Truth and Contradiction in Aristotle's De Interpretatione 6-9

Author(s): Russell E. Jones

Source: Phronesis, Vol. 55, No. 1 (2010), pp. 26-67
Published by: Brill
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/20720827
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 PIIRONP.SIS

Phronesis 55 (2010) 26-67 biill.nl/phro

Truth and Contradiction in Aristotle's

De Interpretatione 6-9

Russell E. Jones
Department of Philosophy, University of Oklahoma,
Norman, OK73019-2006, USA
rustyjones@ou. edu

Abstract
In De Interpretatione 6-9, Aristotle considers three logical principles: the principle of biva
lence, the law of excluded middle, and the rule of contradictory pairs (according to which
of any contradictory pair of statements, exactly one is true and the other false). Surprisingly,
Aristotle accepts none of these without qualification. I offer a coherent interpretation of
these chapters as a whole, while focusing special attention on two sorts of statements that
are of particular interest to Aristotle: universal statements not made universally and future
particular statements. With respect to the former, I argue that Aristotle takes them to be
indeterminate and so to violate the rule of contradictory pairs. With respect to the latter,
the subject of the much discussed ninth chapter, I argue that the rule of contradictory pairs,
and not the principle of bivalence, is the focus of Aristotle's refutation. Nevertheless, Aris
totle rejects bivalence for future particular statements.

Keywords
truth, falsehood, contradiction, bivalence, De Interpretatione

Consider the following three principles, each of which Aristotle examines

in De Interpretatione 6-9:

[PB] For every statement p, either is true or is false.

[LEM] For every contradictory pair (p,q), the following is a necessary

truth: 'Either or q.n

l) Throughout, in formulating principles about contradictory pairs I use the ordered pair

? Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2010 DOI: 10.1163/003188610X12589452898804

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 RE. Jones I Phronesis 55 (2010) 26-67 27

[RCP] For every contradictory pair ( , q), one of p and q is true, and
the other is false.

It may be difficult at first look to see the differences between these princi
ples. PB ('Principle of Bivalence ) stands out as being about single state
ments, while the other two are about pairs of statements. Given standard
modern symbolic logic - i.e., the assumption of PB plus the rules of infer
ence found on the inside cover of most introductory logic books - each of
these three principles is either foundational to the system or an easy step up
from that foundation.2 But if we are building from the ground up - that is,
if we are putting together foundational logical principles rather than work
ing within a pre-established set of inference rules - then the truth of these
principles remains an open question. Consider, for example, the supervalu
ationist logic that has been articulated and gained some currency in recent
decades.3 A rough characterization of the supervaluationist account of truth
is as follows: p is now true (in the relevant sense) just in case, for any way
the world could go in the future, the complete history of the world includes
p. So, the statement will walk my dog tomorrow' is true now just in case
every possible way the world could go from here includes my walking my
dog tomorrow. Likewise for the statements 'The Treaty of Versailles was
signed in 1919' and 'There will never be a round square'. The latter two
statements are true on this criterion, but the first statement is not. But
will walk my dog tomorrow' is not false, for my dog and I may well take our

(p,q) rather than the ordered pair (/>,-/>), though the latter may seem less awkward and
more perspicuous. I use the former formulation in order to avoid begging several sorts of
questions, including whether Aristotle's conception of negation is internal or external to a
proposition, and whether contradictory pairs behave like a truth-table including and ~p
would lead us to expect. These and related questions will be discussed in some detail
throughout the essay. In some cases, when the alternative seems too awkward, I use terms
of the form not-p. Again, I do not intend to decide in advance whether 'not- in these cases
functions exactly like the modern symbol l~\
2) Indeed, my elementary logic students (at least those with passing grades) would readily
and rightly assent to all three propositions. For they have learned that every statement can
be assigned one of two truth values (true or fake), and this is just what PB claims; and they
can construct truth tables for negations, conjunctions, disjunctions, and conditionals, from
which (in conjunction with PB) the other two propositions follow. It is a major task of this
paper to show that Aristotle does not treat these propositions in precisely the same way as
someone steeped in modern symbolic logic is likely to treat them.
3) See, for example, the early formulation of supervaluationism in R. H. Thomasons 'Inde
terminist Time and Truth-Value Gaps', Theoria 36 (1970), 264-281.

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28 HE. Jones I Phronesis 55 (2010) 26-67

customary walk in the morning. The statement is neither true nor false,
then, and so PB does not hold on this criterion. Nevertheless, LEM ('Law
of Excluded Middle') holds. For example, the disjunctive statement will
walk my dog tomorrow or I will not walk my dog tomorrow' is true even
though neither of its disjuncts is, for there is no possible way the world
could go from here such that I neither walk my dog nor fail to walk her. So,
supervaluationism endorses LEM, but not PB. Like PB, RCP ('Rule of
Contradictory Pairs') does not hold on the supervaluationist account. For
will walk my dog tomorrow' and will not walk my dog tomorrow' form a
contradictory pair, yet it is not the case that one of the pair is true and the
other false. It is important to be clear about this, for it shows that RCP and
LEM are distinct principles and prepares us to find Aristotle treating them
differently in De Interpretationen
Aristotle is widely considered to be the first systematic logician. Since he
was working on the front end of logical theory, we should not be surprised
to find him making an extended effort to get clear on some principles that
we are likely to take for granted as foundational. In this paper, I argue

4) The merits of supervaluationism have been much discussed in recent years. As I will sug
gest that Aristotle's logic shares some of the important and distinctive characteristics of
supervaluationism, and since I do not wish to attribute radically implausible views to Aris
totle, some readers might expect me to defend supervaluationism against some forceful
criticisms that may also apply to Aristotle as I interpret him. But I will neither endorse nor
reject supervaluationism in this essay. Charity demands not that we attribute to Aristotle
views that are correct, but rather that we attribute to him views that have a reasonable
degree of plausibility, so far as is consistent with textual and other considerations. And the
important characteristics that Aristotle shares with defenders of supervaluationism meet
this standard.
Among the charges that have been leveled against supervaluationism are the following.
(1) Tarski's T-schema, according to which */>' is true if and only if p, is violated on super
valuationism. But the T-schema is often taken to be fundamental to the concept of truth.
(2) Related to the first charge, on supervaluationism, the truth of a disjunction does not
entail that one or the other of the disjuncts is true. (3) Some rules of inference, including
conditional proof and reductio ad absurdum, are not preserved in supervaluationism. The
first two of these charges are particularly relevant to Aristotle, as will become clear in the
discussion of De Interpretatione 9 (on which see ?3, below). Rosanna Keefe (Theories of
Vagueness, Cambridge University Press, 2000) has recently offered a thorough defense of
supervaluationism against these and other charges. For the debate, I refer the reader to
Keefe, especially chapters 7-8. For our purposes, it is enough to note that the current state
of the debate shows that supervaluationism is neither obviously false nor wildly implausi
ble, and likewise neither is the position which I will attribute to Aristotle. Whether it is best
all things considered is well beyond the scope of this paper.

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 RE. Jones I Phronesis 55 (2010) 26-67 29

based on a close reading of De Interpretatione 6-9 that Aristotle holds none

of PB, LEM, and RCP without qualification. Each fails to hold of certain
types of statements. For readers unfamiliar with the nuances of De Inter
pretatione - and perhaps even for some who have read the text carefully -
this will no doubt come as a surprise. Perhaps such readers will be tempted
to write off Aristotle's arguments if they lead to such conclusions. That
would be too hasty, however, and I will show that Aristotle has good reason
to deny the unqualified versions of these principles. Many readers will have
encountered arguments that Aristotle believes that PB requires restriction,
for it has been traditional to read Int. 9 as denying PB with respect to
future contingents. I agree with the tradition in this respect, though the
argument structure I identify is importantly different from traditional
reconstructions. Others who have done more extensive work on De Inter
pretatione in general may not be surprised to find RCP up for considera
tion, as the most recent English monograph on De Interpretatione, by
C. W. A. Whitaker, argues that Aristotle raises a variety of counterexamples
to RCP.5 In this I agree with Whitaker, but again I think the details of
Aristotle's arguments remain unaccounted for by Whitaker's interpretation
in interesting and important respects. In particular, Whitaker argues that
Aristotle accepts PB. I will argue that a careful reading of chapter 9 reveals
that Aristotle rejects PB. The interpretation I offer of De Interpretatione
6-9 sheds new light on these important theses, revealing a motivated and
coherent Aristotelian account on which he accepts none of these unquali
fiedly. These chapters constitute an exploration into the nature of contra
diction, a foundational topic for philosophy. Aristotle proceeds in ways
importantly different from logicians today, and getting straight on what he
is doing in De Interpretatione 6-9 will have implications for other aspects
of Aristotelian philosophy.
My interpretation will proceed in three main stages, the first treating
chapters 6 and 7, and the second and third treating chapters 8 and 9,
respectively. Chapters 6 and 7 provide much of the groundwork from
which the arguments of Int. 6-9 proceed, for there Aristotle discusses the
nature of the contradictory pairs which figure in two of the three principles
under consideration. In each of the three stages, Aristotle raises a coun
terexample to RCP. The first counterexample, in chapter 7, is limited to
RCP. The second, in chapter 8, serves as a counterexample not only to

5) Ar?stotks De Interpretatione: Contradiction and Dialectic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996).

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 30 RE. Jones I Phronesis 55 (2010) 26-67

RCP but also to LEM. And the third counterexample, in chapter 9, serves
as a counterexample not only to RCP but also to PB.

1. Contradictory Pairs and Entailment in Int. 6-7

In De Interpretatione 6-7, Aristotle introduces the notion of contradictory

pairs. He first reminds us of the two types of statements there are: affirma
tions and negations (or denials).6 He then gives an argument that for every
affirmation there is a corresponding negation, and likewise for every nega
tion there is a corresponding affirmation. A pair of such corresponding
statements - one affirmation and its corresponding negation - constitutes
a contradictory pair. Aristotle then reclassifies statements into three kinds:
those that are about particulars, those that are about universals and are
made universally, and those that are about universals but are not made
universally. Contradictory pairs behave differently depending on the nature
of the statements that compose them. Of particular interest in this context,
while most contradictory pairs obey RCP, those that consist of universal
statements not made universally form a counterexample to RCP.
Our treatment of Int. 6-7 falls into three parts. The first two - concern
ing the nature of contradictory pairs and the first two sorts of statements,
respectively - can be treated with relative brevity. The third sort of state
ments, however, presents special problems and requires a more detailed
analysis.

1.1. Contradictory Pairs

Aristotle opens Int. 6 with two definitions, already arrived at in chapter

five:

An affirmation is a statement stating something of something, and a negation is a

statement stating something from something, ( a a a a a
a a , a a a a a .) 17a25-26.7

Aristotle has in mind the following analysis of statements. E

is composed of two things: a subject and a predicate. S

6) Sometimes it seems more natural to use 'denial' rather than 'negation

change the terms.
7) Translations are my own unless otherwise noted. Throughout I fo
OCT edition.

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 HE. Jones I Phronesis 55 (2010) 26-67 31

cates can stand in either of two relations to one another: they can be com
bined, and they can be separated. An affirmation states of a subject and a
predicate that they are combined ( a a ), and a negation states
of a subject and a predicate that they are separated ( a ). So, to
borrow an example from chapter seven, 'Socrates is white' expresses a com
bination: It is an assertion that Socrates and whiteness are combined. 'Soc
rates is not white' expresses a separation of Socrates and whiteness: It is a
denial that Socrates and whiteness are combined.
Combination and separation are not merely linguistic relations between
subject terms and predicate terms. Aristotle's argument that every affirma
tion has a corresponding negation, and vice versa, reveals that actual things
can be combined and separated as well. This brief argument runs as follows
(17a26-34):

(1) It is possible to state (a) of what holds that it does not hold, (b) of what does not
hold that it holds, (c) of what holds that it holds, and (d) of what does not hold that
it does not hold.
So, (2) It is possible to deny whatever anyone has affirmed, and to affirm whatever
anyone has denied.
So, (3) For every affirmation there is an opposite negation, and for every negation
there is an opposite affirmation.

(3) is just a restatement of (2), so the key inference is from (1) to (2). It
is clear that the inference is valid only if it is implicitly assumed that the
four ways of stating in (1) exhaust the possibilities, and only if for anything
that holds or does not hold, it is possible to state that it holds, and possible
to state that it does not hold. It is clear enough that we are to take 'stating
that it holds' to be equivalent to 'making an affirmation, and 'stating
that it does not hold' to be equivalent to 'making a denial'. So, we could
restate the argument as follows, making explicit what is merely implicit in
the text:

(1) Statements can be divided exhaustively into four classes: statements

(a) of what holds that it does not hold, (b) of what does not hold that
it holds, (c) of what holds that it holds, and (d) of what does not hold
that it does not hold.

So, (2) It is possible to state about exactly two sorts of things: (a) what
holds, and (b) what does not hold. (1)
So, (3) It is possible to state in exactly two different manners: (a) that
something holds, and (b) that something does not hold. (1)

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 32 RE. Jones I Phronesis 55 (2010) 26-67

(4) To state that something holds is to affirm.

(5) To state that something does not hold is to deny.
(6) So, it is possible to state in exactly two different manners: (a) to
affirm, and (b) to deny. (3-5)
(7) For anything that holds, it is possible to affirm it, and possible to
deny it.
(8) For anything that does not hold, it is possible to affirm it, and pos
sible to deny it.
So, (9) It is possible to deny whatever anyone has affirmed, and to
affirm whatever anyone has denied. (2,7,8)
So, (10) For every affirmation there is an opposite negation, and for
every negation there is an opposite affirmation, (restatement of 9)

The argument can now easily be seen to be very plausible. Since 3-6 do not
serve a strictly inferential function in the argument, but serve only to help
legitimate the shift in language from stating that it holds' and stating that
it does not hold' to affirming' and 'denying', the only premises that drive
the argument are (1), (7), and (8). These each appear eminently plausible
and so Aristotle's conclusion is established. Since to affirm something is to
state that two things are combined (which is to state that they 'hold'), and
since things in reality can either hold or not, it seems that Aristotle means
us to think of things in reality as either being combined or not. And this
is just what we should expect if we have read the Categories (especially
Cat. 2), where we find that things are combined just in case the present-in
or the said-of relation holds between them. If these relations fail to hold,
they are separated.
Aristotle then announces that he will call any pair of affirmations and
negations of the sort described in (10) a contradictory pair (a a )'.
One qualification is in order. Such a pair of statements is a contradictory
pair provided that the terms are "not homonymous, together with all the
other such things we further stipulate against the sophistic trouble-mak
ings" ( a a a a a a , -
, a a a a e a a a
e e , 17a34-7). This is me
out pairs that trade on hom
of the sort described in the
There are three things to
not make use of truth and

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 RE. Jones I Phronesis 55 (2010) 26-67 33

arguing that every statement is a member of one. This will be important to

keep in mind as we approach the following chapters. In particular, since
negation for Aristotle is internal to a sentence, it remains an open question
whether Aristotelian negation will function as modern truth tables would
lead us to expect, and whether Aristotelian contradictories will behave in
the same way as those defined in terms of the truth and falsehood of their
members.8
Second, to return to the point made above, the argument makes clear
that Aristotle takes the relations between subjects and predicates to mirror
the relations between things. After all, one states, for example, of some
thing that holds that it holds. An affirmation is described as stating that
something holds. Given what Aristotle told us at the beginning of the
chapter about affirmations, this means that to state that something holds
is to state that something is a a something. But given the similarity of
language, this strongly suggests that for something actually to hold just is
for something to be a a something. And the corresponding account
holds for negations.
Finally, the conclusion of the above argument does not explicitly state
that every statement belongs to exactly one contradictory pair. For all the
argument explicitly tells us, Aristotle may be committed only to the weaker
principle that every statement belongs to at least one contradictory pair.
But Aristotle does hold the stronger claim. To get an argument for the
stronger claim we must look to 7.17b37-18a7, from which we can recon
struct the following argument:

(1) There are only two manners of stating: stating that the subject and
predicate are combined (i.e. affirming) and stating that the subject and
predicate are separated (i.e. negating).
So, (2) From the same subject and predicate, no more than two state
ments can be formed: one affirmation and one negation.
(3) A negation must have the same subject and predicate as its corre
sponding affirmation, and vice versa.
So, (4) No affirmation has more than one corresponding negation,
and vice versa (2,3)

8) As in Cresswell's definition, below.

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 34 RE. Jones I Phronesis 55 (2010) 26-67

The argument is plainly valid. We have already seen that Aristotle relies on
(1) throughout chapter six. (3) can simply be stipulated, and it is a com
monsensical stipulation at that. Conjoin the conclusion of the argument
with the conclusion of the earlier argument ((10), above), and you have the
principle that every statement belongs to exactly one contradictory pair.9
The question whether every statement belongs to exactly one contradic
tory pair is still a live one. M. J. Cresswell gives the following argument
that if every proposition has exactly one contradictory, then logically
equivalent propositions are identical.10 Since '2 + 3 = 5' and '4x7 = 28',
for example, are logically equivalent but apparently distinct propositions,
Cresswells argument threatens to undermine the principle that every state
ment has exactly one contradictory (i.e., belongs to exactly one contradic
tory pair).

(1) Every proposition has exactly one contradictory, (assumed for con
ditional proof)
(2) and q are contradictories iff: (i) it is not logically possible for both
and q to be true; and (ii) it is logically necessary that at least one of
and q is true, (definition of contradictories)
(3) If p and q are contradictories, then q and p are contradictories,
(symmetry of contradictoriness)
(4) Let p1 and p2 be two propositions which are logically equivalent,
(by stipulation)
So, (5) p1 has a contradictory q. (1)
So, (6) />2and q cannot both be true. (2i,4,5)
So, (7) At least one ofp2 and q must be true. (2ii,4,5)
So, (8) />2and q are contradictories. (2,6,7)
So, (9) pj is a contradictory of q, andp2 is a contradictory of q. (5,8)
So, (10) p1 and p2 are identical. (1,9)
So, (11) If every proposition has exactly one contradictory, then logi
cally equivalent propositions are identical. (1-10, conditional proof)

9) Aristotle actually seems to make the stronger claim at 17b37 that every statement has
exactly one contradictory, but of course at this stage the conclusion of the earlier argument
is already on the table.
10) M. J. Cresswell, 'Does Every Proposition Have a Unique Contradictory?', Analysis 68.2
(April 2008), 112-114. The precise formulation is my own, though this is very much Cress
well's argument.

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 RE. Jones I Phronesis 55 (2010) 26-67 35

The argument is valid, and so one might think that since Aristotle accepts
the antecedent of (11), he is committed to the consequent. But this would
have the counterintuitive consequence, among others, that every mathe
matical proposition is identical to every other. If my interpretation in the
remainder of this paper is correct, however, Aristotle would reject (11)
because he would reject (2). (2) entails RCP, a principle Aristotle rejects.11
But before giving us counterexamples to RCP, Aristotle first examines two
sorts of contradictory pairs that obey RCP.

1.2. Contradictory Pairs That Obey the Rule of Contradictory Pairs (RCP)

We have already seen that Aristotle has given two different individually
exhaustive classifications of statements: one into two classes (assertions and
negations) and one into four (saying of what holds that it holds, or that it
does not; and saying of what does not hold that it holds, or that it does
not). In Int. 7 he offers a new classification into three classes and gives the
following examples of each:

statements ? about particulars

'e a e ' 'Socrates is white'
e a e ' 'Socrates is not white' (17b28-9)
UU statements - about universal made universally
' a a e ' 'Every man is white'
e a e ' 'No man is white' (17b6)
UN statements - about universal not made universally
'e e a '
e e a ' (17b9-10)12
The first two of these, and UU statements, are relatively easily under
stood. UN statements will be the focus of the following section.

n) It is noteworthy that while (2) explicitly uses the notion of truth to define contradicto
ries, Aristotle does not.
12) UN statements are the focus of the following section. I leave these statements untrans
lated because any translation would tend to favor one interpretation over another. It will
therefore be best to refrain from translating these statements before we have reached some
conclusions about their proper interpretation. But a rough working translation, which is
meant to be as neutral as possible and simply provides one English word for each Greek
word, is 'Man is white' and 'Man is not white'.

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 36 RE. Jones I Phronesis 55 (2010) 26-67

A statement about a particular ( a 'e a , 17a39), or 'P statement',

takes some singular item as its subject and predicates something of that
subject. The two examples given above form a contradictory pair. A state
ment made universally about a universal (e a a a e a
a , 17b5-6), or 'UU statement', is a universally quantified state
ment. The two examples given above are contraries ( a a ). A contrary
pair is a set of two statements: (a) one of which affirms and one denies the
same thing of the same thing; (b) both of which may be false but not both
true; and (c) whose contradictories may both be true (17b 16-26). The fol
lowing, which we may call partial statements', should also be classified
with the UU group, as they provide the contradictories for 'Every man is
white' and 'No man is white', respectively:

' a a e ' 'Not every man is white'

'e a e ' Some man is white' (17b 18-20)

Contradictory pairs which have as one member a UU (or partial) state

ment have as the other member a partial (or UU) statement.
Recall that RCP is the principle that for every contradictory pair (p,q),
one of and q is true, and the other is false. Unsurprisingly, Aristotle tells
us that statements and UU statements obey this principle:13 "So with
respect to contradictory pairs about universals taken universally, it is neces
sary that one member be true and one false (a a a a
e a e ); likewise with those about particulars" (17b26-28). What is
surprising is that Aristotle goes on to claim that UN statements violate
RCP: "But with respect to those about universals not taken universally, it
is not always the case that one is true and one false ( ae e a
e e )" (17b29-30). To see why this is so we must investigate the
nature of UN statements.

1.3. Universal Statements Not Made Universally

There has been some dispute in recent scholarship over how to interpret
UN statements, or those which are made non-universally about universals
( a a a e a e a , 17b9). J. L. Ackrill takes
them to be "indefinite statements", semantically equivalent to man is

13) Though he will later qualify this claim with respect to statements (see ?3, below).

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 R.E. Jones I Phronesis 55 (2010) 26-67 37

white' and man is not white', respectively.14 On this account, then, such
statements function as existentially quantified statements, and so are
equivalent to the partial statements of the UU group. C. W. A. Whitaker
argues against this interpretation and offers in its place an account accord
ing to which these statements are unquantified statements about univer
sals. On this account, 'e e a ' expresses a combination of
whiteness with the universal man.15
After identifying in Int. 7 six pieces of data for which any satisfactory
interpretation must account, I will argue that neither of the two interpreta
tions just mentioned is satisfactory, for each has some consequence that Aris
totle clearly cannot accept. On the one hand, Ackrill's interpretation has the
absurd consequence that A man is not white' is semantically equivalent to
'No man is white'. Whitaker's interpretation, on the other hand, results in a
violation of the law of non-contradiction. I then offer an interpretation
which has neither of these consequences. " e a ' is ambig
uous. The ambiguity in question is not due to the usual suspects: homonymy
and amphiboly.16 But it is there nonetheless, and affects the status of this
class of statements. This interpretation accounts for all the relevant data.

1.3.1. The Avaihble Data

Aristotle explicitly identifies several characteristics of UN statements. Here
I simply list these in the order he presents them, and in what I believe are
uncontroversial formulations. It is largely with respect to its explanatory
power for the data that we should judge each possible interpretation.

(Dl) UN statements are not contrary. (17b7-8)

(D2) What is being revealed by UN statements may be contrary.
(17b8)
(D3) UN statements are contradictory. (17b26-30)
(D4) For contradictory UN statements, it is not always the case that
one is true and one is false. (17b29-30: a [a a e ] ' e
a a , ae e a e e )

14) Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione (Ox

129.
15) Whitaker (1996), 83-94.
16) See, e.g. Int. 17a34-7 and S? 165b30-166a22.

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 38 HE. Jones I Phronesis 55 (2010) 26-67

(D5) It is true to say at the same time that 'e a e '

and that e a e \ (17b30-32)
(D6) e a e ' looks as if it signifies that 'No man
is white', but it does not signify the same, nor does it necessarily
hold at the same time. (17b34-37: e e ' a a a
e a a a e a a e e a e
a a a e a e ? e e a a e
' a a a a .)
With these pieces of evidence, we are now in a position to evaluate various
accounts of UN statements.

1.3.2. The Indefinite Account and the Universal Account

J. L. Ackrill17 takes UN statements to be "indefinite statements". On this
interpretation, then, 'e e a ' and e e a '
are semantically equivalent to man is white' and man is not white',
respectively. The former is also semantically equivalent to 'e a
e (Some man is white)', which Aristotle gives as the contradictory of
e a e (No man is white)'. Call this interpretation the
indefinite account'.
The indefinite account has some initial plausibility, for it is quite natural
in Greek to take 'e e a ' to mean that a man is white. But
the following argument tells strongly against this interpretation.18

(1) The distinctive part of the indefinite account (assumed for reduc
tio), broken into two conjuncts:
(1.1) ?Man is white (e e a ) ' is semantically
equivalent to man is white'.19
(1.2) 'Man is not white ( e e a )' is semanti
cally equivalent to man is not white'.
(2) 'Some man is white (e a e )' is semantically
equivalent to man is white'. (17b 19-20)

17) 1963, 129.

18) For a similar argument against the indefinite account, see Whitaker (1996), 86-7.
19) Again, 'Man is white' is meant only to indicate 'e e a ', and similarly
for 'Man is not white' and e e a '.

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 RE. Jones I Phronesis 55 (2010) 26-67 39

(3) 'Man is not white ( e e a )' is not semantically

equivalent to 'No man is white ( e a e ) \
(17b34-37 (D6))
(4) 'Man is white' is contradictory to 'Man is not white'. (17b29-32)
(5) 'No man is white is contradictory to 'Some man is white'. (17bl9-20)
(6) and q are semantically equivalent just in case there is some r such
that is contradictory to r and q is contradictory to r. (17a26-7;
17b37-18al2)
So, (7) 'Man is not white' is contradictory to man is white'. (1.1,4,6)
So, (8) 'Man is not white' is contradictory to 'Some man is white'.
(2,6,7)
So, (9) 'Man is not white' is semantically equivalent to 'No man is
white'. (5,6,8)
So, (10) The indefinite account is false. (3,9, reductio ad absurdum)

One step in the argument deserves explication. As we have seen, Aristotle

clearly holds that there is exactly one contradictory for every statement. So,
if p and q have the same contradictory, then they must be semantically
equivalent. That is to say, they amount to the same statement. Conversely,
if r has as contradictories both and q, then and q must be semantically
equivalent and amount to the same statement, for again r has exactly one
contradictory. So, (6) is clearly an Aristotelian premise.20 The argument,
then, goes through straightforwardly, and the indefinite account must be
rejected. Not only is (9) highly implausible in itself, but it is an explicit
denial of one of the data, (D6), for which an adequate interpretation must
account. Since premises (2)-(6) are clearly Aristotelian and even apparently
accepted by Ackrill, and since their conjunction with the indefinite account
is incoherent, it is clear that the indefinite account must be rejected.
Indeed, the distinctive premises of the indefinite account, (1.1) and (1.2),
come as a package deal, and so both must be rejected.
Whitaker rightly rejects the indefinite account. He understands UN
statements as unquantified statements about universals. That is, the subject
of a UN statement is simply a universal, such as 'man or 'animal', and UN
statements are not quantified either universally (as are UU statements) or

20) Also, Ackrill (1963, p. 129) explicitly states that Aristotle could have entirely avoided
discussion of indefinite statements, since they are equivalent to statements like 'e
a e (Some man is white)'. So he seems to be committed to something very
much like (6).

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40 RE. Jones I Phronesis 55 (2010) 26-67

existentially (as Ackrill takes UN statements).21 So, UN statements closely

resemble statements, except that statements have a particular as subject,
while UN statements have a universal as subject, 'e e a ',
then, should be translated 'Man is white', where man' refers to a universal.
A universal can have contrary properties in virtue of the properties of its
particular instantiations, and so 'Man is white' and 'Man is not white' may
be true at the same time. For UN contradictory pairs, then, it is possible for
both members to be true. Call this 'the universal account'.
The universal account fares no better than the indefinite account. Con
sider the following argument, keeping in mind that 'man' refers to a uni
versal, throughout.

(1) It is possible for 'Man is white' and 'Man is not white' to be a

genuine contradictory pair and true at the same time. (The univer
sal account, assumed for reductio)
(2) If they are true at the same time, either man is white and not
white in the same respect, or in different respects. (Law of excluded
middle)
(3) If in different respects, then 'Man is white' and 'Man is not white'
do not constitute a genuine contradictory pair. (17a34-7)22
(4) So, man is white and not white in the same respect. (2,3)
(5) If man is white and not white in the same respect, then the law of
non-contradiction is violated. (Def. of law of non-contradiction:
Metaphysics 1005M9-20)23
(6) So, it is not possible for 'Man is white' and 'Man is not white' to
be true together and to be a genuine contradictory pair. (1-5,
reductio ad absurdum)

21) Whitaker 1996, 83-94.

22) "I mean they are opposite when they affirm and deny the same thing of the same thing,
not homonymously, together with all the other such things we further stipulate against the
sophistic trouble-makings." Again (see ?1.1), this qualification is meant to rule out cases -
among others - where something is one way in one respect (say, white of tooth) but a dif
ferent way in a different respect (say, black of skin).
23) "So it is clear that such is the most certain principle of all... [that] it is impossible for
the same thing to hold and not hold of the same thing in the same respect" {Metaphysics
1005bl7-20).

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 R.E. Jones I Phronesis 55 (2010) 26-67 41

This argument seems to go through straightforwardly.24 But recall that part

of the universal account is that universals are funny entities, and that a
universal has a property just in case one of its instances has that property.
We can distinguish between not-being white and being not-white. If a
universal has the property of being white, it follows that it does not have
the property of not-being white. But it does not also follow that it does not
have the property of being not-white. So, if some man is white, and some
man is not white, then the universal man has both the property of being
white and the property of being not-white. And this is not a violation
of the law of non-contradiction, but merely an interesting fact about a
universal.25
This line of reasoning is not available as an interpretation of De Interpre
tationen however. Aristotle clearly distinguishes between negations, or
negated verbs (for example, 'is-not'), and negative properties (for example,
not-white'), by means of word order. In the former case, the negative par
ticle is typically placed immediately before the verb. In the latter case, the
negative particle is typically placed immediately before the predicate.26 But

24) Though an anonymous referee asks, "If the phrase a universal has a property' is defined
as just another way of saying 'some instance of the universal has that property', why does
Whitaker's universal account violate the law of non-contradiction?" To clarify, I do not
think it would violate the law of non-contradiction, were this what Whitaker meant. But I
take Whitaker to mean something importantly different. If all he means is that UN state
ments express the notion that some instance of a given universal has a given property, then
my argument does not apply to Whitaker's true view. But in this case, I fail to see how
Whitaker's interpretation differs in any important way from Ackrill's, and so the argument
against Ackrill's view would apply to Whitaker's as well. Since Whitaker himself argues
against Ackrill's view, I think we should take him to be saying something rather different:
that UN statements are genuinely about universals, rather than instances of universah. What
is true of a universal may be true in virtue of its instances, but it is nevertheless the univer
sal, rather than their instances, which are the subjects of UN statements.
25) Whitaker (1996, 91-3) seems to take an even more extreme position than this. On his
view, man can both be white and not-be white, where the negation is understood to go with
the verb. But this view seems clearly to violate the law of non-contradiction, a bedrock of
Aristotle's philosophy, and so to be a non-starter. In articulating the position as affirming
that man can be both white and not-white, where being not-white does not entail not
being white, I have attempted to present a position with greater initial plausibility. How
ever, I do not mean to endorse it as anything but initially more plausible than the extreme
position, as I am quite sure that even the more moderate position is not consistent with De
Interpretatione (see below).
26) For the contrast, as well as negated subjects, see especially 19b37-20al: a a
[a e a ] e a e e e ? e a

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42 HE. Jones I Phronesis 55 (2010) 26-67

in e e a ', the negative particle is placed before the

verb, strongly suggesting that we should understand the verb to be negated,
'is-not white', rather than a negative predicate, 'is not-white'. So, the argu
ment against this interpretation appears to be decisive.

1.3.3. UN Statements as Indeterminate

The need for an alternative to the two foregoing interpretations is apparent.
In this section I articulate and defend such an alternative. My interpretation
takes its inspiration from (Dl) and (D2): UN statements are not contrary,
but what is being revealed by them may be contrary. This suggests that there
is an ambiguity in UN statements. Though they are, strictly speaking, not
contraries, since they are not UU statements, nevertheless what they reveal
may be contrary; i.e., UN statements may be used to convey the same thing
as UU statements. But (D6) makes plain that even if they may convey the
same thing as UU statements, they are not semantically equivalent to UU
statements. This, I suggest, is because UN statements are indeterminate.
They may be used to convey the same thing as UU statements or the same
thing as existentially quantified statements, the contraries of UU state
ments. How they are understood in a given instance will determine whether
or not they are genuinely contradictory in that instance. If both 'e e
a ' and e e a ' are taken to convey the same
thing as UU statements, it will be possible for both to be false. For in this
instance they will form a contrary pair, and one feature of contrary pairs is
that it is possible for both members to be false. If both are taken to convey
the same thing as the contradictories of UU statements, partial statements,
then it will be possible for both to be true. For it is possible for some man
to be white and some man not to be white, at the same time and in the same
respect. If, however, one is taken as a UU statement and one as a partial
statement, then one will be true and one false.

The ambiguity is especially pronounced because of the lack of an indefi

nite article in Greek. While the indefinite pronoun ? ' can serve a similar
function, as in 'e a e ', it is more common in Greek to
omit article and pronoun altogether to convey what in English we convey
with a' and some'. But omitting the article and pronoun leaves one with a

a - e a a , e a a -
e a a . Other examples of
occur, among other places, at 19

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 R.E. Jones I Phronesis 55 (2010) 26-67 43

statement that could also plausibly be taken to convey that man is white by
nature, or that all men are white. So, in Greek, UN statements are ambigu
ous in a way that affects whether in a given case they form a genuine con
tradictory pair. Call this interpretation 'the indeterminacy account'.
This very name for the account suggests a response to an objection that
may arise. An objector may challenge this interpretation using the very
data which inspired it. After all, (Dl) says that UN statements are not
contrary. But my interpretation is committed to treating them as contrary,
sometimes at any rate. Does not my interpretation violate (Dl), then?
It does not. According to the indeterminacy account, Aristotle is here
treating UN statements as just that, indeterminate. Prior to being used by
a speaker to convey something determinate, they are importantly distinct
from both UU statements and indefinite statements. After all, if they are
capable of conveying a broader range of meanings than either UU state
ments or indefinite statements, they can hardly be strictly equivalent to
either of these. It is only once they are used to convey something determi
nate that they take on the characteristics of these other classes of state
ments. Since contrary pairs by definition have members both of which
may be false but not both true, and since under some determinations UN
statements could both be true, considered as indeterminate UN statements
are not contraries.
But, our objector may respond, this is incompatible with (D5), which
states that it is true to say at the same time that 'e a e '
and that e a e '. Surely if Aristotle says that these
can be true together, then he cannot be considering them in their indeter
minate form. But the answer to this is quite straightforward as well. Aris
totle is revealing that among the possible things that UN statements can
convey are those that indefinite statements convey. So, a contradictory pair
of UN statements may convey things that can be true together.
A final worry about the indeterminacy account may arise. At the end of
chapter 6 Aristotle seems to rule out that ambiguous statements are under
consideration, a point I rely on in arguing against Whitaker's universal
account. A contradictory pair is a set of two statements, one of which
affirms and one of which denies the same thing of the same thing, pro
vided that the terms are "not homonymous, together with all the other
such things we further stipulate against the sophistic trouble-makings"
(17a34-7). "All the other such things we further stipulate" could easily be
taken to include ambiguity quite generally. So it appears that ambiguity is
not an available interpretation, and so the indeterminacy account is false.

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 44 RE. Jones /Phronesis 55 (2010) 26-67

This worry is surmountable as well. 17a34-7 explicitly rules out cases of

homonymy. In the Sophistici Elenchi Aristotle discusses such cases at
I65b30-166a7. Also in SE, Aristotle discusses cases of amphiboly (I66a7
22). But it is not clear that he has other cases of ambiguity in mind, either
in Int. or SE.27 And UN statements need not contain either homonymy or
amphiboly in order to be ambiguous. The ambiguity arises instead from
the possible intentions of a speaker who utters this sentence. A UN state
ment may be used to convey different thoughts.
UN statements, then, present an odd case. Like statements containing
homonymy and amphiboly, they are ambiguous. But unlike statements
containing homonymy and amphiboly, there is no particular word mean
ing or grammatical structure of a UN statement to which we can attribute
the ambiguity. Rather, it is the variety of things a speaker may intend to
reveal by uttering a UN statement that makes it ambiguous. In this respect,
UN statements are similar to statements like 'Johnny is ready and 'Steel is
strong enough.' Nowadays, some philosophers of language take such state
ments, though grammatically complete, to fail to express a proposition
absent a context. Likewise, UN statements fail to have a determinate
meaning absent a context, though they are grammatically complete and
can be grouped into contradictory pairs. So, Aristotle takes these state
ments to conform to the principle at 17a34-7: one of each contradictory
pair affirms and one denies the same thing of the same thing, and the
terms are "not homonymous, together with all the other such things we
further stipulate against the sophistic trouble-makings." Nevertheless,
these statements are indeterminate as to what their utterance is meant to
convey. Sometimes, both members of the pair will be meant to convey
what UU statements would, sometimes both will be meant to convey what
partial statements would, and sometimes one has the meaning of a UU

27) Indeterminacy of the sort I am attributing to UN statements does not fit well within
any of the six types of fallacies dependent on language: homonymy, amphiboly, collection,
division, accent, and form of speech. (For the list, see SE l65b26-8. For discussion of each
of the six types, seel65b23-l66bl9.) Even if this sort of indeterminacy were in view in SE,
however, this would not disqualify the indeterminacy account. For Int. 8 treats statements
which are syntactically one but semantically many, and such statements would seem to fall
under the category of'fallacies concerning making two questions one' treated at SEl67b37
I68al7. On this see ?2, below. So if a way is discovered to fit indeterminate statements into
the treatment of fallacy in SE, it will not automatically follow that UN statements in Int. 7
cannot be understood as indeterminate.

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 HE. Jones I Phronesis 55 (2010) 26-67 45

statement and the other of a partial statement. But what the statements are
meant to convey is undetermined by their form or syntax. And so, when
considered in their indeterminate form, it is possible that both are true, it
is possible that both are false, and it is possible that one is true and the
other false. Since UN statements are in themselves indeterminate with
respect to these possibilities, they are not in their indeterminate form to be
taken as genuine contradictories.
My interpretation can account for every relevant piece of data identified
in section 1.3.1:

(Dl) UN statements are not contrary.

(D2) What is being revealed by UN statements may be contrary.
(D3) UN statements are contradictory.
(D4) For contradictory UN statements, it is not always the case that
one is true and one is false.
(D5) It is true to say at the same time that 'e a e '
and that e a e '.
(D6) e a e ' looks as if it signifies th
is white ( e a e )but it does not si
same, nor does it necessarily hold at the same time.

Under some determinations, UN statements will be tr

accounts for (Dl), (D4), and (D5). (D2) is very well s
interpretation, since it is a central feature of my inte
statements may be used to reveal various things, including
as UU statements. (D3) is, of course, accounted for, for
contradictory. Indeed, under some, but not all, determ
tory pairs consisting of UN statements will be such tha
and one false. And (D6) is accounted for, because even t
things e a e * may be used to reveal i
white ( e a e )nevertheless the former
nate, while the latter is determinate. In themselves, t
equivalent, since the former can be used to reveal a wid
than the latter.

Finally, it is worth asking why Aristotle would allow

statements to form contradictory pairs at all. Why doe
that such statements are not well-formed until they are u
nate way? After all, in chapter five he says that a singl

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 46 RE. Jones I Phronesis 55 (2010) 26-67

which reveals one thing ( e )" (17a 16). Since an indeterminate

UN statement may reveal more than one thing, it does not appear to meet
this criterion for being single and so does not appear to be a candidate for
a contradictory pair.
Curiously however, in chapter five Aristotle gives a disjunctive rather
than a simple criterion for being a single statement: "[a] one which reveals
one thing or [b] one which is one by a connective" ( e
e - 17al6).28 Unfortunately, he does not elaborate much, especially as it
seems that [a] and [b] applied separately could yield contrary judgments
for the same sentence: for example, 'Socrates is Platos teacher and in the
Lyceum'. But it seems at least that [a] is a semantic criterion, while [b] is a
syntactic criterion. 'Socrates is Plato's teacher and in the Lyceum' is seman
tically many but syntactically one.29 Aristotle never explicitly resolves
whether one of these takes priority over the other. UN statements of the
sort we have been considering are semantically many but syntactically one.
Aristotle allows them to form contradictory pairs because they are syntacti
cally one, but warns against thinking that they behave like statements that
are both syntactically and semantically one. Unlike statements like 'Soc
rates is white', UN statements fail to obey RCP, because they are semanti
cally many. This suggests that some statements that are semantically
many but syntactically one fail to obey RCP as well. 'Socrates is Plato's
teacher and in the Lyceum' could be false, but its denial could be false as
well (given that the denial is meant to express Socrates' separation from
both predicates, as it would be on Aristotle's view).30 Yet Aristotle never
mentions such statements. Why not? I suggest that it is obvious that 'Soc
rates is Plato's teacher and in the Lyceum' is semantically many. We are not
likely to think that we can infallibly infer the truth value of its denial from

28) For further discussion see Whitaker (1996), 74-11 and Ackrill (1963), 125-127.
29) One might think that the disjunctive criterion allows for merely syntactic unity only in
cases where there is a connective such as ' a ', and hence that the UN statements we have
been considering cannot be a merely syntactic unity. But, considered apart from the dis
junctive criterion, they certainly seem to be a syntactic unity. And given that we have little
elaboration to go on, [b] is plausibly read as indicating that a statement is syntactically one
if (but not only if) it coherently expresses a combination or separation between subject and
verb and cannot be made into two by the suitable removal of a connective. ('Suitable
removal' is meant to allow for making 'Socrates is Plato's teacher and in the Lyceum' into
'Socrates is Plato's teacher' and 'Socrates is in the Lyceum'.)
30) Since both members of such a contradictory pair could be false, this constitutes a coun
terexample to LEM, as well.

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 RE. Jones I Phronesis 55 (2010) 26-67 47

its truth-value, and vice versa. But this is not so obvious for UN state
ments, and takes some work to show. At any rate, it is clear from the clos
ing lines of the chapter that Aristotle takes himself to have provided a
counterexample to RCP: "It has been said... that not every contradictory
pair is true or false,31 and why, and when they are true or false" (e a ...
a a a e a a , a a , a e a
e - 18a9-12).

2. Contradictory Pairs, Entailment, and Excluded Middle in Int. 8

In Int. 8 we again encounter a class of statements that are syntactically one

but semantically many, and again these fail to obey RCP. Furthermore,
because both members of the contradictory pairs considered in chapter
eight may be false, they constitute a counterexample to LEM, as well. Sup
pose the word cloak' stands for man and horse, not homonymously, but
for both at once, 'Cloak' represents two things - man and horse - as a
genuine unity, though they are not a unity.32 Aristotle argues that 'Cloak is
white' - a syntactically single statement - would mean the same thing as
this statement with a compound subject: 'Man and horse is white'. But the
latter would mean the same thing as the following two statements taken
together: 'Man is white' and 'Horse is white'. Since 'Cloak is white' would
mean the same thing as the combination of two different semantically
single statements, 'Cloak is white' is clearly semantically many. Since it is
semantically many, it may violate RCP in a similar way as UN statements.
Furthermore, since 'Cloak is white' and 'Cloak is not white' may both be
false (for example, if man is white but horse is not), statements where a
term represents two things which are not a genuine unity as a unity violate
LEM. Recall that LEM is the principle that for every contradictory pair
(p,q), the following is a necessary truth: 'Either or q"
As in chapter seven, Aristotle points out a class of statements which
are syntactically one but semantically many, and which thereby fail to
obey RCP. Again, because of their syntactic unity, he allows them to form

31) "True or false" is clearly shorthand for RCP, as RCP is clearly the target of the chapter.
Nothing in the argument suggests that PB is in view, and contradictory pairs taken as a
whole cannot have a truth-value; only their members can.
32) 'Cloak', then, stands in contrast to man', which represents two things - mammal and
bipedal - as a unity which really do form a unity. Cf. Int. 11. 'Cloak' also stands in contrast
to the English term 'bank', which, though it can be used to represent two different things
(sides of rivers and financial institutions), does not represent those things as a unity.

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48 RE. Jones I Phronesis 55 (2010) 26-67

contradictory pairs. And again, the class of statements he raises may hide
well the fact that they are semantically many. To be sure, we will not likely
be fooled by the example 'Cloak is white'. But any case where one word
stands for multiple things which do not form a genuine unity will function
the same way, whether a word stands for white and walking, or for tall,
dark and handsome, or whatever else one can think of. Again Aristotle
sums up the chapter by making clear that he takes himself to have provided
a counterexample to RCP: "So neither in these cases is it necessary for one
contradictory33 to be true and the other false" ( e ' e a a a a
e a e e e a a a - 18a26-27).34

3. Contradictory Pairs and Bivalence in Int. 9

According to the most traditional view of Int. 9, Aristotle denies the fatalist
conclusion by denying bivalence, that is, by denying that for any statement,
it is either true or it is false. More specifically, he denies an instance of PB:

[PBF] For any statement p, where is about the future, either is true
or p is false.

On this view, the argument structure of Int. 9 is to assume PBF and derive
the conclusion that all future events are necessary. But this conclusion is
absurd, for it is obvious that some future events are not necessary. So, PBF
is rejected.35

33) Occasionally Aristotle uses 'a a ' to mean contradictory' rather than contradic
tory pair'. It is generally plain in context which he means.
34) This treatment of Int. 8 is necessarily brief. For further commentary on the details, see
Ackrill (1963), 130-132 and Whitaker (1996), 95-108. Another excellent work, which
argues that Int. 8 does treat homonomy, is Susanne Bobzien (2008) 'Aristotle's De Interpre
tatione 8 is about Ambiguity' (in Maieusis: Essays in Ancient Philosophy in Honour ofMyles
Burnyeaty ed. Dominic Scott, Oxford University Press, pp. 301-321).
35) For two among many such interpretations, see Ackrill (1963), 132-142; and Paolo Criv
elli, Aristotk on Truth, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, esp. 198-233. Oth
ers have agreed with the traditional interpretation that the fatalist argument in Int. 9 has
this same basic structure of assuming PBF and concluding to the necessity of all future
events, but have argued that Aristotle accepts PBF and so cannot avoid the fatalist conclu
sion by rejecting PBF. Instead, Aristotle identifies a modal fallacy in the argument, a confu
sion of n?cessitas consequentiae and n?cessitas consequentis. See, e.g., Gail Fine, 'Truth and

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 RE. Jones I Phronesis 55 (2010) 26-67 49

Whitaker has criticized the traditional interpretation.36 Whitaker agrees

that the argument of the chapter is a reductio, but it is not PBF under
attack, but rather the rule of contradictory pairs:

[RCP] For every contradictory pair one of p and q is true, and

the other is false.

An instance of this principle is:

[RCPF] For every contradictory pair (p,q), where both and q are
future particular statements, one of and q is true, and the other is
false.

Chapter nine is set up as a reductio: RCPF is the refutand, and the absur
dity to which it leads is the fatalist conclusion. The explanation for RCPF
not holding is that, though one of the pair must be true and the other false,
it is genuinely indeterminate which is which. There is in principle no cor
rect answer when faced with the question, Will there be a sea-battle tomor
row, or will there not be a sea-battle tomorrow? But, Whitaker maintains,
this explanation is consistent with PBF and, in fact, Aristotle holds
PBF. According to Whitaker, then, Aristotle accepts the following three
propositions:

(1) Reality has yet to determine whether there will be a sea battle
tomorrow.
(2) Either a sea battle will occur tomorrow or it will not.
(3) sea battle will occur tomorrow' is either true or it is false, and A
sea battle will not occur tomorrow' is either true or it is false.

The first makes plain that the matter is genuinely indeterminate; the sec
ond expresses Aristotle's commitment to the law of excluded middle even
in indeterminate cases; and the third expresses Aristotle's commitment
to bivalence, even in indeterminate cases. Whitaker argues that Aristotle
accepts these propositions and maintains a coherent position in doing so.

Necessity in De Interpretatione 9\ History of Philosophy Quarterly 1:1 Qan. 1984), 23-47;

Christopher Shields, Aristotle, 181-191.
36) Whitaker(1996), 109-131.

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50 RE. Jones I Phronesis 55 (2010) 26-67

I agree with Whitaker that RCPF is the refutand and the focus of the
argument.37 Consider the opening lines of Int. 9: "With things that are
and things that have been it is necessary for the affirmation or the negation
to be true or false (a a a a a a a a e
e a )". Taken literally, it says that of such contradictory pairs, at least one
member must have a truth-value. But this cannot be Aristotle's meaning.
"It is necessary for the affirmation or the negation to be true or false"
expresses RCP in shorthand fashion, just as the closing lines of the preced
ing two chapters express RCP in varying degrees of fullness ("It has been
said... that not every contradictory pair is true or false, and why, and when
they are true or false"; "So neither in these cases is it necessary for one
contradictory to be true and the other false").38 RCP (and not PB, as the
traditional interpretation would read the opening line) has been the main
principle at issue since chapter seven. The opening line of chapter nine is
sandwiched directly in between the clear statement of RCP at the end of
chapter eight, and a summing up of the results of chapter seven, which
concerned RCP: "Also with universals taken universally always one is true
and one false (ae e a e e ), and with particulars, as
has been said; but with universals not said universally it is not necessary.
These things have already been discussed" (18a29-33). So when Aristotle
then goes directly on to say, "But with particulars that are going to be (
a ' a a a e ) it is not the same" (18a33-34), he is explicitly
targeting RCPF. Aristotle is announcing that he will qualify his claim that
statements obey RCP.39
This points to a serious error in traditional reconstructions of Aristotle's
argument at the very first step: They misidentify the refutand. This error
results from a failure to read Int. 9 as intimately connected to the argument
of the surrounding chapters, particularly the examination of contradictory

37) Several of the points made in this paragraph can be found in Whitaker (1996), 112
114.
38) Aristotle explicitly refers to RCPF as the refutand three other times in Int. 9. The others
are at 18b26-31 ("it is necessary for one of the opposites to be true and one false" (a a
a e e a e a e )); 19al-4 ("if in the whole of time it
was the case that one or the other was true..." ( e e a e e a )); and the
summation at 19a39-b2 ("So it is clear that it is not necessary that of every opposing affir
mation and negation one is true and one is false" ( e a a a
a a a e a a a e a e a e e a )).
39) On the initial claim about statements see Int. 7 and

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 RE. Jones / Phronesis 55 (2010) 26-67 51

pairs and RCP in Int. 6-8. Whitaker, however, falls into another error that
is just as serious: Even if Whitaker s argument is persuasive that the tradi
tional identification of the refutand is misguided, he fails to show that the
conclusion identified by the traditional interpretation is false. That is, even
if RCPF is the refutand, the explanation for it failing to hold for future
particular contradictory pairs may be the falsity of PBF. Indeed, there
remains very good reason to think that Aristotle denies both RCPF
and PBF, for - as I will argue below - on Aristotelian grounds, proposi
tions (1) - (3) (above) are inconsistent. Aristotle clearly expresses his com
mitment to (1) and (2). He does not clearly express his commitment to
(3); indeed, he may well intend Int. 9 to be read as a denial of (3). At any
rate, charily demands that we attribute a commitment to (1) - (3) to Aris
totle only as a last resort.
Both the traditional error and Whitaker s error are avoidable, and I offer
an interpretation which aims to preserve what is particularly valuable about
Whitaker s interpretation while retaining the traditional claim that Aristo
tle rejects bivalence for future particular statements. The development of
this new interpretation will proceed in two stages. First, I offer a fresh and
independently plausible reconstruction of the argument of the chapter
which remains sensitive to both the text of chapter 9 and the rest of Int. by
taking RCPF as the refutand, while concluding that Aristotle also rejects
PBF.40 But Whitaker raises several sorts of evidence for his own view
that Aristotle endorses PBF, which thereby serves as potential evidence
against my interpretation. So, after offering my own account, I argue that
Whitaker s interpretation is deeply flawed. On the one hand, the positive
evidence he gives for his interpretation is inconclusive at best, and on the
other hand, his interpretation saddles Aristotle with a deeply inconsistent
position.

3.1. The Argument tf/lnt. 9

The main argument of Int. 9 can be understood as a reductio with RCPF

as the refutand. In the following, I seek to trace the main line of argument
in the chapter. I do not consider everything Aristotle says in the chapter,

40) It is worth noting that future contingent statements would thereby provide the only
counterexamples in Int. 6-9 to any of PB, LEM, or RCP that do not depend on statements
that are semantically many.

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 52 RE. Jones I Phronesis 55 (2010) 26-67

but only what is directly relevant to the main argument. I then turn to
Aristotle's explanatory remarks regarding the main argument.

3.1.1. The Main Argument ?/lnt. 9

Aristotle begins by claiming that RCP holds with respect to statements
about the present or the past, both with respect to statements about uni
versals taken universally and with respect to particular statements. But
RCP does not hold with respect to universals not taken universally. All of
this has been established in chapter seven. Aristotle then announces the
thesis of the chapter: With respect to future particulars "it is not the same";
i.e., RCP does not hold with respect to future particulars.
Aristotle immediately launches into his argument. In fact, there are three
subarguments (18a34-18b9, 18b9-16, 18b26-19a6), each assuming RCPF
and concluding to some absurdity. For the first subargument, assume:

[RCPF] For every contradictory pair (p,q), where both and q are future
particular statements, one of and q is true, and the other is false.

From RCPF, it follows that:

(4) Either is true or q is true. (RCPF; 18a35-38)

Aristotle also explicitly holds a principle connecting truth and a special

kind of necessity: ineluctability. If is ineluctable, there is nothing that can
prevent p. Notice that whether is necessary or contingent in this special
sense may change from one time to another. For instance, Aristotle seems
to endorse the necessity of the present (and almost certainly holds the
necessity of the past as well) at 19a23-27. In other words, Aristotle endorses
the claim that if is true now, nothing can change the fact that is true
now. (Likewise, the idea that the past is necessary just is the idea that noth
ing can now change the fact that an event happened in the past or that a
statement was true in the past: i.e., there is no sense crying over spilled
milk.) So, is a future particular statement, and it is now possible that
and possible that not-/?, then is now contingent. But at the time occurs
(or not-p occurs), (or not-/?) is necessary. It is this kind of necessity as
ineluctability that Aristotle has in view throughout the passage. Aristotle
holds the following principle (18a39-18bl, 18b9-15):

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 R.E. Jones I Phronesis 55 (2010) 26-67 53

[TN] If is true, then is necessary.

An instantiation of TN yields:

(5) If q is true, then q is necessary. (TN; 18a39-18bl)

And so, the conclusion of the first subargument is:

(6) Either is necessary or q is necessary. (4,5; 18b4)

The argument generalizes for any future particular contradictory pair. So,
for any statement, either it or its contradictory is necessary.
The second subargument again makes use of RCPF and TN:

(7) If p, then at every time in the past it was true that 'p will be the
case. (RCPF; 18b9-ll)
(8) If at every time in the past it was true that 6 will be the case',
then was always necessary. (TN; 18bl 1-14)
(9) So, if p, then was always necessary. (7,8; 18b 14-15)

Following a digression to which we will return, Aristotle offers the third

subargument:

(10) If everything that happens is necessary, then there is no need to

deliberate or take trouble. (18b26-34)
(11) So, there is no need to deliberate or take trouble. (6,10 or 9,10)

Aristotle takes (6), (9), and (11) to be absurdities (18b26, 19a7-22). On

the one hand, he takes it to be clear that our deliberations and actions can
be the origin of things that will be. On the other hand, he takes it as obvi
ous that many things have multiple genuine possibilities. For example, this
coat may be destroyed by wear and tear or by scissors; either is a genuine
possibility. Not only that, but my deliberation and action can decide which
of the possibilities comes about. The falsity of (6), (9), and (11) is far
clearer than the truth of the conjunction of the premises that entail them.
But which is (are) the offending premise(s)? Aristotle never questions TN,
nor does he question (10). Instead, he explicitly and repeatedly identifies

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 54 RE. Jones I Phronesis 55 (2010) 26-67

RCPF as the refutand (18a28-35, 18b26-31, 19al-4, 19a39-b2). The con

clusion of the main argument of Int. 9 is that RCPF is false.

3.1.2. Explaining the Failure of RCPF

Showing that RCPF is false by showing that it entails falsehoods is different
from showing why RCPF is false. Aristotle first precludes two ways of show
ing why RCPF is false (18b 17-25) and then gives his own explanation
(19a23-39). The explanation is not very clearly put, and this lack of clarity
is a source of confusion for readers. Nevertheless, from Aristotle s clear com
mitments we can deduce what explanation he is committed to, and we can
understand 19a23-39 in a way that is consistent with that explanation.
At 18b 17-25, Aristotle precludes two ways of explaining why RCPF
fails. Recall that RCPF is the principle that for any future contradictory
pair, exactly one member is true and one is false. Suppose we assume that
Aristotle is committed to bivalence for future statements. This seems to
leave two ways of explaining the failure of RCPF: either both members of
a future contradictory pair may be true, as in the case of universals not
taken universally (Int. 7); or both members may be false, as in the case of
statements that appear to be about a single thing but are really about mul
tiple things that do not form a unity (Int. 8).
The second explanation, that both members may be false, is ruled out
for two reasons. First, Aristotle initially considers it within the context of
the reductio argument, which assumes RCPF. But to say that both mem
bers of a future particular contradictory pair are false is to contradict RCPF.
So, this response is not available within the context of the reductio ( 18b 17
20): Someone who assumes RCPF should not also say that both members
may be false. But second, and more broadly, even once the reductio argu
ment is accepted, this response is not available. For to say, for example,
that both members of the contradictory pair concerning the occurrence of
a sea battle tomorrow are false is to say that (necessarily) there neither will
nor will not be a sea-battle tomorrow. But this is a blatant contradiction
and a violation of the law of excluded middle (19a27fF; see below). So, it
cannot be the case that both members of a future particular contradictory
pair are false.
The other explanation, that both members may be true, is ruled out for
precisely parallel reasons (18b20-22). In the context of the reductio argu
ment, it is ruled out because it violates the assumed principle RCPF. But
more importantly, to say that both members are true is to say, using the sea

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 R.E. Jones I Phronesis 55 (2010) 26-67 55

battle again, that a sea-battle both will and will not occur tomorrow. But
this is again a blatant contradiction. So, it cannot be the case that both
members of a future particular contradictory pair are true.
If future particular contradictory pairs can violate RCPF, so that it may
not be the case that one member is true and the other false, yet they cannot
both be true, nor can they both be false, then it seems that PBF must not
hold for future particular statements. For if PBF holds, then every future
particular statement is either true or false. Every statement has a contradic
tory. So, if PBF holds, then the only possible truth values for a future
particular contradictory pair (p,q) are (t,t), (t,f), (f,t), and (f,f). Yet Aristo
tle has ruled out all four of these possibilities. This is strong evidence that
Aristotle rejects PBF. Indeed, if Aristotle rejects PBF, he has available a very
straightforward explanation of the failure of RCPF: RCPF entails PBF;
therefore since PBF is false, so is RCPF. Recall that Aristotle is committed
to the following extremely plausible principle:

[SC] Every statement has a contradictory. (17a26-34, 17b37-18al2;

see ?1.1, above.)

The argument for PBF follows from RCPF and SC as follows, where (x,y)
is any future particular contradictory pair:

(1) For all x, if is a future particular statement, then there is some y

such that (x,y) constitutes a future particular contradictory pair,
(assumption of SC with respect to future particulars)
(2) For all and all y such that and y constitute a future particular
contradictory pair (x,y): (i) is either true or false; and (ii) if is
true, y is false; and (iii) if is false, y is true, (assumption of RCPF)
So, (3) For all x, if is a future particular statement, then is either
true or false.

(3) is simply a statement of PBF. In a sense (given the assumption of SC) PBF
is included in RCPF. More broadly, RCP involves an assumption of PB.
Aristotle, then, is committed to rejecting PBF: some statements about
the future are neither true nor false. But is Aristotle aware of this commit

ment? And does he explicitly identify the falsity of PBF as the explanation
for the falsity of RCPF? These are more difficult questions. The argument
of 19a23-39, where Aristotle seems to be giving an explanation concerning

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 56 RE. Jones I Phronesis 55 (2010) 26-67

the main argument 18a28-19a22, is frustratingly obscure, and seems at

many points to admit of several (incompatible) interpretations. Aristotle
never says clearly and in so many words that the failure of PBF explains the
failure of RCPF. But, 19a23-39 can be plausibly read in such a way that it
is not only consistent with such a commitment, but positively supports it.
If we were to read 19a23-39 by itself, we would find such a reading possi
ble, but not the only option. But given that we can infer a commitment to
denying PBF from other things Aristotle says explicitly, and given that we
can read 19a23-39 as consistent with that commitment, charity demands
that we do so. With this motivation for my interpretation of 19a23-39,
then, I interpret the main points as follows.
Aristotle first distinguishes between necessity of the present and neces
sity simpliciter. Both types of necessity seem to be versions of necessity as
ineluctability (as opposed to, say, purely logical necessity). Necessity of the
present indicates that something is necessary now, Necessity simpliciter
indicates that something is necessary at every time, i.e., the necessity is not
qualified by a particular time. That is, given that S is now (for example, a
sea battle occurs), S is necessary. But this is not to say that S is necessary
simpliciter, for S may have been contingent at some time (19a23-27). Aris
totle then endorses the law of excluded middle: for any possible state of
affairs S, either S or not-S. So, necessarily (simpliciter), either S or notS.
And this applies to future states of affairs just as much as present or past
states. But, Aristotle emphasizes, this is not to say that necessarily (simplic
iter or qualifiedly) S or necessarily not-S. The modal claim applies only to
the disjunction as a whole, not to each of the disjuncts singly. As Aristotle
puts it, we cannot "divide" - that is, we cannot distribute the necessity over
each of the disjuncts (19a27-32).
Since statements are true or false depending on the way things are in
reality,41 the same account applies to statements. So, if things in reality are
such that S is possible and not-S is possible, the truth-value of the corre
sponding contradictory statements must reflect these possibilities (19a32
35). This is so for cases where it is not always the case that S, nor always the
case that not-S, and S or not-S will obtain in the future; i.e., this is so for
future contingent states of affairs (19a35-36). In such cases "it is necessary
for one or the other of the contradictories to be true or false - not, how
ever, this one or that one, but as chance has it; or for one to be true rather

41) Cf. 6.17a26-34, discussed in ?1.1, above.

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 RE. Jones I Phronesis 55 (2010) 26-67 57

than the other, yet not already true or false" (19a36-39; Ackrill trans.). In
other words, the law of excluded middle holds, for either S will obtain or
not-S will obtain, but PBF does not hold, for, again, we cannot "divide"
and say either that S will obtain, or that not-S will obtain.42
In a sense, I have begged some questions of interpretation concerning
19a23-39, for parts of the text are open to alternative interpretations -
though it is worth noting that I think none of these are better supported by
the text than mine. But I have not begged the question viciously; there is
an argument to support this interpretation. The argument is that, whether
he recognizes it or not, it is plain from the first half of chapter 9 that Aris
totle is committed to denying PBF. So, charity demands that we see if we
can plausibly read 19a23-39 in a way that supports, or is at least consistent
with, this commitment. And indeed we can so read the passage, plausibly
and without doing any violence to the text at all. This is very strong evi
dence that this reading is the correct one.
In summary, Int. 9 is primarily concerned with whether future particu
lar contradictory pairs are such that one member is true and one false. The
chapter fits well with chapters seven and eight, which ask the same ques
tion of other sorts of contradictory pairs. Aristotle gives a reductio argu
ment to show that RCPF does not hold, and this is Aristotle's main point
in Int. 9, the one with which he begins (18a28-34) and ends (19a39-19b4)
the chapter. But while this shows that RCPF is false, it does little to explain
its falsity. If bivalence (PBF) does not hold of future particular statements,
that would explain the falsity of RCPF. Arguments that Aristotle accepts
PBF are weak, and various explicit statements of Aristotle's commit him
to denying PBF. Though Aristotle's explanatory passage at 19a23-39 is
obscure, it can plausibly be read in a way that is consistent with, and even
supports and makes plain, his commitment to denying PBF. Interpreting
Int. 9 in this way avoids two errors of interpretation. First, it avoids the

42) At this point an objector might point out that on my interpretation Aristotle is commit
ted to denying, first, that Tarski's T-schema (' ' is true iff p) holds universally, and second,
that disjunctions are always truth-functional. (See note 4, above.) Again, I refer the reader
to Keefe (2000), who, though she is not discussing Aristotle, defends a view similar to the
one I attribute to Aristotle. She argues that the central intuitions that support the T-schema
and universal truth-functionality for disjunctions can be accounted for on her supervalua
tionist model, even though she, along with Aristotle, denies that they hold strictly (see
especially pp. 213-217). I suggest that Aristotle could have availed himself of Keefe s argu
ments had he been pressed on this point, and we can do the same on his behalf. Thanks to
Mark Wheeler for pressing the objection.

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 58 RE. Jones / Phronesis 55 (2010) 26-67

error of reading the chapter as an isolated treatise unconnected to the rest

of Int. Treating it that way might lead one mistakenly to identify the
refutand as PBE Second, it avoids the error of thinking that if PBF is not
the refutand, then Aristotle does not deny, and is not committed to deny
ing, PBF in Int. 9. Aristotle is so committed, and is most plausibly taken
to be explaining the falsity of RCPF by the falsity of PBF.

3.2. Whitaker on Bivalence

In this section I examine Whitaker s interpretation of Int. 9, namely, that

Aristotle denies RCPF but nevertheless accepts PBF. Whitaker gives three
main pieces of evidence for his interpretation. I argue, first, that the posi
tion Whitaker attributes to Aristotle is inconsistent with central Aristote
lian principles. This motivates a careful evaluation of the three pieces of
evidence Whitaker gives, since, if strong enough, it will lead us to attribut
ing an inconsistent position to Aristotle. I argue that the evidence he gives
for his interpretation is inconclusive at best. Given that we already have a
sensible interpretation of the text at hand, that inconclusiveness, coupled
with the inconsistency to which it commits Aristotle, gives us sufficient
reason to reject Whitakers interpretation.

3.2.1. An Inconsistent Triad

Recall that on Whitakers interpretation, Aristotle accepts the following
three propositions:

(1) Reality has yet to determine whether there will be a sea battle
tomorrow.
(2) Either a sea battle will occur tomorrow or it will not.
(3) sea battle will occur tomorrow' is either true or it is false, and
sea battle will not occur tomorrow' is either true or it is false.

Consider the Ockhamist account of truth. According to Ockham, these

three propositions are consistent, for on his account, a proposition cx is
(was, will be) A at t ' is (determinately) true at , if and only if at some
time or other there is (was, will be) no potency in things for s not being
(having been, being going to be) A at t . Conversely, a proposition cx is
(was, will be) A at t 9 is (determinately) false at t, if and only if at some
time or other there is (was, will be) no potency in things for s being (hav

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 KE. Jones I Phronesis 55 (2010) 26-67 59

ing been, being going to be) A at tm.43 And at some time (no later than
tomorrow), for the proposition A sea battle will occur tomorrow', either
there will be no potency in things for a sea battle's occurring tomorrow or
there will be no potency in things for a sea battle's not occurring tomorrow.
If the former, then sea battle will occur tomorrow' is false, and sea
battle will not occur tomorrow' is true. If the latter, then these truth-values
are reversed. And so one of the statements in (3) will be true now, and one
false. (2) follows from this, and (1) is to be taken to mean that at tn (i.e.,
now) there is a potency in things for a sea battle to occur tomorrow, and
there is a potency in things for a sea battle not to occur tomorrow, which
contradicts nothing in (2) or (3). So, on an Ockhamist account of truth,
the triad is consistent.

It is worth bringing up the Ockhamist account of truth because Aristo

tle's own account has affinities with Ockham's. There is a historical reason
for this: Ockham takes himself to hold Aristotle's account, slightly, but cru
cially, revised.44 The revision is captured by the "at some time or other".
Aristotle's position is that, if a statement is true now, then there is something
in reality to which it corresponds now. That is, if is ? is true now, then
reality is now such that is A; if will be A at tj is true now, then reality is
now such that there are no possible futures in which is not A at t . And
if will be A at tj is false now, then reality is now such that there are no
possible futures in which is A at tm. Ockham interpreted Aristotle as deny
ing truth-value to future contingents because of this account of truth. But

43) This formulation is taken from Marilyn McCord Adams s introduction (p. 10) in: Wil
liam Ockham, Predestination, Gods Foreknowledge, and Future Contingents, trans., with
introduction, notes, and appendices, by Marilyn McCord Adams and Norman Kretzmann
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983).
44) A related difference which I do not discuss here is that Ockham time-indexes statements

while Aristotle does not. So, Aristotle, but not Ockham, can allow that statements change
in truth-value. See, e.g., Categories 5.4al0-bl9, where Aristotle argues that while a state
ment or belief may have one truth-value at one time and another truth-value at another
time, statements and beliefs do not undergo change and are not able to receive contraries.
What changes when a statement has a different truth-value at t1 than at t2 is something in
the world to which the statement is related. But this relational change does not produce a
change in the statement, any more than Theaetetus growing up and becoming taller than
Socrates produces a change in Socrates. What changes is something external to the state
ment or to Socrates, to which the statement or Socrates bears some relation. Being-true and
being-taller-than-Theaetetus are not genuine properties of the statement or Socrates,
respectively. On this see also Crivelli 2004, 30-31 and 183-194.

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 60 RE. Jones I Phronesis 55 (2010) 26-67

Ockhams theological commitments necessitated a commitment to biva

lence; otherwise, how could God infallibly foreknow all things, including
future contingents? Revising Aristotle's account so that truth is not tied to
current reality (and so mutable), but rather to reality at any time (and so
immutable), allows Ockham to maintain his theological commitments.
Notice also that it is this revision that makes the triad of (l)-(3) consist
ent on an Ockhamist correspondence account. For if truth is tied to cur
rent reality, then we may again read (1) to mean that at t there is a potency
in things for a sea battle to occur tomorrow, and there is a potency in
things for a sea battle not to occur tomorrow. But on the Aristotelian
account of truth, it follows from (1) that (3) cannot be the case. If reality
is undetermined as to whether there will be a sea battle tomorrow, then it

is possible that there will be and possible that there will not. But this means
it is neither true or false that a sea battle will occur tomorrow, nor true or

false that it will not. So, (1) entails the negation of (3). (2) is consistent
with (1) and with (3), but (1) and (3) are inconsistent.45
Ockham's interpretation of Aristotle on truth is consistent in the rele
vant respects with recent scholarship.46 On the dominant interpretations
of Aristotle's account of truth, propositions (l)-(3) are inconsistent. Attrib
uting to Aristotle an incoherent account should be an interpretation of last
resort. But Whitaker's interpretation, on which Aristotle holds (l)-(3),
requires us to do just this or to offer a revisionary account of Aristotle s
general theory of truth, a project that appears unpromising. That the
project is unpromising is evidenced not only by the fact that many good
Aristotelian scholars have endorsed the dominant account, but more
immediately is evidenced by the fact that our own reading of chapter nine
turned up a good deal of evidence in favor of the dominant account. Most

45) Notice also that Ockham's revision makes future particular contradictory pairs obey
RCP. Given the strong evidence in Int. 9 that Aristotle rejects RCP for future particular
contradictory pairs, we should not be tempted to think that Aristotle is {contra Ockham's
own interpretation of Aristotle) in fact adopting an Ockhamist account of truth.
46) See esp. Crivelli 2004 for an impressively comprehensive account. See also Michael
White, 'Fatalism and Causal Determinism: An Aristotelian Essay', The Philosophical Quar
terly 31 (1981), 231-241. White labels the view of time which he attributes to Aristotle the
'dynamic-present/past conception of time', according to which the future fundamentally
lacks the reality of the present and the past. On the correspondence view of truth which
accompanies this conception of time, "[the only] facts or states of affairs that there can be
at a given time are those that are [present or past] at that time, and... the only sort of cor
respondence relation that can obtain at a given time is correspondence at that time" (233).

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 R.E. Jones I Phronesis 55 (2010) 26-67 61

obviously, we have evidence in chapter nine that Aristotle endorses the

claim that future particular contradictories cannot both be true, or both
false. So, it must be the case that one is true and one false, or that they lack
truth-values. But we also found Aristotle claiming that if a statement is
true, then it is necessary (i.e., ineluctable). Since some future particular
contradictory pairs contain no necessary statements, it must be that some
future particular statements are neither true nor false. But if that is the
case, then this must be because there is as yet no reality there to which they
correspond or fail to correspond. Rejecting the claim that propositions
(l)-(3) are inconsistent for Aristotle requires offering both a more plausible
general account of Aristotle on truth than the dominant account offers,
and a more compelling reading of chapter nine than the one I offered in
the previous section. Even motivating the consideration of a new account
will be difficult if it includes Whitaker s claim that Aristotle accepts PBF
but not RCPF, since it seems obvious that the negation of RCPF, together
with the claim that future particular contradictory pairs cannot have either
two true members or two false members, entails the negation of PBF.
If this is right, then we have reason to examine closely the three main
lines of evidence Whitaker marshals in favor of his interpretation to see if
they require it. I will examine each in turn, arguing that the evidence is
inconclusive at best.

3.2.2. Aristotle Tacitly Employs PBF

First, Whitaker notes that PBF is tacitly employed in the argument from
18bl7-25.47 This, he claims, is evidence that Aristotle holds PBF; other
wise, it would be illegitimate for him to employ it in the argument. Indeed,
I agree that it is illegitimate for Aristotle to employ premises that he does
not accept, with the exception of the refutand and what follows from it. If
a premise is employed by Aristotle but is not the refutand and does not
follow from the refutand,48 then this provides good evidence that Aristotle
accepts that premise. And I agree that Aristotle tacitly employs PBF here:
The argument assumes that a statement that is not true is false.49 But
this is not good evidence that Aristotle accepts PBF, for we have already
seen (?3.1.2) that PBF follows in a straightforward way from RCPF and a

47) I discuss the argument in more detail in ?3.1, above.

48) That is, does not follow from the refutand along with premises Aristotle accepts.
49) See Whitaker 1996, 117-118.

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 62 RE. Jones I Phronesis 55 (2010) 26-67

principle to which Aristotle is clearly committed - that every statement has

a contradictory. Since PBF follows from the refutand along with a princi
ple Aristotle accepts, that Aristotle employs PBF is not good evidence that
he accepts it. He may accept it, or he may reject it along with the refutand;
we shall have to determine this on separate grounds.

3.2.3. Assertions Are Defined in Terms of Bivalence

A second reason that Whitaker gives for thinking Aristotle holds PBF is
that if we deny this, there seem to be textual inconsistencies both within
De Interpretatione and elsewhere in the corpus.50 The internal textual
inconsistency is the most important. Aristotle defines statements at Int. 4
(I6b33-17a2) as "[sentences ( )]51 of which truth or falsity hold". If
statements are by definition things of which truth or falsity hold, then
future particular statements by definition satisfy PBF.
This is a troubling bit of text for those who would deny that Aristotle
holds PBF, but it is not so troubling as it at first appears. First, it would not
be shocking for Aristotle to make a statement and then qualify it later. But
more importantly, in chapter four Aristotle is trying to distinguish between
declarative sentences and other sentences like prayers. And surely future
particular statements belong in the category of the former, rather than the
latter. It is a little bothersome for the definition if truth or falsity do not
hold now of a future particular statement, but truth or falsity is the sort of
thing that will hold of such a statement. In perhaps anachronistic lan
guage, the proposition expressed by a future particular statement is the sort
of thing of which truth or falsity can, and indeed will, hold, while a prayer
is something which in principle cannot be true or false. While it is bother
some that we cannot always say that truth or falsity does hold of a future
particular statement, as I6b33ff seems to imply, this bit of bother does not
count decisively, or even strongly, for the view that Aristotle is committed
to PBF. At any rate, it pales in comparison to the strong evidence we have
encountered for the rejection of PBF.
Whitaker appeals to three texts outside of De Interpretatione. Categories
2a7-8 states, "It seems every affirmation is true or false." Here Aristotle is
concerned to distinguish items in combination like man runs from single

50) Ibid., 125-126.

51) 'Phrases' would be better here than 'sentences' but for the fact that 'phrases' is often used
in English in such a way as to exclude sentences. 'Sentences' serves the present purpose well,
though we would do well to take more care with the translation were we working on Int. 4.

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 RE. Jones / Phronesis 55 (2010) 26-67 63

items like man and 'runs'. Only the former are true or false. Again, this
can be given a similar treatment to Int. I6b33-17a2, for Aristotle is con
cerned with a particular sort of distinction and seems not to have future
particular statements specifically in view. Another text is Metaphysics
101 lb28: "One who says that something is or not will speak truly or
falsely." But this text can easily enough be read in such a way as not to
commit Aristotle to PBF, but only to the law of excluded middle.52 And
finally, Whitaker appeals to De Anima 430b4-5, which reads: "But, then,
it is not only false or true that Cleon is white, but also that he was or will
be."53 This is evidence against Aristotle's denial of PBF, but it should not be
overplayed. Aristotle is not always careful in his language or examples; it
would not be too surprising, whatever his settled position, if he ascribed
truth or falsity to 'Cleon will be white' in a passage where the truth or
falsity of future particular statements is not the issue at hand.
What conclusions can we draw? First, each of the four passages can be
read in such a way as to severely limit its force against the thesis that Aris
totle denies PBF. Second, as I argued above (?3.1.1), much deeper aspects
of Aristotle's thought, including his theory of truth, provide support for
the view that Aristotle is committed to denying PBF, whether or not this
view coheres well with every passing statement Aristotle makes. Indeed,
this gives us reason to read these texts in a way that does not commit Aris
totle to PBF, so far as possible. So, an appeal to texts outside of Int. 9 has
not yet been shown to provide decisive or even strong support for the the
sis that Aristotle holds PBF.

3.2.4. 'But Not Yet True or Fake

A third reason Whitaker gives for thinking Aristotle holds PBF is more
complex, but primarily concerns the phrase a e '
(19a39). Whitaker writes, "The view that Aristotle denied truth value to
future singular assertions rests principally on the interpretation of this
phrase as not yet true or false'."54 At first look, this phrase does seem to

52) On this, see Christopher Kirwan, Metaphysics Books , , and E (2nd ed.), Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1993, 118. Kirwan argues that the text in question concerns Aristotle's
commitment to the law of excluded middle, and denying bivalence for future particular
statements does not commit one to denying excluded middle.
53) Manuscript L omits the "will be", perhaps intentionally in an effort to remove the
apparent contradiction with Int. 9.
54) Whitaker 1996, 123.

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 64 RE. Jones I Phronesis 55 (2010) 26-67

point to a denial of PBE But Whitaker gives three reasons to think that
this interpretation of 19a39 is "extremely unlikely". I shall consider each of
these reasons in turn.
a) It cannot be the case that neither member of the contradictory pair is truey
for this would not respect the constraint established at 18b17-25. At 18bl7
25, Aristotle established that fatalism cannot be avoided by saying that
neither member of a future contradictory pair is true, for then neither
would occur. But if neither occurs, then there is no future at all, for one or
the other must occur if there is a future. Whitaker takes care to point out
that on his interpretation of Aristotle's explanation of the failure of RCPF
to hold, this constraint is met. Though it is not settled which member is
true and which is false, nevertheless one is true and one is false.55 So, it is
not the case that neither is true. But if Aristotle's explanation is that PBF
does not hold, it appears as if he does not respect his own constraint. This
appears to count in favor of Whitaker's interpretation.
But this line of argument is misguided, for in fact Whitaker's interpreta
tion fares worse with respect to this constraint. The trouble with Whitak
er's interpretation is that it becomes very difficult to say with any clarity
what it means for one member to be true and the other false, but neither
to be determinately true or false,56 in a way that preserves PBF and respects
the constraint of 18b 17-25. But the interpreter who thinks Aristotle denies
PBF has a very simple explanation for why Aristotle fails to respect his own
constraint: The constraint holds only when the refutand, RCPF, is assumed.
The constraint is expressed within the reductio argument. Recall that from
RCPF and SC, PBF follows. And from PBF it follows that if neither mem
ber of a future particular contradictory pair is true, then both are false.
And it is their falsity that entails that there will be no future, not their lack
of truth value.57 By denying PBF Aristotle can avoid the constraint alto
gether, for it arises only if PBF is assumed. If in the end Aristotle denies
rather than accepts PBF, this is more easily explicable with respect to
18b 17-25, not less.

55) Ibid., 124.

56) Note well that 'determinate!/ as a qualification for 'true' or 'false' has little to do with
the thesis of determinism that is denied in Int. 9. Rather, if a statement is not determinately
true or false, then the state of the world is such that it is genuinely up in the air whether or
not the state of affairs it says will obtain will, in fact, obtain.
57) Recall from ?3.2.2 that Whitaker is committed to this and uses it to argue that Aristotle
is committed to PBF. See Whitaker 1996, 117-118.

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 RE. Jones I Phronesis 55 (2010) 26-67 65

b) The qualification 'but not yet true or fake is applied only to usual things,
not to chance things. In Physics B.5, Aristotle recognizes three sorts of things:
those that happen always, those that happen for the most part but not
always, and those that happen neither always nor for the most part (i.e. by
chance). These categories seem to be in view in the present chapter, par
ticularly in 19al8-22. Whitaker finds these categories to be in view in
19a32-39. If not yet true or false' is a denial of bivalence, it should apply
to both non-necessary classes of future particular statements. But Aristotle
applies it only to the things that happen for the most part, not to those
that happen neither always nor for the most part. If this were Aristotle's
way of escaping the fatalist argument by denying PBF, it should apply to
the latter class as well. It is best, then, to understand this as a denial of
RCPF rather than PBF.58
This argument is not very satisfying and there are several things to be said
about it. First, it is not obvious that Aristotle means in 19a32-39 to distin
guish between those non-necessary things that happen for the most part
and those that do not. But, let us assume that he does. Still, Whitaker's
argument does not compel, for if he is right that a
e ' (19a39) applies only to things that happen for the most part, he is
right whether this is interpreted as expressing the denial of RCPF or the
denial of PBF. Yet Whitaker thinks that the denial of RCPF holds of both
usual and chance statements. The emphasis of RCPF is important here
because one might think (wrongly) that if, of a future particular contradic
tory pair (p,q), is usually so and q is usually not, this allows us to assign
truth to and falsity to q, thereby satisfying RCPF. But the same inclination
would give Aristotle reason to emphasize PBF here: We might think that
truth and falsity can be assigned to and q if they are usual, thereby satisfy
ing PBF, but not if they are neither necessary nor usual. Whitaker's reason
ing does not aid us in deciding between the two interpretations.
c) "True or false" must simply be elliptical for RCP Suppose we assume
that Whitaker is correct about this interpretation of 19a39, though we
have just established that this is questionable. What consequences does
this have? First, it does not have the consequence that Aristotle accepts
PBF. Aristotle's denial of PBF is compatible with this interpretation of
19a39. Second, it does not establish positive evidence for Whitaker's thesis
that Aristotle explains the failure of RCPF to hold by claiming that, while

58) See Whitaker 1996, 122-123.

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 66 RE. Jones I Phronesis 55 (2010) 26-67

one member of the pair is true and one is false, it is indeterminate which
is which. Instead of providing positive evidence for this thesis, Whitaker s
interpretation of 19a39 simply removes a piece of evidence which has
sometimes been taken to be decisive in favor of the view that Aristotle
denies PBF. Nevertheless, that Aristotle denies PBF is still on the table as a
possible interpretation. Whitaker's arguments concerning "not yet true or
false" do not in the end tell decisively in favor of his overall interpretation.
Nor does the combination of his three main sources of evidence.

Conclusion

I have argued not only for many particular details of interpretation in Int.
6-9, but also that the chapters are intimately connected. In particular, Int.
6-9 constitutes an examination of contradictory pairs and which sorts of
them obey RCP, LEM, and PB. In each of chapters seven through nine, we
find a counterexample to RCP. Contradictory pairs consisting of statements
that are semantically many violate RCP, and, in those cases where a single
term represents two things that are not a unity, LEM. Contradictory pairs
consisting of future particular statements violate RCP and PB. The analysis
of future particular statements should be of particular interest, as chapter
nine is one of the most widely discussed philosophical passages ever pro
duced. I have demonstrated that the traditional conclusion that Aristotle
denies PB for future particular statements is correct, though not because the
passage has the argument structure it is generally thought to have. Rather,
chapter nine continues to focus on RCP, even as it also rejects PB.59

59) In writing this essay, I have benefitted greatly from conversations with and comments
from many people, among whom the following stand out: Dominic Bailey, Hugh Benson,
Ray Elugardo, Hugh Hunter, John Mouracade, Christopher Shields, Robin Smith, and
Linda Zagzebski. Earlier versions of parts of section 3 were presented at the 2008 Central
Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association and at the 2008 Alaskan Phi
losophy Workshop in Ancient Philosophy at the University of Alaska at Anchorage, where
I benefitted from formal comments from Dean Kowalski and Mark Wheeler, respectively,
and informal comments from a number of capable scholars. Most recently, an anonymous
referee for this journal provided detailed comments which have resulted in a number of
improvements.

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 RE. Jones I Phronesis 55 (2010) 26-67 67

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White, M. 1981. 'Fatalism and Causal Determinism: An Aristotelian Essay', The Philo
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