Case Assignment on Conspiracy:

People vs. Conturia GR No. 108940, June 22, 1995

People vs. Corbes GR No. 113470

Case Assignment on Article 11

People vs. Roman GR 198110

People vs. Araquel GR L-12629
Rugas vs. People GR No. 147789
Belbis Jr vs. People GR No. 181052
People vs. Babor GR No. 106875
People vs. Genosa GR No. 135981
People vs. Padernal GR No. L-30527
People vs. Oanis and Galanta GR No. 47722
SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 108490. June 22, 1995.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RENATO CANTURIA, ORLANDO DIIN,

CARLOS BARON, NORBERTO GABITO, ANTONIO SAN JORGE, EDISON DIIN, EDISON
SANCHEZ and GLORIOSO LERIT, accused-appellants.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Jesus G. Chavez for accused-appellant.

DECISION

NARVASA,C.J : p

At just about midnight on September 10, 1985, the spouses Romeo and Leonor Mendenes and
their three children were in deep slumber in their modest home in the municipality of Irosin, Sorsogon.
They were quite oblivious of the fact that one of eight men, armed with bolos, had succeeded in boring a
hole through the lawanit window of their bedroom making it possible for him to unlock the same, and for
him and his companions to make a surreptitious entry into the house.
The first of the intruders to come into the house roused the spouses from sleep and brandishing
his weapon, ordered the startled pair to lie face down on the floor. This man, later identified as Carlos
Baron, bound Romeo Mendenes hand and foot. Another bolo-wielding man also entered the house
through the same window, opened the main door, and let his companions in.
Thereupon the bandits, for that they were, ransacked the Mendenes house and went through the
family's personal belongings. Baron remained beside Romeo whom, he kicked whenever the latter tried to
lift his head to see what the armed trespassers were doing.
After a while, Renato Canturia, one of the robbers, moved to the side of Mrs. Leonor Mendenes and
began touching intimate parts of the hapless woman's body. Evidently, this disgusting activity soon led to
full arousal of Canturia's animal passion. He dragged Leonor out of the house to a place some thirty
meters away. There, by threat of his jungle knife, two and a half (2 1/2) meters long, he forced Leonor to
take off her clothes. Ignoring her tearful pleas, Canturia pawed her body and mashed her private parts
after which he had sexual intercourse with her, twice. All throughout the unfortunate woman's ordeal,
Canturia's knife remained pointed at her throat. A third attempt to rape Mrs. Mendenes was aborted when
Canturia heard his companions whistling for him. He ordered Leonor to put her dress back on, pulled her
back inside the house, and tied her hands.
Before leaving the house, the armed men warned husband and wife not to tell anyone what
happened lest the worse fate of death befall them all. The Mendenes children mercifully slept undisturbed
all throughout their parent's harrowing experience. 1
After the malefactors' departure, Leonor, whose feet had not been fettered, went to where her
husband still lay on the floor. They struggled to free each from their bonds and after a time were able to
do so. Still filled with fear of the robbers, they then fled with their children to the house of Romeo's father.
When daylight came, Romeo reported the incident to the Irosin Police Station, and Leonor underwent a
physical examination in the Irosin District Hospital. She was found positive for spermatozoa. 2
 The information received from the Mendenes spouses convinced the Irosin police officers that it
was a group of persons known as "Dose Pares" which was responsible for the crime. In fact, they had
already received reports of several robberies allegedly perpetrated by this group in the area. Accordingly,
on September 19, 1985, police officers proceeded to the houses of the suspects, namely: Carlos Baron,
Orlando Diin, Renato Canturia, Glorioso Lerit, Antonio San Jorge, Norberto Gabito, Edison Diin, and Edison
Sanchez. In the course of their investigation, they found some of the items stolen from the Mendeneses in
the house of Antonio San Jorge. The police then brought the eight men to their headquarters. They were
pointed to by Romeo and Leonor as the persons who had robbed them. Leonor particularly identified
Canturia as the person who had raped her.
Following this, the eight suspects were charged with robbery with rape under an information
reading as follows:
"That on or about the 10th day of September 1985, in the Municipality of Irosin, Province
of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused with intent to gain, by using force and intimidation, conspiring, confederating and helping
one another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously entered (sic) the house of Mr.
and Mrs. Romeo Mendenes by unlevering (sic) and unlocking the back of the window and once
opened went inside the house by passing thru the window an opening intended for entrance or
egress, and poked at the occupants with a bolo and tied their hands and feet and on the occasion
thereof one of the conspirators Renato Canturia forcibly take (sic) Leonor (wife of Romeo
Mendenes) out of their home for almost 30 meters away said forcibly had sexual intercourse
against the will and consent of said Leonor and at the same time the co-conspirators of Renato
Canturia ransacked the personal belongings of Mr. and Mrs. Mendenes and take, rob, steal and
carry (sic) away the following articles, to wit:

1. three (3) dozen of plates;

2. One (1) clock citizen;

3. One (1) necklace;

4. Three (3) fighting cocks;

5. Thirteen pieces of 25 c/coins;

6. Two (2) pants

7. One (1) dozen bowl;

8. One (1) dozen fork;

9. Two (2) casserols;

10. Two (2) cauldrons;

11. Two (2) wedding rings;

12. Two (2) blankets;

13. One (1) flashlight plus several underwear and T-shirt and articles

with a total value of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, to the damage and
prejudice of the aforesaid amount and to the personal damage of Leonor Mendenes.

With the aggravating circumstances of night time, superior strength and use of deadly
weapon."

The case, was docketed as Criminal Case No. 280 and, upon the defendants' plea of not guilty, was
tried in the Regional Trial Court of Irosin, Sorsogon, Branch 55, Judge Senecio Ortile presiding.
 The evidence of the prosecution tended to prove the facts narrated in the opening paragraphs of
this opinion. As might be expected, the People's case was anchored mainly on the testimony of Leonor
Mendenes who unequivocally pointed to all eight accused as the persons who had offended against her
family. She described to the Court the specifies participation of each of the accused in the crime; she
pointed to Baron as the one who had roused them from sleep and hogtied her husband, Romeo; she
identified Glorioso Lerit and Edison Diin as the look-outs; and she related how the robbers had
methodically divested her family of its possessions. She singled out Canturia as the person who had
brutally defiled her.
Six of the accused opted to testify for the defense: Edison Diin and his father Orlando Diin, Glorioso
Lerit, Antonio San Jorge, Renato Canturia and Edison Sanchez. All put up the defense of alibi; all claimed
that at the time of the commission of the offense, they were at places other than the Mendeneses' house,
San Jorge claimed he was in the mountains of Tabon-Tabon stripping abaca. The other five testified that
they were either in their respective house, sleeping, or drinking with friends.
After giving evidence in their defense, Sanchez and Lerit escaped from the Sorsogon Provincial
Prison and have since remained at large.
The Regional Trial Court found all the accuse guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged,
adjudging the proofs of the prosecution to be entitled to full credit, and rejecting the defense of alibi set
up by the accused. In its decision dated 27 June 1991, the Trial Court sentenced each of the defendants to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to pay jointly and severally the amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity to Leonor Mendenes and the amount of P10,000.00 corresponding to the value of the stolen
goods without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. It also directed that the accused be credited
with the full benefit of their preventive imprisonment if they should agree in writing to abide by the
disciplinary rules imposed or convicted prisoners, failing in which they would be credited only with four
fifths (4/5) of the time of their preventive confinement. 3
An appeal was taken in behalf of all the accused to this Court. The Court's attention was soon
called, however, to the escape of Lerit and Sanchez from the Sorsogon Provincial Prison. For this reason
the Court dismissed their appeal in a Resolution dated November 3, 1993, pursuant to Section 8, Rule 124
of the Rules of Court. 4 The Public Attorney's Office, counsel for the fugitives, Lerit and Sanchez, offered no
objection to the dismissal of the latter's appeal and promptly withdrew its appearance for them. 5 The trial
Court's judgment as regards Lerit and Sanchez thus became final and executory. 6
Hence, it is only with the appeal of the six remaining accused that the Court will have to deal. These
six appellants fault the Trial Court for failing to give due weight to the defense of alibi considering the
"untenable identification by private complainant," Leonor Mendenes. Appellants contend that Leonor
could not have sufficient time and opportunity to see and subsequently remember the faces of the
robbers. They argue that by Leonor's own admission, the crime took place in the middle of the night, in a
room where the lone source of illumination, a 25 watt bulb, was immediately turned off by the first robber
to enter the house; that after this bulb was thus turned off, the only source of illumination that remained
was the flashlight held by one of the robbers. They thus conclude that in such a dark environment,
Leonor's identification of the accused as the robbers is incredible and erroneous, The appellants also
contend the neither could Leonor have been seen the face of the person who raped her because it was
pitch black in the place where the sexual violation took place. According to them, this erosion or
degradation of the proof of identity should have given corresponding enhancement and acceptability to
the defense of alibi.
The arguments are untenable and cannot be accepted.
There is no question but that a robbery was perpetrated by a band against the Mendenes spouses
at their home, and that in the course thereof, Leonor Mendenes was raped. There is no serious dispute
either (no rebuttal having been essayed) about the fact that the police team that went to investigate the
suspects in their houses, found some of the stolen items in the house of accused San Jorge. 7 The
explanation proffered by San Jorge for his possession of the stolen items — that they were peddled to his
wife by co-accused Orlando Diin 8 — strengthens rather than weakens the case against him and his co-
accused. When a person has in his possession part of recently stolen property, he is presumed to be the
taker of all, in the absence of satisfactory explanation of his possession. 9
The matter of the accuracy of the identification by Leonor Mendenes of the offenders is a factual
issue resolved by the Trial Court which pursuant to established doctrine, should be given weight on appeal
unless there are convincing indications that certain facts or circumstances of weight and significance have
been overlooked which, if considered, would alter the result of the case. The Court discerns no such
convincing indications in the case at bar and thus perceives no reason to overturn the trial court's
conclusion of the correctness of Leonor Mendenes's positive identification of the appellants as the persons
who had robbed her family of their hard-earned property, and of Canturia as the person who had ravished
her during the robbery. The records reveal that Leonor Mendenes categorically pointed to the appellants
as the persons who broke into her house and carried away her family's belongings, mostly, kitchen
utensils. There was no hesitation, equivocation or vacillation on her part when she identified the accused
as the people responsible for the robbery. She repeated the identification in open court, while
understandably under deep emotion, crying very hard, attempting to control the detestation she must
have felt for those who had so grievously wronged her and her loved ones. She detailed with clarity the
specific participation of each of the accused in the robbery. And when she came to Canturia, and identified
him before the Court as her rapist, she broke down and sought to hit him. 10 There was, to repeat, no tinge
of doubt, hesitation, or artificially in her testimony. She acted as naturally and normally as might be
expected from a grievously wronged woman recounting her plight.
When asked how she came to see the faces of the accused in the dark confines of their bedroom,
Leonor positively declared that one of the robbers held a flashlight while light reflected on their faces. At
the time the robbers entered the room, Leonor and her husband were told to lie down. Romeo's hands
were tied and every time he tried to glance at the robbers, he was kicked by Baron. Leonor was not
similarly restricted in her movements. She was not tied. She was also on the floor but she was able to lift
her face. She was thus able to see and recognize the faces of the culprits. True, after a while she was
sexually harassed by Canturia but fending off lascivious actuations did not deter or prevent her from
recognizing the faces of the other robbers and observe how her family's belongings were being carted
away by heartless men. There is no cause to doubt the sincerity and the certitude of her evidence.
Quite recently, this Court ruled that the light coming from a flashlight is sufficient illumination by
which to make a reliable identification. 11 In this case, the illumination coming from the flashlight of one
robbers made it possible for Leonor to see the bandit's faces. Moreover, as this Court has previously
observed, it is a most natural reaction for victims of criminal violence to strive to observe the appearance
of their assailants and the manner in which the crime was committed. Leonor must also have striven to
engrave the faces and physical features of the robbers in her memory, the better to help in later bringing
them to justice. It should moreover be recalled that Canturia was already sexually molesting her even at
the onset of the robbery. He stayed physically close to her inside the house. And they could not have been
closer, physically, than during the rapes. The Court is satisfied that Leonor had the opportunity to make an
accurate identification of her rapist and of his companions, and that there was no mistake in her
subsequent identification of them.
The Court cannot, however, see its way to upholding the conviction of all the accused for robbery
with rape. Of seeming relevance, to be sure, are two (2) familiar principles, i.e. (a) that in a conspiracy the
act of one is the act of all — a conspiracy being amply demonstrated by the proofs among the eight (8)
accused in this case — and (b) that when "more than three armed malefactors take part in the commission
of robbery, it shall be deemed to have been committed by a band," in which case, any member of the band
"who is present at the commission of robbery by . . . (said) band, shall be punished as principal of any of
the assaults committed by the band, unless it be shown that he attempted to prevent the same." 12 This
notwithstanding, it is the Court's view that only Canturia should be held responsible for the crime because
he alone perpetrated the detestable crime of rape. The others could not be held liable therefor. For while
the evidence does convincingly show a conspiracy among the accused, it also as convincingly suggests that
the agreement was to commit robbery only; and there is no evidence that the other members of the band
 of robbers were aware of Canturia's lustful intent and his consummation thereof so that they could have
attempted to prevent the same. In an early case, where on the occasion of a robbery in band, one of the
members of the band caught a woman while trying to get away, and raped her in a place away from her
house in which the robbery was being committed, this Court declined to hold the other members of the
band responsible for the rape, in the absence of positive proof that they "were aware of, much less . . .
(abetted)" said rape. 13 Said other members of Canturia's band may and should be held guilty of the crime
of robbery by a band under Article 294, No. 5, in relation to Article 296, of the Revised Penal Code.
The aggravating circumstances of dwelling and nocturnity shall be appreciated against the
appellants. The crime was committed in the place of abode of the victims; and the accused used the cover
of the night to facilitate the commission of the crime. Abuse of superior strength is absorbed by
commission in band. The robbery having been committed by a band with the attendance of these
aggravating circumstances, there being no countervailing mitigating circumstances, the penalty provided
by law for the offense shall be imposed in its maximum period.
In view of all the foregoing, the judgment of the trial court finding accused appellant Renato
Canturia guilty of the crime of robbery with rape, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA with all the accessory penalties of the law, is hereby AFFIRMED. Appellants Carlos Baron,
Orlando Diin, Edison Diin, Norberto Gabito and Antonio San Jorge are sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS of prision correccional as minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS
of prision mayor as maximum for the crime of robbery. The award of damages by the lower court is also
hereby affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Puno and Mendoza, JJ.,concur.
||| (People v. Canturia, G.R. No. 108490, [June 22, 1995], 315 PHIL 278-292)
G.R. No. 113470 March 26, 1997

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
DANILO CORBES Y OLAZO, MANUEL, VERGEL Y PASCUAL, and six (6) JOHN DOEs, accused.

DANILO CORBES Y OLAZO and MANUEL VERGEL Y PASCUAL, accused-appellants.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

DANILO CORBES y OLAZO and MANUEL VERGEL y PASCUAL appeal from the decision dated 27 December
1991 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Br. 124, finding them guilty as principals by conspiracy of the
crime of robbery with homicide under par. 1, Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code and sentencing them to suffer the
penalty of reclusion plus damages. 1

The antecedents: At about nine o'clock in the morning of 17 November 1990 six (6) armed men entered the
premises of the Caloocan Consortium Corporation at No. 305 Cordero Street, Caloocan City, and took away from
the establishment P169,000.00 in cash and P4,500.00 from Mateo Figuracion, an employee therein. They also took
with them the .38 calibre revolver of security guard Timoteo Palicpic whom they shot to death. The malefactors then
ran towards 8th Avenue where Daniel Corbes and Manuel Vergel had parked their getaway vehicle, a blue
passenger jeep. They then sped away.

That same day, Manuel Vergel went to the Caloocan Police Station and reported the incident. He claimed that the
robbers used his passenger jeep in fleeing from the Caloocan Consortium Corporation, but he denied any previous
knowledge of the robbery or of any intentional participation therein. However, upon further interrogation by P/Cpl
Daniel G. Del Rosario, Supervisor of the Dayshift Investigation Section, Caloocan City Investigation Division, Vergel
retracted his earlier statements and pointed to Danilo Corbes who together with the other accused allegedly planned
the robbery and convinced him to drive for them. When apprehended and brought to the police station, Corbes in
2

turn pointed to a certain "Benny" as the brains behind the crime.3

Corbes, Vergel and six (6) John Does (still at large) were charged as principals by conspiracy. On the witness stand
Vergel however diverged from his earlier story and insisted that the jeep he was driving was merely hired by Corbes
and Benny on the pretext of hauling scrap metal from Caloocan City. As soon as he parked his jeep along 8th
Avenue, Benny alighted from the jeep leaving him with Corbes. Vergel maintained that at that time he knew nothing
of the robbery being perpetrated at the Caloocan Consortium Corporation and that he became aware of it only when
Benny came back from the direction of Cordero Street about ten (10) to fifteen (15) minutes later with several armed
men who boarded the jeep and threatened him with bodily harm if he would not start its engine and drive. So he did
as they ordered. After the men alighted at 9th Avenue, he proceeded to the house of Avelino Vergel, the owner of
the jeep, and together they went to the Caloocan City Police Station to report the matter.

Daniel Corbes likewise professed innocence. Although he admitted having approached Vergel, he contended that
he did so only to accommodate Benny who had sought his help in looking for a jeep for hire. Being the Vice-
President of DAMATA (Damayan ng Maralitang Tahanan), a neighborhood association in Letre, Malabon, he
accompanied Benny to Sangandaan and there waited for Vergel who agreed to have the jeep he was driving hired
for a fee of P250.00. Then together with Vergel and Benny he left for Caloocan City allegedly upon Vergel's
invitation.

The trial court rejected the pretensions of Corbes and Vergel; instead, it convicted the two (2) accused on the basis
of the eyewitness account of Elena San Jose whose testimony established their participation in the robbery as
lookout and driver, respectively.

Specifically, Elena San Jose testified that while she was rocking her baby to sleep in the veranda of her house at 8th
Avenue she noticed a blue-colored jeep parked about three (3) meters away. Vergel was at the driver's seat. She
saw Vergel alight several times from the jeep ostensibly to inspect its engine and other parts as if something was
wrong with them, while Vergel's companion whom she identified as Corbes walked to and fro along 8th Avenue up
to the corner of Cordero Street. Half an hour later Elena saw four (4) men in a jolly mood approaching and shouting
"Yahoo! Yahoo!" from the direction of Cordero Street. They immediately boarded the jeep as Vergel hurried them
up: "Dalian n'yo, baka tayo mahuli!" The vehicle then drove away in the direction of F. Roxas Street. 4

The court a quo accorded evidentiary weight to the testimony of Dante Despida, owner of the Gulf-Pacific Security
Agency, Inc., who testified that on 19 November 1990 Vergel and Corbes admitted to him inside the Caloocan
Police Station that they participated in the robbery holdup as driver of the getaway vehicle and as lookout,
respectively. Thus, Vergel and Corbes were sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to
pay jointly and severally, (a) the amount of cash stolen, (b) the value of the .38 cal. revolver taken, and (c)
P50,000.00 as consequential damages to the heirs of Timoteo Palicpic.

Appellants contend in this appeal that conspiracy was not sufficiently proved since it cannot be inferred solely from
their mere presence at the crime scene. In addition, Vergel disparages the testimony of Elena San Jose as being
rehearsed and replete with inconsistencies, while that of Dante Despida relative to the oral confessions allegedly
made to him inside the Caloocan Police Station as unworthy of belief considering that he had no business inside the
detention cell since he was not even a police investigator, and considering further that he was the uncle of security
5

guard Timoteo Palicpic who was gunned down during the robbery.

We sustain the claim of appellants that the evidence failed to meet the quantum of proof required by law to establish
conspiracy which jurisprudence dictates must be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the commission of
the crime itself. No less than proof beyond reasonable doubt is required.
6 7

In the instant case, no conclusive proof was presented that appellant Manuel Vergel conspired with the other
accused to commit robbery. What is indubitable is that he was approached by Corbes who was tasked to look for a
getaway vehicle and was persuaded to act as driver in fetching the group from the venue of the robbery. Vergel's
feigned ignorance of any prior knowledge of the robbery is negated by his remark, "Dalian n'yo, baka tayo mahuli!"
made to the robbers as they were boarding the jeep. Such utterance, which indicates knowledge of the criminal
design of the malefactors, coupled with his act of driving for the robbers, makes appellant Vergel guilty as an
accomplice, i.e., one who knows the criminal design of the principal and cooperates knowingly or intentionally
therewith by an act which even if not rendered the crime would be committed just the same. In one case, we held
8 9

that the driver of the taxicab, knowing that his co-accused were going to commit robbery permitted them to use his
taxicab in going to the place where the robbery was committed, is an accomplice.

As regards appellant Danilo Corbes, there is similarly a lack of adequate evidence of conspiracy. The evidence
merely points out that Corbes looked for a jeep to be used as getaway vehicle of the robbers and, to that end, he
intentionally sought out and convinced Manuel Vergel to act as driver. Moreover, he went with Vergel and Benny to
Caloocan City where the robbery was staged. We have also held that the liability of one whose participation was
limited to looking for a banca and providing one to a gang of bank robbers, or one who went with the actual
10

perpetrators of a crime without conspiring with them, is only that of an accomplice. Where the quantum of proof
11

required to establish conspiracy is lacking, the doubt created as to whether accused acted as principal or
accomplice will always be resolved in favor of the milder form of liability, that of a mere accomplice Besides, in
12

several cases wherein the Court confirmed the existence of conspiracy, some accused were held liable as mere
accomplices only because their role in the commission of the crime was not indispensable; in other words,
minor. Courts sometimes draw the inference of guilty participation in the criminal design from concerted acts in the
13

consummation of the criminal act and from the form and manner in which assistance is rendered. To reiterate, in
case of doubt, the courts naturally lean to the milder form of responsibility. 14

Furthermore, we reduce appellants' liability to the crime of robbery only. It was not established by the evidence that
the other accused, who are at large, had agreed to kill if necessary to carry out successfully the plan to rob. On the
contrary, the records show that one of the robbers berated the gunman for having shot the security
guard. Therefore, what appellants may be said to have joined was merely the criminal design to rob, which makes
15

them accomplices. Their complicity must accordingly be limited to the robbery, not to the killing of Timoteo Palicpic.
Waiting only at the parked jeep at 8th Avenue could not have given them the opportunity to prevent the killing, as is
required of one seeking relief from liability for assaults committed during the robbery. The Court had occasion to
16

rule that the jeep driver, who was unaware of the killing perpetrated inside the building as he stayed always near his
jeep, could not be deemed a co-conspirator in the killing of the guards, as the killing was not part of the original plan
but arose only during the exigency of the moment. 17
The penalty for robbery under par. 5, Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code is prision correccional in its maximum
period to prision mayor in its medium period the duration of which is four (4) years two (2) months and one (1) day
to ten (10) years. As the robbery was committed by a band under Art. 295 the penalty should be imposed in its
maximum period. Since accused-appellants are found guilty only as accomplices to the robbery in band, the
imposable penalty shall be one degree lower which is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in
its medium period or four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, if only for the purpose of determining the penalty to be imposed, the minimum shall be
taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., destierro in its maximum period to arresto mayor in its medium
period or four (4) years two (2) months and one (1) day of destierro to four (4) months of arresto mayor medium,
while the maximum shall be taken from the maximum of the imposable penalty as herein before stated or four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium. Both accused-appellants having already been detained
since 20 November 1990, or more than the maximum of their indeterminate penalty, they should now be
18

immediately released from custody pursuant to B. P. Blg. 85.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is MODIFIED. Accused-appellants DANILO CORBES Y OLAZO and
MANUEL VERGEL y PASCUAL are declared GUILTY merely as ACCOMPLICES to the crime of robbery and
sentenced accordingly to an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months of arresto mayor medium as minimum to
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium as maximum.

Accused-appellants Danilo Corbes y Olazo and Manuel Vergel y Pascual having already been detained for more
than the maximum of their indeterminate penalty, their immediate release from custody is likewise ordered unless
they are held for another lawful cause. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Vitug, Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 198110 July 31, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
WILSON ROMAN, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated February 28, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
03972, which affirmed with modification the Judgment2 dated June 10, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Iriga City, Branch 35, in Criminal Case No. IR-4231.

The Antecedent Facts

On November 11, 1996, Wilson Roman (accused-appellant) was charged with Murder before the RTC of Iriga City,
Branch 35. Upon arraignment on February 6, 2004, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. 3 Thereafter,
trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution presented the following as witnesses: Elena Romero (Romero), Asterio Ebuenga (Ebuenga), Martin
Borlagdatan (Borlagdatan), Elisea Indaya (Indaya), Ramil Baylon (Baylon), SPO1 Medardo Delos Santos and Dr.
Teodora Pornillos (Dr. Pornillos). The defense, on the other hand, presented the testimony of the accused-appellant
and Delia Tampoco (Tampoco).

Prosecution witness Romero testified that in the morning of June 22, 1995, she was at a wedding party in the house
of a certain Andang Toniza in Barangay Coguit, Balatan, Camarines Sur, when she witnessed the accused-
appellant hacks Vicente Indaya (victim) unrelentingly with a bolo. The victim was hit on his head, nape, right
shoulder, base of the nape and right elbow before he fell on the ground and instantly died. 4

Borlagdatan, who was also at the wedding party, testified that he was at the kitchen, getting rice to be served for the
guests, when he heard someone shouting that somebody was hacked. When he went out to check what the
commotion is about, he saw the victim lying on his stomach, drenched in his own blood, while the accused-appellant
was standing in front of him, holding a bolo. Borlagdatan tried to seize possession of the bolo from the accused-
appellant but the latter made a downward thrust, hitting his right thumb. He left the place and proceeded to the
nearby health center to have his wound treated.5

The testimonies of Ebuenga and Ramil Baylon, who were also in attendance at the wedding party, corroborated the
testimony of Borlagdatan.

Ebuenga testified that he was only two (2) feet away from the accused-appellant and the victim when the former
hacked the latter at the back of his head, nape and left shoulder. 6 Baylon, on the other hand, demonstrated in open
court how the incident transpired, with him acting as the accused-appellant and a court employee as the victim. With
the court employee had his back to Baylon, the latter mimicked how the accused- appellant hacked the victim five
(5) times. The accused-appellant continued to hack the victim even when he was already on his knees. 7

Indaya, wife of the victim, testified that she learned of the incident from her sister-in-law, Consorcia Villaflor. They
immediately proceeded to the crime scene and saw her husband lying on his stomach, with five (5) hack wounds at
the back of his head. She further testified on the damages sustained by their family from the untimely demise of the
victim, who is a father to eleven (11) children and the breadwinner of the household. 8

Dr. Pornillos interpreted in open court the Necropsy Report9 executed by Dr. Mario Bañal (Dr. Bañal), who
conducted the post-mortem examination on the cadaver of the victim. She testified that the victim sustained seven
(7) hack wounds. The first and second wounds were inflicted at the back of the head and at the posterior lobe,
respectively, while the third and fourth wounds were found at the skull. The fifth and sixth wounds were inflicted at
the left shoulder of the victim while the seventh wound was at the back portion, above the waist and along the spine.
She further testified that the weapon used could be a bolo and that the assailant was positioned at the back of the
victim. She also confirmed that the wounds could have been inflicted while the victim is already down on the
ground.10

The accused-appellant proffered a different version of the incident. He testified that on June 22, 1995, he went to
the house of his parents-in-law in Barangay Coguit, Balatan, Camarines Sur to bring the bamboos he towed from
San Isidro, Balatan, Camarines Sur. On his way back, he met his close friend, Abundio Belbis (Belbis), who cajoled
him to come with him to a wedding party at Barangay Coguit, Balatan, Camarines Sur. At the wedding venue, he
saw the victim having a heated exchange of words with his brother-in-law, Geronimo Villaflor (Villaflor), who
happened to be his friend. He pacified the two and told Villaflor to leave. Thereafter, he joined Belbis and had some
drinks. After twenty (20) minutes, the victim suddenly appeared, loudly tapped their table and, while pointing at him,
exclaimed, "Son of a bitch, I’ll kill you! Why are you pacifying me? You are just like your friends." He stood up and
turned to leave. While leaving, however, he heard a woman shouting, "Wilson, you will be hacked!" When he turned
his head, he saw the victim running towards him with a bolo. Seeing the impending attack, he moved back, making
him lean on the fence, but still he was hit on his left hand at the back of his palm. While wrapping his palm with a
towel, the victim hit him once again but he was able to dodge. He got mad and lost control of himself so he pulled
his bolo from the scabbard and hacked the victim.11

Tampoco, on the other hand, testified that when she saw the victim aiming to hack the accused-appellant, she
shouted, "Wilson, you will be hacked!" With her warning, the accused-appellant was able to move back and avoid
the attack. However, the victim moved and lunged at the accused-appellant again. The accused-appellant was hit
once but was, thereafter, able to seize possession of the bolo from the victim and hacked the latter. 12

The Ruling of the RTC

On June 10, 2009, the RTC rendered a decision,13 finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of murder, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the prosecution having proven the guilt of the accused WILSON ROMAN beyond reasonable doubt
for the felony of murder, he is hereby CONVICTED and sentenced to suffer imprisonment from twenty years and
one day to forty years of reclusion perpetua. He is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of Vicente Indaya
represented by Elisea B. Indaya the following amount: 1)For the death of Vicente Indaya – Pesos:One Hundred
Thousand (₱100,000.00); 2)actual Damages in the amount of Pesos: Fifty Thousand (₱50,000.00); 3)Moral
Damages in the amount of Pesos: Fifty Thousand (₱50,000.00); and the cost of suit.

SO ORDERED.14

The RTC ruled that the prosecution was able to establish all the elements constitutive of the crime charged.
Specifically, it was able to prove the identity of the accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime through the
categorical testimonies of Romero, Ebuenga, Borlagdatan and Baylon who personally witnessed the hacking of the
victim. Further, the qualifying circumstance of treachery was also sufficiently established by the consistent accounts
of the witnesses that the accused-appellant attacked and hacked the victim from behind, while he was unarmed and
defenseless, until he was down on the ground.15

The RTC also dismissed the plea of self-defense proffered by the accused-appellant. It ruled that the accused-
appellant’s bare claim that the unlawful aggression initially came from the victim cannot stand against the
overwhelming evidence presented by the prosecution showing that it was him who attacked and repeatedly hacked
the victim to his death. It noted the variance between the testimonies of the accused-appellant and his witness,
Tampoco, as to where the bolo that was used in the crime came from.16 The accused-appellant testified, thus:

"Q What did you do, if any?

A I was able to pull my bolo out of the scabbard and hacked him." 17

On the other hand, Tampoco testified:

"Q While Wilson Roman, the accused was in that position, what did Vicente Indaya do if any?
A What Vicente Indaya did was to move to where I was standing and then Vicente Indaya lunged at Wilson Roman.

Q Then after that what happened?

A Wilson Roman was able to seize the bolo.

Q Before Wilson Roman was able to seize the bolo held by Vicente Indaya, was Wilson Roman hit by that bolo?

A Yes, sir.

Q You said that accused Wilson Roman was able to seize the bolo from the victim, Vicente Indaya and Wilson
Roman hacked Indaya, that’s why he died?

A Yes, sir."18

As regards the civil liability, the RTC ordered the accused-appellant to indemnify the heirs of the victim with actual
and moral damages.19

The Ruling of the CA

On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the ruling of the RTC in a Decision 20 dated February 28, 2011,
disposing thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated June 10, 2009 is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION on the damages. Accordingly, accused-appellant Wilson Roman is
directed to pay the heirs of Vicente Indaya the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages, ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages. The award of actual
damages of ₱50,000.00 is deleted.

SO ORDERED.21

The CA ruled that the RTC correctly dismissed the accused-appellant’s plea of self-defense to extricate himself from
criminal liability. It pointed out that the eyewitnesses’ accounts confirmed that the accused-appellant was the
unlawful aggressor and not the victim. It was established during the trial that the victim was only walking in the yard
when the accused-appellant attacked him from behind.

Further, the CA noted that the disparity of the wounds sustained by the accused-appellant and the victim militates
against the claim of self-defense. While the accused-appellant sustained a superficial cut at the back of his palm,
measuring an inch, the victim was inflicted with seven (7) hack wounds on his head, neck and shoulder, all of which
were mortal.22

The CA, however, modified the award of damages, ratiocinating thus:

In consonance with the Supreme Court’s pronouncements, WE reduce the award of civil indemnity given by the trial
court from ₱100,000.00 to ₱50,000.00 while the amount of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages is maintained.

As to actual damages, the heirs of the victim of murder are not entitled thereto because said damages were not duly
proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. To be entitled to actual damages, it is necessary to prove the actual
amount of loss with reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence
obtainable to the injured party.

In the present case, no proof was presented that the heirs of Vicente Indaya actually spent the amount of
₱50,000.00 awarded by the court a quo. However, under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be
recovered, as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the victim suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was
not proved. Thus, in lieu of actual damages, the award of ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages is proper.
Likewise, exemplary damages is warranted when the commission of the offense is attended by an aggravating
circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying. In this case, since the qualifying circumstance of treachery was
established, WE award the amount of ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages.23 (Citations omitted)

On March 10, 2011, the accused-appellant, through the Public Attorney’s Office, filed a Notice of Appeal 24 with the
CA, pursuant to Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-
03-SC.

The Issues

The issues for consideration of this Court in the present appeal are the following:

(1) Whether the accused-appellant may properly invoke self-defense;

(2) Whether the qualifying circumstance of treachery exists.

The accused-appellant contends that the prosecution was not able to establish his guilt beyond moral certainty. He
argues that he should not be held criminally liable for the death of the victim as he only acted in self-defense from
the unlawful aggression exerted by the latter. He was just

walking when he was suddenly attacked by the victim with a bolo and that he swung his own bolo only to save
himself from the impending danger to his person.25

The accused-appellant further asseverates that there was a reasonable necessity for him to use his bolo to repel the
unlawful aggression of the victim as it is the only weapon available to him at the time of the attack. He adds that the
unlawful aggression was exerted by the victim without any provocation on his part. 26

Even granting that the theory of self-defense is unavailing to him, the accused-appellant contends that he should
only be convicted of the lesser crime of homicide for failure of the prosecution to establish the presence of
treachery. He claims that the evidence on record failed to show that there was a conscious effort on his part to adopt
a particular means, method or form of attack to ensure the commission of the crime, without affording the victim any
opportunity to defend himself. And, considering that treachery cannot be presumed, he opines that any doubt as to
its existence must be resolved in his favor.27

For their part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintains that the accused-appellant’s guilt for the crime of
murder was proven beyond reasonable doubt. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were positive, clear
and consistent in that the victim was unarmed when he was attacked from behind by the accused-appellant. 28

The OSG likewise refutes the accused-appellant’s claim of self-defense. It argues that the evidence presented by
the accused-appellant do not clearly and convincingly establish the presence of unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim. The mere fact that the victim was engaged in a heated argument with another person so much so that the
accused-appellant pacified them does not constitute unlawful aggression within the contemplation of the law. 29

Finally, the OSG maintains that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was clearly established by the
eyewitnesses’ consistent accounts that the accused-appellant, without provocation, suddenly attacked the victim
with his bolo from behind, the latter being defenseless and totally unaware of the impending danger to his person. 30

The Court’s Ruling

The accused-appellant’s guilt was

proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Absent any showing that the lower court overlooked circumstances which would overturn the final outcome of the
case, due respect must be made to its assessment and factual findings. Such findings of the RTC, when affirmed by
the CA, are generally binding and conclusive upon this Court.31
In the instant case, the records are replete with evidence establishing the accused-appellant’s guilt for the crime
charged. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, Romero, Borlagdatan and Baylon, were positive, clear and
consistent in all material points. They uniformly declared that they were at the scene of the crime at the time it was
committed and identified the accused-appellant as the assailant who hacked the victim to his death. Specifically,
Baylon relayed in his testimony how the accused-appellant hacked the unsuspecting victim from behind with a bolo.
He recounted that the accused-appellant continued hacking the victim even as the latter was already kneeling on
the ground.32 Baylon’s testimony was corroborated by several eyewitnesses: Romero, Ebuenga and Borlagdatan, all
of whom confirmed the veracity of his account.

Further corroborating the eyewitnesses’ testimonies is the Necropsy Report issued by Dr. Bañal. In the said report, it
was confirmed that all of the wounds suffered by the victim were located at his back, mostly in the head, inflicted by
a sharp-edged object which is presumably a bolo.33

Remarkably, the accused-appellant did not impute any ill-motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses which
could have impelled them to falsely implicate him in a serious crime like murder. Where there is no evidence that the
witnesses of the prosecution were actuated by ill-motive, it is presumed that they were not so actuated and their
testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.34

With the overwhelming evidence presented against the accused-appellant, this Court entertains no doubt on his
guilt.

The accused-appellant failed to

establish the elements of self-defense.

In his vain attempt to extricate himself from criminal liability, the accused-appellant interposed a plea of self-defense.
In his version of the incident, he claims that the victim was the unlawful aggressor and that he simply acted in self-
defense in order to avert an impending harm. He avers that he earned the ire of the victim when he intervened in his
altercation with Villaflor while at a wedding reception. A few minutes after that, he claims that the victim came back
and loudly tapped the table where he and his friends were having some drinks. The victim hurled invectives against
him and threatened to kill him but he simply stood up and turned to leave the place. As he was leaving, however, he
heard someone shouting that he is about to be hacked. Turning his head, he saw the victim running towards him,
aiming to hit him with a bolo. He was able to avoid the attack but he was still hit in the palm as the victim continued
to thrust his bolo. It was then that he removed the bolo from his scabbard and hit the victim. 35

It bears emphasizing that self-defense, like alibi, is an inherently weak defense for it is easy to fabricate. Thus, it
must be proven by sufficient, satisfactory and convincing evidence that excludes any vestige of criminal aggression
on the part of the person invoking it.36 In order for self-defense to be appreciated, the accused must prove by clear
and convincing evidence the following elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself.37

It is a statutory and doctrinal requirement that, for the justifying circumstance of self-defense, unlawful aggression as
a condition sine qua non must be present. There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, unless the victim
commits an unlawful aggression against the person defending himself.38 There is unlawful aggression when the peril
to one’s life, limb or right is either actual or imminent. There must be actual physical force or actual use of a
weapon.39

In People v. Nugas,40 this Court expounded on the nature of unlawful aggression as the key element of self-defense:

Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of the justifying circumstance of self-defense.
Without unlawful aggression, there can be no justified killing in defense of oneself. The test for the presence of
unlawful aggression under the circumstances is whether the aggression from the victim put in real peril the life or
personal safety of the person defending himself; the peril must not be an imagined or imaginary threat. Accordingly,
the accused must establish the concurrence of three elements of unlawful aggression, namely: (a) there must be a
physical or material attack or assault; (b) the attack or assault must be actual, or, at least, imminent; and (c) the
attack or assault must be unlawful.
Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful aggression; and (b) imminent unlawful
aggression. Actual or material unlawful aggression means an attack with physical force or with a weapon, an
offensive act that positively determines the intent of the aggressor to cause the injury. Imminent unlawful aggression
means an attack that is impending or at the point of happening; it must not consist in a mere threatening attitude,
nor must it be merely imaginary, but must be offensive and positively strong (like aiming a revolver at another with
intent to shoot or opening a knife and making a motion as if to attack). Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a
mere threatening attitude of the victim, such as pressing his right hand to his hip where a revolver was holstered,
accompanied by an angry countenance, or like aiming to throw a pot.41 (Citations omitted)

In Del Castillo, the Court discussed the implication of a plea of self-defense, viz:

The rule consistently adhered to in this jurisdiction is that when the accused’s defense is self-defense he thereby
admits being the author of the death of the victim, that it becomes incumbent upon him to prove the justifying
circumstance to the satisfaction of the court. The rationale for the shifting of the burden of evidence is that the
accused, by his admission, is to be held criminally liable unless he satisfactorily establishes the fact of self-defense.
But the burden to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt is not thereby lifted from the shoulders of the State, which
carries it until the end of the proceedings. In other words, only the onus probandi shifts to the accused, for self-
defense is an affirmative allegation that must be established with certainty by sufficient and satisfactory proof. He
must now discharge the burden by relying on the strength of his own evidence, not on the weakness of that of the
Prosecution, considering that the Prosecution’s evidence, even if weak, cannot be disbelieved in view of his
admission of the killing.42 (Citations omitted)

Unfortunately for the accused-appellant, his claim of self-defense shrinks into incredulity when scrutinized alongside
the positive and consistent testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as to what transpired during the incident. It is
worth noting that the incident transpired in broad daylight, in the midst of a wedding reception at that, within the
clear view of a number of guests. Thus, it is of no wonder that the testimonies of all the prosecution witnesses are
consistent in all material points, particularly how the attack was made upon the defenseless victim. They all
confirmed that before the crime was consummated, the victim was only walking in the yard, unarmed. There was not
the least provocation done by the victim that could have triggered the accused-appellant to entertain the thought
that there was a need to defend himself. The victim did not exhibit any act or gesture that could show that he was
out to inflict harm or injury. On the contrary, the witnesses all point to the accused-appellant as the unlawful
aggressor who mercilessly hacked the unwary victim until he collapsed lifeless on the ground.

Further, as correctly observed by the CA, the severity, location and the number of wounds suffered by the victim are
indicative of a serious intent to inflict harm on the part of the accused-appellant and not merely that he wanted to
defend himself from an imminent peril to life. The CA noted:

As clearly shown by the evidence at hand, his cut was superficial which only measures one (1) inch. In stark
contrast, Vicente Indaya suffered seven (7) hack wounds on his head, neck and shoulder, all located at the back
and Dr. Teodora Pornillos described all of them as fatal. It is, therefore, difficult to believe that accused-appellant
hacked Vicente Indaya merely to defend himself or to disarm the latter. The severity, location and number of
wounds sustained by the victim are eloquent evidence that accused-appellant was resolute on his intent to kill
Vicente Indaya.43

Moreover, in the incident report executed by the police officers, only one (1) bolo, specifically that which was used in
the hacking, was reported to have been recovered from the crime scene. 44

This belies the accused-appellant’s claim that the victim was also armed at the time of the incident.

Crime was qualified by treachery.

The accused-appellant contends that even supposing he should be found guilty of killing the victim, he should be
convicted only of homicide, not murder, for failure of the prosecution to establish treachery.

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against a person, employing means, methods or
forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might make.45 It takes place when the following elements concur:
(1) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) that the offender
consciously adopted the particular means of attack employed.46

The CA correctly appreciated the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, viz:

WE also concur with the lower court’s appreciation of the qualifying circumstance of treachery. The essence of
treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressors on unsuspecting victims, depriving the latter of
any real chance to defend themselves, thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressors, and without
the slightest provocation on the part of the victims. Verily, what is decisive is that the attack was executed in a
manner that the victim was rendered defenseless and unable to retaliate.

The record shows that Vicente Indaya, while walking in the yard, was suddenly and repeatedly attacked with a bolo
from behind. The manner and mode of attack adopted by accused-appellant, to OUR minds, bespeak of treachery.
To be sure, the victim, who was then unarmed and unsuspecting, was deprived of any real chance to mount a
defense, thereby ensuring the commission of the crime without risk to accused-appellant. This is also buttressed by
the fact that the wounds sustained by the victim were all located at the back. On this score, WE agree with the trial
court’s finding of treachery.47 (Citations omitted)

At the time that the crime was about to be committed, the victim does not have the slightest idea of the impending
danger to his person. He was not facing the accused-appellant and unarmed, hence, lacked the opportunity to avoid
the attack, or at least put up a defense to mitigate the impact. On the one hand, the accused-appellant was armed
and commenced his attack while behind the victim. The presence of treachery cannot be any clearer.

Penalty and Award of Damages

The RTC and the CA did not err in finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder qualified by treachery. However, modifications have to be made with respect to the penalty imposed and the
amount of civil indemnity awarded to the heirs of the victim.

In its Judgment dated June 10, 2009, the RTC convicted the accused-appellant with the crime of murder and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of "imprisonment from twenty years and one day to forty years of reclusion
perpetua."48 On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC with modification only as to the damages. 49

Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the crime of murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua
to death. Pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 2 of the same Code, if the penalty prescribed by law is composed of two
indivisible penalties, the lesser penalty shall be imposed if neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance is
present in the commission of the crime.50 In the present case, no aggravating circumstance attended the
commission of the crime. Thus, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua is the proper penalty which should be
imposed upon the accused-appellant.

The RTC, however, sentenced the accused-appellant to an imprisonment of twenty (20) years and one (1) day to
forty (40) years of reclusion perpetua, giving the impression that the penalty of reclusion perpetua can be divided
into periods when in fact it is a single and indivisible penalty. In People v. Diquit, 51 perpetua is an indivisible penalty,
it has no minimum, medium, and maximum periods. It is imposed in its entirety regardless of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the crime. 52 Consequently, in this case, the
CA should have rectified the error committed by the RTC as to the penalty imposed on the accused-appellant. The
CA should have been more circumspect in scrutinizing the appealed decision, specifically the propriety of the
penalty imposed, since the very purpose of appeal is to amend or correct errors overlooked by the lower court. In
this case, therefore, the accused-appellant should simply and appropriately be sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, without any specification of duration.53

Further, modification has to be made with respect to the amount of civil indemnity awarded to the heirs of the
victim.
1âwphi1

In People v. Asis,54 this Court held:

When death occurs due to a crime, the following may be awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the
victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5) temperate
damages.

Conformably with existing jurisprudence, the heirs of Donald Pais are entitled to civil indemnity in the amount of
₱75,000.00, which is mandatory and is granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the
commission of the crime. Likewise, moral damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00 shall be awarded in favor of the
heirs of the victim. Moral damages are awarded despite the absence of proof of mental and emotional suffering of
the victim’s heirs. As borne out by human nature and experience, a violent death invariably and necessarily brings
about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victim’s family. 55 (Citations omitted)

The award of civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the
commission of the crime. It requires only the establishment of the fact of death as a result of the crime and that the
accused-appellant is responsible thereto.56 However, in order to conform with the prevailing jurisprudence, the civil
indemnity awarded to the heirs of victim must be raised to ₱75,000.00. 57

The awards of moral damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00, temperate damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00 and
exemplary damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00, of the CA are all in accordance with existing jurisprudence 58 and
are thus sustained.

Moral damages in the sum of ₱50,000.00 can be awarded despite the absence of proof of mental and emotional
suffering of the victim’s heirs. As borne out by human nature and experience, a violent death invariably and
necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victim’s family. 59 The award of temperate
damages, on the other hand, is warranted when the court finds that some pecuniary loss was suffered but its
amount cannot be proved with certainty.60 Considering that the death of the victim definitely caused his heirs some
expenses for his wake and burial, though they were not able to present proof, temperate damages in the amount of
₱25,000.00 was properly awarded to them.

Exemplary damages, on the other hand, may also be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more
aggravating circumstances.61 The presence of treachery was sufficiently established by the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, recounting how the victim was surprised by the accused-appellant’s attack from behind. It
has been repeatedly reiterated in the records that the victim was unarmed and defenseless at the time of the attack.
The results of the post-mortem examination of the cadaver of the victim further confirmed the veracity of the
accounts of the witnesses particularly that the attack was done when the victim had his back against the accused-
appellant. Given the clear presence of the qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery, the award of exemplary
damages of ₱30,000.0062 is in place.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated February 28, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03972,
finding Wilson Roman GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of murder is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in
that Wilson Roman is hereby sentenced to suffer the indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua and that the award of
civil indemnity is hereby raised to ₱75,000.00.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-12629 December 9, 1959

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
ALFREDO ARAQUEL, defendant-appellee.

Acting Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason for appellant.
Francisco Villanueva for appellee.

GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:

This is an appeal by the Government from an order of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, dismissing the
information for homicide filed against the accused Alfredo Araquel on the ground of double jeopardy.

The record shows that on January 30, 1955, the acting chief of police of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, filed with the justice
of the peace court of that municipality a complaint for homicide against Alfredo Araquel accusing him of having
hacked and killed Alberto Pagadian with a bolo. More than a year and a half later, or on July 3, 1956, while said
complaint, for reason nor stated, was still pending in the justice of the peace court, the chief of police of Narvacan
moved for the amendment thereof, alleging that upon reinvestigation of the facts he found that the crime committed
by the accused was not homicide as charged in the original complaint but that of homicide under exceptional
circumstances as provided for in article 247 of the Revised Penal Code. Finding the motion to be well taken, the
justice of the peace court, on July 16, allowed the filing of the amended complaint which charged the accused with
"the crime of HOMICIDE UNDER EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES defined and punished under Article 247 of
the revised Penal Code." That same day, the accused was arraigned under the amended complaint. And as he
entered a plea of "guilty", the justice of the peace court, also on that same day, sentenced him to suffer the penalty
of destierro for a period of one year to any place not within the radius of at least 25 kilometers from the municipal
building of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur.

During the service of the sentence by the accused, the acting Provincial Fiscal of Ilocos Sur was informed of the
case through the Department of Justice to which the private prosecutor had lodged a complaint. And after
conducting an investigation, the said acting provincial fiscal on February 16, 1957, filed with Court of First Instance
of the province an information against the accused Alfredo Araquel charging him with homicide as defined and
penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code for the killing Alberto Pagadian.

On July 9, 1957, the accused moved to quash the information on the ground of double jeopardy, invoking the
previous charge against him for homicide under exceptional circumstances and the subsequent sentence passed
upon him by the justice of the Peace Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur. The fiscal opposed the motion, but the trial
court, in this order of July 18, 1957, sustained the plea of double jeopardy and dismissed the information. Hence,
this appeal.

The plea of jeopardy made by the accused was, to our minds, erroneously sustained by the lower court.

In order that a defendant may legally be placed in jeopardy, one of the necessary and indispensable conditions is
that he should have been tried before a court of competent jurisdiction. (Sec. 9 Rule 113, Rules of Court.) The court
below, in upholding the plea of double jeopardy, held that the Justice of the Peace Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur,
had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint for "homicide under exceptional circumstances defined and
punished under Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code," on the theory that "the act defined" in that article "is a
felony" which is penalized with destierro and, consequently, falls under the jurisdiction of the inferior court, following
the ruling laid down in the case of Uy Chin Hua vs. Dinglasan, et al., (86 Phil., 617; 47 Off. Gaz. No. 12, Supp., p.
233)

There can of course be no question that, under the rule enunciated in the case of Uy Chin Hua vs. Dinglasan et al.,
supra, offenses penalized with destierro fall under the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace and municipal courts.
(See also De los Angeles vs. People, 103 Phil., 295.) That rule, however, cannot be made to apply to the present
case, for it is apparent that Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code does not define a crime distinct and separate from
homicide, parricide, or murder, as the case may be, depending, in so far as those crimes are concerned, upon the
relationship of the victim to the killer and the manner by which the killing is committed. The article in question reads:

ART. 247. Death or physical injuries under exceptional circumstances. — Any legally married person who,
having surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill any of
them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical
injuries, shall suffer the penalty of destierro.

If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he shall be exempt from punishment.

These rule shall be applicable, under the same circumstances, to parents with respect to their daughters
under eighteen years of age, and their seducers, while the daughters are living with their parents.

Any person who shall promote or facilitate the prostitution of his wife or daughter, or shall otherwise have
consented to the infidelity of the other spouse, shall not be entitled to the benefts of this article.

This article is found under Section One of Chapter One, Title Eight of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. Title
Eight refers to Crimes against Persons, Chapter One is entitled Destruction to Life and Section One thereof treats of
the crimes of parricide, murder and homicide.

As may readily be seen from its provision and its place in the Code, the above-quoted article, far from defining a
felony, merely, provides or grants a privilege or benefit--amounting practically to an exemption from an adequate
punishment — to a legally marries person or parent who shall surprise his spouse or daughter in the act of
committing sexual intercourse with another, and kill any or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall
inflict upon them any serious physical injury. Thus, in case of death or serious physical injuries, considering the
enormous provocation and his righteous indignation, the accused — who would otherwise be criminally liable for the
crime of homicide, parricide, murder, or serious physical injury, as the case may be — is punished only
with destierro. This penalty is mere banishment and, as held in a case, is intended more for the protection of the
accused than a punishment. (People vs. Coricor, 79 Phil., 672.)And where physical injuries other than serious are
inflicted, the offender is exempted from punishment circumstances mentioned therein, amount to an exempting
circumstances, for even where death or serious physical injuries is inflicted, the penalty is so greatly lowered as to
result to no punishment at all. A different interpretation, i. e., that it defines and penalizes a distinct crime, would
make the exceptional circumstances which practically exempt the accused from criminal liability integral elements of
the offense, and thereby compel the prosecuting officer to plead, and, incidentally, admit them, in the information.
Such and interpretation would be illogical if not absurd, since a mitigating and much less an exempting circumstance
cannot be an integral element of the crime charged. Only "acts or omissions . . . constituting the offense" should be
pleaded in a complaint or information, and a circumstance which mitigates criminal liability or exempts the accused
therefrom, not being an essential element of the offense charged — but a matter of defense that must be proved to
the satisfaction of the court — need not be pleaded.(Sec. 5, Rule 106, Rules of Court; U.S. vs. Campo, 23 Phil.,
368.)

That the article in question defines no crime is made more manifest when we consider that its counterpart in the old
Penal Code (Article 423) was found under the General Provision (Chapter VIII) of Title VIII covering crimes against
persons. There can, we think, hardly be any dispute that as part of the general provisions, it could not have possibly
provided for a distinct and separate crime.

We also note that under Republic Act No. 296, the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace and municipal courts, as
enlarged, extends only to "assaults where the intent to kill is not charged or evident at the trial."(Section 87 [c]).
A fortiori, where the intent to kill is evident — as in cases of homicide under the exceptional circumstances provided
in Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code — the case must necessarily fall beyond the jurisdiction of the inferior
courts. An absurb situation would, indeed, be created if the justice of the peace courts could exercise jurisdiction
over a case involving an acting killing, when they lack jurisdiction to try even a case of slight physical injury where
the intent to kill was evident. Such could not have been the intendment of the law.

It may not be amiss to state here that the killing under exceptional circumstances under both the old (Art. 423)and
Revised Penal Code (Art. 247) had invariably been tried before the Courts of First Instance under an information
charging the accused with either homicide, parricide, or murder. (See U.S. vs. Vargas, et al., 2 Phil., 194;
U.S. vs. Melchor, 2 Phil., 588; U.S. vs. Posoc, et al., 10 Phil., 711; U.S. vs. Alano, 32 Phil., 381; U.S. vs. Verzola, 33
Phil., 285; People vs. Zamora de Cortez, 59 Phil., 568; People vs. Gonzales, 69 Phil., 66; People vs. Dumon, 72
Phil., 41; People vs. Coricor, 79 Phil., 672; People vs. Sabilul, 89 Phil., 283; 49 Off. Gaz., 2743.) In all the above-
cited cases, the accused merely invoked the privilege or benefit granted in Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code or
Article 423 of the old Penal Code.

We, therefore, conclude that Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code does not define and provide for a specific crime,
but grants a privilege or benefit to the accused for the killing of another or the infliction of serious physical injuries
under the circumstances therein mentioned. Consequently, a complaint or information charging homicide under the
exceptional circumstances provided in Article 247 must fall under the jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance, the
offense charged being actually that of homicide. The fact that the exceptional circumstances are also pleaded — as
was done in the amended complaint filed with the Justice of the Peace Court of Narvacan — would not affect the
nature of the crime charged. For they are not integral elements of the crime charged but are matters which the
accused has to prove in order to warrant the application of the benefit granted by the law. As unnecessary and
immaterial averments to the crime charged, they may be stricken out as surplusage and still leave the offense fully
described.

Conformably to the above finding, we hold that defendant was not tried by a court of competent jurisdiction when he
was arraigned before the Justice of the Peace Court of Narvacan upon the amended complaint for "homicide under
exceptional circumstances" filed against him by the chief of police of the municipality, and consequently, has not
legally been placed in jeopardy in the present case.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside and the case remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings.
No special pronouncement as to costs.

Bengzon, Labrador and Endencia, JJ., concur.

Bautista Angelo and Barrera, JJ., concur in the result.
[CASE DIGEST] Alexander P. Rugas vs. People of
the Philippines (G.R. No. 147789, January 14, 2004)
Facts
On December 11, 1997, the petitioner Alexander P. Rugas was charged with
Frustrated Homicide

Alexander Rugas invoked self-defense. When he was in the house of his aunt at Barangay
Taclobo, San Fernando, Romblon. His aunt had asked him to take care of her
children. While he was in the kitchen slicing lemon, he heard someone shouting outside the
house: Get out those who are brave! He then pocketed the knife he was using and went out
of the house to find out what the commotion was all about.

As synthesized by the trial court and adopted by the Court of Appeals, the prosecution was
able to establish the following:

At around 9:00 o’clock in the evening of September 16, 1997, Herberto (or Gerberto) Rafol
was conversing with Perla Perez in the street fronting the house of Anda Romano in
barangay Taclobo, San Fernando, Romblon, when the accused Alexander P. Rugas,
suddenly stabbed him at his left thigh. He faced him to know who stabbed him but the
accused stabbed him on his stomach. He ran and shouted for help. Somebody helped him in
boarding him to a tricycle and he was brought to the hospital at Cajidiocan.

Issue
Whether or not there is an unlawful aggression.

Ruling
In the present case, the defense claimed that the victim shouted while in the street Get out
those who are brave. So that accused got out and asked why are you like that? Then a
fistfight ensued. The Court opines that the accused herein voluntarily and practically face a
fight. The rule is when one agrees to engage in a fight, he cannot plead self-defense because
there is no unlawful aggression to speak of.
conducted the autopsy, the kidneys
suffered the most serious damage.
Although he admitted that autopsy alone
cannot show the real culprit, he
stated that by having a long standing
infection caused by an open wound,
it can be surmised that multiple organ
failure was secondary to a long
standing infection secondary to
stab wound which the victim
allegedly
sustained. What is important is that the
other doctors who attended to the
wounds sustained by the victim,
specially those on the left and
right
lumbar area, opined that they affected
the kidneys and that the wounds
were deep enough to have caused
trauma on both kidneys.
Finally, it can be concluded that
without the stab wounds, the victim
could not have been afflicted with
an infection which later on caused
multiple organ failure that caused his
death. The offender is criminally
liable for the death of the victim if his
delictual act caused, accelerated or
contributed to the death of the victim