised at the earliest possible opportunity.14 Such appearance as
counsel before the Tribunal, to our mind, would have been the first opportunity to challenge the
This Court adopted the "direct injury" test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the constitutionality of the Tribunal’s constitution.
person who impugns the validity of a statute must have "a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result." The Vera doctrine was
Although there are recognized exceptions to this requisite, we find none in this instance. Petitioner
upheld in a litany of cases, such as, Custodio v. President of the Senate, Manila Race Horse
is unmistakably estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the PET before which tribunal he had
Trainers’ Association v. De la Fuente, Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works and Anti-Chinese
ubiquitously appeared and had acknowledged its jurisdiction in 2004. His failure to raise a
League of the Philippines v. Felix.
seasonable constitutional challenge at that time, coupled with his unconditional acceptance of the
Tribunal’s authority over the case he was defending, translates to the clear absence of an
However, being a mere procedural technicality, the requirement of locus standi may be waived by indispensable requisite for the proper invocation of this Court’s power of judicial review. Even on
the Court in the exercise of its discretion. This was done in the 1949 Emergency Powers Cases, this score alone, the petition ought to be dismissed outright.
Araneta v. Dinglasan, where the "transcendental importance" of the cases prompted the Court to
act liberally. Such liberality was neither a rarity nor accidental. In Aquino v. Comelec, this Court
Prior to petitioner’s appearance as counsel for then protestee Macapagal-Arroyo, we had occasion
resolved to pass upon the issues raised due to the "far-reaching implications" of the petition
to affirm the grant of original jurisdiction to this Court as a Presidential Electoral Tribunal in the
notwithstanding its categorical statement that petitioner therein had no personality to file the suit.
auspicious case of Tecson v. Commission on Elections.15 Thus -
Indeed, there is a chain of cases where this liberal policy has been observed, allowing ordinary
citizens, members of Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute actions involving the
constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings.

xxxx
Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G.R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G.R. No. 161634, invoke the Electoral Tribunal provide that, for President or Vice-President, election protest or quo
provisions of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in assailing the warranto may be filed after the proclamation of the winner.17
jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in urging the
Supreme Court to instead take on the petitions they directly instituted before it. The Constitutional
provision cited reads: Petitioner, a prominent election lawyer who has filed several cases before this Court involving
constitutional and election law issues, including, among others, the constitutionality of certain
provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003), 18 cannot
"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, claim ignorance of: (1) the invocation of our jurisdiction under Section 4, Article VII of the
returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the Constitution; and (2) the unanimous holding thereon. Unquestionably, the overarching framework
purpose." affirmed in Tecson v. Commission on Elections19 is that the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction
to decide presidential and vice-presidential election protests while concurrently acting as an
independent Electoral Tribunal.
The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The omission in the 1935 and the 1973
Constitution to designate any tribunal to be the sole judge of presidential and vice-presidential
contests, has constrained this Court to declare, in Lopez vs. Roxas, as "not (being) justiciable" Despite the foregoing, petitioner is adamant on his contention that the provision, as worded, does
controversies or disputes involving contests on the elections, returns and qualifications of the not authorize the constitution of the PET. And although he concedes that the Supreme Court may
President or Vice-President. The constitutional lapse prompted Congress, on 21 June 1957, to promulgate its rules for this purpose, petitioner is insistent that the constitution of the PET is
enact Republic Act No. 1793, "An Act Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal unconstitutional. However, petitioner avers that it allows the Court to appoint additional personnel
to Try, Hear and Decide Protests Contesting the Election of the President-Elect and the Vice- for the purpose, notwithstanding the silence of the constitutional provision.
President-Elect of the Philippines and Providing for the Manner of Hearing the Same." Republic
Act 1793 designated the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to be the
members of the tribunal. Although the subsequent adoption of the parliamentary form of Petitioner’s pastiche arguments are all hurled at the Court, hopeful that at least one might possibly
government under the 1973 Constitution might have implicitly affected Republic Act No. 1793, the stick. But these arguments fail to elucidate on the scope of the rules the Supreme Court is allowed
statutory set-up, nonetheless, would now be deemed revived under the present Section 4, to promulgate. Apparently, petitioner’s concept of this adjunct of judicial power is very restrictive.
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution. Fortunately, thanks in no part to petitioner’s opinion, we are guided by well-settled principles of
constitutional construction.

Former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his separate opinion, was even more categorical:
Verba legis dictates that wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus
The Court is unanimous on the issue of jurisdiction. It has no jurisdiction on the Tecson and Valdez attached to them prevails. This Court, speaking through former Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, in
petitions. Petitioners cannot invoke Article VII, Section 4, par. 7 of the Constitution which provides: J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration20 instructs:

"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer’s document, it being essential for the rule of law to
returns and qualifications of the President or Vice President and may promulgate its rules for the obtain that it should ever be present in the people’s consciousness, its language as much as
purpose." possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to
the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts
to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these
The word "contest" in the provision means that the jurisdiction of this Court can only be invoked are cases where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum.
after the election and proclamation of a President or Vice President. There can be no "contest"
before a winner is proclaimed.16
However, where there is ambiguity or doubt, the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in
accordance with the intent of its framers or ratio legis et anima. A doubtful provision must be
Similarly, in her separate opinion, Justice Alicia Austria-Martinez declared: examined in light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances surrounding the
framing of the Constitution.21 In following this guideline, courts should bear in mind the object
sought to be accomplished in adopting a doubtful constitutional provision, and the evils sought to
G.R. Nos. 161434 and 161634 invoke the Court’s exclusive jurisdiction under the last paragraph of
be prevented or remedied.22 Consequently, the intent of the framers and the people ratifying the
Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. I agree with the majority opinion that these petitions
constitution, and not the panderings of self-indulgent men, should be given effect.
should be dismissed outright for prematurity. The Court has no jurisdiction at this point of time to
entertain said petitions.
Last, ut magis valeat quam pereat – the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. We intoned
thus in the landmark case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary:23
The Supreme Court, as a Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), the Senate Electoral Tribunal
(SET) and House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) are electoral tribunals, each
specifically and exclusively clothed with jurisdiction by the Constitution to act respectively as "sole It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications" of the President and Vice- to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon
President, Senators, and Representatives. In a litany of cases, this Court has long recognized that a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great
these electoral tribunals exercise jurisdiction over election contests only after a candidate has purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and
already been proclaimed winner in an election. Rules 14 and 15 of the Rules of the Presidential interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not
to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand The mirabile dictu of the grant of jurisdiction to this Court, albeit found in the Article on the
together. executive branch of government, and the constitution of the PET, is evident in the discussions of
the Constitutional Commission. On the exercise of this Court’s judicial power as sole judge of
presidential and vice-presidential election contests, and to promulgate its rules for this purpose, we
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a find the proceedings in the Constitutional Commission most instructive:
construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the words
idle and nugatory.
MR. DAVIDE. On line 25, after the words "Vice-President," I propose to add AND MAY
PROMULGATE ITS RULES FOR THE PURPOSE. This refers to the Supreme Court sitting en
We had earlier expounded on this rule of construction in Chiongbian v. De Leon, et al., 24 to wit: banc. This is also to confer on the Supreme Court exclusive authority to enact the necessary rules
while acting as sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President.
[T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a provision of our
Constitution merely for the benefit of one person without considering that it could also affect
others. When they adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not willed, that said provision should MR. REGALADO. My personal position is that the rule-making power of the Supreme Court with
function to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with respect to its internal procedure is already implicit under the Article on the Judiciary; considering,
all other provisions of that great document. however, that according to the Commissioner, the purpose of this is to indicate the sole power of
the Supreme Court without intervention by the legislature in the promulgation of its rules on this
particular point, I think I will personally recommend its acceptance to the Committee.26
On its face, the contentious constitutional provision does not specify the establishment of the PET.
But neither does it preclude, much less prohibit, otherwise. It entertains divergent interpretations
which, though unacceptable to petitioner, do not include his restrictive view – one which really xxxx
does not offer a solution.

MR. NOLLEDO. x x x.
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, the provision under scrutiny, should be read with other
related provisions of the Constitution such as the parallel provisions on the Electoral Tribunals of
the Senate and the House of Representatives. With respect to Sections 10 and 11 on page 8, I understand that the Committee has also created
an Electoral Tribunal in the Senate and a Commission on Appointments which may cover
membership from both Houses. But my question is: It seems to me that the committee report does
Before we resort to the records of the Constitutional Commission, we discuss the framework of not indicate which body should promulgate the rules that shall govern the Electoral Tribunal and
judicial power mapped out in the Constitution. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the Supreme the Commission on Appointments. Who shall then promulgate the rules of these bodies?
Court’s constitutional mandate to act as sole judge of election contests involving our country’s
highest public officials, and its rule-making authority in connection therewith, is not restricted; it
includes all necessary powers implicit in the exercise thereof. MR. DAVIDE. The Electoral Tribunal itself will establish and promulgate its rules because it is a
body distinct and independent already from the House, and so with the Commission on
Appointments also. It will have the authority to promulgate its own rules.27
We recall the unprecedented and trailblazing case of Marcos v. Manglapus:25

On another point of discussion relative to the grant of judicial power, but equally cogent, we listen
The 1987 Constitution has fully restored the separation of powers of the three great branches of to former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion:
government. To recall the words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission, "the
Constitution has blocked but with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the
executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government." Thus, the 1987 MR. SUAREZ. Thank you.
Constitution explicitly provides that "[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines" [Art. VI, Sec. 1], "[t]he executive power shall be vested in the President of the
Philippines" [Art. VII, Sec. 1], and "[t]he judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in Would the Commissioner not consider that violative of the doctrine of separation of powers?
such lower courts as may be established by law" [Art. VIII, Sec. 1]. These provisions not only
establish a separation of powers by actual division but also confer plenary legislative, executive
MR. CONCEPCION. I think Commissioner Bernas explained that this is a contest between two
and judicial powers subject only to limitations provided in the Constitution. For as the Supreme
parties. This is a judicial power.
Court in Ocampo v. Cabangis pointed out "a grant of the legislative power means a grant of all
legislative power; and a grant of the judicial power means a grant of all the judicial power which
may be exercised under the government." MR. SUAREZ. We know, but practically the Committee is giving to the judiciary the right to declare
who will be the President of our country, which to me is a political action.
The Court could not have been more explicit then on the plenary grant and exercise of judicial
power. Plainly, the abstraction of the Supreme Court acting as a Presidential Electoral Tribunal MR. CONCEPCION. There are legal rights which are enforceable under the law, and these are
from the unequivocal grant of jurisdiction in the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the essentially justiciable questions.
Constitution is sound and tenable.
MR. SUAREZ. If the election contest proved to be long, burdensome and tedious, practically all the what was statutory but it is not an infringement on the separation of powers because the power
time of the Supreme Court sitting en banc would be occupied with it considering that they will be being given to the Supreme Court is a judicial power.31
going over millions and millions of ballots or election returns, Madam President.28
Unmistakable from the foregoing is that the exercise of our power to judge presidential and vice-
Echoing the same sentiment and affirming the grant of judicial power to the Supreme Court, presidential election contests, as well as the rule-making power adjunct thereto, is plenary; it is not
Justice Florenz D. Regalado29 and Fr. Joaquin Bernas30 both opined: as restrictive as petitioner would interpret it. In fact, former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., who
proposed the insertion of the phrase, intended the Supreme Court to exercise exclusive authority
to promulgate its rules of procedure for that purpose. To this, Justice Regalado forthwith assented
MR. VILLACORTA. Thank you very much, Madam President. and then emphasized that the sole power ought to be without intervention by the legislative
department. Evidently, even the legislature cannot limit the judicial power to resolve presidential
and vice-presidential election contests and our rule-making power connected thereto.
I am not sure whether Commissioner Suarez has expressed his point. On page 2, the fourth
paragraph of Section 4 provides:
To foreclose all arguments of petitioner, we reiterate that the establishment of the PET simply
constitutionalized what was statutory before the 1987 Constitution. The experiential context of the
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
PET in our country cannot be denied.32
returns and qualifications of the President or Vice-President.

Consequently, we find it imperative to trace the historical antecedents of the PET.

May I seek clarification as to whether or not the matter of determining the outcome of the contests
relating to the election returns and qualifications of the President or Vice-President is purely a
political matter and, therefore, should not be left entirely to the judiciary. Will the above-quoted Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7 of the 1987 Constitution is an innovation. The precursors of the
provision not impinge on the doctrine of separation of powers between the executive and the present Constitution did not contain similar provisions and instead vested upon the legislature all
judicial departments of the government? phases of presidential and vice-presidential elections – from the canvassing of election returns, to
the proclamation of the president-elect and the vice-president elect, and even the determination,
by ordinary legislation, of whether such proclamations may be contested. Unless the legislature
MR. REGALADO. No, I really do not feel that would be a problem. This is a new provision
enacted a law creating an institution that would hear election contests in the Presidential and Vice-
incidentally. It was not in the 1935 Constitution nor in the 1973 Constitution.
Presidential race, a defeated candidate had no legal right to demand a recount of the votes cast
for the office involved or to challenge the ineligibility of the proclaimed candidate. Effectively,
MR. VILLACORTA. That is right. presidential and vice-presidential contests were non-justiciable in the then prevailing milieu.

MR. REGALADO. We feel that it will not be an intrusion into the separation of powers guaranteed The omission in the 1935 Constitution was intentional. It was mainly influenced by the absence of
to the judiciary because this is strictly an adversarial and judicial proceeding. a similar provision in its pattern, the Federal Constitution of the United States. Rather, the creation
of such tribunal was left to the determination of the National Assembly. The journal of the 1935
Constitutional Convention is crystal clear on this point:
MR. VILLACORTA. May I know the rationale of the Committee because this supersedes Republic
Act 7950 which provides for the Presidential Electoral Tribunal?
Delegate Saguin. – For an information. It seems that this Constitution does not contain any
provision with respect to the entity or body which will look into the protests for the positions of the
FR. BERNAS. Precisely, this is necessary. Election contests are, by their nature, judicial. President and Vice-President.
Therefore, they are cognizable only by courts. If, for instance, we did not have a constitutional
provision on an electoral tribunal for the Senate or an electoral tribunal for the House, normally, as
composed, that cannot be given jurisdiction over contests. President Recto. – Neither does the American constitution contain a provision over the subject.

So, the background of this is really the case of Roxas v. Lopez. The Gentleman will remember that Delegate Saguin. – But then, who will decide these protests?
in that election, Lopez was declared winner. He filed a protest before the Supreme Court because
there was a republic act which created the Supreme Court as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal.
President Recto. – I suppose that the National Assembly will decide on that.33
The question in this case was whether new powers could be given the Supreme Court by law. In
effect, the conflict was actually whether there was an attempt to create two Supreme Courts and
the answer of the Supreme Court was: "No, this did not involve the creation of two Supreme To fill the void in the 1935 Constitution, the National Assembly enacted R.A. No. 1793, establishing
Courts, but precisely we are giving new jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, as it is allowed by the an independent PET to try, hear, and decide protests contesting the election of President and
Constitution. Congress may allocate various jurisdictions." Vice-President. The Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court were tasked to
sit as its Chairman and Members, respectively. Its composition was extended to retired Supreme
Court Justices and incumbent Court of Appeals Justices who may be appointed as substitutes for
Before the passage of that republic act, in case there was any contest between two presidential
ill, absent, or temporarily incapacitated regular members.
candidates or two vice-presidential candidates, no one had jurisdiction over it. So, it became
necessary to create a Presidential Electoral Tribunal. What we have done is to constitutionalize
The eleven-member tribunal was empowered to promulgate rules for the conduct of its x x x. So it became necessary to create a Presidential Electoral Tribunal. What we have done is to
proceedings. It was mandated to sit en banc in deciding presidential and vice-presidential contests constitutionalize what was statutory but it is not an infringement on the separation of powers
and authorized to exercise powers similar to those conferred upon courts of justice, including the because the power being given to the Supreme Court is a judicial power.34
issuance of subpoena, taking of depositions, arrest of witnesses to compel their appearance,
production of documents and other evidence, and the power to punish contemptuous acts and
bearings. The tribunal was assigned a Clerk, subordinate officers, and employees necessary for Clearly, petitioner’s bete noire of the PET and the exercise of its power are unwarranted. His
the efficient performance of its functions. arguments that: (1) the Chief Justice and Associate Justices are referred to as "Chairman" and
"Members," respectively; (2) the PET uses a different seal; (3) the Chairman is authorized to
appoint personnel; and (4) additional compensation is allocated to the "Members," in order to
R.A. No. 1793 was implicitly repealed and superseded by the 1973 Constitution which replaced the bolster his claim of infirmity in the establishment of the PET, are too superficial to merit further
bicameral legislature under the 1935 Constitution with the unicameral body of a parliamentary attention by the Court.
government.

Be that as it may, we hasten to clarify the structure of the PET as a legitimate progeny of Section
With the 1973 Constitution, a PET was rendered irrelevant, considering that the President was not 4, Article VII of the Constitution, composed of members of the Supreme Court, sitting en banc. The
directly chosen by the people but elected from among the members of the National Assembly, following exchange in the 1986 Constitutional Commission should provide enlightenment:
while the position of Vice-President was constitutionally non-existent.

MR. SUAREZ. Thank you. Let me proceed to line 23, page 2, wherein it is provided, and I quote:
In 1981, several modifications were introduced to the parliamentary system. Executive power was
restored to the President who was elected directly by the people. An Executive Committee was
formed to assist the President in the performance of his functions and duties. Eventually, the The Supreme Court, sitting en banc[,] shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
Executive Committee was abolished and the Office of Vice-President was installed anew. returns and qualifications of the President or Vice-President.

These changes prompted the National Assembly to revive the PET by enacting, on December 3, Are we not giving enormous work to the Supreme Court especially when it is directed to sit en
1985, Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 884, entitled "An Act Constituting an Independent banc as the sole judge of all presidential and vice-presidential election contests?
Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide Election Contests in the Office of the
President and Vice-President of the Philippines, Appropriating Funds Therefor and For Other
MR. SUMULONG. That question will be referred to Commissioner Concepcion.
Purposes." This tribunal was composed of nine members, three of whom were the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court and two Associate Justices designated by him, while the six were divided
equally between representatives of the majority and minority parties in the Batasang Pambansa. MR. CONCEPCION. This function was discharged by the Supreme Court twice and the Supreme
Court was able to dispose of each case in a period of one year as provided by law. Of course, that
was probably during the late 1960s and early 1970s. I do not know how the present Supreme
Aside from the license to wield powers akin to those of a court of justice, the PET was permitted to
Court would react to such circumstances, but there is also the question of who else would hear the
recommend the prosecution of persons, whether public officers or private individuals, who in its
election protests.
opinion had participated in any irregularity connected with the canvassing and/or accomplishing of
election returns.
MR. SUAREZ. We are asking this question because between lines 23 to 25, there are no rules
provided for the hearings and there is not time limit or duration for the election contest to be
The independence of the tribunal was highlighted by a provision allocating a specific budget from
decided by the Supreme Court. Also, we will have to consider the historical background that when
the national treasury or Special Activities Fund for its operational expenses. It was empowered to
R.A. 1793, which organized the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, was promulgated on June 21,
appoint its own clerk in accordance with its rules. However, the subordinate officers were strictly
1957, at least three famous election contests were presented and two of them ended up in
employees of the judiciary or other officers of the government who were merely designated to the
withdrawal by the protestants out of sheer frustration because of the delay in the resolution of the
tribunal.
cases. I am referring to the electoral protest that was lodged by former President Carlos P. Garcia
against our "kabalen" former President Diosdado Macapagal in 1961 and the vice-presidential
After the historic People Power Revolution that ended the martial law era and installed Corazon election contest filed by the late Senator Gerardo Roxas against Vice-President Fernando Lopez in
Aquino as President, civil liberties were restored and a new constitution was formed. 1965.

With R.A. No. 1793 as framework, the 1986 Constitutional Commission transformed the then MR. CONCEPCION. I cannot answer for what the protestants had in mind. But when that protest
statutory PET into a constitutional institution, albeit without its traditional nomenclature: of Senator Roxas was withdrawn, the results were already available. Senator Roxas did not want
to have a decision adverse to him. The votes were being counted already, and he did not get what
he expected so rather than have a decision adverse to his protest, he withdrew the case.
FR. BERNAS. x x x.

xxxx
MR. SUAREZ. I see. So the Commission would not have any objection to vesting in the Supreme MR. CONCEPCION. Insofar as the Supreme Court is concerned, the Supreme Court always
Court this matter of resolving presidential and vice-presidential contests? manages to dispose of the case in one year.

MR. CONCEPCION. Personally, I would not have any objection. MR. SUAREZ. In one year. Thank you for the clarification.35

MR. SUAREZ. Thank you. Obvious from the foregoing is the intent to bestow independence to the Supreme Court as the
PET, to undertake the Herculean task of deciding election protests involving presidential and vice-
presidential candidates in accordance with the process outlined by former Chief Justice Roberto
Would the Commissioner not consider that violative of the doctrine of separation of powers? Concepcion. It was made in response to the concern aired by delegate Jose E. Suarez that the
additional duty may prove too burdensome for the Supreme Court. This explicit grant of
independence and of the plenary powers needed to discharge this burden justifies the budget
MR. CONCEPCION. I think Commissioner Bernas explained that this is a contest between two
allocation of the PET.
parties. This is a judicial power.

The conferment of additional jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, with the duty characterized as an
MR. SUAREZ. We know, but practically the Committee is giving to the judiciary the right to declare
"awesome" task, includes the means necessary to carry it into effect under the doctrine of
who will be the President of our country, which to me is a political action.
necessary implication.36 We cannot overemphasize that the abstraction of the PET from the explicit
grant of power to the Supreme Court, given our abundant experience, is not unwarranted.
MR. CONCEPCION. There are legal rights which are enforceable under the law, and these are
essentially justiciable questions.
A plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, readily reveals a grant of authority to the
Supreme Court sitting en banc. In the same vein, although the method by which the Supreme
MR. SUAREZ. If the election contest proved to be long, burdensome and tedious, practically all the Court exercises this authority is not specified in the provision, the grant of power does not contain
time of the Supreme Court sitting en banc would be occupied with it considering that they will be any limitation on the Supreme Court’s exercise thereof. The Supreme Court’s method of deciding
going over millions and millions of ballots or election returns, Madam President. presidential and vice-presidential election contests, through the PET, is actually a derivative of the
exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Thus, the
subsequent directive in the provision for the Supreme Court to "promulgate its rules for the
MR. CONCEPCION. The time consumed or to be consumed in this contest for President is purpose."
dependent upon they key number of teams of revisors. I have no experience insofar as contests in
other offices are concerned.
The conferment of full authority to the Supreme Court, as a PET, is equivalent to the full authority
conferred upon the electoral tribunals of the Senate and the House of Representatives, i.e., the
MR. SUAREZ. Although there is a requirement here that the Supreme Court is mandated to sit en Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
banc? (HRET),37 which we have affirmed on numerous occasions.38

MR. CONCEPCION. Yes. Particularly cogent are the discussions of the Constitutional Commission on the parallel provisions
of the SET and the HRET. The discussions point to the inevitable conclusion that the different
electoral tribunals, with the Supreme Court functioning as the PET, are constitutional bodies,
MR. SUAREZ. I see. independent of the three departments of government – Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary – but
not separate therefrom.
MR. CONCEPCION. The steps involved in this contest are: First, the ballot boxes are opened
before teams of three, generally, a representative each of the court, of the protestant and of the MR. MAAMBONG. x x x.
"protestee." It is all a questions of how many teams are organized. Of course, that can be
expensive, but it would be expensive whatever court one would choose. There were times that the
Supreme Court, with sometimes 50 teams at the same time working, would classify the objections, My questions will be very basic so we can go as fast as we can. In the case of the electoral
the kind of problems, and the court would only go over the objected votes on which the parties tribunal, either of the House or of the Senate, is it correct to say that these tribunals are
could not agree. So it is not as awesome as it would appear insofar as the Court is concerned. constitutional creations? I will distinguish these with the case of the Tanodbayan and the
What is awesome is the cost of the revision of the ballots because each party would have to Sandiganbayan which are created by mandate of the Constitution but they are not constitutional
appoint one representative for every team, and that may take quite a big amount. creations. Is that a good distinction?

MR. SUAREZ. If we draw from the Commissioner’s experience which he is sharing with us, what xxxx
would be the reasonable period for the election contest to be decided?

MR. MAAMBONG. Could we, therefore, say that either the Senate Electoral Tribunal or the House
Electoral Tribunal is a constitutional body?
MR. AZCUNA. It is, Madam President. Indeed, the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and courts of first instance, are vested with
original jurisdiction, as well as with appellate jurisdiction, in consequence of which they are both
trial courts and, appellate courts, without detracting from the fact that there is only one Supreme
MR. MAAMBONG. If it is a constitutional body, is it then subject to constitutional restrictions? Court, one Court of Appeals, and one court of first instance, clothed with authority to discharge
said dual functions. A court of first instance, when performing the functions of a probate court or a
court of land registration, or a court of juvenile and domestic relations, although with powers less
MR. AZCUNA. It would be subject to constitutional restrictions intended for that body.
broad than those of a court of first instance, hearing ordinary actions, is not inferior to the latter, for
one cannot be inferior to itself. So too, the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is not inferior to the
MR. MAAMBONG. I see. But I want to find out if the ruling in the case of Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil. Supreme Court, since it is the same Court although the functions peculiar to said Tribunal are
192, will still be applicable to the present bodies we are creating since it ruled that the electoral more limited in scope than those of the Supreme Court in the exercise of its ordinary functions.
tribunals are not separate departments of the government. Would that ruling still be valid? Hence, the enactment of Republic Act No. 1793, does not entail an assumption by Congress of the
power of appointment vested by the Constitution in the President. It merely connotes the
imposition of additional duties upon the Members of the Supreme Court.
MR. AZCUNA. Yes, they are not separate departments because the separate departments are the
legislative, the executive and the judiciary; but they are constitutional bodies.39
By the same token, the PET is not a separate and distinct entity from the Supreme Court, albeit it
has functions peculiar only to the Tribunal. It is obvious that the PET was constituted in
40 41
The view taken by Justices Adolfo S. Azcuna and Regalado E. Maambong is schooled by our implementation of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, and it faithfully complies – not
holding in Lopez v. Roxas, et al.:42 unlawfully defies – the constitutional directive. The adoption of a separate seal, as well as the
change in the nomenclature of the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices into Chairman and
Members of the Tribunal, respectively, was designed simply to highlight the singularity and
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 1793, which provides that: exclusivity of the Tribunal’s functions as a special electoral court.

"There shall be an independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal x x x which shall be the sole judge As regards petitioner’s claim that the PET exercises quasi-judicial functions in contravention of
of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the president-elect and the Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution, we point out that the issue in Buac v.
vice-president-elect of the Philippines." COMELEC43 involved the characterization of the enforcement and administration of a law relative
to the conduct of a plebiscite which falls under the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections.
However, petitioner latches on to the enumeration in Buac which declared, in an obiter, that
has the effect of giving said defeated candidate the legal right to contest judicially the election of
"contests involving the President and the Vice-President fall within the exclusive original
the President-elect of Vice-President-elect and to demand a recount of the votes case for the office
jurisdiction of the PET, also in the exercise of quasi-judicial power."
involved in the litigation, as well as to secure a judgment declaring that he is the one elected
president or vice-president, as the case may be, and that, as such, he is entitled to assume the
duties attached to said office. And by providing, further, that the Presidential Electoral Tribunal The issue raised by petitioner is more imagined than real. Section 12, Article VIII of the
"shall be composed of the Chief Justice and the other ten Members of the Supreme Court," said Constitution reads:
legislation has conferred upon such Court an additional original jurisdiction of an exclusive
character.
SEC. 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be
designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.
Republic Act No. 1793 has not created a new or separate court. It has merely conferred upon the
Supreme Court the functions of a Presidential Electoral Tribunal. The result of the enactment may
be likened to the fact that courts of first instance perform the functions of such ordinary courts of The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution which
first instance, those of court of land registration, those of probate courts, and those of courts of provides that the power "shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
juvenile and domestic relations. It is, also, comparable to the situation obtaining when the established by law." Consistent with our presidential system of government, the function of
municipal court of a provincial capital exercises its authority, pursuant to law, over a limited "dealing with the settlement of disputes, controversies or conflicts involving rights, duties or
number of cases which were previously within the exclusive jurisdiction of courts of first instance. prerogatives that are legally demandable and enforceable" 44 is apportioned to courts of justice.
With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, judicial power was expanded to include "the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
In all of these instances, the court (court of first instance or municipal court) is only one, although enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
the functions may be distinct and, even, separate. Thus the powers of a court of first instance, in amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
the exercise of its jurisdiction over ordinary civil cases, are broader than, as well as distinct and Government."45 The power was expanded, but it remained absolute.
separate from, those of the same court acting as a court of land registration or a probate court, or
as a court of juvenile and domestic relations. So too, the authority of the municipal court of a
provincial capital, when acting as such municipal court, is, territorially more limited than that of the The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterizes the resolution of electoral
same court when hearing the aforementioned cases which are primary within the jurisdiction of contests as essentially an exercise of judicial power.1avvphi1
courts of first instance. In other words, there is only one court, although it may perform the
functions pertaining to several types of courts, each having some characteristics different from
those of the others. At the barangay and municipal levels, original and exclusive jurisdiction over election contests is
vested in the municipal or metropolitan trial courts and the regional trial courts, respectively.
At the higher levels – city, provincial, and regional, as well as congressional and senatorial –
exclusive and original jurisdiction is lodged in the COMELEC and in the House of Representatives
and Senate Electoral Tribunals, which are not, strictly and literally speaking, courts of law.
Although not courts of law, they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve election contests which
involve, in essence, an exercise of judicial power, because of the explicit constitutional
empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) and Section 17, Article VI
(for the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals) of the Constitution. Besides, when the COMELEC,
the HRET, and the SET decide election contests, their decisions are still subject to judicial review
– via a petition for certiorari filed by the proper party – if there is a showing that the decision was
rendered with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.46

It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-
presidential election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power. In the landmark case
of Angara v. Electoral Commission,47 Justice Jose P. Laurel enucleated that "it would be
inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of
government along constitutional channels." In fact, Angara pointed out that "[t]he Constitution is a
definition of the powers of government." And yet, at that time, the 1935 Constitution did not contain
the expanded definition of judicial power found in Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2 of the present
Constitution.

With the explicit provision, the present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme Court, in
conjunction with latter’s exercise of judicial power inherent in all courts,48 the task of deciding
presidential and vice-presidential election contests, with full authority in the exercise thereof. The
power wielded by PET is a derivative of the plenary judicial power allocated to courts of law,
expressly provided in the Constitution. On the whole, the Constitution draws a thin, but,
nevertheless, distinct line between the PET and the Supreme Court.

If the logic of petitioner is to be followed, all Members of the Court, sitting in the Senate and House
Electoral Tribunals would violate the constitutional proscription found in Section 12, Article VIII.
Surely, the petitioner will be among the first to acknowledge that this is not so. The Constitution
which, in Section 17, Article VI, explicitly provides that three Supreme Court Justices shall sit in the
Senate and House Electoral Tribunals, respectively, effectively exempts the Justices-Members
thereof from the prohibition in Section 12, Article VIII. In the same vein, it is the Constitution itself,
in Section 4, Article VII, which exempts the Members of the Court, constituting the PET, from the
same prohibition.

We have previously declared that the PET is not simply an agency to which Members of the Court
were designated. Once again, the PET, as intended by the framers of the Constitution, is to be an
institution independent, but not separate, from the judicial department, i.e., the Supreme Court.
McCulloch v. State of Maryland49 proclaimed that "[a] power without the means to use it, is a
nullity." The vehicle for the exercise of this power, as intended by the Constitution and specifically
mentioned by the Constitutional Commissioners during the discussions on the grant of power to
this Court, is the PET. Thus, a microscopic view, like the petitioner’s, should not constrict an
absolute and constitutional grant of judicial power.

One final note. Although this Court has no control over contrary people and naysayers, we
reiterate a word of caution against the filing of baseless petitions which only clog the Court’s
docket. The petition in the instant case belongs to that classification.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.