1. Title: MARIANO v.

COMELEC

Facts: The petitioners were challenging Section 2 of Republic Act (R.A.) 7854, claiming that it
was unconstitutional. They argued that the section did not properly specify the exact land area
or territorial boundaries of Makati, which violated the Constitution and the Local Government
Code.

Issues: The main issue here was whether Section 2 of R.A. 7854, which was about converting
Makati into a highly urbanized city, was constitutional. The petitioners argued that it didn't
provide clear and specific boundaries for Makati's territory, as required by the Constitution and
the Local Government Code.

Ruling: The Supreme Court found no merit in the petition. Section 2 of R.A. 7854 did describe
the land area of the proposed city of Makati, even though it didn't use metes and bounds or
technical descriptions. It stated that Makati would comprise its present territory and mentioned
neighboring areas like Pasig River, Mandaluyong, Pasig, Pateros, Taguig, Pasay, and Manila.

The Court recognized that it's crucial to clearly define territorial boundaries because they
determine the extent of a local government's authority. Unclear boundaries can lead to conflicts
and harm the welfare of the people. However, in this case, the Court found that the description
in Section 2 did not cause confusion or change the land area of Makati. It simply stated that the
city would include the existing territory of the municipality.

The Court also pointed out that Congress had used similar descriptions for other local
government units without causing boundary disputes. Therefore, the Court ruled that Section 2
of R.A. 7854 was constitutional and did not violate the requirement for precise boundary
descriptions.

2. Title: Municipality of Jimenez v. Baz, Jr.

Facts: The Municipality of Sinacaban was created by Executive Order No. 258 issued by
President Elpidio Quirino. The order specified the boundaries of Sinacaban, which included
certain areas in the Municipality of Jimenez. However, there was also an agreement between
Sinacaban and Jimenez in 1950, known as Resolution No. 77, approved by the Provincial
Board, which stated that certain areas would be considered part of Jimenez.
A dispute arose over which areas belonged to Sinacaban and which to Jimenez. The Provincial
Board ruled in favor of Sinacaban, but Jimenez disagreed and filed a legal petition, seeking a
resolution.

Issues: The main issue in this case was whether the boundaries specified in Executive Order
No. 258 or the agreement in Resolution No. 77 should be used to determine which areas belong
to Sinacaban and Jimenez. Jimenez argued that Resolution No. 77 should be upheld, while
Sinacaban relied on the technical description in the executive order.

Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the technical description in Executive Order No. 258
should be the basis for determining the boundaries of Sinacaban. The executive order did not
limit Sinacaban to only the mentioned areas (barrios/now barangays) but provided a detailed
metes and bounds description of its territory.

The Court also ruled that a relocation survey was the only way to definitively establish the
boundaries of the municipalities. The existence of Resolution No. 77 could not be used by
Jimenez as a basis to oppose Sinacaban's claim if it contradicted the technical description in the
executive order.

3. Title: City of Pasig v. COMELEC

Facts: The residents of Karangalan Village wanted to create a new barangay called Barangay
Karangalan, separate from their mother barangays Manggahan and Dela Paz in the City of
Pasig. A plebiscite for this creation was scheduled for June 22, 1996. Around the same time, the
City of Pasig also created Barangay Napico, and a plebiscite for its creation was set for March
15, 1997. However, the Municipality of Cainta, a neighboring area, raised objections and filed
petitions with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to suspend or cancel the plebiscites.

The Municipality of Cainta pointed out a pending case in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Antipolo, Rizal, which was meant to settle a boundary dispute between them and the City of
Pasig. The proposed barangays, including the disputed areas, were part of this boundary
dispute. COMELEC decided to hold the plebiscite for Barangay Karangalan in abeyance but
ruled differently for Barangay Napico, claiming that the matter was already moot due to the
plebiscite held on March 15, 1997.

Issues: The primary issue in this case was whether the pending civil case concerning the
boundary dispute between the Municipality of Cainta, and the City of Pasig posed a "prejudicial
question" that needed resolution before conducting plebiscites for the creation of the proposed
barangays. Additionally, it questioned if the plebiscite for Barangay Napico had already become
irrelevant because it had already been held.

Ruling: The Supreme Court agreed with COMELEC's position that the civil case concerning the
boundary dispute between Cainta and Pasig raised a "prejudicial question." This means that the
outcome of the boundary dispute needed to be settled before holding plebiscites for creating the
proposed barangays. It would be futile to define the territorial jurisdiction of a barangay without
resolving the territorial jurisdiction dispute between the municipalities.

However, the Court disagreed with the argument that the plebiscite for Barangay Napico was
automatically rendered moot just because it had already been conducted. The issues raised by
Cainta regarding the holding of this plebiscite were still pending before the Antipolo RTC, which
had to determine these issues independently.

4. Title: MEJIA v. BALOLONG

Facts: This case is a legal dispute over who had the rightful claim to be councilors in the city of
Dagupan. Four petitioners were elected councilors in an election held on November 11, 1947.
Four respondents were appointed by the President on December 30, 1947. The key issue
revolved around the timing of when the city of Dagupan was officially created and came into
existence. This timing determined whether the President had the power to appoint the
respondents as councilors.

Issues: The main issue in this case was the timing of the creation of the City of Dagupan. If it
was established on June 20, 1947, the date Act No. 170 became effective, then the next general
elections mentioned in the law would have been on November 11, 1947. If this were the case,
the President would not have had the authority to appoint the respondents as councilors.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the City of Dagupan was legally created and became a
public corporation on June 20, 1947, when Act No. 170 was approved. This is because a law
like Act No. 170 becomes effective as soon as it is approved or becomes law.

However, a city, as a public corporation or legal entity, cannot function on its own but needs
officials or officers to carry out its functions. So, organizing the government of the city was
necessary. This means that while the city came into existence in June 1947, the city government
had to be organized separately.
The crucial point was that the next general elections mentioned in Act No. 170 referred to the
election held on November 11, 1947, where the petitioners were elected as councilors.
Therefore, the appointments made by the President for the respondents were invalid. In
essence, the Supreme Court ruled that the petitioners were the rightful councilors.

5. Title: U.S. v. ESPIRITUSANTO

Facts: The story starts with the municipality of Malabon in the Philippines. They made a strict
rule that said nobody can play a gambling game called jueteng within their town, and they set
punishments for those who broke this rule. The defendant in this case was accused of breaking
this rule because he was caught collecting bets for jueteng, and the police found jueteng tickets
in his possession. The defendant argued that the town council didn't have the authority to make
such a rule. He said the council only had the power to deal with things like gambling houses and
other disorderly places, not to completely ban games like jueteng. Despite his argument, he was
found guilty.

Issues: The main question here was whether the town council had the right to make a rule that
banned jueteng within the town's limits. The defendant believed that the council had gone
beyond its authority, which was only supposed to be about regulating gambling in certain
places, not banning games entirely.

Ruling: The Supreme Court said that the town council did have the authority to make this rule.
They explained that the Municipal Code, which is a set of laws for towns, gave the council the
power to prevent the bad things that come with gambling. This means they had the authority not
just to regulate gambling houses but also to stop games like jueteng and make rules to get rid of
the problems that come with them. They also said that banning jueteng was in line with another
law called Act No. 1757. This law completely prohibited games of chance like jueteng, and it
was important to enforce it to prevent the social and moral problems that jueteng was causing in
the Philippines. So, in simple terms, the Supreme Court decided that the town council had the
right to ban jueteng to protect the community from the bad effects of gambling.

6. Title: U.S. v. POMPEYA

Facts: Mr. Pompeya was accused of breaking a local law in Iloilo, Philippines. This law
required able-bodied men between the ages of 18 and 50 to help catch bandits and thieves for
up to five days each month. The accusation against Mr. Pompeya was that he didn't do this duty
without a good reason. He argued that this law was against the rules in the Organic Act of the
Philippines, which guarantees the freedom of citizens. Despite his argument, he was found
guilty.

Issues: The main question here was whether the local law in Iloilo, which required people to
help catch criminals, was allowed under the Organic Act of the Philippines. Mr. Pompeya
believed that this law violated the citizens' right to liberty.

Ruling: The Supreme Court said that the obligation for individuals to help protect their
community's peace and order has been around for a long time in well-organized governments.
It's a duty known as "posse comitatus." This means that the people in charge of maintaining
peace and order in a place can ask all male residents of a certain age to help them do this. This
was a well-accepted practice in common law. The Municipal Code, which is a set of rules for
towns, simply explains when and how people in a town can be asked to help keep the peace.
This power given to towns falls under the police power of the state, which means it's the
government's power to make sure there's public order and prevent crimes. It's a power that the
government inherently has and can't be limited. This power covers not just public health and
safety but also the overall well-being of the public. So, in simple terms, the Supreme Court
decided that the law in Iloilo, requiring people to help catch criminals, was constitutional and not
against the citizens' rights. It fell under the government's power to make sure there's order and
safety in society.

7. Title: U.S. v. SALAVERIA

Facts: The municipal council of Orion, Bataan, made a rule that said people can't play a card
game called panguingue on any day other than Sundays or legal holidays. They also set a
punishment for anyone who breaks this rule. The accused in this case was a justice of the
peace. One evening, not on a Sunday or holiday, he and his wife were found playing
panguingue with seven other people at their house by the police. The police confiscated the
money and cards used in the game, and the accused was convicted of breaking the ordinance.
He appealed, saying that the municipal rule was invalid.
Issues: The main question here was whether the municipal rule that prohibited playing
panguingue on non-Sunday or non-holiday days was allowed. The accused argued that this rule
was not valid.

Ruling: The Supreme Court said that even though the game of panguingue wasn't mentioned in
the general gambling law, and it wasn't entirely a game of chance, it could still be regulated by
the municipal authority. This authority comes from the police power, which is the power to make
rules for the well-being of the community and to promote good morals. There's a law called
Section 2238 of the Administrative Code that delegates this police power to municipalities. It
allows them to make rules that are necessary to carry out their duties and responsibilities. This
includes rules that are important for the health, safety, and prosperity of the people in the town.
The Supreme Court emphasized that, like the state, municipalities also have the power to use
the police power to make sure their citizens are comfortable, safe, and that social order is
maintained. So, the ordinance that prohibited playing panguingue on non-Sunday or non-holiday
days was valid because it fell within the municipality's police power and was intended to
promote the well-being of the community.

8. Title: PEOPLE v. GABRIEL,

Facts: The City of Manila had an ordinance that regulated the use of noise and show to attract
buyers or bidders. This ordinance restricted the use of such methods to specific hours during
working days and prohibited them in certain areas like Calles Escolta, Rosario, and Echague,
and Plazas Sta. Cruz and Goiti. The defendant was accused of violating this ordinance and was
convicted. He appealed, arguing that the ordinance was unconstitutional because it was
discriminatory.

Issues: The main issue here was whether the ordinance, which regulated the use of noise and
show to attract buyers or bidders, was constitutional or discriminatory. The defendant claimed
that it violated his rights.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the challenged ordinance was a valid exercise of the
city's police power. This ordinance was essentially a regulation of business practices within the
city and was within the discretion of the city council, which was exercising its police power.

There was no discrimination in the ordinance because it applied uniformly to all kinds and
classes of people conducting business within the prohibited area. No one within the city had a
legal or constitutional right to auction goods without the city's license or consent. Therefore, as
long as the ordinance applied equally to all, the city had the legal right to specify how, when,
where, and in what manner goods could be sold at auction within its limits and to prohibit their
sale in any other way.

9. Title: RECREATION AND AMUSEMENT ASS'N. v. CITY OF MANILA,

Facts: The Municipal Board of Manila passed an ordinance that placed restrictions on the
operation and maintenance of a specific type of slot machine within the city. The ordinance
stated that these slot machines could not be operated within a 200-meter radius of certain
places like churches, hospitals, schools, public markets, plazas, and government buildings. It
also increased the annual fee for operating these machines from P55.00 to P300.00, which had
to be paid in advance. The petitioner sought a preliminary injunction against the City Mayor and
Treasurer to prevent them from enforcing this ordinance.

Issues: The primary issue in this case was whether the ordinance passed by the Municipal
Board of Manila was valid or not. The petitioner claimed that the ordinance was unconstitutional
and sought to prevent its enforcement.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the ordinance in question was valid legislation and within
the authority of the Municipal Board of Manila to enact. The power for the Municipal Board to
regulate slot machines was granted by Section 18(1) of Republic Act No. 409.

The regulation of slot machines, which were considered detrimental to the general welfare of the
population, especially schoolchildren, was a lawful exercise of the state's police power. This
power allowed the city to pass ordinances aimed at protecting public welfare. As a result, the
City Mayor had discretionary powers to decide whether to issue municipal licenses and permits
for the operation of these machines.

10. Title: PEOPLE v. SOLON

Facts: The city streets and public places in the City of Cebu were filled with animal discharges,
creating a situation that posed dangers to public health and was unsightly. This issue was
mainly attributed to around 5,000 horse-drawn vehicles that operated in the city, which naturally
produced the objectionable waste. In response to this problem, the Municipal Board of Cebu
passed a law to address the issue. However, the law applied only to vehicle-drawing animals
and not to other animals that also traversed the same streets.

Issues: The primary issue in this case was whether the ordinance passed by the Municipal
Board of Cebu, which aimed to eliminate animal wastes in the city streets and public places,
was constitutional. The defendant objected to the ordinance's selective application to vehicle-
drawing animals while excluding other animals that also used the same streets.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the ordinance in question, which sought to remove
animal wastes from the city streets and public places, was a measure intended to protect the
health and well-being of the city's residents. The ordinance explicitly stated this purpose. While
it was true that the law only targeted vehicle-drawing animals, the Court found that this
classification was reasonable.

It was acknowledged that there might be non-vehicle-drawing animals occasionally using the
same streets, but their numbers were likely negligible compared to the large number of rig-
drawing animals. Therefore, it couldn't be argued that the ordinance showed favoritism or
imposed restrictions on specific owners of vehicle-drawing animals that weren't applied to
others. In light of these considerations, the Court determined that the ordinance did not violate
the constitutional prohibition against class legislation.

11. Title: PEOPLE v. GOZO,

Facts: Appellant Gozo was charged with violating an ordinance in Olongapo, Zambales, which
required a permit from the municipal mayor for constructing a building, making modifications,
alterations, repairs, or demolitions. Gozo had purchased a house and lot within the U.S. Naval
Reservation in Olongapo City. She demolished the existing house and built a new one without
obtaining a building permit because her neighbors had informed her that such a permit was
unnecessary.

Issues: The main issue here was whether the ordinance in Olongapo, which required building
permits for construction and related activities, was valid. Gozo argued that she was exempt from
this requirement since her property was within the U.S. Naval Reservation.

Ruling: The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the ordinance. Building permits are within the
authority of local government units, and the Court had recognized their validity since 1911. Such
requirements are justified under the general welfare clause, which encompasses various
aspects of public health, morals, safety, well-being, and community order.

Furthermore, the ordinance was applicable to Gozo because within the boundaries of a
municipal territory, any powers vested in the local government can be validly exercised. The
residual authority not granted to the local government belongs to the national government, not
to any foreign country, even if it's a naval reservation. Gozo's claim that she was not covered by
the ordinance was not supported, and it was not the concern of the American naval authorities.
Decisions about jurisdiction under the Bases Agreement were the exclusive prerogative of the
contracting parties, and Gozo had no say in the matter.

12. Title: SAMSON v. MAYOR OF BACOLOD CITY

Facts: The petitioners in this case were movie operators who challenged an ordinance enacted
by the City of Bacolod. This ordinance prohibited the admission of two or more persons with
only one ticket in an amusement place. The petitioners argued that this ordinance violated their
rights by depriving them of their property without due process, as it limited their ability to
manage their theaters as they saw fit.

Issues: The central issue was whether the ordinance, which restricted the admission of multiple
people with a single ticket to an amusement place, was valid. The petitioners claimed that it
infringed upon their property rights and their right to manage their theaters as they desired.

Ruling: The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the ordinance. It found that the ordinance
served legitimate purposes, including preventing fraud in the collection of municipal taxes and
promoting public safety and general welfare. Therefore, it was not an arbitrary exercise of police
power. In essence, the ordinance was considered lawful because it aimed to protect the
interests of the city and its residents, and it was not unduly oppressive or unreasonable.

13. ORTIGAS & CO., LIMITED PARTNERSHIP v. FEATI BANK AND TRUST CO.

Facts: The Municipal Council of Mandaluyong designated Lots Nos. 5 and 6 of the Highway
Hills Subdivision, which had been sold by Ortigas & Co. to the Angeles spouses, as part of the
commercial and industrial zone of the municipality. The deeds of sale explicitly stated that these
lots were to be used exclusively for residential purposes, and these restrictions were recorded in
the titles of these lots.

Issues: The central issue revolved around whether the exercise of municipal power could
override contractual agreements and restrictions made between parties regarding the use of the
land. In simpler terms, could the municipality's decision to designate these lots for commercial
and industrial use supersede the contractual limitations placed on them?

Ruling: The Supreme Court held that there was an exception to the general powers delegated
to municipalities under the concept of the general welfare. This exception arose when the
exercise of municipal power conflicted with vested rights stemming from contractual
agreements. However, in this specific case, the Court found that the exercise of police power by
the municipality took precedence over contractual stipulations between parties regarding the
use of lands, even if these conditions were annotated on the Torrens Title. In essence, the
municipality's designation of the lots for commercial and industrial use outweighed the
contractual restrictions imposed by Ortigas & Co.

14. Title: TANO v. SOCRATES

Facts: On December 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa City enacted
an ordinance that banned the shipment of live fish and lobster outside the city from January 1,
1993, to January 1, 1998, with some exceptions. Similarly, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
the Provincial Government of Palawan passed a resolution prohibiting various activities related
to marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for a five-year period in and coming from Palawan
waters. The petitioners, who were marine merchants and the Airline Shippers Association of
Palawan, faced criminal charges for violating these enactments.

The petitioners argued that they had a preferential right as marginal fishermen under Section
149 of the Local Government Code (LGC) and, therefore, should be exempt from these
regulations.

Issues: The central issue was whether the petitioners had an absolute preferential right as
marginal fishermen that exempted them from the ordinances passed by the local government
units. It also raised the question of whether these ordinances were valid exercises of police
power or not.
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the so-called "preferential right" of marginal fishermen to
use marine resources was not absolute. The provisions of the LGC aimed to balance the right to
use marine resources with the goal of a balanced and healthful ecology. The General Welfare
Clause of the LGC allowed local government units to enact ordinances to effectively enforce
fishery laws within their areas, which included the conservation of marine resources.

The Court emphasized the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC,
which granted powers to local government units, including the exercise of police power to enact
ordinances for the greater good of their communities. Therefore, the ordinances in question
were valid and aligned with the goal of promoting economic development and improving the
quality of life for the people in the community.

15. Title: METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. BEL-AIR VILLAGE

ASSOCIATION, INC

Facts: The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) is a government agency

responsible for providing essential services in Metro Manila. The Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.
(BAVA), on the other hand, is a non-profit organization representing homeowners in Bel-Air
Village, a private subdivision in Makati City. BAVA owns Neptune Street, a road within the
subdivision.

In 1995, the MMDA sent a notice to BAVA, requesting the opening of Neptune Street to public
traffic and the demolition of the perimeter wall separating the subdivision from Kalayaan
Avenue. In response, BAVA filed a case for injunction against the MMDA.

Issues: The main issue was whether the MMDA had the authority to order the opening of a
private subdivision road and the demolition of its perimeter walls, or if this authority was vested
in the Makati City Council by ordinance.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the MMDA does not possess police or legislative powers.
Its authority is limited to implementing rules and regulations in line with its functions, as
delegated by the Metro Manila Council. The MMDA is not a political unit of government and
cannot enact ordinances or exercise legislative power. The power to make such decisions
belongs to local government units through their respective legislative councils.

While the MMDA aims to improve the metropolitan transportation system and promote the
general welfare, its actions must be within the bounds of the law. Opening a private road in a
subdivision without legal basis is not justified, even if the intentions are good. The promotion of
the general welfare should always be consistent with the rule of law.

16. Title: LINA v. DIZON PAÑO

Facts: In December 1995, Tony Calvento was appointed by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office (PCSO) to set up a lotto outlet using Terminal OM 20. He requested a mayor's permit
from Mayor Calixto Cataquiz of San Pedro, Laguna, but it was denied. Mayor Cataquiz cited an
ordinance passed by the Laguna Provincial Council on September 18, 1995, expressing
objection to "illegal gambling," including lotto.

Issues: The main issue was whether the provincial ordinance could serve as a valid ground to
prohibit the operation of the lotto system in Laguna, despite the PCSO's national authority to
conduct such games.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that while the provincial council had the right to express its
objection to lotto and gambling as a policy statement, the ordinance itself was not self-
executing. It was merely an expression of the council's views and did not have the power to
prohibit lotto.

The game of lotto was authorized by the national government through Republic Act 1169, as
amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 42. This law granted the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office the authority to operate lotteries.

In our legal system, local government units have the power to make ordinances, but these
ordinances should not contradict existing laws passed by Congress. The provincial ordinance, in
this case, could not supersede national legislation allowing lotto. Local governments may
express their views, but they cannot enact ordinances that go against national laws.

17. Title: MUNICIPALITY OF DAET v. CA

Facts: So, in this case, there's a town called Daet, and they wanted to acquire a piece of land
owned by a private individual. They said they needed this land for a public project. To determine
how much they should pay for this land, Daet used a law called Presidential Decree No. 42.
This law said that they should pay based on the assessed value of the land, which is basically
what the government thinks the land is worth for tax purposes.
Issue: The big question here was whether the assessed value should be the actual amount
paid to the landowner as compensation. In other words, can Daet just use the assessed value to
decide how much they should pay for the land?

Ruling: The Supreme Court said, "No, you can't do that." They explained that the assessed
value is just a temporary thing. It's meant to help the government take possession of the land
quickly, but it doesn't represent the true value of the land. So, when Daet takes the land, they
have to pay the landowner a fair amount, not just the assessed value.

18. Title: MODAY v. CA

Facts: In this case, there's a town called Bunawan in Agusan del Sur, and they wanted to take
someone's private property for public use. They passed a resolution in the town council to do
this, but the higher authority called Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved of their resolution.
The big question was whether the town could still take the property even though the higher
authority said no.

Issue: The main issue here was whether the town of Bunawan had the power to take
someone's property even if the higher authority, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, didn't agree with
their decision.

Ruling: The Supreme Court said, "Yes, they can." They explained that the law, specifically
Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, which was in effect at that time, gave the town of Bunawan the right
to take someone's property through eminent domain. Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproving
the town's resolution was not valid because their only job was to check if the town had the
authority to make such a decision. Since the town had the power to exercise eminent domain,
their resolution was valid, and they could proceed with taking the property.

19. Title: "MUNICIPALITY OF PARAÑAQUE v. V.M. REALTY CORPORATION

Facts: So, the Municipality of Parañaque wanted to take two parcels of land owned by V.M.
Realty Corporation in order to build homes for underprivileged people as part of a socialized
housing project. They filed a complaint to take these lands through expropriation, which is like a
legal process for taking private property for public use. The issue that came up was whether the
municipality followed the right procedure to do this.

Issue: The main issue here was whether the municipality had followed the correct procedure in
taking V.M. Realty Corporation's land through expropriation. Specifically, they had used a
resolution from the local legislative council, but V.M. Realty Corporation argued that they should
have used an ordinance as required by the law.

Ruling: The Supreme Court said, "No, they didn't follow the right procedure." They explained
that there are specific steps that a municipality needs to follow when taking someone's property
through expropriation. One of those steps is that they need to pass an ordinance, which is like a
local law, to authorize the mayor to do this. But in this case, they had only used a resolution,
which is more like a statement of opinion and not a law.

The Court clarified that an ordinance and a resolution are not the same. An ordinance is like a
law and has a permanent character, while a resolution is temporary and just expresses an
opinion. Also, the way they are passed is different - an ordinance needs a third reading, but a
resolution does not.

So, because the municipality didn't follow the correct procedure, the Court denied their petition
to take the land through expropriation. However, they can still do it properly in the future if they
follow the right steps, including passing an ordinance.

20. Title: BARANGAY MATICTIC v. ELBINIAS

Facts: In this case, there's a Municipality called Norzagaray in Bulacan, and they filed a legal
case to take someone's property through expropriation. However, the court dismissed their case
because, at the time they filed it, the municipality hadn't obtained the necessary approval from
the Department Head or the Office of the President, as required by the law.

Issue: The main issue here was whether another local entity called Barangay Matictic had the
right to challenge the court's decision to dismiss the expropriation case. In other words, could
Barangay Matictic intervene in the case even though they are a separate political entity from the
municipality?

Ruling: The Supreme Court said, "No, Barangay Matictic can't intervene." They explained that
the proper party to challenge the dismissal of the expropriation case should be the Municipality
of Norzagaray, not Barangay Matictic. Even though Barangay Matictic is part of the municipality,
it's a different political entity, and it doesn't have the legal authority to continue the expropriation
case on its own.

The Court pointed out that the dismissal of the case was without prejudice, which means the
Municipality of Norzagaray could revive it in the future. There was no need for Barangay Matictic
to intervene. If Barangay Matictic wanted to pursue an eminent domain action, they could do it
separately, and they didn't have to wait for the municipality's case.

21. Title: PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR v. CA

Facts: So, in this case, the Province of Camarines Sur wanted to buy or take over some land
near the provincial capitol. They wanted to use this land for two things: to create a farm for non-
food and non-traditional crops and to build housing for government employees. The provincial
governor filed cases to take this land through expropriation.

Issue: The main issue here was whether the purpose for taking the land was genuinely for the
public's benefit. You see, traditionally, the law required that the land taken through eminent
domain had to be used directly by the general public, like for roads or public plazas. But times
have changed, and the question was whether things like a resort complex for tourists or housing
projects could also be considered for "public use."

Ruling: The Supreme Court said, "Yes, they can." They explained that the definition of "public
use" has evolved over time. Now, it means anything that brings an advantage, convenience, or
benefit to the community, like a resort complex or housing project.

The Court also ruled that the province didn't need approval from the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) to change the land's use from agricultural to non-agricultural. They argued that if
they followed that rule, it would mean that local governments couldn't take agricultural land for
projects like roads, bridges, schools, and hospitals without DAR approval. This would slow down
important projects, and DAR shouldn't have the authority to decide if the expropriation is for
public use.

22. Title: THE CITY OF CEBU v. DEDAMO,

Facts: In 1993, the City of Cebu wanted to build a public road, and they needed to take a piece
of land owned by the Dedamo couple for it. They filed a complaint to take the land through
eminent domain, offering to pay the Dedamos an amount for their property. However, the
Dedamos disagreed with the purpose of taking their land, arguing that it was for the benefit of a
private company, Cebu Holdings, Inc., and that the offered price was too low. They also claimed
to have no other land in the city.

The trial court eventually decided that the City of Cebu should pay the Dedamos a specific
amount as compensation, and this decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Issue: The main issue here was when should the "just compensation" for the land be
determined - should it be based on the value at the time of filing the complaint in 1993 or at the
time the City took possession of the land in 1994?

Ruling: The Supreme Court said that the key law in determining this point was Section 19 of
R.A. No. 7160, which stated that just compensation should be determined as of the time of
actual taking. They clarified that a previous case (National Power Corp. vs. CA) did not set a
hard and fast rule that compensation should always be determined based on the date of filing
the complaint; it depended on the circumstances.

In this case, the Dedamos and the City had voluntarily agreed to be bound by the report of a
commission, which set the value of the land at the time of actual taking in 1994. This agreement
was like a contract between them and should be upheld in good faith.

The Court also emphasized that the rule in Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, which
mentioned determining just compensation at the time of filing the complaint, could not override
R.A. 7160, which was a substantive law.

23. Title: PATALINGHUG v. CA

Facts: The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City issued a zoning ordinance that designated
the C-2 District for commercial and compatible industrial uses, including funeral
parlors/memorial homes. However, these funeral parlors were required to be at least 50 meters
away from residential structures, churches, and other institutional buildings.

Petitioner decided to construct a funeral parlor on Cabaguio Avenue, Agdao. Some residents
complained that this violated the zoning ordinance since it was too close to a chapel and
residential structures. The Sangguniang Panlungsod investigated and found that the nearest
residential structure, owned by Wilfredo G. Tepoot, was only 8 inches away from the funeral
parlor. Despite this finding, petitioner continued construction.

Private respondents filed a case to nullify the building permit.

Issues: The main issue was whether the funeral parlor's construction violated the zoning
ordinance due to its proximity to a residential structure and a chapel.

Ruling: The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, arguing that the funeral parlor
was within the 50-meter radius from Tepoot's building, which they considered residential based
on a tax declaration. However, the Supreme Court disagreed with this interpretation.

A tax declaration does not conclusively determine the nature of a property for zoning purposes.
Even if a property is declared residential for tax purposes, it may still be within a commercial
zone. In this case, the Sangguniang Panlungsod had already declared the area as commercial,
and that should prevail for zoning purposes.

The operation of a funeral parlor is considered a commercial activity under the ordinance, and
the reclassification of the area as commercial is an exercise of police power to promote the
general welfare. This zoning ordinance was adopted as part of a comprehensive plan for the
orderly development of the area.

As a result, the Supreme Court reinstated the trial court's decision, overturning the Court of
Appeals' ruling.

24. Title: FORTICH v. CORONA

Facts: This case involves two separate motions for reconsideration filed by the respondents
and applicants for intervention. They sought to overturn the Supreme Court's previous decision,
which nullified a "win-win" Resolution issued by the Office of the President. The Resolution in
question was issued in a case involving land reclassification and agrarian reform.

Issues: The main issue revolved around whether local government units needed approval from
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to reclassify lands from agricultural to non-
agricultural use.
Ruling: The Supreme Court stated that the issues raised in the motions for reconsideration
were not of extraordinary importance and had already been addressed in a previous case. In
the case of Province of Camarines Sur vs. Court of Appeals, the Court had ruled that local
government units did not require DAR approval to convert or reclassify lands from agricultural to
non-agricultural use.

As a result, the Court denied the motions for reconsideration with finality, affirming its earlier
decision.

25. Title: MACASIANO v. DIOKNO

Facts: The Municipality of Parañaque passed an ordinance that allowed certain streets to be
closed for the establishment of a flea market. The ordinance was approved by the municipal
council and the Metropolitan Manila Authority but was subject to certain conditions. A contract
was signed for the operation and management of the flea market, and stalls were set up on the
closed streets. However, the PNP Superintendent ordered the destruction of these stalls,
leading to a legal dispute.

Issues: The main issue revolved around the validity of the ordinance and whether the closure of
public streets was lawful. Specifically, it questioned whether the local government had the
authority to control or regulate the use of these public properties.

Ruling: The Supreme Court explained that public properties, like roads and streets, can be
divided into those for public use and patrimonial property. Public properties for public use are
dedicated to the general public and are outside the commerce of individuals or local
governments. These properties cannot be disposed of or leased to private individuals.

While there is a provision allowing local government units to close roads and public places, this
authority must be exercised with consideration for basic principles. These principles dictate that
properties dedicated to public use should not be closed for other purposes unless it is no longer
needed for public service. Once a property is withdrawn from public use, it becomes patrimonial
property of the local government. In this case, roads and streets typically used for vehicular
traffic are still considered public properties for public use and cannot be leased or used for other
purposes.
26. Title: PILAPIL v. CA,

Facts: The Pilapil family owns a parcel of land in Liloan, Cebu. The Colomida family, residents
of Mandaue City, also bought a piece of land in the same area. The Colomidas claimed that they
had acquired a right of way from another person, leading to the National Road, but it passed
through the Pilapils' property. They attempted to improve this road but were met with
harassment and threats from the Pilapils. The Colomidas then filed a petition for injunction and
damages against the Pilapils, seeking legal protection.

Issues: The main issue at hand was the road or "camino vecinal" passing through the Pilapils'
property and its use. The Colomidas sought an injunction to protect their right of way and
prevent the Pilapils from interfering with it.

Ruling: The Supreme Court clarified that the establishment, closure, or abandonment of a
"camino vecinal" or local road is solely within the authority of the Municipality of Liloan. Private
parties cannot interfere with this right. The decision of the Municipality regarding this road must
be respected.

The property of provinces, cities, and municipalities is divided into property for public use and
patrimonial property. The former includes roads, streets, squares, and other public works that
are used for public service and are governed by principles similar to public dominion property.
The local government has the power to adopt zoning and subdivision regulations, maintain
municipal roads, and regulate their use.

In this case, the Municipality of Liloan had the authority to decide the location and use of the
"camino vecinal" in Sitio Bahak through its legislative body, the Sangguniang Bayan. They
adopted an Urban Land Use Plan that included the location of this road. Therefore, the
Municipality's decision on this matter should prevail.

27. Title: Palma v. Graciano

Facts: In this case, Mr. Palma was accused of a crime, but he was later acquitted, meaning he
was found not guilty. After his acquittal, he claimed that the Provincial Government was
responsible for filing false charges against him in bad faith, and he wanted to seek damages for
the harm he suffered. The question was whether the Provincial Government could be held liable
for the actions of the Governor.
Issue: The main issue here was whether the Provincial Government could be held responsible
for the Governor's actions in filing charges against Mr. Palma in bad faith, leading to his
wrongful accusation.

Held: The Supreme Court said, "No, they cannot be held responsible." They explained that the
prosecution of crimes is a governmental function, not a corporate one. Municipal governments
are not liable for the actions of their officers, except when those officers act within their legal
authority and follow the law's requirements.

In this case, since the filing of criminal charges is a governmental function, the Provincial
Government couldn't be held responsible for the Governor's actions in filing false charges
against Mr. Palma. As a result, the action against the province of Cebu and the city of Cebu was
dismissed, and they were not held liable for the damages claimed by Mr. Palma.

28. Title: BACOLOD CITY v. ENRIQUEZ

Facts: In this case, there was a judgment that required certain city officials of Bacolod City to
pay back salaries to certain officers who had been reinstated. To enforce this judgment, a sheriff
decided to take possession of the city's properties that were considered part of its assets.
However, it was revealed that the case that led to the judgment only involved the city officials,
and the city government itself was not a party to that case. The question was whether this levy
on the city's properties was legally valid.

Issue: The main issue here was whether the sheriff's action of seizing the city's properties to
enforce a judgment against city officials, without making the city government a party to the case,
was legally valid.

Held: The Supreme Court said, "No, it's not valid." They explained that because the city
government was not involved in the original case and wasn't had a party to it, they couldn't be
compelled to pay the back salaries. Seizing the city's assets without giving them a fair chance to
defend themselves in court violated the due process clause of the Constitution, which ensures
that everyone gets a fair legal process.

29. Title: MENDOZA v. DE LEON

Facts: In this case, there was a person (the plaintiff) who was given the exclusive right to
operate a ferry over a river by the municipality of Villasis, Pangasinan. This privilege was
granted for two years. However, after just one year, the plaintiff was kicked out because the
municipal council, which included the defendant councilors, decided to give the same ferry
service privilege to someone else. The plaintiff then filed a lawsuit for damages against the
individual council members, claiming they had wronged him. The councilors argued that they
should not be personally liable and that the municipality itself should be sued instead.

Issue: The main issue here was whether the individual council members could be held
personally responsible for their actions, or if the lawsuit should be directed against the
municipality.

Held: The Supreme Court explained that municipal corporations, like Villasis, have both
governmental and business or corporate powers. When council members are performing their
government duties, they are generally not personally liable unless they acted willfully and
maliciously to cause harm.

However, when municipalities engage in business-like activities, they are treated more like
private corporations, and they can be held responsible for their actions. In this case, leasing out
a municipal ferry for a specific period was considered a business or corporate function. The
plaintiff had a valid right to operate the ferry for the agreed lease period.

The Court found no justifiable reason for the councilors to forcefully remove the plaintiff from the
leased ferry without cause. They acted against the interests of the municipality, and it wasn't an
honest mistake or error in judgment. As a result, the councilors should be held personally liable
for the damages suffered by the plaintiff due to the termination of the lease contract.

30. Title: "MUNICIPALITY OF MONCADA v. CAJUIGAN

Facts: In this case, the Municipality of Moncada and Mr. Cajuigan entered into a lease
agreement. The lease was for certain fishponds within the municipality and was supposed to
last from July 1, 1908, to June 30, 1909. Cajuigan started using the fishponds and placed nets
and other things there. However, he couldn't make the lease payments on time and requested
an extension until November 30, 1909, which was granted. But on that date, the municipality
decided to cancel the lease contract and, a week later, forcibly removed Cajuigan from the
fishponds.
Issue: The main issue here was whether the municipality could be held responsible for
damages. The municipality didn't go to court to resolve the issue but took matters into its own
hands by canceling the lease and removing Cajuigan.

Held: The Supreme Court said, "Yes, the municipality can be held responsible for damages."
They explained that because the municipality didn't seek legal redress but instead unilaterally
canceled the lease and forcibly evicted Cajuigan, they must be held liable for their wrongful
actions. However, the damages should be limited to the harm caused by the eviction itself,
which is like a simple trespass.

Even though the lease was supposed to last for a few more months after the eviction, Cajuigan
couldn't claim damages for the entire period. The damages should only cover the eviction and
its immediate consequences.

So, the judgment was modified, meaning that the municipality was held responsible for
damages, but those damages were limited to the harm caused by the eviction itself, not the
entire lease period.