TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Contents………………………………..……………………….…Page 2
Index of Authorities ………………………….………………………….…Page 3
Table of Cases ……………………………………………………………..Page 4-6
List of Abbreviation ………………………….………………………….…Page 7
Statement of Jurisdiction ………………………..………………….………Page 8
Statement of Facts ………………………………………………….………Page 9-10
Statement of Issues.…. ……………………………………………….…….. Page 11
Arguments Advanced ……………………….…………………….………Page 13-31
Prayer………………………………………………………………..………..Page 32

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

 STATUTES AND LEGISLATIONS

1. Indian Contract Act, 1872
2. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973
3. Indian Evidence Act, 1872
4. Constitution of India, 1950

 BOOKS AND LEXICONS

1. The Law of Evidence by Batuk Lal
2. Indian Penal Code by RatanlalDhirajlal
3. Criminal Procedure Code by RatanlalDhirajlal
4. Constitutional Law of India by H.M Seervai
5. Law of Criminal Appeals, Revisions, References by Mukherjee

 ONLINE DATABASE
1. www.indiakanoon.org
2. www.judis.nic.in
3. www.manupatra.com
4. www.ipleaders.com
5. www.scconline.com

2
TABLE OF CASES

1. Twarit Consultancy Services Pvt. Ltd. and another Vs. GPE (India) Ltd. and
others [2021] SGHC (1) 17.
2. Anupam Mittal Vs. Westbridge Ventures 11 , Investment Holdings [2023].
3. Jagdish Chander v. Ramesh Chander and K. K. Modi v. K. N. Modi.
4. Delhi Development Authority Vs. Jacksons Engineers Pvt. Ltd. 1996 (Suppl)
Arb. LR 296 (DB-Del).
5. TRF Limited (2017) 8 SCC 377 , PARA 7.1.
6. Voestalpine Schienen Gmbh Vs. Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. (2017)
4SCC 665 PARA. 20.
7. Bharat Broadband Network Ltd. Vs. United Telecoms Ltd. (2019) 5 SCC 755.
8. BOI vs BOJ (2018) 2 SLR.
9. C and E Ltd v. Gopal das Bagri ,2023 SCC.
10. Desbois v. Industries A.C. Davie Inc., Court of Appeal of Quebec, Canada, 26
April 1990, [1990] CanLII 3619 (QC CA).
11. Jung Science Information Technology Co. Ltd. v. Zte. Corporation, High
Court—Court of First Instance, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of
China, 22 July 2008, [2008] HKCFI .
12. HSMV. Corp. v. ADI Ltd., Central District Court for California, United States
of America, 8 November 1999.
13. Kammergericht Berlin, Germany, 28 Sch 24/99, 22 March 2000.
14. CLOUT case No. 665 [Oberlandesgericht Naumburg, Germany, 10 SchH
03/01, 19 December 2001].
15. CLOUT case No. 900 [Centre for Arbitration and Dispute Resolution,
Uganda, 15 July 2004], cause No. 10/04.
16. Union of India Vs. Raman Iron Foundry [(1974) 2 SCC 231]
17. Food Corporation of India & Ors vs Abhijit Paul in Civil Appeal Nos. 8572-
8573/2022 arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 16009-16010 of 2019 and cited in 2022

3
 LiveLaw (SC) 975
18. Dulichand Laxminarayan Vs. CIT AIR 1956 SC 354 ,Para 11
19. Pratibha rani Vs. Surajkumar AIR 1985 SC 628 ,(1985 ) 2 SCC 370
20. Sanjay Kanubhai Patel Vs. Chief Controlling Revenue Authority AIR 2005
Bom 57,para8.
21. Rampratap v Durgaprasad AIR 1925 Pc 293;
22. Hemchandra Dev vs. Dhirendra Chandra Das AIR 1960 Cal 691
23. CIT v Kedarmal Keshardeo AIR 1968 A&N 68
24. Aruna Group Of Estates and Bodinayakanur v State Of Madras (1962) 2 Mad
LJ 294
25. Ross v. Parkyns (1875) L.R. 20 Eq.331,335
26. Associated Cinema of America , Inc. Vs. World Amusement Co. (1937) 201
Minn 94
27. Chowgale & Co. Ltd. Vs. Rizvi Estates & Houses (P) Ltd., (1997) 4 Bom CR
648 and
28. U.P. State Sugar Corpn Vs. Mahalchand M. Kothari , AIR 2005 SC 61.
29. Dhanraj Mills Ltd. Liability Co. VS. Narsingh Prasad Boobna . AIR 1949 Pat
270
30. Bishamber Nath Agarwal v. Kishan Chand, AIR 1990 All 65
31. Sardar Amarjit Singh Kalra Vs. Promod Gupta & ors.
32. BSkyB Vs. EDS [2010] EWHC 86 (TCC)
33. Museprime Properties Vs. Adhill Properties [1990] 36 EG 114
34. Common Cause Vs. Union of India (1999),
35. Temple of Preach Vihar (Cambodia Vs. Thailand ) , 1962 I.C.J. 6 (June
2015)
36. Kalu and others Vs. Life Insurance Corporation
37. Smt. Sudha Devi Vs. State of U.P. and others
38. Hulley Enterprises Limited (Cyprus)v. The Russian Federation,

4
 UNCITRAL,PCA Case No. 2005-03/
39. Natwarlal Damodardas Soni , 1973 AIR 1587
40. R.M. Malkani , 1973 SCR (2) , 417
41. Pooran Mal v. Director of Inspection of Income Tax, 1974 SCR (2)7*4

5
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ABBREVIATIONS EXPANSION
AIR All India Reporter
Ed. Edition
Hon’ble Honorable
i.e. That Is
No. Number
P. Page
Para Paragraph
SC Supreme Court of India
SCC Supreme Court Cases
Sec. Section
u/s Under Section
Vs Verses
& And
@ Alias

6
Statement of Jurisdiction

7
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Indovia, a vibrant and culturally diverse country, has emerged as a global technology
powerhouse with a thriving IT and software industry. Known for its rich history and
technological advancements, Indovia has become a hub for innovative companies seeking to
leverage its skilled workforce and vast market potential. Artificiana Pvt Ltd. (Artificiana), a
frontrunner in the Indovian tech landscape, stands at the forefront of this technology revolution,
driving transformative solutions across various industries.
2. On the other side of the world, RoboNation, a land of opportunity and innovation, boasts a
robust tech ecosystem that continues to push the boundaries of scientific discovery. The country
has witnessed the rise of ground-breaking AI research and development firms. Among them, AI
Innovations Corp (AI Innovations) stands out for its pioneering work in artificial intelligence,
harnessing the potential of cutting-edge algorithms to drive meaningful change in diverse
sectors.
3. As the two countries come together in the realm of technology collaboration, their unique
cultural, legal, and business landscapes add complexity to the partnership. While Indovia’s
strong emphasis on interpersonal relationships and collective harmony influence its approach to
negotiations, RoboNation’s focus on competition and individual success drives its ambition in
the global market. Balancing these divergent perspectives becomes critical in navigating
potential disputes and ensuring a successful collaboration.
4. AI Innovations approached Artificiana to join forces and develop cutting-edge Artificial
Intelligence (AI) products for the global market. This collaboration was aimed at revolutionizing
the AI industry. During the course of their discussions, the Parties engaged in extensive
deliberations regarding the specific obligations and roles that each entity would undertake within
the partnership. The discussions included a meticulous examination of the technological
expertise contributed by AI Innovations, the market insights and domain knowledge brought by
Artificiana, as well as the collaborative research and development efforts that would drive the
creation of AI solutions.
5. On March 15, 2022, the Parties entered into a detailed and comprehensive Collaboration
Agreement (Agreement) to formalize their partnership. The Agreement (Annexure A)
meticulously detailed the multifaceted aspects of their collaboration, ensuring a clear roadmap
for their joint venture. It outlined the scope of work, specific deliverables, and the intricate

8
responsibilities to be shouldered by each party. Intellectual Property Rights were carefully
addressed, delineating how innovations arising from the partnership would be shared and
protected. Financial contributions and investment commitments were also specified to facilitate
seamless resource allocation. Moreover, the Agreement defined a well-structured timeline,
setting out milestones for the development and eventual deployment of the ground-breaking
AIpowered software application – aptly named 'MindFlayer'. This contractual foundation
underscored the Parties' commitment to their shared vision of driving AI innovation on a global
scale.
6. Both Parties committed to a symbiotic relationship, wherein AI Innovations would harness its
advanced AI algorithms and expertise to engineer the software's technical intricacies.
Meanwhile, Artificiana, leveraging its profound industry insights and domain knowledge, would
facilitate the application's seamless integration into real-world financial scenarios. Moreover, the
Agreement enshrined the principle of equitable Intellectual Property sharing, ensuring that the
innovative solutions emerging from their collaboration would be jointly owned and collectively
safeguarded. The Agreement provided for a harmonious blend of AI Innovations' technical
prowess and Artificiana's market acumen. This collaborative accord forms the bedrock upon
which 'MindFlayer' stands as a testament to the shared commitment of AI Innovations and
Artificiana to redefine the AI landscape and propel the realm of financial analysis into an era of
unprecedented innovation.
7. The central goal of the collaboration was to create an AI-driven financial analysis tool that
would revolutionize the industry. The envisioned software application was expected to predict
market trends, analyse investment opportunities, and provide real-time financial insights to
ultimately enhance the financial decision-making process for Artificiana’s clients.
8. On June 13, 2022, Artificiana appointed a new CEO, Mr. Jim Brenner. Mr. Brenner, during
one of his interviews with a global business magazine ‘MindVerse,’ talked about the new
software ‘MindFlayer’ which would be a game changer for the industry. On June 24, 2022,
MindVerse printed this interview with the headline ‘Artificiana’s new Mind-Flaying invention!
A game changer.’ The interview had no mention of collaboration between the two companies.
9. After reading Mr. Jim Brenner’s interview, AI Innovations took proactive steps to address the
situation and ensure that the collaboration and their contributions were accurately represented
and recognized. On June 29, 2022, they promptly reached out to Artificiana following the

9
publication of the interview. They initiated a direct communication channel to discuss the
omission of their collaboration from the interview. AI Innovations expressed their concerns
about the oversight and highlighted the significance of acknowledging their pivotal role in the
development of 'MindFlayer'.
10. Artificiana acknowledged the oversight and publicly issued a statement dated July 11, 2022,
to clarify the situation. However, in their statement, they inadvertently downplayed the
significance of AI Innovations' contributions, referring to them as a "technical support partner."
This choice of words could be perceived as diminishing the role of AI Innovations in the
collaborative effort.
11. On July 15, 2022, recognizing the potential impact of misrepresentation, AI Innovations sent
a formal letter to Artificiana. In this letter, they elaborated on their multifaceted contributions to
the collaborative project, highlighting their role beyond mere "technical support." The letter
provided specific instances of their innovation, technological expertise, and integral
contributions that had a direct impact on the development and success of 'MindFlayer'.
12. Upon receiving the formal letter from AI Innovations, Artificiana’s legal representatives
wrote to AI Innovations a response dated July 25, 2022, acknowledging AI Innovations'
elaboration on their contributions and their desire for accurate representation. However,
Artificiana's response did not provide a detailed account of how they intended to rectify the
situation or ensure a more comprehensive portrayal of AI Innovations' role in the collaborative
project.
13. Artificiana, while acknowledging AI Innovations' concerns, faced internal delays in
formulating a comprehensive response and action plan. Various factors, including conflicting
priorities and decision-making processes, contributed to the delay in providing a more detailed
account of their intended steps.
14. As time passed without a satisfactory resolution or clear action plan from Artificiana,
frustration and tensions began to grow on AI Innovations' side. The lack of progress in rectifying
the situation heightened AI Innovations' concerns about their contributions being undervalued or
misrepresented.
15. AI Innovations internally evaluated their options and considered potential measures to
protect their interests and ensure proper recognition. This evaluation included discussions about
accelerating the development and marketing of MindFlayer to assert their ownership and

10
showcase their contributions independently. They started exploring their options for securing
patents and Intellectual Property Rights to assert exclusive ownership of the application.
16. Soon thereafter, Artificiana caught wind of a compelling industry rumour that suggested AI
Innovations might be applying for a patent application for ‘MindFlayer’. The rumour, circulating
within tech circles, triggered speculations. Adding to the rumours was an article in a respected
magazine, titled ‘AI Arm-Wrestle: Tech Titans Grapple for Supremacy’, providing subtle
confirmation. The article subtly explored the implications of AI Innovations' potential patent
endeavours and the ongoing dispute between the two companies.
17. On October 10, 2022, in order to put the dispute to bed, Artificiana’s legal representative,
Ms. Nancy Hopper privately reached out to Mr. Steeve Byers from AI Innovations, attempting to
negotiate a settlement outside of arbitration. She proposed a joint statement wherein both
companies acknowledge the collaboration over the software. She further added that in exchange
for this, AI Innovations should not proceed with its patent application. She further hinted that
such an application may be deemed to be in breach of the Agreement. Mr. Byers told Ms.
Hopper that he shall discuss the proposal internally and may reach out to her if needed.
18. On November 15, 2022, AI Innovation sent a notice invoking arbitration to Artificiana. In its
Notice of Arbitration, AI Innovation claimed that it has ownership rights over MindFlayer till the
completion of the project, pursuant to Clause 20.1, and as such is entitled to the Intellectual
Property Rights for ‘MindFlayer.’ They alleged that Artificiana undermined the collaboration
between the Parties and was in breach of Clause 5.3 of the Agreement which constituted a
material breach of the Agreement. AI Innovations further claimed that Artificiana has not made
timely payments for its services and expertise during the collaboration. They claimed that the
non-payment of fees has caused financial strain on their operations and has significantly
hampered further development of the software application. As a part of their claim, AI
Innovations claimed damages worth $500 million from Artificiana for the misrepresentation and
for the breach of the Agreement. AI Innovations appointed Ms. Joyce Mayfield as their
arbitrator.
19. On November 29, 2022, Artificiana sent its Answer to the Request for Arbitration and also
appointed Mr Will Henderson, as its co-arbitrator. Answering the notice of arbitration,
Artificiana responded to the notice stating that the pre-arbitration stage has not been concluded
and that Parties are undergoing negotiations. Artificiana further stated that the dispute is not

11
arbitrable under the applicable laws. In its Answer to the Request for Arbitration, Artificiana
challenged the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal on the basis that the arbitration agreement
was not valid and effective, and, as such, that the Indovian courts are the competent ones to
determine the dispute. They further refuted the claims of AI Innovation and alleged that AI
Innovations clandestinely applied for a patent of ‘MindFlayer’ even though they were not
entitled to any Intellectual Property Rights over the software application. They further alleged
that AI Innovations did not employ the latest technology to develop the software. Artificiana
claims that it has sent numerous communications to AI Innovation to develop the software in
accordance with their discussions and the Agreement, but all in vain. They alleged that AI
Innovations had misrepresented its technological capabilities and financial standing to induce
Artificiana into entering into this collaboration. Responding to the Request for Arbitration,
Artificiana claimed that they are the actual aggrieved party and it is them who should be granted
damages, if any.
20. On 15 December 2022, in the absence of the agreement of the co-arbitrators, and upon
Claimant’s request, the SIAC appointed Ms Erica Sinclair, as chairperson. On January 5, 2023,
the Respondent submitted the challenge to Ms Erica’s appointment based on the following:
(i) Ms. Erica failed to disclose that her husband, Mr. Murray Sinclair, was the chairman of the
board of Data-mension, a Japanese-incorporated company that held 99% of Algorithmia, a
company incorporated in England, and which, in turn, held 57% of AI Innovations’
shareholding; and
(ii) The connection between Ms. Erica’s spouse and the Claimant in these proceedings was
sufficient to establish the lack of Ms. Erica’s independence and impartiality under the Indovian
laws, including the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration.
21. The Respondent pointed out that although the information about Mr. Sinclair was available
on the website of Data-mension since the beginning of the arbitration proceedings, it could only
confirm the information that Mr. Sinclair was Ms. Erica’s spouse on January 4, 2023, when Ms.
Erica Sinclair responded to the request for clarifications submitted by the Respondent. 22.
Subsequently, vide Procedural Order No. 5 dated March 15, 2023, the Arbitral Tribunal
identified the issues under consideration which are as follows:
(1) Whether the Arbitral Tribunal has the jurisdiction to hear the dispute?
(2) Whether the challenge raised by the Respondent over Ms. Erica’s appointment maintainable?

12
 (3) Whether the Claimant has ownership and proprietary rights over the Intellectual Property
Rights of MindFlayer?
(4) Whether the Respondent has breached the Agreement, thereby entitling the Claimant to seek
damages?
23. It was decided that the hearing on merits shall take place on June 4, 2023, and the Arbitral
Tribunal shall decide upon these issues.
24. At the hearing on merits, Respondent produced a print screen of an internal email of the
Claimant, wherein Mr. Byers’ sent an email to Mr. Brenner telling him about his interaction with
Ms. Hopper. The email also mentioned the request for the use of updated technology by the
Respondent. Along with the new evidence, the Respondent moved an application to admit the
said evidence.
25. The Claimant objected to the Respondent’s submission of such document at the hearing,
stating that
(a) the purported document is inadmissible at this stage of the hearing; and
(b) the email communication is an internal communication between the legal team and the CEO
of the company and has been obtained illegally by the Respondent.
26. The Respondent submitted that it had only obtained this print screen the evening before the
hearing, and hence it could not have produced it before. The Respondent further submitted that
the said document is a crucial piece of evidence and hence must be admitted. Seeing the nature
and complexity of the dispute, the Arbitral Tribunal, issued Procedural Order No. 6 dated June 4,
2023, amending the issues for adjudication. The Arbitral Tribunal added the following issue to
the pre-existing list of issues:
(5) Whether the Printscreen produced by the Respondent at the stage of hearing, admissible?
27. The Arbitral Tribunal has listed the matter for 5 th November 2023, for final hearings on the
issues.

13
 ISSUES RAISED

I.
WHETHER THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL HAS Whether the Arbitral Tribunal has the
jurisdiction to hear the dispute?

(2) Whether the challenge raised by the Respondent over Ms. Erica’s appointment
maintainable?
(3) Whether the Claimant has ownership and proprietary rights over the Intellectual
Property Rights of MindFlayer?
(4) Whether the Respondent has breached the Agreement, thereby entitling the Claimant
to seek damages?

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 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

CONTENTION-I

ISSUE 1: WHETHER THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL HAS THE JURISDICTION TO

HEAR THE DISPUTE?

1. It is most humbly submitted that the Arbitral Tribunal does not have the jurisdiction to hear
this dispute as (a) firstly, the dispute secures public interest (b) secondly, arbitration
agreement is invalid.

A. THE DISPUTE BETWEEN PARTIES INVOLVE PUBLIC INTEREST.

2. It is humbly submitted that in the present case both the law governing the arbitration
agreement and the law of the seat should be considered. The law of the seat of the arbitration,
Singapore law would govern the procedure of the arbitration including challenges to the
tribunal or its jurisdiction.1 Singapore has adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law to apply to
international arbitrations……The International Arbitration Act, has given the Model Law the
force of law in Singapore…The International Arbitration Act is applicable to international
arbitration.2
3. Any dispute which the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration under an arbitration
agreement may be determined by arbitration unless it is contrary to public policy to do so. 3
Section 11 of the International Arbitration Act (Cap 143A, 2002 Rev Ed) (“IAA”) was that
there would ordinarily be a presumption of arbitrability so long as a dispute fell within the
scope of an arbitration clause. This presumption might be rebutted by showing that
Parliament intended to preclude a particular type of dispute from being arbitrated, or it would

1
Anupam Mittal v Westbridge Ventures II Investment Holdings [2023] SGCA 1
2
Ashwinie Kumar Bansal, International Commercial Arbitration, (New Delhi: Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt.
Ltd., 2012) pp. 979-980.
3
Section 11(1) of Singapore’s International Arbitration Act, 1994.

15
 be contrary to the public policy considerations involved in that type of dispute to permit it to
be resolved by arbitration.4
4. Also, in the case of Anupam Mittal Vs. Westbridge Ventures 11, Investment Holdings,
Singapore Court of Appeal, held that if a dispute is contrary to the public policy of the
foreign law governing the arbitration agreement, then the dispute cannot proceed to
arbitration.
5. Therefore, in the instant case, the purpose of the collaboration between the two companies
was to revolutionize the industry and also to have the client’s base on the global level , which
clearly shows the involvement of the public interest and hence this case is non-arbitrable.

B. THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT IS INVALID.

6. It is stated that in the present case, the Arbitration agreement shall be governed by Indian
law.5 Under Arbitration Agreement, the words shall contemplate an obligation and
determination on the part of the parties to invoke arbitration and not merely a possibility. For
example, use of the words such as “parties can if they so desire, refer their dispute to
arbitration” or “in the event of any dispute, the parties may also agree to refer the same to
arbitration” shall not be construed as submission to arbitration.6
7. The basis of agreement under the act is a written submission by the parties. No particular
form is necessary but the words used for this purpose must words of choice and
determination to go to arbitration and not problematic words of mere possibility.7
8. In the present case, the clauses of the agreement between parties shows no determination to
go to arbitration and also words like ‘upon the will of the either party’ used in clause 25.3 of
Collaboration Agreement [hereinafter CA] are mere words of possibilities, due to which, this
agreement cannot be known as an arbitration agreement, according to the above precedents.
9. Therefore, in the lights of above discussion and merit on record it can be concluded that the
present case involves public interest and the arbitration agreement is invalid. Thus, the
Arbitral Tribunal does not have the jurisdiction to hear this case.
4
Twarit Consultancy Services Pvt. Ltd. and another Vs. GPE (India) Ltd. and others [2021] SGHC (1) 17.
5
Moot proposition, clause 25.5 of Collaboration Agreement.
6
Jagdish Chander v. Ramesh Chander (2007) Supreme Court, decided on 26 Apr. 2007; see also K. K. Modi v. K. N.
Modi (1998) Supreme Court, decided on 4 Feb. 1998.
7
Delhi Development Authority Vs. Jacksons Engineers Pvt. Ltd. 1996 (Suppl) Arb. LR 296 (DB-Del).

16
 CONTENTION-II

ISSUE 2: WHETHER THE CHALLENGE RAISED BY THE RESPONDENT OVER

MISS ERICA’S APPOINTMENT MAINTAINABLE?

10. It is most humbly submitted before the honorable Arbitral Tribunal that in the instant case, on
15th December 2022, in the absence of the agreement of the co-arbitrator and upon
Claimant’s request the SIAC appointed Ms. Erica Sinclair as chairperson. On January 5 th the
respondent challenged the appointment of Ms. Erica based on, the connection between
Erica’s spouse and the claimant and her failure to disclose full information about her
husband, which form sufficient clause to establish the lack of independence and impartiality
on the part of Ms. Erica. Therefore, Ms. Erica’s appointment is not maintainable (C) firstly,
Mr. Murray Sinclair (Erica’s husband) was the chairman of a company which hold 57%
shares of claimant’s company which arises justifiable doubts as to independence and
impartiality of Ms. Erica (D) secondly, Ms. Erica failed to disclose the information of her
husband.

C. MR. SINCLAIR WAS THE CHAIRMAN OF A COMPANY WHICH HOLDS 57%

SHARES OF CLAIMAT’S COMPANY GIVES JUSTIFIABLE DOUBTS AS TO
INDEPENDENCE AND IMPARTIALITY OF MS. ERICA.

11. It is humbly stated that independence and impartiality of the arbitrator are the hallmarks of
any arbitration proceedings. Rule against bias is one of the fundamental principles of natural
justice which is applied to all judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings. 8 Also, if a close family
member of the arbitrator has a significant financial interest in one of the parties or an affiliate
of one of the parties then it will automatically disqualifies the appointment of arbitrator. 9

8
Voestalpine Schienen Gmbh Vs. Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. (2017) 4SCC 665 PARA 20.
9
List 10 of Schedule 7 Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; see also Section 12(5), inserted by the 2015
Arbitration and Conciliation Act amendment.

17
12. In TRF Ltd. V. Energo Engg. Projects Ltd., 10 it was stated that if any person whose
relationship with the parties or the counselor or the subject-matter of dispute falls under any
of the categories specified is the 7 th schedule, he is ineligible to be appointed as an arbitrator
but not otherwise.
13. In the case of Bharat Broadband Network Ltd. Vs. United Telecoms Ltd. 11 under Para 57 the
honorable court clearly mentioned that, there are certain minimum levels of the arbitral
process regardless of the parties apparent agreement. A sensible law cannot, for instance,
permit appointment of an arbitrator who is employed by or similarly dependent on one party
even if this is what parties agreed.
14. In C and E Ltd v. Gopal das Bagri,12 The Court opined that upon lifting of the corporate veil
the family was in control and the management of the company and would qualify as an
‘affiliate’ under Explanation 2 of the Fifth and Seventh Schedule read with Section 12 of the
Act of 1996.
15. In BOI vs BOJ13 Singapore Court of appeal expounded that the test is to check whether there
exist facts and circumstances that gives rise to reasonable suspicion or apprehension of bias
in the fair minded and informed observer this includes – Classification of facts and
circumstances that are significant of checking the existence of bias Understanding whether
the fair minded and informed observer would reasonably entertain an apprehension of bias
from those facts and circumstances. The court elaborated that the fair minded and informed
individual is not personally concerned with the matter outcome other than the general
public’s interests in the fair and proper disposition of justice.
16. In Kammergericht Berlin, Germany14 One German court has held that an arbitrator could be
challenged where the circumstances invoked gave rise to reasonable grounds for objectively
suspecting its impartiality, and that proof that the arbitrator actually lacked impartiality was
not required. Similarly, after also stating that proof of actual partiality was not required,
another German court ruled that a challenge would be successful where objective

10
(2017) 8 SCC 377, PARA 7.1.
11
(2019) 5 SCC 755.
12
(2023) SCC; Cal. (HC), decided on 27 Jul., 2023.
13
(2018) 2 SLR 1156 .
14
28 Sch 24/99, 22 March 2000.

18
 circumstances gave rise to justifiable doubts as to the impartiality or independence of the
arbitrator.15

17. In the instant case the relation of of Ms. Erica and Mr. Sinclair falls under schedule 7 (10) of
the arbitration and conciliation act which makes Ms. Erica ineligible to be appointed as an
arbitrator in the present dispute. Also, facts and circumstances that Mr. Murray Sinclair was
the chairman of the board of Data-mension a Japanese incorporated company that held 99%
of Algorithmia, a company incorporated in England, and which, in turn, held 57% of AI
innovation’s shareholding, all these circumstances give rise to reasonable suspicion or
apprehension of bias of Ms. Erica.

D. MS. ERICA FAILED TO DISCLOSE THE INFORMATION OF HER HUSBAND.

18. It is humbly submitted that Article 1216 of U.M.L imposes on each arbitrator a continuing
duty to disclose to the parties circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to his
or her impartiality or independence. An arbitrator’s failure to comply with the disclosure
requirement may, in itself, give rise to justifiable doubts as to that arbitrator’s impartiality
and independence.17 A prospective arbitrator shall disclose to those who approach him in
connection with his possible appointment any circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable
doubts as to his impartiality or independence. An arbitrator, once appointed or chosen, shall
disclose such circumstances to the parties unless they have already been informed by him of
these circumstances.18
19. Also, when a person is approached in connection with his possible appointment as an
arbitrator, he shall disclose in writing any circumstances, such as the existence either direct
or indirect, of any past or present relationship with or interest in any of the parties or in
relation to the subject-matter in dispute, whether financial, business, professional or other
kind, which is likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to his independence or impartiality. 19
15
CLOUT case No. 665 [Oberlandesgericht Naumburg, Germany, 10 SchH 03/01, 19 December 2001]
16
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, art. 12.
17
Jung Science Information Technology Co. Ltd. v. Zte. Corporation, High Court—Court of First Instance, Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region of China, 22 July 2008, [2008] HKCFI
18
UNCITRA Arbitration Rules, art. 9.
19
Section 12 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

19
20. General Standard (3) of the IBA guideline states that those fact or circumstances that may
give rise to doubts to the arbitrator’s independence or impartiality in “the eyes of the parties”
shall be disclosed by the arbitrator.20 Also, the UK supreme court in the case of Halliburton
Company V. Chubb Bermuda Insurance Ltd21 has held that the duty of disclosure under GS 3
stems from the parties interest in being fully informed.
21. In the case of HSMV. Corp. v. ADI Ltd,22 a court found that despite the fact that article 12
does not explicitly require an arbitrator to investigate whether he or she has questionable
relationships or interests, the disclosure requirement imposed in paragraph (1) implies such a
duty. An arbitrator is thus “obligated to conduct a conflict check to see if he must disclose
any circumstances that might cause his impartiality to be questioned”.
22. Therefore, in the light of the above discussion and merits on record it is contended that it is
the duty of the arbitrator to disclose the circumstances which give rise to justifiable doubts as
to his independence or impartiality. And in the instant case Mr. Murray Sinclair (Erica’s
husband) was the chairman of a company which hold 57% shares of claimant’s company and
this information was available on the website of Data-mension since the beginning of
arbitration proceedings. Further, the respondent sent a request for clarification to Ms. Erica
on the 4th of January in which she failed to disclose the information about her husband’s
connection with the claimant which is the duty of the arbitrator under the UNCITRAL Model
Law. The fact and circumstances gives reasonable doubt of her bias nature. Thus, it is
imminent to note that Ms. Erica shall not be appointed as a 3rd arbitrator.

CONTENTION-III

20
IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration, part I, clause 3 (Disclosure by the Arbitrator).
21
(2020) UKSC 48.
22
Central District Court for California, United States of America, 8 November 1999

20
ISSUE 3: WHETHER THE CALIMANT HAS OWNERSHIP AND PROPRIETARY
RIGHTS OVER THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OF MINDFLAYER?

23. It is most humbly submitted before the honorable Arbitral Tribunal that the claimant does not
have sole ownership and proprietary rights over the Intellectual Property Rights of
Mindflayer
as (E) firstly, both the parties are joint owner of Mindflayer, (F) secondly, both the parties are
partners and (G) thirdly, the patent application filed by the claimant is liable to be rejected.

E. BOTH THE PARTIES ARE JOINT OWNER OF MINDFLAYER.

24. It is humbly submitted that in the present case both the parties are joint owner of Mindflayer.
The agreement between both the parties enshrined the principle of equitable Intellectual
Property sharing, ensuring that the innovative solutions emerging from their collaborations
would be jointly owned.23
25. Further, Claimant argued that it has ownership right over Mindflayer till the completion of
the project pursuant to Clause 20.1. It is humbly stated that Clause 20.1 of CA states that “In
consideration of the services rendered and any payments made under this collaboration
agreement, AI Innovation shall retain all rights to any intellectual property (IP) created or
developed during the course of the project till the completion of the project”. Here under
clause 20.1, there is nowhere mention that the claimant will retain ownership rights over
Mindflayer till the completion of the project. Here the intention behind the word “AI
Innovation shall retain all rights to any intellectual property” was that the claimant has all
right to use any Intellectual Property created or developed during the course of the project till
the completion of the project and not about the ownership of Intellectual Property.
26. Every contract is to be considered with reference to its object and the whole of its terms and
accordingly the whole context must be considered in endeavoring to collect the intention of
the parties, even though the immediate object of enquiry is the meaning of an isolated
clause.24 Contractual terms cannot be interpreted in isolation, following strict etymological

23
Moot proposition, para. 6.
24
Bihar State Electricity Board, Patna and Ors. v. M/s Green Rubber Industries and Ors. [(1990) 1 SCC 731, ¶23.].

21
 rules or be guided by popular connotation of terms, at variance with the contractual context. 25
The process of interpretation, though the exclusive domain of the Court, inheres the duty to
decipher the meaning attributed to contractual terms by the parties to the contract. Words and
expressions used in the contract are principal tools to ascertain such intention. While
interpreting the words, courts look at the expressions falling for interpretation in the context
of other provisions of the contract and also in the context of the contract as a whole. These
are intrinsic tools for interpreting a contract.26
27. Therefore, it is imminent to note that neither the terms of contract nor intention or conduct of
the parties shows that the claimant alone will hold ownership rights over Mindflayer till the
completion of project. Claimant is the co-owner of Mindflayer and not a sole owner.
Therefore, in the light of the above discussion and merit on record it is stated that in the
present case both parties are joint owner of Mindflayer. And the court has power to interpret
the contractual terms in accordance with the terms of agreement and intention of parties.

F. BOTH THE PARTIES ARE IN PARTNERSHIP.

28. It is humbly submitted that on March 15, 2022, the parties entered into a detailed and
comprehensive Collaboration Agreement to formalize their partnership. 27 In the present case
both the parties are in Partners according to Indian Partnership Act, 1932. Partnership is the
relation between persons who have agreed to share the profits of a business carried on by all
or any of them acting for all.28
29. According to Section 4, the following essentials are necessary to constitute a ‘Partnership’.
1. There should be an agreement between the persons who wants to be partners.
2. The purpose of creating partnership should be carrying on of business.
3. The motive for the creation of partnership should be earning and sharing profits.
4. The business of the firm should be carried on by all of them or any of them acting for all,
i.e., in mutual agency.
25
Union of India Vs. Raman Iron Foundry [(1974) 2 SCC 231].
26
Food Corporation of India & Ors vs Abhijit Paul in Civil Appeal Nos. 8572-8573/2022 arising out of SLP (C) Nos.
16009-16010 of 2019 and cited in 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 975.
27
Moot proposition, para. 5.
28
Section 4 of Indian Partnership Act, 1932.

22
30. Although, present case fulfills all the abovementioned elements of partnership, i.e.,
 There is a written agreement between both the parties which divides their rights and
obligation for the development of AI products. Further, the parties engaged in extensive
deliberations regarding the specific obligations and roles that each entity would undertake
within the partnership.29
 The project of parties is to develop cutting-edge Artificial Intelligence (AI) products for
the global market and sell AI products in Global market 30 and will earn profit. Investment
commitments were also specified under the agreement.31
 Here, both the parties are active partners as they both are engage in a development of AI
products.
31. Agreement of partnership need not to be express, but can be inferred from the course of
conduct of the parties to the agreement. If any of the parties has got obligation to others for
the purpose of inducting those others to whom any of the parties may be accountable in law,
into the arena of partnership and for treating them as partners under the law. 32 The question
whether the relation of partnership does or does not exist, “must depend on the real intention
and contract of the parties”.33
32. Therefore, in the light of the above discussion and merit on record it is stated that in the
instant case, the fact and circumstances clearly shows that both claimant and respondent are
partners. Also, it is specifically mentioned in several paragraphs of the facts they work
together as a partner, they formalize their partnership by entering into CA etc. Thus, it is the
duty of the court to see to facts of the and take it on merit.

G. PATENT APPLICATION IS LIABLE TO BE REJECTED.

29
Moot proposition, para 4.
30
Ibid.
31
Moot proposition, para 5.
32
CIT v Kedarmal Keshardeo AIR 1968 A&N 68; see also Aruna Group Of Estates and Bodinayakanur v State Of
Madras (1962) 2 Mad LJ 294.
33
Ross v. Parkyns[13] Jessel , M.R.

23
33. It is humbly submitted that in the present case the claimant filed Patent application to hold
ownership right over Mindflayer. But the respondent states that the claimant have no right to
file the above application.
34. Also, a novel product or technique must have an innovative step in order to be patentable in
India. Sections 3 and 4 of the Indian Patent Act, 1970 deal with those discoveries or methods
that do not fall under the ambit of the Act and therefore are not patentable.
35. Section 3(k) of the act states that any mathematical methods, business methods, computer
programmes34 per se and algorithms are not considered patentable inventions. And in the
present case, Mindflayer is a computer software and according to the abovementioned
section, being a computer software it is non patentable. Therefore, the application of the
claimant to have the patent is liable to be rejected.
36. Therefore, in the light of the above discussion and merit on record it is stated that in the
instant case, the claimant alone has no ownership and propriety right over Mindflayer, both
the parties are partners under Indian partnership Act, 1932 and have joint ownership of
Mindflayer. Also both the patent application filed by the Claimant is liable to be rejected as it
is barred by section 3(k) of The Patent Act, 1970.

34
Section 3(k) of The Patent Act, 1970

24
 CONTENTION-IV

ISSUE 4: WHETHER THE RESPONDENT HAS BREACHED THE AGREEMENT,

THEREBY ENTITLING THE CLAIMANT TO SEEK DAMAGES?

37. It is most humbly submitted before the honorable Arbitral Tribunal that the (H) respondent
has not breached the agreement, therefore (I) the claimant is not entitle to seek any damages
and (J) It was the Claimant who breached the agreement, therefore (K) the respondent is
entitle for damages.

H. RESPONDENT HAS NOT BREACHED THE AGREEMENT.

38. It is humbly submitted that in the instant case Claimant alleges that the respondent has
breached clause 5.3 of the CA which constituted material breach of the agreement. It is
humbly stated that in the present case the respondent has not breached clause 5.3 of the CA.
39. Clause 5.3 of the CA states that, “Artificiana shall ensure accurate representation of AI
Innovation’s contributions to ‘Mindflayer’ in all relevant communications, and media
interactions. They shall provide due credit to AI Innovation’s role. 35” And it is humbly
submitted that Artificiana (respondent) gave full representation of AI Innovation’s
contribution to ‘Mindflayer’ in a public statement issued on July 11, 2022. In the statement
respondent represented the contribution of claimant to Mindflayer and refer them as his
“technical support partner”.
40. Also, the role of respondent in the CA is to provide technological expertise, AI algorithms,
and innovation to drive the development of ‘Mindflayer’. 36 Thus, it can’t be argued that
respondent downplayed the significance of AI Innovation’s contributions by referring them
as “technical support partner”.

35
Moot proposition, Annexure- A, clause 5.3.
36
Moot proposition, Annexure- A, clause 5.2.

25
41. Further, it is also alleged by the claimant that the respondent has lacked in timely payments.
It is humbly submitted that the claimant has no cogent proof to prove that the respondent has
failed in timely payments. The respondent with mala fide intention has made false allegation
without a single proof and thus mere allegation without any evidence is not admissible.
42. Also, the respondent has made timely payments to the claimant and it was the claimant who
always demanded the payments before due dates. It is clearly stated in the clarification of
facts that the claimant has demanded the payment 10 days before the due date. 37 Thus, it is
clearly established from the act of the claimant that the respondent has made payments on
time. In the case of Bishamber Nath Agarwal v. Kishan Chand38, it has been held that when
an arrangement specifies that a particular act relating to the contracts is to be completed
within a given period or manner, it should be performed in that manner or period and the
parties don’t have the right of performing it in their own way or time.
43. Thus, it is humbly submitted that for the breach of the contract it is necessary that the refusal
should have been communicated to the other party and should make the intention not to
perform quite explicit.39 And, a breach of contract occurs when a party thereto renounces his
liability under it, or by his own act makes it impossible that he should perform his obligations
under it or totally fails to perform such obligations.40
44. Therefore, in the light of the above discussion and merit on record it is stated that in the
instant case, the respondent has not breached the agreement.

37
Para 10 of clarification.
38
AIR 1990 All 65.
39
Dhanraj Mills Ltd. Liability Co. VS. Narsingh Prasad Boobna AIR 1949 Pat 270.

40
Associated Cinema of America, Inc. Vs. World Amusement Co. (1937) 201 Minn 94; see also Chowgale & Co. Ltd.
Vs. Rizvi Estates & Houses (P) Ltd., (1997) 4 Bom CR 648; U.P. State Sugar Corpn Vs. Mahalchand M. Kothari, AIR
2005 SC 61.

26
 I. CLAIMANT IS NOT ENTITLED FOR DAMAGES.

45. It is humbly submitted that the respondent has previously dealt with the issue that the
respondent has not breached the agreement (H). Also, the party who is injured by the breach
of a contract may bring an action for damages. 41 Damages means compensation in terms of
money for the loss suffered by the party.42
46. When a contract has been broken, the party who suffers by such breach is entitled to receive,
from the party who has broken the contract, compensation for any loss or damage caused to
him.43 A person could recover only those damages which were either to be considered
“reasonably as arising naturally, i.e., according to the usual course of things” from the
breach.44 Thus, it is imminent to note that for claiming compensation it is necessary that any
one of the party to the contract should breach the contract. Therefore, in the present case
there is no breach of contract by the respondent thereby claimant is not entitled to claim
damages.

J. IT IS THE CLAIMANT WHO HAS BREACHED THE CONTRACT.

47. It is humbly submitted that in the instant case claimant has breached clause 5.2 and clause
25.1 of the CA. Firstly under clause 5.2 of CA the role of respondent is to provide
technological expertise, AI algorithms, and innovation to drive the development of
‘Mindflayer’.45 Thus, it is the duty of the claimant to provide technological expertise and
innovation to the respondent. But the claimant has breached its duty by not providing
updated technology to the respondent. Also, it is pertinent to mention that the respondent has
sent numerous communications to the claimant to develop the software in accordance with
their discussions and agreement, but the claimant never responded. The fact that respondent
has sent numerous communications to the claimant to develop the software can be
corroborated by the print screen which was filed by the respondent as evidence.
41
Finlay Muir & Co v. Radhakissen Gopikissen, ILR (1909) 36 Cal 736.
42
Sudesh Prabhakar Volvoikar v. Gopal Babu Savolkar, (1996) 5 Bom CR 1.
43
Section 73 of The Indian contract Act, 1872.
44
Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) 9 Exch 341.
45
Supra note 36.

27
48. Secondly, the claimant has breached clause 25.1 of the CA. Under clause 25.1 it is stated
that, Any dispute, claim or difference arising out of or in connection with this collaboration
agreement, including any question regarding its existence, validity or termination (Dispute)
shall be attempted to be resolved amicably and in good faith through negotiations…….the
other Party shall respond promptly to participate in the dispute resolution
process……..during the process of negotiation, both parties shall engage in a sincere
exchange of information and make good faith efforts to reach a solution. Thus, there are
some acts of the claimant which directly breach clause 25.1 of the CA i.e.,
 Initiation of negotiation proceedings by Ms. Nancy Hopper and no response of Mr.
Steeve Byers.
 Initiation of arbitration proceeding without the result of negotiation proceeding.
49. Contracts are seen as relationships consisting of promises which are enforceable by law. 46
The right originates and subsists by virtue of the contract itself. It is the duty of the Court,
while interpreting the contract to decipher the true and correct meaning the parties intended
and enforce the rights arising out of the contract.47
50. The parties to a contract must either perform, or offer to perform, their respective promises,
unless such performance is dispensed with or excused under the provisions of this Act, or of
any other law.48 In view of section 37 it is obvious that promises made are binding under
excelled under the provisions of contract act itself or under any other law it is well
established principle of law that parties and privities to contract are undoubtedly bound by
it.49
51. Therefore, in the light of the above discussion and merit on record it is humbly submitted that
the claimant has breached clause 5.2 and 25.1 of the agreement.

K. CLAIMANT MISREPRESENTED THE FACT

46
British Russian Gazette and Trade Outlook Ltd. v Associated Newspapers Ltd [1933] 2 KB 616.
47
State of Madhya Pradesh vs. M/s Sew Construction Ltd. Ors.[1] decided on 18.11.2022.
Civil Appeal No. 8571/2022 arising out of SLP (C) No. 907/2020
48
Section 37 of Indian Contract Act, 1872.
49
Ranjaya Shahi vs. Boela Prasad Motani AIR 1978 pat.91

28
52. It is humbly submitted that in the instant case claimant has breached the agreement which
causes financial loss to the respondent. Also, it was the claimant who misrepresented the fact
that they had latest technology to provide the respondents, and by misrepresenting their
technological capabilities and financial standing, the claimant induced the respondent into
entering the into the collaboration. The main reason behind collaborating with the claimant
was its technical expertise & the same was misrepresented. Thus, due to the
misrepresentation, the respondents faced financial loss by investing in the project.
53. In the case of, BSkyB Vs. EDS50, court found that there was negligent and fraudulent
misrepresentations, therefore the aggrieved party could claim all the damages caused by the
misrepresentation, without any limit.
54. Also, in the case of Museprime Properties Vs. Adhill Properties,51 it was held that
misrepresentation was a ground to rescind the contract and the party who suffered would be
awarded the return of their deposit, damages in respect of lost conveyancing expenses and
interest. Section 7352 of the Act lays down the law relating to compensation for loss caused
by a breach of contract is not pre-fixed by the parties .
55. In the case of, Common Cause Vs. Union of India,53 the term ‘damages’ was explained by the
Apex Court, as a form of compensation due to the breach, loss or injury caused to one party
by the other.
56. Also, there is a legal maxim i.e., “nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria”
a person having done wrong cannot take advantage of his own wrong and plead bar of any
law to frustrate the lawful trial by a competent court. 54 Therefore, in the light of the above
discussion and merit on record it is humbly submitted that respondent has not breached the
agreement and the claimant is not entitled for damages. Further, it was the claimant who
breached the agreement due to which the respondent has suffered damage. Thus, the
respondent is entitled for damages from the claimant.

50
[2010] EWHC 86 (TCC).
51
[1990] 36 EG 114.
52
Section 73 of The Indian Contract Act, 1872.
53
(1999).
54
Vit Makarius, The Nature of the Burden and Standard of Proof in International Commercial Arbitration , CZECH &
CENTRAL EUR. Y.B. OF ARB 54.

29
 CONTENTION-V

CONTENTION -5
Whether the print screen produced by the respondent at the stage of hearing admissible ?
It is most humbly submitted before the honorable Tribunal that the print screen produced by the
respondent is admissible.
The claimant has objected to the respondents submission of document stating two reasons –
1. The document is inadmissible at this stage of the hearing
2. The email is illegally obtained evidence.

1. Considering the first objection ,

A. Schedule 1st of Article 19 of IAA states that ;
Article 19. Determination of rules of procedure
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Law, the parties are free to agree on the procedure to be
followed by the arbitral tribunal in conducting the proceedings.
(2) Failing such agreement, the arbitral tribunal may, subject to the provisions of this Law,
conduct the arbitration in such manner as it considers appropriate. The power conferred upon
the arbitral tribunal includes the power to determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality
and weight of any evidence.
Your honor in the above mentioned provision, it is clearly mentioned that if the parties have not
agreed to any proceeding for the arbitral tribunal. Then, according to power conferred upon the
Arbitral Tribunal it can determine the admissibility , relevance , materiality and weight of any
evidence.
And your honor in the present case, there was no agreement on the procedure to be followed ,So
now it is the power of the Arbitral Tribunal to conduct the arbitration in such manner as it

30
considers appropriate. And according to the provision mentioned above , it is the honorable
Arbitral Tribunal who has the power to determine the admissibility.
B. UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES

Article 27(4) of UNCITRAL Rules provides equally broad discretion to arbitrators to

determine arbitrators to determine the admissibility of evidence.
C. IBA Guidelines on the taking of evidence in international arbitration.

Article 9(1)of those rules also provide broad discretion to arbitrators on questions of
admissibility of evidence.

Your honor in the above provisions it is clearly mentioned that it is The Arbitral
Tribunals who has the discretion to for the admissibility of evidences at any stage of the
hearing .
Your honor in the above mentioned provisions it is clearly stated that it is the discretion of the
honorable tribunal to determine the admissibility of an evidence and at any point of time .
2. Now considering the second objection that the evidence is an illegally obtained evidence .
It is most humbly submitted before the Arbitral Tribunal that based on a review of a selected
prominent cases hear before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the Court of Justice of
European Union (CJEU), the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and international
tribunals established under International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)
or the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) rules, it can be
concluded: The fact that evidence is obtained illegally will not automatically disqualify such
evidence as inadmissible. ICSID Review - Foreign Investment Law Journal, Volume 33, Issue 1,
Winter 2018, Pages 235–259
So an evidence cannot only be disqualified on the basis of that it is an illegally obtained evidence
,and held inadmissible as held in the case of Hulley Enterprises Limited (Cyprus)v. The
Russian Federation, UNCITRAL,PCA Case No. 2005-03/AA226 The PCA’s conclusion
Clarified that IOE is admissible before tribunals, which may rely on it ,thus expanding the scope
of admissibility of evidence.

31
And also as discussed above according to Article 19 of IAA , Article 27(4) of UNCITRAL and
Article 9(1) of IBA rules gives broad discretion to the arbitral tribunal to decide on the
admissibility of evidences.

NASCENT INDIAN JURISPRUDENCE

The admissibility of evidence in arbitral proceedings in India is governed by the Indian Evidence
Act, 1872. The sole test to determine the admissibility of IOE is the extent of its relevance. The
same has been upheld by the court in the cases of Natwarlal Damodardas Soni and R.M.
Malkani. The Supreme court held that IOE must be made admissible, if it is relevant to the
dispute, however, it is to be dealt with much care by the court.
1973 AIR 157, 1973 SCR (2) 417
The Apex court, while dealing with IOE, also remarked in Pooran Mal v. Director of
Inspection of Income Tax, that if no constitutional or statutory construction prescribes
exclusion of IOE, then the IOE must be admitted if it is pertinent to the matter. The same dictum
has been recently reiterated by the Supreme Court in the Rafael Case. 1974 AIR 348, 1974 SCR
(2) 704
Therefore in the light of the above discussion and merits on record it is clear that the print
screen provided by the respondents is admissible. As it deals with the matter in issue and
clearly shows the malafide intentions of the claimants to not provide the respondents with
the agreed consideration of the agreement i.e the updated software .And not proceeding
with the agreed dispute settlement procedure that was negotiation and rather filing for an
arbitral proceeding which can not be conducted before fulfilling the first , as agreed in the
agreement .

32