Juvielyn A.

Ballado
PALE

1. Ui vs. Bonifacio [AC No. 3319, June 8, 2000, 333 SCRA 38]
Facts:
Leslie Ui filed an administrative complaint for disbarment on the ground of
immorality against Atty Iris Bonifacio for having an illicit affair to her husband Mr. Carlos
L Ui. Mr. Ui and Atty Bonifacio live together and had 2 children. Respondent states on her
answer that there was no illicit relationship between her and Mr. Carlos Ui because they
married abroad. She was confronted by a woman who insisted that she was the lawful
wife of Mr. Carlos Ui. When respondent discovered Carlos Ui's true civil status, she cut
off all her ties with him.

In her Reply complainant states, among others, that respondent knew perfectly well that
Carlos Ui was married to complainant and had children with her even at the start of her
relationship with Carlos Ui, and that the reason respondent went abroad was to give birth
to her two (2) children with Carlos Ui. During the pendency of the proceedings before the
Integrated Bar, complainant also charged her husband, Carlos Ui, and respondent with
the crime of Concubinage before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal and later was
dismissed on the ground of insufficiency of evidence to prove her allegation.
Complainant filed a Motion to Cite Respondent in Contempt of the Commission, wherein
she charged respondent with making false allegations in her Answer and for submitting a
supporting document which was altered and intercalated. Respondent averred that she
did not have the original copy of the marriage certificate because the same was in the
possession of Carlos Ui, and that she annexed such copy because she relied in good
faith on what appeared on the copy of the marriage certificate in her possession.
Respondent contends, among others, that it was she who was the victim in this case and
not Leslie Ui because she did not know that Carlos Ui was already married, and that upon
learning of this fact, respondent immediately cut-off all her ties with Carlos Ui.

Issue:
Whether or not Atty Iris Bonifacio is guilty of gross immoral conduct which is a
ground for disbarment.
Ruling:
No, the complaint for Gross Immorality against Respondent is DISMISSED for lack
of merit against Atty. Iris Bonifacio. One of the conditions for the admission to bar is having
a good moral character. Possession of good moral character is a continuous requirement
for the practice of law. In the said case the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos
Ui, clothed as it was with what respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be
considered immoral.
For immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society
and the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. Moreover, for such
conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be "grossly immoral," that is, it must
be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree. The act of immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui
upon discovering his true civil status belies just that alleged moral indifference and proves
that she had no intention of flaunting the law and the high moral standard of the legal
profession.

2. Advincula vs. Macabata [A.C. No. 7204, March 7, 2007, 517 SCRA 600]
Facts:
A complaint for disbarment filed by Cynthia Advincula against respondent Atty.
Ernesto M. Macabata, charging the latter with Gross Immorality. Complainant seek the
legal advice of the respondent Atty. Macabata regarding her collectibles from Queensway
Travel and Tours as a promise he sent Demand Letter. They met in a restaurant to discuss
the possibility of filing the complaint against Queensway Travel and Tours because they
did not settle their accounts as demanded. After the dinner, respondent sent complainant
home and while she is about to step out of the car, respondent hold her arm and kissed
her on the cheek and embraced her very tightly.
On the following month in the morning, she met respondent at coffee shop to
finalize the draft of the complaint to be filed in Court. After the meeting, respondent offered
again a ride, which he usually did every time they met. Along the way, complainant was
wandering why she felt so sleepy where in fact she just got up from bed a few hours ago,
when she was almost restless respondent stopped his car and forcefully hold her face
and kissed her lips while the other hand was holding her breast. Complainant even in a
state of shocked succeeded in resisting his criminal attempt and immediately manage to
go out of the car.
In the late afternoon, complainant sent a text message to respondent informing
him that she decided to refer the case with another lawyer and needs to get back the case
folder from him a exchange of conversation between the complainant and the respondent
thru text message.
On the following morning respondent replied to the complainant asking for
forgiveness and that he will not do the same again but the complainant said “talk to my
lawyer”.
A hearing was conducted, Atty. Ernesto A. Macabata is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for three (3) months for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Issue:
Whether respondent committed acts that are grossly immoral or which constitute
serious moral depravity that would warrant his disbarment or suspension from the practice
of law.

Ruling:
No, the court would not suffice to warrant a disbarment or suspension from the
practice of law. The term "grossly immoral" is referred to acts, so corrupt as to constitute
a criminal act or; so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or; committed
under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of
decency.
Even if Atty. Macabata admits that she kissed Advincula,and there was no malice. it is not
sufficient as to warrant a grossly immoral act. The complainant failed to present
substantial evidence against Atty.Macabata, to prove that there was grossly immoral
conduct on the part of the respondent. Moreover, the Court found Atty. Macabata guilty
of an isolated act of misconduct of a lesser nature as states in Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private
life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Hence, the complaint for disbarment against Atty. Macabata is hereby dismissed.
However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED to be more prudent and cautious in his
dealing with his clients with a STERN WARNING that a more severe sanction will be
imposed on him for any repetition of the same or similar offense in the future.

3. Reyes vs. Nieva [A.C. No. 8560, September 6, 2016, 802 SCRA 196]
Facts:
Complainant alleged that she has been working at the Civil Aviation Authority of
the Philippines (CAAP) as an Administrative Aide on a Job Order basis since October
2004. Sometime in January 2009, she was re-assigned at the CAAP Office of the Board
Secretary under the supervision of respondent, she would notice that during office hours,
respondent would often watch pornographic films saved in his laptop. who was then
acting as CAAP Acting Board Secretary. During complainant's stint under respondent,
would often watch pornographic films saved in his laptop. Complainant also averred that
whenever respondent got close to her, he would hold her hand and would sometimes give
it a kiss. During these instances, complainant would remove her hands and tell him to
desist. According to complainant, respondent even offered her a cellular phone together
with the necessary load to serve as means for their private communication, but she
refused the said offer, insisting that she already has her own cellular phone and does not
need another one.

Complainant also narrated that in the afternoon of April 1, 2009, respondent texted her to
wait for him at the office. Fearing that respondent might take advantage of her,
complainant convinced two (2) of her officemates to accompany her until respondent
arrived. Upon respondent's arrival and seeing that complainant had companions, he just
told complainant and the other two (2) office staff to lock the door when they leave.
Complainant further recounted that on the following day, April 2, 2009, respondent called
her on her cellular phone, asked if she received his text message, and told her he would
tell her something upon his arrival at the office. At about 9:30 in the morning of even date,
respondent asked complainant to encode a memorandum he was about to dictate.
Suddenly, respondent placed his hand on complainant's waist area near her breast and
started caressing the latter's torso. Complainant immediately moved away from
respondent and told him "sumosobra na ho kayo sir." Instead of asking for an apology,
respondent told complainant he was willing to give her P2,000.00 a month from his own
pocket and even gave her a note stating "just bet (between) you and me kahit na si
mommy," referring to complainant's mother who was also working at CAAP. At around
past 11 o'clock in the morning of the same day, while complainant and respondent were
left alone in the office, respondent suddenly closed the door, grabbed complainant's arm,
and uttered "let's seal it with a kiss," then attempted to kiss complainant. This prompted
complainant to thwart respondent's advances with her left arm, raised her voice in order
to invite help, and exclaimed "wag naman kayo ganyan sir, yung asawa nyo magagalit,
sir may asawa ako." After respondent let her go, complainant immediately left the office
to ask assistance from her former supervisor who advised her to file an administrative
case against respondent before the CAAP Committee on Decorum and Investigation
(CODI).

Complainant alleged she was traumatized and was even diagnosed by a psychiatrist to
be suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder with recurrent major depression.
Eventually, complainant filed the instant complaint.
In his defense the respondent denied all the allegations coming from the complainant. He
stated that a 79-year-old retiree cannot do that especially if the office was very small that
is allotted for him and his staff, he admits of offering a mobile phone but it was a phone
for official transaction only and cannot be used for personal purposes and that there was
no sexual meaning. He claims that he would not do the acts he allegedly committed as
there were other people in the office and that those people can attest in his favor.
Respondent then pointed out that the administrative case filed against him before the
CODI was already dismissed for lack of basis and that complainant was only being used
by other CAAP employees who were agitated by the reforms he helped implement upon
his assumption as CAAP consultant and eventually as Acting Corporate Board Secretary.
The IBP investigating commissioner found Atty. Nieva not guilty however, the IBP Board
found respondent guilty of committing sexual advances, and accordingly, recommended
that he be suspended from the practice of law for three (3) months. The ruling of the IBP
Board was reversed by the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, finding Atty. Nieva not
guilty, hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for violating the Code
of Professional Responsibility (CPR)

Ruling:
Yes, Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR provides:
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes.
A lawyer should abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon admission to the Bar but
also throughout their legal career, to maintain their good standing in this exclusive and
honored fraternity. They can be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred for any
misconduct, even if it involves to his private activities, if it shows him to be wanting in
moral character, honesty, probity, or good demeanor.
The IBP found that as compared to complainant's purposedly bare and uncorroborated
allegations, respondent's evidence point to the conclusion that none of the alleged sexual
advances made by respondent against complainant actually occurred. As such, it
absolved respondent from any administrative liability.
In support of such finding, the IBP largely relied on the following: (a) the five (5)
photographs respondent submitted to the CODI to show that respondent's office space
was so small that any commotion caused by a sexual harassment attempt would have
been easily noticed by the other occupants thereof; and (b) the investigation conducted
by the CODI per the Transcript submitted by respondent where the witnesses said that
they did not notice anything out of the ordinary on April 2, 2009, the date when
respondent's alleged sexual advances against complainant were committed.
However, the foregoing evidence, taken as a whole, did not actually refute complainant's
allegation that at around past 11 o'clock in the morning of April 2, 2009, respondent closed
the door, grabbed complainant's right arm, uttered the words "let's seal it with a kiss" and
attempted to kiss complainant despite the latter's resistance.
The Court notes that respondent never refuted complainant's allegation that he would
regularly watch pornographic movies in his office-issued laptop. In fact, respondent
readily admitted that he indeed watches "interesting shows" while in the office, albeit
insisting that he only does so by himself, and that he would immediately dose his laptop
whenever anyone would pass by or go near his table. Without a doubt, it has been
established that respondent habitually watches pornographic materials in his office-
issued laptop while inside the office premises, during office hours, and with the knowledge
and full view of his staff.
It was obvious, that the Court cannot countenance such audacious display of depravity
on respondent's part not only because his obscene habit tarnishes the reputation of the
government agency he works for - the CAAP where he was engaged at that time as Acting
Corporate Secretary - but also because it shrouds the legal profession in a negative light.
As a lawyer in the government service, respondent is expected to perform and discharge
his duties with the highest degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence, and skill,
and with utmost devotion and dedication to duty. His aforesaid habit miserably fails to
showcase these standards, and instead, displays sheer unprofessionalism and utter lack
of respect to the government position he was entrusted to hold.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ramon F. Nieva is found GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01,
Canon 1, and Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly,
he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.

4. In the Matter of The Disqualifica1on Of Bar Examinee Haron S. Meling In The 2002
Bar Examina1ons And For Disciplinary Ac1on As Member Of The Philippine Shari’a Bar
[B.M. No. 1154, June 8, 2004, 431 SCRA 146
Facts:
On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office
of the Bar Confidant (OBC) a Petition to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking
the 2002 Bar Examinations and to impose on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as
a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar. In the Petition Atty Melendrez alleges that Meling
did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2022 Bar Examinations that he has a three
pending criminal cases before the MTCC namely for both Grave Oral Defamation and
Less Serious Physical Injuries.
The said cases as mentioned above happened on May 21, 2001 when Haron S. Meling
allegedly uttered defamatory words against Atty. Melendrez together with his wife while
they were in front of medical practitioner where there are also other people. Meling also
attacked and hit the face of Melendrez’ wife causing the injuries to the latter.
In addition, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using title “Attorney” in his
communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, even though he is not a
member of the Bar. Attached to the Petition is an indorsement letter which shows that
Meling used the appellation and appears on its face to have been received by the
Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cotabato City on November 27, 2001. Pursuant to this
Court’s Resolution dated December 3, 2002, Meling filed his Answer with the OBC.
In his Answer, Meling said that he did not disclose the criminal cases against him by
melendrez because he was then advised by Judge Corocoy Moson their former professor
to settle the misunderstanding between him and melendrez. Believing in good faith that
the case would be settled because the said Judge has moral ascendancy over them, he
being their former professor in the College of Law, Meling considered the three cases that
arose from a single incident and involving the same parties as “closed and terminated.”
Moreover, Meling denies the charges and adds that the acts complained of do not involve
moral turpitude.

As regards the use of the title "Attorney," Meling admits that some of his communications
really contained the word "Attorney" as they were, according to him, typed by the office
clerk. In its Report and Recommendation dated December 8, 2003, the OBC disposed of
the charge of non-disclosure against Meling in this wise: The reasons of Meling in not
disclosing the criminal cases filed against him in his petition to take the Bar Examinations
are ludicrous. He should have known that only the court of competent jurisdiction can
dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor a law professor. In fact, the cases filed against
Meling are still pending. Furthermore, granting arguendo that these cases were already
dismissed, he is still required to disclose the same for the Court to ascertain his good
moral character. Petitions to take the Bar Examinations are made under oath, and should
not be taken lightly by an applicant.

Issue:
Whether or not Meling’s act of concealing cases constitutes dishonesty.
Ruling:
Yes, The Petiton is GRANTED. The Membership of Haron S. Meling is hereby
suspended until further orders from the court, the suspension to take effect immediately.
Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Shari’a Court, is not a matter of right but
merely a privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who
are also known to possess good moral character.The requirement of good moral
character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law, its
continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. The disclosure
requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether there is satisfactory evidence
of good moral character of the applicant.
The nature of whatever cases are pending against the applicant would aid the Court in
determining whether he is endowed with the moral fitness demanded of a lawyer. By
concealing the existence of such cases, the applicant then flunks the test of fitness even
if the cases are ultimately proven to be unwarranted or insufficient to impugn or affect the
good moral character of the applicant. Meling’s concealment of the fact that there are
three (3) pending criminal cases against him speaks of his lack of the requisite good moral
character and results in the forfeiture of the privilege bestowed upon him as a member of
the Shari’a Bar.
The judiciary has no place for dishonest officers of the court, such as Meling in this case.
The solemn task of administering justice demands that those who are privileged to be
part of service therein, from the highest official to the lowliest employee, must not only be
competent and dedicated, but likewise live and practice the virtues of honesty and
integrity. Anything short of this standard would diminish the public's faith in the Judiciary
and constitutes infidelity to the constitutional tenet that a public office is a public trust.

5. Dantes vs. Dantes [A.C. No. 6486, September 22, 2004, 438 SCRA 582]
Facts:
In an Affidavit-Complaint filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
Emma T. Dantes, sought the disbarment of her husband, Atty. Crispin G. Dantes on the
ground of immorality, abandonment, and violation of professional ethics and law.
Complainant alleged that respondent is a philanderer. Respondent purportedly engaged
in illicit relationships with two women, one after the other, and had illegitimate children
with them. From the time respondent’s illicit affairs started, he failed to give regular
support to complainant and their children, thus forcing complainant to work abroad to
provide for their children’s needs.
Complainant pointed out that these acts of respondent constitute a violation of his
lawyer’s oath and his moral and legal obligation to be a role model to the community.
Respondent though admitting the fact of marriage with the complainant and the birth of
their children, respondent alleged that they have mutually agreed to separate eighteen
(18) years before, after the Complainant had abandoned him in their residence but when
Emma returned after 18 years, she insist that she was accommodated in the place where
he and they were residing, thus he was forced to live alone in an apartment which he
rented. Respondent also alleged that he sent their children to the best school he could
afford and was able to provide for their needs. Respondent also bought lots in Pampanga
for their children and even gave them an adequate financial support even after Emma
abandoned him. He also alleged that Emma filed the case to force him to remit seventy
percent (70%) of his monthly salary to her
Denying that there was a mutual agreement between her and respondent to live
separately, Emma (Complainant) asseverated that she was just compelled to work abroad
to support their children. When she returned to the Philippines, she learned that
respondent was living with another woman. Respondent, then bluntly told her, that he did
not want to live with her anymore and that he preferred his mistresses.
The IBP conducted its investigation and hearings on the complaint Complainant (Emma)
presented documentary evidence consisting of the birth certificates of Ray Darwin,
Darling, and Christian Dave, all surnamed Dantes, and the affidavits of respondent and
his paramour to prove the fact that respondent sired three illegitimate children out of his
illicit affairs with two different women. Letters of complainant’s legitimate children likewise
support the allegation that respondent is a womanizer.

The IBP submitted its Report and Resolution that the respondent be suspended
indefinitely from the practice of law.

Issue:
Whether or not Atty Crispin Dantes violates Professional and Ethics and Law
Ruling:
Yes, The Code of Professional Responsibility forbids lawyers from engaging in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct. Immoral conduct has been defined as
that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the
opinion of good and respectable members of the community. To be the basis of
disciplinary action, the lawyer’s conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral.
That is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.
It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character has three
ostensible purposes, namely: (i) to protect the public; (ii) to protect the public image of
lawyers; and (iii) to protect prospective clients. A writer added a fourth: to protect errant
lawyers from themselves.
 Undoubtedly, respondent’s acts of engaging in illicit relationships with two different
women during the subsistence of his marriage to the complainant constitutes grossly
immoral conduct warranting the imposition appropriate sanctions. Complainant’s
testimony, taken in conjunction with the documentary evidence, sufficiently established
respondent’s commission of marital infidelity and immorality. Evidently, respondent had
breached the high and exacting moral standards set for members of the law profession.
He has made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and
dignity. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case
of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer
of the Court and as a member of the bar. Where a lesser penalty, such as temporary
suspension, could accomplish the end desired, disbarment should never be decreed.
However, in the present case, the seriousness of the offense compels the Court to wield
its power to disbar as it appears to be the most appropriate penalty.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing Atty. Crispin G. Dantes is hereby DISBARRED
and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.

6. Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Palma [A.C. No. 2474, September 15, 2004, 438 SCRA 306
Facts:
Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. filed a complaint for against Atty. Leo J. Palma, alleging
as grounds "deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct in office, violation of his oath as a
lawyer and grossly immoral conduct." Complainant and respondent met sometime in the
70’s. Complainant was a client of Angara Concepcion Regala & Cruz Law Offices
(ACCRA) and respondent was the lawyer assigned to handle his cases. Owing to his
growing business concerns, complainant decided to hire respondent as his personal
counsel.
On June 22, 1982, without the knowledge of complainant’s family, respondent married
Lisa in Hongkong. It was only the next day that respondent informed complainant and
assured him that "everything is legal." Complainant was shocked, knowing fully well that
respondent is a married man and has three children. Upon investigation, complainant
found that respondent courted Lisa during their tutoring sessions. Immediately,
complainant sent his two sons to Hongkong to convince Lisa to go home to Manila and
discuss the matter with the family. Lisa was persuaded.
Complainant also came to know that: (a) on the date of the supposed marriage,
respondent requested from his (complainant’s) office an airplane ticket to and from
Australia, with stop-over in Hong Kong; (b) respondent misrepresented himself as
"bachelor" before the Hong Kong authorities to facilitate his marriage with Lisa; and (c)
respondent was married to Elizabeth Hermosisima and has three children, namely:
Eugene Philippe, Elias Anton and Eduardo Lorenzo.
On August 24, 1982, complainant filed with the Court of First Instance, a petition for
declaration of nullity of the marriage between respondent and Lisa. In the decision dated
November 2, 1982, the CFI declared the marriage null and void ab initio.
Thereafter, complainant filed with this Court the instant complaint for disbarment.

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action. He

contended that the complaint fails to allege acts constituting deceit, malpractice, gross
misconduct or violation of his lawyer’s oath. There is no allegation that he acted with
"wanton recklessness, lack of skill or ignorance of the law" in serving complainant’s
interest. Anent the charge of grossly immoral conduct, he stressed that he married
complainant’s daughter with "utmost sincerity and good faith" and that "it is contrary to
the natural course of things for an immoral man to marry the woman he sincerely loves.

In the Resolution dated March 2, 1983 case was referred to Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) for investigation, report and recommendation.
On December 28, 1983, the First Division of this Court a Resolution setting aside the CFI
Decision declaring the marriage between respondent and Lisa null and void ab initio; and
(b) remanding the case to the CFI for proper proceeding and determination. To this date,
the records fail to disclose the outcome of this case. On March 19, 1984, respondent filed
with the OSG an Urgent Motion to Suspend Proceedings poses a prejudicial question to
the disbarment proceeding. It was denied.

On March 20, 2003, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan submitted a Report
and Recommendation finding respondent guilty of grossly immoral conduct and violation
of his oath as a lawyer. She recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of three (3) years. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the above Report and Recommendation, but it reduced respondent’s penalty
to only one (1) year suspension

Issue:
"The main issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not respondent committed the
following acts which warrant his disbarment:

a) Grave abuse and betrayal of the trust and confidence reposed in him by
complainant;
 b) His misrepresentation that there was no legal impediment or prohibition to his
contracting a second marriage;
c) The acts of respondent constitute deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct in
office, grossly immoral conduct, and violation of his oath as a lawyer.

Ruling:
Yes, At the outset, it must be stressed that the law profession does not prescribe
a dichotomy of standards among its members. There is no distinction as to whether the
transgression is committed in the lawyer’s professional capacity or in his private life. This
is because a lawyer may not divide his personality to be an attorney at one time and a
mere citizen at another. Thus, not only his professional activities but even his private life,
insofar as the latter may reflect unfavorably upon the good name and prestige of the
profession and the courts, may at any time be the subject of inquiry on the part of the
proper authorities. The ringing truth in this case is that respondent married Lisa while he
has a subsisting marriage with Elizabeth Hermosisima.
Undoubtedly, respondent’s act constitutes grossly immoral conduct, a ground for
disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. He exhibited a
deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the Bar. In
particular, he made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding
respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage is contrary to honesty,
justice, decency, and morality
The definition of what constitutes immoral conduct, i.e., "that conduct which is willful,
flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good
and respectable members of the community." The respondent act is said to be immoral
because he abandoned his family and lured an innocent young woman to marry him, he
also mispresented himself as bachelor so that he can contract a marriage in a foreign
country. Clearly it speaks out of betrayal of trust and abuse of confidence.
It was respondent’s closeness to the complainant’s family as well as the latter’s complete
trust in him that made possible his intimate relationship with Lisa. When his concern was
supposed to be complainant’s legal affairs only, he sneaked at the latter’s back and
courted his daughter. Like the proverbial thief in the night, he attacked when nobody was
looking. Moreover, he availed of complainant’s resources by securing a plane ticket from
complainant’s office to marry the latter’s daughter in Hongkong. He did this without
complainant’s knowledge. Afterwards, he even had the temerity to assure complainant
that "everything is legal." Clearly, respondent had crossed the limits of propriety and
decency.
Respondent’s culpability is aggravated by the fact that Lisa was just a 22-year old college
student of Assumption Convent and was under psychological treatment for emotional
immaturity.
Anent respondent’s argument that since the validity of his marriage to Lisa has not yet
been determined by the court with finality, the same poses a prejudicial question to the
present disbarment proceeding. Suffice it to say that a subsequent judgment of annulment
of marriage has no bearing to the instant disbarment proceeding. As we held in In re
Almacen, a disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely
criminal but is rather an investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers.
Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal action is not determinative of an
administrative case against him,34 or if an affidavit of withdrawal of a disbarment case
does not affect its course,35 then the judgment of annulment of respondent’s marriage
does not also exonerate him from a wrongdoing committed. So long as the quantum of
proof clear preponderance of evidence in disciplinary proceedings against members of
the bar is met, then liability attaches.

The interdict upon lawyers, as inscribed in Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, is that they "shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct." This is founded on the lawyers’ primordial duty to society as spelled out in
Canon 1 which states: "CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the
laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes."
"Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws.
He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override
the laws, to trample them underfoot and to ignore the very bonds of society, argues
recurrency to his position and office and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate
and dangerous elements of the body politic."
Corollarily, the above responsibility is enshrined in the Attorney’s Oath which every lawyer
in the country must take before he is allowed to practice.
WHEREFORE, respondent Leo J. Palma is found GUILTY of grossly immoral conduct
and violation of his oath as a lawyer, and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law.

7. So vs. Lee [B.M. No. 3288, April 10, 2019]

Facts:
On May 19, 2017, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) received a letter from the
complainant alleging that Lee is a defendant in Civil Case No. 740 and is not fit for
admission to the Bar considering her irresponsible attitude towards her monetary
obligations. The said letter was a copy of the Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money4
So had filed against Lee.
In her Comment, Lee claimed that she was unaware of the pendency of said Case she
learned of it only when she registered for the oath taking. She admitted that she obtained
a ₱200,000.00 loan from So but had already paid a total of ₱140,000.00 for 10 months.
Lee explained that due to the losses her business suffered, she failed to pay the
subsequent monthly payments. She pointed out that she did not intend to evade her
obligation to So, but had asked the latter to give her ample time to settle it.
In its July 11, 2017 Report, the OBC noted that Lee was an applicant of the 2016 Bar
Examinations and in her application, she declared that a civil case was filed against her
on January 29, 2014 titled "Nonoy Bolos v. Ma Lucille Lee Jao" for collection of sum of
money. It highlighted that Civil Case pertained to the several loans Lee had incurred with
Joseph "Nonoy" Bolos (Bolos) in the aggregate amount of ₱1,450,000.00."

Issue:
Whether or not Lee should be allowed to retake the Lawyer’s Oath and sign the
roll of attorneys

Ruling:
Yes, the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State upon
those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required
by law for the conferment of such privilege
SEC. 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. - Every applicant for
admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-
one years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the Philippines, and must
produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and
that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in
any court in the Philippines
Jurisprudence had deemed the following acts as crimes involving moral turpitude:
abduction with consent, bigamy, concubinage, smuggling, rape, attempted bribery,
profiteering, robbery, murder, estafa, theft, illicit sexual relations with a fellow worker,
issuance of bouncing checks, intriguing against honor, violation of the Anti-Fencing Law,
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, perjury, forgery, direct bribery, frustrated homicide,
adultery, arson, evasion of income tax, barratry, blackmail, bribery, duelling,
embezzlement, extortion, forgery, libel, making fraudulent proof of loss on insurance
contract, mutilation of public records, fabrication of evidence, offenses against pension
laws, perjury, seduction under the promise of marriage, falsification of public document,
and estafa through falsification of public document.
As such, the pendency of a civil case alone should not be a deterrent for successful Bar
examinees to take their Lawyer's Oath and to sign the Roll of Attorneys especially since
not all charges or cases involve acts evincing moral turpitude. The facts and
circumstances of each case should be taken into account to establish that the applicant's
actions tarnished his or her moral fitness to be a member of the Bar.
Thus, the pendency of Civil Case Nos. 740 and 1436 against Lee is not enough reason
to prevent her from taking her Lawyer's Oath and signing in the Roll of Attorneys. The
existence of these civil cases alone does not establish that she committed acts tainted
with moral turpitude.
In sum, the pendency of civil cases alone should not prevent successful Bar examinees
to take their Lawyer's Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys, unless the same involves acts
or omissions which had been previously determined by the Court to be tainted with moral
turpitude.

WHEREFORE, the Court recommends the Office of the Bar Confidant to ALLOW Ma.
Lucille P. Lee to retake the Lawyer's Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys subject to the
condition that she: (a) notify the Court within one (1) month from making her first monthly
payment to Joseph Bolos; and (b) inform the Court upon full satisfaction of her monetary
obligation.

8. Jimenez vs. Crespo [A.C. No. 10548, December 10, 2014, 744 SCRA 215]
Facts:
Mario Crespo, otherwise known as Mark Jimenez (Jimenez), filed a complaint for
estafa against complainant, her sister Rosemarie Flaminiano, Marcel Crespo, Geraldine
Antonio, Brenda Heffron, Magdalena Cunanan, and Isabel Gonzalez.He alleged that he
was the true and beneficial owner of the shares in the Clarion Corporation incorporated
for purchase of Forbes property.The stockholders of Clarion, except to Myla, executed a
deed of assignment in favour of Caroline Jimenez, who was then the common-law partner
of Mark Jimenez. Clarion simulated a loan from Caroline.
Clarion bought the Forbes property from Gerardo Contreras. To affect the undervalued
sale, Myla handed a check funded by Mark Jimenez. Further, the money used as the
purchase price was not reflected in the books of Clarion. Later, Mark Jimenez transferred
on his shares to Caroline by another deed of assignment.
While Mark was in prison in US, he learned from Atty. Francisco that his son Marcel
Crespo approached Caroline and threatened her and succeeded in transferring her
nominal shares in Clarion to Antonio, through another deed of assignment. All
transactions were reflected in the GIS. Mark was informed by Atty. Francisco that through
fraudulent means, The complainant, and her co-respondents in estafa case, put the
Forbes property for sale, which was sold the same to Philmetro without Mark’s knowledge,
but the same was undervalued. Mark alleged that through fraud, Caroline was able to sell
the Forbes property using his own money and failed to remit the proceeds thereof to him.
Respondent executed an affidavit in support of Mark Jimenez’s alleged participation. He
alleged that when he asked Caroline if she obtained Mark’s consent with regard the sale,
she answered in the affirmative. On the other hand, Caroline alleged that she was
shocked and felt betrayed in the affidavit executed by Atty. Francisco as the latter actively
participated in the transactions and was asked by the former for legal consequences of
the sale. Atty. Francisco also acted as the personal lawyer, corporate lawyer, and
secretary of Clarion. Hence, she filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Francisco.
In his reply, Atty. Francisco his services were initially engaged by Mark Jimenez and
hence was only acting pursuant to the latter’s orders. He argued that he violated neither
privileged communication nor represented conflicting interests. He also denied being the
legal counsel of Caroline but merely assisted her in some matters and that he only acted
as a lawyer of Mark and as a legal counsel of Clarion. The IBP found Atty. Francisco guilty
of violating the Canons 1 and 10 of CPR and the Lawyer’s Oath and suspended him for
1 year from practice of law.

Issue:
Whether Atty. Francisco is guilty for violation of CPR and Lawyer’s Oath.

Ruling:
Yes, Violations of Canons 1 and 10of the CPR and the Lawyer’s Oath
Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR provide:
CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS
OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
-Rule 1.0 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful
conduct.
Canon 1 clearly mandates the obedience of every lawyer to laws and legal processes.
To the best of his ability, a lawyer is expected to respect and abide by the law and, thus,
avoid any act or omission that is contrary thereto. A lawyer’s personal deference to the
law not only speaks of his character but it also inspires respect and obedience to the
law, on the part of the public.
When Atty. Francisco was admitted to the Bar, he also took an oath to "obey the laws,"
"do no falsehood," and conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his
knowledge and discretion.
In the facts obtaining in this case, Atty. Francisco clearly violated the canons and his
sworn duty. He is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct when he
admitted to having allowed his corporate client, Clarion, to actively misrepresent to the
SEC, the significant matters regarding its corporate purpose and subsequently, its
corporate shareholdings. n the documents submitted to the SEC, such as the deeds of
assignment and the GIS, Atty. Francisco, in his professional capacity, feigned the
validity of these transfers of shares, making it appear that these were done for
consideration when, in fact, the said transactions were fictitious, albeit upon the alleged
orders of Jimenez.
In his long practice as corporate counsel, it is indeed safe to assume that Atty.
Francisco is knowledgeable in the law on contracts, corporation law and the rules
enforced by the SEC. As corporate secretary of Clarion, it was his duty and obligation to
register valid transfers of stocks.
In determining whether Atty. Francisco violated the rule on conflict of interests, a
scrutiny of the parties’ submissions with the IBP reveals that the complainant failed to
establish that she was a client of Atty. Francisco.
First, complainant’s claim of being Atty. Francisco’s client remains unsubstantiated,
considering its detailed refutation.
Second, there is a stark disparity in the amount of narrative details presented by the
parties. Atty. Francisco’s claim that he was the counsel of Clarion and Jimenez, and not
of the complainant, was clearly established in a sworn statement executed by Jimenez
himself.
Third, noteworthy is the fact that complainant opted not to file a reply to Atty. Francisco’s
answer. This could have given her opportunity to present evidence showing their
professional relationship. She also failed to appear during the mandatory conference
with the IBP-CBD without even updating her residential address on record. Her
participation in the investigation of the case apparently ended at its filing.
Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is superior to
or has greater weight than that of the other. It means evidence which is more convincing
to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. Under
Section 1 of Rule 133, in determining whether or not there is preponderance of
evidence, the court may consider the following: (a) all the facts and circumstances of
the case; (b) the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and
opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts
towhich they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony; (c) the witnesses’
interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may
ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the number of witnesses, although it does not
mean that preponderance is necessarily with the greater number..
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be
disbarred or suspended on any of the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or
other gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer's oath; (6) willful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court; and (7) willful appearance as an attorney for a party
without authority. A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in
his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity and good demeanor, or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

While the Court finds no violation of the rule on conflict of interests and disclosure of
privileged communication, the acts of Atty. Francisco, in actively and passively allowing
Clarion to make untruthful representations to the SEC and in other public documents,
still constitute malpractice and gross misconduct in his office as attorney, for which a
suspension from the practice of law for six (6) months is warranted.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Edgar B. Francisco GUILTY of violation of Canons
1 and 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for which he is SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, effective upon receipt of this Decision.

9. Republic Act No. 6397

Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court
Re: Administra1ve Case No. 44 of the RTC, Br. IV, Tagbilaran City, Against A Sy.

Facts:
This administrative case stemmed from the settlement of the estate of testator
William C. Ogan which has since been pending in the Court of First Instance (CFI), now
Regional Trial Court (RTC).

In 1976, Judge Fernando S. Ruiz took over the case from Judge Paulino S. Marquez
who, in turn, inherited it from Judge Antonio Beldia. Noting that the proceedings have
been pending for thirteen (13) years, Judge Ruiz then inquired into the principal causes
of the delay. He found out, as will be shown later in detail, that Atty. Samuel C. Occeña
caused the delay by disobeying lawful court orders and by willfully prolonging the
litigation through his various maneuvers, in gross violation of his oath as a lawyer that
he will not willingly sue any groundless, false, or unlawful suit, or delay any man's cause
for money or malice.

Under the terms of the Last Will and Testament of the late William C. Ogan, his
residuary estate was divided among his seven children. One of them, Necitas Ogan-
Occeña, was named in the will as executrix of the estate. As such, she retained her
husband, Atty. Samuel C. Occeña, as her lawyer.
The estate consists of bank deposits, securities (both here and in the United States of
America), and real estate in Cebu City and in Ohio, U.S.A. The deceased left no debt.
However, since the death of the testator on February 1, 1963, the settlement of his
estate has not yet been terminated owing largely to the dilatory tactics of Atty. Occeña.

However, since the death of the testator on February 1, 1963, the settlement of his
estate has not yet been terminated owing largely to the dilatory tactics of Atty. Occeña
the other heirs filed several motions praying that the estate's remaining P250,000.00
cash as well as its shares of stocks in the Philippines and in the United States be
distributed among all the heirs.

Obviously, the main causes of the delay in the probate proceedings were Atty. Occeña's
claim for attorney's fee in the amount of P250,000.00 and the executrix's refusal,
through her husband, to account for the shares of stocks belonging to the estate which,
according to her, were not in her possession. The other heirs could not accept that
explanation because as executrix, she was charged with the responsibility of collecting
all the assets of the estate.

Thus, on August 8, 1977, Judge Ruiz issued an order directing the executrix to
comment why the securities were not in her possession.
October 22, 1977, issued an order requiring her to submit within 30 days the latest
inventory of all the securities of the estate.
Judge Ruiz then issued another order on February 6, 1978, "directing her to take
possession of all certificates of stocks or their replacements belonging to the estate and
to make an up-to-date inventory thereof with a statement of their nature and their value."
Again, she did not comply with the order.
On August 15, 1979, Judge Ruiz issued an order authorizing Nancy Ogan-Gibson, one
of the heirs, to go to Vinton County, Ohio, U.S.A., to take proper action on the five
parcels of land owned by the estate and to submit a report to the probate court.
On October 16, 1979, the probate court issued an order requiring the executrix to
distribute immediately among the heirs all the shares of stocks of the estate.
After several postponements at her instance and that of her husband, the incident was
set for hearing on April 20, 1981. But neither of them appeared, thus delaying the
proceedings for about a year and a half. Finding the executrix unfaithful in the
performance of her duties, the probate court, on May 12, 1981, adjudged her in
contempt of court.
By filing the said civil actions, criminal charge, and administrative complaints, found to
be groundless, Atty. Occeña further delayed with malice the probate proceedings and
inflicted hardship and pain upon Judge Ruiz.
Pursuant to Section 28, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court providing inter alia that
the CFI may suspend an attorney from the practice of law for cause, Judge Ruiz, on
May 26, 1982, filed with the same probate court Administrative Case charging Atty.
Occeña with gross misconduct, violation of his oath as a lawyer and willful disobedience
of lawful court orders.

Atty. Occeña was then directed to file his answer within 15 days from notice which was
extended to another 15 days upon his motion. Still, he did not file an answer. he
submitted was a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. But it was
denied for lack of merit. Upon Atty. Occeña's motion, he was given an extension of 15
days from November 3, 1982 within which to file his answer. However, he did not
comply. Neither did he appear during the hearing.

August 15, 1983, this Court dismissed Atty. Occeña's petition for lack of merit. The
hearing of the administrative case was set on January 30 and 31, 1984, but again, he
did not appear, hearing was reset but once more, Atty. Occeña failed to appear. Upon
his telegraphic request, the hearing was reset. He filed his Answer and Motion for
Referral to the Solicitor General or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. His motion was
denied. The hearing was reset upon another telegraphic request of Atty. Occeña, the
hearing was postponed to. Again, he did not appear.
On November 14, 1985, based on the evidence presented ex parte, showing that Atty.
Occeña has "abused, misused and overused the judicial system,"Judge Ruiz rendered
a decision suspending him from the practice of law for three (3) years. Willful
disobedience of lawful orders of the court; gross misconduct in office, Willful
disobedience of lawful orders of the court; gross misconduct in office, Disobeying the
laws, Did falsehood and consented to the doing of same in court.

Issue:
Whether or not Atty Oceana should be disbarred in the practice of law?
Ruling:
Yes, Atty. Occeña gravely violated his oath of office in his handling of Special
Proceedings The facts of the case succinctly show that through his atrocious maneuvers,
he successfully delayed the disposition of the case for the last thirty-eight (38) years,
causing untold hurt and prejudice, not only to the heirs, but also to Judges Ruiz and Beldia
who heard the case. Atty. Occeña has caused a mockery of the judicial proceedings and
inflicted injury to the administration of justice through his deceitful, dishonest, unlawful,
and grossly immoral conduct. Indeed, he abused beyond measure his privilege to practice
law.
The Court has held that a lawyer should not abuse his right of recourse to the courts for
the purpose of arguing a cause that had been repeatedly rebuffed. Neither should he use
his knowledge of law as an instrument to harass a party nor to misuse judicial processes,
as the same constitutes serious transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The practice of law is a sacred and noble profession. It is a special privilege bestowed
only upon those who are competent intellectually, academically, and morally. A lawyer
must always conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients and the public at
large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach. He must faithfully perform
his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. A violation of the high
standards of the legal profession subjects the lawyer to administrative sanctions by this
Court which includes suspension and disbarment.
Clearly, Atty. Occeña's conduct has made him unfit to remain in the legal profession even
for a single moment. Thus, for his serious administrative offenses, punishable under
Section 27 of Rule 138, Atty. Occeña deserves the ultimate penalty, that of expulsion from
the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers.

WHEREFORE, ATTY. SAMUEL C. OCCEÑA is DISBARRED from the practice of law.

His name is STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY

10. In re ASy. Marcial Edillon [A.C. 1928, August 3, 1978, 84 SCRA 554]
Facts:
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors
unanimously adopted Resolution recommending to the Court the removal of the name
of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership
dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice. The authority
of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a
delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys for non-payment of dues.The
respondent is a duly licensed practicing Attorney in the Philippines
The respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his
constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to
maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to
pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial
support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is
being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the
Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule
and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from
the Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases
triable by the Court but is rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an
administrative body."

Issue:
Whether or not the Supreme Court may compel the respondent to pay his
membership fee to the IBP.

Ruling:
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as
distinguished from bar associations organized by individual lawyers themselves,
membership in which is voluntary. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed
for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable
annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code
of professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient
reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation
for discipline or disbarment of the offending member.
Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act (Republic
Act No. 6397), and looking solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution
granting the Supreme Court the power "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice
and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law," it at once becomes
indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary
power in all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of law.
The Supreme Court concluded that the provisions of Rules of Court (Article 139-A) and
of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither
unconstitutional nor illegal.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the
respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby
ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.
11. Tabuzo vs Gomos [A.C. No. 12005, August 17, 2018)
Facts:
A Verified Complaint1 filed by Atty. Achernar B. Tabuzo (complainant) against
Atty. Jose Alfonso M. Gomos (respondent)2 who was then a Commissioner of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).The case was assigned to respondent for an
investigation and report.
In this case, the complainant alleged that the respondent that respondent violated the
Constitution, the Rules of Procedure of the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline
(Commission), Rule 139-B of the Rules Court and Republic Act (R.A.) No. 67136 when
he failed to act on her pleadings with dispatch and for issuing his report and
recommendation on August 15, 2014 or 174 days from the submission of the last
pleading. Second, Complainant averred that respondent was very cruel and heartless to
an inexperienced lawyer when he mutilated statements made in her pleadings in CBD
Case No. 12-3457; and that he maliciously cropped and pasted portions of
complainant's statement in her position paper to give the wrong impression before the
IBP-Board of Governors (Board) that the introductory heading was an act of name
calling against respondent, thereby violating Rules 1.018 and 1.029 of Canon 1 and
Rules 3.01,10 3.02,11 and 3.0412 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Third, Complainant asserted that respondent committed nonfeasance for deliberately
refusing to institute disciplinary action against a lawyer for serious violation of duties
owed to the Court and the legal profession despite several notices. Lastly, complainant
posited that respondent was grossly ignorant of the rules on privileged communication,
on evidence, on the crime of perjury, and on forum shopping when he failed to dismiss
the present administrative case outright because it had no merit and when he ignored
the perjury and forum shopping committed by Sillo.
Respondent denied the allegations and contended that they were not only false and an
unfortunate misappreciation of the laws, facts, and circumstances but also an act of
harassment.
Then the Commission recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit.
The complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration insisting that respondent, as an
investigating commissioner, has an accountability to the legal profession separate and
distinct from that of the IBP Board and such accountability is not a mere administrative
matter inside the IBP-Commission. Complainant posited that respondent could be held
administratively liable because he was a quasi-judicial officer performing functions
delegated by the Court, hence, a public officer.
Issues:
1. Whether respondent may be held administratively liable in the same manner
as judges and other government officials.

2. Whether respondent may be held administratively liable for rendering an alleged

adverse judgment in his capacity as an investigating commissioner of the IBP.

Ruling:
The IBP is a sui generis public institution deliberately organized, by both the
legislative and judicial branches of government and recognized by the present and past
Constitutions, for the advancement of the legal profession. The IBP as an organization
has as its members all lawyers coming from both the public and private sectors who are
authorized to practice law in the Philippines. However, Section 434 of the IBP's By-Laws
allows only private practitioners to occupy any position in its organization.
This means that only individuals engaged in the private practice are authorized to be
officers or employees and to perform acts for and in behalf of the IBP. Hence, the IBP
Commissioners, being officers of the IBP, are private practitioners performing public
functions delegated to them by this Court in the exercise of its constitutional power to
regulate the practice of law. The IBP-CBD's delegated function of entertaining complaints
against lawyers is public in nature; but the responsible officer performing such function is
a private individual-not a public officer.
Consequently, it also follows that IBP Commissioners are not "public officers". They are
not "public officials" as they are not elective or appointive officials of the "government".
IBP Commissioners cannot be held administratively liable for malfeasance, misfeasance,
and nonfeasance in the framework of administrative law because they cannot strictly be
considered as being "employed" with the government or of any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality including government-owned or controlled corporations.
IBP Commissioners and other IBP officers may be held administratively liable for violation
of the rules promulgated by this Court relative to the integrated bar and to the practice of
law. Even if they are not "public officers" in the context of their employment relationship
with the government, they are still "officers of the court" and "servants of the law" who are
expected to observe and maintain the rule of law and to make themselves exemplars
worthy of emulation by others. Most importantly, no less than Sec. 5 of the Constitution
placed them under the Court's administrative supervision. Therefore, IBP Commissioners
may be held administratively liable only in relation to their functions as IBP officers not as
government officials.
WHEREFORE, the Court AGREES with the Report and Recommendation of the IBP and
Committee on Bar Discipline adopted by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of
Governors, and DISMISSES the administrative complaint filed against Atty. Jose Alfonso
M. Gomos.