Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive

Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection

2008-12

Study of the Mine Resistant Ambush

Protected (MRAP) vehicle as a model
for rapid defense acquisitions

Blakeman, Seth T.
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School

http://hdl.handle.net/10945/10285
 NAVAL
POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

MBA PROFESSIONAL REPORT

Study of the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle

Program as a Model for Rapid Defense Acquisitions

By: Seth T. Blakeman

Anthony R. Gibbs
Jeyanthan Jeyasingam
December 2008

Advisors: Lawrence R. Jones

Michael W. Boudreau
Brett A. Wagner

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

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December 2008 MBA Professional Report
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Study of the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected 5. FUNDING NUMBERS
(MRAP) Vehicle as a Model for Rapid Defense Acquisitions
6. AUTHOR(S) Blakeman, Gibbs, Jeyasingam
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
Naval Postgraduate School REPORT NUMBER
Monterey, CA 93943-5000
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING
N/A AGENCY REPORT NUMBER

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)

The purpose of this MBA Project is to analyze the procedures followed in the acquisition of the Mine
Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle. The MRAP program, initiated in response to the improvised explosive
device (IED) threat in Iraq and Afghanistan, is unprecedented in timeline and scale. As such, it provides a unique
case study on the rapid acquisition of a major military system in response to an urgent operational need.
The objective of this research is to provide a guide for future rapid acquisition programs by documenting the
conduct of the MRAP program from the initial needs identification and program start in 2006 through production and
fielding at the time of this writing. The major analysis will focus on the program as a rapid acquisition within the
context of the Acquisition Management and Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS)
framework. The goal for analysis is to answer the following question: What are the key factors and decisions that
contributed to program success, with success defined as meeting program objectives and warfighter needs? In
addition, this report will address the key trade-offs made within the MRAP program and the potential long-term
impacts of these decisions.

14. SUBJECT TERMS Rapid Acquisitions, MRAP, Mine Resistant Ambush Protected, Expedited 15. NUMBER OF
PAGES
153
16. PRICE CODE
17. SECURITY 18. SECURITY 19. SECURITY 20. LIMITATION OF
CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THIS CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT
REPORT PAGE ABSTRACT
Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UU
NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18

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 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

STUDY OF THE MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED

(MRAP) VEHICLE PROGRAM AS A MODEL FOR RAPID
DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS
Seth T. Blakeman, Major, United States Army
Anthony R. Gibbs, Major, United States Army
Jeyanthan Jeyasingam, Major, United States Army

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

December 2008

Authors: _____________________________________
Seth T. Blakeman

_____________________________________
Anthony R. Gibbs

_____________________________________
Jeyanthan Jeyasingam

Approved by: _____________________________________

Dr. Lawrence R. Jones, Advisor

_____________________________________
Michael W. Boudreau, Advisor

_____________________________________
Brett A. Wagner, Advisor

_____________________________________
Terry Rea, CAPT, USN
Acing Dean, Graduate School of Business and Public Policy

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 STUDY OF THE MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED
(MRAP) VEHICLE PROGRAM AS A MODEL FOR RAPID
DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS

ABSTRACT
The purpose of this MBA Project is to analyze the procedures followed in the
acquisition of the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle. The MRAP
program, initiated in response to the improvised explosive device (IED) threat in Iraq and
Afghanistan, is unprecedented in timeline and scale. As such, it provides a unique case
study on the rapid acquisition of a major military system in response to an urgent
operational need.
The objective of this research is to provide a guide for future rapid acquisition
programs by documenting the conduct of the MRAP program from the initial needs
identification and program start in 2006 through production and fielding at the time of
this writing. The major analysis will focus on the program as a rapid acquisition within
the context of the Acquisition Management and Joint Capabilities Integration and
Development System (JCIDS) framework. The goal for analysis is to answer the
following question: What are the key factors and decisions that contributed to program
success, with success defined as meeting program objectives and warfighter needs? In
addition, this report will address the key trade-offs made within the MRAP program and
the potential long-term impacts of these decisions. The results will serve as a guide for
future development of other rapid acquisition initiatives and assist future acquisition
leaders in decision-making.

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1
A. PURPOSE.........................................................................................................1
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES ...........................................................................2
C. METHODOLOGY ..........................................................................................2
D. LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH ..................................................................3
II. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW ...................................................5
A. GENERAL........................................................................................................6
B. MRAP OVERVIEW........................................................................................6
1. History...................................................................................................6
2. Capabilities and Characteristics.........................................................8
3. Need.......................................................................................................9
4. Manufacturers....................................................................................10
C. LITERATURE REVIEW .............................................................................11
1. The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
(JCIDS) ...............................................................................................11
2. Rapid Acquisition Processes .............................................................14
3. Regulatory Framework Governing Rapid Acquisitions ................15
4. The Warfighter Rapid Acquisition Process (WRAP).....................17
5. A Recent Case Study on an Accelerated Acquisition .....................18
6. The Value of the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC) .................19
D. SUMMARY ....................................................................................................21
III. PROGRAM MANAGEMENT AND CONTRACTING STRATEGY .................23
A. EARLY PROGRAM HISTORY ..................................................................23
1. Need Identification.............................................................................24
2. Requirement validation .....................................................................25
B. PROGRAM STRATEGY .............................................................................26
1. Acquisition Strategy...........................................................................26
2. Tailored Acquisition Approach ........................................................27
C. PROGRAM EXECUTION ...........................................................................28
1. Concurrency .......................................................................................30
2. LRIP vs. FRP......................................................................................31
3. Source Selection .................................................................................33
4. Contracting Strategy and Management...........................................35
5. Program Evolution.............................................................................38
D. BUDGET AND FINANCE............................................................................39
1. Funding Actions .................................................................................40
2. Budget Complexity.............................................................................43
3. MRAP Approach to Funding............................................................45
E. KEY FACTORS AND TRADE-OFFS.........................................................49
IV. TESTING AND EVALUATION (T&E)..................................................................53

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 A. T&E PLANNING AND STRATEGY..........................................................53
B. T&E EXECUTION........................................................................................55
C. KEY FACTORS AND TRADE-OFFS.........................................................59
V. PRODUCTION AND INTEGRATION...................................................................63
A. RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS .....................................................................64
B. MANUFACTURER VIGNETTES...............................................................68
1. Force Protection Industries, Incorporated (FPII) ..........................68
2. International Military and Government, LLC (IMG) ...................74
3. SFI Fabrication ..................................................................................77
C. INTEGRATION OF GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT
(GFE)...............................................................................................................79
D. DCMA INVOLVEMENT .............................................................................83
E. KEY FACTORS AND TRADE-OFFS.........................................................86
VI. PROGRAM LOGISTICS .........................................................................................89
A. MANPOWER & PERSONNEL ...................................................................89
B. TECHNICAL DATA .....................................................................................93
C. DESIGN INTERFACES ...............................................................................95
D. COMPUTER RESOURCES.........................................................................96
E. MAINTENANCE PLANNING ....................................................................99
F. TRAINING ...................................................................................................100
1. MRAP University.............................................................................100
2. Manufacturer-Provided Training ..................................................102
G. LOGISTICS SUPPORT..............................................................................103
1. The Role of the FSR.........................................................................106
2. Commonality ....................................................................................107
H. FACILITIES ................................................................................................109
1. Charleston.........................................................................................109
2. Kuwait...............................................................................................110
3. Iraq ....................................................................................................110
4. Afghanistan.......................................................................................111
I. TRANSPORTATION..................................................................................113
1. Transportation Cost Oversight.......................................................114
2. MEAP................................................................................................115
J. FIELDING OPERATIONS ........................................................................116
K. KEY FACTORS AND TRADE-OFFS.......................................................116
VII. CONCLUSIONS ......................................................................................................119
LIST OF REFERENCES ....................................................................................................125
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .......................................................................................131

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 LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. MRAP Compared to the JLTV and the HMMWV............................................9

Figure 2. Major Decision Support Systems.....................................................................12
Figure 3. Chronology of Requirement Validation...........................................................25
Figure 4. Comparison of MRAP Acquisition Strategy and a Traditional Acquisition
Framework .......................................................................................................29
Figure 5. MRAP Vehicle Funding Requests & Appropriations......................................42
Figure 6. Program Fund Status by Per Budget Line........................................................44
Figure 7. Program Fund Status by Service and Type......................................................44
Figure 8. FY07 versus FY08 Finance Procedures...........................................................47
Figure 9. MRAP Vehicle Contract Financial Summary..................................................48
Figure 10. MRAP Vehicle Contract Funding Status.........................................................48
Figure 11. DT-C1 Test Overview......................................................................................56
Figure 12. DT-C2 Test Overview......................................................................................57
Figure 13. DT-C3 Test Overview......................................................................................58
Figure 14. MRAP Test Overview......................................................................................59
Figure 15. MRAP Production Value Stream.....................................................................63
Figure 16. FPII Buffalo Vehicle (Category III) ................................................................71
Figure 17. FPII Cougar Vehicles (CAT II and I, respectively).........................................71
Figure 18. Basic FPII Production Process.........................................................................72
Figure 19. IMG MaxxPro (CAT I)....................................................................................76
Figure 20. MRAP Variant Mix by Service........................................................................80
Figure 21. Government Furnished Equipment by Service ................................................80
Figure 22. MRAP JPO Personnel Overview .....................................................................91
Figure 23. MRAP JPO Organizational Structure ..............................................................92
Figure 24. MEP Items Identified for Integration by the JPO ............................................96
Figure 25. Windchill Field Issues and Response ..............................................................98
Figure 26. The Vehicles of MRAP University................................................................101
Figure 27. Path Forward: Provisioning and Supply Support...........................................105
Figure 28. Parts Commonality Matrix.............................................................................108
Figure 29. RSA Locations within Iraq ............................................................................111
Figure 30. Current Fielding Locations within Afghanistan ............................................112
Figure 31. Transportation Pipeline and Responsibility ...................................................114

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 LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

A
ACAT Acquisition Category
AH Armor Holdings (BAE)
AL Aluminum
AO Area of Responsibility
APBA Acquisition Program Baseline Agreement
APOD Aerial Port Of Debarkation
APM Assistant Program Manager
ARL Army Research Lab
ASL Authorized Stockage List
ASN RD&A Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and
Acquisition
ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials
ATC Aberdeen Test Center
ATR Above Threshold Reprogramming

B
BAE British Aerospace Systems
BMO Battalion Maintenance Officer
BMT Battalion Maintenance Technician
BSFV-E Bradley Stinger Fighting Vehicle—Enhanced
BTR Below Threshold Reprogramming

C
C4ISR Command and Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance
CAT Category
CARC Chemical Agent Resistant Coating
CBA Capabilities-Based Assessment
CDD Capabilities Development Document
CECOM Communications and Electronics Command
CENTCOM Central Command
CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
CLS Contractor Logistics Support
CONUS Continental United States
COTS Commercial Off The Shelf
C-MNS Combat Mission Needs Statement
CPD Capabilities Production Document
CROWS Common Remotely Operated Weapon System
CSIR Council for Scientific and Industrial Research

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D
DAGR Defense Advanced GPS Receiver
DCMA Defense Contract Management Agency
DLA Defense Logistics Agency
DOT&E Director, Operational Test and Evaluation
DoD Department of Defense
DPAS Defense Priorities and Allocations System
DPM Deputy Program Manager
DT Developmental Testing
DVE Drivers Vision Enhancer

E
ECP Engineering Change Proposals
EDFP Engineering Data For Provisioning
EFP Explosively Formed Penetrator/Projectile
EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EPLRS Enhanced Position Location and Reporting System

F
FAR Federal Acquisition Regulation
FBCB2-BFT Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below—Blue Force
Tracking
FMS Foreign Military Sales
FMTV Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles
FN Fabrique Nationale Manufacturing, LLC
FOB Freight On Board (Origin)
FOB Forward Operating Base
FOV Family Of Vehicles
FPII Force Protection Industries, Incorporated
FRP Full Rate Production
FSR Field Support Representative
FTP File Transfer Protocol
FY Fiscal Year

G
GAO Government Accountability Office
GDLS General Dynamics Land System
GAO Government Accountability Office
GFE Government Furnished Equipment pg
GVWR Gross Vehicle Weight Rating

H
HEMTT Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck
HMMWV High Mobility, Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle
HVAC Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning

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I
ICD Initial Capabilities Document
IDIQ Indefinite Delivery, Indefinite Quantity
IED Improvised Explosive Device
IMG International Military and Government, LLC
IOT&E Initial Operational Test & Evaluation
IPT Integrated Product Team
IP Issue Point
ISO International Organization for Standardization
IWN Immediate Warfighter Needs

J
JCD Joint Capabilities Document
JCIDS Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
JERRV Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal Rapid Response Vehicle
JIEDDO Joint IED Defeat Organization
JLTV Joint Light Tactical Vehicle
JP-8 Jet Propellant
JPO Joint Program Office
JRAC Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell
JROC Joint Requirements Oversight Council
JUONS Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statement

K
KBR Kellogg, Brown & Root

L
LAR Logistic Assistance Representatives
LAV Light Armored Vehicle
LRIP Low Rate Initial Production

M
MARCORSYSCOM Marine Corps Systems Command
MATLCV MRAP All Terrain Light Combat Vehicle
MCOTEA Marine Corps Operational Test and Evaluation Activity
MCTAGS Marine Corps Transparent Armor Gun Shields
MDA Milestone Decision Authority
MDAP Major Defense Acquisition Programs
MDT Mean Down Time
MEAP MRAP Expedient Armor Program
MEP Mission Equipment Packages
MIPR Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request
MNF-W Multi-National Forces West
MRAP Mine Resistant Ambush Protected
MTBF Mean Time Between Failure

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MTTF Mean Time To Failure
MTTR Mean Time To Repair

N
NBC Nuclear, Biological and Chemical
NDAA National Defense Authorization Act
NSN National Stock Numbers

O
OEF Operation Enduring Freedom
OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer
OGPK Objective Gunner Protection Kit
OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom
O&M Operations and Maintenance
OMB Office of Management and Budget
ONS Operational Needs Statement
OR Operational Readiness
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense
OT Operational Testing
OTC Oshkosh Truck Corporation

P
PDU Pilot Display Unit
PL Public Law
PLL Prescribed Load Listing
PM Program Manager
PMCS Preventive Maintenance Checks and Services
POM Program Objective Memorandum
PPBES Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System
PPBS See PPBES
PQDR Product Quality Deficiency Report
PVI Protected Vehicles, Inc

Q
QAR Quality Assurance Representative

R
RDC Rapid Deployment Capability
RDECOM U.S. Army Research, Development, and Engineering Command
RDT&E Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
REF Rapid Equipping Force
RFP Request For Proposal
RGS Requirements Generation System
ROVER III Remotely Operated Video Enhanced Receiver
RRAD Red River Army Depot

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RRP Rapid Response Process
RSA Regional Support Activity
RWS Remote Weapon Station

S
SDD System Design and Development
SFI Steel Fabrication Inc
SINCGARS Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System
SOCOM Special Operations Command
SOP Standard Operating Procedure
SPAWAR Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command
SPOD Sea Port Of Debarkation
SSA Service Support Area
SVML Standard Vehicle-Mounted Launcher

T
TACOM Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command
TARDEC Tank Automotive Research, Development, and Engineering Center
T&E Test and Evaluation
TEMP Test and Evaluation Master Plan
TIWG Test Integration Working Group
TOCNET Tactical Operations Center Intercommunications System
TOW Tube Launched Optically Tracked Wire Guided
TRADOC U.S. Army Training And Doctrine Command
TRA Technology Readiness Assessment
TRANSCOM Transportation Command
TSG Technical Solutions Group

U
UCA Undefinitized Contract Action
USMC United States Marine Corps
UUNS Urgent Universal Needs Statement
USDAT&L Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics

W
WALK Warrior Aid and Litter Kit
WC Windchill
WRAP Warfighter Rapid Acquisition Process
WAWF Wide Area Work Flow

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 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We extend our sincere gratitude to several individuals who supported us in this project.
First, we would like to thank our loving families for their support and understanding during our
time at the Naval Postgraduate School, and particularly as we worked on this project. We would
also like to thank our advisors, Dr. Larry Jones, Professor Mike Boudreau, and Commander Brett
Wagner for their guidance and insight. A very special thanks goes to Mr. Dave Hansen, Deputy
Program Manager, MRAP Joint Program Office, for his assistance in our research. Without his
patience in answering our countless questions and the access he provided, this project would have
been incomplete. We would also like to thank Colonel John Rooney, Commander, Aberdeen
Test Center; Captain Joseph Manna, Commander, DCMA-Atlanta; and Ms. Clarissa Tornai at the
Joint Program Office for their immeasurable contributions to this project. Finally, we wish to
thank Ms. Karey Shaffer and staff with the Acquisition Research Program for sponsoring and
assisting with this project.

I would like to say a special thank you to my wife, Stephanie, and my two daughters for
your patience over the last several months as I’ve worked on this project. I’d also like to thank
my partners, Seth Blakemen and Jey Jeyasingam, for the great working relationship and hard
work on this project. — Anthony Gibbs

I would like to offer my gratitude and appreciation to my wife Kim, who at my request,
temporarily put her career on hold so that I could dedicate the required amount of time necessary
for a project of this caliber. To my kids who gave me their support over the last 18 months. To
the other 2/3 of our combined arms team, Jey and Tony, who gave me insight and direction when
I needed it. — Seth Blakeman

My sincere thanks go to my partners, Tony Gibbs and Seth Blakeman, without whom I
would not have reached this point. My deepest gratitude goes to my spouse and two sons for
your support during the last 18 months. Thank you for letting me do what I do. Finally, a very
special thanks to my mother-in-law, my father-in-law, and my parents for assisting with the
children and adjusting to our lifestyles over the last few years. — Jeyanthan (Jey) Jeyasingam

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 ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Seth Blakeman, Major, Acquisition Corps, has served in a variety of command

and staff positions. He is a 1997 graduate of Frostburg State University and was
commissioned a 2LT in the Engineer Corps. He is a graduate of the Engineer Officer
Basic Course, the Armor Captain’s Career Course, the Acquisition Basic Course and the
Naval Post Graduate School where he earned an MBA. His next assignment is in
contingency contracting.

Anthony R. Gibbs, Major, Acquisition Corps, United States Army, earned an

MBA at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in December 2008. Prior to attendance at
NPS, Major Gibbs served as an Infantry Assignment Officer with duty at the Army
Human Resources Command in Alexandria, Virginia. He also commanded a rifle
st st
company in 1 Battalion, 501 Parachute Infantry Regiment during Operation Enduring
Freedom. Major Gibbs earned a Bachelor of Science degree in Mechanical Engineering
at the University of Missouri-Rolla in May 1997 and is married with two children.

Jeyanthan Jeyasingam, Major, Acquisition Corps, United States Army, received

his Masters of Business Administration from the Naval Post Graduate School (NPS) in
December 2008. Prior to accession into his functional area and selection for attendance to
NPS, Major Jeyasingam served as an Army Armor Officer. His previous duty
assignment was Battalion Operations Officer, 1st Battalion, 357th Infantry regiment, Fort
Lewis, Washington. He also served as an Observer/Controller Trainer with 1-357 IN
Regiment and Commanded Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 2d Brigade, 1st
Infantry Division during Operation Iraqi Freedom II. Major Jeyasingam, a graduate of
the University of Central Florida, is a Malaysia native via Florida, and is married with
two children.

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 I. INTRODUCTION

In late 2006, the Department of Defense (DoD) launched a major acquisition

program to rapidly procure thousands of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles
(MRAPs)1 for use in Iraq and Afghanistan. With a raised, V-shaped, armored hull,
MRAPs provide improved protection against Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)–the
insurgent weapon of choice and greatest casualty producer in Iraq–when compared to up-
armored high mobility, multi-wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) and other flat-bottomed
vehicles. The unprecedented scope of the MRAP program, combined with its rapid
execution, presents an opportunity to study a major rapid acquisition program.

In standard DoD acquisitions for major systems, the source selection process
typically results in a contract award to one manufacturer. This provides a common
design that simplifies training and sustainment operations. In the case of the MRAP
program, however, mounting causalities from IEDs made the program the number one
DoD acquisition priority. Consequently, decision-makers emphasized getting the
capability into the hands of warfighters at the earliest opportunity. Because no single
supplier had the capacity to quickly build the required number of vehicles, the program
used multiple vehicle designs from multiple manufacturers to meet the requirement.
Although this makes the fullest use of the defense industrial base and provides the fastest
production in the short run, it comes at the expense of maintainability and lifecycle costs
in the long run.

A. PURPOSE

The purpose of this research is to document and analyze the process of acquiring
the MRAP vehicle from the Operational Needs Statement (ONS) in 2005 to the time of
this writing (October 2008). The objective is to focus on all aspects of rapid procurement

1 It has become common for the acronym “MRAP” to connote “Mine Resistant Ambush Protected
vehicle” (with the word “vehicle” being implied in the acronym). The use of “MRAP” in this project
reflects this widespread terminology, and the MRAP vehicle is sometimes referred to simply as “the
MRAP.”
1
and identify key elements that contributed to the program’s success. The results will
serve as a guide for the future development of other rapid acquisition initiatives and assist
future acquisition leaders in decision-making.

B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

The first objective with this research is to provide a guide for future rapid
acquisition programs based on the limited time under which the MRAP vehicle was
procured. This report will document the conduct of the program from the initial needs
identification and program start in 2006 through production and fielding at the time of
this writing. The major analysis will focus on the MRAP program as a rapid acquisition
within the context of the Acquisition Management and Joint Capabilities Integration and
Development System (JCIDS) framework. The goal of this analysis is to answer the
following question: What are the key factors and decisions from this program that
contributed to success, with success defined as meeting program objectives and
warfighter needs? In addition, this report will address the key trade-offs made within the
MRAP program and the potential long-term impacts of these decisions.

C. METHODOLOGY

This report focuses on three broad areas within the MRAP program. First, it
addresses the program management and contracting issues. This includes an overview
and analysis of the needs identification, generation of required capabilities, source
selection, contracting actions, budget and finance actions, and the program management
organization. The second focus area covers testing and evaluation, resource constraints,
Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) involvement and contractor
certification, manufacturing, quality control, and integration of Government Furnished
Equipment (GFE). The third and final focus area details the program fielding and
support strategy, training plan, logistics, and transportation plan.

The framework for this analysis involves identifying the key factors that
contributed to success in each of the three focus areas. The research draws on documents
available from open sources such as major news reports, the Government Accountability
2
Office (GAO) and other government reports, academic and research papers, and
information provided by the program office. The analysis also includes interviews with
the Program Manager (PM) and others from the Joint Program Office (JPO), key program
participants from DCMA, the Commander of Aberdeen Test Center (ATC), senior
officials at Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR) involved in the
integration effort, and interviews with senior managers for two MRAP producers and one
major subcontractor to the effort.

D. LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH

This research identifies the key aspects of the MRAP program that contributed to
its success. It does not, however, identify every factor that contributed to the program;
therefore, it is not a comprehensive overview of the program from the perspective of all
stakeholders. For example, the research does not include feedback from users in Iraq and
Afghanistan, and it draws on visits and interviews with only two of the five MRAP
manufacturers. In addition, this research does not provide the perspective of the
program’s largest customer, the U.S. Army.2 Finally, considering the unique nature and
large scale of this program, this report does not provide a comprehensive view of all rapid
defense acquisitions.3

2 Numerous unsuccessful attempts were made to interview MRAP program representatives at the U.S.
Army Tank-Automotive and Armament Command (TACOM).
3 The majority of acquisition programs considered rapid are much smaller in scale [Acquisition
Category (ACAT) II—IV] and do not have the same political or senior DoD level emphasis.
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 II. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW

In many ways, September 11, 2001, marks a transition point for the United States
military. This infamous day not only ushered in a new era of conflict against terrorist
organizations, but it also began a continuous process of transformation within the military
Services, particularly the Army and the Marine Corps. Instead of facing a clearly
recognizable enemy on a well-defined battlefield, the U.S. now fights a patient enemy
who waits for battle on its own terms. This enemy is constantly studying tactics,
techniques, and procedures to exploit weaknesses and avoid situations in which the U.S.
has a technological or military advantage. This has forced a continuous process of
adaptation in response to this ever-changing enemy. The new emphasis on
counterinsurgency warfare, as documented in the recently published Army Field Manual,
FM 3-24 (Counterinsurgency), clearly demonstrates this shift in how the U.S. Army
fights.

The evolving battlefield brought more than just a change in warfighting doctrine;
it also demanded changes in the hardware the U.S. military has used for decades. Simply
looking at readily available photos of currently deployed forces compared to those from
early in the conflict reveals the changes. The Army now wears a new uniform, body
armor, helmet, and other individual gear and employs heavily armored vehicles, robots,
and jamming devices. With an all-volunteer military, force protection is arguably more
important now than in previous wars. As such, much of the new equipment is for added
Soldier survivability. The single, most important stimulus in these hardware upgrades is
the current enemy’s weapon of choice and greatest killer: the improvised explosive
device or IED. Accounting for roughly half the U.S. casualties in Iraq and about a third
of those in Afghanistan, the IED created the need for the MRAP vehicle. Given the
rapidly evolving battlefield and materiel requirements, speed in defense acquisition is
arguably more important now than at any time since World War II.

With this emphasis on speed in defense acquisitions in response to warfighter

needs, significant research effort has been dedicated to rapid acquisitions in recent years.

5
This chapter reviews the outcomes of that research, the regulatory framework regarding
rapid acquisitions, and presents a summary of the key factors that apply to the MRAP
program.

A. GENERAL

MRAPs are a family of vehicles produced by a variety of domestic and

international companies that generally incorporate a V-shaped hull and armor plating
designed to provide protection against mines and IEDs. The DoD is procuring three
types of MRAPs: Category I (CAT I) vehicles, weighing about 7 tons and capable of
carrying 6 passengers; CAT II vehicles, weighing about 19 tons and capable of carrying
10 passengers; and CAT III vehicles, intended to be used primarily to clear mines and
IEDs, weighing about 22.5 tons and capable of carrying up to 12 passengers. The Army
and Marine Corps first employed MRAPs in limited numbers in Iraq and Afghanistan in
2003—primarily for route clearance and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operations.
These route clearance MRAPs quickly gained a reputation for providing superior
protection for their crews, and critics suggested that MRAPs might be a better alternative
for transporting troops in combat than up-armored HMMWVs (Feickert, 2007, p. 1).

B. MRAP OVERVIEW

1. History

MRAP technology is not new. It was developed in South Africa in the early
1960s to mid-1970s for the armed forces of various South African nations in combating
the same type of IED threat that U.S. forces face today (Walsh, 2008a, August 6).
Engineers of that era concluded that mine blasts could be directed out and away from a
vehicle by elevating the chassis and creating a V-shaped hull along its base. Variants
based on this original MRAP technology have been in production outside the United
States since that time by subsidiaries of General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS) and
BAE Systems. The United Nations has relied upon these vehicles for mine and route
clearing operations in southern Africa and Eastern Europe.

6
 As a result of combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq [Operations Enduring
Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF)], warfighters identified a need for a series of
vehicles designed to survive the catastrophic threats posed by the Improvised Explosive
Device (IED), as well as from conventional mine and ambush tactics. These vehicles
were collectively described as MRAP capable and would be specifically built to defeat
these threats.

The MRAP vehicle’s success at protecting its passengers was widely known prior
to the 1990s but only recently recognized by the United States DoD. The DoD first
tested the MRAP in FY 2000. Following testing, the Army purchased an additional 10
vehicles for contingency purposes that were subsequently used in the Global War on
Terror, primarily by EOD teams. These vehicles were the Joint Explosive Ordnance
Disposal Rapid Response Vehicle (JERRV) and the Buffalo, both manufactured by Force
Protection Industries, Incorporated (FPII) (Inspector General, 2007, pp. 4-7). Given the
success of these vehicles against IEDs, the DoD quickly recognized them as an effective
materiel solution.

Warfighters initially requested MRAPs as early as 2003. However, due to time,

budgetary considerations, and the general optimism and belief in a short conflict in Iraq,
senior defense officials focused their efforts on up-armored HMMWVs and other anti-
IED efforts such as bolt-on armor kits. As the conflict progressed and the enemy shifted
tactics from road-side bombs to buried, under-body attacks, it became apparent that up-
armored HMMWVs did not provide the necessary level of protection (Hansen, 2008,
June 10). MRAP requests increased, and in late 2006, the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council (JROC) validated a requirement for 1,185 vehicles. The first request for
proposal (RFP) for the MRAP was released November 9, 2006, and the JPO was
subsequently established December 6, 2006 (Mann, 2008, Slide 4). Given the Marine
Corps’ lead in the program, the JPO was established within Marine Corps Systems
Command (MARCORSYSCOM), and Mr. Paul Mann was transferred from Naval Sea
Systems Command to serve as the PM. Although initially an Acquisition Category
(ACAT) III program, it received high level attention from the start with the Assistant

7
Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition (ASNRD&A), Dr.
Dolores Etter, serving as the program’s first Milestone Decision Authority (MDA)
(Owen, 2008, p. 5).

2. Capabilities and Characteristics

The generic MRAP is a diesel (JP-8)4 powered, 3-5 ton capacity, four-wheel-
drive vehicle with a V-shaped hull and heavy armor encapsulating the crew and
passenger compartments. It is approximately 19 feet long, 9 feet wide, and 8.6 feet tall
and is equipped with an automatic transmission. In addition to the driver and vehicle
commander, the vehicle has seating for four to eight passengers, depending on the
variant. The vehicle is equipped with driver and commander doors, a rear door or ramp
for the passenger compartment, and a single vehicle accessibility hatch on the roof.
Some variants also have a gunner’s turret placed close to the front of the vehicle.

MRAPs are equipped with heating and air conditioning units; they are Nuclear,
Biological and Chemical (NBC) over-pressure and filter protected, and are equipped with
a winch capable of recovering an identical vehicle. The minimum hard-bottom fording
depth is 36 inches, and the vehicle is capable of both on- and off-road travel. It is
equipped with run-flat tires that are monitored by a central tire inflation system. All
variants are transportable by the C-17 Starlifter and the C-5 Galaxy transport aircraft.
The armor package on the MRAP provides all-around coverage, while the glass is multi-
strike resistant. These characteristics protect the crew from blast, shock, fragments, and
the acceleration effects of mine blasts (MRAP JPO, 2006). The V-shaped hull is
specifically designed to redirect the blast out and away from the vehicle’s passenger area.
While the vehicle may be disabled by the explosion, the intent is to keep the passengers
alive and, ideally, allow vehicle recovery and repair.

The figures below depict how the most widely produced MRAP, the International
Military and Government, LLC (IMG) MaxxPro, compares in size to both the Joint Light
Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) currently in development and to the HMMWV. These figures

4 JP-8 is a kerosene-based fuel common to a variety of U.S. military vehicles to include aircraft,
trucks, and armored vehicles.
8
show that the increased survivability is gained at the expense of a significant increase in
size and weight, as well as a corresponding reduction in maneuverability.

MRAP JLTV HMMWV

Figure 1. MRAP Compared to the JLTV and the HMMWV

(From Hansen, 2008, June 4, Slides 13-14)

3. Need

In February 2005, Marine Corps Brigadier General Dennis Hejlik, Deputy

Commander of 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, submitted an urgent need request. The
six-page document stated, “There is a need for the MRAP vehicle capability to increase
survivability and mobility of Marines operating in a hazardous fire area against known
9
threats. The ‘expanded use’ of roadside bombs, rocket propelled grenades, and small
arms fire in Al Anbar province requires a more robust family of vehicles” (Sherman &
Castelli, 2007). His request went unfilled for four months, and the issue surfaced again in
a June 10, 2005, status report indicating that the Marine Corps was holding out for a
“future vehicle,” presumably the JLTV—more mobile than the MRAP, but more
protective than the HMMWV. This vehicle was not expected to be available, however,
until 2012 (Eisler, Moorison, & Vanden Brook, 2007).

In May and July 2006, the Multi-National Forces West (MNF-W) Commander in
Iraq submitted urgent universal need statement (UUNS) requests for 185 and then an
additional 1,000 vehicles. Those requests were combined and designated as a Joint
Urgent Operational Needs Statement (JUONS) by the Central Command (CENTCOM)
commander in October 2006. After the JROC validated that initial request,
MARCORSYSCOM released the initial RFP on November 9, and the MRAP JPO was
established within MARCORSYSCOM shortly thereafter on December 6. To illustrate
the early uncertainty in the program, the initial 1,185 requirement grew to 15,374
vehicles by September 2007 (Mann, 2008, slide 3). By March 2007, the Marine Corps
Commandant, James Conway, called the vehicle his “Number 1 unfulfilled warfighting
requirement” (Eisler, Moorison, & Vanden Brook, 2007). In May 2007, the Secretary of
Defense, Mr. Robert Gates, made MRAP the top DoD acquisition priority. In addition,
Secretary Gates assigned the program a DX rating (priority rating reserved for the top
acquisition programs) in June 2007, and by September of that year, the program was
designated an ACAT 1D Program, placing oversight in the hands of the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) (Miles, 2007).

4. Manufacturers

The source selection process resulted in the procurement of MRAP vehicles from
five different manufacturers: BAE Systems (BAE); Armor Holdings (AH) (now owned
by BAE Systems); General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS); Force Protection
Industries, Inc. (FPII); and Navistar’s International Military and Government, LLC
subsidiary (IMG) (now called Navistar Defense). Although limited commonality exists

10
in engines, transmissions, tires, and axles, it was not a major concern in the source
selection decision, demonstrating the program emphasis on procuring vehicles quickly
from multiple manufacturers at the expense of long-term sustainability and lifecycle
costs.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

1. The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS)

The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), which is

normally a methodical and sequential process, provides the framework under which all
joint, top-driven acquisition programs are conducted. The MRAP program, although
rapid and unique in nature, was conducted within this framework, albeit in a highly
tailored manner. This section provides an overview of the JCIDS process as it is relevant
to the MRAP program.

JCIDS is the most current procedure used by the DoD to articulate warfighter
needs and establish a basis for future defense acquisition programs. The JCIDS replaced
what was formerly known as the Requirements Generation System (RGS) and, with that,
the costly redundancies that each Service required within its own Service-specific stove-
pipe. The purpose of JCIDS is to provide the guidelines for generating required
capabilities and identifying joint needs. This top-down approach to decision-making
determines if a required capability exists, then assigns a resource sponsor within the DoD
for acquisition (Jones & McCaffery, 2008, pp. 569-570).

Three key processes within the DoD must work hand-in-hand to ensure that
warfighter needs are met. As illustrated in Figure 2, they are the requirements process
(JCIDS), the acquisition process, and the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and
Execution System (PPBES). To provide systems that meet the needed capabilities, these
three processes must be synchronized to support decision-making (Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, 2007, p. 2). This synchronization is complicated by the differing nature
of the three processes. While PPBES is calendar-driven, the JCIDS and acquisitions
processes are event-driven. In the case of an immediate need, the JCIDS process can
11
quickly validate a capability gap and identify a suitable materiel solution. Constrained by
the calendar-driven PPBES process, however, the acquisition process may be unable to
make the procurement until the next budget cycle is complete. This process can take up
to two years, depending on what time of year the need is identified. Because of this time
lapse, JCIDS is unresponsive to immediate needs unless funds are made available
through non-standard means such as reprogramming actions or emergency supplemental
appropriations.

Figure 2. Major Decision Support Systems

(From Nalwasky, 2007, Slide 5)

The JCIDS process was developed not only to identify joint warfighting
requirements but also to prioritize them. While the central objective of JCIDS is to attend
to the shortfalls of joint operations as defined by combatant commanders, the primary
objective is to ensure that warfighters receive what is needed to accomplish the mission.
The decision authority for the capabilities requirements is the JROC, which reviews,
validates, and makes recommendations on acquisition programs based on their categories
and key performance parameters. The JROC prioritizes acquisition programs and
validates capabilities as well as performance criteria for these programs. The JROC
review and validation is a key factor in the milestone decision authority’s decision to
initiate a development program (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007, pp. 2-3).

12
 The first step in initiating the JCIDS process is to conduct a capabilities-based
assessment (CBA) that identifies the capabilities required, performance criteria, and
shortfalls of existing systems to meet those requirements. This process results in a Joint
Capabilities Document (JCD) or Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) that validates the
need to address a capability gap and verifies that affordable and technically feasible
solutions exist to address those requirements. Following validation, the JCD or ICD
becomes the basis for further analysis by the assigned action Service or agency. This
analysis results in a Capabilities Development Document (CDD) that identifies the best
technical approach. CDD approval by the JROC validates the key performance
parameters of the selected approach, assesses the risk with respect to cost, schedule, and
technology maturity, and assesses the affordability of the system based on available
resources. JROC approval of the CDD is one of the key factors involved in the decision
to initiate a program (pp. 2-3).

The JROC’s role during the entire process and in approving the ICD, CDD, and
the Capabilities Production Document (CPD) is to make certain that the system being
developed meets the required capability, does not stray from the original requirement as
defined in the JCD or ICD, and remains affordable. The JCIDS process has been
continually refined since its inception, and the information required at each level is well
scrutinized to ensure that effective and appropriate decisions are made. The following
passage from the executive summary of the JCIDS overview document summarizes the
process’s intent:

The JCIDS process was designed to be a robust process to support the

complex decisions required of the JROC and the acquisition community in
identifying and procuring future capabilities. Recognizing that not all
capabilities/weapon systems require the same level of consideration, the
JCIDS process is tailorable. The JROC has identified several alternative
paths to allow accelerated identification of capability gaps and potential
solutions, and to allow them to enter into the JCIDS process at the
appropriate stage to deliver those capabilities more rapidly. (Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007, p. 3)

As this project will demonstrate, the flexibility offered by this tailorable approach
was a key factor in the rapid execution of the MRAP program. The synchronization

13
required between the JCIDS, acquisition, and PPBES processes demonstrate that a large-
scale, rapid acquisition program will likely require a non-standard source of funding to
enable truly rapid procurement.

2. Rapid Acquisition Processes

Although obvious in its utility, the ability to rapidly react to changing battlefield
needs is not inherent in the acquisition system. This deliberate and methodical process
can take years and even decades to progress from need identification to fielding of a new
system. In recognition of this, the overarching DoD acquisition directive (DoD Directive
5000.1) states the following:

There is no one best way to structure an acquisition program to

accomplish the objective of the Defense Acquisition System. MDAs and
PMs shall tailor program strategies and oversight, including
documentation of program information, acquisition phases, the timing and
scope of decision reviews, and decision levels, to fit the particular
conditions of that program, consistent with applicable laws and regulations
and the time-sensitivity of the capability need. (Under Secretary of
Defense, 2003a, p. 3)

As a result of this directive and of prior efforts to streamline the acquisition

process, each of the Services and Special Operations Command (SOCOM) have
developed procedures to rapidly place needed capabilities into warfighters’ hands.

In his 2006 thesis, Michael W. Middleton describes these Service rapid

acquisition processes, providing overviews of the Marine Corps Urgent Universal Needs
Statement (UUNS), the Navy Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC), the Army Rapid
Equipping Force (REF), the Air Force Rapid Response Process (RRP), and the SOCOM
Combat Mission Needs Statement (C-MNS). Although different in execution, they are
similar in their efforts to meet urgent warfighter needs. Middleton states:

Many of the Service rapid acquisition systems are limited to existing

Service budgets and affect only that Service’s materiel portfolio. These
Service initiatives allow increased flexibility and are managed by existing
acquisition staffs that are implementing existing Service acquisition

14
 strategies. The Services also manage the long-term rapid acquisition of the
materiel and may incorporate it more fully where feedback dictates. (2006,
pp. 11-12)

In addition, these procedures apply only to ACAT II, III, and IV programs, thereby
limiting the program scope to $140 million for research and development and $660
million for procurement (in FY2000 dollars) (Under Secretary of Defense, 2003b, p. 21).

To further demonstrate the emphasis on rapid acquisitions in support of urgent

operational needs, the Deputy Commanding General, U.S. Army Research, Development,
and Engineering Command (RDECOM), COL(P) Peter N. Fuller summarized five
distinct processes in the Army alone that provide robust capabilities to warfighters. The
JUONS, validated through the Joint Staff, applies to requirements that support more than
one Service. The ONS is similar to the JUONS but for requirements unique to the Army.
The Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) provides solutions to mitigate IED threats,
typically in response to JUONS requirements. The JCIDS system, referred to as the PM
Informal process, attempts to adjust system performance requirements in existing
acquisition programs based on direct contact between field commanders and PMs. This
direct warfighter-to-PM coordination takes advantage of existing development work and
in effect starts the program before formal approval. The final process, the Rapid
Equipping Force (REF), involves forward-deployed teams evaluating needs and rapidly
fielding solutions to those needs, largely through commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) items.
The existence of these overlapping and mutually supporting processes demonstrates the
need for and emphasis on rapid acquisitions, but it sustains inefficiencies in addressing
evolving changes in requirements precipitated by rapidly changing threats. As Fuller
points out, however, these processes nevertheless incorporate considerable innovation
and flexibility to speed acquisitions when compared to the conventional JCIDS process
(2008).

3. Regulatory Framework Governing Rapid Acquisitions

Legislative authority for rapid acquisition comes from two primary sources:
Section 806 of the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal

15
Year 2003 (U.S. Congress, 2002) and Section 811 of the Ronald Reagan National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (U.S. Congress, 2004). A thorough
knowledge of both is essential in understanding the legal limitations on a rapid
acquisition program.

The first piece of legislation, Section 806 of the Bob Stump NDAA required that
the Secretary of Defense establish a process for rapid acquisition and deployment of
items that: 1) are currently available or under development, and 2) are urgently needed to
react to an enemy threat or to respond to significant and urgent safety situations. The law
further requires establishment of procedures to streamline communication of warfighter
needs, procedures for demonstrating, rapidly acquiring, and deploying capabilities that
meet these needs, and procedures for adequately testing these items and incorporating test
results into decision-making. The law limits the scope of this authority by limiting the
quantity of items procured using these procedures to the number established for low-rate
initial production (LRIP) for the system (U.S. Congress, 2002). This definition is
somewhat vague in its meaning, however; the LRIP quantity can differ by system type
and the MDA holds significant latitude in determining the LRIP quantity (Under
Secretary of Defense, 2003b, p. 13).

Section 811 of the Ronald Reagan NDAA provides additional authority with
respect to rapid acquisition by directing the Secretary of Defense to appoint a senior
official within the DoD to oversee the acquisition of equipment to eliminate a combat
capability deficiency that has resulted in combat fatalities. This official is authorized to
waive any provision of law, policy, directive, or regulation concerning the establishment
of need; the requirement for research, development, testing, and evaluation; and the
source selection and contract award for procuring the equipment. The official’s
responsibility is to facilitate rapid acquisition and deployment of the needed equipment,
with a goal of 15 days for awarding the acquisition contract. Again, this law seeks to
limit this authority—this time by establishing a maximum of $100 million as the
aggregate limit for an item during a fiscal year (U.S. Congress, 2004).

16
 4. The Warfighter Rapid Acquisition Process (WRAP)

The Warfighter Rapid Acquisition Process (WRAP) is an Army program that

predates the OEF and OIF-inspired initiatives such as the ONS and JUONS. The WRAP
was “directed at accelerating procurement of systems identified through TRADOC5
warfighting experiments as compelling successes which satisfy an urgent need”
(Department of the Army, 1997, Paragraph 5-5). Where current processes focus on
eliminating capability gaps for warfighters in an operational environment, the WRAP,
formalized by Army Regulation in 1997, was a peacetime process designed to streamline
the acquisition process for the most promising systems under development.
Consequently, the benchmark for a rapid acquisition process was much slower than is
acceptable in the current environment. Many of the lessons learned from this program
still apply, however, and are relevant to current rapid acquisition processes.

The Bradley Stinger Fighting Vehicle—Enhanced (BSFV-E, now known as the

Bradley Linebacker) was the first program managed under the WRAP. This program,
which filled an urgent air defense capability need for the Army, was an ACAT IV
program costing $20.1 million. It was also a non-developmental program that focused on
modifying GFE components such as the Bradley Fighting Vehicle and Stinger air defense
missile standard vehicle-mounted launcher (SVML). In essence, a Stinger missile
launcher replaced the TOW (tube launched optically tracked wire guided) missile
launcher on an M2A2 Bradley turret. This, along with added targeting and fire control
capabilities, were the only requirements for the system integration (Jones, 1996, pp. 33-
34).

In his 1996 Master’s Thesis, Walter Jones conducted a case study on the WRAP
process based on the experience of the BSFV-E. Although relatively simple in terms of
the development effort, this program provides key lessons for a successful rapid
acquisition. First and foremost, it demonstrated the importance of funding. Although
this seems an obvious point, the program was approved for the WRAP program, but the
Army did not budget money toward the effort. This program only succeeded because the

5 TRADOC is the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command.

17
Program Executive Officer for Tactical missiles personally sponsored the program,
funding it from within his own organization (pp. 55-60). As Jones pointed out, the PPBS
(since renamed the PPBES for Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution
System) is not structured to rapidly fund WRAP programs (p. 57). This indicates that for
rapid acquisition programs to be successful, they must acquire funding from a non-
standard source such as reprogrammed funds or supplemental appropriations.

Jones also determined that the WRAP process cannot be applied to every
acquisition program. In summary, he concluded that the WRAP process can be
successfully applied to programs with five specific characteristics. First, a working
solution must exist that meets an urgent Army need using mature technology or a non-
developmental item such as a COTS solution. Second, the program must be small in size
and potentially allow for reprogramming of funds. Third, the materiel solution must be
supported by strong advocates from both the user and developer communities. Fourth,
the program must utilize fixed-type price contracts and contract incentives associated
with key program or milestone events to spur contractors forward. Finally, the program
must be low production quantity or exercise the use of exercisable contract options as a
means of building upon success (pp. 71-72).

5. A Recent Case Study on an Accelerated Acquisition

In their 2005 MBA Professional Report, James Conatser and Vincent Grizio
detailed the accelerated acquisition and deployment of the Force XXI Battle Command
Brigade and Below—Blue Force Tracking (FBCB2-BFT) system in support of
Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom. In simplified terms, this system provides an
integrated, digital command and control capability across all battlefield functional areas
and from the squad/platform to the brigade/regimental level (p. 9).

This program provides a different scenario for rapid acquisition in which the need
was previously identified, a requirements document was already approved, and the
system was progressing through the development process. In this case, the combination
of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, along with capability demonstrated in limited user
tests and advanced warfighting experiments, effectively made the capability an urgent
18
operational need. Rather than use the approved LRIP run to conduct the Initial
Operational Test & Evaluation (IOT&E), the Army instead chose to immediately field
more than 1,000 systems to deployed and deploying units.

Conatser and Grizio (2005) determined that the success of this accelerated effort
relied on four program characteristics. First, this program had a relatively mature
technical solution to fill a capability gap. Second, user representatives were willing to
accept a useful solution in the short term while the program management office continued
to develop the system to its desired end state. Third, the effort had the support of senior
military leadership at the Service Chief, Combatant Commander, and MDA level.
Finally, the program had a sufficient funding stream in both the short and long term.
Although this program was at a point in development that facilitated its transition to rapid
deployment, Conatser and Grizio (2005) feel that these four criteria apply to any rapid
acquisition effort in support of contingency operations (pp. 49-50).

6. The Value of the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC)

Based on legislative guidance and the Service-specific limits of the Service rapid
acquisition processes, the Office of the Secretary of Defense moved to establish an
overarching process to meet Immediate Warfighter Needs (IWNs) of a joint nature.
IWNs are Joint Urgent Operational Needs that require resolution and fielding in 120 days
or less. As described by Middleton, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz
directed the formation of the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC) in September 2004 and
subsequently moved to formalize the procedures that the group would follow. This
process culminated on July 15, 2005, with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Instruction 3470.01 (CJCSI 3470.01) (Middleton, 2006, pp. 13-19). This instruction
“establishes policy and procedures to facilitate assessment, validation, sourcing,
resourcing, and fielding of operationally driven urgent, execution-year combatant
commander needs” (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2005, p. 1). It also describes
the role of all stakeholders, with emphasis on the JRAC, which is responsible for

19
resolving combatant commander validated IWNs and for providing a single point of
contact and accountability on the OSD staff for tracking the timeliness of actions (pp. 1-
4).

The JRAC process applies only to joint needs that are outside the scope of
existing DoD 5000 Series and previously discussed Service processes. It is intended to
complement, rather than replace or compete with, any existing Service or joint process.
As with the others, the JRAC process has limits and can only be used to field ACAT II,
III, or IV programs (p. 2).

Middleton (2006) conducted a thorough review of the JRAC process by providing

its detailed history, a breakdown of the cell members, and a recent case example in which
the process was used to meet a JUONS. He analyzed the process from the perspective of
10 value centers. His analysis determined the JRAC process is value added in several
areas. First, it holds powerful budgetary options and an ability to access all colors of
money.6 Second, the process is handled directly by senior level officials, thereby
eliminating several layers of bureaucracy. Third, the process provides portfolio balance
that reduces Service overlap. Fourth, it provides an acquisition strategy that aligns
closely with overarching DoD strategies such as JCIDS and COTS procurement. Fifth, it
provides impartiality since funding follows the solution. Sixth, the process provides
focus based on the JRAC’s involvement only with rapid acquisitions. Finally, the
process acknowledges the evolving nature of war as it shows the DoD can adapt quickly
and provide needed capabilities rapidly. He found the process non-value added in terms
of lifecycle costs given the lack of analysis on long-term maintenance, training and
resourcing, and based on the lack of a mechanism to incorporate feedback from the
warfighter. In terms of acquisition speed, he found the process value added in that it
establishes deadlines for immediate warfighter need validation and solution but is non-
value added in that it sets no limit or goal for fielding nor any penalty for not meeting
limits or goals (Middleton, 2006, pp. 57-59).

6 “Color of Money” is a term commonly used within DoD to identify appropriations by type (e.g.,
Operations and Maintenance, Procurement, RDT&E, Military Personnel Expenses, and Military
Construction). Once Congress appropriates funds into these separate accounts, money cannot be
transferred between accounts without being re-appropriated (Jones & McAffery, 2008, pp. 350-351).
20
D. SUMMARY

Based on the research assessed, several trends are evident in successful rapid
acquisition programs, both prior to and since the start of the Global War on Terror. First,
this research indicates that a materiel solution must be present as a COTS or non-
developmental item to allow rapid procurement. Second, the solution must be accepted
by both the senior leadership within the DoD and by the user community. Finally, the
program must have a reliable funding stream. All of these have been critical to the
MRAP’s success.

This research also reveals another issue of even more significance to the MRAP
program: the limits placed on all current rapid acquisition processes by law and DoD
acquisition regulations and instructions. As all processes are limited to ACAT II and
lesser programs, the ACAT I level MRAP program was forced to progress under the
standard Acquisition Management and JCIDS framework, albeit in a highly tailored
manner and with rare, non-standard Congressional funding actions. As we will
demonstrate, however, the principles behind existing rapid acquisition processes can be
successfully applied to ACAT I level programs, provided the need is urgent.

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 III. PROGRAM MANAGEMENT AND CONTRACTING
STRATEGY

A. EARLY PROGRAM HISTORY

On October 26, 2006, CENTCOM combined two separate Urgent Universal

Needs Statements (UUNS) for 185 and 1000 vehicles, respectively, into a single Joint
Universal Operational Needs Statement (JUONS) for 1185 MRAPs. Two weeks later, on
November 9, MARCORSYSCOM released the first RFP to industry and on December 6,
2006, officially established the MRAP JPO. Ten manufacturers responded to the
proposal and submitted bids. Nine of those manufacturers were subsequently awarded
IDIQ7 contracts on January 26, 2007 with immediate production orders for a minimum
number of prototype vehicles for testing. Of the nine awarded contracts, two failed to
meet contract requirements and were removed from the program prior to testing. The
initial test phase started for at least one manufacturer in February 2007 and continued
through that April for other manufacturers. This initial testing, conducted at Aberdeen
Proving Ground, MD, focused heavily on threshold survivability requirements and
eliminated two more manufacturers due to failure in meeting minimum survivability or
usability requirements. The early decision to use multiple manufacturers proved sound
because the increasing requirement outpaced the industrial capacity of any one

7 Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ): The indefinite-delivery contract may be used to
acquire supplies and/or Services when the exact times and/or exact quantities of future deliveries are not
known at the time of contract award. The IDIQ contract offers the following advantages:
Flexibility in both quantities and delivery scheduling
Ordering of supplies or Services after requirements materialize
Indefinite-quantity contracts limit the Government’s obligation to the minimum quantity specified in
the contract
Requirements contracts may permit faster deliveries when production lead time is involved, because
contractors are usually willing to maintain limited stocks when the Government will obtain all of its actual
purchase requirements from the contractor
Indefinite-delivery contracts may provide for any appropriate cost or pricing arrangement. Cost or
pricing arrangements that provide for an estimated quantity of supplies or Services (e.g., estimated number
of labor hours) must comply with the appropriate procedures (FAR, 2008, p. 396). All MRAP IDIQ
contracts were firm fixed price (FFP) contracts.

23
manufacturer to produce that many vehicles. By May 2007 the requirement grew to
7,774 vehicles; by September of that year the requirement increased again to 15,374.

1. Need Identification

In the months following the March 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, the military
transitioned into an occupying force responsible for establishing security and assisting in
government reconstruction and nation-building efforts. Shortly thereafter, insurgents
turned to the improvised explosive device (IED) as their weapon of choice against U.S.
and coalition forces. IEDs were cheap, unsophisticated, plentiful, easy to employ, and
often produced devastating and catastrophic results. By 2005, IED related casualties
were the number one killer in Iraq, prompting DoD to find a solution.

In 2006, consensus began to form within the Marine Corps and CENTCOM that
MRAPs were needed in response to the IED threat. On May 21, 2006, the MNF-W
Commander in Iraq submitted an urgent universal need request for 185 MRAP vehicles
and followed with another request for 1,000 additional vehicles on July 10, 2006.
Designation of these requests as a JUONS by the CENTCOM commander on October 26,
2006, clearly established the warfighters’ need and effectively started the MRAP
program.

The perceived reluctance within the DoD to accept the MRAP as a materiel
solution to the IED threat is one of the most controversial and criticized aspects of the
MRAP program. Such criticisms, however, overlook the escalating actions the DoD took
from 2004 through 2006 in response to the numerous escalating threats. Lieutenant
General (Retired) Joseph L. Yakovac, Jr., the former Military Deputy to the Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology, points out that the
DoD undertook numerous initiatives early-on to include fragmentation kits, up-armored
HMMWVs, bar armor, and the JIEDDO in response to the range of threats. In addition,
no consensus existed within the user community, and particularly within the Army, on
how to best address the IED threat (personal communication, October 1, 2008).

24
Regardless, the purpose of this research is not to analyze the acquisition process before,
but rather to examine the process after the need was validated and the MRAP program
was established.

2. Requirement validation

The JUONS designation led to program start-up and release of the first RFP on
November 9, 2006, followed shortly thereafter by official establishment of the JPO in
December 2006. Figure 3, below, shows the chronology of the requirements validation
from the initial 1,185 to the final total of 15,374 vehicles in September 2007. This
demonstrates the explosive growth and initial uncertainty as the program transitioned
from an ACAT III program to an ACAT ID program and one of the largest in the DoD.

Figure 3. Chronology of Requirement Validation

(From Mann, 2008, Slide 3)

25
 On May 2, 2007, the JROC, chaired by Admiral Edmund Giambastiani, the Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, approved an MRAP Capability Production
Document (CPD), formally setting the size of the required MRAP fleet at 7,774 vehicles.
This approval, which precedes procurement actions for standard programs, came less
than two months after the military Services detailed their collective need for MRAP
vehicles, an extraordinarily rapid pace in formalizing a new need for a large weapon
system program (Sherman, 2007, May 17). Even more extraordinary, however, was that
at this point in the MRAP program, testing was underway for seven competing
manufacturers and production contracts had already been awarded to five companies.

B. PROGRAM STRATEGY

1. Acquisition Strategy

The acquisition strategy was formed in support of three primary program

objectives: first, field survivable, mission capable vehicles; second, field them as rapidly
as possible; and third, grow the industrial base while simultaneously managing all aspects
of the acquisition process. The PM considered all other factors trade-able in support of
those objectives. The JPO planned to achieve this through parallel execution of as many
elements of the acquisition framework as feasibly possible. Given the nature of the
requirement and the dire need for a survivable system, the decision was made not to
restrict innovation by demanding a single COTS solution, but to solicit industry and see
what different solutions an expanded industrial base could provide (Hansen, 2008, May
30). To incentivize multiple vendors, the strategy included use of multiple IDIQ
contracts followed by phased, rapid testing focused on threshold requirements. This
phased testing served as a form of source selection that led to rapid award of multiple
production orders. The use of multiple manufacturers required an intensive contractor
management effort and centralized integration process. Finally, the rapid fielding
without sustainment systems in place required a contractor logistics support (CLS)
approach (Owen, 2008, pp. 6-8).

26
 If a vendor chose to develop a new design, the JPO stipulated that it had to be
produced within 60 days of contract award. One manufacturer, IMG, did design and
produce a new and different testable prototype within the 60-day window. The remainder
of the manufacturers chose a modern adaptation of a mature, COTS, 30-year-old materiel
solution, based on the BAE RG-31.

2. Tailored Acquisition Approach

By January 31, 2007, the MRAP program had grown into an ACAT II program, a
designation that would keep the procurement under the Navy’s purview. However, by
February 8, then-Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
(USDAT&L), Kenneth Krieg, recognized the scope of the MRAP program would grow
significantly. Accordingly, he directed the Navy acquisition executive who was
overseeing the MRAP program, Dr. Delores Etter, to plan for MRAP transition to ACAT
ID status (Sherman, 2007, March 15). ACAT-ID designations are reserved for programs
with procurement costs greater than $2.19 billion (FY 2000 constant dollars), and are
overseen by the OSD (Under Secretary of Defense, 2003b, p. 21). Dr. Etter said she
approved a “tailored plan” for the MRAP program documentation and added that “the
MRAP office is making progress to get all program documentation in place to support a
joint acquisition by the Army and Marine Corps” (Sherman, 2007, March 15). The
tailored plan granted leeway to the MRAP program, allowing simultaneous execution of
all facets of the DoD acquisition framework.

Despite the MRAP program’s tailored approach, it was not granted waivers for
any of the normal DoD acquisition documentation or required processes. DoD
acquisitions are characterized by slow, deliberate and well-documented processes
intended to ensure a thorough and complete system design. In many ways, the MRAP
program was no different, despite its rapid execution. As an example, all programs
require a Technology Readiness Assessment (TRA) prior to the Milestone C decision to
verify that a system is technologically mature and ready for fielding. Due to the rapid
nature of the MRAP program and its use of vehicles considered COTS, the JPO did not
complete a technology readiness assessment and requested a waiver of this requirement.

27
For rationale, the JPO argued that MRAP was a mature design based on 30-year-old
technology—it is basically an armored truck. The MDA and OSD staff declined the
waiver, requiring the JPO to petition the Office of Naval Research for a TRA on a system
that was already fielded and proven in use in Iraq and Afghanistan (Hansen, 2008, May
30).

C. PROGRAM EXECUTION

The JPO implemented its acquisition strategy through a tailored approach to the
acquisition framework. It began by leveraging FPII’s existing, active production line
with a sole-source contract for immediate production. This started production on a
proven vehicle design and expanded the industrial base by ramping up a production
facility. Next, a RFP was released to industry in an attempt to get as many respondents
as possible, with the intent of leveraging their combined production capabilities as
quickly as possible. Upon receiving bids from ten manufacturers, the JPO performed a
technical review and assigned risk to the various manufacturers and their designs. IDIQ
contracts were subsequently awarded to nine companies with immediate production
orders for test vehicles.8 In addition, the JPO awarded larger production orders under
LRIPs9 1 and 2 in February 2007 to the five manufacturers considered low-risk. These
orders, placed prior to testing, represent deliberate risk acceptance by the PM in an effort
to initiate production on vehicles considered likely to meet minimum requirements. The
high risk manufacturers, on the other hand, did not receive LRIP contracts until they

8 The initial production orders called for two prototypes per vehicle category (CAT I and II only) per
manufacturers. (9 manufacturers x 2 prototypes x 2 categories = 36 vehicles in the initial production
orders.)
9 As defined by AR 70-1, LRIP (Low rate initial production) is:

1. The first effort of the Production and Deployment (P&D) phase. The purpose of this effort is to
establish an initial production base for the system, permit an orderly ramp-up sufficient to lead to a smooth
transition to full rate production (FRP), and to provide production representative articles for Initial
Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) and full-up live fire testing. This effort concludes with a Full
Rate Production Decision Review (FRPDR) to authorize Full Rate Production and Deployment (FRP&D).
2. The minimum number of systems (other than ships and satellites) to provide production
representative articles for Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E), to establish an initial production base
and to permit an orderly increase in the production rate sufficient to lead to full rate production (FRP) upon
successful completion of operational testing (OT). For major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs), LRIP
quantities in excess of 10 percent of the acquisition objective must be reported in the Selected Acquisition
Report (SAR) (Department of the Army, 2003, p.82).
28
 successfully passed the threshold requirements of the initial test phase. Testing included
survivability, automotive, safety, and user tests; results were subsequently used in part as
source selection criteria. The manufacturers that successfully passed threshold
requirements for the first test phase (DT-C1) were awarded production orders under a
series of LRIP contracts. Figure 4 shows a comparison of the tailored MRAP acquisition
approach with the traditional acquisition framework.

MRAP Acquisition Strategy

Traditional Acquisition
Framework

RFP Sole Source contract

award Solicitation

Proposal Evaluation
Proposal Evaluation

IDIQ
Source Selection

Low risk High risk Award Contract

LRIP 1 & 2 Developmental / User

Testing

Developmental LRIP
and user tests

FRP
LRIP contract

Additional Testing

Figure 4. Comparison of MRAP Acquisition Strategy and a Traditional Acquisition

Framework

On May 2, 2007, Secretary of Defense Gates designated the MRAP as the number
one DoD procurement priority (Young, Greenwalt, & Hoover, 2007, p. 2). This
effectively made MRAP the widely accepted materiel solution at a time when the
warfighter and user communities were not yet in consensus on a single solution, let alone
the MRAP. In a sense, the top-driven emphasis placed the requirements generation
process in the hands of the acquisition community, rather than users. This represents a
trade-off in that not all users got the solution they wanted. In addition, warfighters did
not necessarily get the best overall solution because of this lack of defined requirement.
29
As the Joint Program Manager Paul Mann stated, the MRAP program was, “a program of
adequacy. Adequacy in this sense is good” (personal communication, September 8,
2008).

On June 1, 2007, Secretary Gates assigned the MRAP program a “DX” rating
under the Defense Priorities and Allocation System (Young et al., 2007, p. 5). Together,
the prioritization and DX designation gave the MRAP program the highest priority
concerning parts and material suppliers in the government and private sector. Combined
with the early risk acceptance and tailored acquisition approach, Secretary Gates’
emphasis further streamlined the MRAP program and mobilized all resources in its
support. This section of the report focuses on the execution of the program from its start
through the time of this writing, with specific emphasis on the key aspects of the tailored
MRAP acquisition approach.

1. Concurrency

“The early program objective to have significant numbers of MRAP vehicles

fielded by the end of calendar year 2007 forced the program to plan for and manage all
aspects of the process simultaneously rather than sequentially. That included contracting,
testing, integration, transportation to theater and fielding” (Owen, 2008, p.6). Within the
defense acquisition framework, from concept refinement through disposal, each step is
designed to be executed in series. The MRAP program executed all steps in parallel,
making it faster but very difficult to manage. For example, the MRAP program
simultaneously conducted developmental testing, operational testing, production,
integration, fielding, and disposal, while also refining requirements to account for an
increasing Explosively Formed Penetrator (EFP) threat and greater need in the restrictive
terrain of Afghanistan. This complicated management because the JPO could not focus
on any one phase within the acquisition framework at any given time. Additionally,
milestones could not be followed in their normal, sequential manner. Yet all processes
and documentation were still required (Hansen, 2008, June 10).

Typically, ACAT I programs have an Acquisition Program Baseline Agreement

(APBA) approved by the MDA prior to entering the procurement phase; this was not the
30
case for the MRAP program due to its extraordinarily rapid maturation as an ACAT I
program. The APBA that was approved at the lowest level–by Vice Admiral Steve
Stanley, Director, Force Structure, Resources and Assessment for the Joint Staff, who
was not the MDA–was not linked to any requirement. Secretary Young, the USDAT&L,
ultimately approved the program’s APBA on June 16, 2008, but by that time more than
9,000 vehicles had already been produced, with approximately 5,000 more under
contract. At that point, requirements for only 1,595 of the total 15,374 remained unfilled.
Programs revolve around money, and programs cannot plan their budgets or Program
Objective Memorandum (POM) forecast unless they have a valid requirement (Hansen,
2008, June 10). Without the APBA, there is no link to a requirement for which to justify
a budget, yet the MRAP program was able to purchase nearly the full production run
without an approved APBA or full rate production (FRP) decision.

The MRAP program CPD approval provides an additional example. The CPD, a
requirements document needed prior to the Milestone C decision, precedes acquisition
actions such as the FRP decision. Yet, for the MRAP program, testing was underway for
seven manufacturers, with production contracts awarded to five companies for over 2,000
vehicles, before approval of an MRAP CPD. Such “leaning forward” and tailoring of the
acquisition process was common throughout the program.

2. LRIP vs. FRP

Acquisition programs require a FRP decision by the MDA prior to entering into
full production. Until that decision is approved, programs are limited by regulation to
producing no more than 10% of their total acquisition objective. Two requirements for
this decision are the operational test and evaluation reports and live fire test and
evaluation reports. As of May 30, 2008, the MRAP program did not have those reports
and therefore did not have a FRP decision. However, of a production objective of 15,374
vehicles, 14,146 were either already produced or on contract, greatly surpassing the LRIP
restriction of 10% (Hansen, 2008, May 30). The JPO accomplished this through a series
of MDA-approved LRIP purchases, another example of the tailored approach. Despite
moving forward with production without the normally required documentation, the JPO

31
nevertheless committed to producing that documentation for future reference by working
with the appropriate agencies such as the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation
(DOT&E) to produce the required documentation. As the Deputy PM, Dave Hansen
noted, following the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and despite the lack of a long term
sustainment plan for the MRAP, the Services will keep some MRAP vehicles. The FRP
documentation, with live fire and operational test and evaluation data, will give hard,
factual evidence for which vehicles are worth keeping in the inventory (Hansen, 2008,
June 10).

The history of LRIP purchases of MRAP vehicles is as follows:

January 26, 2007 Award of nine competitive IDIQ contracts

February 9, 2007 Milestone C Decision

February 14, 2007 LRIP 1, contract awarded for 215 FPII and BAE vehicles

February 23, 2007 LRIP 2, contract awarded for 180 OTC (Oshkosh Truck
Company), PVI (Protected Vehicles, Inc.) and GDLS
vehicles

April 23, 2007 LRIP 3, contract awarded for 1,000 FPII vehicles

June 19, 2007 LRIP 5, contract awarded for 471 FPII and IMG vehicles

June 28, 2007 LRIP 6, contract awarded for 441 BAE vehicles

July 13, 2007 LRIP 7, contract awarded for 1,925 AH and IMG vehicles

August 10, 2007 LRIP 8, contract awarded for 725 FPII and GDLS vehicles

September 6, 2007 Program designated ACAT 1D

October 18, 2007 LRIP 9, contract awarded for 2,400 FPII, BAE and IMG
vehicles

32
 December 18, 2007 LRIP 10, contract awarded for 3,126 FPII, BAE, BAE-
TVS10, and IMG vehicles

March 14, 2008 LRIP 11, contract awarded for 2,243 FPII, BAE, BAE-
TVS, and IMG vehicles

May 2, 2008 LRIP 11, contract awarded for 40 BAE vehicles

(Mann, 2008, slide 31)
July 17, 2008 LRIP 12, contract awarded for 773 GDLS vehicles
September 4, 2008 LRIP 13, contract awarded for 822 IMG vehicles
(D. Hansen, personal communication, October 14, 2008)

LRIPs 12 and 13 consisted of the relatively small GDLS RG-31 Mk5e and the
smaller, lighter, more maneuverable version of the IMG MaxxPro vehicle known as the
MaxxPro Dash. Destined for the restrictive terrain of Afghanistan, these vehicles were
selected based on the need for better off-road capability and greater maneuverability in
that environment. These final LRIP orders also demonstrate the evolving requirement
that shifted from focus on the threat in Iraq to the increased threat in Afghanistan.

3. Source Selection

The MRAP source selection process included two phases. The first phase
consisted of a technical evaluation conducted by a source selection panel–not unlike the
source selection process for any normal program. The criteria consisted of an
engineering design review, cost realism determination, a fair and reasonableness cost
determination, manufacturing processes and facilities evaluation, and past performance
review. The source selection committee assigned risk to the manufacturers based on the
technical evaluation. For example, Oshkosh Truck Company (OTC) was rated low-risk
because it offered a low-risk design; its cost and pricing information was determined fair
and reasonable; it had modern and adequate manufacturing facilities; and it had favorable
recent and relevant performance in government contracts. IMG, on the other hand, was

10 Following BAE purchase of Armor Holdings (AH), AH vehicles were produced under the BAE
Tactical Vehicle Solutions (BAE-TVS) subsidiary.
33
rated a higher risk because of both its unique and unproven bolt-together design, and
because it had no governmental past performance record. In addition, IMG had no
experience with armored vehicles and depended on a foreign supplier as its source of
armor. Based on the source selection analysis and because the urgent nature of the
program demanded many vehicles, the PM awarded IDIQ contracts to nine of the ten
competing manufacturers, including even high-risk manufacturers such as IMG. The
IDIQ contracts included immediate production orders for a minimum number of
prototype vehicles for testing. Only one manufacturer was eliminated at this point based
on the committee’s determination that it had no chance of successfully contributing to the
program.

The second component of source selection consisted of the first phase of

developmental testing, known as DT-C1. Focused heavily on survivability—with a
minimum level of user, safety, and automotive testing—this phase served as a screening
process for the first round of large LRIP orders. Of the nine manufacturers on contract to
deliver test vehicles, two failed to provide the vehicles within the 60-day requirement,
and two more failed to pass threshold survivability specifications. One low-risk
manufacturer, OTC, was eliminated from the program in this phase of testing, whereas
IMG passed and, following further testing, went on to become the largest MRAP
producer. Of the five manufacturers that successfully passed the DT-C1 requirements, all
were awarded large LRIP orders. This source selection approach allowed the JPO to
quickly identify suitable vehicles, get them into production, and then steer future
production orders to certain manufacturers once future phases of testing could better
inform the source selection.

The decision to maximize participation and the associated competition was

arguably costly; however, it improved the end product by bringing innovation to the
program. IMG, which was initially deemed a high-risk manufacturer, brought both an
innovative design and a manufacturing capability unequalled in the program, providing
the best example of a successful and rapid expansion of the industrial base in support of
the requirement. OTC failure in the first phase of testing and subsequent removal from

34
the program demonstrates the inherently increased risk involved with relying only
on low-risk manufacturers in a rapid program.

4. Contracting Strategy and Management

The contracting strategy mirrored the acquisition strategy by executing as many

steps of the contracting process as possible in parallel rather than series. The MRAP JPO
contracting team started the process by awarding a sole-source contract to FPII for 288
Cougar vehicles, while simultaneously issuing an RFP to industry. The JPO did this in
order to leverage an active production line and start production immediately, while also
beginning to mobilize the industrial base. This competitive approach provided several
important benefits. For one, it spurred innovation in that the JPO accepted different
designs as long as they could meet or exceed a minimum survivability requirement. In
addition, a $100,000 incentive per vehicle for early delivery of test vehicles motivated the
manufacturers to deliver test vehicles earlier than their proposed schedules (2008, Owen,
p.11). The JPO contracting office also incentivized speed in delivery by establishing the
order of testing based on order of delivery. For example, the first manufacturer to deliver
vehicles for testing, FPII, was the first to begin DT-C1 testing. The first manufacturer to
complete this testing was also the first awarded an LRIP contract. To further add
leverage, the JPO made no guarantee that all manufacturers that did deliver would be
awarded a production contract, thereby creating a winner-take-all possibility. Although
all manufacturers that eventually passed testing were awarded LRIP contracts,
manufacturers did not know that there would be multiple contracts at the time of testing.
In fact, each contract had a 4,100 vehicle ceiling per year, with the intent of having
enough production capacity under any one contract for the possible award of the entire
requirement (then 4,066 vehicles) to a single manufacturer (Owen, 2008, p.11). This
further incentivized the manufacturers to deliver first.

The initial approach of issuing IDIQ contracts followed by production orders to

low-risk manufacturers prior to testing, although costly, accomplished two tasks. First,
by buying all rather than a portion of the minimum amounts from each manufacturer, the
Government fulfilled the obligations of the IDIQ contracts. This reduced the risk of

35
protest or complaint over unfilled orders. Second, assuming the low-risk manufacturers
would pass testing, the early production orders enabled easy transition into full
production because those manufacturers were already ramping up for production. Of the
nine manufacturers awarded IDIQ contracts for test vehicles, the source selection
committee assessed five as acceptably low in risk to receive LRIP contracts prior to
testing. Although two of these manufacturers ultimately failed, three of the five that did
meet DT-C1 requirements completed that phase of testing more prepared for production
than if starting from scratch. This example demonstrates the risk acceptance and
associated trade-off with this aspect of the acquisition approach. In exchange for an
accelerated ramp-up of three MRAP manufacturers, the program bought 160 vehicles
from OTC and Protected Vessels, Inc. (PVI), at a cost of $23 million, that it couldn’t
ultimately use (Hansen, 2008, June 10).

An additional aspect of the contracting strategy, intended to maximize program

participation, allowed contractors to mitigate some of their production risks, performance
risks and start-up costs by including all those costs up front in higher per-vehicle prices
for lower order quantities. This stepladder pricing was considered one of the most
valuable business attributes of the contracting strategy, yet it is a practice not condoned in
traditional acquisition programs. In addition, it helped limit the Government’s liability in
the event of a contract termination (Owen, 2008, p. 11). Alpha11 contracting was another
tool used successfully in that it saved both time and money by establishing costs and
prices with vendors up front. This became apparent with the large volume of
undefinitized contract actions (UCAs), engineering change proposals (ECPs),
amendments, and modifications because time consuming negotiations did not have to be

11 There is no formal definition of Alpha Contracting. It is a theory of acquisition reform and in the
case of the MRAP program applied in a hybrid form due to the use of multiple manufacturers. Defined by
Clements (2002, p. 58), “Alpha Contracting is a method of sole-source contracting that capitalizes on the
teaming of the Government and the contractor early and throughout all stages of the acquisition process. It
differs from the traditional sole-source contracting method in that it includes the contractor in the planning
and development of the contract from the beginning of the process, thereby reducing the overall time to
contract award.”

36
conducted for each change, variant, or vendor. Additionally, it helped create a long term
partnership rather than the win-lose adversarial relationship that can occur with
traditional negotiations.

The multiple-award, IDIQ, test and production acquisition strategy effectively

implemented the concept of “competitive prototyping” to expedite vehicle delivery,
foster competition and innovation, and provide the maximum amount of ordering
flexibility available. In short, competitive prototyping sped delivery of MRAP vehicles
to warfighters and led to an ever-improving product. Recognition of the advantages
produced by competitive prototyping have since resulted in a mandate by the
USDAT&L, John Young (2007), that all acquisition strategies requiring USDAT&L
approval will require competitive, technically mature prototyping through the milestone
B decision.

In spite of the contracting strategy successfully employed for the MRAP program,
the lead JPO contracting officer pointed out the challenges involved. Primarily, the
program lacked enough trained people do to contract work given the size of the task (L.
Frazier, personal communication, July 28, 2008). At peak operation, twenty-three
personnel were on staff in the JPO contracting office, three of whom were administrative
rather than contracting specialists. After peak operation, the number dropped to 14,
putting significant work load on the remaining personnel. Navy contracting personnel
also rotated in and out of the JPO assignment every two months (Mann, 2008, slide 6). In
an effort to assist with getting trained and competent people in the contracting office, the
JPO employed contract specialists under contract from two different organizations. In
addition to providing personnel, these contractors also provided buildings and office
space.

Another challenging aspect of the contracting process involved managing

amendments (L. Frazier, personal communication, July 28, 2008). The dynamic nature
of the program required numerous amendments in three broad categories of logistics,
testing, and ECPs. These three amendment categories, combined with five different
manufacturers, each with multiple variants, increased the amount of contract work
dramatically. Examples of contract amendments for the MRAP program were as follows:
37
 • Logistics–Initial contracts included no logistical plans due to the speed with
which they were awarded. The contracts were amended after the initial
award.

• Testing–Changes due to testing included additions to product verification

testing and plans for successive test phases. These changes were necessary
due to the evolving nature of the test and evaluation master plan (TEMP).

• ECPs–All ECPs were executed as a form of letter contract or UCA, meaning

the contractors were awarded a contract for immediate production with all
cost and pricing data agreed to as a “not-to-exceed” amount. This amount had
to be definitized or finalized at a later specified date.

5. Program Evolution

Sustainment for the MRAP program was initially contracted from each
manufacturer through a contractor logistics support (CLS) agreement to include parts and
field service representatives (FSRs). Within a short amount of time, the requirement for
the number of MRAPs grew from 1,185 to 4,066 vehicles, and then again quickly
changed to 7,774. With projections of an eventual requirement for more than 10,000
MRAPs, the JPO realized by the early summer of 2007 that a pure CLS approach would
not be feasible given the widely decentralized operations in Iraq. This necessitated
contract renegotiations for factors such as Engineering Data for Provisioning (EDFP) and
cross-training of FSRs to work on all vehicle variants as the strategy changed to reflect a
hybrid/organic approach to sustainment.

Vehicle modifications dealt mostly with GFE initially. As GFE packages

stabilized, modifications required during integration were incorporated at the
manufacturer level, streamlining the integration effort. For example, IMG vehicles
initially took up to four days for a full GFE integration, making it one of the most time-
intensive integration requirements. IMG implemented approximately 30 ECPs based on
interaction with SPAWAR, the GFE integrator, reducing the integration time to
approximately four hours per vehicle (Major, 2008, August 22). As the program

38
progressed, it also implemented changes based on soldier feedback and design flaws
brought to light in the harsh operational environment of Iraq.

The MRAP program also grew and adapted to reflect the changing tactics of the
insurgents in Iraq. Even before the end of the first phase of testing, insurgent use of EFPs
increased sufficiently to warrant additional survivability measures for MRAP vehicles.
The MRAP JPO responded with the MRAP expedient armor program (MEAP), which
basically added additional armor to the sides of the vehicles (Hansen, 2008, June 10).
The JPO implemented a three-pronged approach to the problem. First, they added
additional armor to the existing MRAPs in-theater. Second, the JPO worked with MRAP
manufacturers to modify the vehicle designs to allow for quick MEAP installation and to
handle additional weight. The additional armor required increasing the gross vehicle
weight rating (GVWR) and upgrading suspension components. Third, the JPO solicited
industry again with a RFP in an MRAP II competition, with the requirement of providing
survivability against IED and EFP attacks. Although the JPO contracted for and tested
MRAP II vehicles, it did not make production orders for a number of reasons, to include
the additional size and weight, the diminished threat in Iraq through 2008, and the added
capability given existing MRAP vehicles by the MEAP program. As the most recent
evolution of the MRAP program (as of this writing), the JPO is preparing to release
another RFP to procure an even smaller and lighter MRAP vehicle. This program, called
MRAP All Terrain Light Combat Vehicle (MATLCV), is expected to involve
procurement of about 2,000 additional vehicles and require an approximate $3 billion in
additional funding (Sherman, 2008).

D. BUDGET AND FINANCE

The high-profile and politically charged MRAP program has been funded
primarily through timely, non-standard methods—namely, supplemental appropriations,
emergency appropriations, and reprogramming actions. This is extraordinary because
most defense acquisition programs are funded long-term through the PPBES and the
Program Objective Memorandum (POM) process and short-term through the base DoD
budget. The MRAP program was not included in the FY 2007 or FY 2008 base budget

39
because it had not been forecast, and therefore the Services had no long- or short-term
plan for funding. In addition, through September 2007, the total requirement kept
changing, making it impossible to provide an accurate budget estimate for FY 2008. For
these reasons, the MRAP program relied on reprogramming actions, emergency additions
to the defense appropriations, and supplemental appropriations.

A potential issue for the Army and Marine Corps concerning the MRAP program
is the potential effect on funding for the JLTV program, which is intended to replace the
HMMWV. Concerns over redundancy in wheeled vehicle programs led the White House
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to request a long-term strategy update in this
regard. As addressed in the DoD Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy released in July
2008, both the Army and Marine Corps intend to place the majority of their MRAP
vehicles in war reserves and pre-position stocks (Feickert, 2008).

When a program under consideration for procurement has no long-term plan,

financing that effort through normal channels such as the President’s Budget or POM can
be difficult, if not impossible. However, MRAP had the political backing of key
members of Congress, namely Senator Joe Biden (D-DE) and Representative John
Murtha (D-PA), Chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense who,
among others, assisted in funding the MRAP program though supplemental
appropriations. In addition to supplemental funding, the MRAP program received money
reprogrammed from other systems. All told, despite not having a long-term plan that
linked to a formal budget, the MRAP finance office has managed to execute nearly $20
billion in the form of supplemental funding, emergency funding, and reprogramming
from other, lower priority programs (Cresswell-Atkinson, 2008a).

1. Funding Actions

A list of funding actions in support of the MRAP program follows:

1. March 28, 2007. Tina Jonas, the DoD comptroller approved shifting
$498 million from select Army and Marine Corps procurement accounts
into others designated “to accelerate the procurement” of MRAP vehicles.
This reprogramming action tapped into seven budget lines, diverting from
40
 programs such as the Army HMMWV program, the Marine Corps
amphibious assault vehicle, and the Blue Force Tracker program
(Sherman, 2007, April 26).

2. April 26, 2007. Senator Joe Biden introduced an amendment (#739 to the
Senate Version of the 2007 Supplemental Appropriation Bill) to accelerate
$1.5 billion in funds for the MRAP program. The amendment
subsequently passed (Biden, 2007).

3. July 17, 2007. The JPO requested reprogramming actions of $1.165

billion among various defense appropriations to accelerate the
procurement of additional MRAP vehicles (Cresswell-Atkinson, 2007).

4. July 31, 2007. The White House requested $5.3 billion to purchase 1,520
MRAP vehicles and provide additional parts for other MRAPs already on
order. The funding request was added to the DoD’s $141.7 billion request
for military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan for the budget year
beginning October 1, 2007 (Towell, Dagget, & Belasco, 2008, pp. 21-22).

5. October 3, 2007. Senator Joe Biden introduced an amendment

authorizing an additional $23.6 billion for MRAP vehicles (2008, p. 67).
Senator Biden’s strong and persistent support is notable in that it
coincided with his unsuccessful run for the presidency.

6. October 8, 2007. The chairman of the Senate Appropriation Defense

Subcommittee pledged to pay for all MRAP vehicles the DoD requested.
At that point, the DoD had asked Congress for $16.8 billion in FY 2008
for the MRAP program, enough for 15,374 vehicles. Of the requested
MRAP funding, $5.2 billion was secured in a continuing resolution, a
temporary budget stopgap for the new fiscal year that continued the
previous year’s funding levels until the defense appropriations bill was
signed into law (Rutherford, 2007).

7. October 22, 2007. The President asked Congress to consider amendments

to the Presidential budget request for FY 2008 that would provide
41
 additional resources for ongoing military and intelligence operations in
support of OIF, OEF, and other selected international activities. This
included $11 billion for the production, fielding, support, and continued
advancements of MRAP vehicles under equipment, force structure, and
facilities improvements (Nussle, 2007).

These examples show the continuous efforts to establish and support the MRAP
program’s requirements, as well its significant political support. This political support
was instrumental in the rapid funding the program received through non-standard actions,
(i.e., Congressional approval of reprogramming, supplemental appropriations, and
emergency additions to the base defense appropriation). Figure 5 provides the
breakdown of all funding requests and appropriations through FY 2008.

MRAP Vehicle Program Funding Requests &

Joint MRAP Appropriations
Vehicle Program
(RDT&E, Procurement and O&M)

FY06/ FY07 FY07 FY07 FY07 FY07 FY07 FY07 FY08 FY08 FY08 FY09
Prior Bridge Bridge Bridge Supp Supp Supp Supp Supp Supp Supp Bridge
Funds Supp BTRs ATR Request Request Cong Add ATR Request Request Request Supp

$B Amendment
(Increase)
Amendment Amendment Request
Increase #1 Increase #2

USMC $0.043 $0.603 $0.428 $0.468 $0.250 $0.585 $0.119 $0.090 $2.694 $0.020 $0.436

USA - $0.020 $0.070 $0.520 $0.250 $0.447 $0.798 $1.764 $11.028 $1.883

USN $0.130 $0.060 $0.129 $0.008 $0.107 $0.223 $0.093 - $0.109

USAF - - $0.015 $0.124 $0.031 $0.128 $0.630 - $0.106

SOCOM - - $0.223 $0.036 $0.110 $0.160 - $0.076

TOTAL $0.173 $0.663 $0.020 $0.498 $1.355 $0.500 $1.200 $1.165 $0.441 $5.342 $11.047 $2.610

$22.4B Appropriated Thru FY08

Multiple Supplemental Budget Requests, Amendments, ATRs, BTRs, Congressional

Adds and Cash Flowing ensure Program Financial Success
1

Figure 5. MRAP Vehicle Funding Requests & Appropriations

(From Cresswell-Atkinson, 2008b).

42
 2. Budget Complexity

The MRAP Vehicle program has been funded by more than $20 billion in
appropriations across multiple sources and Services. Because of the size and urgency of
the program, financial management has received and required a great deal of attention
from Congress, OSD, the Services and the JPO. The very nature of this circumstance
brings several key challenges, one of which is the magnitude and pace of the program,
including its many changes. Engineering changes can happen rapidly, as often as the
threat forces employ innovative approaches to out-maneuver DoD anti-IED efforts. This
ultimately affects the funding requirements. Often in DoD acquisitions, this
appropriation and apportionment process can take months, but all phases were conducted
in parallel and thus were compressed into weeks, days, or hours for the MRAP program.
Execution of this large magnitude of funding across multiple funding accounts must
occur carefully and quickly to ensure that funds are received and obligated appropriately
and in a timely manner to support mission requirements at the same time that
requirements are changing. In just two fiscal years, the MRAP program executed nearly
$22 billion for procurement of vehicles, GFE, logistics support, upgrades, facilities,
transportation to theater and testing across multiple Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air
Force and SOCOM funding accounts. Until June 2008, and because there was no APBA,
all funding obligations legally required separate OSD-level approval prior to execution
(Cresswell-Atkinson, 2008c).

As previously discussed, the MRAP program did not have an approved APBA in
place prior to entering the procurement phase. Key personnel instead worked quickly to
develop a streamlined process to receive OSD Obligation Authority and to ensure that
urgent funding documents were not delayed. Once the APBA was signed by the MDA in
June 2008, the program no longer required Obligation Authority signature from the OSD
(M. Cresswell-Atkinson, personal communication, July 29, 2008). As of this writing,
$22.4 billion has been appropriated to the program ($5.6 billion through FY 2007 and
$16.8 billion in FY 2008) for 15,374 MRAP vehicles. Of the total appropriations, $22.0
billion has been transferred to the program for obligation. Total program funding status
is shown in Figure 6 and is further broken down by funding line and Service in Figure 7.
43
 Funds Received To Date
$M USM C USA USN USAF SOCOM TOTAL

RDT&E $258 $40 $298

Procurement $3,902 $14,354 $690 $887 $765 $20,598
O&M $289 $289
O&M Transportation $151 $538 $38 $46 $57 $830
Total $4,600 $14,932 $728 $933 $822 $22,015 Transferred to Date

$400 Still in Transfer Fund

$22,415 Total Appropriated

Figure 6. Program Fund Status by Per Budget Line

(From Cresswell-Atkinson, 2008a, p.1)

Funding Status- Per Budget Line

Budget Plan
15,805
Vehicles Total
$M COA 1 USMC USA USN USAF SOCOM Spent
Proc- Vehicles $8,247 $1,771 $5,196 $317 $289 $215 $7,787
Proc- Prog/Other $181 $18 $40 $0 $4 $83 $145
Proc- Autom Testing $108 $74 $19 $93
Proc- Initial Spt/Spares/BDAR $4,659 $381 $2,214 $50 $82 $45 $2,774
Proc- GFE $3,505 $682 $1,684 $143 $169 $207 $2,884
Proc- Fielding/Fac $325 $0 $277 $277
Proc- Spirals $3,036 $243 $1,950 $33 $44 $25 $2,295
RDT&E- MRAP I $125 $124 $19 $144
RDT&E- MRAP II $49 $37 $37
RDT&E- Spirals $124 $66 $20 $86
O&M- Log/Facilities $299 $272 $272
O&M- Transportation $830 $120 $438 $25 $10 $57 $650
Total $21,488 $3,789 $11,857 $568 $597 $632 $17,444
% Comm/Service 82% 79% 78% 64% 77% 79%
Total Obligated/Service $3,480 $9,866 $540 $533 $508 $14,927
% Oblig/Service 76% 66% 74% 57% 62% 68%

Figure 7. Program Fund Status by Service and Type

(From Cresswell-Atkinson, 2008a, p.1)

44
 3. MRAP Approach to Funding

In an effort to ensure complicated MRAP transactions occurred in a timely

fashion, communication and financial processes were streamlined across key JPO,
Service, OSD and Congressional financial personnel allowing for major funding
processes and funding obligations to occur in days, and in some cases, hours. For
example, several multi-million dollar contract awards were obligated by the JPO within 2
hours of OMB/OSD funding apportionment. This is remarkable given the appropriation
of funds to each of the Services rather than to the JPO. The program’s priority status and
high-level attention allowed transfer and consolidation of these funds within a matter of
minutes (Cresswell-Atkinson, 2008c).

Another key to the MRAP finance office success was the ability to successfully
estimate costs and to request, receive, and execute almost $20 billion in less than 18
months. Joint cost estimating was carefully managed to understand program financial
requirements, noted as a critical success by the JPO Director of Budget and Financial
Management (M. Cresswell-Atkinson, personal communication, July 29, 2008).

One of the non-routine fiscal initiatives the MRAP finance office created was a
special “purple account,” or joint transfer account allowing for fiscal severability. This
account, called the MRAP Vehicle Fund, was authorized with the passing of Public Law
110-116, the FY 2008 Defense Appropriation Act. In addition to appropriating $11.6

45
billion in emergency funding for the MRAP program, Section 812212 of this law
officially granted authority to the Secretary of Defense to transfer funds for procurement,
research, development, testing and evaluation (RDT&E), and operations and maintenance
(O&M) for the program (110th Congress, 2007). This account and associated procedures
developed by the JPO finance office allowed for movement of funds to the required
Service execution accounts with only a five-day notice to OMB and Congress. In June
2008, at the request of the JPO finance office, Congress also provided language in the
2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act, Public Law 110-25213, which allowed the JPO to
transfer funds back into the MRAP Vehicle Fund for later transfer into other Service
appropriation accounts (110th Congress, 2008). The flexibility of the MRAP Vehicle
Fund and the transfer back/retransfer ability was a key factor in the program’s financial
success. It allowed the JPO financial manager to move financial resources into the right
Service and appropriation accounts in response to changes in program requirements, with
continual dialogue in the form of monthly program briefings to Congressional
appropriation staffers to ensure Congress was kept informed (M. Cresswell-Atkinson,
personal communication, July 29, 2008).

12 PL 110-116, SEC. 8122. (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and in addition to amounts
otherwise made available by this Act, there is appropriated $11,630,000,000 for the ‘‘Mine Resistant
Ambush Protected Vehicle Fund’’, to remain available until September 30, 2008. (b) The funds provided
by subsection (a) shall be available to the Secretary of Defense to continue technological research and
development and upgrades, to procure Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles and associated support
equipment, and to sustain, transport, and field Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles. (c)(1) The
Secretary of Defense shall transfer funds provided by subsection (a) to appropriations for operation and
maintenance; procurement; and research, development, test and evaluation to accomplish the purposes
specified in subsection (b). Such transferred funds shall be merged with and be available for the same
purposes and for the same time period as the appropriation to which they are transferred. (2) The transfer
authority provided by this subsection shall be in addition to any other transfer authority available to the
Department of Defense. (3) The Secretary of Defense shall, not less than 5 days prior to making any
transfer under this subsection, notify the congressional defense committees in writing of the details of the
transfer. (d) The amount provided by this section is designated as an emergency requirement and necessary
to meet emergency needs pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) of section 204 of S. Con. Res. 21 (110th
Congress), the concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal year 2008. This division may be cited as the
‘‘Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2008’’ (110th Congress, 2007, p.47).
13 P.L. 110-252, SEC. 9108 amends section 8122(c) of Public Law 110–116 by adding at the end the
following: ‘‘(4) Upon a determination that all or part of the funds transferred under paragraph (1) are not
necessary to accomplish the purposes specified in subsection (b), such amounts may be transferred back to
the ‘Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle Fund’ ’’ (110th Congress, 2008, p.83).

46
 Prior to the creation of the MRAP Vehicle Fund, monies dedicated to the MRAP
program were restricted to their respective appropriation accounts or “color of money.”
For example, money dedicated or “colored” specifically for procurement could not be
used for testing and evaluation (T&E), but the program office did just that prior to the
creation of the special fund. The “color of money” restrictions would not allow blending
of funds from one account into another because these controls are intended to ensure that
each dollar is spent for the purpose appropriated by Congress. This was restrictive at best
and unacceptable in a fast moving, highly political program such as MRAP. The
appropriation to the “purple” MRAP Vehicle Fund gave the JPO flexibility and earned
the trust of Congress, allowing the JPO to transfer and obligate funds as needed in
support of procuring MRAPs. Figure 8 shows the differences in fund flow for FY 2007
versus FY 2008 with fiscal severability and the MRAP Vehicle Fund.

Figure 8. FY07 versus FY08 Finance Procedures

(From M. Cresswell-Atkinson, personal communication, July 29, 2008)

Figures 9 and 10 summarize all contract actions for the MRAP program through
July 2008.
47
 MRAP Vehicle Contract Financial Summary
$ Millions
$11,477
$12,000 $10,521
BAE-TVS 5030

$1,926 BAE 5025

$10,000 FPII 5006 + 5031
$1,652
GDLS 5028
$1,927 IMG 5032
$8,000 $1,741
$5,922

$2,220 $5,258
$6,000 $2,063
$828
$1,091 $643 $736
$1,017
$597
$4,000
$1,493
$1,403
$364
$4,314 $351
$2,000 $4,048
$2,594 $2,171

-
Funded Obligated Invoiced Paid

Figure 9. MRAP Vehicle Contract Financial Summary

(From Cresswell-Atkinson, 2008a, p.4)

MRAP Vehicle Contract Funding Status

$ Millions
$5,000 $4,314

Funded/ Not on Contract

$4,500
On Contract/ Not Yet Invoiced
$266
$4,000 Invoiced/ Not Yet Paid
Paid
$3,500
$1,454

$3,000
$2,220
$2,500 $1,926 $1,927
$423
$157
$2,000
$273 $186 $569
$1,091
$1,500
$825 $91
$1,098 $73
$1,000 $2,171

$91 $46 $1,403 $653

$500
$736 $597 $13
$351
-
BAE-TVS 5030 BAE 5025 FPII 5006 + 5031 GDLS 5028 IMG 5032

Figure 10. MRAP Vehicle Contract Funding Status

(From Cresswell-Atkinson, 2008a, p.4)

48
 Above Threshold Reprogramming (ATR) and Below Threshold Reprogramming
(BTR) techniques were used to keep production going in FY 2007 and avoid production
breaks. When Congress appropriates funding, it is for specific programs and items as
represented in the budget exhibits. If the Service funding needs change, they process a
reprogramming request to transfer funds from one account to another. There is a
cumulative threshold per appropriated account under (below) which Services can
reprogram funding without Congressional approval—this transfer is affected via a BTR
form. If the reprogramming need exceeds the threshold, then Congress must approve the
transfer of funds.

The BTRs and ATRs ensured the MRAP program had sufficient FY 2007 funding
to procure the maximum production rates from all qualified vendors for vehicle deliveries
through February 2008. The JPO had to procure production through February 2008,
while in FY 2007, because of production lead times. Vehicles procured with new FY
2008 funding (not available to the program until October 2007) would not be delivered
until March 2008. Therefore, to procure production through February 2008 and prevent a
break in production, while in 4th Quarter FY 2007, the JPO relied on ATR and BTR
reprogramming (M. Cresswell-Atkinson, personal communication, July 29, 2008).

E. KEY FACTORS AND TRADE-OFFS

Analysis of the programmatic and contracting processes applied in the MRAP

program indicates several factors critical to the JPO success in meeting the program
objectives. Chief among these factors was the multiple award, IDIQ, test and production
acquisition strategy, which was designed with the focused intent of rapidly meeting
urgent warfighter needs. This acquisition strategy included a tailored approach to the
acquisition process, allowing concurrent, rather than sequential, execution of all
acquisition phases. It applied competitive prototyping to expedite vehicle delivery, foster
competition and innovation, and provide maximum ordering flexibility to the PM. It
used threshold testing as an initial means of source selection, and it accepted a multiple-
manufacturer approach as a way of rapidly expanding the industrial base and maximizing

49
production capacity. Finally, the strategy involved identifying low-risk manufacturers
and awarding production orders prior to testing as a way of ramping up production
capacity.

From a contracting perspective, the JPO used multiple IDIQ contracts with
immediate production orders and performance incentives to motivate manufacturers and
maximize industry participation. The contracting strategy also included the use of
stepladder pricing to allow manufacturers to mitigate start-up, production, and
performance risk by charging higher per-vehicle prices for smaller orders. Finally, the
MRAP contracting team employed alpha contracting as a way of minimizing the
negotiations involved with UCAs, ECPs, amendments, and other contract modifications
that were prevalent in the program. These contracting techniques not only lessened the
risk of protest and liability for the Government, but also assisted in creating long-term
partnerships for the program.

From a budgeting and finance perspective, the MRAP program obviously would
not have been possible without the tremendous political support of Congress and the
President, reflected in more than $22 billion in program funding through FY 2008. This
political support also led to the creation of one of the most important fiscal initiatives
implemented by the JPO finance office. The special transfer account, known as the
MRAP Vehicle Fund, allowed money normally appropriated to specific accounts to be
allocated and mixed together without regard to specific appropriation controls at the
discretion of the program office, permitted by the underlying support of Congress, OMB
and the DoD comptroller. This allowed the JPO to quickly obligate funding from all
Services and provided the flexibility needed to quickly react to the changing program
requirements.

The aforementioned factors, which by no means represent a comprehensive list of

the elements critical to the program success, group into two broad categories. The first is
the element of concurrency, which was a key component in the acquisition strategy.
Simultaneous execution of the normally sequential acquisition phases, combined with
concurrent and continuous activities within those phases, compressed the program
acquisition timeline more than any other single factor. A few examples of concurrency
50
were procurement actions prior to approval of an APBA, simultaneous developmental
testing and production of vehicles, and continuous refinement of performance
requirements in response to the evolving threat.

The second broad category enabling the MRAP program rapid execution, which
goes hand-in-hand with concurrency, is risk acceptance. The sequential and deliberate
defense acquisition framework is designed to minimize risk. The strategy of concurrency
therefore represents the most vivid example of risk acceptance in the MRAP program and
formed the basis for very specific instances of risk acceptance. For example, by
awarding production orders prior to threshold and user testing, the PM accepted the risk
of procuring a small number of vehicles that were ultimately unusable. In addition, by
using survivability-focused threshold testing as a form of source selection, the program
accepted the risk of fielding vehicles that were unreliable and difficult to sustain in an
operational environment.

Risk acceptance in any situation does not come without a reciprocal trade-off.
The MRAP program, therefore, made numerous trade-offs in support of the program
strategy. As a first example, the use of multiple manufacturers sped delivery of large
quantities of vehicles to warfighters, but it did so at the expense of complexity in
sustainment, increased training requirements for Soldiers and Marines, and higher
lifecycle costs. As another example, the award of production contracts prior to threshold
testing resulted in the procurement of 160 vehicles at a cost of $23 million that were
ultimately determined unusable in Iraq or Afghanistan; this trade-off should be
considered, however, with respect to the three successful manufacturers that were
similarly awarded early production contracts and therefore sped vehicle deliveries to
warfighters. Finally, the use of a commercially available solution, as opposed to full-
scale development based on thorough analysis of a user-generated requirement, resulted
in a vehicle that was adequate, but not ideally suited to the operational environment

In conclusion, the program’s focus on concurrency and risk acceptance, enabled

by its unprecedented political support, established the conditions necessary for success in

51
meeting program objectives of fielding as many survivable vehicles as quickly as
possible while expanding the industrial base. As subsequent analysis will show, these
themes permeated every facet of the MRAP program.

52
 IV. TESTING AND EVALUATION (T&E)14

A. T&E PLANNING AND STRATEGY

Concurrent with the release of the original MRAP RFP in November 2006,
MARCORSYSCOM and the Marine Corps Operational Test and Evaluation Activity
(MCOTEA) established a Test Integration Working Group (TIWG) with the Aberdeen
Test Center (ATC), the Army Research Lab (ARL), and the Director, Operational Test
and Evaluation (DOT&E). The purpose of the TIWG was to determine and discuss T&E
and Title 1015 requirements, T&E funding requirements, and the requisite reports needed
for rapid fielding. Through the work of this group and interaction with component
acquisition agencies, a modified T&E strategy and plan was developed, combining
developmental, operational, and live fire test events where possible. In addition, the JPO
made an early commitment to develop a DoD compliant test and evaluation master plan
(TEMP) to capture the evolving requirements of the program. The initial cooperation
between all stakeholders involved in the T&E effort was instrumental in the success of
the program, and “the decision to construct an ‘evolving’ TEMP, without the benefit of a
program CDD or CPD, was instrumental in forging a unified MRAP T&E strategy and
framework, managing initial T&E risk, and developing the overarching DT
(developmental testing) and OT (operational testing) activities required by DoD
regulation or statute” (Owen, 2008, p. 12). In addition, early construction of this TEMP
resulted in early cooperation between test agencies and conveyed the overall DT and OT
plans to key DoD decision-makers, resulting in expedited funding for T&E resources.

The bulk of developmental testing for MRAP vehicles was conducted at the
Aberdeen Test Center in Maryland. This test center is the lead DoD asset for automotive,
manned and unmanned ground vehicle, gun and munitions, and live fire vulnerability and
lethality testing (Aberdeen Test Center, 2008, August 17). COL John Rooney, who took

14 Unless otherwise cited, the information from this section was drawn largely from an interview with
the Aberdeen Test Center Commander (Rooney, 2008, August 7).
15 Title 10 of the U.S. Code is the law governing all aspects of the armed forces.

53
command of the test center in June 2005, was involved with the first bolt-on armor kits
that were the initial solution to the IED threat. As such, he has been involved with the
MRAP program from its start and has been instrumental to its success.

COL Rooney first learned of the MRAP program in November 2006 during a
conversation with Paul Mann, who became the MRAP Joint Program Manager that
December. Upon learning of the scope, timing, and priority of the program, COL
Rooney immediately began planning for the testing. He determined that an approximate
250-member team would be required, and he started building this team from within his
2,000-member organization, as well as hiring new personnel to backfill for these new
positions. He also analyzed the scope of the program and determined two major
shortfalls in the test center’s capacity that would slow the test process: a limited number
of survivability ranges and anthropomorphic test devices (test dummies). COL Rooney
needed a $12 million investment in the survivability ranges, which he secured by
leveraging the importance of the MRAP program. This allowed him to triple the center’s
test capacity between December 2006 and March 2007. In addition, he built, over time,
the quantity of anthropomorphic test devices from eight at the program start to 45, at the
time of this report. These facility and equipment upgrades were key to the program
success because of the time intensive nature of the set-up and the data collection involved
in survivability testing.

In conjunction with the MRAP JPO, COL Rooney’s team developed an

aggressive test program that fed directly into source selection. In effect, the program
office established threshold specifications based primarily on survivability. As soon as
manufacturers delivered test vehicles to Aberdeen, those vehicles were tested as per this
plan. Manufacturers meeting initial thresholds for survivability as well as basic
automotive characteristics were given production contracts. Although all vehicles
meeting those standards were ultimately purchased, the process started as a competition
of sorts, with the first vehicle or vehicles successfully passing the testing program and
possibly receiving all of the initial orders. This screening process, heavily focused on
survivability but much less on reliability and maintainability, introduced significant risk
to the program, but it also added two notable benefits. First, the promise of multiple
54
awards incentivized multiple manufacturers to participate in the process. Second, the
promise of award to the first successful vehicle or vehicles, with additional incentives for
delivery ahead of schedule, led manufacturers to deliver test vehicles quickly and to
modify designs based on test feedback. The program manager accepted risk with the
T&E plan but, in doing so, added speed to the procurement process. In addition,
competition among manufacturers improved the quality of products available to the
program in later contracts.

B. T&E EXECUTION

The developmental test program was designed and conducted in three phases.
Developmental Test C1 (DT-C1) consisted of threshold testing with an approximate ratio
of 90% focus on survivability and 10% on automotive (Hansen, 2008, May 30). It also
included a limited user test, in which a platoon of Soldiers and a platoon of Marines with
operational experience conducted operational tests on the vehicles. Results of both the
threshold and the user testing were immediately fed to manufacturers for potential
changes that were quickly retested. To be considered a suitable MRAP, each vehicle had
to complete DT-C1 with a green (no deficiencies) rating on survivability and green or
amber (some minor deficiencies) in automotive and user tests. Of the seven
manufacturers that submitted vehicles for testing during MRAP I, five had a vehicle in at
least one class16 that met the required thresholds of DT-C1 and were determined suitable
during user tests; all five manufacturers were subsequently awarded production contracts.
A listing of DT-C1 activities is shown in Figure 11.

16 Some manufacturers submitted vehicles for more than one category. IMG, for example, submitted
Category 1 and 2 versions of the MaxxPro. Although the Category II version was rated green in
survivability, it was found unacceptable in terms of payload. The Category 1 version was rated green in
both categories.
55
 Figure 11. DT-C1 Test Overview
(From Mann, 2008, Slide 35)

One notable risk taken during DT-C1 involved the GFE, such as communications
gear and IED jammers. At this early stage of the program, the GFE package for each
Service and vehicle configuration was undetermined. Consequently, the vehicles were
not tested in their exact operational set-up. To mitigate, the test team used surrogate
weight for likely GFE equipment. Additionally, the test team worked closely with the
integration team at SPAWAR in Charleston, SC, to retest as necessary once the GFE
packages were determined for each vehicle.

Developmental Test C2 (DT-C2), shown in Figure 12, consisted of more in-depth

automotive and particularly endurance testing, plus additional survivability testing.

56
 Figure 12. DT-C2 Test Overview
(From Mann, 2008, Slide 36)

Developmental Test C3 (DT-C3), shown in Figure 13, added yet another level of
automotive and survivability testing and added non-ballistic survivability testing as well.
Survivability testing includes extensive use of anthropomorphic test devices, which
makes set-up and data collection both time and resource intensive, but it also provides an
in-depth characterization of the vehicle and the protection it provides to every passenger
in a vehicle.

57
 Figure 13. DT-C3 Test Overview
(From Mann, 2008, Slide 37)

Whereas DT-C1 focused on threshold testing for minimum acceptable

performance, DT-C2 and DT-C3 focused more on objective requirements and, in some
cases, testing to failure. This full test strategy, shown in Figure 14, allowed the PM to
quickly determine which vehicles met minimum requirements and send them into
production. After that, the DT-C2 and C3 tests were designed and used to provide full
characterization of the vehicle for potential design changes, future procurement decisions,
and for the long-term benefit of the vehicle’s program office and users. This test strategy
represents a hybrid approach in that it combines developmental, operational, and live fire
testing, rather than conducting them as separate phases of the test and evaluation
program. Also notable is that given the urgent need and rapid fielding of these vehicles
as they came off production lines, the program still conducted an initial operational test
and evaluation (IOT&E). This month-long test, which provides required feedback for
any FRP decision, was conducted in September 2007 at Yuma Proving Ground. At this

58
point in the program, however, several thousand vehicles were already under contract
with manufacturers ramping toward full capacity. This example demonstrates the unique
nature of the MRAP program in that the T&E plan was fully executed (and continues to
be), with a level of detail on par with any other major program. The difference and
associated trade-off in this case, however, is that most of the production and source
selection decisions were made before the test results could fully inform the final design
and production.

Figure 14. MRAP Test Overview

(From Mann, 2008, Slide 11)

C. KEY FACTORS AND TRADE-OFFS

Testing for the MRAP program is unique in many ways. The unprecedented
funding, political pressure from numerous sources, and emphasis by senior leaders in the
DoD, including the Secretary of Defense, gave this program advantages that will be

59
difficult to replicate in any situation other than emergency measures targeted at saving
lives. These conditions allowed the rapid expansion of the test facilities needed to
support the rapid testing. They also set the conditions whereby numerous vehicles would
be available for testing. At the time of this report, 58 MRAP vehicles are present at the
Aberdeen Test Center. Although this is unrealistic for most test programs, it is an
integral part of the program plan, which enables concurrent survivability and automotive
testing. Normally, prototype vehicles are limited such that all automotive testing must be
done before proceeding with destructive survivability testing.

From COL Rooney’s perspective, “No program has embraced testing more or
better than MRAP” (2008, August 7). He attributes this to the constant JPO focus on the
goal of getting the maximum number of survivable vehicles to warfighters in the shortest
time possible. At least four factors were critical to the T&E effort for the MRAP
program. First, the early formation of the TIWG fostered cooperation and frequent
communication between all parties involved in the T&E effort. This structure enabled
development of an effective and flexible TEMP and assisted the program in getting the
resources needed in the effort. Second, the use of multiple manufacturers with constant
on-site presence during the T&E fostered competition and rapid feedback of T&E into
design changes. This enabled the JPO to determine the best materiel solution from across
industry, and the on-site competition established an atmosphere of improvement among
the manufacturers. Third, the presence of multiple test vehicles for each variant enabled
the JPO to determine the capabilities and limitations of each variant faster and more
thoroughly. Cases in which the test center has only one prototype require that destructive
survivability testing be conducted after automotive testing, which slows the process.
Multiple prototypes for the MRAP T&E allowed for a concurrent and continuous T&E
effort. Finally, whereas some program managers dispute or are unreceptive to negative
test results, the MRAP PM was fully committed to the test program. As a result, the JPO
learned capabilities and limitations of each variant faster and more thoroughly. Although
these factors are arguably due to the unique nature of the requirement as addressed
earlier, the researchers believe that these lessons should be applied to the maximum
extent possible in future programs, whether rapid or standard in nature.

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 As with all decisions, trade-offs were a necessary part of the T&E plan for the
MRAP program. The first and most obvious trade-off in this case involved the heavy
emphasis on survivability during DT-C1, at the expense of reliability, maintainability,
and other supportability issues. The PM accepted significant risk in that some of the
vehicles fielded, although survivable, may have been difficult to sustain and may have
had low operational availability. A second trade-off involved the prioritization of the
MRAP ahead of existing and ongoing acquisition programs. As a result of the un-
forecasted MRAP T&E requirements, personnel and other resources were reallocated
from some programs. Consequently, some schedules were adjusted and programs had to
replace reassigned personnel; however, no program missed an acquisition decision based
on changes made at the Aberdeen Test Center due to MRAP T&E requirements. In
addition, the MRAP program provided a silver lining for existing and future programs
with the facility and equipment upgrades it brought to Aberdeen.

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 V. PRODUCTION AND INTEGRATION

The MRAP production and integration process is best examined in terms of the
value stream from subcomponents through the final integration effort and transportation
to warfighters in Iraq and Afghanistan. This basic process, as shown in Figure 15, begins
with the numerous suppliers to the five prime contractors manufacturing the vehicles.
These suppliers produce the components and subassemblies such as engines,
transmissions, axles, and seats. Within this supply base exists some of the bottlenecks
associated with MRAP production, such as armor and, initially, tires. To demonstrate the
complexity at this level, the JPO has identified 62 major Tier 2 vendors17 for 15 critical
sub-assemblies (Hansen, 2008, June 4, slide 11).

Figure 15. MRAP Production Value Stream

17 Tier 2 and lower level vendors refer to the supply chain below the prime contractors.

63
 Following Tier 2 and lower level suppliers, the value stream flows to the prime
contractor level, in which the vehicles are assembled and receive the first DCMA
acceptance inspection. Upon inspection, vehicles from all five manufacturers are
delivered to SPAWAR in Charleston, SC, for integration and installation of GFE. At this
site, DCMA conducts yet another acceptance inspection and works with the prime
contractors to resolve any quality issues during the GFE integration and installation
phase. Given the multiple vehicle variants and ever-changing GFE requirements that
vary by Service, the integration effort at SPAWAR was an initial area of concern and
bottleneck in the production process. Following integration, selected vehicles are fitted
with MEAP (MRAP Expedient Armor Program)18 armor at multiple facilities in the
Charleston area and are then moved to the Port of Charleston or Charleston Air Force
Base for movement to the CENTCOM area of operations (AO).
This next section of the report focuses on key processes within the value stream,
starting with critical resource constraints at the supplier level and actions taken to
mitigate these potential bottlenecks to production. It also provides an overview of the
actual production process, with vignettes from two of the largest MRAP manufacturers, a
major Tier 2 supplier, and the integration effort at SPAWAR. The interaction and quality
assurance provided by DCMA is critical throughout this process and is also examined.

A. RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS

Some of the primary components and subassemblies supplied at the Tier 2 level
include axles from three manufacturers, four different engines from three manufacturers,
multiple transmissions from one manufacturer, and suspension components from nine
manufacturers (Hansen, 2008, June 4, slide 11 and MRAP JPO, 2008, June 2). Of these
items, as well as most other components, sufficient capacity existed within the defense
and commercial industrial bases to meet the demands of the MRAP program. When
added to existing demands from commercial businesses as well as other programs within

18 MEAP is additional armor applied to the sides of MRAP vehicles as added protection against
explosively formed penetrators (EFP) which became prevalent after the start of the MRAP program. It is
installed in the Charleston area vice at the OEM (original equipment manufacturer) site due to its weight
and bulk.
64
the DoD, however, this spike in demand posed potential limits on production rates.
These limits were in many cases unknown and dependent on how lower level suppliers
would react to the increased demand for their products. Some of the resource constraints
were identified or clarified through industrial surveys conducted by the Office of the
Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Industrial Policy. These surveys helped to define
production limits in steel and in the heavy tires needed for the vehicles (Hansen, 2008,
May 30).

To mitigate these potential bottlenecks, three major actions were taken to

prioritize and increase production of necessary components and materials for the MRAP
program. First, on May 2, 2007, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates issued a
memorandum stating the following:

The MRAP program should be considered the highest priority Department

of Defense acquisition program and any and all options to accelerate the
production and fielding of this capability to the theater should be
identified, assessed and applied where feasible. In this regard, I would
like to know what funding, materiel, program, legal or other limits
currently constrains the program and the options available to overcome
them. This should include an examination of all applicable statutory
authorities available to the Secretary of Defense or the President. (Owen,
2008, p. 14)

Concurrent with this memo, Secretary Gates directed the establishment of a DoD
MRAP Task Force whose objective was to “get as many of these vehicles to our Soldiers
and Marines in the field as is possible in the next several months” (Young et al., 2007, p.
2). Not only did this clearly establish the MRAP program as the top priority for all
resources and effort within the DoD, the task force and its direct reporting line to the
Secretary added an additional level of pressure to all program participants and
stakeholders. In effect, the memorandum directed all officials involved in the program to
identify any issues that might constrain the program and take action to mitigate them.
One such example occurred on May 22, 2007, when Dr. Delores Etter, the Navy
Acquisition Executive, approved an exception to Title 10 U.S. Code section 2533b,
which “prohibits DoD from procuring end items, or components thereof, containing

65
specialty metals not melted or produced in the United States” (Young et al., 2007, p. 7).
Such exceptions were made and waivers requested in many cases based on this direct
guidance from the Secretary of Defense.

This top-level prioritization also provided emphasis and direction to industry,

which had competing requirements in both government and commercial work. The effect
of this public prioritization must also be considered within the context of the situation on
the ground in Iraq. In May 2007, casualties were at their highest sustained rate of the war
(Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2008). The combination of these two factors
effectively created a moral imperative for industry to support the program.

The second action, which flowed directly from the prioritization, occurred on
June 1, 2007, when Secretary Gates approved a DX rating under the Defense Priorities
and Allocation System (DPAS) (Young et al., 2007, p. 5). As outlined in Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Subpart 11.6, a DX rating is the highest priority rating and
requires preferential acceptance and performance of contracts and orders supporting
certain approved national defense programs (DoD, 2008). This rare step prioritized the
MRAP program by law within American industry, requiring all MRAP-related orders to
be filled first and ahead of existing orders, with the exception of other DX rated orders.19
The DX rating assisted FPII in eliminating a potential bottleneck in transfer case
availability due to insufficient production capacity of a specific tapered roller bearing
(Walsh, 2008a, August 6). Although IMG had no significant sourcing issues, SFI
Fabrication—a Tier 2 supplier—used the DX rating to buy welding equipment and a laser
cutting machine within weeks when such acquisitions would typically take months (Carr,
Collins, & Daniel, 2008, August 22). These examples show that the DX rating is a very
powerful tool for use in a rapid acquisition program. Although it varies in importance by
manufacturer, it is critical throughout the supply chain.

19 DPAS provides two levels of priority for rated orders, DO and DX. DX rated orders take priority
over all unrated and DO rated orders. Multiple DX rated orders hold the same level of priority; therefore,
multiple DX rated orders are handled on a first-in, first-out basis. Based on the small number of DX rated
programs, the MRAP program did not encounter any conflicts with other DX rated orders.
66
 As John Young20, then-MRAP Task Force Chairman, pointed out on November
8, 2007, “DX ratings provide the most important DoD programs priority access to scarce
production resources; however, they do not resolve fundamental production capacity
shortfalls” (Young et al., 2007, p. 5). This reality led to the third major action—direct
intervention by the DoD in the areas of industry where production capacity did not meet
the need. Specifically, this involved tires and steel. In July 2007, industrial surveys
indicated a production capacity of tires for MRAP class vehicles at less than 1,000 per
month. With a planned production rate of 1,196 vehicles per month, this was well short
of the needed capacity (p. 6). The DoD provided $4 million to the Defense Logistics
Agency (DLA) to purchase additional tire molds for the then-sole-source supplier,
Michelin, to expand production (Castellaw, 2007, p. 5). In addition, the DoD added
Goodyear as a second source, increasing capacity to approximately 17,000 tires per
month in January 2008 (Young et al., 2007, p. 6). This addition provided the capacity to
meet not only new vehicle production but also the requirement for operational spares and
replacements.

The second major capacity shortage—production of steel—also required

considerable attention. The total DoD demand for steel is only a fraction of the U.S.
production capacity, but armor steel plate and thin gauge, quenched, and tempered steel
required for MRAP vehicles are niche requirements within that industry. These specialty
steels require unique processes and equipment that are available in only a few places
(Young et al., 2007, pp. 6-7). To increase capacity, the JPO and MRAP Task Force
advance procured two types of steel (P900 and High-Hard), qualified additional sources
of steel to increase the defense industrial base, and made a specification change (qualified
ASTM 4330/4130 & AL521 steel as alternatives to MIL-A-46100 High Hard steel) to
increase material options (Steinholtz, 2007, Slides 6-7). The program also used the
waiver process as described above to qualify and buy from overseas sources. These
actions increased capacity from about 8,400 tons of the specialty steel per month at the
program start to 20,900 tons per month by November 2007 (Young et al., 2007, pp. 7-8).

20 The Honorable John J. Young, Jr. is the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics, current as of this writing.
67
 The resource constraints and actions taken to mitigate them demonstrate the range
of tools available within the DoD for a rapid acquisition. By issuing clear guidance on
priority, invoking the Defense Priorities and Allocation System, obtaining waivers to
statutory requirements, and intervening where necessary in the supply chain, officials
involved with the program virtually eliminated the bottlenecks in resources needed for
desired production rates.

B. MANUFACTURER VIGNETTES

As previously discussed, nine manufacturers responded to the original request for

proposal, with seven manufacturers’ vehicles tested, and five awarded production
contracts. These manufacturers ranged from traditional U.S. defense contractors such as
BAE Systems (BAE), General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS), and Armor Holdings
(AH);21 to niche manufacturer Force Protection Industries, Inc. (FPII); and to a
subsidiary of a large commercial manufacturer with no recent defense business,
International Military and Government, LLC (IMG). This section will provide an
overview of two of those manufacturers, FPII and IMG, and their history in the program.
It also provides insight at the lower levels of the supply chain with a vignette on an IMG
supplier, SFI Fabrication.

1. Force Protection Industries, Incorporated (FPII)

Force Protection Industries, Incorporated (FPII) traces its roots to the civil wars of
southern Africa in the 1960s and 1970s. Prevalent in these conflicts was the use of land
mines and other explosive devices, very similar in nature to the threats that U.S. and
coalition forces initially faced in Iraq and Afghanistan. In response to significant
casualties from these attacks, the South African Government tasked its Council for
Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) with developing technologies to increase their
soldiers’ survivability. CSIR, formed in 1945, “undertakes directed and multidisciplinary
research, technological innovation as well as industrial and scientific development to

21 Armor Holdings’ Caiman Vehicle is produced by its subsidiary Stewart and Stevenson, maker of the
DoD’s Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles. Armor Holdings is now owned by BAE Systems and operates
as BAE-Tactical Vehicle Solutions (BAE-TVS).
68
improve the quality of life of the country’s people” (Council for Scientific and Industrial
Research, 2008). Out of this research came the basic MRAP technology used today
(Walsh, 2008a, August 6). Namely, this includes a monocoque, raised, V-shaped,
armored hull to deflect the force of a blast outward from the vehicle.

A young chemist named Dr. Vernon Joynt was one of the lead scientists working
on the counter-mine program for CSIR. In the mid-1990s, Dr. Joynt, along with a
Rhodesian Special Air Service officer, Garth Barrett, brought the MRAP technology to
the United States with the goal of capitalizing on the then-prevalent humanitarian de-
mining operations being sponsored by the United Nations. They developed a three-
vehicle concept for route clearance operations and in 1997 formed a company called
Technical Solutions Group (TSG). Within this concept, one vehicle provided security, a
second vehicle searched for mines or IEDs using ground penetrating radar and other
sensors, and the final vehicle (the Buffalo) interrogated potential threats using its robotic
arm and claw (2008a, August 6). In 2002, the company was purchased by Force
Protection, Inc. and went public on the NASDAQ exchange.

The U.S. Army first purchased an FPII (TSG at that time) vehicle in 2000, when
Communication and Electronics Command (CECOM), in an effort to find a mine
protected clearance vehicle, bought one Buffalo for testing under a Foreign Comparative
Test Program.22 In 2001, the Army bought another Buffalo for testing and in 2002
bought 10 more for contingency purposes. Between then and 2006, the Army bought an
additional 76 Buffalos and the Marine Corps began purchasing Buffalos and a smaller
MRAP variant and forerunner to the Cougar vehicle, the JERRV (Inspector General,
2007, pp. 5-6). This gradual build-up of sales enabled FPII to grow from 150 employees
and $10 million in revenue in 2004 to 750 employees and nearly $200 million in revenue
in 2006 (Walsh, 2008a, August 6). In addition, these early sales positioned FPII as the
leader in the MRAP program that started in November 2006. Not only did FPII have the
only products that had been tested and used in Iraq, they also had an active production

22 This program leverages foreign technology to meet requirements, thereby avoiding redundant
research and development and lowering procurement cost and time (Office of the Secretary of Defense,
n.d.).
69
base. For these reasons, the MRAP JPO accepted risk early in the program, awarding a
sole-source contract for FPII Cougar and Buffalo vehicles, prior to the start of
developmental testing at Aberdeen Proving Grounds.

FPII currently manufactures MRAP vehicles at its Ladson, SC, facility, operates a
blast and ballistic testing facility at Edgefield, SC, and conducts research and
development at a facility in Summerville, SC. In addition, FPII acquired a separate
production facility in Roxboro, SC, and entered into agreements with other manufacturers
to expand capacity if necessary. The company currently employs approximately 1,500
personnel, down from a peak of over 2,000 at the end of 2007 (Walsh, 2008a, August 6).
Unlike other MRAP producers, FPII business is dedicated almost exclusively to MRAP
vehicles. Consequently, the long-term sustainability of the current size and work force of
FPII is uncertain given the expected short duration of the MRAP program.

The primary products from FPII are the Buffalo (CAT III) and Cougar family of
vehicles (in CAT I and II versions) as shown in Figures 16 and 17. The company is also
developing a smaller line of vehicles, called the Cheetah, which attempts to combine the
survivability of the larger MRAPs with the size and mobility of the HMMWV. The DoD
tested the Cheetah as part of MRAP II but has not procured any of those vehicles for
fielding. The biggest FPII customer is the U.S. DoD with the bulk of vehicles going to
the Marine Corps. It has also sold vehicles through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
program to Canada, the United Kingdom, Iraq, Italy, and France and is forming a
partnership with a British company to streamline sales to the United Kingdom,
effectively bypassing FMS (Walsh, 2008a, August 6).

70
 Figure 16. FPII Buffalo Vehicle (Category III)
(From Force Protection Industries, Inc., 2008)

Figure 17. FPII Cougar Vehicles (CAT II and I, respectively)

(From Force Protection Industries, Inc., 2008)

The FPII manufacturing process is straightforward with most fabrication done

within the company. The Buffalo vehicle starts production as a chassis and cab from a
major truck manufacturer such as Mack or Peterbilt. FPII then disassembles that truck
and uses the engine and other drive-train components to build the new vehicle. Major
processes include forming sheet armor into monocoque capsules that make up the cab
and passenger compartments, welding of the monocoque components, and painting. The

71
various fabricated parts are then integrated with the automotive components during final
assembly. All Buffalo production, with the exception of capsule formation, is conducted
at the Ladson facility (Walsh, 2008a, August 6).

Cougar production is very similar except the process starts with direct OEM
components such as Caterpillar engines and Allison transmissions rather than a chassis
cab from a major truck manufacturer. Cougar production is spread between multiple
facilities and among the FPII operating partners such as GDLS in Lima, OH, and
Anniston, AL, as well as Spartan Motors in Charlotte, MI (2008a, August 6). A key
characteristic of the FPII manufacturing process is the high percentage of fabrication
work done in-house. This explains the relatively large workforce and lower production
capacity as compared to IMG. The basic FPII production process is shown in Figure 18.

Figure 18. Basic FPII Production Process

(From Walsh, 2008b, Slide 10)

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 At the start of the MRAP program, supply managers at FPII identified no sourcing
issues with the exception of a specific Timken tapered roller bearing required for transfer
cases. The DX rating assigned to the program alleviated this concern; the company also
worked with its axle supplier, Marmon Herrington, to increase capacity to meet the
increased demand. Armor was not seen as a shortage item, although it was a long-lead
item that took up to 120 days to procure, even with the DX rating (Walsh, 2008a, August
6).

The FPII management was willing to license vehicle designs for production by
other defense contractors at the program start. The company entered a licensing
partnership with General Dynamics, resulting in Cougars being produced by that
company, as well as with BAE. FPII also partnered with Armor Holdings (now owned
by BAE) and Textron, Inc. as a means of expanding production capacity. The company
accepted risk at the start of the MRAP program, investing $50 million in long-lead items
such as armor and axles in anticipation of contract awards and capacity expansion
(2008a, August 6). The raw material investment turned out to be a low-risk decision and
paid off for the company, but the production capacity expansion far exceeded the
eventual contracts that the company received. This over-expansion is evident in the rapid
growth in work force, followed by an approximate 25% reduction in 2008 when FPII did
not receive the anticipated vehicle orders.

The FPII strategy was to create a network of capacity across multiple OEMs,
capitalize on the existing fleet of Cougars and the company’s history to secure the bulk of
the MRAP market, get ahead and stay ahead of schedule, conduct strategic supply base
purchases (at risk), and create a joint venture with a reputable defense contractor.
However, the company has faced challenges based largely on the difficulties in rapidly
transitioning from a small to a large business. Namely, their technical data packages
were immature, unstable, and unable to quickly incorporate changes needed for large-
scale production and licensing across multiple facilities and manufacturers. In addition,
this growth brought tremendous challenges due to the lack of an enterprise resource
planning system that integrated accounting, ordering, estimating, and other functions
(2008a, August 6). Finally, the intensive in-house production process made ramp-up and
73
expansion contingent on rapidly expanding the work force. That work force,
consequently, may need to be further scaled down without substantial new business.

2. International Military and Government, LLC (IMG)

IMG, recently renamed Navistar Defense, is a subsidiary of Navistar International

Corporation, the largest North American manufacturer of medium trucks, school buses,
and diesel engines. Headquartered in Warrenville, IL, Navistar operates major
engineering and manufacturing facilities throughout the US, Canada, and Mexico. Prior
to the MRAP program, Navistar performed no major military work since the World War
II era, when the company was known as International Harvester. In 2004, Navistar’s
CEO, Daniel Ustian, tasked another long-time Navistar employee and executive, Archie
Massicotte, with establishing the IMG subsidiary as a means of expanding the company
business into the military and government arena (Major, 2008, August 22). Since that
time, IMG has established itself as a responsive and high-quality manufacturer, securing
roughly 40% of all orders under the MRAP program, to include 100% of the final vehicle
order for lighter, smaller MRAP vehicles to be used in Afghanistan (Defense Industry
Daily, 2008).

The first major order for IMG actually came from Kellogg, Brown & Root
(KBR), a major services contractor to the DoD, for an armored road tractor to be used in
Iraq. In this effort, IMG teamed with Griffin Incorporated, the leading American
manufacturer of armored vehicles for the non-defense market, producing 558 road
tractors outfitted with 360 degree fully armored cabs. IMG built and delivered these
vehicles, which they call KBR cabs, in five and a half months, demonstrating the ability
to quickly ramp-up manufacturing capacity. This effort started effectively from scratch,
with Griffin Armor acquiring and rehabilitating an old facility in West Point, MS, for the
project. This same facility is being used for final assembly of the IMG MRAP vehicle,
the MaxxPro, along with other vehicles produced within the IMG subsidiary. Griffin
Armor continues to operate the manufacturing facility as an operating partner to IMG
(Munro, 2008, August 22).

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 Following production of the KBR cab, which ended in June 2006, IMG solicited
other orders, and Griffin Armor used the West Point facility to produce a batch of
armored personnel carriers for the Israeli Defense Ministry. During this time, IMG
developed a relationship with the Israeli company Plasan Sasa, which specializes in
developing and manufacturing vehicle armor kits (Munro, 2008, August 22).

When MARCORSYSCOM released the original MRAP solicitation in November

2006, IMG initially developed a proposal in collaboration with a South African company.
Approximately 72 hours before the proposal was due, however, a team from Plasan met
with the IMG president, and convinced him to change the plan. Over the next three days,
the IMG team rewrote the proposal to incorporate the Plasan-designed armor package,
completing and submitting the new proposal on the due date (Major, 2008, August 22).
At that stage, the IMG proposal for the MaxxPro represented a truck in concept only,
with no existing prototype and detailed design and integration work yet to be done.
Because of this and the lack of recent and relevant past performance information, the JPO
considered IMG a high-risk manufacturer. Consequently, IMG was initially awarded
only an IDIQ contract for four test vehicles. This is in contrast to other companies
considered low-risk that were awarded IDIQ contracts and production orders prior to
testing under LRIPs 1 and 2.

Following the initial contract award on January 26, 2007, IMG completed the
detailed design, built prototypes, and delivered the first to the Aberdeen Test Center on
March 10, 2007, beating all other manufacturers with the exception of FPII, which
already had an operational assembly line (Aberdeen Test Center, 2008, August 11, slide
2). During the initial survivability testing of DT-C1, the MaxxPro performed poorly and
was nearly eliminated from the competition. However, IMG and Plasan worked closely
with the test officials, analyzed the test results and redesigned and modified the vehicle,
delivering new prototypes for testing in fewer than two weeks. As the IMG MaxxPro
program manager, John Major summarizes, “That was 10 days that really solidified the
program” (2008, August 22). That version of the MaxxPro passed the threshold
requirements of DT-C1 and led to the first large IMG contract for 1200 vehicles on May
24, 2007 (Owen, 2008, p. 23).
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 Unlike the monocoque capsule characteristic of MRAPs produced by FPII and the
other manufacturers, the IMG MaxxPro consists of a modular design with a capsule that
is bolted together in a series of steps. The design leverages other Navistar subsidiaries,
using a severe service chassis23 produced in Garland, TX. The vehicle is designed for
multiple strikes, with the survivability capsule easily moved from a destroyed chassis to a
new one. The CAT I version of the MaxxPro is shown in Figure 19.

Figure 19. IMG MaxxPro (CAT I)

(From Aberdeen Test Center, 2008, August 11, slide 2)

The modular design of the MaxxPro also contributes to manufacturability. In

addition to the severe service chassis, the armor consists of three kits. The A-kit consists
of the driver platform, firewall, windscreen, and door frames. The C-kit is the engine
armory package. Both kits are incorporated into the pre-existing chassis assembly line in
Garland, TX, allowing the MaxxPro chassis to leave the plant as a drivable chassis,
which reduces rework at the final assembly plant in West Point. The B-kit, which forms
the survivability capsule is then added at West Point and effectively completes the
vehicle. With the current set-up, IMG can produce up to 500 MaxxPro vehicles per
month (Munro, 2008, August 22).

23 The chassis produced in Garland, TX, is in this case a heavy-duty drivable vehicle chassis complete
with frame, drive-train, driver’s platform, and instrument panel.
76
 Unlike the FPII design and assembly process, which places the time- and labor-
intensive manufacturing steps on the final assembly line, IMG traded complexity at the
supply base for speed in final assembly. This reliance on its supplier base exposes IMG
to additional risk, given the tight production timelines of the MRAP program, but it is
also characteristic of a world-class manufacturer in the automotive industry. This
reliance also allowed the company to expand capacity rapidly. As an example, at peak
production of 500 vehicles per month, the West Point facility employed 920 personnel,
compared to more than 2,000 personnel at FPII for a lower production capacity. The
IMG vehicle design, pre-existing operations, and partnering relationships enabled the
company to take the MaxxPro from concept to fielding in larger numbers and
significantly faster than any of its competitors.

In competing for the MRAP program, IMG took substantial risk as a corporation.
As already stated, the JPO considered the company high-risk based on the lack of a
working prototype and recent and relevant past performance information. As a result,
IMG invested in excess of an estimated $20 million to support capacity expansion for
engines, chassis, armor, and other raw materials before receiving the first production
contract (Major, 2008, August 22). It also initially relied on a precarious supplier
arrangement, with Plasan providing the armor by air from Israel. This risk acceptance
paid off for IMG, however; out of a total of more than 15,000 vehicles procured under the
MRAP program, more than 6,000 will be manufactured by IMG.

3. SFI Fabrication24

One of the major IMG armor fabricators is SFI Fabrication, a small company with
plants in Memphis, TN; Conway, AR; and New Boston, OH. Prior to the MRAP
program, SFI had an existing relationship with International School Bus, another
subsidiary within Navistar. In the original IMG sourcing arrangement, Plasan Sasa
supplied the fabricated armor for the MaxxPro vehicles, and through the International
School Bus/SFI relationship developed SFI as a fabricator in their supply chain (2008,

24 The information in this section was derived from a plant visit and group interview with company
managers (Carr, Collins, & Daniel, 2008, August 22).
77
August 22). When Plasan Sasa proved unable to meet the supply requirements, IMG then
developed its own domestic supply chain for armor and fabrication, retaining SFI as a
major subcontractor. Although SFI currently conducts a large part of the fabrication for
IMG, the armor plate sourcing is handled entirely by IMG.

SFI did military work in the past, but the MRAP program was the first involving
armor, which requires different procedures for welding and other fabrication. It also
represents the first experience working under a DX rating. The large amount of work
required an increase in work force, which was the biggest challenge. To fill new
positions, SFI held numerous job fairs and started an in-house welding school to improve
the skills of its welders. Concerning the DX rating, the company had to shift work
between the three company facilities as well as outsource some work in order to establish
the most efficient production mix. In some cases, pre-existing orders were delayed by the
MRAP program, but other SFI customers were patient given the circumstances (Carr,
Collins, & Daniel, 2008, August 22).

An initial area of concern for SFI as work began on the MRAP program involved
CARC paint, which is required for all military vehicles. Chemical Agent Resistant
Coating (CARC) is not widely used within industry, few companies are certified in its
application, and capacity is typically small for those that are. As of August 2008, SFI
was sub-contracting work to four different CARC painters (2008, August 22). In
addition, the use of multiple, geographically dispersed subcontractors introduced
inefficiency in the supply chain, as fabricated components are shipped from the SFI
facility in Memphis to places such as Fort Wayne, IN, and Huntsville, AL, for CARC
paint, while the West Point MaxxPro plant is only 150 miles south of the SFI Memphis
facility.

This look at SFI provides key insight at the lower levels of the supply chain.
First, the industrial base can and does quickly respond to urgent, lifesaving DoD
requirements. Obviously, financial incentive existed in this program for a company such
as SFI, but managers also spoke of the moral imperative they felt to support this program.
A second observation is that the SFI CARC paint issues demonstrate the detail in which
the supply chain must be examined when attempting a rapid acquisition. SFI is one of
78
several suppliers to multiple manufacturers, all competing for essentially the same
resources. This requires consideration of seemingly obscure items such as paint, in
addition to the obvious issues such as tires and steel.

C. INTEGRATION OF GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT (GFE)25

At the MRAP program outset, one of the initial areas of concern involved the
integration of GFE. This effort involves the installation of an average of 10 additional
systems per vehicle. These systems range from internal components such as radio
mounts, intercom systems, and driver night sights, to external systems such as IED
frequency jammers, spotlights, and antennae. To add to the complexity involved with
adding these systems to multiple variants of vehicles from five manufacturers, each
Service and SOCOM required unique packages of GFE. In addition, the GFE
requirements have never stabilized, making the integration effort a process of continuous
change and refinement. Figure 20, the current vehicle mix by Service, and Figure 21, the
GFE packages by Service, clearly demonstrate the number of unique variations and
complexity involved in this process. They also show the criticality of integration within
the overall value stream.

25 The majority of the information in this section is drawn from an interview with Peter Ward (2008,
August 5), Industrial Engineer at SPAWAR Systems Center Charleston.
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 Figure 20. MRAP Variant Mix by Service
(From Mann, 2008, Slide 14)

Figure 21. Government Furnished Equipment by Service

(From Mann, 2008, Slide 13)
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 The decision to use the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center (SPAWAR) in
Charleston, SC, was made at the MRAP program outset based on the previous integration
effort with up-armored HMMWVs for the Marine Corps. Through work on HMMWVs,
SPAWAR developed facilities, processes, and expertise in rapidly integrating multiple
vehicles, thereby offering a unique capability at exactly the time it was needed. As a
Navy asset, SPAWAR involvement as a major contributor to a ground combat system
program seems unconventional. However, this effort is very much in line with the
SPAWAR core mission, which revolves around engineering and command, control,
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR)
capabilities. As Peter Ward, Industrial Engineer at SPAWAR points out, the organization
focuses on those capabilities and how they can be applied on any platform (2008, August
5). In that respect, the SPAWAR core mission encompasses the types of systems
included in MRAP integration. Additionally, SPAWAR involvement reflects the recent
focus on “joint-ness” in warfighting and in acquisitions. As embodied in the JCIDS
process, the MRAP program brings the best capabilities from across the DoD.

In addition to the prior integration work and engineering capability, SPAWAR

offered a number of other advantages that made it the logical choice for the effort. First,
the SPAWAR location in Charleston positions it near a railhead, a major Air Force Base
with a C-17, wing and a secure seaport, all of which add efficiency in the value stream.
Charleston Naval Weapons Station is also home to the Army 841st Transportation
Battalion, which would oversee the transportation from the continental U.S. into the
CENTCOM AO no matter where the integration occurred. Second, SPAWAR provided
precisely the testing capability needed for rapid integration prototyping with its Poseidon
Park facility. This facility is one of only a few in the U.S. that enables three critical tests
needed for this effort26, reducing timeframes to 30 or fewer days—a process that can
sometimes take years (Ward, 2008, August 5).

26 The Poseidon Park facility is used for: (1) co-sight interference testing to determine interference
between GFE components, (2) hazard-to-personnel testing to determine whether GFE combinations created
unacceptable levels of radiation for users, and (3) antenna pattern testing. All are necessary to determine
safe and effective combinations and positioning of GFE on the vehicles.
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 The integration process at SPAWAR consists of two steps: prototyping and full
rate integration. The prototype process is an engineering design process that involves a
team of engineers who take each variant and determine the optimal fit for the required
equipment. On average, this process takes the team 30 days and includes testing as
described above for each prototype. The engineers, all government employees, take the
approved design and create installation manuals. These installation manuals are then
passed to the SPAWAR lead contractor, which oversees GFE installation in the full-rate
integration process. Government quality assurance representatives (QARs) work with the
contracted employees to ensure the installations are being done in accordance with the
instruction manual intent and that every installation is tested to ensure it functions as
designed. The location of prototype engineers, integrators, and QARs under one roof,
with test facilities close by, were key in the rapid prototyping and continuous changes
needed for the program (Ward, 2008, August 5).

With the large number of MRAP variants, ever-changing GFE combinations, and
incorporation of feedback from warfighters, the full-rate integration process is constantly
evolving. Because of this, the 25 production lines at SPAWAR were not able to simply
replicate tasks in assembly line fashion. At one point, each line had an average turnover
of four variants per week. The organization has since found ways to control that
variation, and the integration process now falls somewhere between a job shop and
assembly line operation. Each installation crew is now cross-trained on three to four
variations, enabling better control of manufacturing tasks. SPAWAR also implemented a
Lean Six Sigma program to track key production metrics and implement continuous
process improvements.

As previously explained, the scale of the integration effort and the unknown
production capacity at SPAWAR was a major area of concern at the start of the MRAP
program. With the process improvements discussed, as well as with continuous
partnering efforts with vehicle and GFE manufacturers to shift labor intensive tasks such
as bracket installation, welding, and painting farther up the value stream, SPAWAR built
capacity to match or exceed the flow of vehicles from manufacturers. Although

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integration time varies by vehicle, as of this writing the SPAWAR average of about 10
days per-vehicle far exceeds the original goal of 30 days per-vehicle (Ward, 2008,
August 5).

Success in the integration effort can be attributed to four key factors. First, the
focus on partnering between all members of the value stream enabled SPAWAR to work
with vehicle and GFE manufacturers in implementing changes throughout the production
process in order to speed the integration effort. Second, the top-down focus on parallel
and concurrent processes fostered continuous installation, regardless of test status during
the integration process. Although this focus added expense and the possibility of rework,
it also increased the importance of rapid defect correction to prevent large amounts of
rework. The drawback was that some defects may have been discovered further along in
production than would have been the case in a more deliberate process. Third, the JPO
focus on the overall program strategy and objectives (as many survivable vehicles as
quickly as possible) permeated every part of the value stream to include the integration
effort. This translated into increased cooperation between all participants in the process,
as well as a higher level of dedication and commitment from the integration team, which
conducted continuous operations on a seven-day-per-week schedule with major emphasis
on improving throughput. Finally, the SPAWAR location and capability made it the
ideal location for the effort.

D. DCMA INVOLVEMENT27

A critical participant in the MRAP program, from its start through final vehicle
delivery to warfighters, has been the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA).
Capt. Joseph Manna, Commander of DCMA Atlanta, summarized the MRAP effort by
stating: “If we would have followed normal bureaucratic procedures, we would have
failed the mission” (2008, August 5). The first DCMA work on the program included
assistance to the JPO in completing industrial and pre-award surveys. These core
functions enabled the JPO to determine, at the outset, the industrial capacity for vehicle

27 This section draws largely from an interview with Capt. Joe Manna, Commander of DCMA Atlanta
(Manna, 2008a, August 5).
83
production, as well as the responsibility of each manufacturer. Following contract award,
DCMA focus shifted to contract administration and quality assurance, with oversight on
the value stream from the lowest tier suppliers to movement into the CENTCOM AO.

Given the MRAP program status as the highest DoD acquisition priority, DCMA
developed a strategy to reflect this. The strategy included the following efforts:

• work closely with the JPO and OEMs to preclude or fix acceptance issues
early in the production process;

• execute thorough process proofing for new production and integration lines;

• influence prime and sub-contractors to smooth delivery schedules;

• survey critical supplier inventories and deliveries daily; team with the JPO to
validate new vendors;

• issue letters of delegation to target DCMA support at key facilities;

• provide feedback from SPAWAR to OEMs on identified deficiencies; and,

• participate in integration cut-in efforts at OEM. (Manna, 2008, September 8,

Slide 15).

All efforts were made with a focus on speeding delivery of vehicles to

warfighters, while providing quality assurance and enabling flexibility in the ever-
changing process. Key in these efforts were the close interactions between DCMA and
all stakeholders involved in production. To facilitate these efforts, Capt. Manna focused
on teaming arrangements between DCMA staff, manufacturers, and the integration team
at SPAWAR. This team relationship differed from the sometimes adversarial
relationship between DCMA and contractors (Manna, 2008, August 5).

A vital characteristic of the MRAP program is the emphasis on concurrency. This

involves keeping vehicles moving down the line - taking corrective action and/or
implementing ECPs as the vehicles continue moving toward the ultimate transportation
point. For the MRAP program, this meant conditional acceptance of vehicles at the two
primary DCMA inspection and acceptance points: following production at the

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manufacturer facilities and upon arrival for integration at SPAWAR. This conditional
acceptance applied only to minor deficiencies and non-critical parts shortages and came
with a mutually agreed-upon plan for correction, a suspense date, and any necessary
contract remedies.28 Compared to standard acquisition programs of a non-rapid nature,
this conditional acceptance is unique; DCMA would normally require correction of all
deficiencies prior to acceptance. In addition, conditional acceptance inherently adds risk
due to the addition of tracking requirements and the chance that deficiencies can be
passed to the user. In the case of the MRAP, however, the need was of such importance
that continuous flow of the vehicles toward warfighters was the primary concern
(Gregory, 2008, August 5). The MRAP JPO therefore implemented a process to make
this continuous flow of vehicles possible, allowing small deficiencies to pass through
with the understanding that the manufacturers would correct those deficiencies before
final delivery to users. This should not be considered a best practice for most programs,
however, because even small deficiencies can cause the user to lose confidence in a
product, and conditional acceptance will inevitably result in some of these deficiencies
reaching the user.

A notable feature of the DCMA quality assurance program for the MRAP vehicle
is that it attempted to identify all defects prior to shipment overseas, rather than waiting
for the Product Quality Deficiency Report (PQDR) process that would eventually identify
defects in the field. Any quality issues are captured in written form as part of the PQDR
Process, an investigation is performed to determine the root cause of the issue, the results
are screened for validity, and the PM then takes any necessary action to resolve the
problem (Marine Corps Logistics Command, 2008). In the MRAP program, however,
DCMA personnel inspect every vehicle, finding issues that would normally be addressed
in the PQDR process and fixing them through teaming arrangements with manufacturer
FSRs. DCMA typically tries to do this in all production efforts; the difference for the

28 The PM detailed the conditional acceptance policy in a program policy letter. This policy limited
conditional acceptance to minor deficiencies or non-critical parts shortages. Any deficiencies related to
safety, survivability, drivability, or HVAC system operation were generally not authorized for conditional
acceptance; authority for conditional acceptance in these cases was held at the PM level. Such vehicles
were considered shipped in place, with deficiencies corrected before shipment from the manufacturer
facility (Mann, 2007).
85
MRAP program is that its production cycle will end before the PQDR process can
provide useful feedback. In this way, DCMA provides the only timely quality assurance
feedback for the MRAP program.

Another notable trade-off made in order to maximize industry participation in the

program and speed production was the initial acceptance of immature quality systems
among the manufacturers. The MRAP contracts contained essentially the same quality
system requirements as any program to include compliance with ISO 9001 standards or
an equivalent system. The difference for the MRAP program was recognition that rapid
capacity expansion for some of the manufacturers would result in quality issues that
would not be addressed as fast as the desired production rate. This held true for
manufacturers with immature processes and quality systems such as FPII. This decision
led to the full inspection of every vehicle, rather than spot inspection and lot acceptance.
In the case of FPII, it also allowed a small manufacturer to participate in a program where
the quality system requirement may normally have prevented it. Although this increased
risk in the process, the DCMA involvement mitigated this risk throughout the value
stream, ensuring quality through end item inspection and on-site quality control
monitoring (D. Hansen, personal communication, November 6, 2008).

This brief overview covers only a portion of the DCMA effort involved in the
program, but it shows the level of involvement by an agency already stretched thin on
personnel. Given the MRAP program priority, DCMA shifted personnel from other
oversight projects such as at FN Manufacturing, where M-240 machine guns, M-249
squad automatic weapons, and M-16 rifles are produced (Manna, 2008, August 5). This
again points to the trend of risk acceptance throughout the MRAP program. In this case,
not only were personnel removed from oversight positions supporting other programs,
these personnel were re-assigned to oversee work outside their areas of expertise.

E. KEY FACTORS AND TRADE-OFFS

This in-depth look at the production value stream provides insight to the factors
that made the MRAP program successful from a production and integration perspective.
The program priority, as communicated by the Secretary of Defense and executed by the
86
JPO, is evident throughout the process. Accordingly, a number of key factors contributed
to success in meeting the overall program objectives of fielding as many survivable
vehicles as fast as possible. First, the use of multiple vehicle manufacturers was a critical
trade-off that allowed maximum expansion and use of the industrial base. This allowed
the program to leverage the strengths of each participating manufacturer and pre-
established supply chains. Attempts to focus on a common design would likely have
resulted in increased competition for limited resources and a corresponding reduction in
capacity. In addition, this decision brought in manufacturers that may have been less
likely to commit resources given an all-or-nothing outcome. Finally, the competition
brought about by multiple manufacturers allowed the Government to determine the best
vehicles and shift production in that direction later in the program.

A second key factor in the production and integration effort involved the detailed
DoD look at the entire supply chain, which allowed identification of key resource
constraints such as tires and steel, and allowed for the implementation of efforts to
mitigate these constraints. It also demonstrates the range of tools available to assist a
rapid defense acquisition, such as a DX rating under the Defense Priorities and Allocation
System. This powerful tool gives the Government priority status for materials needed for
the program as well as resources needed to manufacture the product.

A third factor evident in this effort, as well as the entire MRAP program, is the
focus on concurrent processes. As discussed under T&E, this factor introduces risk into
the program as it increases the chance of rework or of fielding a vehicle difficult to
sustain. The benefit, however, is that concurrency again contributes to the overall
program strategy and speeds the capability to warfighters.

A fourth factor evident throughout the production and integration phases is the
focus on partnering. These efforts, fostered by the JPO and DCMA, teamed MRAP
manufacturers with test officials, DCMA representatives, and system integrators at
SPAWAR. This teaming effort led to increased communications throughout the value
stream and resulted in continual product and process improvement.

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 Finally, the use of SPAWAR as the systems integration facility proved one of the
key program factors. By leveraging the SPAWAR capability and location, the program
turned a potential bottleneck into one of the greatest successes.

As discussed throughout, key decisions that enabled success based on program

strategy carried trade-offs that must be considered. Throughout all phases of the
program, one in particular is pervasive. That trend, a trade-off of logistical sustainability
in favor of maximized production, is the focus of the next section of this project.

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 VI. PROGRAM LOGISTICS

A. MANPOWER & PERSONNEL

Prior to the MRAP program establishment in December 2006, only three

personnel within MARCORSYSCOM were assigned to oversee the limited amount of
MRAP vehicles that had been previously procured. These three were the program
manager, the contracting officer, and an administrative assistant. Following the
designation of the MRAP requests as a JUONS, an Integrated Product Team (IPT) was
formed to draft a RFP to solicit manufacturers who could produce and deliver these
vehicles rapidly. As the program started to gain momentum, there was still little growth
in personnel numbers up until July 2007. Up until this point, there was a two pronged
approach to program expansion. The Army set up its own program office for the MRAP
vehicle with eight to ten personnel from TACOM whose purpose was to focus on MRAP
issues and participate on IPTs. At the same time, the Marine Corps established a staff of
25 personnel that included logisticians, contract specialists, and financial managers.
Some of these personnel were also well experienced in program and project management.
Additionally, about 60 contracted personnel provided support services. In total, until July
2007, less than 100 personnel worked on the MRAP program29 (D. Hansen, personal
communication, October 15, 2008).

During this time, nine different manufacturers received contracts for the
production of MRAP vehicles, seven of which eventually delivered prototype vehicles for
testing. These manufacturers were IMG, FPII, BAE, AH, OTC, PVI, and GDLS. The
program office had one individual overseeing each of the three categories of these
vehicles, as well as the manufacturers offering vehicles within that category. For
individuals directly involved with the program, this meant long working hours, working

29 This does not include the approximate 250 previously mentioned personnel on theT&E team at
Aberdeen Proving Ground.
89
outside their expertise, and multi-tasking. After reorganizing the program office in
August 2007, the JPO assigned an Assistant Program Manager (APM) to oversee each
manufacturer product.

The JPO also managed to enlist the services of personnel from the Air Force and
the Navy who are not assigned to the program but still contribute by sharing the workload
and providing expertise. As of this writing, the Army alone has over 200 personnel from
TACOM and the Tank Automotive Research, Development, and Engineering Center
(TARDEC) who contribute to the MRAP program. Although these Army personnel are
task organized to the program, they are not assigned and remain separated not only by
distance, but also by culture and lack of a formal program of record. The organizational
structure shown in Figure 22 displays the positions within the JPO as of this writing, and
demonstrates the growth in the program in less than two years (D. Hansen, personal
communication, October 15, 2008). This chart was the basis for “right-sizing” of the
program.

90
 Figure 22. MRAP JPO Personnel Overview
(After MRAP JPO, 2008, September 15)

Unlike the other Services, Marine Corps personnel involved with the program are
all directly assigned to the JPO. As of this writing, that number is 40 personnel, with
augmentation by ten Navy and three Air Force personnel, as well as over 200 support
contractors within the Quantico area. This brings the total number of personnel within
the JPO to just fewer than 580, approximately 200 of whom are task organized for MRAP
support, but not assigned to the JPO. This number also includes individuals that are
assigned part time to the program from various agencies. Although the separation by
distance between the various organizations under the JPO implies a difficult organization
to manage, this separation has not affected the timeliness of the program. In retrospect,
this program has managed to get more accomplished with fewer personnel and in a
91
shorter amount of time when compared to other joint programs. For most of the program
existence, the JPO functioned with less than 60 government employees and yet still
managed to meet mission goals (Hansen, 2008, June 10). Figure 23 depicts the structure
of the MRAP JPO, current as of this writing.

Figure 23. MRAP JPO Organizational Structure

(From MRAP JPO, 2008c)

Besides accomplishing MRAP contracting, testing, production, and fielding very

rapidly, the compactness of the initial JPO produced advantages in that by starting small,
the program grew towards right-sizing its personnel as opposed to spread-loading
requirements. With the expansion in personnel, individuals who initially worked in
excess of 100 hours per week were able to transition to a more reasonable work schedule
of 60 hours per week or less. Additionally, by growing the personnel numbers, the JPO
allowed individuals who were specialized in certain fields to focus on their areas of
expertise. Prior to the expansion of personnel, individuals had to execute all ten elements
92
of logistics singlehandedly with the assistance of a few support personnel. As of this
writing, the individuals associated with the program are specialized in their particular
fields and are capable of doing their jobs effectively because they only have to focus on
their own work (Hansen, 2008, June 10).

In summary, the expansion of the JPO reduced the need for over-tasking
personnel. This expansion also allowed specialization rather than the multi-tasking
prevalent at the program inception. Even considering these strides, the program
continues to face a less than ideal organizational structure in that it is an ad hoc
organization and is not a program of record within the DoD.

B. TECHNICAL DATA

Contractually, MRAP vehicles were treated as commercial items and were

therefore procured under fixed-price contracts from the start. Given this commercial item
designation and the relatively small 1,185 vehicle requirement at the program start, the
MRAP JPO did not initially purchase technical data from any of the vehicle
manufacturers. All vehicles were originally intended to be maintained by the
manufacturers, with reliance on contractor logistics support (CLS). Therefore, purchase
of technical data was deemed unnecessary during the initial procurement period.
However, when the required number of MRAP vehicles increased, the JPO changed the
sustainment plan to transition from CLS to hybrid/organic maintenance. This required
some technical data for the provisioning of parts, specifically the engineering data for
provisioning (EDFP) (Hansen, 2008, June 10). EDFPs are the drawings for parts and
components that will be provisioned to support repair parts requirements.

With the EDFP from each manufacturer, the JPO was able to use the Defense
Logistics Agency (DLA) system to compare identical, or similar, components that were
already listed by National Stock Numbers (NSN). This enabled the JPO to determine if
identical parts or suitable substitutes existed within the defense supply system; parts that
didn’t exist in the DoD supply system required new NSNs and addition to the supply
system. In many cases, the EDFP was proprietary to prevent reverse engineering of
components by competing manufacturers, but was used by the Government to find
93
suitable substitutes (Hansen, 2008, June 10). An example of this is the Caterpillar C7
engine which is used in two of the MRAP vehicle variants, as well as the Marine Corps
LAV and the Army Stryker vehicles. Most of the parts on this engine already existed in
the supply system, making provisioning simple. IMG, on the other hand, used its own
proprietary engines that were not previously used within the DoD. Provisioning in this
case required significantly more time and effort, as new NSNs were assigned and
cataloged within the supply system.

As stated by Deputy PM, Dave Hansen, “Ninety-nine percent of all technical data
is used for provisioning and making sure that we can support the parts in the system for a
long period of time” (2008, June 10). Therefore, even if a component is proprietary with
no match in the supply system, the JPO can still load the component into the system,
identifying it as being solely distributed by a particular manufacturer. In addition, EDFP
serves as a form of insurance that allows the Government to procure a needed part even if
the original manufacturer goes out of business or stops producing that part. Finally,
EDFP assists the DLA in accepting or rejecting a product, thereby helping to ensure that
the end users get suitable parts.

Within the MRAP program, the manufacturers were required to participate in a

production verification audit. This audit held all manufacturers accountable for the
technical data they provided and assisted the JPO in understanding vehicle configuration
provided by each of the manufacturers. The JPO insisted that manufacturers correct
discrepancies when found, and with the assistance of DCMA quality assurance personnel,
verified the product met the specifications of the technical data. Correction of
discrepancies in the technical data helps the Government to maintain an accurate EDFP
database with which to support sustainment operations (D. Hansen, personal
communication, 2008, October 15).

The technical data for the MRAP program concerning maintenance is currently
collected at the unit or organizational level. Data indicating reliability, maintainability,
and operational availability would normally be available as the result of testing and
therefore influence acquisition programs, but the MRAP program rapid testing with
emphasis on survivability prevented this data from being collected prior to vehicle
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procurement. Data such as mean time between failure (MTBF), mean time to failure
(MTTF), mean down time (MDT), and mean time to repair (MTTR) were instead
gathered after procurement. This represents risk acceptance by the JPO in support of the
program objectives, as well as a potential trade-off of reliability, maintainability, and
availability in exchange for speed in fielding. The absence of reliability and failure data
from vehicle testing increased sustainment risk; that is, reliability and failure information
contributes to accurate quantity estimation needed for repair parts provisioning.

C. DESIGN INTERFACES

Considering the multiple manufacturers and vehicle variants involved in the

MRAP program, integration of equipment was a major challenge. As previously
discussed, each Service had unique GFE requirements and some Services had
requirements unique to specific units or applications.

The original solicitation provided the minimum essential interface controls

identified at the program start for Mission Equipment Packages (MEP), considering that
multiple manufacturers would be used. These interfaces were identified based on the
space, power, heat load, cabling, cableways, and all through-hull connections required.
Figure 24 is an example of a list of Mission Equipment Package items identified by the
JPO for integration into the CAT II Infantry Tactical Maneuver Vehicle. Additional
MEP packages were specified for the CAT II Ambulance vehicle, the CAT II Convoy
vehicle, and the CAT I Reconnaissance vehicle. By tasking the manufacturers to provide
key interfaces necessary for the SPAWAR integration effort under a “plug and play”
concept, the JPO achieved success in providing full functionality of the MRAP variants
before they ever reached using units. This relieved the crew or organization-level
mechanics from the burden of configuring MRAPS for in-theater operations. Continuous
crew feedback has also led to modifications to improve the fit and functionality of the
MEPs.

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 MISSION EQUIPMENT PACKAGE
Infantry Tactical Maneuver Vehicle (CAT II)
Weapons System
M2 50 Caliber Machine Gun MK 19 40 mm Grenade Machine Gun
M240 B 7.62mm Machine Gun TOW Improved Target Acquisition System
Gunner Protection Kits Common Remotely Operated Weapons
Station (CROWS)
Command, Control, Communication & Computers (C4)
Dual Radio ASIP SINCGARS FBCB2 - Blue Force Tracker
Vehicle Intercom System (VIS) Enhanced Position Location Reporting System
(EPLRS)
Sensors and Countermeasures
Driver Viewer Enhancer White and IR Spotlight
Counter Remote Electronic Warfare System
Loudspeaker public address system (CREW)

Figure 24. MEP Items Identified for Integration by the JPO

(After MRAP JPO, 2006).

By identifying key integration requirements early in the program, the JPO enabled
the manufacturers to modify designs without compromising personnel safety or structural
integrity of the vehicles. Again, however, a trade-off was made in that less than 100% of
the required interfaces were identified at the program start. This trade for time at the
program start led to a more labor intensive and time-consuming installation effort at the
SPAWAR integration site.

D. COMPUTER RESOURCES

Two computer applications played a critical role in the MRAP program. They are
Wide Area Work Flow (WAWF) and Windchill (WC). Both of these Internet-based
applications facilitated the simultaneous flow of information among multiple points,
which was essential to the MRAP program success, given its widely dispersed operations.
These applications allowed all parties involved to see a common operating picture with
the most up-to-date information, despite their geographical separation. Both of these
Internet sharing applications allowed JPO and other personnel to conduct concurrent

96
activities based on real time information. Every functional area within the MRAP JPO
had a station set up for WAWF and/or WC access, providing all personnel with the latest
information (D. Hansen, personal communication, 2008, October 15).

WAWF is a paperless, DoD-wide contract administration system designed to

eliminate paper from the receipt and acceptance process of the DoD contracting lifecycle.
The goal is to give authorized defense contractors and DoD personnel the ability to create
invoices, receive reports, and access contract related documents. Traditional DoD
business methods call for three documents to make a payment: the contract, the receiving
report, and the invoice. However, this is only true if the paper method is being used.
These three documents are processed separately, and information is then manually keyed
into the payment system (Defense Finance and Accounting Service, n.d.). The WAWF
application eliminates the paper trail and redundant processes, and instantly shares all
documents electronically. It also increases the accuracy of the data while reducing the
risk of losing documents. WAWF was primarily used by the DCMA representatives who
supported this program, the MRAP JPO staff, and the MRAP manufacturers.

WAWF provides many benefits such as improved efficiency, data accuracy, and
speed of payment. For the MRAP program, however, the main benefit was in providing
contractors and the DoD immediate accessibility to requisite documents from anywhere
in the world. This mitigated the risk of conditional vehicle acceptance, because it
facilitated the deficiency tracking and resolution process. As previously discussed, this
conditional vehicle acceptance is an example of the concurrency of effort that contributed
to the program success.

The second important application, Windchill, is business collaboration software

that is designed to enable development efficiencies while reducing errors and rework.
This software assists in managing distributed product development, product content,
business processes, and complex information assets (Parametric Technology Corporation,
n.d.). It is fast, secure, scalable and interoperable, which enabled the JPO to post and
share documents, despite having manufacturers and departments dispersed across the US.
This Internet-based method proved an efficient way for the JPO to share information
when individuals were not operating at their local workstations. It not only worked
97
within the continental U.S. (CONUS), but also for sharing information between the
CONUS-based JPO and individuals deployed in the CENTCOM AO (D. Hansen,
personal communication, 2008, October 15).

WC benefited the JPO because it reduced rework and therefore saved time. WC
also enhanced the cross-enterprise understanding of program activity because it allowed
everyone to see a common operating picture. Finally, WC gave its users within the JPO
the freedom of mobility. Since information could be accessed almost anywhere,
individuals were not restricted to working from their cubicles, but could execute their
functions even from manufacturer facilities. Information flow within WC is depicted in
Figure 25.

Figure 25. Windchill Field Issues and Response

(From Conway, 2008, Slide 26)

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E. MAINTENANCE PLANNING

A major factor in the high readiness rate of MRAP vehicles has been the use of
contractor logistics support (CLS) during initial fielding. In the summer of 2007, as
MRAP vehicle requirements expanded dramatically, the JPO shifted to a hybrid/organic
approach, with eventual plans for fully organic sustainment. CLS, however, remained
critical. Prior to the transition to organic support at the unit level, the ratio of FSRs to
vehicles was one to ten. The JPO attained this ratio by pooling the efforts of original
equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and organizing cross-training among the FSRs from
each manufacturer. As an example of the commitment of one manufacturer to the
program, FPII went from 105 FSRs to 300 in just a matter of months (Walsh, 2008a,
August 6).

The short ramp-up to MRAP fielding did not afford the program time to fully test
the vehicles for maintainability, nor did the JPO initially develop a maintenance plan
beyond CLS. Given the commercial item designation, the JPO originally determined that
manufacturers would maintain their own products; this created the need for FSRs.

As of this writing, unit organic maintenance personnel perform 10-level (crew-

level) and some 20-level (organization-level) MRAP vehicle maintenance, while FSRs
perform 20- and higher-level maintenance. In most cases, FSRs supervise the 10-level
maintenance and ensure it is being properly performed. Additionally, to keep up with the
latest technology, organic maintenance personnel do perform minor modification work
orders within their capabilities. This prevents the necessity of running combat patrols to
the regional support activities (RSAs) for purely maintenance purposes. For example,
modifications such as 360 degree light kits and integration of other GFE have been
completed by unit maintenance personnel in theater (Hansen, 2008, June 10).

For the maintenance policy at the unit level including preventive maintenance
procedures, FSRs and unit maintenance officers of each unit are responsible for updating
and making recommended changes. This is attributable to the limited endurance and
reliability testing prior to vehicle procurement, which did not allow determination of
MTBF, MTTR, or other data necessary in developing maintenance procedures. The

99
strategy was simple: ensure that repair parts are on hand, and then drive the MRAP until
it breaks. Although these vehicles were commercially acquired, the standard unit
mechanic’s toolset contained most of the tools needed to work on the MRAP. The only
missing item, a fixture required for removal and installation of the MaxxPro belly-plate,
has since been provided by IMG (D. Hansen, personal communication, 2008, November
14).

As of this writing, the JPO has achieved its goal of 90% operational readiness
(OR) rate (MRAP JPO, 2008, October 21). This success is directly attributable to the
decision to use CLS early in the program. This enabled the JPO to rapidly field the
vehicles and maintain a high OR rate, while buying time for building the organic
capability to sustain the MRAP fleet. This provides yet another example of how
concurrency of effort contributed to success in the MRAP program.

F. TRAINING

FSR and uniformed mechanic training courses are conducted at the Red River
Army Depot (RRAD) in Texarkana, Texas. Participants in this training come from
across the Services and MRAP manufacturers. This consolidated training was
implemented by the JPO and was named MRAP University (Hansen, 2008, June 10).

1. MRAP University

MRAP University offers cross-platform training geared towards familiarizing all

attendees with the five most common MRAP vehicles, as shown in Figure 26. MRAP
University was created to provide a common place to familiarize personnel on operations
and maintenance of the multiple variants of MRAP vehicles. It is run by TACOM and
has been active since November 2007. Until September 19, 2008, MRAP University
offered two courses, the Field Level Maintenance Training Course and the Operator
Training Course, both 40 hours in length. These courses provided basic familiarization
and operator training, as well as an overview of maintenance, diagnostics and
troubleshooting, and recovery procedures.

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 The Operator Training Course was directed at unit level operators and covered
basic familiarization, preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS), day and night
driver training, emergency and recovery procedures, and operator level troubleshooting
and maintenance (MRAP University, n.d.).

The Field Level Maintenance Training Course was focused on FSRs, instructors,
TACOM LARs, and key military personnel such as Battalion Maintenance Officers
(BMOs) and Battalion Maintenance Technicians (BMTs). For each of the five vehicles,
this course covered basic vehicle characteristics, safety, warnings and cautions, operation,
maintenance procedures, diagnostics and troubleshooting procedures, and finally, an
overview of the recovery procedures (MRAP University, n.d.).

Figure 26. The Vehicles of MRAP University

(After Hansen, 2008, June 4, slide 10).

The success of MRAP University resulted in a shift in focus after September 19,
2008, from basic operator and maintenance training to more in-depth familiarization.
The maintenance familiarization course is now 5 weeks long and covers vehicle
characteristics; safety; warnings and cautions; operation of MRAP vehicles; heating,
ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems; maintenance procedures; diagnostics
and troubleshooting procedures; and recovery procedures, with heavy emphasis on
troubleshooting procedures and maintenance of air conditioning units. The operator
familiarization course is now 2 weeks long and is designed for unit master drivers as

101
opposed to operators. This course covers the same topics as the original Operator
Training Course but with a focus on training unit trainers instead of actual operators
(MRAP University, n.d.).

In addition to the training provided by MRAP University, the Infantry Center at

Fort Benning, GA, published a “Smartbook” covering basic vehicle characteristics and
employment for all MRAP variants (United States Army Infantry Center, 2008).
Together, MRAP University and the Smartbook provide operators and maintainers the
minimum information needed to successfully employ the vehicles. More importantly,
they demonstrate that training and doctrine development programs can quickly adapt to
major rapid acquisitions.

2. Manufacturer-Provided Training

Some manufacturers have taken the basic training, described above, to a higher
level by establishing their own facilities and offering training to Service members as well
as FSRs from other manufacturers. Participation of FSRs who work for competitors does
potentially expose proprietary data and technology to view by other manufacturers;
however, as FPII Executive Vice President Damon Walsh stated, “this is support for the
troops so we do it for their (other manufacturers’) guys, too.” FPII provides a training
program and facilities and offers 40 to 50 hours of FSR training per week. Additionally,
FPII requires that trainers have 90 days of job experience and training before they are
slotted as trainers (2008, August 6).

Once FSRs have achieved their individual skill levels, they rotate with
counterparts in theater and the returning FSRs share their knowledge with engineers and
management stateside. This contributes to recommended changes in MRAP vehicles
based on lessons learned from the returning FSRs. Unlike the other manufacturers, IMG
does not provide its own FSRs, but instead subcontracts that requirement to DynCorp.
Although this relieves IMG from the requirement to train and provide FSRs, it also may
constrain a potential feedback loop when compared to other manufacturers. When IMG
wants or needs information about its vehicles, it must request that through DynCorp
(Major, 2008, August 22).
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 FSR cross-training has proven vital to the operational availability of the MRAP
vehicle fleet. As a combat multiplier, FSRs have enabled the DoD to field MRAPs
without trained maintenance personnel at the organizational level. This risk acceptance
was based upon the urgent need and on the fact that MRAP maintenance could leverage
FSR knowledge and relevant skills of organizational-level mechanics. In this respect,
organizational level maintenance personnel already possessed some of the basic
automotive maintenance skills needed to work on MRAPs. This represents another
example of the JPO accepting risk by fielding vehicles before development of a training
program for operators and maintainers. This risk acceptance was not without cost,
however. As reported by the Associated Press, at least 66 MRAP-related accidents
occurred between November 2007 and June 2008, with at least 40 of those rollovers
caused by bad roads, weak bridges, or driver error. These accidents resulted in five
soldier deaths (Associated Press, 2008). Such incidents arguably might have happened in
any vehicle, but this vividly demonstrates the trade-offs made in fielding MRAPs so
rapidly.

G. LOGISTICS SUPPORT

The initial JPO logistics support strategy was to employ a pure CLS approach
with manufacturer FSRs and 90-day spares packages supplied at vehicle fielding. The
90-day spares packages were determined by the OEMs based on expected short-term
parts needs. The initial plan also called for centralized fielding, centralized support, a
ratio of one FSR for every ten vehicles, and the use of non-standard COTS manuals.
However, as the program grew from 1,185 to more than 15,000 vehicles, the JPO had to
adjust the strategy. Based on the need to get this significantly larger number of MRAP
vehicles into the hands of warfighters as quickly as possible, the JPO had to conduct
decentralized simultaneous fieldings as well as perform de-centralized support
operations. In addition, the larger number of vehicles in use throughout Iraq made pure
CLS infeasible. The JPO therefore changed to a hybrid/organic support concept, with
manufacturer FSRs assisting organic maintenance personnel.

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 Like the initial pure CLS approach, the hybrid/organic approach relied heavily on
manufacturer FSRs. The difference with the hybrid approach was the need for multi-
variant FSRs trained at MRAP University, as previously discussed. In addition, this
approach relied on multi-variant new equipment trainers and government depot
mechanics. Instead of 90-day spares packages, the JPO supplied units with prescribed
load listings (PLL) for expected routine repair needs. Additionally, the JPO supplied
service support areas (SSAs) with authorized stockage lists (ASL) of parts based on
analysis of Stryker and other similar vehicles, sized for an estimated 12 months of supply
with each ASL supporting a density of 25 vehicles. This approach also relied on
provisioning parts through the defense supply system and on Government validation of
manuals for all field-level tasks (Conway, 2008, slide 5). Changing the strategy in these
ways allowed the JPO to meet the program objectives of fielding as many survivable
vehicles as quickly as possible, while still being able to support them.

To support ongoing operations and prepare for future, purely organic support, the
JPO planned to execute the provisioning of parts in two phases. Phase I involved
assigning Type II NSNs for the items listed in the parts manual, with OEMs as the source
of supply. Phase II encompasses the formal provisioning of parts to include assigning
new Type I NSNs and identifying Type I NSNs already in the system, thereby removing
OEMs from the supply chain.30 Upon successful completion of parts provisioning,
scheduled through March 2009, the logistics supply support will shift from parts
deliveries based on OEM part number data to parts deliveries based on provisioning of
technical data. Figure 27 shows the JPO parts provisioning and supply support timeline
(2008, slide 23).

30 Type I NSNs are assigned to parts provisioned and verified by EDFP. Type II NSNs are
provisional NSNs assigned as an expedient method of entering OEM parts in the defense supply system.
Once fully provisioned through the use of EDFP, these Type II NSNs are replaced with the permanent
Type I NSNs, or existing parts with previously assigned Type I NSNs are identified that are identical or are
suitable substitutes. This process prevents permanent addition of redundant identical items to the system.
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 Figure 27. Path Forward: Provisioning and Supply Support
(From Conway, 2008, Slide 23)

Parts obtained under the hybrid/organic concept are requisitioned through the
DLA supply system using Type II NSNs. These requisitions are sent to the OEMs who
procure the parts from the parts manufacturers. Parts are then consolidated at RRAD and
shipped into theater based on priority. ManTech International Corporation and AECOM
manage parts consolidation and shipping under contract from the JPO. These companies
bring years of logistics distribution experience to the program and their contribution
allows the JPO to focus on future sustainment planning while providing oversight on the
current sustainment execution. To maintain the operational readiness rate at or above
90%, the JPO also undertakes individual emergency buys through a parts allocation
board. This involved risk acceptance by the JPO because unforecasted orders may place
manufacturers in a position of needing parts for both an emergency buy and for vehicles
in production. In fact, this has occurred with FPII; the company has reallocated parts
assigned for production to meet spares demands in theater (Walsh, 2008a, August 6).

As the program matures, the JPO plans to transition to a fully organic logistics
support concept and award long term contracts to sole-source suppliers or add items to
existing long-term contracts. Essentially, this means that all parts will be fully
105
provisioned through the DLA supply system and that these parts will come directly from
the supplier instead of going through the OEM as is now the case.

1. The Role of the FSR

As the number of military personnel trained on the MRAP increases, the role
played by FSRs in day-to-day unit operations varies based on unit and location. In some
cases, FSRs perform all maintenance; in others, FSRs provide assistance to unit-level
mechanics while performing 30-level maintenance. The level of involvement depends on
the unit mission and requirements of specific missions. If the supported unit is
conducting a mission that is personnel intensive, FSRs have reportedly conducted
operator-level maintenance, which freed the Service members to participate in that
mission. As of this writing, the Army has transitioned to a more organic maintenance
posture, while the Marine Corps continues to rely heavily on FSRs at the unit level
(Hansen, 2008, June 10).

CLS has arguably added significant cost to the MRAP program. However, when
considering the urgent need, the JPO did not have time to establish a conventional
support system. By employing CLS, the JPO allowed MRAPs to be placed in use while
concurrently establishing the means to support the product in the present and future.
Additionally, the JPO awarded contracts to ManTech International Corporation and
AECOM Technology Corporation to manage the MRAP repair parts consolidation task
based on their track records of logistical support to the DoD. CLS was the preferred
method for this program because it not only reduced the timeline of the fielding process,
but also enabled the DoD logistics system to make an orderly transition to support the
new requirement. As of this writing, all requisitioned parts are consolidated at RRAD by
ManTech and AECOM and are flown to their destinations based on priority (D. Hansen,
personal communication, 2008, November 14). CLS has therefore allowed the JPO to
focus on fielding a quality product to the warfighter, rather than on sustaining it.

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 2. Commonality

Although typically a major concern when procuring a new family of vehicles

(FOV), parts commonality was never a significant consideration given the program
objectives and acquisition strategy of using multiple manufacturers. The vehicles
procured for testing contained proprietary technology that distinguished one
manufacturer from another. These prototype vehicles, and the initial production vehicles,
were designed with limited consideration of GFE and therefore had limited requirement
for common design interfaces (Hansen, 2008, June 10). Consequently, design interfaces
became an issue when the Services requested specific equipment in each of the vehicles.

The selected MRAP vehicles do not provide 100% commonality across the
MRAP family of vehicles (FOV), or offer complete commonality within the existing
DOD vehicle fleet. They do, however, provide commonality with vehicles widely
available worldwide in the commercial marketplace. For example, the FPII Cougar
model includes a Caterpillar C7 engine and the IMG MaxxPro is built on the widely used
Navistar severe service chassis. Caterpillar and International have worldwide distribution
and support systems, as do most other suppliers of major components to the MRAP
manufacturers (Hansen, 2008, June 10). Using five manufacturers suggests added
complexity for program logistics, but analysis of components from the JPO shows that
significant commonality exists among the MRAP variants and that many parts are
currently in use within the existing DoD vehicle fleet. These components include
engines, transmissions, transfer cases, axles, oil filters, air filters, fan belts, fuel filters,
starters, alternators/generators, batteries, and tires. Figure 28 depicts these commonalities
among existing vehicles and the MRAP FOV. This chart indicates that a large number of
MRAP parts already existed in the supply system. As such, many military organizations
already carried these parts on their PLL or ASL (2008, June 10). Although the lack of
commonality across the MRAP FOV added complexity to sustainment, the use of widely
available components made the trade-off more manageable and acceptable.

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 MRAP Component Matrix

Vehicle Applications BAE (RG-33) GDLS-C (RG-31) IMG (Maxx Pro) FPII (Cougar) BAE-TVS (Caimen)

Engine
Cummins ISL-400e Cummins QSB6.7(275 HP) INTL DT530 ST Caterpillar C7 Caterpillar C7

Military MRAP Only HEMTT MRAP Only FMTV, Stryker, USMC LAV FMTV, Stryker, USMC LAV
Motor Homes, FarmEquipment, Medium FarmEquipment, MediumDuty Trucks, MediumDuty Trucks, RV's, Buses, Fire MediumDuty Trucks, RV's, Buses, Fire
Commerical Duty Trucks, Buses Construction Equipment MediumDuty Trucks, RV's Trucks Trucks

Eng Oil Filter Cummins, Fleetguard, Luberfiner, Cummins, Fleetguard, Luberfiner,

Donaldson, Baldwin Donaldson, Baldwin Fleetguard, Luberfiner Baldwin, Donaldson Baldwin, Donaldson, AMSOIL

Military MRAP Only MRAP, HEMTT MRAP Only FMTV, Stryker, USMC LAV FMTV, Stryker, USMC LAV
Motor Homes, FarmEquipment, Medium FarmEquipment, MediumDuty Trucks, MediumDuty Trucks, RV's, Buses, Fire MediumDuty Trucks, RV's, Buses, Fire
Commerical Duty Trucks, Buses Construction Equipment MediumDuty Trucks, RV's Trucks Trucks

Air Filter Insufficient Technical Data to Determine

Donaldson, Baldwin, Fram Donaldson, Baldwin, Fram Source of Original Parts Vendor Donaldson, Hastings Donaldson, Hastings

Military MRAP Only MRAP, HEMTT MRAP Only FMTV, Stryker, USMC LAV FMTV, Stryker, USMC LAV
Motor Homes, FarmEquipment, Medium FarmEquipment, MediumDuty Trucks, MediumDuty Trucks, RV's, Buses, Fire MediumDuty Trucks, RV's, Buses, Fire
Commerical Duty Trucks, Buses Construction Equipment MediumDuty Trucks, RV's Trucks Trucks

Fan Belts
Dayco, Ford, Bosch, Hamilton Gates, Bosch, Goodyear, Carlise, Veyance Goodyear, Bosch Gates, Nacco, Goodyear, Bosch MS, Nacco, Goodyear, Veyance, Carlise

Military MRAP Only MRAP, HEMTT MRAP Only FMTV, Stryker, USMC LAV FMTV, Stryker, USMC LAV
Motor Homes, FarmEquipment, Medium FarmEquipment, MediumDuty Trucks, MediumDuty Trucks, RV's, Buses, Fire MediumDuty Trucks, RV's, Buses, Fire
Commerical Duty Trucks, Buses Construction Equipment MediumDuty Trucks, RV's Trucks Trucks

Starter
Bendix, Delco-Remy, Rockwell Bendix, Delco-Remy, Rockwell Bendix, Delco-Remy, Rockwell Bendix, Delco-Remy, Rockwell Bendix, Delco-Remy, Rockwell

Military MRAP Only MRAP, HEMTT MRAP Only FMTV, Stryker, USMC LAV FMTV, Stryker, USMC LAV
Motor Homes, FarmEquipment, Medium FarmEquipment, MediumDuty Trucks, MediumDuty Trucks, RV's, Buses, Fire MediumDuty Trucks, RV's, Buses, Fire
Commerical Duty Trucks, Buses Construction Equipment MediumDuty Trucks, RV's Trucks Trucks

Alternator
Niehoff - 400 Amp (N1601-1) Niehoff - 450 Amp Niehoff - 400 Amp (N1602-1) Niehoff - 400 Amp (N1601) Niehoff - 400 Amp (N1602-2 &N1602-3)
Insufficient Technical Data to Determine Insufficient Technical Data to Determine Insufficient Technical Data to Determine
Military HMMWV Military Application Military Application HMMWV Military Application

Commerical Marine, Mediumand Heavy Duty Trucks Marine, Mediumand Heavy Duty Trucks Marine, Mediumand Heavy Duty Trucks Marine, Mediumand Heavy Duty Trucks Marine, Mediumand Heavy Duty Trucks

Fuel Filter(s)
Fleetguard Fleetguard. Mowag International, CAT, Fleetguard Supacat, Baldwin, Cat, Parker Supacat, Baldwin, Cat, Parker, Mowag

Military MRAP Only MRAP, HEMTT MRAP FMTV, Stryker, USMC LAV FMTV, Stryker, USMC LAV
Motor Homes, FarmEquipment, Medium FarmEquipment, MediumDuty Trucks, MediumDuty Trucks, RV's, Buses, Fire MediumDuty Trucks, RV's, Buses, Fire
Commerical Duty Trucks, Buses Construction Equipment MediumDuty Trucks, RV's Trucks Trucks

Battery
Interstate, Delco-Remy, Hawker EXIDE, Interstate, Hawker EXIDE, Interstate, Hawker EXIDE, Interstate, Hawker EXIDE, Interstate, Hawker

Military Across the Fleet Across the Fleet Across the Fleet Across the Fleet Across the Fleet

Commerical Commerical Wide Commerical Wide Commerical Wide Commerical Wide Commerical Wide

Tire
Michelin, Goodyear Michelin, Goodyear Michelin, Goodyear Michelin, Goodyear Michelin, Goodyear

Military 39585R20 XZL 365/80R20 39585R20 XZL 39585R20XZL 395/85R20 XML

Commerical Across the Fleet Across the Fleet Across the Fleet Across the Fleet Across the Fleet

Transmission
Allison Allison S-2500SP Allison 3000SP Allison 3500SP Allison

Military MRAP MRAP MRAP MRAP Caimen, FMTV

Motor Homes, FarmEquipment, Medium FarmEquipment, MediumDuty Trucks, MediumDuty Trucks, RV's, Buses, Fire MediumDuty Trucks, RV's, Buses, Fire
Commerical Duty Trucks, Buses Construction Equipment MediumDuty Trucks, RV's Trucks Trucks

Transfer Case Insufficient Technical Data to Determine Insufficient Technical Data to Determine Insufficient Technical Data to Determine
Cushman 315M-2 Source of Original Parts Vendor Source of Original Parts Vendor Cushman 315N Source of Original Parts Vendor
Insufficient Technical Data to Determine Insufficient Technical Data to Determine Insufficient Technical Data to Determine Insufficient Technical Data to Determine Insufficient Technical Data to Determine
Military Military Application Military Application Military Application Military Application Military Application
MediumDuty Trucks, RV's, Buses, Fire MediumDuty Trucks, RV's, Buses, Fire
Commerical FarmEquipment, MediumDuty Trucks, R0079495 MediumDuty Trucks, RV's Trucks Trucks

Figure 28. Parts Commonality Matrix

(From MRAP JPO, 2008, June 2)
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 As Figure 28 demonstrates, the MRAP FOV includes four engine models by three
manufacturers: Cummins, Inc., International Truck and Engine Corporation, and
Caterpillar. The Cummins QSB engine used on the RG-31, for example, is also used in
the Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMTT) and the Caterpillar C7 engine is
used on the Stryker, Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV), and the Marine
Corps’ Light Armored Vehicle (LAV). Since these engines are already in the supply
system, repair parts are readily available. Additionally, these companies are globally
established, providing the DoD an alternate method of procurement should a problem
arise with the normal supply distribution program.

H. FACILITIES

All facilities used by the MRAP JPO are referred to as issue points or RSAs. To
establish such sites, the JPO needed huge areas for use as parking lots, buildings for
vehicle processing, areas for installation of last-minute items (such as IED jammers), and
finally, areas for mechanics to work on the vehicles. Each site included an implied task
of providing shop tools such as hydraulic lifts and air compressors necessary for
conducting vehicle maintenance. Essentially, every site needed to replicate a
maintenance bay with all infrastructure support. This section of the report provides an
overview of the facilities in Charleston, SC; Kuwait; Iraq; and Afghanistan, and their
effect on the value stream in MRAP fielding.

1. Charleston

As previously discussed, SPAWAR in Charleston, SC, was selected as the

integration facility based on its capabilities and prior experience in up-armored
HMMWV integration. In addition to its proximity to the aerial port of debarkation
(APOD) and the sea port of debarkation (SPOD), the facility also provided expertise in
engineering and testing of C4I systems. SPAWAR’s Poseidon Park facility not only
allowed the execution of three major types of C4I tests, but also allowed these tests to be
completed in 30 days. As stated by SPAWAR’s industrial engineer, Pete Ward, “If we
did not have Poseidon Park, we could not have done that in 30 days” (2008, August 5).

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 To provide insurance against work stoppage due to hurricane or other natural
disaster, SPAWAR positioned an identical site set-up about 10 miles from the primary
site. This alternate site ensured continuous integration of vehicles and only required the
movement of personnel and equipment for it to be operational.

2. Kuwait

The facilities in use in Kuwait are fully mature due to continuous U.S. presence in
that nation since the Persian Gulf War in 1991. The JPO had no issues securing sites to
conduct vehicle disembarkation procedures and the infrastructure within the country also
supported the rapid movement the program required. Many facilities were available for
rent and immediate occupation such as at Ali-Al-Salim Airbase, which has functioned as
the APOD in Kuwait since the military terminal at Kuwait International Airport ceased
operations in 2004. The required port facilities were no different as huge port areas were
not being utilized; these facilities were constructed by the U.S. during Operations Desert
Shield and Storm. The JPO chose the facility best suited to its needs among the many
available at the Kuwaiti port and converted it into a functional support activity by making
minimal changes such as installing air conditioners, lighting, and hydraulic lifts. Thus,
establishing the RSA in Kuwait was not a significant issue for the JPO and the same
applied for facilities in Iraq (D. Hansen, personal communication, 2008, October 15).
Although not an issue, the well-positioned facilities aided the timely movement of the
vehicles to warfighters.

3. Iraq

The JPO considers Iraq as a mature theater that is lacking some minor
infrastructure support. The use of plywood shelters and tents at forward operating bases
supports this classification. Therefore, to establish issue points (IPs) and RSAs in Iraq,
the JPO took extra measures that included pouring concrete slabs for maintenance bays
and erecting sprung shelters. Nine different sites were established in Iraq, each with
requirements unique to its location. These sites included Mosul, Tikrit, Al-Taqaddum,
Kalsu, Talul, Baghdad, Taji, Balad, and Kirkuk. Of the nine sites, four were established

110
as RSAs and therefore had the capacity to perform battle damage repairs. These RSAs
are depicted in Figure 29. Their strategically dispersed locations provide support to
Service members, and the locations are easily accessible through established main supply
routes (D. Hansen, personal communication, 2008, October 15).

Besides the basic infrastructure required at the IPs and RSAs, the JPO also built
living facilities at some locations to house FSRs supporting the program. These living
facilities included containerized housing units, latrines, and showers, all of which were
the responsibility of the JPO. The presence of the fielding and support teams at these
locations, coupled with the new equipment and facilities, contributed to the rapid fielding
of MRAP vehicles.

RSA RSA
Speicher Balad

RSA
TQ RSA
Liberty

Figure 29. RSA Locations within Iraq

(From Conway, 2008, slide 27)

4. Afghanistan

Unlike the facilities in Kuwait and Iraq, those in Afghanistan were very immature
and lacked the infrastructure needed to support the MRAP program. Due to constraints
on suitable locations and space within forward operating bases, limited options existed
for the JPO to conduct operations. As of this writing, these options are limited to flying

111
into Kandahar and Baghram, with additional issue points at Jalalabad and FOB Salerno.
The base JPO plan for Afghanistan involved establishing four RSAs with a budget of just
under $500 million. Included in this cost estimation is fencing for expansion of forward
operating bases and the cost of procuring additional land needed for work areas (D.
Hansen, personal communication, 2008, October 15). Figure 30 below shows the
fielding locations within Afghanistan.

Figure 30. Current Fielding Locations within Afghanistan

(From MRAP JPO, 2008, October 18)

The multiple IPs and RSAs located within the respective theaters are another
example of how the JPO fielded MRAP vehicles and how it is supporting those vehicles
in a rapid manner. Centrally locating RSAs led to low turnaround times for battle-
damaged MRAP vehicles, thereby improving operational availability. As of this writing,
the RSAs have returned all but 50 MRAP vehicles to fully mission capable status (MRAP
JPO, 2008, October 28). The vehicles have been repaired and returned to duty largely
due to FSRs on site, OEM parts on hand, and the available equipment at these facilities to
rebuild the vehicles.

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I. TRANSPORTATION

The initial transportation plan called for completed MRAPs to be shipped and
flown directly from Charleston, SC, to Iraq or Kuwait. These vehicles would then be de-
processed at the destination before being issued to the receiving units. Until October
2007, all MRAPs were flown into the Iraqi theater because of the urgent need, with the
flow reaching three hundred and eighty vehicles per month. Vehicles were flown into Ali
Al-Salim Airbase in Kuwait as well as Balad Airbase located on Camp Anaconda in Iraq
(Hansen, 2008, June 10). The JPO, Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), individual
Services, combatant commands, and DCMA shared the responsibility of placing the
vehicles into warfighter hands.

As of this writing, the average time required to ship and field MRAP vehicles is
thirty days from the time the vehicle leaves the US. The process of moving the vehicles
into theater is depicted in Figure 31 and shows the 10-step process. First, the completed
MRAPs are inspected and accepted by DCMA representatives at the manufacturer
locations. The MRAP contracts specify Freight On Board Origin (FOB) and the co-
location of DCMA assets with manufacturers assists in conditional acceptance of vehicles
prior to transport. Next, vehicles are transported from the various manufacturing sites by
trailer to SPAWAR in Charleston, SC, where the third step, GFE integration, takes place.
Responsibility during this step lies with the MRAP JPO. Following GFE integration, the
vehicles are tested and driven to Charleston Air Force Base for airlift or to Charleston
Naval Weapon Station for sealift. Vehicles identified for use within the U.S. are
transported to their destinations by trailer. Once the vehicles are delivered to the APOD
and SPOD, TRANSCOM assumes responsibility for the air- and sealift.

The vehicles arriving in Kuwait undergo de-processing and await intra-theater

transport which is the responsibility of the combatant commands. These vehicles are sent
to respective IPs in Iraq by trailer where the JPO re-assumes responsibility. Receiving
units then draw the vehicles, conduct familiarization training as per Service-specific
standards, and then move to their respective forward operating bases.

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 Figure 31. Transportation Pipeline and Responsibility
(After MRAP JPO, 2008, October 21)

When the MRAP production rate surpassed the TRANSCOM airlift limit of 380
vehicles per-month, the JPO moved to surface-shipping as the primary means of
transportation to Iraq. With the ability to transport up to 500 vehicles per-ship, and
production rates exceeding 1000 per-month by early 2008, vehicle flow eventually
exceeded both the 250 vehicle per-week de-processing capability in Kuwait, as well as
the ability of units to receive vehicles given ongoing combat operations. As the queue
filled at multiple sites in Kuwait and Iraq, the program shifted entirely to ship-borne
transportation by May 2008. MRAPs bound for Afghanistan, however, must still be
airlifted because of that country’s landlocked and remote location (Hansen, 2008, June
10).

1. Transportation Cost Oversight

Transportation was one of the most significant cost elements for the MRAP
program; therefore, the mode of transportation was a significant concern for the JPO. At

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the height of fielding operations, airlift costs were $134,000 per vehicle versus $18,200
per vehicle for sealift. Hence, the transition to sealift for the Iraq theater resulted in a
huge cost savings relative to airlift.

2. MEAP

Among many issues that arose from airlifting MRAP vehicles was the extra
protection of the EFP kits that resulted from the MEAP program. Depending on the
variant, these kits add anywhere from 4,300 to 11,000 pounds per vehicle, which in some
cases puts the vehicles over their GVWR. Besides the weight, most of the aircraft used to
transport these vehicles could not accommodate the width of the vehicle once the kit was
installed. Airlifting vehicles with EFP kits installed was therefore not a feasible option,
and the EFP kits were flown separately and mounted at destination. Not all MRAPs were
retrofitted with EFP kits, and, as of this writing, only the vehicles destined for areas prone
to EFPs receive the kits (Hansen, 2008, June 10).

The addition of EFP kits has also caused problems in ground transportation. The
additional weight changes a vehicle’s center of gravity, complicating trailer transport.
This creates problems even in the U.S. where road conditions are better than in Iraq.
However, once these kits are bolted on in Kuwait, movement by trailer is the only
available means of moving them into Iraq for fielding. Installing these kits in Kuwait
alleviated the transportation problem from the U.S. into theater but added a problem of
transportation from Kuwait into Iraq (2008, June 10).

Logistically, EFP kit additions in theater caused major concern for the JPO as it
created requirements for, among other things, personnel to do the work, lease space for
the actual work, and the health and welfare of the personnel. Despite these challenges,
the JPO has successfully shipped the EFP kits and vehicles separately, married them in
theater, and delivered them to warfighters (Hansen, 2008, June 10). This additional
requirement and complexity in the value stream, meanwhile, has been transparent to
receiving units.

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J. FIELDING OPERATIONS

As with sustainment, the MRAP program is unique in its initial lack of a fielding
plan. No real plan existed because the JPO did not initially know the total requirements
at the time fielding started. The program objectives, on the other hand, were very
simple–field as many survivable vehicles as fast as possible; everything else remained
secondary. In the early stages of the program, this meant a fielding timeline of production
plus 60 days (Hansen, 2008, June 10). The MRAP fielding process was no different than
the regular process any unit would undergo in drawing vehicles. The difference existed
in the expedited fielding, characterized by the “truncated,” or shortened, training that
operators and maintainers underwent prior to receiving the vehicles.

The fielding process varies between the Services and individual units based on
Service-specific standing operating procedures (SOPs) and prior unit experience with
MRAPs. Units with more familiarity conduct an expedited fielding process, while others
spend up to five days in familiarization training before completing their equipment draw.
As an example, Army units typically conduct 5 days of operator and maintenance training
and account for all ASL and PLL parts in the presence of a mechanic before receiving the
vehicle. Marine Corps units, on the other hand, typically conduct a much less rigid
fielding process, preferring to place the vehicles directly into operation (Hansen, 2008,
June 10).

This expedited fielding process represents yet another trade-off made by the JPO
in support of the program strategy. Whereas a typical new equipment fielding would
include an extensive training and familiarization period for operators and maintainers, the
urgent need required MRAPs to be placed into immediate operation.

K. KEY FACTORS AND TRADE-OFFS

This overview of MRAP logistics planning and execution highlights numerous

factors that contributed to program success. As previous analysis has shown, many of the
trade-offs that enabled rapid MRAP fielding involve risk acceptance in sustainment.

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Accordingly, the key factors from a logistics standpoint are those which mitigate this risk
of fielding an unsupportable and unsustainable vehicle.

First, the JPO mitigated complexity in sustaining MRAP vehicles by using CLS to
execute sustainment operations. A combination of manufacturer FSRs, OEM new
equipment training (NET) trainers, and organic Service mechanics ensured that vehicle
fielding occurred on a compressed timeline. Co-locating FSRs with units in theater
ensured that vehicles remained mission ready, evident in the operational readiness rate of
the MRAP FOV. FSRs provided units with the expertise needed to maintain MRAPs and
enabled unit mechanics to concentrate on other missions such as maintaining other
equipment or augmenting combat patrols. The trade-off, however, of having co-located
FSRs was that the JPO was responsible for the health and well-being of those individuals.

In addition to maintenance support, CLS also enabled the sustainment of MRAP

vehicles while parts were being provisioned in the defense supply system. OEM supply
systems with initial spares packages ensured that parts were readily available and
accessible to the warfighter during fielding. As the program transitioned to organic
support, established supply chain management companies such as ManTech International
and AECOM also ensured the continuous flow of parts to keep the vehicles operational.

A second major factor contributing to the MRAP program success involved

providing a common place for learning, also known as MRAP University. This ensured
FSRs and select Service members were cross-trained on products from all manufacturers
and that key maintainers and operators had the expertise needed to safely operate and
maintain the vehicles. This cross-training allowed the JPO to conduct decentralized,
simultaneous fielding and fulfill decentralized support requirements.

In conclusion, the key logistics factors again follow the trends prevalent
throughout the MRAP program. Use of a CLS approach allowed concurrency in
normally sequential tasks by ensuring sustainment of MRAP vehicles while the DoD
built an organic sustainment capability. MRAP University contributed to this
concurrency in operations by providing a base of knowledge to key personnel while
operators and maintainers adapted to the new vehicles. As before, however, the

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conditions that allowed concurrency also required risk acceptance. This came in the form
of compressed new equipment training and the risk of fielding vehicles without full
knowledge of their limitations or maintenance requirements. As before, however, these
trade-offs were necessary factors for the program to successfully meet overall objectives.

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 VII. CONCLUSIONS

As of October 21, 2008, more than 9,000 MRAP vehicles have been fielded to
warfighters in Iraq and Afghanistan, with nearly 4,000 more progressing through the
integration and transportation process (MRAP JPO, 2008, October 21). Considering
MARCORSYSCOM released the original RFP in November 2006, this is an
unprecedented DoD acquisition accomplishment that required flexibility and priority of
effort within the DoD, industry, and Congress. Although detailed data indicating MRAP
effectiveness in saving lives is held at the classified level, substantial anecdotal evidence,
as well as significantly reduced casualties in Iraq through 2008, indicates that MRAP
vehicles are indeed survivable. By these criteria, the MRAP program has been effective
in meeting the program objectives of fielding as many survivable vehicles as quickly as
possible.

The question of whether the program has met warfighter needs is more difficult to
address, given the requirement was largely top- rather than user-driven. Again, however,
substantial anecdotal evidence suggests that MRAP vehicles have largely met warfighter
needs by providing survivability and the required mobility for most missions in Iraq. For
Afghanistan and the much more restrictive terrain associated with that country, however,
the question is more difficult to answer. Effectiveness in meeting warfighter needs is
therefore best assessed in how the program addressed the range of needs. In this case, the
final LRIP purchases of smaller vehicles and the latest evolution of the program, the
MATLCV, demonstrates that the MRAP program is not forcing an ineffective solution,
but is tailoring the solution for maximum effectiveness in the operational environment.
From this perspective, the MRAP program has met warfighter needs.

The success of the MRAP program is attributable to many factors, all of which
point back to the overall program objectives of fielding as many survivable vehicles as
quickly as possible. This chapter summarizes the key factors, starting with a comparison
to prior research and an overview of additional factors that contributed specifically to the
MRAP program and concluding with the significant trade-offs involved.

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 Research indicates that four conditions must exist for a successful rapid
acquisition program: existence of a materiel solution, user acceptance, leadership
acceptance, and a dedicated source of funding. Analysis of the MRAP program generally
conforms to these conditions, but with exceptions. Comparison with this prior research is
as follows:

• Prior research involving rapid acquisitions concludes that a materiel solution

must exist that meets the user’s requirements. Further, this solution must be
technologically mature and ready for production. In the case of MRAP, this
largely holds true. At the program outset, FPII produced multiple variants of
MRAP vehicles that were already in operational use. FPII vehicles, as well as
those built by BAE and GDLS were based on technology and designs that
date back 30 years. In that respect, a materiel solution did exist, although
large production capacity did not. IMG vehicle design and status as the
largest MRAP producer provides an exception to this condition, however, in
that it did not have a materiel solution at the program start. Rather, that
company had only a concept based on proven technology. This shows that a
complete materiel solution is not a key factor in enabling a rapid acquisition;
the key factor is the presence of a mature technology that meets the
requirement. Had extensive research and development work been required,
the MRAP program would not have progressed as it did. The IMG example,
however, demonstrates that a world-class manufacturer can rapidly take a
mature technology from concept to fielded product. This indicates that
emphasis should be placed as much on the required technology as on an off-
the-shelf product when researching materiel solutions for urgent needs. In
cases where the technology exists, the program strategy should include ways
of incentivizing industry to apply that technology in a rapidly produced
product.

• User acceptance of any fielded product must be considered before assessing

its overall success in meeting a requirement. For the MRAP program, user
acceptance depends largely on the time frame of the assessment. Prior to
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 Secretary Gates making the MRAP the top DoD acquisition priority, no
consensus existed within the user community, and particularly within the
Army, over the best way of addressing the IED threat. Since the program
start, however, MRAPs have gained widespread user acceptance, although
with recognition of the limits based on size and maneuverability. This
acceptance, therefore, conforms to prior research from the perspective of how
warfighters have used the MRAP. It does not, however, indicate that user
acceptance is critical at program start.

• Perhaps more than any other factor, the MRAP program demonstrates the
importance of leadership acceptance in the success of a rapid acquisition
program. Even after the initial JUONS validation in December 2006,
consensus did not exist in the user community or the senior DoD leadership
that MRAP offered the best solution to the IED threat. Through the spring of
2007, MRAP was still largely a Marine Corps initiative. When Secretary
Gates prioritized the program first among all DoD programs, however, he
effectively established leadership acceptance and a broad mandate for the
program. From that point on, the program commanded the priority of effort at
every level within the DoD. This indicates that leadership acceptance enabled
program success more than any other factor, and largely influenced the user
acceptance that followed.

• The final condition, a dedicated funding source, is critical for any acquisition
program regardless of whether it is rapid or standard in nature. The urgent
need and scale of the program with requirements exceeding $22 billion
precluded funding through the standard PPBES process. Its priority and
backing within the DoD and Congress enabled it to receive sufficient funding
through reprogrammed funds, and emergency and supplemental
appropriations. The MRAP program conforms to prior research in that it
required money through non-standard sources. The tremendous political
support ensured the program had relatively little resistance in obtaining those
funds.
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 In addition to the conditions identified in prior research, two key factors enabled
the MRAP program to field more than 9,000 vehicles by late October 2008: concurrency
and risk acceptance. Both are related in that concurrency is a direct example of risk
acceptance; yet they are distinct in the ways they enabled rapid execution of the program.
Just as important is the tremendous political and DoD leadership support the program
received from inception. The political support enabled the program to receive more than
$22 billion in funding through non-standard sources, as well as the flexibility to obligate
those funds as needed and with speed consistent with the program execution. DoD
leadership support gave the program top priority within the DoD and industry, effectively
focusing all resources on the effort. This support, specifically from Congress and the
Secretary of Defense, set the conditions for the PM to apply the two key factors of
concurrency and risk acceptance to the program.

Concurrency in execution is the first key factor that enabled rapid execution of the
MRAP program. This applied throughout the program and is evident in the following
examples:

• The program executed all phases of the acquisition management framework

simultaneously, rather than in sequence. As of this writing, the JPO is
involved in activities associated with concept refinement, technology
development, systems development and demonstration, production and
deployment, and operations and support, to include disposal.

• Manufacturers initiated vehicle production prior to and during developmental

testing. In a normal acquisition, developmental testing would be complete
before production of vehicles for fielding.

• DCMA conditionally accepted vehicles to allow concurrent integration,

deficiency correction, and continuous flow to warfighters. DCMA normally
requires correction of all deficiencies prior to acceptance.

• The program simultaneously fielded vehicles while building the organic

capability to support them. Normally, a program builds sustainment
capability prior to fielding.
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 Additional examples of concurrency exist throughout the program execution,
representing the single biggest factor in how the program compressed what would
normally be a much longer schedule.

Risk acceptance is the second key factor that enabled rapid acquisition of MRAP
vehicles, and is largely connected to the concurrency in execution. Risk acceptance came
in multiple forms and in all phases of the acquisition. Examples of risk acceptance
critical to the rapid execution of the MRAP program include the following:

• Acceptance of a materiel solution not necessarily based on consensus in the

user community and not ideally suited to the operational environment
increased the risk of committing to a product that did not meet warfighter
needs.

• Award of LRIP contracts prior to testing involved risk of procuring vehicles

that could not ultimately be used.

• Award of LRIP contracts based heavily on survivability testing meant risk of

procuring vehicles that were unreliable or difficult to maintain.

• Advanced purchase of materials and production capacity expansion by

manufacturers before award of production contracts increased risk of
manufacturer losses and liability to the Government.

• Conditional acceptance of vehicles with minor deficiencies increased tracking

requirements and involved risk of passing deficiencies to warfighters.

• Procurement of multiple variants from multiple manufacturers increased risk

of high life cycle cost and complexity in sustainment.

• Fielding vehicles before parts were fully provisioned in the defense logistics
system involved risk of fielding an unsustainable vehicle.

The program includes numerous other examples of risk acceptance, all of which
contributed to the overall objective of fielding as many survivable vehicles as quickly as
possible.

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 As with any decision, the risk acceptance and concurrency that enabled rapid
execution of the MRAP program came with trade-offs. As one example, the use of a
COTS technology and materiel solution resulted in procurement of thousands of vehicles
that are largely one-dimensional. The size and weight of the MRAP vehicles limit
mobility in restrictive terrain, thereby limiting the range of mission capability. Although
very effective at increasing survivability, MRAP vehicles do so at the expense of
mobility and, therefore, do not meet all warfighter needs. As another example, the use of
multiple manufacturers, although critical in achieving the desired production rates,
increased training requirements for operators and maintainers, added complexity in
sustainment, and increased life-cycle costs as compared to a common vehicle. Multiple
other trade-offs exist for every case of risk acceptance in the program.

In conclusion, the MRAP program represents an important example of how the

defense acquisition system can rapidly react to meet warfighter needs. This report
highlights the key factors that enabled program success in rapidly fielding thousands of
vehicles: concurrency and risk acceptance enabled by unprecedented political and DoD
leadership support. Political and DoD leadership support, obviously, is situation
dependent and is largely out of a PM’s control. In addition, concurrent execution of
acquisition processes and heavy risk acceptance is not appropriate for every program.
Therefore, this report does not provide a guide to rapid acquisitions that can apply to all
programs. It does, however, provide an example of risk acceptance and concurrent
execution that can be tailored to the urgency of many needs on a case-by-case basis. In
addition, the modified acquisition process used to develop and field the MRAP
demonstrates that the current acquisition management framework and JCIDS process are
flexible enough to enable rapid execution of major weapons systems.

124
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(Public Law 110-116). Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
110th Congress. (2008, June 30). Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008 (Public Law
110-252). Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

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 INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center

Ft. Belvoir, Virginia

2. Dudley Knox Library

Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California

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